Socratic Synousia: A Post-Platonic Myth?

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οὐ λόγους . . . ἀλλὰ τῇ ξυνουσίᾳ πλέον

Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus* 62–63

THIS PAPER QUESTIONS WHETHER the relationship between Socrates and his young followers could ever have been treated by Plato in the same fashion as it is treated in the Platonic *Theages*, where the terminology of *synousia* is repeatedly applied to it. I argue that in minimizing the part played by knowledge, and in maximizing the role of the divine and of *erôs*, the work creates a “Socrates” who conforms to the educational ideology of the Academy of Polemo in the period 314–270 B.C. I indicate how this may assist our understanding of Arcesilaus’s Socraticism, and suggest ways in which the work may have found its present place in the corpus. I acknowledge that such themes necessarily involve speculation, but I hope that readers may be surprised by the amount of evidence for some aspects of the case.¹

I. THE EDUCATIONAL PROCESS IN THE *THEAGES*

With Mark Joyal’s new edition of the *Theages* we have additional reason to regard it as a product of the Academy after Plato, and to feel confident that Socratic *synousia* is a primary theme.² Like other aspects of the work, this theme seems to have been influenced by the famous passage on Platonic midwifery at *Theaetetus* 150b–51d, in which, according to Joyal (82–89), the god to whom Plato refers (150c8, d4, d8, cf. 151d1) has been erroneously identified by the author of the

¹ I confess that I usually incline towards the side of those who deny authenticity in the case of the most problematic texts. Any substantial Greek corpus from the fourth or fifth centuries B.C. is likely to include some spurious work(s), and short spurious passages have often found their way into dramatic works in particular. Too many discussions of authorship appeal to authority rather than objective data, and provisional conclusions only are to be recommended in most cases. I seek to rely on data, which will be found interesting even by those who offer a different explanation of them.

² See Mark Joyal, *The Platonic Theages: An Introduction, Commentary, and Critical Edition* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2000), especially 48–49 on *synousia* and 121–34 on authenticity. Subsequent pranthetical references to Joyal are to this text.

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Theages with the *daimonion* (151a4–5). As will become clear, I have reservations about this claim, though there is no doubt that the passage of the *Theaetetus* needs to be considered closely in relation to the *Theages*, and that the god of the “midwife” is *very closely linked* with the *daimonion* by our author.³

The picture of Socratic education that emerges in the *Theages* is of a process whereby the pupil assimilates himself to a master endowed with quasi-divine powers. In conformity with other pictures of Socrates in the Platonic tradition, conventional teaching is supposed to play no part in this process (130d4–5). However, the usual Platonic picture is one where Socratic questioning leads the interlocutors towards an understanding of their errors and a clarification of the issues. While there is no suggestion that dialectic could play no part in master-pupil relations, the assimilation is here attributed to the closeness of the two, and the degree of *physical* closeness is found to be relevant. It is good if they share the same house, better if they share the same room, better still if pupil gazes at the master as he speaks, and best if there is actual physical contact (130d–e).⁴ My colleague Cliff Hooker suggests to me that the author may be trying to depict the impact of *charisma*, while Joyal (144) speaks of “improvement by a kind of osmosis”! Assimilation will result in educational progress and fluent speech (130c2–4), and that progress is also viewed as moral improvement (128c2–5). It is, however, not something that the master can effect at will, for firstly improvement will depend upon the power that controls the divine sign (129e), and secondly the master does not lay claim to any skills other than in matters of love (128b).

The educational relevance of love is not made explicit, but in view of the strength of Socrates’s claims to erotic expertise, his surpassing of other experts past and present (b4–6), and an earlier reference to the tyrannical skills of a lady called Callicrite,⁵ as well as the emphasis on visual and tactile contact, one must assume that it played some part. Indeed Pangle speaks of this work’s reconsidering “the relation between Socrates’s famous ‘demonic voice’ and his equally famous ‘eroticism.’”⁶ The presence of the prospective pupil’s father would have made it difficult to elaborate within this dramatic context. The *daimonion* that plays such a large part in Socratic education in this work would seem to be related in some way to the daimonic force of Love as pictured in the *Symposium*:⁷ if only because both contribute to the picture of Socrates as a daimonic individual.

³ Much depends on how one understands the phrases ἡ δύναμις αὐτῇ τοῦ δαιμονίου τούτου (129e1–2) and ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου δύναμις (129e7–8). If this is just a periphrasis for the *daimonion* then the two powers involved in midwifery would seem to have been identified; if, however, the implication is actually that there is an unseen δύναμις controlling the divine sign, then interpretation of the midwifery passage is unobjectionable.

⁴ Comparison with *Symp.* 175c–d is interesting: Agathon implies, albeit humorously, that by sheer proximity to Socrates he shall be sharing in his new-found wisdom; Socrates’s reply (though not stating as much) seems to be lamenting the fact that no such transference by proximity is possible.

⁵ See 125d10–e7, with Joyal, *The Platonic Theages*, 30–32; see also Mark Joyal, “Anacreon fr. 449 (PMG)”, *Hermes* 118 (1990): 122–24.

⁶ See *The Roots of Political Philosophy*, ed. Thomas L. Pangle (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1987) intro. Cf. 173: “Most memorable and revealing of all, we are given to understand the manner and meaning of Socrates’s clothing his passionate relations with his students in the mysterious garb of the ‘demonic.’”

⁷ See Joyal, *The Platonic Theages*, 97.

In conformity with this concept of Socratic education, the master-pupil relationship is thought of primarily as a kind of *synousia* (συνουσία), or “being (together) with” the master. Again, it is not entirely irrelevant that this noun, along with the associated verb σύνειμι, also served as a polite means of designating sexual intercourse, though it is also regularly used for intellectual studies with a teacher. This may be because of a traditional educational sense, in which young men benefited from regular but informal oral discourse with their elders;⁸ however, one cannot be totally confident that the word *synousia* had historically been given the job of making *specific* reference to such meetings and discourse.⁹ When the term can also be used for drinking parties and sex, one would need good reason for postulating a quasi-technical educational sense, from Homer to the fifth century, such as that found repeatedly in the *Theages*. This sense involves (1) an educational purpose, (2) repeated contacts, and (3) a relationship between a pupil and a mentor.

2. SYNOUSIA AND RELATED TERMS IN PLATO

At first sight there would appear to be no problem with describing a series of intellectual encounters with Socrates as a *synousia*. The term had been employed regularly, particularly in the “early” dialogues,¹⁰ to refer to study with other intellectuals or encounters between intellectuals. Both noun and verb (συνουσία and σύνειμι) are particularly prominent in the *Protagoras* in this sense,¹¹ but it is also present in the *Apology*, *Cratylus*, *Gorgias*, *Hippias Major*, and occasionally elsewhere.¹² This usage, because it applies to study with a variety of individual teachers, might naturally be thought suitable for studies with Socrates also. It is not clear, however, that Plato thought of Socrates as one who offered *synousia* in that seemingly technical sense. In works treated here as authentic (see n.10), I have found very few

⁸ See Kevin Robb, “ASEBEIA AND SUNOUSIA: The Issues Behind the Indictment of Socrates,” in *Plato's Dialogues: New Studies and Interpretations*, ed. G.A. Press (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993), 77–106. Cf. Robb, *Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 197–213; Eric A. Havelock, *The Muse Learns to Write: Reflections on Orality and Literacy from Antiquity to the Present* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 4; also “Why was Socrates Tried?,” in *Studies in Honour of Gilbert Norwood*, ed. Mary E. White (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1952), 100. It is not clear to me how far Havelock seeks recognition that *synousia* is the proper term for such pre-literate mentoring; Robb clearly assumes this, but on the basis of passages already influenced by late fifth century changes in education.

⁹ Havelock, “Why was Socrates Tried?,” 108 n.5, refers to three cases of relevant terminology in *Clouds*, but of these 252 is about meeting the Clouds themselves for discourse, 1316 is about opponents whom he may meet in argument, and 1404 is about associating with new styles of thought and speech. None therefore is about mentoring arrangements in pre-sophistic society, all concern the world of the sophists, and only the first (with ἐς λόγους) seems somewhat technical.

¹⁰ It is convenient for the purpose of this article to think in terms of *two* groups of Platonic works, the former consisting of *Euthphr.*, *Apol.*, *Cr.*, *Phd.*, *Crat.*, *Symp.*, *Chrm.*, *La.*, *Ly.*, *Euthd.*, *Prt.*, *Grg.*, *Meno.*, *HpMa.*, *HpMi.*, *Ion.*, and *Menex.*, while the latter includes *Sph.*, *Plt.*, *Prm.*, *Phlb.*, *Phdr.*, *Rep.*, *Ti.*, *Criti.*, and *Law.*, with all other works except the *Theaetetus* being treated as spurious or doubtful. The present writer's beliefs on matters of dating and authenticity are actually more complicated, so that the terms ‘early’ and ‘late’ are here convenient labels only.

¹¹ Noun: 316c8, d1, 318a3, a4, b6, 335b5, b8, c3, 337b3, 338d7; verb: 316c7, 318a4, a7, c2, 336b2.

¹² *Ap.* 19c6, 20a1 x 2; *Crat.* 396d6, 403d4(?); *Grg.* 455d2, 457d1, 515d2; *HpMa.* 282b8, c5, 283c3, c3, 286d4(?); *Tht.* 179a1 (of Protagoras); *Phdr.* 271e2 (an imaginary teacher of ideal rhetoric); *Soph.* 232c7; also in doubtful works *Alc.* I 118c6, 119a3; *Clit.* 406a3.

Table 1. Occurrences of *synousia* etc. and *suggignesthai*

	Total	Non-technical	with sophists	with Socrates
Early 'be with'	73	43*	28	2*
Early 'get with'	29	7*	20	2*
<i>Tht.</i> 'be with'	17	4	2 [†]	4 [†]
<i>Tht.</i> 'get with'	7	1 [†]	3	3 [†]
Late 'be with'	67	58*	5	4*
Late 'get with'	27	23	4	0
<i>Theag.</i> 'be with'	29	6	7	16
<i>Theag.</i> 'get with'	5	0	2	3
<i>Ep.</i> II 'be with'	6	0	0	6
<i>Ep.</i> II 'get with'	2	1	1	0
<i>Ep.</i> VII 'be with'	5	1	0	4
<i>Ep.</i> VII 'get with'	4	0	0	4
Other 'be with'	8	0	6	2
Other 'get with'	9	4	4	1

* all instances listed as 'with Socrates' may be non-technical

† one instance listed as 'with Socrates' may belong to the other column

instances of this terminology,¹³ just 11 cases out of 150, which I contemplated listing as referring technically to a Socratic or Platonic type of educational relationship. Many of these stood up poorly to further scrutiny.

A full study must examine not just the terminology deriving from συνείναι (be [together] with), but also that of συγγίγνεσθαι (get [together] with). In the works routinely accepted as authentic I find 63 cases of this verb, in a variety of senses. One can "get together" (just as one can "be together") for sex, for social activities such as drinking parties, for conversation,¹⁴ or for educational activity. But these terms may refer to nothing more than a meeting. I examined all examples of these terms for the purpose of distinguishing which ones could plausibly be seen as referring somewhat technically to meeting, ideally on a regular basis, for educational purposes. Readers are warned that there is inevitably a subjective element in the interpretation of such data, and they may prefer to duplicate the exercise.

In the case of the 63 cases of the verb for getting together, I counted 27 referring to sophistic studies (or similar), and only 5 referring to Socratic studies (or similar). Of these the *Protagoras* accounted for 12 out of 27 references to getting together for sophistic studies, thus apparently confirming the existence of a technical sense related to sophistic education, while the *Theaetetus* accounted for three of the five references to Socratic studies. A comparative table offering the rates of

¹³ My data have been collected from Leonard Brandwood, *A Word Index to Plato* (Leeds: Mancey, 1976) for this and related purposes.

¹⁴ On the connection with conversation see Aldo Brancacci, *Oikeios Logos: la filosofia del Linguaggio di Antistene* (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1990), 158–64.

synousia etc. and *suggignesthai* in accepted and suspected works may be of assistance. I have broken Plato into three: works usually thought to precede the *Republic* (early), the *Theaetetus*, and the *Republic*, and after (late).¹⁵ In the works of doubtful authenticity I have listed *Theages*, *Epistle II*, and *Epistle VII* separately, and in the *Epistles* I have temporarily listed references to education with Plato under the heading 'with Socrates.'

It may be observed that in early Plato and the *Theaetetus* the terminology of "getting with" appears on average to be somewhat the more technical of the two groups. Elsewhere there is no appreciable difference, except in *Epistle II* where the reverse is clearly the case, and possibly in the other *spuria*.

The references in Plato to a technical kind of *synousia* involving "Socrates" deserve close scrutiny. We may recall that to meet all criteria for a technical educational sense the term should describe repeated educational contacts between a pupil and a mentor, though I have listed some other contacts with Socrates for educational purposes. I begin with works other than the *Theaetetus* and with the terminology of "being with." At *Apology* 25e3 we have what may appear to be a technical reference to Socrates's *intellectual* associates, but the term has appeared earlier in the same argument for associating with horses (25b4) or human associates in general (d1); hence it cannot be treated as technical. At *Lysis* 223b3 the noun is employed by Socrates to describe the meeting and discussion that has preceded between himself and the young men, but it cannot here mean "study," and "gathering" would be just as appropriate.¹⁶ At *Timaeus* 17a "gathering" or "intellectual discussion" would both be appropriate, and Socrates would in any case be only a minor participant, while at *Philebus* 19c2, where Socrates has granted the young men a *synousia*, the word can be translated as innocently as Dorothea Frede's "meeting."¹⁷ I have included two instances in the *Laws*, 951e5 and 953d6, of approved kinds of educational contact involving discussion of legal systems. Such discussions would be Platonic rather than Socratic, and they differ also in involving no teacher-like or leader-like figures. I am uncertain how I should classify them.

The terminology of "getting with" is a similar case. Outside the *Theaetetus* the two cases that I tentatively listed as Socratic are *Euthd.* 306d6 and *Meno* 79e7. In the former Crito is telling Socrates what he feels "whenever I get together with you." We are clearly dealing with repeated meetings involving intelligent discussion, but Crito is not a "pupil" of Socrates, and the passage in fact concerns the education of his sons. It would be perverse to insist on this being a technical educational sense of the word. In the latter *Meno* is talking about what he had heard about Socrates even before he "got together with him." Clearly that is meant to mean before he held an intellectual discussion with him, and the impression that we receive from the rest of his speech is that the dialogue depicts the first intellectual discussion that the two have had. Therefore the 'getting together' is

¹⁵ See n.10, for details.

¹⁶ I have not included *La.* 181c, since the *synousia* would not be a relationship between a mentor and young persons; as for *Rep.* 328d5, the context appears to me to be one of paying informal visits rather than of performing an educational service.

¹⁷ In *Plato: Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977), 407.

in fact an educational encounter with Socrates, but not part of an on-going course of study. The fact that the meeting involves discussion does not mean that the verb was used here in a sense more technical than 'encounter.'

We now move to the *Theaetetus*, where two uses of the terminology of "being with" and one of "getting with" fall outside the midwifery passage. The cases of "being with" occur in the imaginary speech of "Protagoras" at 168a2 and a8, where "Protagoras" is speaking from his experience as an educator. The former case really refers to prior educational experiences,¹⁸ but there is a hint that the term might also apply to Socratic education; the latter case talks about what might result from Socratic education if Socrates were to behave in too eristic a manner. Socrates, "Protagoras" assumes, would be the senior partner in an on-going educational process, and hence the use does look somewhat technical. As in the former case, there is doubt about whether it tells us anything about Plato's own concept of *Socratic* education, for "Protagoras" is assimilating Socratic and sophistic education in a way that Plato would ultimately find illegitimate.¹⁹ One possibly technical use of "get together" in the *Theaetetus* is also inconclusive. In the introductory conversation between Euclides and Terpsion the former reports how pleased with Theaetetus's abilities Socrates had been after getting together and conversing with him. It is not necessary to assume a technical meaning, for although the encounter between Socrates and Theaetetus was clearly of an educational kind, involving senior and junior partners, it was not part of an on-going course of study.

In the *Theaetetus* these doubtful cases applied to Socratic activities are more interesting, because Socrates clearly represents his own conversations with young men as a *synousia* in the midwifery passage (150a–151d). Terminology of "being together" occurs at 150d4, 151a3, and 151a4. Terminology of "getting together" occurs at 150d2 and 151a6. So in this one passage of all Plato's works (excluding those treated as spurious here) Socrates's own activities are depicted by Socrates himself as an educational *synousia* between senior and junior partners of a potentially on-going character.

Several explanations for this unique feature of the *Theaetetus* may be offered. First, one may believe that the work is trying to represent Platonic rather than Socratic interrogation.²⁰ Plato might have no qualms about admitting that the Academy's education involved a technical kind of *synousia*, even when he would not admit this for Socrates. One might find it difficult to explain, however, why the new concept should appear explicitly only here, and how Plato could not have expected the content to influence people's conceptions of Socrates. For it looks as if something is being said that applies very specifically to Socrates: to one with a divine mission, a divine sign, and a curious relationship with the youth of Athens.

¹⁸ Hence I have listed this under technical sophistic uses.

¹⁹ It is of course possible that Protagoras himself had used this term regularly for studies with himself and with others like him. The twelve cases of a sophist sense of these terms in the *Protagoras* suggest as much.

²⁰ On the notion that midwifery is a new, significantly more Platonic way of characterising the Academic educational experience see M. F. Burnyeat, "Socratic Midwifery, Platonic Inspiration," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 24 (1977): 7–16.

Alternatively, one may recall that Socrates, in painting himself as a kind of midwife, is speaking of a kind of service that he is offering. Like the physical midwife, Socrates is offering a kind of supportive assistance to the pregnant individual, an assistance not unnaturally rendered by the term *synousia*, involving as it does both close physical proximity and conversation. This explanation would be more convincing if examples could be found in Greek literature of midwives who offer a kind of *synousia*, but as things are *synousia* in the context of midwives is only likely to signify sexual intercourse.²¹ Moreover, it is not really in the immediate context of the midwife's role that the terms are found, but rather in the context of Socrates's clientele and their intellectual experiences.

Thirdly, one may appeal to the dangers of representing Socrates as offering some new kind of educational experience, so that he reverts to the term *synousia*. This is so if it had been used of pre-literate informal education by one's elders, so that Socrates would seem to be replacing this directly.²² But what if it had been adopted as technical terminology by the sophists, as our sources more easily prove? In the first couple of decades after Socrates's death it may have been poor tactics to represent a conversation with Socrates as a *synousia*, but that situation may by now be changing. In the *Theaetetus* Plato could be less anxious than before to avoid a word that has a somewhat technical application to intellectual studies, because the wider passage is bizarre enough to discourage any comparison with Socrates's intellectual rivals. Furthermore, terms indicating close contact are balanced by others that indicate its cessation (151e3, e4), contact with another (e5), and return (151a2). Arriving, remaining, and leaving Socrates's company are all matters about which the passage speaks, and the *company* in which the associate is found is here critical for Socratic education. Whatever the reason, the *Theaetetus* is unique, and Socratic *synousia*, involving repeated educational contact between pupil and mentor, is not something that Plato usually cares to consider.

This fact may have been partially recognised by the author of the *Clitophon*, for 406a actually contrasts sophistic studies (*synousia* with the sophist Thrasymachus) with "passing time" (διατριβαί, α3) with Socrates,²³ as if different terminology were appropriate.²⁴ Though the contrast is not, perhaps, a strong one, it is certainly deliberate, and one could scarcely imagine Thrasymachus advertising himself as one who offers a *diatribê*, which would normally be a leisure activity! The distribution of the noun *diatribê* is quite different from that of *synousia*, for it is not found in the sophistic *Protagoras* at all,²⁵ but is found in many works depicting

²¹ See Aetius med., *Iatr.* 16.8.2–3, Galen *Loc.Aff.*, 8.420.8–14K. These references come from a complex search of the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* disk D.

²² See Robb, "ASEBEIA AND *SUNOUSIA*"; Havelock, "Why was Socrates Tried?", 103–104.

²³ The term has not yet acquired its more technical Hellenistic sense, ably tackled by John Glucker, *Antiochus and the Late Academy* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978), 162–66, 191.

²⁴ S. R. Slings (*Plato: Clitophon* [Cambridge: CUP, 1999], 264) denies a similar claim by G. la Magna in *Platone: Clitophon, con introduzione e commento* (Napoli, 1935), that there is a contrast here. He appeals to *Laches* 201c2, which refers to a meeting and discussion that has not been initiated by Socrates and is reminiscent of *Lysis* 223b3, and to *Prt.* 335c3, where (as b8 makes plain) it is Protagoras's *synousiai* that are at issue.

²⁵ In works usually held to precede the *Republic*, it is found in *Apol.* 33e4, 37d1, 41b1; *Chrm.* 153a3; *Euthphr.* 2a2; *Grg.* 484e2; *HpMi.* 363a5; *L.* 180c2, 181a3; *Ly.* 204a1; *Symp.* 177d1, e2; *Th.* 167e4, 172d1. While it is never very technical, all but five of the twelve cases are referring to Socrates's normal style of activity.

Socrates.²⁶ The term *diatribê* was also the earliest and most authentic term for the Academy as an educational institution.²⁷

The conclusion of this section must be that Plato did not encourage us to think in terms of a *synousia* between Socrates and his young followers except in the *Theaetetus*: chiefly in a small but prominent section of only two Stephanus pages. That conclusion is slightly unexpected given the frequency of the terminology of *synousia* in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*.²⁸ Any work in the Platonic corpus that unequivocally links Socrates with an on-going intellectual *synousia* with pupil-like figures must now be treated with considerable suspicion, unless there is a ready explanation for such an anomaly. When used of the sophists, the word is usually suggestive of a rather formal relationship, while Socrates's discussions with young men seem to have been of a strictly informal type in Plato's eyes. It is indeed the comparatively formal relationship between pupil and mentor that best distinguishes the Socrates of the *Theages* from his informal Platonic counterpart.

3. THEAETETUS AND THEAGES

Once one has established the special status of the *Theaetetus* regarding the depiction by Plato of a Socratic type of *synousia*, one is in a better position to judge the debt of the *Theages* to that work: not necessarily to its true intention but at least to a particular reading of it. Though one may easily derive a concept of Socratic *synousia* from Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, and plausibly from certain other Socratics whose works have not survived, there is only the one indisputably Platonic work that can supply it. Even there, one would be in doubt about whether the terminology was being approved as a way of indicating studies with Socrates, but for the midwifery passage. Outside this passage there is no *concentration* of the relevant terminology, and the only uses that are not easily dismissed as non-technical are put into the mouths of other intellectuals: Euclides of Megara (the Socratic) at 142c7, and Protagoras at 168a2 and a8. For the present I argue on the assumption that the whole of the midwifery passage precedes the *Theages*.

The *Theages* is not slavishly following the *Theaetetus* and its midwifery passage, only taking over from it what it can readily make use of. There is no suggestion in

²⁶ The author of the *Clitophon* does use the vocabulary of "getting together" shortly afterwards at 407a5, and there is no doubt that this is concerned with Clitophon's history of studies with Socrates. It may be relevant that it is Socrates who had employed the contrast, while it is Clitophon who had used the language of "getting together," thereby tending to obscure the differences between studying with Socrates and studying with a sophist.

²⁷ Suda, no. 775 (on Ἀκαδημία); *Acad. Ind. Herc.* VI 28–30, VII 8–10, Q 8–10, XVIII 2–4 N 6–8 (*scholê* first occurs at XII 22–23, and then not until XXV 8–9); finally Diogenes is credited with a saying that only works if *diatribê* was the favoured term, D.L. 6.24 (in *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae*, ed. Gabriele Giannantoni [Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1990]). See further, Gucker, *Antiochus and the Late Academy*, 162–66.

²⁸ The normal term for Socrates's young associates is οἱ συνόντες (those who were with him), as seen at I.1.4, I.1.5, I.2.5, I.2.8, I.2.9, I.2.17 bis, I.2.49, I.2.56, I.2.64, and a further 28 times. The more technical συνουσιασται is found at I.6.1. The noun συνουσία is also found regularly (I.2.14, I.2.38, I.2.60, I.6.11, I.6.12), though sometimes it can be non-technical (I.5.4, 2.6.29, 3.7.3). The terminology of "getting together" may also be found, I.2.61, but it is normally used less technically in the *Memorabilia*; nevertheless it seems to replace the terminology of "being together" in the *Apologia Socratis* (5, 30, 34). Whether this reflects differences in date or in source material is a matter for speculation. Xenophon has no use for διατριβή as a term for Socratic activity.

the *Theages* that Socrates operates as a midwife, and no interest in how his questions will work upon intellectually suitable young men. What is of primary interest is the notion that there is divine or quasi-divine control over whether a young man begins, maintains, and profits from a period of study with Socrates. In the *Theaetetus* we have the qualification that it is those whom the god allows who will make great progress (150d4–5), and we are also told that, of those who have left and wish to resume their studies, the divine sign excludes some and permits others to make further progress (151a2–5).²⁹ It is within 150d2–151a6 that the terminology of *synousia* has occurred too.

The author of the *Theages* seems to have assumed that reference to a god in charge of Socratic midwifery (150c–d, 151d1, 210c6–d1) and to the divine sign (151a4) are all indicative of a single power³⁰ which may intervene in various ways. Hence, more than anywhere else in the corpus, Socrates is conceived of as a *divinely guided individual*. He has inferred that this power may exclude somebody from Socrates's company altogether, may allow it without assistance, and may actively foster it. People who are allowed to associate with Socrates but are not assisted and make no progress are not clearly postulated by the midwifery passage, but there is a slight ambiguity at 150d4: the god's permission may not be solely concerned with whether *synousia* continues, but rather with whether continuation will involve great progress.

There is some excuse for reading the passage in the latter way, for *synousia* must last long enough to determine whether a given individual is "pregnant" in the manner that will allow him to benefit from Socrates's services: presuming that this requires a kind of *synousia* before the decision can be made. After all, it takes nearly 60 Stephanus pages more of conversation before young Theaetetus has been found lacking any genuine embryo (210b), and the work's sequel has Socrates follow his own practice (151b3–6) by recommending the young man to a different intellectual for questioning: an intellectual who will do all the constructive work himself, and require no more than regular assent from his interlocutor.³¹ There can be no doubt that Theaetetus has been found to have no further need of Socrates, and that the benefits of the abortive discussion will be felt in the future rather than in immediate progress. The author of the *Theages* has no use for the notion of intellectual pregnancy, perhaps regarding it as an absurd Socratic metaphor, and therefore he must account for differences in progress by some other means. Given the overall level of divine involvement implied by the *Theaetetus*, divine sponsorship, of the kind suggested by *Euthd.* 290d–91a,³² would be an ob-

²⁹ There may also be the implication, in the use of the phrase *ὁὐν θεῶν ἐπιτείν* at 151b4 (cf. *Prt.* 317b7 where the agnostic Protagoras is likewise saying what has worked for him "with god's blessing"), that the god has helped Socrates to recognise what other educators the non-pregnant will benefit from.

³⁰ Cf. Joyal, *The Platonic Theages*, 83–89. I suspect that this is why he prefers to refer to the "power of the divine sign" than simply to the sign at 129e1–2 and 7–8.

³¹ See *Sophist* 217d for the recommendation of Theaetetus, and 216a (which picks up the final words of *Thl.* for its being the sequel of that work. For the Eleatic Stranger as a kind of sophist himself see Eugenio Benitez, "Characterisation and Interpretation: the Importance of Drama in Plato's *Sophist*," *Literature and Aesthetics* 6 (1996): 27–42.

³² Compare Joyal, *The Platonic Theages*, 85.

vious explanation. In effect, divine sponsorship will be what accounts for genuine intellectual pregnancy in the first place.

The result of the author's requiring divine control over progress, as well as entry into Socrates's circle and the way Socrates operates, is that none of the responsibility for the success of the encounter will belong to Socrates himself. While the *Theaetetus*'s Socrates could at any early stage say to the unsuccessful associate that he was not pregnant, and so accept no responsibility for lack of progress, the *Theages*'s Socrates might continue the *synousia* for several years and *even then* simply claim that the god had not looked favourably on their association. This would be a very convenient notion of Socratic *synousia* for the Academy to be promoting when competing with rival schools in Hellenistic times. The claim that some will find considerable progress possible could go hand in hand with a warning that no progress can be guaranteed.

The one associate who is named in the midwifery passage, Aristides son of Lysimachus, is also the most important of those named in the *Theages*, and plays the climactic role in the work (130a4–e4), for it is through his words that we hear what the effect of Socratic *synousia* is really like. Aristides is named at 151a1 as one of those who had failed to recognise the twin roles involved in the midwifery process, and had assumed that they themselves were responsible for their progress,³³ forgetting the part played by Socrates. They leave too early, and cause the rest of their discoveries to “miscarry” by associating with the wrong people. Ultimately their real ignorance becomes plain to everybody, themselves included, and they seek to return to Socrates. The *Theaetetus* quite deliberately employs the phrase ‘because of unsound *synousia*’ to depict the bad influence that will sabotage what has been achieved with Socrates.³⁴ Leaving Socrates's *company*, these young men have fallen into bad *company*. Assimilation to those around one is something of a theme in *Republic* VIII–IX, but it also occurs later in the *Theaetetus* at 176e–77b: people do not realise that their adoption of unjust ways causes their assimilation to the paradigm of wretchedness rather than that of blessedness. They are “bad associating with bad” (177a6–7). Like the Aristides-type (150e7–51a1), their clever speaking does not even convince themselves (177b5), their rhetorical abilities wither, and they seem no different from children. That condition has been utilised by the author of the *Theages*, who has Aristides complain of his ridiculous condition (130b8), his earlier confidence in argument that had led him to pursue the *synousiai* of the most polished of men (c2–4), and his total lack of that ability now (c5–6).

Both works have contrasted the *synousia* of Socrates with the *synousia* of men of the wrong sort. In the case of a good number of susceptible individuals, progress is facilitated by the former, and impeded by the latter. What may not be entirely clear in the *Theaetetus* is whether these individuals are influenced directly by the physical presence of one of two contrasting types, or whether it is only through conversation and argument that the benefit or harm may be done. For just as ‘company’ in English implies conversation, so too does *synousia*. To judge from

³³ One should not translate αἰτιασάμενοι at e2 as “censuring themselves” (LSJ I 1 a), but rather as “giving themselves the credit” (I 1 b).

³⁴ 150e4–5: διὰ πονηρὰν συνουσίαν.

the digression of 172c–177b, we must think of two rival worlds, that of the law-courts etc., and that of philosophy, each with its own paradigm of the successful individual. Into these worlds individuals may immerse themselves to a greater or lesser extent, assimilating themselves to one paradigm or the other. Assimilation to the divine involves justice, while injustice leads in the opposite direction. What would matter crucially in the case of susceptible young men is the role-models available to them. Perhaps then the beneficial influence of Socrates has something to do with an associate's willingness to model himself on Socrates's respect for justice and truth.

The *Theages* is more explicit, for Aristides has told Socrates that he has learned nothing from him, yet made progress whenever he was with him, even if he wasn't in the same room. Progress was enhanced while he was watching Socrates speak, though the choice of verbs of seeing (130d8, εἶ) does not suggest that the content was so important. And progress was further enhanced by sitting next to Socrates and touching him. One can only believe that the positive influence of Socrates has more to do with physical presence than with conversation. Furthermore, through association with others the beneficial influence of Socrates disappears little by little (130c8), which presumably would not have been the case if it were taking place by argument and persuasion. In the wrong sort of company Aristides has simply lost the plot, and, in the language of the *Phaedrus*, the growth of his wings has suffered from drying-out and contraction (251d).

Whatever dialectic may achieve, both these works are critically concerned with the influence of Socrates over his individual associates, an influence that is not simply the result of listening to him, but of the experience of his presence. As such, *synousia* becomes an ideal term to describe his relationship with his associates, and perhaps a better one in his case than in the case of the sophists. For the word implies a relationship with a mentor rather than a lecturer, interrogator, or instructor in logic.

4. THE PROVENANCE OF THE *THEAGES*

To my mind Joyal has convincingly established that the *Theages* is not a work of Plato.³⁵ Much of the argument that has preceded would also tend to point strongly in this direction. But the date and purpose of the work have properly been treated with considerably more caution. Joyal correctly notes the work's relevance to a world of rival educational claims, and its "unmistakably apologetic tone" (153). The Socratic setting dictates that the rival educators are sophists and eminent politicians, but things changed rapidly in the course of the fourth century. The development of Isocrates's school, the Academy, and then the Lyceum made it difficult to write a Socratic dialogue that said much of immediate relevance to undermine the claims of one's rival educators. Indeed the *Theages* contains very little polemic, and no new accusations against politicians and sophists. It is Theages himself who recalls Socrates's doubts about the politicians (126d), and Socrates

³⁵ See Joyal, *The Platonic Theages*, 121–34. Caution, however, invites us to recall that the same kind of peculiarities that indicate to Joyal and myself that Plato is unlikely to have written such a work, are to Pangle (*The Roots of Political Philosophy*, introduction) missing stars in the constellation of Plato's literary output, and are required to complete the whole.

seems to be actively recommending Prodicus, Gorgias, and Polus at one point (128a), and even to be making excuses for not taking on Theages as a pupil (128b–c). Rather the work is aiming to distinguish some special features of learning with Socrates, which are not directly opposed to other types of study, but which make him a good choice of educator in some circumstances, and a riskier choice in others. I reluctantly conclude that the context of the *Theages* cannot be determined with reference to the Academy's *opponents* in any given era, and that this has to be done rather by referring our picture of Socratic education to what is known of the educational practices of the changing Academy. In doing this one must concentrate on the more unusual features of the portrait of Socratic education in the *Theages*.

We therefore ask when the Academy might have been promoting an education in which physical proximity was idealised, progress (and even entry) was controlled by daimonic forces beyond the teacher's control, Socratic *erôs* was a major catalyst, conventional teaching and learning were not decisive, and dialectic was all but forgotten as a means of moral improvement. Answers will inevitably rely on an incomplete and in some ways unreliable picture of the Academy's history, but there is a period which needs to be given serious consideration. That is the period of Polemo and Crates, which has left us very little in the way of interesting doctrine, and a surprising amount about teacher-pupil relationships. The headship of Polemo lasted from about 314 B.C. until 270/69, and that of Crates for between two and six years thereafter.³⁶

The ethos of the institution probably continued unbroken for some time thereafter, under Arcesilaus, but one would not expect Arcesilaus's Academy to have been directly responsible for a picture of Socrates that paid so little attention to his skills in argument.³⁷ Presumably when Arcesilaus turned the Academy in the direction of argument on both sides of the question he made appeal to the kind of Socrates that he had encountered in some of the more entertaining dialogues of Plato, and the educational function of Socratic argument would have been essential to the marketing of his new strategy.³⁸ Nevertheless we shall have cause to refer to Arcesilaus's early career in the closing days of what is known as the Old Academy.

Polemo is well known for his insistence, probably against Zeno of Citium, that practical ethics has no need for a dialectical foundation.³⁹ That accords with the *Theages*'s apparent lack of interest in the use of argument in moral education.

³⁶ See T. Dorandi, *Filodemo, Storia del Filosofo: Platone e l'Accademia* (Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1991), 58. John Dillon, *The Heirs of Plato* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 159 with n.13, places the death of Polemo six years earlier, and others give a date rather later. Such differences will affect the dates of Crates.

³⁷ See contra, A. Carlini, "Alcuni dialoghi pseudoplatonici e l'Accademia di Arcesilao," *ASNP* 31 (1962): 59–60.

³⁸ On Arcesilaus and the Socratic side of Plato see for instance A.A. Long "Socrates and Hellenistic Philosophy," *CQ* 38 (1988): 150–71; Christopher J. Shields, "Socrates among the Sceptics," in *The Socratic Movement*, ed. P.A. Vander Waerd (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1994), 341, citing Cic. *De Or.* 3.67; *Fin.* 2.2, 5.10; *Ac.* 1.44–45; *ND* 1.11.

³⁹ For Polemo's non-dialectical ethics as anti-Zenonian see David Sedley, "The Stoic-Platonist Debate on *kathêkonta*," in *Topics in Stoic Philosophy*, ed. K. Ierodiakonou (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 145–49.

However, my primary reason for a focus on the Academy of Polemo is that it clearly promoted a very close bond between the senior and junior partner in the educational relationship, a bond involving close physical proximity, probably promoted with reference to Socratic *erôs*, and interpreted by some as involving sexual contact. Such a bond could be viewed as *synousia* in the educational, leisure-related, and sexual senses of the term. Very close relationships at least bordering on the erotic were at times a feature of the Academy (as of other Hellenistic Schools), and involved its leading figures.

The relevant relationships have been investigated by Kulevski, who has spoken of "the closest and most intimate teacher-pupil relationships, where teaching was personal, private, and erotic."⁴⁰ Polemo had once been enamoured of Xenocrates according to D.L. 4.19,⁴¹ but under his leadership close relationships between two males were sanctioned: as if with the blessing of "Pausanias" from Plato's *Symposium*. Polemo's wife is reported to have taken legal action against him for neglect, on the basis of his interesting young men.⁴² He is reported to have pursued Crantor (D.L. 4.17) and had a long-term relationship with Crates (4.21–22).⁴³ Crantor had a relationship with Arcesilaus (4.22, 29). In these cases some witnesses did not hesitate to apply the term 'beloved' (ἐρώμενος), though perhaps not the stronger term boy-friend (παῖδικά). Arcesilaus is said to have favoured female courtesans as well as male youths (4.40–41), and his erotic activities caused him to be known as a "corruptor of youth."⁴⁴ One imagines that he would have taken comfort from the fact that the same charge had been levelled against Socrates.

Furthermore, the *closeness* of these figures demonstrates that the ideal of learning by proximity flourished, and dwellings were shared by both Polemo & Crates and Crantor & Arcesilaus (4.22, 30). Pupils are said to have built huts to live close to Polemo (4.19).⁴⁵ They learnt from the *example* of their teacher (4.19, 21), while the *assimilation* of Crates and Polemo seems to reflect an Academic ideal (4.21). Polemo in turn had clearly modelled himself upon Xenocrates.⁴⁶ This comes close to the idea of "improvement by . . . osmosis" of which Joyal (144) speaks.

The Academy from this period has left us little of substance, but Crantor is in some way connected with verses on Eros (D.L. 4.26–27). While unremarkable,

⁴⁰ Branco Kulevski, *Education and the Hellenistic Schools of Philosophy* (PhD Diss., University of Sydney, 1988), 143.

⁴¹ D.L.=Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, trans. R. D. Hicks, 2 vols. (London: W. Heinemann, 1925).

⁴² D.L. 4.17, the significance being totally obscured by the Loeb translation. Dillon, *The Heirs of Plato*, 157, notes that Polemo's having a wife would make him older than he seems to have been on being converted to the Academy. That his conversion eventually led to a more modest demeanour did not entail the sudden renunciation of male-to-male relationships.

⁴³ cf. Philodemus *Acad.* 15.31–46 (*Philodems Academica*, ed. K.Gaiser [Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1988], 246).

⁴⁴ On these relationships see Kulevski, *Education and the Hellenistic Schools of Philosophy*, 194–96; also Kulevski, "The Educative Eros: Teacher-Pupil Intimacy and Aspects of Pedagogic Domination in Plato's Academy," *History of Education Review* 13 (1984): 14–28.

⁴⁵ The reference is not without its difficulties, as Dillon (*The Heirs of Plato*, 9) shows.

⁴⁶ D.L. 4.19; cf. Philodemus *Acad.* 14.41–45 (Gaiser, 240).

they dwell upon the double origin of Love, his double nature, and his potential for both good and ill: all in accordance with Pausanias's speech in the *Symposium*.⁴⁷ Polemo, however, has left us a definition of *erôs* as "service to the gods for the care and salvation of the young,"⁴⁸ which seems to make pederastic tendencies such as Pausanias would sanction a natural feature of the divinely inspired philosopher.⁴⁹ It is crucial that what evidence there is shows the influence of Pausanias's speech, rather than that of Socrates (or Diotima), for it fits what we know about Academy's having abandoned transcendental aspects of Platonic philosophy. Polemo's definition confirms the main thrust of the more anecdotal biographical evidence.

Also relevant to the portrait of Socrates in the *Theages* is his status as a kind of *theios aner*: a divinely favoured individual with access to quasi-divine powers. Unlike Joyal, I do not think that the emphasis on Socrates's *daimonion* stems directly from a special interest in *daimones*, but rather from claims that the Head of the Academy is the successor of a divinely inspired individual.⁵⁰ It seems that Polemo and Crates were viewed, by Arcesilaus among others, as a pair of Golden Age individuals, speaking divine words from demonic lips (D.L. 4.21–22), indicating that the Academy had at that time promoted the demonic nature of its leadership along with the erotic. While little is known of Polemo's theology, recent work connecting him with Cicero's *Academica* 1.24–31 makes it likely that he postulated a single active power (Latin *vis* and Greek δύναμις) within the universe, identified with the soul and intellect of the universe, as also with providence and necessity.⁵¹ This unitary theology may explain why the *Theages* is keen to reduce the *daimonion* and the god of midwifery to a single divine entity, called by the crucial term δύναμις (129e1, e8).

It is clear that our dialogue has tailored its picture of Socratic education to ideals that seem to have been in practice around the time of Polemo. In these circumstances I should argue that it is most likely to have been written at that time. In particular I am struck by the fact that the work promotes the view that doing philosophy with Socrates involves a relationship that cannot be terminated prematurely. The student case-histories presented at 128d–130e all say something about the troubles that follow from leaving Socrates's *synousia* before the appointed time. Long-term relationships, possibly resembling those favoured by Pausanias at *Symposium* 181d, were certainly being promoted at the time of Polemo and Crates. The *Theages* was in part warning of the dangers of thinking one could

⁴⁷ 180c–85c; the speech of Eryximachus at 185c–88e is also relevant.

⁴⁸ Plut. *Mor.* 780d; see Dillon (*The Heirs of Plato*, 165) who observes that the details of the language do not suggest that the fragment concerns the raising of families!

⁴⁹ Polemo appears to me to be interpreting and perhaps correcting *Symp.* 184d, where Pausanias is approving of any kind of service (παιδικοῖς ὑπηρετῶν ὅτι οὖν δικαίως ἂν ὑπηρετεῖν) to the beloved that has the moral improvement of the beloved as its aim. The definition suggests that this is far more than a service (again ὑπηρεσία) to the beloved, for it is also, crucially, a divine service.

⁵⁰ See Joyal, *The Platonic Theages*, 139–44, where the interest in the daimonic and prophetic element is thought to point towards the Academy of Xenocrates. I should be surprised if these interests had seriously diminished under the lesser known figure of Polemo.

⁵¹ This is seen as the forerunner of Zeno's theology by David Sedley, "The Origins of the Stoic God," in *Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath*, ed. M. Frede and A. Laks (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 41–83; cf. Dillon, *The Heirs of Plato*, 168–73.

dabble with education at the Academy. One made a commitment that could only be dissolved with the blessing of the divine forces overseeing the School. Nor could it be expected that the improvement experienced while in the teacher's company would survive translocation into the outside world (130c).

Thus, while Joyal cautiously dates the work to the period 360–30 BC,⁵² I should place it at something more like 300–275 B.C., seeing it as influenced by the close friendship between Polemo and Crates. I decline to name an author. To my mind the work's interest in the figure of Socrates and its lack of interest in any particular teachings may help to explain Arcesilaus's movement towards an anti-dogmatic Academy, in which improvement was presumably thought to occur independently of any doctrine that might be passed down (cf. *Theages* 130d4). The special stature of the teacher, as inheritor to a tradition that went back to a divinely inspired figure, was also his claim to be taken seriously. Readers may object that we have already allowed that improvement in the *Theages* does not take place by argument. That is quite correct, and that is because the ability to argue effectively is seen as part of the goal to which one improves. Aristides described his peak, when he had benefited most from Socratic *synousia*, in terms of his ability to be second to none in argument (c3). His idea of the outcome of a successful education may not have been very different from that of Arcesilaus. Dialectical success is not, as in Zeno, the foundation of personal improvement; personal improvement is what sets one upon the road to dialectical success.

5. THE PURPOSE OF THE *THEAETETUS* AND OF THE SECTION 150C–151

Unique passages in Plato require scrutiny.⁵³ We have discovered that the passage of the midwifery section that contains seemingly technical material about Socratic *synousia* (150d2–151a6) is precisely the passage where the long-term effects of Socratic education over his quasi-pupils are discussed, and this seemed to offer an explanation of the vocabulary's presence. However, all it does is to raise the question of why Plato should wish to discuss such long-term effects here. Unlike Xenophon, Plato does not ordinarily portray Socrates as a didactic teacher, and the very existence of people who are studying under his direction is something that is hard to reconcile with the informal citizen who is ready to converse with anybody: even if he has to pay for the privilege himself.⁵⁴

Firstly, the discussion seems not to fit well with the depiction of Socrates as a midwife. For instance, the midwife's role is not an extended one. Those utilising their services do not ordinarily desert them for a while and then beg to return because they seem to be getting nowhere. Midwives do not ordinarily have a di-

⁵² Joyal, *The Platonic Theages*, 147.

⁵³ I do not believe that uniqueness can *per se* be an argument for spuriousness, nor that all Platonic works share similar purposes, nor that all dialogues have one purpose only. This section is offered in the belief that there is likely to have been some degree of consistency in Plato's most vivid portrayals of Socrates, except where special circumstances or aims dictate otherwise.

⁵⁴ See *Ap.* 29d–30a, 33a, for the fact that Socrates did not direct himself to any specific clientele, even though his imitators are mostly rich young men (23c); for his willingness to pay in order to question people see *Euphryphro* 3b, cf. *Ap.* 41b–c.

vine sign that excludes individuals from becoming their clients. The progress of a midwife's client does not go backwards and forwards like moral education. The respective roles of the mother and the midwife in the birth are never confused.

Secondly, the discussion is not relevant to the career of Theaetetus. Theaetetus will have no genuine "conceptions" (210b–c), and he is accordingly one of those who will be passed on to another intellectual for further studies (*Sophist* 217d). Pregnancy and midwifery will play no part in those studies, and there is no suggestion that Theaetetus had more than the single dialectical encounter with Socrates spoken of by Euclides at 142c. At any rate the proceedings that will terminate in Socrates's conviction and death are already under way (210d), so there is simply no time for an extended relationship to develop. If he has made any progress as a result of his talking to Socrates it is in the recognition of his ignorance, unlike those discussed at 150d–51a; that recognition may have some beneficial consequences in the future, either for his later discoveries or for his character (210b11–c4), but this is not the immediate and evident intellectual progress of 150d4–8 and 151a5.

Thirdly, the passage makes too many claims for Socrates's midwife-like skills. After describing the likely benefits of Theaetetus's seemingly unproductive encounter, Socrates affirms, "This, and no more, is as much as my craft can do, nor do I know any of the things the rest do . . ." (210c). However, at 150d Socrates shares with the god the credit for successful midwifery processes, and seems much more concerned to maximise the benefits that may come from his services. Few would dispute that the self-effacing version is Plato's regular Socrates, and that the self-promoting one is something of an aberration.

This leads to a fourth problem. The passage is at odds with Plato's description of Socrates elsewhere. This is not so serious for those who are content to see the midwifery passage as a simple description of what Academic education had become, but more difficult for anybody who wished to maintain even a loose connection between the description of midwifery and Plato's own recollection of how Socrates functioned. Yet if the passage is simply a description of how Platonic education works, and the figure of Socrates is no more than a mask for Socrates, then how is it that Plato can be so sure that he has always been barren of discoveries?

These considerations do not prove that our passage is spurious, but they do suggest that it is not well integrated within the drama as a whole. It makes it look as if Plato has temporarily abandoned the other purposes of the work, and is simply utilising this opportunity to explain to the reader what some kind of education (under Socrates or under himself?) could be like *for pupils of a variety of types*. But is this compatible with Plato's compositions elsewhere?

Only a rigorous investigation would suffice to deal with this matter, and we need to begin with the overall purpose of the midwifery section. We need to return to Theaetetus's description at 148e of his reactions to reports of Socrates's usual questions. His reaction is one that combines genuine interest with doubts about his adequacy to offer a solution. It is in response to his description of this state that Socrates informs him of his pregnancy. The metaphor has perhaps been chosen partly as a gambit to tease Theaetetus⁵⁵ and stimulate his curiosity, thereby

⁵⁵ Note the request at 149a6–7 that Theaetetus should not divulge Socrates's skill as a midwife.

making him readier to converse, but his response to Socrates’s claims is one of surprise and seriousness. It is clear that the midwife’s role was not one that Socrates had made generally known (in contrast to his role of mystifier), and not one that he wanted to be made known (149a6–9). Hence its confinement to the one dialogue should be no surprise. It belongs here because it is dramatically appropriate here.

The section not only explains Theaetetus’s current feelings, it helps him to understand the emotions that he is likely to experience after submitting to Socratic examination and after failing to convince Socrates that his ideas have any truth in them. And it helps him to recognise that he must be responsible for the ideas being examined, not the infertile Socrates.

None of these aims can be realised without a close correspondence between the physical role of the ordinary midwife and the intellectual role of Socrates. The role of the physical midwife is carefully described so as to prepare the way for aspects of Socratic midwifery, beginning at 149b4, with various similarities being introduced:

Physical midwifery	Socratic midwifery
149b5-c4: The midwife is not able to conceive herself any longer	150c3-8 (cf. 157c7-8): Socrates is banned from “conceiving” himself
149c5-8: The midwife is skilled in distinguishing who are pregnant	151b2-3, b7-8 (cf. 148e6-7, 157d2-3): Socrates is able to tell who is, and who is not, intellectually pregnant
149c9-d4: The midwife has drugs and charms for stimulating or easing labour, increasing fertility, or causing miscarriages	151a8-b3 (cf. 157c9-d2): Socrates can stimulate “labour” and cause it to cease
149d5-50a6: Midwives know what sort of man will produce the best children for their patients	151b3-6: Socrates can arrange intellectual “introductions” that will be of benefit

Even the point of non-correspondence is carefully introduced. Though they are not required to distinguish true offspring from phantoms, if they did so that would be the supreme feature of the midwife’s art (150a9–b3); but Socrates does have to do this, and it is indeed the supreme part of his art (150b9–c3, 151c2–d3).

It is now fairly easy to see where Socrates’s major speech at 150b6–51d6 is setting out aspects of the comparison with the midwife:

- 150b6–9: basic distinction between male and female pregnancies, physical and psychological pregnancies.
- 150b9–c3: the supreme feature of Socrates’s art, not shared by physical midwives, is to be able to tell real offspring from phantoms.
- 150c3–8: Socrates cannot “conceive.”
- 150c8–d2: variation on the above.
- 150d2–151a6: *No direct comparison.*
- 151a6–8: Socrates’s patients are in labour more than a physical midwife’s.
- 151a8–b1: Socrates can stimulate and ease labour.
- 151b2–3: Socrates can recognise absence of pregnancies

151b3–b6: Socrates arranges introductions.

151b7–b8: Socrates can recognise pregnancies.

151b8–c2: request that Theaetetus becomes his midwifery patient.

151c2–d3: request that Theaetetus understands when Socrates tells phantoms from real offspring.

151d3–6: request that Theaetetus gives a new answer.

In the light of this one has to ask what this passage, and the dialogue as a whole, would lack if one were to omit 150d2 (or possibly 150c8) to 151a6, with or without a few words of transition.

150c8–d2: The denial of Socrates's wisdom is repeated, but it has changed from not having anything wise (to offer), to not being at all wise.⁵⁶ This perhaps goes too far, given that he lays claim to a craft for distinguishing truth from falsehood! Socrates's affirmation that he possesses no such discovery as an offspring of his own *may* seem unobjectionable as long as we do not think of Socrates as simply standing for Plato here. Even so, many would wish to credit Socrates with some discoveries, and this is the first indication that he has never had one. The comparison with midwifery would in fact suggest that he ought simply to have grown too old for any new psychical conceptions of his own.

The term for discovery (εὑρημα) may sound somewhat technical, and thus not a term likely to have originated with an interpolator. In the required sense (cf. LSJ I 1)⁵⁷, however, it is found across a range of authors subject to sophistic influence, and appears for instance in Aristophanes' *Clouds* (561) and often in Euripides.⁵⁸ It is not a term often associated with Plato, only once elsewhere chosen by Plato's Socrates, but present in two works whose authenticity is generally denied.⁵⁹ Hence its presence actually agrees well with the presence of other terminology more suggestive of sophistic language. More worrying is that only here and at d7 is the language of giving birth glossed and diluted with the subsidiary language of discovery. Elsewhere in the dialogue the product of midwifery is not treated as a discovery.

150d2–6: Some quasi-pupils seem very ignorant at first, but as education proceeds all who are permitted by the god make amazing progress. It is not easy to relate this to anything else in accepted works of Plato, though Cleinias in the *Euthydemus* seems initially indifferent, and does make rapid progress. Claims that

⁵⁶ This is on the more usual interpretation of οὐ πᾶν τι σοφός, which postulates an emphatic rejection of any Socratic claim wisdom. That is thought incorrect by anon. *Thl.* LV 34–45 (cf. David Sedley, "Three Platonist Interpretations of the *Theaetetus*" in *Form and Argument in Late Plato*, ed. C. Gill and M.M. McCabe [Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996], 98), where the adverbial phrase is thought to *qualify* the rejection of wisdom. Sedley observes that the standard interpretation does not accord with other Platonic uses of the phrase; those who would interpret it that way would therefore be well advised to consider the possibility of another author.

⁵⁷ LSJ=H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, rev. with suppl. by H.S. Jones (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1968).

⁵⁸ LSJ list *Ba.* 59, *Hec.* 50, *Hf* 188 in the required sense. Also Antiphon 1.15; Sophocles fr.432; *On Ancient Medicine* 4.

⁵⁹ I.e. *Minos* 321a4, *Ep.* II 313b1; in the works presumed genuine it is chosen by Socrates only at *Hp.Mi.* 372c7 (where the noun is an obvious choice, being opposed to μάθημα); it is also found at *Euthd.* 290c6 (used of mathematical discoveries in a speech of Cleinias that is intended to sound unexpectedly technical), *Ion* 534e1 (in a quote from Tynnichus), and *Prt.* 326d6 (in Protagoras's long and impressive speech, and used of the laws that had been "discovered" by ancient lawgivers). Outside the midwifery passage it is absent from works usually attributed to the middle and late periods.

pupils will make great progress are made by Protagoras at *Prt.* 318a, and taken up by Socrates at 318c–d using the same verb (ἐπιδίδωμι) for progressing, usually in close proximity to the word ‘better’ (βελτίων a9, c2, d2). We do not expect them to be introduced by Socrates himself, and the verb here has the appearance of being used in the same *technical* manner (i.e. for philosophic progress) as at *Theages* 129e–30e. This is certainly unusual for Plato.⁶⁰

150d6–151a5: The latter part of this passage is all theoretically designed to show the simple proposition that, whereas the pupil is responsible for the “conception,” Socrates and the god have sole responsibility for its delivery and for the subsequent progress. This is another uncharacteristic claim being made by Socrates, and, though we may not doubt the importance of his role, he is usually at pains to make it seem relatively insignificant. He is typically self-effacing about the midwifery process itself at 210c. Hence it should come as a surprise to the reader that those who seek Socrates’s company make progress at all; Theaetetus has seemingly only heard of his ability to confound people (149a9).

150e4–7: The miscarriage of further correct ideas when pupils have left Socrates, and the death by ill-nourishment of the new-born babies, are both extensions of the midwifery image. At first sight one would not think an imitator likely to introduce either of them, though the idea of an intellectual miscarriage is already present in Aristophanes’ *Clouds* (137–39), a potential source. It is not elsewhere an image used by Plato. Plato had not suggested that midwives were involved in ante-natal or post-natal services, nor does the text explicitly attribute any comparable services to Socrates, other than the post-natal service of diagnosing genuine offspring. It is also hard to see what kind of post-natal care a fully investigated true conception would require. The loss of offspring is supposed to occur through valuing what is false ahead of what is true, presumably being overwhelmed by the pressure of false conceptions that Socrates is not at hand to dispel. If true conceptions are so vulnerable then they must presumably have the status only of opinions, even after they have been tested by Socrates.

150e7–151a2: Socrates’s followers have in some case seemed ignorant *at first* (150d3); those who leave prematurely seem ignorant *in the end too*. In both cases this impression is shared by the follower and other people, the same phrase (ἐαυτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις) occurring at d5 and e7. Presumably this is meant to contrast sharply with the intervening situation, when they have been following Socrates for a while. Yet there is ordinarily no time at which Socrates’s followers are not liable to seem ignorant, as one can see from Crito’s embarrassment in the *Crito*; Callicles thinks all people who philosophise too long are ridiculous in public (*Grg.* 485a–e), and Socrates is quite happy even to concede his own ignorance (*La.* 200e–201a). Alcibiades was not reduced to a state of helplessness only when he first associated with Socrates, but always, and he saw others have the same experi-

⁶⁰ In the Platonic corpus the only place where it is clearly used for philosophic progress, outside *Theages*, where it is used 7 times, and *Theaetetus* (twice), is *Epistle* VII 339b4. In the *Laws* (676a5, 747b6, and 913b6), as well as *Hp.Ma.* 283e3, it is used for progress in virtue. At *Thl.* 146b6, *Crat.* 410c2, and *Prt.* (3 times at 318a–d) it is used of an individual making progress in other intellectual activity, and in these cases the terminology is introduced by somebody other than Socrates (Theodorus, Hermogenes, Protagoras). Even in *Epistle* VII the term is that used by Archdemus and others.

ence (*Symp.* 215d–e). The student who began as nothing, achieved expertise, and then reverted once more to nothing, is to be found rather in the *Theages*. It is Aristides. In fact I cannot exclude the possibility that *Tht.* 150c8–51a5 was written later than *Theages* 130a–e.

151a2–5: We now meet what in Plato would be the most extraordinary claim of all. Pupils come to Socrates begging him to receive them back; he accepts some, who again make progress, and his divine sign rejects others. Consider *Euthyphro* 3d: “I fear that they think that out of generosity I talk promiscuously with every individual, not only without taking a fee but even being happy to make a contribution if somebody will listen to me.” This Socrates is the same as that of the *Apology*, and particularly of 33a: “If somebody desires to hear me speaking and playing my usual role, be he older or younger, I have never begrudged anybody . . .” Nothing stops this Socrates from associating with anybody in his usual fashion. It is the Socrates of *Theages* 129c whose divine sign can turn away pupils.

It is something of a shock to find oneself arguing that part of the description of Socratic midwifery in the *Theaetetus* is a late interpolation. Nevertheless, the argument warrants consideration. While this is by no means necessary for my view of the *Theages*, the passage that relates most intimately to that dialogue may be a post-Platonic addition:⁶¹ interpolated in order to reinterpret Socrates in conformity with the desired public profile of the Academy at a later age. The message is simple. In spite of the fact that the master offers no ideas of his own, the right sort of pupil may expect to make progress and to maintain it *as long as they stay with the Academy*. If one couples that with the subsequent text’s presumably genuine message that the master can arrange introductions with persons who have wisdom of their own and will be of more benefit to the pupil, then one realises how well this would have suited the Academy of Arcesilaus: himself known for making such introductions (D.L. 4.42).

6. OTHER SPURIA AND DUBIA

A spurious work has to arise, and to be incorporated into the corpus, as a result of circumstances which may or may not also introduce other spurious works. I briefly consider *Epistles* II and VII, as both of these have a considerable number of cases where the language of *synousia* is applied technically to studies with Plato, with *Epistle* VII having a broader range of examples.⁶² Of these the famous passage about how the greatest lesson may not be learned through its being stated, but through much *synousia* devoted to the subject itself and “living together” (τοῦ συζῆν), is by far the most important. This *Epistle* also houses the only case of the technical terminology of progress (*epidosis*) in philosophy (as opposed to other intellectual studies) in the corpus, outside the *Theages* and the spurious lines of the *Theaetetus*. This is at 339b4, and concerns Dionysius’s progress. What these *Epistles* are evidence of is an Academic practice of *synousia* at their time of compo-

⁶¹ I refrain from speculating as to how any such interpolation may have arisen, and do not mean to minimise the difficulties inherent in such an assumption. Indeed I should welcome a coherent explanation of why Plato himself may have written these lines.

⁶² “Being with” at 327d1, 330a4, 332d2, 341c6, 345a1; also “getting with” at 327a2, 330b2, 339b1, 349c2. *Epistle* II has “being with” at 310c1, c8, 311a3, d4, d7, and 315a4.

sition, whenever that may have been. The nature of that *synousia*, however, is not such as to invite immediate comparison with the *Theages*.⁶³

More important is the relationship with the first *Alcibiades*, which emerged clearly from Joyal's study of the *Theages*.⁶⁴ It is interesting that it includes some technical uses of the terminology of *synousia* (114d1, 118c4, c8, 119a3), with the first of these being used of associations like the current conversation between Alcibiades and Socrates. Yet that is the least technical sense of the four, and may perhaps mean no more than "meeting" or "conversation." There is no technical terminology of philosophic progress (ἐπίδοσις), though progress is of concern (124c). Nor would the *Alcibiades* offer support to any theory of philosophical progress by simply associating closely with the master. Argument and something very close to simple instruction both play an important part in this work. Most interesting is the notion that the divine sign (103a), subsequently interpreted as a god (124c), has prevented the association of Socrates and Alcibiades from taking place. This is not a matter of Socrates refusing the company of Alcibiades when requested, but merely stops Socrates from approaching Alcibiades. The possible link between the divine sign and Socrates's love for Alcibiades is also of interest. However, nothing convinces me that the *Alcibiades* shares the distinctive conceptions of Socratic *synousia*, the *daimonion*, and erotic relationships in philosophy that we find in the *Theages*. The usual view, shared by Joyal (154), that the first *Alcibiades* was the earlier dialogue and a significant source for the author of the *Theages*, is in my view correct.

Although I can claim no other spurious or dubious work as of the same authorship as the *Theages*, there is the possibility that the first *Alcibiades* has been introduced into the corpus at the same time, during a period when both works were thought to contribute substantially to an understanding of Socratic education: an education enhanced by erotic feelings and overseen by divine forces. In the Thrasyllan arrangement that has determined the order of dialogues in our principal modern manuscripts the *Alcibiades* is the first work of tetralogy 4 and the *Theages* the first of tetralogy 5. Between them come three works whose authenticity seems to have been questioned even in the more trusting ancient world,⁶⁵ *Alcibiades II*, *Hipparchus*, and *Erastae*. It is conceivable that Thrasyllus's arrangement had preserved a block of five works that were for some reason introduced into the corpus in Hellenistic times, early enough to distinguish them from the collection of *spuria* that follows other works in our manuscripts: as a similar collection had done even in the source (possibly Thrasyllus, T22) of D.L. 3.62.

If the five works entered the corpus as a block then it is probable that they did so either as a result of an attempt to repossess further Platonic works, or as a

⁶³ Though these facts are of interest, our previous comparisons have been between conceptions of how Socrates's philosophy worked; the *Epistles* concern Plato's own educational influence. With Socrates playing only a minor role in the *Epistles*, one cannot confidently claim that any of these similarities with the *Theages* indicate that they share the same background.

⁶⁴ See particularly Joyal, *The Platonic Theages*, 154–55, with the other references listed there.

⁶⁵ See Aelian *VH* 8.2, Athenaeus *11.506c*, Thrasyllus (T18c Tarrant) in D.L. 9.37. Jaap Mansfeld, *Prolegomena: Questions to be Settled before the Study of an Author or a Text* (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 100, argues that *Erastae* was not then considered in doubt, but see my reply, "Introducing Philosophers and Philosophies," *Apeiron* 28 (1995): 150–51.

consequence of certain similarities that somebody perceived in them. Do they, then, share any similarities? There are no formal ones,⁶⁶ and they do not constitute a linguistic unity, with the second *Alcibiades* known for a significant orthographical difference in the manuscripts.⁶⁷ However, there are notable points of contact, one being the presence of erotic interest. We have seen this in the *Theages*, where it is somewhat muted. The *Hipparchus* also seems mild, but Hipparchus the son of Peisistratus is idealised as a philosopher at 228b–c and as an educator at 228c4–d2. In the prominent digression on his death, Aristogeiton is depicted as a rival educator, and Harmodius as his pupil and beloved. Harmodius in turn loves another young pupil, who leaves the two for Hipparchus. Hipparchus, though not explicitly painted as a physical as well as an intellectual seducer, is killed out of the grief of his jilted rivals. Philosophy was again erotic, as in Polemo's Academy. And it is depicted as such in a passage peripheral to the argument.

Erotic interest is present in the *Erastae*, firstly in the setting, where two eligible boys are being watched by would-be lovers. The attention of the two boys to the discussion that Socrates is provoking has Socrates among others responding like a lover (133a), so that *erôs* is again involved in the educational process. In the *Alcibiades* works, the very interlocutor is enough to guarantee erotic interest. In *Alcibiades I* Socrates is initially depicted as a lover who has finally come forward (103a–104c), and the soul-lover role continues (119c5, 131cd), until Alcibiades is transformed into the lover of Socrates at the end (135d–e). Socrates also scores a minor victory in love at the end of *Alcibiades II* (151a–c).

Another subject to recur is that of tyranny and monarchies. The political ambition of Alcibiades launches the discussion in *Alcibiades I*, and there is a substantial digression on Persian and Spartan monarchies (120a–24a), with tyranny as a source of prosperity being rejected 135b. The tyrannical ambitions of Alcibiades, extending to the whole of Europe, arise in *Alcibiades II* (141a–e), and are again discouraged. Alcibiades's reaction to the idea of pan-European tyranny (141b) is similar to Theages's reaction to the idea of world-tyranny (125e–26a): he thinks that everybody would choose it. Socrates had in fact been teasing Theages for quite some time over the need to learn the art of tyranny (124b–25e). The *Hipparchus* is named after the reputedly tyrannical ruler of Athens (228b–29d).⁶⁸ As for the *Erastae* it introduces the tyrannical or kingly art at 138b–c, preparing for a corrected picture of the philosopher as somebody who will be second to none in household and city management (138d–39a).

There are, then, loose connecting links between these works. The education that they promote tends in all cases to be personal and erotic, and involves little knowledge content.⁶⁹ It is marketed as something fit for those with strong leadership

⁶⁶ Most are in direct dialogue, but not *Erastae*. Three name interlocutors, two do not. *Hipparchus* is named after a ruler mentioned in a digression, much like another doubtful dialogue, the *Mimos*. *Erastae* is named after an unnamed pair of rival lovers.

⁶⁷ See Brandwood, *Word Index*, s.v. οὐθέν, μηθέν.

⁶⁸ One notes that the *Mimos* is named after an allegedly wise king who studies with a particularly fine educator: the great sophist-schoolmaster Zeus himself (319c); after being taught the whole royal art, he passes a part of his education, that involved with the administration of justice, on to Rhadamanthys (320c).

⁶⁹ With the denial of the value of polymathy in *Erastae* compare the observation concerning the dangerousness of other knowledge without the knowledge of the good in *Alcibiades II* 146d–e, and the specific questioning of the value of polymathy at 147a5.

ambitions, though with the normal requirements of just conduct and self-knowledge. Though there is virtually no chance that they come from the same pen, and *Alcibiades* I may be authentic in whole or in part,⁷⁰ they may all have been accepted and admitted into the corpus by virtue of their all meeting the same set of criteria.

How the corpus developed in the years after Plato's death is a matter for speculation. Whatever the case, an enigmatic statement to the effect that Arcesilaus acquired Plato's books must surely be present in the tradition for some good reason.⁷¹ Making a few purchases at the market-place would not have attracted much attention, but a public effort to acquire as much of Plato as possible would have done so. One should recall the very close relationship that had flourished between Arcesilaus and Crantor. They lived together. Crantor is called the first commentator on the *Timaeus* in Proclus (*In Tim.* 1.76.1), and we know a little of his views on the *Timaeus*. He took the cosmogony itself as a mere expositional device,⁷² and explained the Egyptian origin of the Atlantis story in terms of Plato's response to critics: presumably rather than allowing its historical truth (*In Tim.* 76.2–8).⁷³ What other dialogues Crantor commented on we do not know, but his commentary-output amounted to 30,000 lines (D.L. 4.24). Writing commentaries relies on the text's ready availability. Arcesilaus had access to whatever Crantor had. He must also have inherited some of the enthusiasm of his close friend for the study of Plato's texts, and for an interpretation that gave educational purposes priority over literal meaning.⁷⁴ As Crantor's friend, Arcesilaus had access to a number of Platonic texts, probably quite a few. Furthermore, on becoming scholarch he would have inherited for school use any texts that belonged to the Academy. Through Crantor he would have become attracted to a non-literal approach to such works. Why then are we told that he acquired them? Arcesilaus is being seen as one who wanted to acquire *everything* Plato had written, and with reason to believe that there were authentic works still not in the Academy's possession. We know from another cryptic note in Diogenes Laertius (3.66) that fees had to be paid for the privilege of consulting some newly published works of Plato, probably in Zeno of Citium's early days at Athens:⁷⁵ i.e. in the early days of Polemo's headship.

⁷⁰ See Pamela M. Clark, "The Greater Alcibiades," *CQ* 5 (1955): 231–40.

⁷¹ D.L. 4.32 and Index Acad. Herc. XIX 14–16, where it is said that this happened as a young man. This is therefore likely to have preceded his headship, and perhaps occurred during his friendship with Crantor. On these passages see Mansfeld, *Prolegomena*, 198–99.

⁷² *In Tim.* 277.8–10. This may be inferred also from Plutarch *Mor.* 1013a. For discussion see John Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London: Duckworth, 1977), 40–43; *The Heirs of Plato*, 219–20.

⁷³ This is complicated by the statement that contemporary Egyptian priests could corroborate aspects of the story. There is discussion of this passage in my *Plato's First Interpreters* (London: Duckworth, 2000), 54–55.

⁷⁴ Crantor took the cosmology of the *Timaeus* as a mere expositional device, Proc. *In Tim.* 1.277.8–10, Plut. *Mor.* 1013a; see Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 40–43; *The Heirs of Plato*, 219–20. He also probably took the Atlantis-story less than literally, though there are complications; see Tarrant, *Plato's First Interpreters*, 54–55.

⁷⁵ Mansfeld, *Prolegomena*, 198–99. I wrongly assumed in *Thrasyllan Platonism* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1993), 184, that it is a question of recently edited works, rather than ones recently made available. It is more likely that the public would pay to consult works newly available than newly edited, and that would accord with the normal meaning of the verb ἐκδίδωμι in relation to books (LSJ 7). It seems highly unlikely that all works remained unavailable at this time, or that none were sent into immediate circulation by Plato himself.

Let us suppose that one of the works not then circulating, which now became available for a fee, was the first *Alcibiades*. Regardless of its origin, it would soon have acquired a reputation as a credibly Platonic work in which Socrates conversed with no less a figure than Alcibiades. It had little new doctrine, but had the potential to be a major text within an Academy that took great interest in erotic relationships and in divine guidance. The Academy's (re)discovery of such a work would have made it anxious to know what else was out there. I suggest that Arcesilaus made it his business to locate, examine, and, if appropriate, purchase additional texts of Plato that came to light. Like most of us he would have judged "authenticity" on the basis of a close agreement with his own conception of Platonic education.

All these five works should have had some appeal for Arcesilaus. None embraces scepticism, but all have something to offer the sceptically inclined. In *Alcibiades I* there is the section where Socrates holds imagined knowledge responsible for all errors of conduct (116e–18b). In *Alcibiades II* there is the suggestion that the majority might be better off knowing nothing at all, when they are ignorant of what is most important (146d–47d); and also the theme that, in our ignorance, we should be better off not praying at all. The *Hipparchus* reaches a conclusion that seems somewhat counter-intuitive (cf. 232b3–4), and it is hardly surprising that the interlocutor feels that he is being deceived (228a). The *Erastae* attacks the notion that the philosopher should have a wide range of expertise, like a pentathlete (135e), and could be used to question the value of some rival schools, such as the Stoics and Peripatetics. The *Theages* is remarkable for its picture of progress through the uncertainties of associating with a mentor rather than through learning.

I am not claiming that Arcesilaus came across these five works and no others in his attempt to "acquire Plato's books." Rather I suggest that, among the copies he obtained, these five were marked for the inclusion between *Phaedrus* and *Symposium* and the bulk of what we think of as Socratic works in tetralogies five to seven,⁷⁶ as a means of linking the established works on love with others that will depict Socrates in action with young men or with rival experts. They were thought of as explaining the link between *erôs* and the philosophic practices of Plato's Socrates.

7. CONCLUSION

It seems clear enough from the present study that to talk technically of Socratic *synousia* is to talk of a Socrates other than the Socrates that Plato had known. Isolated uses of the terminology within the authentic works are likely to be non-technical. The concentration of such terminology within the *Theages* reflects a later Academic ideal of a combined physical and spiritual process most naturally

⁷⁶ I make no claim that Arcesilaus arranged these works in tetralogies, and the notion of an Academic "edition" is rightly questioned (among others) by Jonathan Barnes, "The Hellenistic Platos," *Apeiron*, 24 (1991): 124–25; and Mansfeld, *Prolegomena*, 199; and, if the tradition that he wrote nothing is correct (D.L. 4.32), he clearly cannot have written a work of introduction explaining any arrangement. However, there may well have been some ordering of the works within the Academy's collection that was partially preserved in subsequent arrangements. Hence Thrasyllus (D.L. 3.56) was moved to claim that Plato had organised his works in tetralogies.

associated with the Academy of Polemo. It may be late contamination that must account for the concentration of such terminology in a portion of the midwifery passage of the *Theaetetus*. The *Theages* comes to occupy its place in the corpus because it either was available, or became available, to the young Arcesilaus, who, on the basis of recent Academic ideology, judged it to be a genuine introduction to the philosophy of Plato's Socrates.⁷⁷

⁷⁷ My thanks for their considerable efforts to the referees for the *Journal*, whose help, even where they felt least in sympathy with my case, has in my view allowed me to make considerable improvements to the paper.