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Title: The spectator in the filmmaker: re-framing filmology through creative filmmaking practices.

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The relationship between filmmakers who create and spectators who judge film is the focal point of this paper. It examines theoretically how these two positions co-exist inside a filmmaker that can be supported through critical and conceptual examinations of creative filmmaking practice by drawing on early film studies scholarship called filmology. Some elements of the original film theory still resonate today while other elements of it have been passed over. For example, the filmic terms ‘diegesis’ and ‘spectator’ are central to film theory and pedagogy but ‘creator’, ‘afilmic’, ‘profilmic’ and ‘filmographic’ are not frequently used. By examining the filmolgy and re-framing it, this paper unites the filmmaker and spectator and describes them in relation to filmmaking structures and production contexts.

By looking at psychological and sociological approaches to making and viewing films, it will be argued that spectatorship provides one component of the knowledge, skill and practice required for a filmmaker to work creatively in a system. Other systemic components that flow in parallel with spectatorship are the practical, logistical and networking skills required to conceptualize, finance, execute and distribute a film. So the filmic agent is someone who holds knowledge of both filmmaking and spectating and the Systems View of Creative Practice will be used as a focal theory to explain their creative practice. This conceptual framework supports internalized and embodied practices of a filmmaker where the filmic agent makes decisions inside temporal filmic structures.
Introduction:

Filmology as a movement became the cornerstone of cinema and film theory, which defines the ideological parameters of film studies (Lowry, 1985 p. 159). Souriau’s seminal work ‘The Structures of the Filmic Universe and the Vocabulary of Filmology’ (Souriau 1951, 234-40) continues to this day to be significant because it defined filmic terms that provide approaches to understanding cinema ‘which still affect the practice of film scholars and of film pedagogy within the Western university (Lowry, 1985 p. 5). Etienne Souriau, a philosopher and aesthetician, defined the term ‘diegesis’ as ‘everything which concerns the film to the extent that it represents something’ (Souriau in Lowry, 1985 p. 85). Christian Metz describes this as “a small stroke of genius” (1984 p. 8). Souriau also identified the role of the spectator as part of a filmology made up of seven levels of a filmic reality. Furthermore, Souriau’s complex understanding of filmic realities fits neatly with the more recent research into creativity.

While creativity studies have taken a great interest in the way that new ideas emerge and meet the world, film and media studies have traditionally focused less on the creative processes of developing, writing and producing new works … building primarily on a theoretical framework from the humanities, film studies have generally not focused on extensive case studies of the nature of creative work or on understanding how ideas for new works emerge and are shaped through the different stages from conception to execution. (Redvall, 2016 p. 141)

What has been occurring in creativity studies and screen production research (Redvall 2013, 2016, Kerrigan 2013, 2016) provides a refreshing way to understand how films and screen works are made. Some of these ideas were included in the original study of film from France but over time the spectator, the diegesis and film reception has risen to dominate much of the scholarly debate of film studies and theory. Occasionally scholarship and critique on filmmaking appeared. For example, documentary film production was researched in the book ‘Framing Science: The Making of a BBC Documentary’ (Silverstone, 1985). The production of serial television was investigated as a media text in ‘Doctor Who: the Unfolding Text’ (Tulloch and Alvarado, 1983). But during this century a new line of enquiry has emerged from within the academy that is practice-focused and this brings with it new understanding of industrialised forms of production (Caldwell 2008, Dawson and
Holmes 2012) and unique ways of exploring filmmaking (Berkeley 2011, Knusden 2014) and screen production scholarship (Kerrigan et. al. 2015). My own research has contributed to this emerging field through applying systems approach of creativity from psychology to filmmaking practice. My perspectives as a screen practitioner intrinsically motivate me to reflect theoretically on the choices that are offered through filmmaking practice.

**Critical Reflections on Filmmaking Practice**

As a filmmaker and academic I have examined my own documentary filmmaking practice through rational and creative perspectives (Kerrigan 2013, 2016). From this position, the relationship between filmmaking and spectatorship is of great interest to me as I hold both positions. I believe that meaning is made out of the world we inhabit, and as a practice-led researcher I take a constructionist ontological and epistemological position. This allows me to adopt reflective practice as a research method, which has been done here to critically examine theory about filmmaking practice. Donald Schön’s notion of the ‘Reflective Practitioner’ (1987) describes an individual's ability to observe how they embody and reproduce skills and knowledges as reflection-in-action and reflect-on-action (Schön, 1987: 26). This helps me to identify transferrable skills and formulate generalisations or theories from my experiences, some of which are transferrable and may shape my future actions. Researcher John Cowan developed Schön’s work further and coined the term ‘reflection-for-action’ (1998: 37) to describe the anticipatory reflection which a practitioner engages in when preparing for action. So the theoretical conceptual proposition presented here is part of my reflective action cycle as I examine my creative filmmaking agency.

My filmmaking agency arises from my past practice and experiences of more than a decade working professionally in television production where I worked in the field using single camera production techniques and in the studio using multi-camera techniques. Working with content from news and current affairs, science, comedy, sit-coms and serial drama productions, I experienced how to mediate content for the screen. In the role of continuity I worked for over five years on fast turn around 16 mil film and video television series. This is where I learnt the rules of dramatic and fiction filmmaking. As a producer, writer and director I moved into children’s television and worked on ABC’s Play School. These professional experiences were added to my decade and a half of academic research on screen production where I have lectured and researched the making a community documentary on a micro budget.
Accumulatively these experiences have given me a unique perspective from which to critically reflect on filmmaking as a creative practice. Below are some critical reflections drawn from conceptual understandings of my professional filmmaking practice and my academic research that provide theoretical insights into how spectatorship aligns with creative filmmaking practice.

The central theory to be drawn on is the confluence approach to creativity and this will be done through the ‘Systems View of Creative Practice’ (Kerrigan 2013, 2016). Csikszentmihalyi argues to be creative in a system ‘one must internalise the rules of the domain and the opinions of the field, so that one can choose the most promising ideas to work on, and do so in a way that will be acceptable to one’s peers’ (1999, p. 332). As McIntyre, Fulton and Paton assert, ‘Systems are complex. We cannot understand them just by exposing their parts. We also need to demonstrate those parts’ interconnectedness’ (2016 p. 201). Understanding the components of interconnectedness requires some sociological understanding of how meaning is made. The Social Production of Art (Wolff 1981) provides well-trodden pathways to examine the concept of the author and the author’s relationship to the reader, while Structuration Theory (Giddens, 1984) supports the re-categorisation of filmology into three filmic components: agents, structures and contexts. The interconnected or co-existing knowledge of the spectator and the filmmaker is a primary motivator for this theoretically critical examination.

**Systems View of Creative Practice**

Eva Novrup Redvall has applied the Systems Model of Creativity (Csikszentmihaly 1999) to Danish screenwriting and television production (2013). Redvall’s research has developed the ‘Screen Idea System’ (2013: 31) that proposes ‘a dynamic understanding of the processes where the existing knowledge in the domain informs the choices of individuals as well as the conceptions of quality when the field assesses suggested new variations’ (Redvall 2013: 30). Redvall begins this description of creativity with the domain but the unique thing about the systems perspective is that the system has no fixed starting point ‘indicating the system’s essential nonlinearity’ (McIntyre 2012: 5). Adopting this nonlinear approach means that it is possible to begin the creative filmmaking process by making a film and offering it to the field for inclusion in the domain or by being a spectator and viewing and critiquing a film already held in the domain, which has the potential to stimulate ideas to influence filmmaking. As Csikszentmihalyi argues ‘creativity is any act, idea or product that changes an existing domain, or that transforms an existing domain.
into a new one’ (1996: 28). The Systems View of Creativity (Csikszentmihalyi 1999: 315) explains creativity as a process that produces novelty. This could be a novel film or it could be a novel opinion about a film. As argued elsewhere, ‘the systems model is one that equally accommodates social judgments about cultural products as well as accommodating individual and group processes of creative documentary practice’ (Kerrigan 2016: 137).

Figure 1: A Systems View of Creative Practices (Kerrigan 2015: online)

The System View of Creative Practices (Figure 1) is a reorganization of the elements of the Systems View of Creativity and it shares the three components that Csikszentmihalyi argues are essential for creativity: an agent, a field and the domain. Creative practice is at the center of the model to indicate how a person can internalize and embody knowledge from the domain, field and their own idiosyncratic background. Each component of the system is necessary but not sufficient in and of
itself to produce creativity and when it does occur it is because an individual has internalised all the systems components. This is how a filmmaker is conditioned by the system and their practice enables them to produce a film that is offered to the field to stimulate novelty. If the film is considered worthy and is selected by the field it will form part of the domain. When this occurs, the components of the interconnected system can be seen to produce novelty which arises because of the actions of the conditioned agent, in this case a filmmaker who internalises the system through iterative and recursive practices.

The Systems View of Creative Practice can be used to explain the actions of the filmic agent as someone who holds knowledge of both filmmaking and spectating. This framework does not preference one creative activity over another, rather it provides a framework that helps creative individuals understand that this knowledge co-exists and thus that the position of the filmmaker and the spectator are deeply interconnected. This is an essential component for creative practice that is the stimulation, selection, and transmission of novelty (Kerrigan 2016). Here is an example of how it occurs: the agent brings their idiosyncratic background, which is comprised of both their filmmaker’s knowledge and skills as well as their spectator’s, which creates their conditioned agency. Filmmakers are conditioned by their practice. They may work alone, for example, or they may work collaboratively as screenwriters, producers, directors, cinematographers, sound recordists, actors/participants/presenters and editors to construct filmic realities. To achieve novelty a filmmaker will internalise their knowledge so that they can behave intuitively. This includes their intuitive responses to spectating, which inform their understanding of the field’s expectations and the domain rules. By internalizing the spectator’s knowledge, a filmmaker will try to meet those expectations through creative practice.

This conditioned filmic agent will be continuously working to please the corresponding field of experts who understand both film production as a process and film as a product. Fields are powerful and their opinions stimulate novelty by encouraging and selecting or discouraging and rejecting novelty. So the filmic agent is simultaneously constrained and enabled by the field’s opinions. At the most obvious level the field is made up of filmmaking peers including those who are part of the production process, for example, these could be financiers, distributors, production companies, casting agents, cast, on-camera participants or crew members. The field also includes critics, audiences and spectators who judge the completed film. The list of field members expands and contracts depending on the stages of production and the staged creative process (Wallas 1976). The field helps
create the contexts of production as well as providing opinions to the filmmaker about the quality, process and procedures of filmmaking. These opinions therefore affect and shape the production of the film and its distribution. Satisfying field opinions is a necessary and important part of the creative process as it will affect the final appearance and quality of the film. When the field’s novelty has been stimulated that novel variation, be that a film or an idea or a practice, will be selected for inclusion in the domain.

The domain provides the knowledge and rules that the field experts comply with, so the domain is made up of an archive of cultural codes and conventions that represent both film production and film. As such the filmic agent resides in a theoretical system of film production that includes their internalized and embodied understanding of spectatorship.

When a film is completed, it circulates through the same system once more: the film is offered to the field to see if it stimulates novelty. The field may be comprised of the same field members who participated on the production of the film, for example commissioning editors or funding bodies, or it could be made up of different field experts, for example niche and general audiences. If the completed film stimulates novelty as judged by the members of that field, then it will be selected and placed in the domain of film production as a diegetic and cultural representation on film. Once the film is in the domain it can be viewed by other filmic agents or by spectators and the cycle continues to spiral around the framework. This describes a theoretical view of creative filmmaking practice, through the practices of a filmic agent who obtains access to the domain of film production and complies with its rules and field opinions. This creative view is supported by scholarship from the discipline of psychology, while other scholars from sociology have described similar phenomena and called it the social production of Art (Wolff 1981).

The Social Production of Art.

Sociologist Janet Wolff describes the distinction between the activities of admiring or judging a work of art and making a work of art (1981: 115-143). Wolff’s arguments provide an explanation of the differences between these two activities, that of production and consumption, which have just been explained above using the system view of creative practice.

Wolff builds on the concepts of ‘Death of the Author’ (Barthes 1977) thorough her sociological description of the production of art. She draws on Barthes when she
argues that ‘the “birth of the reader” may not necessarily signify the death of the author, but it certainly restricts further his or her ‘authority’ (Wolff 1981: 120-121). Inaccurate descriptions of what is occurring in each activity leads to misunderstanding of how meaning is made and of the process of communication. Wolff is pointing out the limitations of the ‘concept of the ‘author’ as a determinate and fixed source of artistic works and their meanings’ (1981: 123). Her argument acknowledges the death of the author but it also recognizes that the author’s social positioning may be elevated because they created a particular art work.

The author as fixed, uniform and unconstituted creative source has indeed died [...] But the author, now understood as constituted in language, ideology, and social relations, retains a central relevance, both in relation to the meaning of the text [the author being the first person to fix meaning, which will of course subsequently be subject to redefinition and fixing by all future readers] (Wolff 1981: 136).

Wolff presents a refreshing view about the social production of art and this can help untangle filmmaking as a creative practice from spectating as a creative practice. Making these distinctions explicit, separating these activities, allows them to be considered discretely as either production or consumption. So too the creative system can theoretically accommodate both positions as occurring in an intertwining spiral of creative practice.

Accepting Wolff’s premise, the filmmaker is the first to fix meaning to a film but once they have achieved this they can be released from the attribution or the burden of being responsible for how others interpret meaning from the work. As a spectator the filmmaker has already judged the work and deemed it to be complete simply by finalizing the film. This permits all future spectators to accept the invitation to also judge the work, and to be responsible for making their own meanings based on their reading of the social, cultural and semiotic codes and conventions that are embedded in the film. How spectators make meaning out of a film will depend on their sociological and psychological manifestation of those filmic codes and conventions (Buckland, 2000). Examinations of this meaning-making moment is fundamentally cultural, social and individual: it is a creative practice. Evidence of these ideas was part of the original scholarship that emerged from the filmology movement in post World War II France.

**Filmology the Movement**
The examination of Souriau’s work has come from Edwards Lowry’s book ‘The Filmology Movement and Film Study in France’ (1985). Lowry, who translated the original French works, provides a comprehensive historical and philosophical study of filmology as a movement and he recognized Souriau as a ‘proto-structuralist’ (1985: 5). By 1955 the filmology movement had two points of focus. One was ‘empirical studies mounted in the fields of sociology and experimental psychology’ (Lowry 1985: 158) while the other branch was ‘the scientific positivism of filmology’ (Lowry 1985: 158). Souriau subscribed to scientific positivism (Lowry 1985: 77-79) so the empirical objectivity of positivism allowed him to systematically categorize and analyse art, which included film. Thus his work was highly respected as it had ‘the legitimating advantage of a scientific basis’ (Lowry 1985: 87). Lowry identified the element in Souriau’s work that can now be strengthened through sociological and psychological approaches that can rationally explain art, the artist and creativity.

Souriau’s aspiration was to discover the laws and structure of a system of correspondence in the arts that would provide an explanation of ‘the commonality of the instaurative activity as manifested in each’ (Lowry 1985: 79). Souriau preferred the term ‘instauration’ which is a synonym of ‘institutions’ and ‘establishment’ (Lowry, 1985 p. 79), when others of that time were using concepts like ‘invention’ or ‘creation’. Souriau argues that the creatorial level ‘corresponds to the intentionality of the instaurative process and to the film’s finalisation’ (Lowry 1985: 86). His notion of instauration is similar to the concept of phenomenology, where ‘man is not the creator of the world, but the consciousness by which the world is realized’ (in Lowry 1985: 76). Thus Souriau’s process of instauration was quite rational in that it ‘governs man by means of things and things by means of man’ (in Lowry 1985: 76). But the positivist framework meant that realizing the truth of art became slightly problematic.

Eventually Souriau’s empirical objectivity was clearly seen to be at odds with the tenet of phenomenology which underpinned his ‘instauration’. Souriau acknowledged there was a reductive aspect to his comparative aesthetics, which is now seen as being primarily structural and scientific. Consequently he never insisted that his methods could answer all questions raised by art (Lowry 1985: 79). Souriau asserts that ‘A variety of methods and viewpoints are legitimate to this exciting study in which psychology may participate as well as sociology, and the science of forms as well as metaphysical mediations on art’ (in Lowry 1985: 79).

By 1960 a more direct link was made between filmology and structuralism when Roland Barthes published in Revue, but this was the only link. As Lowry argues ‘the
similarities between the methodologies are suggested by their common enterprise of defining structures which function within human phenomena’ (1985: 158). It is the acknowledgement of the human phenomena which is the most attractive element of Souriau’s filmology.

Souriau’s Filmology

Souriau analysed the filmic universe and rigorously defined seven levels of filmic reality: afilmic, profilmic, filmographic, screenic, diegetic, spectatorial and creational (Lowry 1985: 80-87). The first level is afilmic reality which ‘is the real and ordinary world independent of the film’ (in Lowry 1985: 84). Souriau argues that it is necessary to define this reality as a comparative reality because it is ‘constantly necessary to refer the filmic universe to this type of reality’ (Souriau in Lowry 1985: 84). For a filmmaker this is the real world that presents many opportunities and challenges for film production. The next is profilmic reality, ‘the reality photographed by the movie camera’ (Lowry 1985: 85). This is the film set – the place where the filmmakers work with the camera and audio to photograph real physical objects, either naturally occurring events or rehearsed events orchestrated for the camera. The filmographic reality is the celluloid itself (today that would also include High Definition Video) and ‘all techniques, such as editing, which affect the film as material object’ (Lowry 1985: 85). The next level is where the film is projected and is called the screenic or filmophanic reality. Souriau notes that the screenic reality is where ‘the great majority of filmological study is focused’ (in Lowry 1985: 85). This statement maintains it truth today and this is one of the reasons for this article: to remind scholars that filmology provided one way to appreciate how the film’s creator and the context of film production shape the finalization of the film. The next level has been rigorously discussed and is extremely well know, the diegetic reality. Known as the imaginary world created by the film or the diegesis. Souriau describes this reality as ‘everything which concerns the film to the extent that it represents something’ (Lowry 1985: 85). There has always been a connection between diegetic reality and profilmic reality, and this is where the filmmaker can be found. Souriau argues that these two realities are coexistent.

Everyone understands what is meant when we say that, in the studio, these two sets (for example, the chateau and the shack) are next to one another, but that in reality (in the story) they are 500 meters apart; that the scene of the brawl and that of the lovers’ rendezvous in the shack were shot on the same day, when in reality (in the story) they
are supposed to have taken place a year apart’ (in Lowry 1985: 85).

Audiences and filmmakers are well aware of the non-linear approaches to filmmaking that are part of filmmaking constraints. This often means that scenes are filmed out of order due to logistical contextual constraints. As Souriau points out, however, the identification of these filmic realities allows the ‘discussion of the material components of the film to be at the level of filmic signification, which occurs only in conjunction with an audience’ (Lowry 1985: 85).

The sixth level identifies the audience’s role in making meaning from the diegesis and is called **spectatorial facts**. It includes ‘all subjective phenomena brought into play by the psychic personality of the viewer’ (Souriau in Lowry 1985: 85). This spectatorial space is a subjective space and it describes the spectator’s personal perception of the film. Souriau’s empirical study ‘Rhythm and Unanimity’ was designed to test spectatorial factors, and following this Souriau argues that ‘errors of interpretation fall within the realm of spectatorial factors’ (Lowry 1985: 86).¹

The seventh level of filmic reality is **creatorial** as it refers to the ‘considerations of the creators(s) behind the film’ (Lowry 1985: 86). As Souriau argues:

> It is a matter of a sort of residue or refuse, which is also subjective: for example, everything which might be in the mind of the film’s creator, which was not achieved, which did not succeed, which is not available in the objective givens of the film, nor in the spectatorial subjectivity’ (in Lowry 1985: 86).

Souriau clearly identifies the choices of the film creator and how they have the authority to construct meaning because they possess the authority to construct filmic realities. This is the authority all authors have over all works made in any medium (Wolff 1981). Some might argue Souriau’s interests were exclusively about the phenomenological experiences of the spectator, particularly given how spectatorship and diegesis have risen to such theorized levels in film theory. But Souriau’s filmology places the spectator in a filmic universe that includes the creator of the film, the apparatus that makes and projects films, the narrative universe created by the film and the world that exists independent of the film. Thus Souriau’s examination of

¹ ‘Rhythm and Unanimity’ allowed Souriau to test audience’s responses to the reception of a film using psychological and sociological methods, examining the audience’s collective reaction to filmic time and their individual interior time. There were some flaws in Souriau’s approach to this experiment as scientific method was not his strength.
the filmic universe and how it functions presents more of a structuralist’s approach to the activity. Indeed Lowry describes Souriau as a proto-structuralist (1985: 5). Souriau’s inclusion of the two agents as active in the process of creating a film - the spectator and the creator - reveals his deep consideration of what occurs for agents who create the filmic universe. Part of his focus was on understanding how filmic structures facilitated production and the choices that the spectator and the filmmaker were afforded by the film production process. Souriau recognized that:

‘...sociology can easily study how individual psychological reactions in the movie theatre are modified by the fact of the collectivity of the public, even how judgments – or more exactly ‘opinions’ – are formed regarding the value of the work presented; but not how all these facts may be controlled, employed and even directed in view of the accomplishment of the artistic mission’ (in Lowry 1985: 80).

Souriau’s sociological tendencies emerge through the observations of spectators as a collective. But he also articulated the creator’s accomplishment of finalising their artistic mission and this was achieved because it ‘includes considerations of the film’s economic, propagandistic, pedagogical or artistic ends; and it is therefore a factor which enters into the calculation of the quality of art in a film’ (in Lowry 1985: 86). Souriau’s seven levels of the filmic reality, his description of the structural apparatus and the contextual environments that a filmmaker is constrained and enabled by, provide opportunity for decision-making about the creation of the filmic universe. This area of Souriau’s filmology deserves closer inspection because it has lain dormant for decades.

**Filmology re-framed by creative practice.**

Souriau’s filmology can be theoretically described as a specific set of filmic components, agents and structures that are foundational elements for some sociological theories such as ‘structuration’ (Giddens, 1979, 1984). Sociologist Anthony Giddens sees agency as an individual’s ability to make choices while structures are those things that determine or delineate choices. This is a simple view of this relationship. A more sophisticated view identifies the duality at work in the relationship between agency and structures because ‘social actions create structures, and it is through social actions that structures are produced and re-produced’ (Haralambos & Holbern 1995: 904). Thus agency and structures are seen as being interdependent, as having an interconnected relationship, which is something that
Souriau has described through filmology. Viewing filmology firstly through the lens of structuration, and secondly through the lens of creative practices allows the interconnectedness that occurs within filmology to be brought into focus so that the functionality of the whole system can provide an appreciation of how these filmic realities actually interconnect. This is important in order to understand the point of view of the film’s creator, as opposed to the examination of elements of the filmology in isolation.

Re-focusing on the interconnectedness of the seven filmic realities allows for the film creator and spectator to be identified as agents. The other five realities can be identified as structures: afilmic, profilmic, filmographic, screenic and diegesis. Diegesis can be described as a structure: it represents the film as celluloid (filmographic) and when projected (screenic) it shows how the creator’s decisions were shaped by the real (afilmic) and re-created (profilmic) world. Thus the filmmaking agent working within a set of filmic apparatus constructs a diegesis. In that sense the diegesis is an example of how social actions are produced inside structures, which are then re-produced. The filmology, when described in this way, complies with the concepts of structuration and the duality of practice (Giddens 1984).

At this point the filmmaker, two agents co-exist on a spectrum that oscillates between creator and spectator is enabled by the technology, the logistics, their craft skills including their mastery of storytelling and narrative codes and conventions internalizes through their spectatorship. It is this filmmaking expertise that provides the capacity for them to judge the quality of the work completed on-set or in an edit suite as being acceptable to a spectator. The joining of these two agents together can be called a filmic agent.

When the filmic agent is multiplied, as is the case in a film crew, a director is joined by a writer, a producer, a cinematographer, an actor and so on. Each of these individuals becomes a filmic agent who joins with others to create a complex filmmaking system. The multiplication of the filmic agent continues to expand to the needs of the production. This describes the interconnected complexity of creative and collaborative filmmaking systems where structuration can theoretically explain how filmic agents work within filmic structures.

The filmic structures are film technologies (filmophanic, screenic), budgets (profilmic) and the real world (afilmic), which are all temporally based. These temporal filmic structures form the environmental contexts of production (filmic, profilmic), which enable (because they are necessary) and simultaneously constrain (because
resources and time are frequently limited. In some instances they can be finite.)

An example of an environmental temporal structure would be when the sun goes down and the cinematographer, and hence the crew, has to wait for it to come back up, unless they have access to electricity and lots of lights. If they have access to these filmic structures then they are enabled and can re-create daylight at night. This is quite a complex thing to set out to do and it requires a highly skilled cinematographer, gaffer and team of electricians to believably achieve this look. Thus the filmic agent working to this challenge requires specialised expertise as a filmic creator to recreate a believable daylight environment at night. As the filmic agent is creating these elements, they are working within afilmic and profilmic realities, while simultaneously drawing on their knowledge of spectatorship to judge the effectiveness of their actions, which are captured through the filmographic reality. These temporal environments of afilmic and profilmic can be called filmic context. It is only when the filmic agent watches the footage back that they can confirm if they met the challenge they set by successfully constructing that diegetic reality.

The filmic processes described here, at their core, are examples of creative practice where a filmic agent makes decisions inside filmic structures that are temporal. To simplify the filmlogy it is possible to recategorise it into three components:

1. Filmic agents (spectorial and creational)
2. Filmic structures (filmographic, screenic, diegetic)
3. Filmic contexts (afilmic, profilmic)

This re-framing of the filmology remains faithful to Souriau's original components and aligns more closely with sociological approaches to structuration and the social production of art as well as with confluence approaches to creativity where the filmmaker internalizes and embodies the filmology in its re-designed form to activate creative practice.

**Conclusion:**

Presented here is a theoretical and conceptual examination of the relationship between filmmaker and spectator that connects to the original ideas of filmology and re-frames them as creative filmmaking practice. If this theoretical proposition is accurate then the relationship between the filmmaker and spectator can be viewed as coming together in the filmic agent whose creative practice is enabled and constrained by filmic structures and contexts. Also if this theoretical proposition is
accurate then a filmmaker requires access to both cultural domains of film and film production, to be able to create films that meet field expectations. Should this theoretical approach be supported by screen production peers then it will need to be practically applied to documentaries, feature films, television serial productions, experimental and digital media productions and so on.

What this conceptual proposition confirms is that the confluence of these factors makes it possible for both filmmakers and spectators to make sense of the diegesis by taking different routes. The filmmaker does this through the creative process - by constructing the film - and they are afforded opportunities to work within the constraints of production to enable the creation of the best film possible. When the film is finalized, it must stand alone to be judged, independent of its creator as a cultural and creative product in its own right. At this point the spectator can make their own meaning out of the diegesis, by judging the film as creative product. The scholarly understanding of this has been rigorously detailed inside film theory, semiotics and cognitive semiotics.

There is no doubt that filmmaking is complex because it is drawing from both spectating and filmmaking as a united creative practice. What has been conceptually and theoretically explained here is that it is possible for the spectator to be located inside the filmmaker - they co-exist - and this enables whilst simultaneously constrains creative filmmaking practice.

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