The Foundations of Aristotle's Ethics.

by

David Ian McBryde, BA (Hons).

Doctor of Philosophy in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Newcastle

August 2010
Statement of Originality

The thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text. I give consent to this copy of my thesis, when deposited in the University Library, being made available for loan and photocopying subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968.

Signed ..................................................  Dated ..............................
Acknowledgements

First and foremost I wish to thank Professor Harold Tarrant, my supervisor, for the advice and support he has given me. This thesis would have been very different and much narrower without his crucial guidance.

The Australasian Society for Classical Studies for the opportunity to present part of this thesis as a paper at their annual conference in 2009. Professor Greg Horsley of UNE was also helpful to me with his advice about aspects of my thesis.

I thank the Interlibrary Loans Department of the University of Newcastle Auchmuty Library for help with acquiring obscure texts.

I thank the Commonwealth Government of Australia for the APA Scholarship awarded to me for three years.

Professor Haig Patapan of Griffith University and David North were also helpful in conversations about the thesis.

I thank Dr Brett Dutton for his friendly advice and reading of various chapters.

I thank Bernie Clarke for his close reading and criticism of draft chapters.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter One</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Two</td>
<td>The <em>Protrepticus</em></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Three</td>
<td>The <em>Eudemonic Ethics</em></td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Four</td>
<td>The <em>Nicomachean Ethics</em></td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Five</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td></td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abstract

This thesis is an investigation into the foundations of Aristotle’s ethics. Those foundations consist of two arguments: The Three Lives argument and the *ergon* argument. These two arguments work together, shaping the structure of the argument as a whole.

Firstly, the Three Lives argument explains why certain goods are treated in the ethics and gives the work its structure. Those goods around which the structure is built are the three goods which belong to the soul: ἀρετή, ηδονή. Each of the Three Lives is dedicated primarily to one of these goods.

Secondly, the *ergon* argument provides the basis upon which (a) to sustain that structure and (b) to allow the parts of that structure to be able to be brought together in the conclusion.

(a) The definition of Happiness provided by the *ergon* argument is wide enough to include any of the three individual goods of the soul and to take into account the subsequent development of the argument which narrows and combines those goods of the soul into manifestations of one good (viz. ἀρετή or ηδονή).

(b) The *ergon* argument allows for the conclusion – the common element of all three goods of the soul is that each has or is an *ergon*. These seem at first to be three separate *erga*, but become reduced in the end to different manifestations of one *ergon*: the being-at-work of the ηδονή (or ἀρετή in its broad sense).

This structure is clearly discernible in the *Protrepticus*, prominently displayed in the *Eudemian Ethics*, and underlies the *Nicomachean Ethics*. As a consequence, this thesis is a successive examination of these works, focusing on the form and content of the arguments. The variation between the works will be seen to be not as fundamental as their shared basis.
Chapter One: Introduction.

1. Introduction.

This thesis is an examination of Aristotle's ethical writings with a view to investigating his establishment of ethics as a type of knowledge (viz. as a πολιτική τις). It addresses the question of what the basis is upon which Aristotle builds up this knowledge.

This topic is usually addressed as the problem of "moral knowledge," and the type of knowledge is sometimes claimed to be επιστήμη (science) in the strict sense as defined by Aristotle. Wiles states a commonly held view: "Aristotle assumes that Ethics is a science – that we can discover certain law-like propositions regarding human conduct. These are fertile assumptions for both axiology and methodology." However, Aristotle identifies πολιτική with φρόνησις (prudence or practical wisdom), and this is contrasted by him with επιστήμη in the strict sense. Rather than focusing on the law-like propositions present in Aristotle's ethical writings in the hope of re-constructing a deductive science out of them in the manner of an επιστήμη (a task which Aristotle himself does not perform) this thesis will examine Aristotle's...

---

1 "Some type of political [expertise]" EN I.2.7, 1094b11. Adjectives ending in -ική imply the presence of an unstated noun (agreeing in gender with it). But in this case, the exact type of the expertise is left indeterminate, by being unspecified. A vague expertise or knowledge becomes attached to the adjective itself since a range of possible kinds of knowing could be implied here, such as τέχνη (art) or επιστήμη (science) or δύναμις (faculty or potency), with each providing distinct types of knowing, as defined by Aristotle in EN VI [= EE V].

2 Cf. the title of Monan (1968).

3 επιστήμη is defined at EN 1139b18-36. This identification of ethics as science in the strict sense is asserted by Reeve (1995), Anagnostopoulos (1994), and Winter (1997).


5 EN 1141b23-33 and cf. EE 1218b13-14.

6 EN 1140b1-2.
ethical writings — the Protrepticus, the Ethica Nicomachea (EN), and the Ethica Eudemia (EE)\(^7\) — from the form and content of Aristotle’s own arguments. At a provisional view, in each of these writings contemplation (\(\theta\epsilon\omega\rho\iota\alpha\))\(^8\) appears as “both the ultimate norm of action and the source of happiness.”\(^9\) As a consequence, “moral knowledge” for Aristotle consists in identifying the human good as strongly dependent on the presence of contemplation (\(\theta\epsilon\omega\rho\iota\alpha\)) in one’s life as “the foundation of morality” or as providing “the ultimate criterion for the rightness of right actions.”\(^10\)

This privileged position of contemplation has been contested in the interpretation of both main ethical treatises, but it will be seen to be consistent through all the ethical works of Aristotle. While the arguments used to achieve this position vary (most prominently between the Protrepticus and the other two main treatises), this variation is less significant than the arrival at the same conclusion.

2. The Problem of Ethics.

Is ethics possible as a type of knowledge? And what would make it possible to be a type of knowledge? For systems of belief or religions – especially revealed religions – either there is a divine law which has been revealed to us which we take on trust and simply try to obey and apply it\(^11\) or authoritative pronouncements based on divine revelation serve the same function.\(^12\) In both cases ethics is merely the working out of

---

\(^7\) The Magna Moralia (MM) is generally not regarded as written by Aristotle himself, though perhaps by the Peripatetic School within a generation or two of his death. The De Virtutibus et Vitiis (VV) is a short list of ethical definitions which contributes little to establishing Aristotle’s teaching and is often regarded as late and spurious.

\(^8\) For an extensive treatment of this term cf. Nightingale (2004).

\(^9\) Defourny (1977) 104.

\(^10\) Ackrill (1980) 31. These are Ackrill’s terms, but not his interpretation of the EN.

\(^11\) Judaism and Islam can be seen as prominent examples of this.

\(^12\) Christianity’s case perhaps. However, for the Church of England, the one leads back to the other for the most part; “Quanquam lex a Deo data per Mosen, quoad ceremonias et ritus, Christianos non astringat, neque civilia eius praecepta in aliqua republica necessario recipi debant: nihilominus tamen
how to do what has already been declared as right or moral. The decisive problem of ethics — the specification of what is moral — has thereby been solved.

Ethics as independent from divine law and revelation has to be able to establish itself as possible, and ethics as a field of knowledge assumes that ethical knowledge is available to human beings by their own efforts. Even an answer to the question “What is ethics?” which merely lists ethical views or positions presupposes that ethics as such is possible or rationally justifiable. An answer to the question “What is ethics?” which simply takes for granted its possibility also runs the risk of merely articulating a response already based on certain unexamined philosophical, political, or religious first principles. It is liable to take ethics as a field of knowledge for granted — it assumes away the problem of the foundation of ethical or moral knowledge.

Ethics is a notoriously difficult subject to pin down exactly. An example of this difficulty can be seen in attempts to define the subject matter of ethics. C. D. Broad’s book entitled Ethics begins with the following sentences:

Ethics may be described as the theoretical treatment of moral phenomena. I use the phrase ‘moral phenomena’ to cover all those facts, and only those, in describing which we have to use, in a specifically moral sense, such words as ‘ought,’ ‘right,’ ‘good’ and their opposites, or any others, which are merely verbal translations of them.\(^\text{13}\)

Broad immediately points out that this does not in fact serve as a definition at all, as it is circular or tautological. Pinning down adequately what in a specifically moral sense means is actually very difficult — as each of those words (“‘ought,’ ‘right,’ ‘good’ and their opposites”) can be used in a non-moral sense.

---

\(^\text{13}\) Broad (1985) 1. Emphasis added.
Another, more adequate approach is that taken by Peter Singer in his "Introduction" to his collection of ethical writings. He begins by stating "Ethics is about how we ought to live. What makes an action the right, rather than the wrong, thing to do? What should our goals be?"14 This approach with its emphasis on right (or justice) and the goals (or ends) of a human life comes very close to Aristotle’s own approach. However, although Singer agrees that "those studying moral philosophy still go to Aristotle’s Ethics as a source of insight and illumination," he goes on to say that "modern writings in ethics often do give a clearer understanding of the problems with which they deal than Aristotle did in his Ethics, and they reach more enlightened conclusions."15

Clarity is desirable, but a clear yet false teaching is not one with obvious merit over a teaching which is correct but more difficult to understand. The more important problem which Singer fails to realise is that precisely what constitutes more enlightened conclusions about ethics is the object of ethics itself – it is our worked-out theory of ethics that must determine what ethical views we consider enlightened, if at any rate ethics is going to be a self-sufficient science or philosophy – not dependent for its own first principles on some other field of knowledge – e.g. on theology or on mere opinion or prejudice. So that Singer’s critique of Aristotle or preference for modern writings – as he expresses it here at any rate – does not seem to be particularly well-founded.16

14 Singer (1994) 3.
16 Interestingly, the two examples Singer gives for rejecting Aristotle’s ethics are drawn – not from the ethical writings themselves – Aristotle’s theoretical investigation into the issue, but from Aristotle’s book called Politics where the theory is applied to practice. The specific criticisms of Singer relate to Aristotle’s views on slavery and on charging interest (both treated in Politics I). Although this cannot be developed here it may be pointed out, that Singer fails to understand Aristotle’s treatment of these matters and so does not prove his point about progress in ethical enlightenment. A response to the issue of slavery which challenges Singer’s negative assessment might follow Ambler (1987), and a similar response to the issue of interest and usury might follow Keynes (1936), especially pages 351-3.
So, to summarise, Broad was unable to delineate the subject matter of ethics adequately and Singer's approach to moral knowledge presupposes answers to the fundamental questions that ethics is supposed to investigate. It is not surprising, then, that it is possible to critique the very possibility of establishing moral philosophy as a philosophy or type of knowledge, and this is done by Wittgenstein.

3. Contemporary Philosophical Approaches for Establishing Ethics.

A. Wittgenstein.

Ludwig Wittgenstein's 1939 "Lecture on Ethics" (LE) provides us with a contemporary example of the problematic nature of establishing ethics as a type of knowledge. Wittgenstein's account parallels certain aspects of Aristotle's even though he apparently claimed or boasted never to have read a word of Aristotle.

*LE* begins with describing the subject matter of ethics (by quoting G. E. Moore) in the same way as Aristotle begins the *EN* (but not immediately in the *EE*) as an enquiry into "the good." Wittgenstein accepts and broadens this statement by providing what he considers synonyms for this, such as, "enquiry into the meaning of life," "enquiry into what makes life worth living," and "the right way of living." This is also similar to both Aristotle's approach (*EN* I.5 and *EE* I.4.2-3) and Singer's.

So, for Wittgenstein, ethics is concerned with the good, but he finds "the good" to have two distinct senses. Firstly, the good has a "trivial or relative" sense, which relates to propositions about "facts." Wittgenstein gives the example of a "good chair" which has the meaning of a "chair [which] serves a certain

---

17 Published in Singer (1993).
18 In Rhees (1981) 158, Wittgenstein is quoted as saying: "Here I am, a one-time professor of philosophy who has never read a word of Aristotle!"
predetermined purpose.”21 This provides a definition of good here as what “comes up to a certain predetermined standard.”22 Secondly, the good has an “ethical or absolute” sense, which relates to “values.”23 Wittgenstein claims that ethics deals only with the good in the latter, absolute sense and never with the former, relative sense. Additionally, he claims that there is no relation between the two senses:

Now, what I wish to contend is that, although all judgements of relative value can be shown to be mere statements of fact, no statement of fact can ever be, or imply, a judgement of absolute value.24

Since, for Wittgenstein, “Our words used as we use them in science, are vessels capable only of containing and conveying meaning and sense, natural meaning and sense,”25 his understanding of nature is nature as defined by modern natural science (as he understands it). Consequently, “Ethics, if it is anything, is supernatural and our words will only express facts...”26 Applying his analogy of the road to absolute judgements of value, he summarises what this would mean to hold true. First he interprets the first case of relative value as follows:

The right road is the road which leads to an arbitrarily predetermined end and it is quite clear to us all that there is no sense in talking about the right road apart from such a predetermined goal.27

Then he applies this analogy to what it “could possibly mean [when we use] the expression, ‘the absolutely right road,’” i.e. the case of absolute value:

...it would be the road [along] which everybody on seeing it would, with logical necessity, have to go, or be ashamed for not going. And similarly the absolute good, if it is a describable state of affairs, would be one which everybody, independent of his tastes and inclinations, would necessarily bring about or feel guilty for not bringing about. And I want to say that such a state

---

21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid. 142.
25 Ibid. 143. Emphasis in the original.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid. Emphasis added.
of affairs is a chimera. No state of affairs has, in itself, what I would like to
call the coercive power of an absolute judge. 28

This is because Wittgenstein does not think that nature provides a standard. Since a
natural end would be required to set up a standard, and such ends do not exist on
Wittgenstein’s understanding of modern science, ethics can be no sort of knowledge
or science at all:

Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate
meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolutely valuable, can be no science.
What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. 29

Aristotle’s approach to ethics will be seen not to rely on a supernatural quality, but
rather to rely on his understanding of nature (φύσις) – i.e. of an entity which has a
nature – as end (τέλος) directed or teleological. Because of the conflation of purpose
external to the entity and theological arguments about the existence of God,
“teleology” has been banished from science and discredited. However, while
purposive behaviour is not a feature of the physical natural world, according to
standard interpretations of modern science, this is not true of living systems or
animals, where one of life’s “most striking characteric[s]” is its “teleonomic
character.”30 “Teleonomy” is a term used by scientists (especially biologists) to talk
about ends without the associations of external purpose and design, which have
attached to the term “teleology” and have made it discreditable. Aristotle’s arguments
in the ethical writings will be seen to rely on an understanding of ends consistent with
 teleonomy – ends intrinsic to the activity or process.

Wittgenstein’s own view of science later shifted (from the simply logical
positivistic work of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to his later Philosophical

28 Ibid. 143. Emphasis in the original.
29 Ibid. 147.
30 Pross (2005) 393.
Investigations).\textsuperscript{31} But we have no record of further reflections by him on the subject of ethics. G. E. M. Anscombe, a follower of Wittgenstein, has supplemented the LE and filled out its argument (especially with regards to the specific case of Aristotle’s ethics). The argument and ideas of her work have been remarkably influential.

**B. Anscombe.**

In 1958, Anscombe published an article, “Modern Moral Philosophy” (\textit{MMP}),\textsuperscript{32} which put forward three main theses:

1. That it was not profitable at present to do moral philosophy.
2. That the concepts of obligation and duty (in a moral sense) – the “moral ought” – ought to be jettisoned from discussion about ethics. And
3. That the differences between moral philosophers from the time of Sidgwick to the present day do not amount to anything of importance.

Anscombe follows Wittgenstein’s lead in making the fact/value distinction, but goes further by urging us to abandon even talking about the ought in the moral sense. She offers a possible return to thought of Aristotle on this issue of how to do ethics by noting that “moral” (and, therefore, the “moral ought”) does not seem to fit into an account of Aristotelian ethics.\textsuperscript{33} This leaves open the possibility that Aristotle’s way of treating ethics does not use the moral ought and that it is therefore not subject to Wittgenstein’s critique of the very possibility of doing ethics.

However, Pigden has seriously undermined many of the claims made in \textit{MMP}.\textsuperscript{34} His critique of Anscombe is convincing, but despite emphatically “not

\textsuperscript{31} Cf. Edwards (1982).
\textsuperscript{32} Anscombe (1981b).
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{MMP} 26.
\textsuperscript{34} Pigden (1988) and (1990).
attempting a critique of Aristotle,”\textsuperscript{35} his critique of Anscombe (and Geach’s) Aristotelian “project’ (as he calls it), ends up consisting in examining the question, “Can Aristotle’s ideas be revived in the context of modern assumptions?”\textsuperscript{36}

Pigden sees Geach’s (and Anscombe’s) project as being identical to Aristotle’s in his ethical treatises: “From a consideration of what it is to be a man, [Geach] wants to derive a notion of a good man.”\textsuperscript{37} This project therefore “[requires Geach to] extract some set of natural requirements either from the concept ‘man’ or from human nature itself.”\textsuperscript{38} So that:

If we are to extract a set of requirements from the concept ‘man,’ the word ‘man’ must be like ‘cobbler’ – it must carry with it a corona of (conventional?) requirements. To understand ‘cobbler’ you must know what cobblers are supposed to do (i.e. mend shoes, and so on). So too, to understand ‘man’ you would have to know what men are supposed to do.\textsuperscript{39}

This is a characterisation of the \(\varepsilon\rho\gamma\omicron\) (\textit{ergon}) argument as it is presented in the \textit{EN} (at I.7.9-16: 1097b22-98a20). This argument will be extensively covered in later chapters, but a preliminary characterisation of it is: the human good resides in the distinctive work — \textit{ergon} — of a human being. Happiness is the human good, so the main task of Aristotle’s ethics is to identify the distinctive work of a human being as human being. One then only has to do that work excellently and one will live by definition a happy life (which satisfies for Aristotle the requirements of living what we would call an ethical or moral life). In critiquing this argument, Pigden believes “that ‘man’ is just not this type of concept.”\textsuperscript{40} This is because,

You can understand what ‘men’ are without understanding that they are supposed to do anything. In this sense (pace Aristotle) carpenters, shoemakers

\textsuperscript{35} Pigden (1990) 147. Emphasis in the original.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid. Emphasis in the original.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid. 148. Emphasis in the original.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid. 148.
and pruning hooks do have a function, but men do not. ‘Man’ is the name of a natural not an artefactual or socio-legal kind...  

And further, that

...a biological reading of these is available which involves no requirements of any kind. Indeed it may be that these words express no concepts at all but are rigid designators senselessly referring to natural kinds, or doing so only with the aid of causal groundings... 

Here Pigden’s argument rests on a linguistic interpretation of Aristotle’s argument – which is not present in the text – but he then turns to examining it as a claim about a natural fact: “Could a set of requirements be extracted from human nature? Perhaps - if men were analogous to organs, essentially parts of a larger structure.” Further,

A spleen has a clearly defined role in terms of the total system, and if it were conscious it would continue to fulfill that function (i.e., be a good spleen) since its own survival would be dependent on that of the larger body...

Pigden links this to Aristotle’s biology;

But Aristotle’s biology is false. Men (unlike spleens) are not components of organic wholes. So again, pace Aristotle, we should not assume that because the eye and hand have a function, man must have a function too. 

Whether Pigden is correct in his understanding of the ergon argument as requiring that human beings belong to a greater whole and so whose function has an end external to the working, or rather whether they have an internal ends which maintain the whole in the functioning of its own activity and so identical to a teleonomic process (and so potentially viable today) will be examined later. The point Pigden misses is that human beings are not components of organic wholes, but rather are organic wholes (i.e. they have a nature).

Another contribution of Anscombe to contemporary debate is the fact that she is in effect the founder of a school of ethics which takes its inspiration in Aristotle’s

---

41 Ibid. 148. Emphasis in the original.
42 Ibid. 149.
43 Ibid. 150. Emphasis in the original.
44 Ibid.
account of the moral virtues – “Virtue Ethics.” Whether (moral) virtue fulfils the role of the highest good for Aristotle, or some other good has a higher position than it will be examined later.

Anscombe also seems to have been the major (maybe even the originating) source of the translation of εὐδοκείμενα (happiness) as “flourishing.” It is indeed Aristotle’s claim that happiness is a type of flourishing (the ergon argument is this claim because it is a combination of a being’s function and its excellence), but this claim is made by Aristotle over against competing interpretations of happiness so that it should not be used to characterise the generally held conceptions of happiness prior to Aristotle’s proof of it in the ergon argument. And so the use of “flourishing” as a translation of εὐδοκείμενα presupposes the success of the ergon argument. And even then, it will hold only for Aristotle’s conception or philosophic re-interpretation of εὐδοκείμενα.

C. John Rawls.

In contemporary political philosophy, the magnum opus of John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (TJ) first published in 1972, stands out as a revival of political and ethical philosophy. In contemporary moral philosophy, the approach of John Rawls exemplifies a return to (non-Aristotelian) Contract Theory. Arising out of the problematic relation of Analytical philosophy to ethical questions, the TJ tries to justify ethical positions and a political system founded on ethical principles from within the Analytic tradition.

46 Rawls (1972).
47 “What I have attempted to do is to generalize and carry to a higher order of abstraction the traditional theory of the social contract as represented by Locke, Rousseau, and Kant.... The theory that results is highly Kantian in nature,” Rawls (1972) viii, and “In justice as fairness the original position of equality corresponds to the state of nature in the traditional theory of the social contract,” ibid. 12 and fn. 5.
Despite this non-Aristotelian revival of ethics, Rawls states “Moral Philosophy is Socratic,” meaning thereby that the dialectical approach as used by Socrates and Aristotle is essential to his own approach to establishing moral knowledge. Concerning Rawls’ decision procedure of “reflective equilibrium” he says, “I believe that this view goes back in its essentials to Aristotle’s procedure in the Nicomachean Ethics.” But there are important methodological differences between Aristotle’s use of dialectics in ethics and Rawls’s use. Rawls’ method of reflective equilibrium involves beginning with a set of considered beliefs, formulating general principles to account for them, and then revising both principles and beliefs in the light of each other, until an equilibrium is reached.

This does resemble Aristotle’s approach in his ethics, but do Aristotle’s first principles of moral knowledge solely rely on ἐνδοξά “received opinions”? Or rather, does it also rely on the type of knowledge which ethics exemplifies? Rawls’ counterpart to Aristotle’s practical reason seems to be some sort of intuition. Daniels disputes this:

Wide reflective equilibrium keeps us from taking considered moral judgments at face value, however much they may be treated as starting points in our theory construction. Rather, they are always subjected to exhaustive review and are “tested,” as are the moral principles, against a relevant body of theory. At every point, we are forced to assess their acceptability relative to theories that incorporate them and relative to alternative theories incorporating different considered moral judgments.

However, Rawls fundamentally attacks Aristotle’s ethics, seeing it (rightly) as an example of what he calls “perfectionism.” This view is based on Rawls’ commitment to his own theory of the “original position,” and is only secure to the

---

49 Rawls (1972) 49.
50 Ibid. 51 n. 26.
51 Jamieson (1993) 482.
52 Daniels (1979) 267.
extent that its presuppositions are well-founded. The "perfectionism" of Aristotle is a result of his definition of happiness as activity in accordance with excellence (virtue). To the extent that Rawl's presuppositions are neither self-evidently true nor universally accepted, the approach of Aristotle has a viable claim to being a more secure and better basis for ethics.

Additionally, "[in] teleological theories [such as Aristotle's] ... the good is defined independently from the right, and then the right is defined as that which maximizes the good." This is true, at least to the extent that Aristotle's approach to ethics is focused on the good – in particular, the human good.

In conclusion, we can see that these contemporary approaches to ethics highlight features of Aristotle's own ethics, either as fundamental problems of ethics which his theory is meant to resolve, or as alternatives to contemporary solutions to ethics.

4. The Modern Approach to Aristotle's Ethics.

According to C. J. Rowe's examination of the history of the interpretations of the two main ethical treatises (viz. the EN and EE), "it was with Schleiermacher that Aristotelian criticism in the modern sense began." However, Schleiermacher rejected the EE, EN, and VV, as spurious and accepted only the MM as genuinely by Aristotle. Spengel in 1843 criticised Schleiermacher for preferring the MM over the EN, but regarded the EE as late and therefore spurious. Spengel rejected the authenticity of EE because "it seemed to him a priori unlikely that Aristotle should have written more than one work on the same subject and following much the same

55 Ibid. 24. Cooper disputes the teleological basis of Aristotle's ethics, Cooper (1975) 87-8.
56 Rowe (1971) 9, emphasis added.
57 Spengel (1843) II cited in Rowe (1971) 9.
pattern," and because the EE seemed inferior to the EN "in both content and construction."

Rowe quotes Spengel’s “basic assumption,” according to Rowe, as being "qu’Aristote ne soit repris à deux fois pour donner à sa morale la forme convenable." This assumption was first questioned by Ernst Kapp in 1912, who “suggested the possibility of supposing a development within Aristotle’s thought.” This opened the possibility for including the EE and EN as both authentically Aristotelian while allowing for the presence of significant doctrinal differences between the two works, which could now be explained as due to their relative chronology. Kapp used “two distinct categories of argument” viz., “an analysis of certain parts of the structures of EE and EN” and “a comparison of their respective arguments.”

It is the second type of argument which formed the basis of Werner Jaeger’s Aristotle (1923) book. Jaeger is an important, though dated, source for this thesis, as he tries to include all of Aristotle’s authentic ethical writings (especially, the Protrepticus, although he excludes the VV and the MM) in his account of Aristotle’s philosophy. Thus, Jaeger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s ethics is broader than most other studies which confine themselves almost exclusively to the EN (or more rarely, to the EE). This thesis will try to match the breadth of Jaeger’s approach.

Jaeger based his interpretation of the development of Aristotle’s ethics around the changing notion of φρόνησις. “By phronesis the Eudemian Ethics understands, like Plato and the Protrepticus, the philosophical faculty that beholds the highest real

\[58\] Rowe (1971) 9-10.
\[59\] Ibid. 10.
\[60\] Ibid.
\[61\] Ibid.
\[62\] Ibid. 11.
\[63\] For extensive coverage of the term, cf. Schuchman (1980), esp. 21-23.
value, God, in transcendental contemplation, and makes this contemplation the
standard of will and action."\(^{64}\) The "theonomic ethics" of the EE is contrasted by
Jaeger with the EN's "contemplative life,"\(^{65}\) but the contrast is minimal or non-
existent.\(^{66}\) Additionally, Rowe points out that Jaeger's account of the history of the
term φρόνησις in Aristotle's ethics "has been shown conclusively to rest on a
misinterpretation of the texts."\(^{67}\) Yet, Rowe still believes that Jaeger's "general thesis
remains of some importance."\(^{68}\)

Monan has argued for the opposite of Jaeger's thesis, viz. that there was a
chronological development from the Protrepticus, but leading up instead to the EE,
rather than the EN.\(^{69}\) Monan's examination of the Protrepticus lays the basis for this
development since within that work he discerns two life-ideals (the political and the
contemplative), and in the course of trying to integrate these two an incompatibility
becomes apparent between Aristotle's "explicit" doctrine and his "implicit" doctrine.
This discrepancy, according to Monan, is still apparent and unresolved in the EN, and
the ethical teaching of Aristotle only becomes fully reconciled in the EE, which
therefore must be the final, and most correct, presentation of Aristotle's ethical
thought. Monan aims
to retrace Aristotle's ex professo picture of moral knowledge as it appears in the
Protrepticus.... [he is] convinced that the Protrepticus, as an exhortation
to life-ideals, is itself an example of value judgement, an exercise of moral
knowledge. Hence [he feel[s] that a sifting of the arguments whereby
Aristotle justified the value judgements he passes in the Protrepticus may
reveal an implicit doctrine of moral knowledge, a doctrine which he did not
formulate but none the less used.\(^{70}\)

---
\(^{64}\) Jaeger (1923) 239.
\(^{65}\) Ibid. 243.
\(^{66}\) As Defourny (1977) makes clear.
\(^{67}\) Rowe (1971) 11.
\(^{68}\) Ibid.
\(^{69}\) Monan (1968).
\(^{70}\) Ibid. 14. Emphasis in the original.
Yet even after Monan’s examination of the *EN*, although the gap between the explicit and implicit teaching of Aristotle is reduced somewhat, Monan contends that “One cannot reduce the explicit and implicit doctrines of moral knowledge contained in the *EN* to complete unity.”71 This culminates in the final assessment by Monan, which elevates the *EE* over the *EN* as the most consistent and mature of the ethical works:

Aristotle’s final identification of the supreme good for man appears not in the rickety amalgam of *EN* X, but in the unified virtue entire identified in *EE* VIII as *kalokagathia*. Only such a position is consistent with his abandonment of the early ‘man is *nous*’ psychology; with his theory of *praxis* as an end in itself; and with a method which reveals the identity of the supreme good by reflecting on the pre-philosophic affective experience of value grasped in the practice of the moral as well as the intellectual virtues.72

Whether this contrast between the *EE* and the *EN* is real or only apparent is decisive for Monan’s position. An examination of *kalokagathia* in *EE* VIII.3 (indeed, of the entire final chapter) becomes very important for determining the doctrinal difference (if any) between the *EE* and *EN*, as Monan in a way identifies the counterpart to *EE* VIII.3 to be the conclusion of the *EN* (viz. *EN* X.6-8), and so it too needs to be closely examined.

In a way comparable to Monan, Anthony Kenny’s approach also tries to vindicate the *EE* at the *EN’s* expense.73 The arguments mustered in support of Kenny’s and Monan’s thesis will be opposed by me – without, however, making any claim as to the relative chronology of either work.

Richard Kraut tried to re-vivify the more exclusive and consistent conception of the *EN* from critics,74 and was followed by Gabriel Richardson Lear, who attempts to solve the inclusive/exclusive conception of happiness in the *EN* reconciling the

71 Ibid. 113.
72 Ibid. 153. Emphasis in the original.
74 Kraut (1989).
dominant end theory with the intrinsic value of the activity of moral virtue.\footnote{Richardson Lear (2004).} The latter two scholars – while providing much of value and of use – have, however, lacked the breadth of view that the earlier, more comprehensive accounts of Aristotle’s ethics provided by their focusing on the \textit{EN} alone and have thereby missed both supporting evidence for their theses and evidence which points in different directions from their own conclusions.

\section*{5. Plan of this Thesis.}
I shall examine Aristotle’s ethical writings in Chapters Two, Three and Four.

This thesis will show the crucial importance and centrality of two arguments in the ethical writings of Aristotle: the \textit{ergon} argument and the Three Lives argument.\footnote{The \textit{ergon} argument is extensively discussed in the secondary literature. For an extended examination see Hutchinson (1986) esp. chapter 3. For a historical examination of the topic of the Three Lives, cf. Festugièrè (1958), Joly (1956), and Lisi (2004).} These two arguments are presented in conjunction with each other in Aristotle’s \textit{Protrepticus}. Therefore, the \textit{Protrepticus} will be examined in Chapter Two. The \textit{Protrepticus} is uncontroversially the earliest ethical writing of Aristotle, and since it is (partially) extant and has recently been reconstructed by Hutchinson and Johnson in such a way that the text, as a basis for a proper interpretation, is now more secure, we will re-examine it in detail.\footnote{Hutchinson and Johnson (2005).} Jaeger used this early work to establish a doctrinal development within the ethical writings. Closer examination of the arguments does not reveal a development in the radical sense intended by Jaeger. There is, however, a later expansion of the arguments and a greater sophistication of presentation made by Aristotle in the ethical treatises. But the crucial observation and conclusion must be, as will subsequently be seen, the overall consistency of argument from the first writing to the last (whichever of the two treatises that may be).
The EE and EN will be examined in Chapters Three and Four. While I take no position on and do not try to prove any sequence of composition of the EE and EN, I will for convenience examine the EE prior to the EN. This helps in explicating the EN, since the parallel passages, parallel books, and shared books of the works are looked at for clues about the structure of the two works, and the EE's greater willingness to be forthcoming about the writer's intentions helps also to understand the structure of the EN.

The conclusion I reach is that Aristotle has a consistent basis to his ethics in order to establish it as a type of knowledge: it is a tripartite structure which remains the same from the Protrepticus to the Nicomachean Ethics. The ethical works are based around the tripartite division of three goods of the soul: ἀρετή (virtue), φρόνησις (prudence), and ἡδονή (pleasure). The Three Lives of the statesman, the philosopher, and the voluptuary are dedicated to these respective goods as ends. The ergon argument underlies all three of the goods, thereby making their combination as a unified whole possible. This unified whole is the contemplative life of the philosopher and Aristotle's ethics is a vindication of the life of philosophy as the best way of life for a human being.
Chapter Two: the *Protrepticus*.

1. Introduction.

Like all the exoteric writings of Aristotle, the *Protrepticus* has not come down to us in an extant manuscript tradition. Rather, we know of its existence because the *Protrepticus* is preserved in the ancient book lists as a writing belonging to Aristotle which consists of one roll’s length. It was not until Ingram Bywater in 1869 first proposed that the various selections of texts found in Iamblichus’ own extant *Protrepticus* contained substantial portions of the lost Aristotelian writing that substantial selections of it were recognised as being extant and identifiable. With this identification the examination of the content of an early writing of Aristotle — previously thought lost — was now made possible.

The title of the work indicates the popular and hortatory nature of the writing, which is consistent with the content of the material contained in Iamblichus’s selections. The *Protrepticus* is an example of deliberative rhetoric, an exhortation consisting in common deliberation in private to individuals (*Rhetorica* 1358b8-10, 1358a36-8) to encourage them to philosophise (the less common subcategory of deliberative rhetoric in Aristotle).

The identification of the *Protrepticus* in Iamblichus’s work was severely criticised by Rabinowitz. Yet as Hutchinson and Johnson point out, “Rabinowitz

---

78 Page and line references to Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*, which is imbedded within the work of Iamblichus, will be to Pistelli (1888), but des Places (1989), Düring (1957) and Chroust (1964) have also been consulted.


80 Bywater (1869).


82 Hutchinson and Johnson (2005) provide a historical survey of the scholarship on the *Protrepticus*.

83 Rabinowitz (1957).
studied only a single set of Iamblichus’ excerpts of Plato [sc. Rabinowitz (1957) 55-7 which examines Pistelli 24, 22 - 27, 10 and is Iamblichus’ severe paraphrase of Plato’s *Euthydemus* (278e3-82d3)] (but not the relevant one),

Hutchinson and Johnson critique.\(^85\)

Hutchinson and Johnson claim to have uncovered a “newly discovered construction method”\(^86\) which reveals the way Iamblichus gathered together his quotations of Aristotle. This method consists in observing how Iamblichus “assemble[s] in each chapter one or a few pure blocks of quotation in a natural sequence, marking them off from each other by thin comments of his own.”\(^87\)

The blocks of quotation are solid and pure, in that no passages are removed from them and no extraneous passages are added to them, though they are sometimes carefully modified. The sequence of quotation blocks is natural, in that Iamblichus never returns to a work he has earlier been quoting from, nor does he ever return to any earlier part of a work he has been quoting from.\(^88\)

Five important conclusions can be drawn from this method:

[1] the seven chapters [Six to Twelve of Iamblichus] contain fourteen\(^89\) separate blocks of quotation, each apparently a pure block of quotation from Aristotle, marked off by thin comments by Iamblichus; [2] the blocks of quotation may or may not have been carefully modified, but Aristotle’s line of thought has apparently not been modified at all; [3] several internal references and connected themes link the material in the seven chapters together and guarantee that they all come from the same work of Aristotle; [4] the protreptic contents of several blocks guarantee that this one work was his *Protrepticus*; and, finally [5], the natural sequence of quotations mirrors and preserves the sequence of passages in Aristotle’s original work.\(^90\)

---

\(^{84}\) Hutchinson and Johnson (2005) 201. The relevant chapters are those which extensively quote Plato in chapters 13 to 19, examined by Hutchinson and Johnson (ibid.) 205-42.

\(^{85}\) Ibid. 274-5 discusses Rabinowitz (1957) 71-92.

\(^{86}\) Ibid. 194.

\(^{87}\) Ibid.

\(^{88}\) Ibid.

\(^{89}\) Fifteen separate blocks have now been identified by Hutchinson and Johnson, as their new draft translation identifies an additional editorial comment by Iamblichus at 37, 9-11. Cf. Appendix 4 at the end of this chapter.

\(^{90}\) Ibid. 194-5.
On the basis of this new discovery of Iamblichus’ procedure Hutchinson and Johnson claim that “...his [sc. Iamblichus’] quotations of the Protrepticus... have an evidential status which is equivalent to that of a manuscript of Aristotle’s lost work.” Although it remains “an incomplete [witness], whose testimony contains lacunae” which may potentially exist between the blocks and before the beginning and after the conclusion of the work. The importance of Hutchinson and Johnson’s discovery for me is that they show a strong proof that the quotations of Aristotle from Iamblichus are identifiable, extensive, and sequential.

Our interpretation of the Protreptic material is based strictly on the Aristotelian quotations as identified by Hutchinson and Johnson. We do not rely on the introductions, bridging comments and conclusions to form our interpretation in any way, except to the extent that is required in the case of otherwise missing antecedents. Obviously, in some cases, gaps of an unknown quantity may lie between the blocks of quotation, to which Iamblichus’ own comments may provide an indication as to what is lacking.

2. Examination of the Protrepticus.

Now, to examine what is non-controversially considered to be Iamblichus’s quotations of Aristotle’s Protrepticus, I will concentrate mainly on Chapters Six to Twelve in succession to discern the form and content of the argument. This examination focuses on important features of the work (primarily structural) and is not a full and comprehensive study of every aspect of the work.

We will consider Chapter Five briefly (focusing on its consistency with the rest of the Protrepticus and with later Aristotelian concepts) since there is a

---

91 Ibid. 195.
92 Ibid.
controversy over the status of that part of Chapter Five of Iamblichus which was identified by Bywater as being Aristotelian (viz. Pistelli 34, 5 - 35, 18; and 36, 7-24).\textsuperscript{93} The independent and free-floating nature of the Aristotelian Chapter Five sections may be due to their being part of an introductory preface, separate from the work itself (possibly in Aristotle's own voice in contrast to a dialogic main body) which Cicero noted Aristotle was accustomed to place before his exoteric writings.\textsuperscript{94}

Chapter Five

The Aristotelian material in Chapter Five begins (at 34, 5) with a universalising statement similar to the beginnings of known Aristotelian treatises (e.g. Metaphysics, Politics, EN, etc.). Additionally, the statement is in accord with Aristotle’s view of nature in the Physics, where “that for the sake of which” (a type of end) is also one of the characteristics of anything that has a nature (φύσις, cf. Physics 194a27-36).

The division between body and soul and their hierarchical relation is consistent with other Aristotelian material in addition to being identical to the position later developed in the less contentiously Aristotelian part of the Protrepticus (viz. 38, 14-22).

The immediate conclusion of a demonstration that “all things are for the sake of the intellect” (34, 15-16) is identical to the “intellectualistic” conclusion of the Protrepticus as a whole at its conclusion in Chapter Twelve. And that the intellect is reduced to an activity (ἐνέργεια) (34, 17-18) is consistent with Aristotle’s teaching about ἐνέργεια in the Metaphysics, and with the ergon argument developed later on which provides the basis for contemplation to be the human good (since the ergon

\textsuperscript{93} Hutchinson and Johnson (ibid.) 202. D. J. Allan attributes this part of chapter five to Posidonius in Allan (1975). Cf. Werner Jaeger who attributes it to Porphyry, Jaeger (1934) 62. Hereafter all references to the text of the Protrepticus will be to page and line numbers of the Pistelli edition, without the continual citation of Pistelli.

\textsuperscript{94} Cicero Att. IV: 16, 2 quoted in Düring (1957) 426.
argument bases the human good on the equivalent of an ἐνέργεια - ergon in its active sense).

The division of thoughts into liberal (or free) because they are choiceworthy in themselves, in contrast to those which are choiceworthy because of something else, is also consistent with later material: Chapter Nine’s argument that the end of prudence is loved for itself, even if nothing else comes from it (viz. even if it is “useless”).

The suggestion that the body is a servant is consistent with 41, 15-18, and the rest of this part of Chapter Five simply culminates in the praise of the contemplative life (35, 5-15), consistent with the conclusion of the work (at 60, 1-10).

The second section of Chapter Five (36, 7-24), while containing the odd anomaly, is also consistent with Aristotelian material, both in the Protrepticus and in his known later writings: The distinction between human beings and the animals being the respective presence and absence of the faculty of the intellect, and it being a preserve of the gods. Additionally, the fact that an excellent (συνόδος τοῦ) person is in no way subject to the vagaries of fortune (36, 13-18) is similar to EN 1100b8-22 and to the so-called “Orphic” characterisation of the contemplative life in Chapter Eight (47, 6 - 48, 21).

In light of this doctrinal consistency both between the Protrepticus and the EN and with the rest of the Protrepticus, Bywater, it seems, had good reason to see this material as Aristotelian and not to exclude it from the other protreptic material as most likely to belong to Aristotle’s Protrepticus. If so, the “fore-shadowing” of various points made later in the text may be an indication that this material in Chapter Five – which is different in tone and style to what follows (being much more deductive), as well as being self-contained and independent from the main argument

---

95 Cf. 52; 16 - 53, 18 and 53, 19 - 54, 5.
96 For example, αἰθόμεσα - (at 36, 10), “glimmers,” is rare and late.
97 Bywater (1869).
of the *Protrepticus* – may well be part of what Cicero referred to as a preface written in Aristotle’s own voice, and such prefaces by Aristotle were placed at the start of his exoteric writings.\(^98\)

In contrast to the material presented by Iamblichus in Chapter Five, which is described by him as \(\alpha \iota \pi \rho \delta \varsigma \tau \eta \nu \tau \varepsilon \iota \varepsilon \iota \omicron \tau \alpha \tau \iota \nu \tau \tau \iota \nu \sigma \omicron \iota \varsigma \nu \) \(\Pi \nu \theta \alpha \alpha \sigma \omicron \omicron \iota \kappa \iota \) \(\pi \omicron \alpha \rho \alpha \kappa \lambda \iota \sigma \omicron \varsigma \iota \varsigma \) (36, 25-6),\(^99\) Iamblichus chooses now (at the beginning of Chapter Six) to present “exhortations to the political and active life as well” (37, 1-2; \(\tau \omicron \iota \zeta \pi \omicron \alpha \kappa \lambda \iota \sigma \omicron \varsigma \iota \varsigma \tau \omicron \omicron \kappa \alpha \iota \) \(\tau \omicron \delta \varsigma \pi \omicron \alpha \kappa \lambda \iota \sigma \omicron \varsigma \iota \varsigma \) \(\tau \omicron \varsigma \pi \omicron \alpha \kappa \lambda \iota \sigma \omicron \varsigma \iota \varsigma \ \tau \omicron \varsigma \pi \omicron \alpha \kappa \lambda \iota \sigma \omicron \varsigma \iota \varsigma \) \(\tau \omicron \delta \varsigma \pi \omicron \alpha \kappa \lambda \iota \sigma \omicron \varsigma \iota \varsigma \)). This may seem to be a contrast to the prior material – a contrast significant enough not to be consistent with it and indicating a less contemplative, more active approach than that which will be presented later in Aristotle’s *EN* and *EE*, where the political life is placed second to the contemplative (*EN* X.6-8, and, though more controversially, *EE* VII’3). However, it will be seen that the treatment here in Iamblichus’ Protreptican material (viz. in Chapters Six to Twelve) is fundamentally consistent in intention with the more theoretical and abstract presentation in Chapter Five – where that sort of approach is said to tend to the same end as the prior material in maintaining that \(\phi \iota \lambda \omicron \sigma \sigma \omicron \phi \iota \omicron \eta \tau \omicron \varepsilon \omicron \nu \) \(\tau \omicron \iota \zeta \ \beta \omicron \omicron \lambda \omicron \mu \omicron \nu \omicron \iota \omicron \) \(\varepsilon \omicron \ \pi \rho \alpha \omicron \tau \tau \iota \eta \omicron \nu \) (34, 3-4),\(^100\) and that it is also consistent with Aristotle’s own later position on this matter. This necessity to philosophise is also the purpose of the Protreptican material as a whole, where the imperative to philosophise is insisted upon throughout.\(^101\)

---

\(^98\) Cf. fn. 94 supra.

\(^99\) “Pythagorean invocations to the most perfect wisdom.”

\(^100\) “It is necessary to philosophise for those who wish to fare well.”

\(^101\) See the occurrences of \(\phi \iota \lambda \omicron \sigma \sigma \omicron \phi \iota \omicron \eta \tau \omicron \varepsilon \omicron \nu \) in Appendix 1 (at the end of this chapter).
Chapter Six

Aristotle begins the material presented in Iamblichus' Chapter Six with a new beginning and from the start: – the basis of human life as an ensouled body. Our life is sustained only so long as our body is supported – the basic pre-conditions of life and food, shelter, clothing etc.

The inference which Iamblichus in his linking statement derives from this material is that this constitutes the necessity for philosophy (37, 9-11; φιλοσοφήτεον ἄρα ἴμιν...), but he also links it up with “being a citizen,” πολιτεύσεσθαι. This is similar to the EN’s connecting the knowledge regarding moral knowledge or ethics as being a form of πολιτική (EN I.2, 1094a27, and cf. 1094b11 and also EE 1218b13-15).

Aristotle now gives a division of types of knowledge. The distinction is hierarchical, since the one type of knowledge uses the other: the sciences which make the things sought-after in life are used by a different type of knowledge or science.102 And a second division now occurs between sciences which serve and those which issue orders (ἐπιτάττονοςαι 37, 14). Again it is a hierarchical division since it is the better type of knowledge in which the authoritatively good resides (τὸ κυρίως ὃν ἐγγοθόν 37, 15-16). That is to say, there is a hierarchy or rank-order of knowledge whose hierarchical arrangement and pinnacle is set as the authoritatively good. This too is perfectly consonant with the EN (I.1-2, 1094a2, 3, 22; 1094b7) where the good generally and the human good in particular determines the hierarchy of sciences (1094b2-7) and sets the end of the science of moral knowledge (1094a18-28), and where the hierarchy of the good determines the hierarchy of the ends pursued by the various types of knowledge (1094a6-16 and cf. EE 1218b7-16).

102 ταύτας (37, 13) agrees in gender with σί ποιοῦσα... ἐπιστῆμα, not with τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ πλεονεκτημάτων (37, 11-13).
Aristotle now (37, 16-22) singles out philosophy as being at the top of both of these hierarchies since the character of this type of knowledge itself (whose characteristics are correctness of judgement, use of reason, contemplation of the good as a whole, and it is this knowledge which he now identifies as philosophy) since;

(1) it is able to use all the other types of knowledge (cf. 37, 18 with 37, 13; and cf. \textit{EN} 1094b4-7) and,

(2) it is able to issue orders in accordance with nature (cf. 37, 18-19 with 37, 14; and cf. \textit{EN} 1145a9; \textit{EE} 1220a9 and 1249b14).

This characterisation leads to the result which the \textit{Protrepticus} as a whole has been written to affirm; viz., that it is necessary to philosophise.

Philosophy contains within itself both correctness of judgement and unfailing commanding prudence (37, 20-2; \textit{τὴν ὀρθὴν κρίσιν καὶ τὴν ἀναμάρτητον ἐπιτοκτητὴν φρόνησιν}). Here a distinction seems to be drawn within philosophy which mirrors Aristotle’s later more precise distinction between wisdom (σοφία) and prudence (φρόνησις) which is presented in the \textit{EN} and \textit{EE}.\textsuperscript{103} This is at odds with Jaeger’s developmental view of Aristotle’s ethical writings, where the concept of a distinction between the two is unknown since Aristotle is yet to break away from “Platonism.”

In the next section (38, 3 - 39, 8), Aristotle precedes his treatment with a discussion (38, 3-14) where he begins to apply his “epistemology” to the subject-matter of ethics. He starts with a distinction between the following sets of pairs:

1. The prior is more known than the posterior.

2. What is better by nature is more known than the worse.

\textsuperscript{103} This distinction is usually misconstrued as a distinction between “ethics” and “physics.” Cf. De Strycker (1960) 78.
This distinction is elaborated in Aristotle’s later writings as well and is incorporated here as there into his treatment of ethics.

Soul and body have a hierarchical relationship. The soul is better since it is by nature more able to rule. Since the body has known arts or sciences concerned with it (like medicine and gymnastics) Aristotle makes the a fortiori argument that the soul too must have “a study and art” (38, 14-20) and that acquisition of this study or art is possible. Aristotle now makes a combination of two entities insofar as one knowledge gives insight into both: soul and nature. Building on the distinction between body and soul, Aristotle now focuses on a knowledge of soul — “that with regard to soul too and its virtues there is a study and an art,” (38, 19-20). The case with soul is similar concerning nature: the highest things are causes and elements, not their derivatives. And the important conclusion is that the knowledge of these highest things is available.

And now (39, 13 - 40, 11) Aristotle tells us more clearly what this science or knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) listed in the prior sections is, and the name of the type of person who possesses it. These seemingly two types of knowledge (on the soul and on nature) are reduced to one – the greatest good, which is prudence (φρόνησις) – and the prudent person chooses on the basis of his knowledge of what is good (39, 13-16; πάντες γὰρ ὡμολογοῦμεν ὅτι δεῖ μὲν τὸν σπουδαίοτατον ἄρχειν καὶ τὸν τῆς φύσεως κράτιστον, τὸν δὲ νόμον ἄρχοντα καὶ κύριον εἶναι μόνον οὕτως δὲ φρόνησις τις καὶ λόγος ἀπὸ φρονήσεως ἄστιν), and is further elaborated in the next two sentences: (39, 16-20; ἔτσι δὲ τις ἠμὲν κανὼν ἢ τίς ὁρός ἀκριβέστερος

104 Physics 184a1-b14; An. Post. 71b33-72a5; Topica 141a23-b14, esp. 141b5-14; Metaphysics 982a4-b10, 1018b9-19a14, esp. 1018b29-19a1.
105 Cf. EN 1095a30-b13.
106 “For, we all agree that it is necessary the most serious person, i.e. the one who is naturally greatest, to rule, and that the law alone ought to rule and have authority; and the [law] is a sort of prudence and reason based on prudence.”
τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλὴν ὁ φρόνιμος; διὰ γὰρ ἂν οὗτος ἔλοιτο κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αἰροῦμενος, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθά, καὶ κακά δὲ τὰ ἐναντία τούτοις.107 And here one's own condition (ἐξεῖς) determines the choice made, and so the condition of a prudent person inclines that person to choose thinking above all things (39, 20-25, cf. the treatment of moral virtue in EN II-IV and EE II-V as belonging to conditions – ἔξεις – of the soul).

In the final section of Chapter Six (40, 15 - 41, 2), Aristotle makes the point that the practice of philosophy is accompanied by pleasure (40, 23). This may indicate the importance of pleasure in the discussion which follows.

Chapter Seven.

A new section and new introduction seem to begin here. Firstly (41, 7-11), the points that will be developed later about φρόνησις are presented:

a. that φρόνησις, or “thinking and knowing” (τὸ φρόνειν καὶ τὸ γινώσκειν),108 is choiceworthy in itself for human beings, and

b. it is also useful in life, since it is a necessary condition for actions which result in goods.

Secondly (41, 11-15), happiness (τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως) is now introduced as the guiding theme and issue running through the entire work. And it is here that Aristotle provides a tripartite division which bears on the structure of the Protrepticus. This tripartite division has been noted by others.109 However, the full implications of this have not been sufficiently grasped and the division itself has been misconstrued. In Jaeger’s case, it may be because he thinks that “[i]he opening words [of this chapter]...

---

107 "Further, what more precise standard or what defining-limit of what is good do we have, apart from the prudent person? For, the things that such people will choose, if their choice follows their knowledge, are good and their contraries bad."
108 These two terms are equated and used interchangeably.
109 Most notably Jaeger (1923).
are Iamblichus' own (p. 41, ll. 6-15)."\(^{110}\) Yet the work of Hutchinson and Johnson (2005) has provided strong evidence that the words are in fact Aristotle's, not Iamblichus'. Jaeger asserts that the tripartite division is as follows:\(^{111}\)

1. "that thinking (τὸ φρονεῖν, [or φρόνησις] which is here a genuinely Platonic term meaning the whole of pure philosophy) is valuable for men in itself";
2. "that philosophy [= φρόνησις?] is essential as useful in life, because without thought and inference man cannot attain to anything profitable";
3. "that philosophy is essential to the attainment of happiness, whatever outlook on life you have, and whether you understand by happiness a maximum of pleasant sensations (阂δονή), or a life completely imbued with ethical principles and occupied in their realization (ἀρετή), or the life of the pure intellect (φρόνησις)."\(^{112}\)

And furthermore that "[t]hese three points correspond exactly to the sequence of the chapters (1) chps. 7-9, (2) chp. 10, and (3) chps. 11-12."\(^{113}\)

However, although there is a correspondence of material set up here by Aristotle with what will be treated by him later, Jaeger confuses and misreads these two introductory sections (41, 7-11 and 41, 11-15). It is the latter section (41, 11-15) which provides the tripartite division which forms the structure of the *Protrepticus* from here to the conclusion (in Chapter Twelve).

The division centres on the meaning of happiness – the central Aristotelian concept for ethics. "Living happily" (τὸ ζῆν εὖ δικαιόνως) may consist in one of three things:

\(^{110}\) Ibid. 65.
\(^{111}\) Ibid. 65-66.
\(^{112}\) Ibid. 65-66.
\(^{113}\) Ibid.
a. τὸ χαίρειν ("rejoicing, feeling some type of pleasure"), (41, 12).

b. τὸ ἀρετήν ἔχειν ("having virtue or excellence"), (41, 13).

c. φρόνησις ("prudence or thoughtfulness"), (41, 13).

These three possibilities are thematically treated in the extant Protreptican material provided by Iamblichus – not in the sequence as listed by Jaeger – but rather in this order:

1. Virtue (Chapter Seven).

2. a. Prudence from endoxa (Chapter Eight).

   b. Prudence as “useless” or choiceworthy in itself (Chapter Nine).

   c. Prudence as useful (Chapter Ten).

3. Pleasure (Chapter Eleven).

Appendix 3 at the end of this chapter provides a more detailed break-up of the tripartite structure of the Protrepticus. These three possibilities seem mutually exclusive or independent options at this stage, but in any event all in turn necessitate philosophy and will combine at the end in the perfect life (which is the happy life). Chapter Twelve provides a conclusion to the whole work conceived as tripartite in the manner detailed above.


Aristotle now (at 41, 14) launches into the consideration of the first good that he will examine – virtue (ἀρετή). Like similar distinctions in Chapters Five and Six, Aristotle here divides a human being into two distinct parts or elements: body and soul (cf. Chapter Five, 34, 9-15 and Chapter Six, 37, 3-9 and 38, 14-22), and he maintains that this division is a relationship of hierarchy, with the soul being the user and ruler of the body, while the body is the ruled and an instrument or tool. Such a hierarchy places
the ruler and user at the top. But within the soul itself there is a similar hierarchy and division or relation of parts as that between the body and soul; one part of the soul has reason which rules and judges about ourselves (41, 20-1), and the other naturally follows and is ruled by it (41, 21-2).\textsuperscript{114}

After this division and hierarchy of parts, virtue enters as the possible perfection of those parts, but it too is better or worse in relation to which of the parts it is the virtue. So that “it is when the most especial and most authoritative and most honourable [parts] attain their virtue that something is well disposed” (41, 24-5; καὶ μὴν ὅταν γε ἔχῃ τὰ μάλιστα καὶ κυριώτατα καὶ τιμιώτατα τὴν ἀρετήν, τὸτε εὖ διάκειται).

So, virtue of soul is better than that of body, and — more importantly — virtue of the better part of the soul (41, 30 ψυχῆς δὲ τὸ λόγον ἔχων καὶ διάνοιαν)\textsuperscript{115} is better than the other parts of soul which are subservient to it (41, 25 - 42, 1). Virtue is always virtue of something, viz. of something which has a work (ergon). So, Aristotle limits the relevant virtue he is talking about to “the virtue of this part” (42, 1-2; ἀρετή τοῦτον τὸ ἐμέρος), viz. the rational part. Aristotle calls this part the soul’s “natural work” which displays the authoritative virtue of the soul:

\begin{quote}

Εἰ τοῖς όταν ὁ πεφυκεν ἔργον ἐκάστου μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἄλλα καθ’ αὐτὸ λεγόμενον κάλλιστα ἀποτελεῖ, τότε καὶ τούτῳ ἄγαθὸν εἶναι λεκτέον, ταύτῃ τε ἀρετήν θετέον κυριωτάτην, καθ’ ἴν ἐκάστον αὐτὸ τούτῳ πεφυκεν ἀπεργάζεσθαι. (42, 5-9).\textsuperscript{116}

\end{quote}

And this hierarchy applies whether we are simple or composite beings. The similarity to the EE and EN’s ergon arguments is quite apparent. In the case of a multiplicity of

\textsuperscript{114} Cf. Appendix 2 at the end of this chapter.

\textsuperscript{115} “the [part] of the soul that has reason and thought” cf. also 41, 30 - 42, 1, where it is said that it also “prescribes and prevents and says that it is necessary or is not necessary to act”; κελετεῖ καὶ κολλᾶει, καὶ δεῖν ἢ μὴ δεῖν φησι πράττειν. This links ἀρετή to πράξεις (via πράττειν), the realm of action of the political person.

\textsuperscript{116} “Further therefore, when a thing most beautifully brings to completion that which is its natural work, not coincidentally but in accordance with itself, then that thing must be said to be good too, and that virtue in respect of which each thing can achieve precisely this result must be termed its most authoritative virtue.”
works (with therefore a corresponding multiplicity of virtues) there is a hierarchy of virtues, with the best of them being the work which characterises them (42, 17-20). This has a direct counterpart in the EN's *ergon* argument (at 1098a17-18) where if a multiplicity of virtues arises the work or virtue is restricted to the "best and most perfect/complete" one.

This work of the thinking part of the soul is identified as truth, which the soul produces by knowledge, and the authoritative end of the soul is contemplation (42, 25; θεωρία τὸ κυριώτατον τέλος). Prudence (φρόνησις) is the condition (ἐξίς) and capability (δύναμις) of this part of the soul (43, 1-5). So, the result is: Virtue leads to a vindication of contemplation. Aristotle draws the appropriate corollary that "its work is none of what one calls the particular virtues." And "this form of knowledge [sc. φρόνησις] is contemplative," "consequently, thinking and contemplation are the work of virtue": τὸ φρονεῖν ἀρα καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἔργον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστι, (43, 20-21).

In 43, 27 - 44, 26 Aristotle illustrates this *ergon* argument by the analogy of sight and sense-perception which closely recalls Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* A.1-2.117 This is the first *ergon* argument which is presented in the *Protrepticus*, which is used to show that the work of virtue leads to the supremacy of the philosophic life.

The life dedicated to action – the life of the πολιτικός – is quickly reduced to its fundamental components, which are seen to have a contemplative basis.

---

117 Cf. the treatment of this text by Byrne (1997).
The Second Life: Prudence (45, 6 - 56, 9).

Chapter Eight

Chapter Eight is either a part of the *Protrepticus*, but a digression from its main argument, which simply contrasts with the more philosophic approaches in the rest of the work, or else it contains selections from other unidentifiable Aristotelian works which also happen to be protreptic in nature. Out of these two possibilities "[t]he best candidate is [that it is a part of the] *Protrepticus*, because of the evident protreptic purpose of the quoted material, including the formulaic conclusion ‘one should philosophise’ [ϕιλοσοφητευ - 48, 19] (which we shall encounter many times in this vicinity), and its energetic rhetorical design."¹¹⁸ However, "the attribution to [the] *Protrepticus* must be regarded for now as probable, not as definitely settled."¹¹⁹

Assuming the attribution of this chapter to the *Protrepticus* is correct, we can see that this Chapter's derivation of arguments “from common notions” (.createFromCommonNotions) – an anachronistic substitution for ἐνδοξα;¹²⁰ – is entirely on the topic of φρόνησις, which we identified earlier as the guiding theme of Chapters Eight to Ten.

It is here, in the last part of this Chapter (47, 6 - 48, 21), that Monan claims that there is a conflicting conception of what a human being is. Monan claims that “the movement of the *Protrepticus* proceeds on two different levels.”¹²¹ Relying on F. Nuyens,¹²² Monan thinks that there are “two conflicting psychologies and pictures of man at work in the *Protrepticus*.¹²³ One which is “frankly intellectualistic” where

¹¹⁸ Hutchinson and Johnson (2005) 258.
¹¹⁹ Ibid.
¹²⁰ This term only appears in Iamblichus’ material.
¹²¹ Monan (1968) 14.
¹²² Nuyens (1948) 95, 98, 128.
“man is explicitly identified with his nous”\textsuperscript{124} and another where the body and the soul are seen as “collaborators.”\textsuperscript{125}

Monan sets up this false opposition by contrasting what he sees as two different psychologies and life-ideals:

1. Intellectualistic: man = νοῦς (42, 3-4), (48, 9-21), Body v. Soul: (60, 10), (47, 21 - 48, 2). And,

2. Non-intellectualist: with the body and soul as collaborators: (41, 15-20, cf. 37, 3-22), (51, 4-6).

According to Monan, “there is a gap between these two psychological pictures [which] ... viewed in terms of their consequences...” are in opposition, and cannot be both simultaneously sustained.\textsuperscript{126}

However, the “conjunction of soul with the body” is fully consistent with the ruling/rulled relationship asserted earlier (at 41, 15-20; 37, 3-9; 37, 11-22), since the injunction that “it is necessary either to philosophise or say goodbye to life” (48, 18-9) is not a recommendation to die and so separate the soul from the body in some “Orphic” rejection of the world,\textsuperscript{127} but rather it is like the Socratic injunction that the “unexamined life is not worth living” (Plato, \textit{Apology of Socrates} 38a5-6). It is a strict command to set the body/soul hierarchy correctly in order, and so it is fully consistent with the distinction and relationship outlined in Chapter Seven.\textsuperscript{128}

Nor does 51, 4-6 help substantiate an opposition to the “intellectualistic” account in the texts cited by Monan, since the entire argument culminates in φρόνησις being the natural end, and its activity of φιλοσοφεῖν being the ultimate “that for the sake

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid. 15.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid. 14.
\textsuperscript{127} Cf. Plato’s \textit{Phaedo} 67c5 and 82d1-7, where Orphic doctrines are used in conjunction with philosophy being presented as the practice of dying and being dead.
\textsuperscript{128} Bos (2003) tries to link at least part of this chapter to the lost Aristotelian work, \textit{Eudemus}, in part because of the difference in tone, which becomes reminiscent of a \textit{consolatio}. 

Page 34
of which” of our lives (52, 2-4). And this is the very part of the soul in a position of hierarchy above the body and the “following” element of the soul in 42, 1-4.129

Chapter Nine

Chapter Nine resumes the main discussion (viz. that of a positive argument concerning φρόνησις) after the approaches based on “common notions.” This Chapter can be divided into four main parts, the first three of which represent discrete steps in a logically developed argument that is sequential; each stage requiring what went before for its own new development, while the final part gives an example based on what occurs in the third section:

1. 49, 3 - 51, 6: Human being, as a natural being, has a natural end.
2. 51, 6 - 52, 16: What is this end? Prudence (φρόνησις).
3. 52, 16 - 53, 18: The end is loved for itself, even if nothing else comes from it (viz. even if it is “useless”).
4. 53, 19 - 54, 5: Example of “useless” contemplation, viz. sight.

This is the second ergon argument of the Protrepticus. The first section of the Chapter shows that a human being has an end and a “that for the sake of which” as a result of its very nature. The second section tells us what this end or purpose is and prudence is named as the best element in the soul (51, 15-25). The third section characterises the result of the second section on ends and purposes and the result of the first section on causes as dealing with the good and not with the necessary. So that Chapter Nine focuses on prudence as the good, not as necessary for further ends and thus as “useless,” whereas Chapter Ten will focus on prudence as useful.

129 Cf. Appendix 2 for the structure of a human being, as presented by Aristotle in the Protrepticus.
In the first section (49, 3-51, 6), Aristotle develops a theory of causes similar, but not identical to that of his later work in the *Physics*.\(^{130}\) While in the *Physics* Aristotle develops a theory of four causes (each cause belonging primarily to nature (φύσις), the subject matter of that work) here there are, rather, four “domains” of causes of beings in general:

1. Thought and Art.

The third and fourth “cause” here will be seen to be irrelevant to the considerations Aristotle is developing here. A comparison with *EN* III.3.3-7 shows that the real object of discussion here is the nature of deliberation. But the first “cause,” which seems reducible to art (τέχνη), causes its products to “have in them both an end and a that for the sake of which” (49, 13-14; ἐνεστὶ καὶ τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ οὗ ἐνεκόρει). But the second “cause” has these two qualities as well, and indeed more characteristically than art does (49, 26 - 50, 14). Once nature is established as having these two qualities, it is an easy step to show that the same must apply to all animals in general and to human beings in particular. The results of this section are that a human being has an end and a “that for the sake of which” as a result of his very nature. This identifies the argument here as being an *ergon* argument. Hutchinson and Johnson call it “a teleological argument for philosophy” and they identify it as “evidently an early version of the ‘ergon’ argument.”\(^{131}\)

The second section (51, 6 - 52, 16) now tells us what this end (and purpose) is. Although very disinterested contemplative answers are at first provided, on the

\(^{130}\) *Physics* 199a15-20; 199b30; 194a21-2.

\(^{131}\) Hutchinson and Johnson (2005) 262.
authority of Pythagoras and Anaxagoras (51, 6-15), on the basis of the end being better than what is for the sake of that end (cf. Plato Philebus, 53c ff.) and of the natural end being what is last in a continuous series (where body comes first and soul later) prudence (φρόνησις) is named as the best element of the soul (51, 16-25).

After Pythagoras’ strictly contemplative view is (at least potentially) qualified (52, 6-11), Aristotle explicitly says that if prudence is the end which is in accordance with nature (which he affirms), then thinking is the best of all things (52, 11-2; κατὰ φύσιν τέλος ἢ φρόνησις, ἀριστον ἄν εἶτι πάντων τὸ φρονεῖν), thereby connecting the meaning of prudence (φρόνησις) with the general word for thinking (τὸ φρονεῖν). This leads to the same hierarchical structure for human action evident throughout the Protrepticus and the EN and EE whereby the body and its related supports are looked after or done for the sake of soul, and virtue is for the sake of prudence, since it is the highest in the hierarchy of goods (52, 12-16).

The third section (52, 16 - 53, 18) characterises the result of the second section on ends and purposes and the result of the first section on causes as dealing with the good and not the necessary so that the question of uselessness (identified earlier at 41, 9) “even if nothing else follows from them” (52, 25-8) is now being addressed directly. So, a division appears between;

A. “...those things that are loved for the sake of something else and without which life is impossible must be called necessary and joint-causes”

(52, 20-22; τὰ μὲν γὰρ δι’ ἐτερον ἀγαπώμενα τῶν πραγμάτων, ὅν ἀνευ ζῆν ἀδύνατον, ἀναγκαῖα καὶ σωφροσύνη λεκτέον), and

B. “...those things which are loved for themselves, even if nothing else follows from them, should be called authoritatively goods” (52, 22-3;
Aristotle now draws the inference that were there not to be a final good, loved for itself, the process of choice would continue on to infinity, which is equivalent to the claim made at the start of the _EN_ that there is an end of action which we wish for because of itself, which is the good and best (_EN_ 1094a18-22).

So, the question of some benefit besides the thing itself is “absolutely ridiculous” (52, 25-8; γελοιον o"ν ήδη παντελως). The additional benefit is then characterised as a “wage,” consisting in a life of bliss and not befitting a free or liberal life (cf. Chapter Five, 34, 23 and 26). And Aristotle concludes “it is not at all strange if prudence does not seem to be useful or beneficial; for, we do not claim it is beneficial but that it is good, and it should be chosen not because of something else but because of itself” (53, 15-8; ουδεν ουν δεινον, αν μη φαινηται χρησιμη οδος μηδε ωφελιμος; ου γαρ ωφελιμον αλλα αγαθην αυτην ειναι φαμεν, ουδε δε ετερον αλλα δε εαυτην αιρειοθαι αυτην προσηκει).

The fourth and final section of Chapter Nine (53, 19 - 54, 5) develops an example of an end loved for itself, even if nothing comes of it. As Nightingale says, Aristotle “draws an explicit analogy between traditional _theoria_ and philosophic contemplation.” However, contrary to her view, there is no “problem in the text” about Aristotle’s procedure or argument here since it is fully consistent with Aristotle’s projected self-consciously chosen plan at the start of the work (41, 7-11) which lists the contents of Chapters Nine, Ten, and Eleven. Nightingale then quotes from Chapter Ten (fragment B48-9 = 55, 7-25) to try to prove that the work is internally inconsistent and reflects “residual Platonism” here. But Aristotle’s claim

---

133 Ibid. 196.
134 Ibid. 196-7.
that prudence (φρόνησις) is choiceworthy for its own sake is not contradictory to an additional argument (already foreshadowed) that prudence (φρόνησις) can also be useful. Here we see the beginnings of the more sophisticated examination of ends that occurs in the EN (at I.7 and I.1).

Chapter Ten
This Chapter is the concluding discussion of prudence (φρόνησις). The usefulness of philosophy is presented in this chapter by a comparison between doctors and trainers who must be experienced with nature with respect to the body. Good lawmakers must therefore also be concerned with nature and this concerns the more important subject of the soul (cf. EN 1102a12-26).

Aristotle here in the Protrepticus makes philosophy indispensable for understanding the virtues of the soul and for teaching about happiness for the city (54, 19-22).

The need for philosophy rests on the fact that “the political [person] must have certain defining-limits taken from nature itself and truth by reference to which they judge what is just, what is beautiful, and what is advantageous” (55, 1-3; τὸν πολιτικὸν ἔχειν τινὰς ὀροὺς δεῖ ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, πρὸς ὁς κρίνει τι δίκαιον καὶ τι καλὸν καὶ τι συμφέρον). And “the most beautiful law” (55, 5; νόμος καλλίστος), which is laid down in accordance with nature (φύσις). The philosopher’s political relevance here is often claimed to conflict with the Politics, however a closer reading of the texts dispels this (as will be shown later, but cf. Politics 1334b6-28, esp. 1334b15, 27).

135 cf. EN V.7, esp. 1135a3-5.
Aristotle ends by re-affirming the contemplative nature of this knowledge (56, 2).

The Third Life: Pleasure (56, 15 - 59, 13).

Chapter Eleven

This Chapter, which covers the discussion of pleasure, also forms a coherent sequentially developed argument (in four sections):

1. Two senses of living and thinking (56, 15 - 57, 23).
   a. Potency/possession.
   b. Activity/use.

2. Ergon Argument III (57, 23 - 58, 5).

3. Natural end, the work of the soul (58, 5-17).

4. Summation and conclusion (58, 17 - 59, 13).

In the first section (56, 15 - 57, 23), Aristotle develops a distinction which is later also fundamental to his philosophy, that of potency and activity (see esp. Metaphysics Θ.1049b4-51a3 and De Anima 416b32-18a25). It lays the groundwork for the third and final ergon argument, presented in section 2 (see above). For, although this chapter is leading up to the argument about the most pleasant life, it displays how Aristotle underwrites the pleasant life via an understanding of activity (energeia) and function (ergon). The first crucial step is the distinction between use and possession of a capability or potency (56, 15 - 57, 1). Then that what is "truly and authoritatively" living relates to life as fully awake or in use as opposed to being in dormancy. Then, (at 57, 1-23) that there is a priority of being given to those things which use their functions rather than merely possessing them and that they are choiceworthy in themselves by their own nature and so more a good.
In the second section (57, 23 - 58, 5), now that the terminological preliminaries are over, Aristotle can begin to develop his third ergon argument. Use and being at work (or activity, energeia) are basically reducible to each other, and although both imply a specific work (ergon) there may be more than one in a composite entity such as a human being, so 57, 24-26; "οὐκ εἰ μὲν ἐνός ἡ δύναμις ἐστι, τὸτε αὐτὸ πρᾶττῃ τις, εἰ δὲ πλείον ἡν ἀριθμὸν, ὦ ἂν τούτων τὸ βέλτιστον,"136 which is matched in the EN’s own ergon argument: 1098a16-8; "τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ’ ἄρετὴν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἄρεται, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην."137

Although this relates to virtue, it is not moral virtue. This is because the soul’s work is tied to “thinking and calculating” (58, 4-5; τὸ διανοεῖσθαι τε καὶ λογίζεισθαι) which belong to the rational part of the soul, not to moral virtue, which belongs to the non-rational part of the soul.

The third section (58, 5-17) explicitly links the two prior sections as two premises from which to draw an inference, which is now the subject of this third section “he is more alive [= first section] who thinks correctly and who most of all attains truth [= second section].” (58, 5-6). The perfect life is ascribed precisely to those who think and who are prudent (58, 10; τοῖς φρονοῦσι καὶ τοῖς φρονίμοις). When the ergon argument is applied directly to life the result for prudent persons is the “perfect and unprevented activity” (58, 15; ἡ γε τελεία ἐνέργεια καὶ ἀκώλυτος), which produces pleasure. This recalls the EN and EE’s account of pleasure as an “unimpeded activity” (1153a15, b10; τὴν ἠδονὴν... μάλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξεως, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητῆν ἀνεμπόδιστον, and for

136 “...when if the capacity is for a single thing, then its use is doing just that thing; if it is for several things, then it is doing whichever is the best of these...”
137 “The human good is the activity or being-at-work in accordance with virtue/excellence, and if there is more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most perfect/complete.” cf. Chapter Seven (42, 9-20).
the entire argument here cf. 1174b26-33 and esp. 33, "ἡ ἡδονὴ... ὡς ἐπιγνώμενον τι τέλος").

The conclusion of the argument is now recounted: “contemplative activity would be the most pleasant” (58, 16-7; ἀν εἶ ἡ θεωρητικὴ ἐνέργεια πασῶν ἡδίστη. cf. EN 1177a22-7, 1178a5-6).

In the fourth section (58, 17 - 59, 13), further clarifications of previous points are made with regard to how pleasure relates to the supremacy of philosophy and the appropriate summing up is made (59, 9-13; δῆλον τοῖνον ὅτι καὶ τὴν γιγνομένην ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ θεωρεῖν ἡδονὴν ἢ μόνην ἢ μάλιστα ἀναγκαῖον ἀπὸ τοῦ ζῆν εἶναι. τὸ ζῆν ἀρα ἡδέως καὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἢτοι μόνου ἢ μάλιστα ὑπάρχει τοῖς φιλόσοφοις).138 This section, like each of the previous sections, is devoted to one of the three goods (virtue, prudence, pleasure), and it too concludes with the vindication of prudence – this time, on the basis of pleasure.

Conclusion to the Protrepticus (59, 24 - 60, 10).

Chapter Twelve

This Chapter concludes the work as it resolves the question of which of the three goods wins out in the end in the competition set for them at the beginning of Chapter Seven (41, 11-15). From the introductory sentences (59, 19-23) of Iamblichus, we can see that the argument of the Protrepticus has been an argument from the parts of happiness (59, 19; ἀπὸ τῶν μερῶν) (viz. virtue, prudence, pleasure), but now a general statement from happiness as a whole is to be made explicitly (59, 20; ἀπὸ τῆς

138 “Therefore, it is clear that also the pleasure that arises from thinking and contemplating is, necessarily, alone or most of all, the pleasure of living. Consequently, living pleasantly and enjoying truly arise either to philosophers alone, or to them most of all.”
όλης εὐδαιμονίας) and the relationship between happiness and philosophy (59, 22; ὃς ἔχει πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν).139

The result is quickly announced: it is with a view to or because of this (sc. τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν, taken from 59, 22) that all things are to be chosen. This allots the prize to prudence (φρόνησις) – the contemplative life wins out over the other two lives.

So Aristotle – and not Iamblichus – now returns to the threefold division of happiness stated in Chapter Seven:

οὕκον τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τιθέμεθα ἢτοι φρόνησιν εἶναι καὶ τινα σοφίαν ἢ τὴν ἀρετήν ἢ τὸ μάλιστα χαίρειν ἢ πάντα ταῦτα. “So, we suppose that happiness is either prudence and some wisdom, or virtue, or the highest enjoyment <or> all these things.” (59, 26 - 60, 1)

This gives us what was originally set out at the beginning of the work (at 41, 11 - 14):

1. φρόνησιν... καὶ τινα σοφίαν (“prudence and a sort of wisdom”).
2. τὴν ἀρετὴν (“virtue”).
3. τὸ μάλιστα χαίρειν (“feeling an intense type of pleasure”).

Each possibility leading to the supremacy of philosophy which is represented by the life of prudence (φρόνησις). And each using its own ergon argument and so having its characteristic virtue, and when unimpeded providing pleasure. Or, a combination of all three goods, still leading to the supremacy of philosophy or prudence.

3. Conclusion

This examination of the Protrepticus was undertaken with a view to discovering its form and content from the extant, sequential and extensive quotations contained in Iamblichus. The main features of that examination have been that the Protrepticus has an identifiable structure, and that that structure is tripartite and focused on three goods: virtue (ἀρετή), prudence (φρόνησις), and pleasure (ἡδονή) as the basis of

139 Cf. the summarising and concluding last chapter of EE (VIII.3).
three ways of life. Each of these goods has a claim to making their possessor live a
happy life (τὸ ζῆν εὖδαιμόνως – 60, 2 and 41, 12). Additionally, each of them has
the ergon argument feature in its justification and description. With their final
combination at the conclusion of the work in the life of philosophy, which is
dedicated to the good of prudence (φρόνησις), such a life contains within itself the
other two goods (viz. virtue and pleasure). These features will recur – in both form
and content – in the later ethical treatises to be examined now by me.
**APPENDIX 1: Table of Occurrences of the verb φιλοσοφητέον**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page, Line number</th>
<th>Voice</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Five</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34, 2</td>
<td>Iamblichus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34, 3</td>
<td>Iamblichus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Six</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37, 9</td>
<td>Iamblichus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37, 19</td>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40, 1</td>
<td>Aristotle &quot;οὐ ... δεῖ φεύγειν φιλοσοφίαν&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41, 14</td>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Eight</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48, 19</td>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Eleven</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59, 18</td>
<td>Iamblichus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Twelve</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60, 8</td>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>4.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 2: Structure of a Human Being

Reason/prudence (concerning particulars), (ruler): virtue
(truth/contemplative)
/
Soul (user, ruler)
/
Human being
\Follower (ruled)
\Body (instrument, ruled)
APPENDIX 3:

*Protrepticus*¹⁴⁰

(Iamblichus, Pistelli ed.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page, line numbers</th>
<th>Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>1. 37, 3-9</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. 37, 11-22</td>
<td>}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. 38, 3 - 39, 8</td>
<td>= the Possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. 39, 13 - 40, 11</td>
<td>= the Greatest of Goods (cf. 52, 12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. 40, 15 - 41, 2</td>
<td>= the Easy (pleasure?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>1. 41, 7 - 43, 25:</td>
<td>A. Three Lives:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. 43, 27 - 44, 26:</td>
<td>[Example : sense perception]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Virtue [41, 14 - 43, 25]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Ergon Argument I.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>1. 45, 6-15</td>
<td>Folly is avoided by all.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. 45, 18 - 46, 18</td>
<td>The incapacity of prudence is avoided by all.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. 46, 22 - 47, 4</td>
<td>Prudence, like substance, has two senses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. 47, 6 - 48, 21</td>
<td>Prudence or intellect is the god in us.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX</td>
<td>1. 49, 3 - 51, 6:</td>
<td>Ergon Argument II:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. 51, 6 - 52, 16:</td>
<td>Human being, as a natural being, has a natural end.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. 52, 16 - 53, 18:</td>
<td>The end is loved for itself, even if nothing else comes from it (viz. even if it is &quot;useless&quot;).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. 53, 19 - 54, 5:</td>
<td>Example of “useless” contemplation, viz. sight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>54, 12 - 56, 9:</td>
<td>Prudence as useful.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI</td>
<td>1. 56, 15 - 57, 23:</td>
<td>Two senses of living and thinking:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. 57, 23 - 58, 5:</td>
<td>Ergon Argument III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. 58, 5-17:</td>
<td>Natural End, the work of the soul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. 58, 17 - 59, 13:</td>
<td>Summary and Conclusion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII</td>
<td>59, 24 - 60, 10:</td>
<td>Conclusion: Prudence best, because Prudence = Virtue + Prudence + Pleasure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹⁴⁰ I exclude the lines allocated by Hutchinson and Johnson to Iamblichus because they are interpretative and not "pure" Aristotle, as well as Chapter V (since its attribution to Aristotle is contested). Cf. Appendix 4 of this chapter for the full authorial allocation of the entire material.
APPENDIX 4: Authorial Allocation of the Pistelli (1888) edition of the *Protrepticus*, by page and line numbers.\(^{141}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lamblichus</td>
<td>34, 1</td>
<td>34, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>34, 5</td>
<td>35, 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lamblichus</td>
<td>35, 18</td>
<td>36, 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>36, 7</td>
<td>36, 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Lamblichus</td>
<td>36, 24</td>
<td>37, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>37, 3</td>
<td>37, 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Lamblichus</td>
<td>37, 9</td>
<td>37, 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>37, 11</td>
<td>37, 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Lamblichus</td>
<td>37, 22</td>
<td>38, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>38, 3</td>
<td>39, 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Lamblichus</td>
<td>39, 9</td>
<td>39, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>39, 13</td>
<td>40, 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Lamblichus</td>
<td>40, 12</td>
<td>40, 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>40, 15</td>
<td>41, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Lamblichus</td>
<td>41, 2</td>
<td>41, 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>41, 7</td>
<td>43, 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Lamblichus</td>
<td>43, 25</td>
<td>43, 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>43, 27</td>
<td>44, 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Lamblichus</td>
<td>44, 26</td>
<td>45, 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>45, 6</td>
<td>45, 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Lamblichus</td>
<td>45, 15</td>
<td>45, 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>45, 18</td>
<td>46, 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Lamblichus</td>
<td>46, 18</td>
<td>46, 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>46, 22</td>
<td>47, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Lamblichus</td>
<td>47, 5</td>
<td>47, 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>47, 6</td>
<td>48, 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Lamblichus</td>
<td>48, 22</td>
<td>49, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>49, 3</td>
<td>54, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Lamblichus</td>
<td>54, 5</td>
<td>54, 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>54, 12</td>
<td>56, 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Lamblichus</td>
<td>56, 9</td>
<td>56, 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>56, 15</td>
<td>59, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Lamblichus</td>
<td>59, 13</td>
<td>59, 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>59, 24</td>
<td>60, 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Lamblichus</td>
<td>60, 10</td>
<td>61, 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{141}\) As listed by Hutchinson and Johnson (2005) and in their unpublished translation.
Chapter Three: The Eudemian Ethics.

1. Introduction.

The following statement of Werner Jaeger concerning the similarity of structure between the Protrepticus and the Nicomachean Ethics (EN) applies even more fittingly to the Eudemian Ethics (EE):

...the system of Aristotle’s Ethics is an organic development, in three separate branches of inquiry, of the tripartite division in the Protrepticus. The goal towards which each leads is the theory of happiness in the final book, which is supported by all three together.\footnote{Jaeger (1923) 237-8.}

Additionally, we saw in the previous chapter on the Protrepticus itself that Jaeger misconstrued the tripartite division which forms the basis of the Protrepticus. The Protrepticus was constructed around three goods providing the basis of Three Lives which have a claim to providing those lives with happiness:

1. Virtue (ἀρετή).
2. Prudence (φρόνησις).
3. Pleasure (ἡδονή).

In the Protrepticus, “Living happily,” or the “happy life,” (Pistelli 41, 12) was seen to consist in a life dedicated to these three goods. Consequently, there was the life of virtue, the life devoted to prudence, and the life of pleasure, each having a claim for the title of the happy life, which were then successively examined, and it ended with a vindication of the life of prudence, which combined all three goods. And we will see that the EE has the same basic structure as that established in the Protrepticus:

\footnote{However, Jaeger is wrong about the EN not providing the same derivation when he continues: “The Nicomachean Ethics does not give this derivation in its introductory book, but leaves the origin of the actual structure obscure.” Jaeger (1923) 237-8. The structure of the EN will be seen in the next chapter also to reflect the tripartite division present in the Protrepticus and EE.}
1. It is based around the tripartite division of ἀρετή, φρόνησις, ηδονή, reflecting the respective ends of the Three Lives (viz. of statesman, philosopher, and voluptuary).

2. The ergon argument playing a central role is used to link all Three Lives together, and

3. a conclusion is drawn in the final book on Happiness (εὐδαιμονία) which is a combination of all Three Lives, but in such a way that establishes the primacy of the life of contemplation (viz. the life of the philosopher) is vindicated as best, since the other two lives resolve into or are subsumed within that of the contemplative life.

These three points are made clear by the following features of the two works.

Firstly, the EE uses the same terms as the Protrepticus when signalling its internal structure.

Secondly, the presence of the ergon argument and the role it plays within the argument as a whole in both works. In the Protrepticus, the ergon argument was used three times – once in each of the treatments of the three goods (Pistelli 41, 14 - 43, 25; 49, 3 - 53, 18; 57, 23 - 58, 5). In the EE (and EN), the ergon argument is present prominently and extensively only in their introductory sections (in the centre of EN I and it is the culminating topic of EE I-II.1.20) where it leaves open room for the later treatments of the three goods to conform to the ergon argument, but no extended and repeated treatment is required in the later discussions which form the basis of the bulk of each Ethics, since the earlier treatment is presupposed. So, instead of three separate ergon arguments (as in the Protrepticus), only one is used. As the ergon argument supports each of the three goods, a streamlined account allows the argument to be
made only once, and it also unifies the argument to a greater degree than that provided in the *Protrepticus*.

Thirdly, a conclusion is drawn in the final chapter of the *EE* which relates each of the three goods together in a hierarchy which determines the ultimate end aimed at in ethics.

The *EE* has a simpler and clearer structure than the *EN*. This is quite apparent when the First Book of each work is examined. In the *EE*, the two lines of enquiry (viz. into Happiness and the Good) which are engaged in through the course of the introductory material (in *EE* I-II.1.20) are clearly separated from each other by Aristotle (in *EE* I.1-6 and *EE* I.7-II.1.20 respectively),\(^{143}\) whereas in the *EN* there is no strict separation of these topics. With this in mind we can discern the following structure to the *EE*’s counterpart to *EN* I:

2. I.7-8: The Good itself.
4. II.1.10-11: Material equivalent to *EN* I.9-12.
5. II.1.13-20: Transition to Moral Virtue (equivalent to *EN* I.13).

The first of the *EE* I’s two lines of enquiry is concerned with happiness, which is examined via a consideration of the three goods and their corresponding lives in *EE* I.1-6 (which includes a digression on method in *EE* I.6), then a second line of enquiry is made into the good itself (*EE* I.7-8), thirdly both lines of enquiry combine or converge in the *ergon* argument (at II.1.1-9). This is in contrast to the *EN*, which examines the issue of the good from its very beginning (*EN* I.1.1), and where the *ergon* argument is treated as the central topic of the introductory material (*EN* I

\(^{143}\) Cf. Rowe (1971) 19 “...the beginning of [chapter] 7... [leads] to a totally different approach to the problem.”
corresponds to EE I-II.1.20: both are introductory material prior to the examination of
the virtue proper which begins at EN II and EE II.1.21 respectively).

A closer look at Aristotle's presentation or form of argument in the EE will
now be undertaken. This examination will concentrate on the structural aspects of the
argument and is not a full presentation of the entire content of the material.


Chapter One

EE I.1.1 (1214a1-8):

Kenny says that the beginning of the EE "leaves us in no doubt that the subject of the
work is happiness." He wishes to impose a false contrast to the treatment of the
same material in the EN, both by downplaying the identity that Aristotle draws
between happiness and the good (which is the subject matter first treated by Aristotle
in the EN), but also by failing to refer here to the appearance of the same quotation at
Delos and the same repudiation of that quotation's position on happiness which
appears later in the EN itself (at 1099a24-31).

The quotation at Delos sharply separates the good, the beautiful, and the
pleasant (the superlatives to these, or to cognates of these, are used in the quotation
itself). This threefold division foreshadows the threefold goods later used to sustain
the Three Lives argument. But Aristotle concentrates here on the three as constituent
parts of happiness, and the three unite somehow in happiness which matches the way

144 Kenny (1978) 191, and cf. Jaeger (1923) 232, "This [beginning of the EE] places the question of
happiness at the summit of ethics, and the whole of the first book is concerned with it." Jaeger misses
the second treatment, on the good, so fails to see that the whole of EE I is divided between a treatment
of happiness and the good.

145 ἀρεστὸν at 1214a5 is the poetic equivalent of ἀριστὸν, at least according to Aristotle's
understanding, as is proved by comparing 1214a5-6 where καλλίστον, λατόταν, and ἀριστότεν are re-
iterated in 1214a7-8 as καλλίστον, ἀριστότεν, ἀριστότεν, and were introduced in non-superlative form as
τὸ τὸ ἄγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ ἢδυ at 1214a3-4.
the three goods and Three Lives of the *Protrepticus* (Pistelli 59, 24 - 60, 10) unite in the life of the philosopher.\(^ {146}\)

*EE* I.1.2-3 (1214a8-14):

Aristotle now talks about the appropriate means of investigation. He says that enquiries can be divided into:

1. Those which relate to knowing alone (τὸ γνῶναι μόνον – 1214a11).
2. Those which also (τὰ δὲ κακὶ... 1214a11) are concerned with possessions (κτήσεις) and actions (πράξεις) about the matter.

Ethics belongs to the second type of enquiry which contains both contemplative investigations and “practical” ones. This is made clear in the twofold question posed at 1214a15:

1. In what does the good life consist?
2. How is it to be acquired?

In considering the first, contemplative question at 1214a30-b6 we see that it contains material (viz. the Three Lives argument and the three goods) which predominates throughout the first half of *EE* I.

The answer to what constitutes the good life or happiness is determined on the basis of which things seem most choiceworthy, or what the greatest good is. The three candidates are listed at 1214a30-33 as:

1. Prudence (φρόνησις).
2. Virtue (ἀρετή).
3. Pleasure (ἡδονή).

\(^ {146}\) *For, happiness is the most pleasant (ἡδονήν) thing since it is the most beautiful (κάλλιστον) and best (δόριστον) of all things*” (1214a7-8).
These are the same as those listed in the *Protrepticus* (Pistelli 41, 12-13 and passim). Aristotle will combine what things are held to be the greatest good (I.1-6) and his own conception of the good (I.7-8) by means of the *ergon* argument (II.1.1-9).

**Chapter Two**

*EE*. I.2.1 (1214b6-27):

The answer to the first contemplative question sets a target which then poses practical problems in order to attain it in life. The two questions which Aristotle now raises about this practical problem are:

1. In what sort of things does living well (or happiness) belong? (1214b12-13).
2. Which are the things without which this (sc. living well or happiness) is not able to arise? (1214b13-14).

These are the issues, according to Aristotle, which lead to confusion concerning the constituent parts of happiness (1214b25-27). The *ergon* argument will place the constituent parts of happiness firmly within the soul itself.

**Chapter Three**

*EE* I.3.1 (1214b28-15a19):

There is a brief treatment of received opinions and a restriction of the opinions to be considered to that of the wise (1215a2). The opinions are then related to the second question listed in chapter one. “From what things” is happiness able to be obtained (1215a9-10) is added to the list of practical questions which obscure the discussion of happiness. If happiness occurs simply as a result of chance or because of nature (alone), this reduces the prospects for attaining happiness for most people.
Chapter Four

EE I.4.1 (1215a20-b14):

The question of the Three Lives returns again. It is shown that the greatest goods for human beings (viz. virtue, prudence, pleasure) are the objects of choice for three ways of life, which gives us the following arrangement (1215a33-b1):

1. Virtue → the political life (πολιτικός).
2. Prudence → the philosophical life (φιλόσοφος).
3. Pleasure → the life of enjoyment (ἀπολαυστικός).

and further (1215b1-5), their own area of concern is listed:

1. Philosopher → prudence (φρόνησις) and study (θεωρία) concerning truth.
2. Statesman → beautiful actions which come from virtue (ἀρετή).
3. Voluptuary → bodily pleasures (ἡδωνάς... σωματικός).

Anaxagoras is now brought in, and Kenny says, “and Anaxagoras is quoted as an intimation of Aristotle’s own eventual composite view.” However the reference at 1215b12-13 regarding Anaxagoras lists “divine contemplation” as one of his possible views about happiness, which is strictly contemplative and not mixed (stated even more explicitly at 1216a10-16). In addition, Anaxagoras’s appearances in both the Protrepticus (Pistelli 48, 17 and esp. 51, 11 and context) and EN (1141b3, and 1179a13) as a representative of the contemplative way of life undermines Kenny’s argument here, as well as his own later quotation: “and the life of scientific contemplation (represented, once again, by Anaxagoras).”}

147 Surely in its broad sense.
148 Or “noble” καλόν.
149 Kenny (1978) 194.
150 Ibid. 104.
Chapter Five

EE I.5 (1215b15-16b25):

This begins with a discussion of the things which blur the results of what is considered choiceworthy (1215b17, 21, 30). More precisely, the variability of the circumstances which occur in life obscure "what the well [done] and what the good which is in life is" (τί τὸ εὖ καὶ τί τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἐν τῷ ζήν – 1216a10, cf. also EN 1094b14-19), since people opt out of life due to extreme circumstances, or could choose to do so if life were seen to be completely futile.

The Three Lives argument is then re-introduced by noting that it answers the question of what makes life choiceworthy (1216a11-12). The Three Lives and their goods are now seen to be ends aimed at, since they provide the "that for the sake of which" to this very question (1216a12).

First, we get the answer provided by Anaxagoras which articulates the contemplative life of ἐρῶνησις; in this view life is "for the sake of contemplating" (1216a13-14). Aristotle's interpretive conclusion on this life confirms this: "So, he thought that the choice of living was valuable for the sake of science/knowledge" (1216a15-16).

Secondly, Aristotle proceeds to the life of the enjoyment of pleasure, mentioning Sardanapallos and Smindurides by name but also including others as representatives for it. A similar conclusion on this life is also drawn by Aristotle: "all these [persons] indeed appear to arrange happiness in enjoying"; οὗτοι δὲ πάντες ἐν τῷ χαίρειν φαίνονται τάττειν τὴν εὐδαμονίαν (1216a18-19).

Thirdly, the life of the statesman is examined. A distinction is also made between the true statesman who acts virtuously for its own sake and most politicians who do so for the sake of other motives, such as for money and gain.
Now Aristotle provides us with a plan of the EE which can be extrapolated from his comments about the order of treatment of the subjects to be considered in this work. This is despite Cooper’s objection that:

The study of the three lives no more provides the structure of the Eudemian Ethics than it does that of the Nicomachean; Jaeger was grasping at straws here with which to prop up his theory of Aristotle’s development.  

Certainly, Cooper does try to prove his contention by saying the following:

In fact, however, Aristotle sets out his account of **εὐδοκιμία** already at the beginning of book II of the EE, and does not develop it out of a study of the three basic goods, or present it as a synthesis of the three one-sided lives.  

However, this is exactly what Aristotle does do, in total contradiction to Cooper’s interpretation. This will also be shown in the discussion of the **ergon** argument later.

However, it is clear that the plan here is derived directly out of the Three Lives:

So then, **from what has been said** [sc. in the Three Lives argument] it is apparent that all attribute happiness to **three ways of life**; the **political** [life], the **philosophical** [life], [the life] of **enjoyment**; (1216a27-29).

So, the immediately preceding argument and the argument to follow thematically treat the Three Lives. Aristotle then fore-shadows what he will treat in his discussion of the life of pleasure:

and of these [lives] the pleasure concerning bodies and enjoyments, both what and what sort of thing it becomes and through what things, is not unclear, so that it is not necessary to seek what they are, but whether they tend somewhat towards happiness or not, and how they tend [towards it], whether if it is necessary to fasten certain pleasures on to living beautifully, it is necessary to fasten on these [ones], or whether it is a necessity to participate in these in some other way, whereas there are other pleasures because of which they think with good reason that the happy [person] lives pleasurably and not only without pain. (1216a29-37).

Pleasure is examined in EE VI-VII [EE VI = EN VII], so this is a forward reference to a thematic treatment of pleasure as a constituent in the happy life. Aristotle then continues:

---

151 Cooper (1975) 145 fn.1
152 Ibid. 144-5 fn. 1.
But it must be considered about these things later; and let us study concerning virtue and prudence first, both what the nature of each of them is, and whether these are parts of the good life, either them or the actions which come from them, since even if not everyone fastens happiness on them, but then all the human beings worthy of mention do so. (1216a37-b2)

The reference to virtue and prudence being treated first is consistent with the content of the remaining bulk of the EE, viz. EE II-V where moral and intellectual virtue are discussed (moral virtue in EE II-IV, and prudence or intellectual virtue in EE V). So, we can see that this plan fits exactly how the bulk of the EE develops, as can be shown diagrammatically later on in our plan of the EE at Table 3.1 (below). Therefore, the order of treatment to be presented by Aristotle in the course of the EE is as follows:

1. Virtue (ἀρετή) which is treated in EE II-IV [EE IV = EN V].
2. Prudence (φρονησις) which is treated in EE V [= EN VI].
3. Pleasure (ἡδονή) which is treated in EE VI-VII [EE VI = EN VII].

There is no doubt that the plan presented by Aristotle here derives from the Three Lives because the consideration of the Three Lives is what is promised as material to be discussed and is discussed. Kenny correctly sees this point: “The traditional opinions about the three lives and the corresponding goods, besides providing the starting point of the inquiry, dictate the plan of the work, as Aristotle spells out immediately (1216a28 ff.)...” Jaeger also saw this connexion: “The EE... not only retains [phronesis] in the earlier [Protreptic] sense... but develops the outline and plan of the whole ethical system from it.” Gauthier and Jolif, basing their interpretation on Jaeger’s, also understand this plan in the same way:

We consequently hold the organising principle which will preside over the plan of the Eudemian Ethics: it is a question of subjecting the three ways of

---

153 The reason why Aristotle's examination of pleasure also includes EE VII (on friendship) will be discussed below.
155 Jaeger (1923) 236-7
life, - political life, life of study and life of pleasure, - to a critical examination which will release from each one of them the component that it brings to the constitution of the mixed [life] which is happiness.\(^{156}\)

Kenny says,

These inquiries [about pleasure which are then listed] are postponed: an answer to the questions is in fact to be found in \(C \equiv EN \text{ VII} = EE \text{ VI}\) of the disputed books: bodily pleasures are necessary to prevent the obstruction of virtuous activity (1153b18 \(\equiv EN \text{ VII.13.2}\) and the pursuit of the right amount of them is itself an exercise of virtue (1154a15-18 \(\equiv EN \text{ VII.14.2}\); cf. 1231a17 in III.2).\(^{157}\)

This is all true and an accurate description and interpretation of Aristotle's text here. However, Kenny continues;

The inquiry immediately\(^{158}\) to be undertaken is that into virtue and [prudence]. (I speak of 'the inquiry'; they cannot be regarded as two separate inquiries entirely, because the division between virtue and [prudence] presupposed in the traditional trichotomy is something which Aristotle is going to correct, substituting for it the distinction between ethical and intellectual virtues.) The word ['[prudence']", used in the traditional distinction to denote the goal of a philosophical career, will be reserved by Aristotle for the practical intellectual virtue, which is the foundation of the 'political life' but which also subserves the theoretical contemplation characteristic of the philosopher.\(^{159}\)

However, what Kenny does not notice is that the enquiries are still distinct since there remains the division between \(\eta \theta \iota \kappa \eta \) \(\alpha \rho \varepsilon \tau \eta\) ("moral" virtue) and \(\delta \iota \alpha \nu \omega \nu \tau \iota \kappa \eta \) \(\alpha \rho \varepsilon \tau \eta\) (intellectual virtue) and, more importantly, the respective parts of the soul to which they refer differ. The term \(\alpha \rho \varepsilon \tau \eta\) is being used in two different senses: a generic sense (where it is understood as "excellence") and in a specific sense (where it is understood as "moral virtue"). In addition, \(\varphi \rho \omicron \nu \varsigma \sigma \iota \varsigma\) has a generic sense (where it is equivalent to \(\nu \omicron \upsilon \varsigma\) in the broad sense of the term), and a specific sense (where it means "practical

---

\(^{156}\) "Nous tenons dès lors le principe organisateur qui va prêder au plan de l'Éthique à Éudème: il s'agit de soumettre les trois genres de vie, - vie politique, vie d'étude et vie de jouissance, - à un examen critique qui dégagera de chacune d'elles la composante qu'elle apporte à la constitution du mixte qu'est le bonheur." Gauthier and Jolif (1970) 78.


\(^{158}\) Actually the enquiry into moral virtue starts at \(EE \text{ II.1.21}\), and so not "immediately."

\(^{159}\) Kenny (1978) 196. I have replaced Kenny's usage of 'wisdom' for \(\varphi \rho \omicron \nu \varsigma \sigma \iota \varsigma\) with my usage of 'prudence' for purposes of consistency and clarity throughout. The terms have to be kept straight for the logic of the argument to be followed.

Page 59
Aristotle does not restrict φρόνησις to meaning only practical wisdom in contrast to σοφία, but rather Aristotle uses φρόνησις in the EE in either sense, and only the context establishes which sense is intended.

So, Kenny has to backtrack on his correct perception of Aristotle's plan, and he does so even further here:

The way in which Aristotle concludes his inquiry into virtue and [prudence] in the EE is something which cannot be described without settling the question whether the EE contains the disputed books of the AE [=EN V-VII = EE IV-VI]. If the disputed books do belong here [in the EE], then we can say that from [EE] 1.7 until the end of the disputed book B [= EN VI = EE V] is devoted to answering the question raised in 1216a38-b2; but we cannot say without qualification that books II to IV of the inclusive Eudemian Ethics deal with virtue, and book V deals with [prudence], since that is to state Aristotle’s definitive treatment in terms of a provisional one which is merely his traditional starting point.161

The re-emergence of the Three Lives argument at the conclusion of the EE (comprising the entire final chapter, VIII.3, which has three discrete sections on each good of the Three Lives) shows that no substitution or replacement has taken place nor can it merely be provisional since it appears as the summarising conclusion to the entire work.

Kenny’s first line of thought will prove to be the correct one to follow. Aristotle (as he himself says) will treat virtue in EE II-IV, prudence in EE V, and pleasure in EE VI-VII, and the treatise will conclude with a tripartite summary which mirrors the tripartite structure of the main bulk of the work.

Gauthier and Jolif provide a similar but different analysis of the plan of the EE:

We will have thus, after an introductory Lecture Series (EE, Book I), a Lecture Series on virtue (EE, Books II, III, and IV = EN, V), a Lecture Series on prudence (EE, Books V-VI, 11 = EN, VI-VII, 11), and a Lecture Series on

160 EE V [= EN VI] treats both φρόνησις (in the narrow sense) and σοφία, and both are here referred to as covered by the same term (viz. φρόνησις).

161 Kenny (1978) 196.
But their schematic leads to the following difficulties:

It is more difficult to explain how the Books VII and VIII of the *Eudemian Ethics* come to associate with this plan. It is probable however that Book VII (Ch. 1-13, the Treatise on friendship) constituted an independent Lecture Series originally, that was connected to the remainder of the Lecture Series on ethics only rather loosely bound together. As for Book VIII (or, according to another manner of counting, with the Book VII, Ch. 14-15), one can see there, with Jaeger, the conclusion of the three Lecture Series on virtue, prudence and pleasure, intended to make the synthesis of the elements of happiness released of each one of them. But it is more probable, like Spengel wanted it already and like Susemihl supported it and recently also M. Margueritte, that book VIII of the *Eudemian Ethics* must take its place before Book VII, and even as it is not a question there of a "book," i.e. of an independent Lecture Series, but simply of fragments of the primitive drafting of the Book V (= EN, VI) i.e. of the Lecture Series on prudence, rejected into an appendix precisely because of their fragmentary nature.163

But at any event the plan that Gauthier and Jolif make tries to fit in with Aristotle’s conception of it as conforming to the pattern set by the Three Lives argument:

"Thus one is led to the following plan for the *Eudemian Ethics*:

| Introductory Lecture Series: happiness in general | I |
| Lecture Series on virtue (i.e. on the element of happiness which the political life reveals) | II, III, IV (= EN, V) |


163 "Il est plus difficile d’expliquer comment viennent s’adjoindre à ce plan les livres VII et VIII de l’*Éthique à Eudème*. Il est probable toutefois que le livre VII (ch. 1-13, traité de l’amitié) constituait initialement une série de cours indépendante, que ne reliait au reste du cours de morale qu’un lien assez lâche. Quant au livre VIII (ou, selon une autre manière de compter, au livre VII, ch. 14-15), on peut y voir, avec Jaeger, la conclusion des trois séries de cours sur la vertu, sur la sagesse et sur le plaisir, destinée à faire le synthèse des éléments du bonheur dégagés en chacun d’eux. Mais il est plus probable, comme le voulait déjà Spengel et comme l’ont soutenu Susemihl et récemment encore M. Margueritte, que le livre VIII de l’*Éthique à Eudème* doit prendre place avant le livre VII, et même qu’il ne s’agit pas là d’un « livre », c’est-à-dire d’une série de cours indépendante, mais simplement de fragments de la rédaction primitive du livre V (= *EN*, VI) c’est-à-dire de la série de cours sur la sagesse, rejetés en appendice précisément à cause de leur caractère fragmentaire." Gauthier and Jolif, (1970) 78. And “cf. *EE*, I, 5, 1216a37-38; Aristotle has mentioned the three lives, political life, philosophical life and life of pleasure (1216a28-29) and has just specified which are the problem which the life of pleasure (1216a30-36) raises; he continues then: ‘But of these problems, it is afterwards that we will have to make the examination; it is virtue and prudence which we should initially treat.’” "Cf. *EE*, I, 5, 1216a37-38 ; Aristote vient de mentionner les trois vies, vie politique, vie philosophique et vie de jouissance (1216a28-29) et de préciser quels sont les problème que souleve la vie de jouissance (1216a30-36) ; il continue alors : « Mais de ces problèmes, c’est après qu’il nous faudra faire l’examen ; c’est de la vertu et de la sagesse qu’il nous faut en premier lieu traiter »." Gauthier and Jolif (1970) 78 fn. 29.
Now a closer look at the problems with Gauthier and Jolif's plan is possible:

Firstly, it excludes the *ergon* argument from the consideration of happiness in general (*EE* I), placing it in the Lecture Series on virtue (*EE* II), presumably because they think that the book division here is non-arbitrary despite what they have said about the book divisions. This, however, would make the inclusion of the *ergon* argument within the general discussion of happiness and not in the books on moral virtue in the *EN* as something which is remarkable. A more likely and consistent treatment would either account for the different placement of the same argument in the different texts or include the *ergon* argument within the same treatment of topics in both works.

Secondly, Gauthier and Jolif include in the *φρόνησις* section part of *EE* VI [= *EN* VII] and the entire *EE* VIII. With *EE* VI at least this placement follows on directly from the prior book (although a new beginning is indicated at its beginning) but this is not the case with *EE* VIII. This would also leave the *EE* without a conclusion (similar to the abrupt ending of the *MM*), so the text as it stands is more likely, and this will be confirmed with a consideration of the content of that final book later.

Thirdly, the Lecture Series on pleasure excludes friendship and treats it as an exceptional item (as well as not including the earlier part of *EE* VI [= *EN* VII]).

---

164 "On abîtit ainsi pour l’Éthique à Eudème au plan suivant :

Série de cours d’introduction : le bonheur en général I
Série de cours sur la vertu II, III, IV (= EN, V)
(c’est-à-dire sur l’élément de bonheur que révèle la vie politique)
Série de cours sur la sagesse V-VI (= EN, VI-VII) (+VIII)
(c’est-à-dire sur l’élément de bonheur que révèle la vie d’étude)
Série de cours sur le plaisir VI (= EN, VII) 12-15
(c’est-à-dire sur l’élément de bonheur que révèle la vie de jouissance)
Hors plan : série de cours sur l’amitié VII." Gauthier and Jolif (1970)
In comparison with Gauthier and Jolif's this outline of ours is entirely sequential and has fewer anomalies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goods</th>
<th>Sections</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Books</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Happiness</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Human good (3 goods → 3 lives), Ergon argument transition to Moral Virtue (on the soul)</td>
<td>I.1-II.1.14, II.1.15-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀρετή</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Moral Virtue</td>
<td>II.1.21-II.11.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Particular Moral Virtues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. - Justice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φρόνησις</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Intellectual Virtue</td>
<td>= EN VI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Κόσμονή</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>In-/continence and Pleasure</td>
<td>= EN VII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Good Fortune</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1 Outline of the EE.

The similarity to the structure of the Protrepticus (as restored and re-constructed by Hutchinson and Johnson) displayed in the previous chapter is apparent, with Sections 2, 3, and 4 corresponding to the three goods of the soul which are being examined there.

Chapter Six

EE I.6 (1216b26-17a17):

Jaeger believes that the EE – unlike the EN – "contains no reflections on the peculiarity of ethical method," but "[i]instead the author discusses the difference between the philosophical and the unphilosophical treatment of ethical and political questions..." However, Jaeger does not correctly interpret the methodological reflections at 1214a8-14, since the distinction Aristotle makes is not between the philosophical and non-philosophical treatment of ethics and politics, but rather that between simply contemplative philosophy and a mix of contemplative and practical philosophy, as shown above.

165 Jaeger (1923) 232-3 and fn.
3. EE I.7-8: Divisions of the Good.


A new beginning (λέγομεν ἡρξόμενοι 1217a18) is made here by Aristotle. The things said before are marked off as a "preface" (πεπροομισαμένων 1217a18), and a fresh start is made (πρῶτον ὁπό τῶν πρῶτων 1217a19), but the fundamental question being treated remains the same: What is Happiness? (1217a2-21). The answer provided is made on the basis of agreement (i.e. the argument remains dialectical): Happiness is the greatest and best of the human goods (1217a21-22).

As a result of this definition of happiness, the good must be examined. Previously, various lives were held to have a claim to being good, but now what actually constitutes good is going to be examined. The good is examined by Aristotle via various divisions. The first division is that between goods that are done (prakton), and those that are not done (1217a31-32). This relates to action or activity as a means or as an end. Aristotle concludes this chapter by placing happiness into the category of a good that is done, viz. the best of the things done by a human being (1217a39-40), and as such is an end. The application of this term (prakton) in the ergon argument points to its being used in the sense of activity or energeia.

b. Chapter 8: the Good Itself.

The question that is examined now is what is the best (good) and how many ways it is meant (1217b1) continuing the division of the good. Three opinions predominate about this, viz. that the best is:

1. the good itself,
2. which is also the first of goods, and
3. the cause of the other goods being goods.
Aristotle first examines and rejects the Platonic Idea of the Good (EE I.8.2-17) as a contender for this best good in the bulk of this chapter. Then he briefly examines and rejects the claim of the "common good" as well (EE I.8.18-19). Thirdly, he outlines his own position and view of the good itself (EE I.8.19-20).

For Aristotle, the good is "that for the sake of which as end." The good itself is therefore the end (τέλος) of the things that are done by a human being. It is therefore a good that is an end, not a means. The science or knowledge that attaches to this end is politics, household-management, and prudence (πολιτική, οίκονομική, φρόνησις, 1218b13-14 cf. EN I.1.1 ff.). Knowledge of the end is placed with prudence as practical wisdom (discussed in EE V = EN VI), and it is this which is the expertise concerned with the human good and establishes the rank-order and architectonic hierarchy of goods.

4. The Ergon Argument.

The ἔργον (ergon) argument is presented at EE II.1.1 (1218b31-19a39).166

The ergon argument in the EE relies for its correct interpretation on understanding of what has gone before it in EE I. All previous interpretations of the ergon argument leave out entirely or considerably downplay the inclusion of both the Three Lives argument (= EE I.1-6) and the good as happiness argument (= EE I.7-8) within the premises of the ergon argument itself. This failure or neglect has led not only to a complete misunderstanding of the role of the ergon argument, but also of the treatise as a whole and its structure. This is so because the ergon argument itself — in effect — is the heart of the ethics, and it determines both the entire structure of the

166 See Appendix 1 at the end of this chapter for a break-up of the Greek text in accordance with the structure of the argument as identified here. The EE's ergon argument is extensively examined in Woods (1982) 93-99 and Hutchinson (1986) 39-52. Both Woods and Hutchinson break-up the text in accordance with their own interpretation, I am indebted to their close analysis.
treatise and indeed the fundamental content of the argument to follow. But this is only made clear by seeing that the Three Lives argument and the good as happiness argument are both present as premises within the ergon argument.

The structure of the ergon argument is as follows:

1. Sections 1 to 13 (1218b31-19a18): The good.
2. Sections 14 to 18 (1219a18-28): The complete good is happiness.
3. Sections 19 to 22 (1219a28-35): Happiness is the activity of a good soul.
4. Sections 23 to 27 (1219a35-39): Happiness is activity of a complete life expressing complete virtue.

Two points are necessary to note here. Firstly, the ergon argument is a continuation of the discussion of the good from the prior chapter (EE 1.8, which presents Aristotle’s own view of the requisite good), because the entire argument constitutes a division of the good. Secondly, in the entire first quarter of the argument (and over half the line count), happiness (εὐδοκιμία) is not even mentioned, rather it is the good that is being treated. The three remaining sections each conclude with an identification of happiness as a result of the premises in their respective sections, culminating in the final identification which is a definition of happiness.¹⁶⁷ This definition of happiness is the one which Aristotle will use to establish his own argument in the bulk of the EE. We shall now examine the ergon argument in closer detail.

Section 1. [1218b31-32]:

Aristotle begins by making a division of all goods into external goods and goods of the soul. So there is a twofold distinction of what elsewhere is a threefold division where ἐκτός (“external [goods]”) is expanded to refer to the body and externals. The

¹⁶⁷ The three identifications of happiness are at 1219a27-28, 34-35, and 38-39. The first mention of happiness is at 1219a28.
decisive point is to delineate and isolate the goods of the soul, so the difference between the two divisions is insignificant.\textsuperscript{168}

Section 2. [1218b33-36]:

Recalling the architectonic distinction in EN I.1, Aristotle says that of goods (that is, of \textit{all} goods) those in the soul are more choiceworthy (αἱρετικὰτερα 1218b33). Aristotle bolsters this judgement by a reference to his “exoteric speeches,” and the \textit{Protrepticus} is the most likely candidate for this reference here since the predominant features of what we saw in the previous chapter was its argument and structure are about to be relied on to prove his point. Aristotle notes no change of position from the views expressed in his exoteric writings on this matter to his more mature judgement now (nor would he be able to rely on his prior argumentation otherwise).

The reason for goods of the soul being more choiceworthy than all other goods is crucial to note, since the preference for goods of the soul over other goods has puzzled modern commentators.\textsuperscript{169} The explanation is immediately supplied by Aristotle in the next sentence (cf. γὰρ 1218b34): “for, prudence (φροντισις) and virtue (αρετὴ) and pleasure (ἡδονή) [are] in the soul” (1218b34-35). And further, all three of these goods are regarded by everyone as possible ends to be pursued in life: either some or all of them (cf. \textit{Protrepticus} Pistelli 59, 24 - 60, 10). This links the \textit{ergon} argument directly to Aristotle’s discussion of the Three Lives and the greatest goods towards which these lives are dedicated earlier in \textit{EE} I (at I.1.7, I.4.2-3 and I.5.9-13), and also with Aristotle’s determination of the good itself as “that for the sake of which as end” (at I.8.20). Or, in other words, it incorporates both halves of the entire bifurcated discussion of \textit{EE} I into its own discrete and self-contained argument.

\textsuperscript{168} Cf. \textit{EN} 1098b12-14, 14-15, \textit{MM} 1184b1-6, and \textit{Politics} 1323b7-21.

\textsuperscript{169} For example, Hutchinson (1986) 40.
Kenny's misreading is instructive: "On all three of the traditional views, the best goods are in the soul: so that best of all things that we are looking for will be something in the soul." This obscures the fact that the best goods in the soul are the very goods just mentioned as the only possible candidates for the best of all things in the soul. It is not anything besides the three possible ones mentioned (viz. φρόνησις, ἀρετή, ἡδονή). The ergon argument explicates the Three Lives and their corresponding goods as the only possible grounding for happiness, and therefore it provides the structure of the main body of the EE.\footnote{Kenny (1978) 198. Emphasis added.}

Kenny's error of ignoring or not understanding this connexion makes him focus on the mention of ἀρετή in the ergon argument as referring to moral virtue, rather than seeing that ἀρετή can be used in a generic or specific meaning and that moral virtue has not yet been formally introduced. Kenny therefore in effect makes only one of the three goods in the soul (viz. ἀρετή) the best good. However, this is contrary to Aristotle's threefold listing here and fails to account for the treatment of σοφία and φρόνησις in EE V [= EN VI], the discussion of pleasure in EE VI [= EN VII], and the listing of all three goods (ἀρετή, φρόνησις, ἡδονή) with φρόνησις setting the ὀρος of virtue (κολοκύγασθια = perfect virtue), with a view to contemplation in EE VIII.3 (to be discussed below).

The division of the good in the argument so far can now be displayed as follows:

\footnote{Cf. Rowe (1971) 25: "This clearly guarantees the close connection of [EE] I.1-5 with the main body of EE."}
Of the soul

All Goods

B. External

1. Prudence (φρόνησις)
2. Virtue (ἀρετή)
3. Pleasure (ἡδωνή)

Table 3.2 Division of the Good.

The goods listed in A1-3 in Table 3.2 are the area of concern in the ergon argument. The argument is confined to these three goods as the area where the human good (or happiness) will be located.

Section 3a. [1218b36-37]:

There is now a division of types of things within the soul. And since φρόνησις, ἀρετή, ἡδωνή are in the soul, they fall individually into either of two ranges of categories: conditions or capabilities, and activities or motions (1218b36-7). This provides us with the following division:

Of things in the soul

1. hexis / dunamis
2. energeia / kinesis

Table 3.3 Division of things within the Soul.

This is particularly relevant for the categorisation of the goods listed in Table 3.2 A1-3. The two divisions are not simply juxtaposed, but continue the development of a sequential argument.

Section 3b. [1218b37-19a1]:

Virtue (ἀρετή) now is split off from the other two goods of the soul. While prudence (φρόνησις) and pleasure (ἡδωνή) are activities, so that they are potentially able to be
identified with the ergon of the soul, virtue is not a work or activity, but rather is a type of condition, disposition or capability (viz. the best type of each of these). The work or use of something can be done either "virtuously" (i.e. excellently or well) or badly. So virtue (ἀρετή) is the best disposition, condition, or capability of whatever has a use or work. The work or use is primary, and the virtue is an expression of a particular manner of the use or work.

Section 4. [1219a1-5]:
Here ἀρετή must have the sense of "excellence," rather than of moral virtue, since this is explained as the best condition of whatever has a "use or work."\(^{172}\) This accounts for one of the three goods of the soul: virtue = best disposition/condition/capability of whatever has a use or work. The other two goods (prudence and pleasure) belong in the other category (at this stage left open between an instance of being-at-work or of motion). Aristotle then uses an inductive argument to prove this contention.

Here we see that the EE account is longer and more explicit than the EN account, but only because the issues raised in the EE's ergon argument are treated in EN from the very beginning in EN I.1, whereas they are treated in the EE discretely packaged together in its ergon argument.

It is claimed that because there is no mention of λόγος (reason) in the account of the ergon in EE, that the argument in EE supports a less "intellectualistic" account of happiness (but cf. 1219a16-17).\(^{173}\) The suggestion is not sustainable, however, since φρόνησις is mentioned as one of the goods of the soul that the whole argument

\(^{172}\) Contra Rowe (1971a) 34: "ἀρετή in [EE] I meant exclusively moral ἀρετή; and since this is also its commonest meaning in the human context, there is a strong temptation to go on taking it in the same way in [EE] II 1."

\(^{173}\) Woods (1982') 96.
is concerned with (1218b34), and ἐρωτηματικός in its broad sense can refer to both ὀρθή and ἐρωτηματικός, and in effect is another way of referring to the λόγον ἐχον part of the soul. Therefore, the “intellectuality” of the EE’s and EN’s ergon arguments is equivalent. This makes the conclusion of the EN in Book X easier to reconcile with the EE. However, Rowe claims that “it seems generally agreed that EE never contained any parallel to EN X.” 174 An examination of the final chapter of the EE will reveal further evidence to support the contention that the EE and EN are for the most part doctrinally equivalent and compatible.

Section 5. [1219a5]:
Therefore, the soul has a best condition which is its virtue.

Section 6. [1219a5]:
Consequently, there is also some work (ergon) of soul. Yet the work is still to be identified.

Section 7. [1219a6]:
Virtue is connected to and reflective of its corresponding work, so that a better virtue must have a better work in comparison with a lesser virtue. This allows room for there to be multiple works (erga) in the soul, but only one best work (ergon), which single work will end up being the relevant one.

174 Rowe (1971a) 34.
Section 8. [1219a6-8]:
And this is so also the case with conditions (hexeis): as conditions hold towards each other, so do the works towards each other. Therefore, the multiplicity of virtues reflects a multiplicity of erga (works), differing in their respective value.

Section 9. [1219a8-9]:
The work (ergon) of each thing is its end (telos). Therefore, virtue – since it is not a work, but a condition of a work – is not an end (except perhaps indirectly or coincidentally). The good that we are looking for will therefore not be virtue, but may have virtue as the necessary disposition of the work which is the end. Therefore, virtue has now been excluded from competition between the three goods of the soul as the good sought-for (while still being able to accompany that good). Only pleasure and prudence now remain as contenders in the ergon argument for the best end. As a consequence, the work is better than the condition (e.g. in the relevant case here, than virtue).

Section 10. [1219a10-11]:
The nature of the end is now discussed. For, the end is best, as end. This is presumably a backward reference to Aristotle’s view of the good itself (1218b10-12 and cf. EN I.1).

Section 11. [1219a11-13]:
Therefore, the work is better than the condition or disposition. This is the close of the discussion of virtue (Sections 6-11).
Section 12. [1219a13-17]:

Use or work (at 1219a1) leaves it an open question whether the *ergon* Aristotle is interested in has an active or passive sense. So, work (*ergon*) has two distinct senses:

1. Some other work beside the use (= product),\(^{175}\) and
2. Use = work (like work of sight = seeing, contemplation etc.).\(^{176}\)

The passive sense of work as product (the result of work) is now excluded from the argument and the sense of work as active (i.e. as use or as being-at-work) remains as the sole meaning intended. Interestingly, in this context *θεωρία* is mentioned explicitly as an example of the active sense that Aristotle intends in the *ergon* argument. This means that the *ergon* argument is compatible with an “intellectualist” reading.

Section 13. [1219a17-18]:

So that of those things of which there is a work or use, the use is better than the condition. This conclusion of the first quarter of the *ergon* argument confirms the conclusion reached in the discussion of virtue (Sections 6-11) at 1218a11-13.

Section 14. [1219a18-23]:

A new stage in the argument is marked by the use of the genitive absolute to sum up what has been settled so far. Woods calls this section a “subsidiary argument,”\(^{177}\) but Hutchinson shows the importance and relevance of this Section to the overall argument.\(^{178}\) Two new premises are now introduced:

\(^{175}\) Cf. *Metaphysics* 1050a23-27, and *EN* I.1. 1094a3-6.
\(^{176}\) Cf. *EN* I.1. 1094a3-6.
\(^{178}\) Hutchinson (1986) 45.
1. Virtue does not do a separate *ergon* from the mere performance of the work: it is the same *ergon* which can be done well or badly (or indifferently).

Section 15. [1219a23-24]:

2. The work of the soul is now revealed: life (cf. *Republic* 1.353d3-e6 and *EN* I.7). But as life is a compound of numerous *erga*, which *ergon* which sustains or characterises human life is not yet determined.

Section 16. [1219a24-25]:

And it is the use (or being-at-work) of life, not inactivity and rest from that work.

Section 17. [1219a25-27]:

Then the inference following on from these two premises: the *ergon* of the virtue [of soul] = a serious or excellent life.

Section 18. [1219a27-28]:

Consequently, this work [of the virtue of soul] = the complete good (= happiness).

Happiness is at last discovered, as this *ergon* of soul is the perfect/complete good sought-for. "Of virtue" seems to be the equivalent of κατ' ἀρετήν, does not denote the work that virtue has. What specific activity of life (viz. prudence or pleasure) done at the level of excellence is still not settled.
Section 19. [1219a28-29]:

Another stage of the argument now takes place (the third quarter): Aristotle brings together both halves of *EE* I with the *ergon* argument, combining the suppositions:

1. Happiness was supposed as the best thing. (This was supposed in both halves of *EE* I: cf. 1214a5 ἰδίος, with 1214a8 ἰδίος; 1217a20-22, 39-40; 1217a39-b1; 1218b10).

Section 20. [1219a29-32]:

2. The ends in the soul are the best of the goods (cf. 1218b32-36 = Sections 1-2).
3. Since activity is better than the disposition and the best activity belongs to the best condition (cf. 1218b36-1219a13 = Sections 3a-11).

Section 21. [1219a32-34]:

4. Conclusion: being-at-work of excellence/virtue (i.e. κατ' ἀρετήν) is the best thing of the soul, the best thing was said to be happiness, so that happiness is being-at-work of a good soul ("good" here relates to virtue as excellence, not moral virtue).

This definition of happiness has two component parts: 1. *energeia* (prudence or pleasure – it is not yet resolved whether it is either or both of these) and 2. virtue.

Section 22. [1219a34-35]:

Consequently, happiness = activity of a good soul. This is the second definition of happiness.
Section 23. [1219a35-36]:
Aristotle now begins the last quarter of the *ergon* argument. To both the two component parts of Aristotle’s definition of happiness (given in Section 21) Aristotle now adds that they each must be complete/perfect (τέλεων).

Section 24. [1219a36]:
And *life* is both complete and incomplete.

Section 25. [1219a36-37]:
And *virtue* – in the same way – is complete and incomplete; for, part is virtue as a whole and part is virtue as a part. Aristotle does not specify what whole (it cannot be mere life – i.e. all the parts of the soul, as the lower, shared parts will be excluded – and each part has its own *ergon*, there is not one *ergon* which does the task of all parts of the soul by its operation. The whole referred to here therefore may be less than the sum of all parts).

Secondly, the activity which will express complete virtue can only be prudence or pleasure, as these are the options (the goods in the soul which were named as the possible goods sought-for) and the only options that remain. Excellence or virtue as a whole is defined later at *EE* II.1.13-20 (which is equivalent to the material presented in *EN* I.13 and serves similarly the function of a transition to the examination of moral virtue).

Section 26. [1219a37-38]:
And *activity* of incomplete things is incomplete.
Section 27. [1219a38-39]:

Therefore, happiness is the activity of complete life in accordance with complete virtue. This is the final definition of happiness. According to Cooper, the EE's ergon argument:

is too abstract to be informative. It tells us at most only that the excellences, whatever they turn out to be, are the essential condition of a [happy] life, but if one is in doubt, or in need of confirmation, as to precisely what states of mind and character are excellences, then the abstract statement in Aristotle's conclusion is not very interesting or helpful.\(^\text{179}\)

The ergon argument provides a definition of happiness which the remainder of the EE will fill out. It is informative because it shows the place of the three goods and that they are component parts of happiness. It remains for Aristotle to examine in greater detail what these component parts are, which consists in the bulk of the remainder of the work. Cooper is under the impression that Aristotle is talking about virtues/excellences here, when in fact he is establishing the basis upon which his definition of happiness can align with the three goods (ἀρετή, φρόνησις, ηδονή), and ultimately – with their combination in the best life.

5. Conclusion of the Introduction.

EE II.1.13-20:

The excellence/virtue as a whole is not a mere summation of all the virtues of a human being: not only is virtue of body excluded, but some virtues of the soul are also excluded (e.g. the virtue of the nutritive part of the soul – 1219b20-24). However, Kenny contends that:

In the EE we are told that happiness is activity 'of complete life in accordance with complete (teleia) virtue'; and the word 'complete' has just been unambiguously glossed when Aristotle has said that 'life is either complete or incomplete, and so also virtue – one being whole virtue, another a part

\(^\text{179}\) Cooper (1975) 146.
(1219a35-9). So that when in the EE Aristotle goes on to distinguish the parts of the soul and the virtues that correspond to them, and to list examples of moral and intellectual virtues, we know that their activities are all supposed to be part of happiness. The virtue of the soul that figures in the definition of the end of man – we learn at 1220a4 – is a virtue which is constituted by the several virtues of the different parts of the soul.\footnote{Kenny (1978) 203-4.}

However, this mischaracterises what Aristotle is doing here, as will be discussed now.

We have to determine what the principle of exclusion that Aristotle uses in order to find out exactly what the virtue as a whole referred to at the conclusion of the \textit{ergon} argument is. A study of the soul is required because the principle of exclusion is confined to the parts of the soul – the body is dismissed out of hand, but the virtue sought-for will be attached to some \textit{part} of the soul (despite being called a whole) (1219b26-27).

This “virtue as a whole” (δαλη ἀρετή) which is being sought for now seems to be called by Aristotle “human virtue” (1219b27). This recalls the \textit{EN}’s \textit{ergon} argument where the lower grades of life are successively excluded from qualifying for the particularly human \textit{ergon} (\textit{EN} 1097b33-98a5), cf. 1219b38 where the relevant parts of the human soul are called particular (τὸ ἰδίον) with \textit{EN} 1097b34 (τὸ ἰδίον), i.e. particular to human beings as human beings).\footnote{Following all the manuscript readings and rejecting Ross’s supplement of ὁδεκ at 1219b38.} Thus the \textit{EE} is also delimiting the human \textit{ergon} and its corresponding excellence in a similar manner.

A division of soul now occurs, with the supposition that there are two parts of the soul which participate in reason (λόγος):

1. by issuing commands,
2. by obeying and listening to reason.

Any other part is excluded from qualifying. Therefore, it has become apparent that λόγος is the principle determining the exclusion of the parts of the soul. This part, the
one that contains λόγος, is now seen to be twofold, comprising calculation (λογισμός) and action (πράξις) at 1219b39-20a2.

Further, it is now revealed that it is only the intellectual virtues that are with reason (1220a8-10), while the other virtue of the soul consists of virtues relating to character that belongs to the non-rational part of the soul, which is yet disposed to follow the other part, which actually does have reason (1220a10-11).

So in contrast to Kenny’s interpretation, the EE is more closely aligned with the EN’s greater emphasis on the intellectual part of the soul. And virtue as a whole is not the combination of moral and intellectual virtue, but rather it is a reference to the virtues of the νοῦς or the λόγον ἔχων part of the soul. The relationship between intellectual and moral virtue is the subject matter of the concluding chapter of the EE.

I shall now examine in brief each of these three promised discussions of the three goods which underlie the Three Lives: Beginning with the examination of (moral) virtue in EE II.1.21-IV, then that of prudence in EE V [= EN VI], and thirdly that of pleasure or the issues that cluster around pleasure in EE VI-VII.

6. First Good of the Soul: Virtue.

Firstly, with regards to the first good of the soul which is examined: Excellence of character or moral virtue belongs to the non-rational part of the soul, yet by its nature it is disposed to follow the part of the soul which does have reason (EE II.1.20: 1220a10-11). The political life was seen earlier to be dedicated to virtue, which is now linked up with moral virtue. The good of the political life will now be elaborated by Aristotle (EE II.1.21-IV), i.e. moral virtue (EE II.1.21: 1220a13). So this is the examination of the first of the Three Lives – the political life and what seems to be its end, (moral) virtue.
The discussion of moral virtue also follows naturally from this definition of happiness in the *ergon* argument, and the particular individual virtues such as courage, moderation and justice are elaborated and examined in detail. Aristotle's virtue must by its nature accompany a corresponding work: the connexion to and dependence on this good to the *ergon* argument and the definition of happiness is clear.

Furthermore, it is uncontroversial that the discussion of moral virtue in *EE* II-IV is in fact the promised discussion of virtue given earlier at 1216a38, so it forms the basis of the life of the statesman and his claim to happiness.

7. Second Good of the Soul: Prudence [*EE V = EN VI*].

This discussion of prudence (φρόνησις) which constitutes the whole of *EE V* [= *EN VI*] treats the second good of the Three Lives argument. This particular good of the soul is the basis of the philosopher's life or of the contemplative life. The book consists of an examination of that part of the soul to which that life is dedicated.

The division between moral and intellectual virtue masks the fact that the two are different in kind and that in the discussion of intellectual virtue in *EE V* [= *EN VI*] a different good from virtue is being treated, namely φρόνησις – to use this term in its broad sense.

Aristotle obfuscates this important distinction by defining φρόνησις in this Book as "practical wisdom" and only using it there in that narrow, technical sense, despite having referred to the entire Book earlier as treating φρόνησις in a broader sense. This twofold usage is comparable to the dual use of νοῦς (intellect) in that Book, as we can see from this table:
Table 3.4 The Structure of Intellectual Virtue (EE V = EN VI).

\( \nu\nu\zeta_1 / \varphi\rho\varepsilon\nu\zeta_1 \)

\( \sigma\sigma\iota\alpha \quad \varphi\rho\varepsilon\nu\zeta_2 \)

\( \nu\nu\zeta_2 \quad \varepsilon\pi\nu\tau\acute{\iota}{\mu}e \)

\( \nu\nu\zeta_1 \) and \( \varphi\rho\varepsilon\nu\zeta_1 \) refer to a part of the soul, not virtues – whereas \( \varphi\rho\varepsilon\nu\zeta_2 \) is the virtue of one part of the \( \nu\nu\zeta \) (i.e. \( \nu\nu\zeta_1 \)), and \( \nu\nu\zeta_2 \) is a constituent of the virtue of the other part of the \( \nu\nu\zeta \) (i.e. \( \nu\nu\zeta_1 \)), viz. of the virtue \( \sigma\sigma\iota\alpha \).

At the beginning of the Book on intellectual virtue, the \( \nu\nu\zeta \) is divided between the only two virtues of the intellect strictly speaking: \( \sigma\sigma\iota\alpha \) (wisdom) and \( \varphi\rho\varepsilon\nu\zeta_2 \) (as shown in Table 3.4 this is prudence in the narrower, technical sense of practical wisdom). Broad \( \nu\nu\zeta \) (\( \nu\nu\zeta_1 \)) corresponds to broad or “Platonic” \( \varphi\rho\varepsilon\nu\zeta_1 \) (viz. to \( \varphi\rho\varepsilon\nu\zeta_1 \)), not to the narrow, technical sense of practical wisdom (\( \varphi\rho\varepsilon\nu\zeta_2 \)). The use of the \( \varphi\rho\varepsilon\nu\zeta_1 \) as part of the Three Lives argument relates to \( \varphi\rho\varepsilon\nu\zeta_1 \) only. \( \sigma\sigma\iota\alpha \) itself has two elements, one of which is also called \( \nu\nu\zeta \), but this is defined in a specific, technical sense which needs to be differentiated as \( \nu\nu\zeta_2 \), in order to distinguish it from \( \nu\nu\zeta_1 \), which has a much broader meaning.

Each of the two intellectual virtues – \( \sigma\sigma\iota\alpha \) and \( \varphi\rho\varepsilon\nu\zeta_2 \) – are virtues because they are perfections of the two parts of the soul which “study” the truth. The ergon argument applies here since the thinking part of the soul has two works (erga) within it relating to two different types of truth (contemplative and active) which each part achieves through its activity.

---

182 \( \nu\nu\zeta_2 \) is defined at EE V.6 [= EN VI.6. 1140b31-41a8].
183 \( \sigma\sigma\iota\alpha \) at EE V.6 (1139a7-11 for the context), and 1139b12-13.
This book also begins and ends with an important analogy. It starts by now saying that although the mean of moral virtue is set by ὀρθὸς λόγος,¹⁸⁴ this has to be more exactly spelled-out. Just like medical expertise or a doctor issues commands or instructions with some determinate defining-limit (δρός), in this case health. The books ends with the resolution of this problem, just as medical-expertise issues orders (ἐπιτάττει) for the sake of health, so does prudence in the narrow sense of practical wisdom, issue orders for the sake of wisdom.

But indeed, neither is [prudence] authoritative over wisdom nor over the better part [of the soul], just as neither is medical-expertise authoritative over health; for it does not use it, but sees how it may come into being; so it issues orders for its sake, but does not issue orders to it.¹⁸⁵

This settles the relationship between moral virtue and intellectual virtue but also between practical and contemplative wisdom. Contemplative wisdom corresponds to the role played by health in the analogy, and practical wisdom to medical expertise.

\( EE \ V \ [= \ EN \ VI] \) is the most important book within the \( EE \) (and \( EN \)) for an examination of moral knowledge, since in it Aristotle “presents us with the most unified study of the subject.”¹⁸⁶ As promised in \( EE \) 1222b7-8, “and what correct reason [is] and what defining-limit it is necessary to look off to when saying the mean, must be considered later,” (and cf. \( EN \) 1103b31-34). This examination of the determining aspect of moral virtue, though crucial for its status, is postponed at that stage and is only presented here in \( EE \ V \ [= \ EN \ VI] \). “It was thus assumed that there was a δρός τῶν μετοπετών – an ultimate standard determining all the μετοπετές, all the moral virtues described in Books \( [EN] \) III-V [roughly = \( EE \) II-IV].”¹⁸⁷ What the

¹⁸⁴ The term ὀρθὸς λόγος (orthos logos) is usually translated as “correct reason” or “right reason” (and sometimes as “right rule”).

¹⁸⁵ “Ἀλλά μήν οὖν κυρία γ’ ἐστι τῆς σοφίας οὖν τοῦ βελτίωνος μορίου, ἀλλὰ μήν τῆς ἀρχής ή ἡμερίας οὖν γὰρ χρήσται αὐτή, ἀλλ’ ὅπως γενηται ἐκείνης οὖν ἐνεκα ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλ’ ὅπως ἐκείνη.” (1145a6-9)

¹⁸⁶ Monan (1968) 64.

¹⁸⁷ Joachim (1951) 163.
aim or standard was, however, was left entirely unstated. However, according to some, “This book [viz. EN VI (=EE V)] considered as an answer to the promise in book ii [viz. 1103b31-4], is both deficient and redundant...” Allegedly, this is shown by the start of the book: “Book VI of the [EN]... seems to get off to a false start...”, since Aristotle, “takes up one line of approach only to abandon it for another....” As Shute elaborates, he thinks that it is:

[1] “deficient as giving us no real explanation of όρθος λόγος,” and
[2] “redundant as introducing the conceptions of σοφία, τέχνη, etc., which have nothing to do with όρθος λόγος at all.”

On the basis of these two points there is a discrepancy of approach between the beginning and the bulk of the book (i.e. a “false start” which allegedly implies lack of revision). But this is a false distinction or characterisation, as I shall now show.

Within 1138b18-34 there is a development (starting at 1138b25) of the argument arising out of the problematic nature of determining orthos logos (correct reason). Aristotle could not begin his account of orthos logos (correct reason) at 1138b35 from its proper point of commencement at the beginning without showing – as he does – that the prior material requires what follows, and that the prior material itself is required by Aristotle’s previous commitments, viz. that moral virtue must be determined by orthos logos (correct reason) which would be explained later. So that the statement by Shute that “If the author intended this book as an explanation of the όρθος λόγος of the second [sc. Book], he certainly forgot his intention in the working out of the book itself” is untrue. Nor is Urmson correct when he states that:

188 Shute (1888) 150.
189 Monan (1968) 64.
190 Cf. Urmson (1988) 79. “Book VI of the [EN]... seems to get off to a false start” because “In the first section of the first chapter Aristotle clearly states that he is about to examine the nature of the principles of right reason that determine the mean between excess and deficiency...”
The remainder of the chapter [1138b35-39a17], however, ignores this section [1138b18-34]; it states that there are two types of excellence [virtue] of intelligence and proposes an examination of them which is begun in Chapter 3 and continues for the rest of the book. Nowhere does Aristotle tackle the problem set out in the first section of Chapter 1 [1138b18-34... So that 1138b18-34 should be regarded as probably either a false start by Aristotle or an unfortunate editorial insertion.192

The specific responses to these criticisms are:

[1] Correct Reason (orthos logos) receives a real explanation by being equated with φρόνησις (prudence, or practical wisdom) and φρόνησις is extensively examined in this book.

[2] The conceptions of the other intellectual conditions (such as science, art, wisdom) inform the discussion and significance of φρόνησις, and as the relationship between σοφία (which itself is a combination of νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη) and φρόνησις is crucial for the argument of the Ethics since Correct Reason is φρόνησις and the ultimate end of φρόνησις is σοφία.

The entire discussion of moral virtue (EN II-V, and EE II.2-IV) has been conducted on the basis that the λόγον ἔχον part of the soul is one and indivisible. This indivisibility was re-enforced, or its problematic and divisible nature made inconspicuous by Aristotle’s use of the phrase “in accordance with ὀρθὸς λόγος” as setting the mean. It also has the function of re-enforcing the integrity or “immanence” of moral virtue. Aristotle now (1139a2-3) revisits the “psychology” of EE II (and EN I) by dividing the λόγον ἔχον into two parts (ultimately, this division will reflect the distinction between σοφία and φρόνησις), each having its own ergon (1139a16-17 and 1139b12-13) and therefore a corresponding virtue. The ergon argument is therefore retrospectively affected or has to be now re-considered in the light of this new division. The highest ergon is now σοφία: φρόνησις issues commands for the

sake of σοφία, and both these virtues together constitute φρόνησις. Moral virtue hereby collapses into φρόνησις, an intellectual virtue: the mean is set by it.

This is equivalent to the conclusion of EE VIII.3 which re-iterates the same point and where the relation between the contemplative element and φρόνησις is that of prudence ruling for the sake of the contemplative (cf. EE 1249b12-15 with EN 1145a6-9, and 1144a3-6).

8. Third Good of the Soul: Pleasure.

Thirdly and finally, the remaining good promised by Aristotle to be discussed is that of pleasure. The ergon argument has relevance to Aristotle's definition of pleasure because pleasure is an unimpeded activity or results from such an activity. The ergon which Aristotle has in mind therefore as the human good, if not identical to pleasure, is at least able to include pleasure as one of its by-products by the operation of its own work. Happiness or the human good was defined as an activity of soul, so if there are pleasures of the soul in addition to bodily pleasures, the happy life may also be a pleasant life.

However, it could seem that this section which treats pleasure as the third good of the soul is more disjointed than the discussions of virtue and of prudence, leading commentators astray in not being able to see the common thread around which the separate parts of EE VI-VII (and EN VII-IX, with the added problem of the dual account of pleasure) cluster. Not only does the discussion of continence and incontinence seem at first glance to be unconnected to the discussion of pleasure.

193 EE [= EN] 1153a15, 20; 1153b10, 16, 18, 23.
194 EE 1249a19.
195 For an argument stating a strong case for pleasure as the human good cf. Weinman (2007) esp. chp. 11.
which follows in \textit{EE VI} [= \textit{EN VII}], but in addition the treatment of friendship on our account is also placed together with it.

Firstly, as regards to the two discussions which make up \textit{EE VI} [= \textit{EN VII}], (viz. \textit{EE VI.1-10} on continence and \textit{EE VI.11-14} on pleasure) there is a clear indication that the two are not strictly separate in Aristotle’s view. At 1231b2-4 Aristotle makes the following forward reference: “And it must be determined more precisely concerning the kind of pleasures in the things said later concerning continence and incontinence.” Stewart makes the following correct characterisation:

That the subject of \textit{ηδονή} is closely connected with that of \textit{ἀχροσία} in the mind of the Eudemian writer, and that his special interest is in the \textit{σωματικα} \textit{ηδονά}, is shown by a passage, \textit{EE.III.2.1231b2} ... which promises a more accurate account of the \textit{ηδονά} when \textit{ἐγκράτεια} and \textit{ἀχροσία} come up for special discussion.\textsuperscript{196}

Unlike Stewart, Natali misses the significance of this forward reference:

Some think that in \textit{EE}, 1231b2-4... there is a reference to \textit{[EN]} book VII [= \textit{EE VI}] as consisting of its two sections on weakness of the will and pleasure. But this is not necessarily so: in our opinion the reference could be to the many distinctions among pleasures that we find in the discussion of akrasia in \textit{[EN]} VII.1-10 [= \textit{EE VI.1-10}], or to a similar discussion planned for \textit{EE}.\textsuperscript{197}

The point is that \textit{ἀχροσία} is being associated with the topic of pleasure, regardless of whether the reference is \textit{EE VI.1-10} or to \textit{EE VI.11-14}, and that alternatively Natali presupposes that this material belongs (solely) to the \textit{EN}, which he does not prove and has not been proven. Rowe makes a similar mistake:

1231b2-4 looks more promising, since it seems to connect the discussion [of pleasure] with the treatment of \textit{ἐγκράτεια} and \textit{ἀχροσία}; and this would correspond well with the pattern of \textit{[EN]} VII [= \textit{EE VI}]. But in fact Aristotle’s language suggests that he is referring here to something which actually forms part of the treatment of \textit{ἀχροσία}; hence I think that the reference is not to \textit{[EN]} VII [= \textit{EE VI}] 12-15 [= 11-14] (or its counterpart), but to the kind of division of pleasures we find in \textit{[EN]} VII [= \textit{EE VI}] 6 [= 4-5].\textsuperscript{198}

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{196} Stewart (1892) 219-20. The “Eudemian writer” is now generally agreed to have been Aristotle.
\textsuperscript{197} Natali (2009) 5 n.6.
\textsuperscript{198} Rowe (1971a) 87.
However, it suffices that the topic of pleasure is connected with the discussion of continence and incontinence for it to be included in or associated with Aristotle’s projected discussion of pleasure.

There are two primary reasons for allowing the topic of friendship to be associated by Aristotle with that of pleasure. Firstly, the importance of pleasure as a component part of friendship (especially in the best type of friendship) and secondly, because Aristotle’s final summation on the topic of pleasure includes points made within the friendship book (EE VII). We will deal here with the first point, the second point will be elaborated below in the examination of EE VIII.3.

We cannot provide a full or extensive examination of Aristotle’s view of friendship in the EE. We can merely indicate the central importance of pleasure within his account of friendship which allows him to associate the two topics closely.

There is a perplexity “whether the pleasant or the good is the object of friendship” [1235b18-19]. And since “the desired and the wished-for is either the good or the apparent good” [1235b25-27] and since this leads on to “the pleasant is an apparent good,” therefore the pleasant is desired, for it appears to be a good. Consequently, it is clear that both the good and the pleasant are an object of love” [1235b29-30]. Goods are then divided into three categories [1236a7-10]:

1. good,
2. beneficial and useful,
3. pleasant.

This leads to three types of friendship based on three characteristics [1236a7-10]:

1. virtue,
2. the useful,
3. the pleasant.
A type of person characteristically responds to each of these [1236a33-36b1]:

1. the friendship because of the useful belongs to most persons,
2. the friendship because of the pleasant belongs to the young,
3. the friendship because of virtue belongs to the best persons.

The most important category is the friendship of the best persons which is then defined as the primary friendship and then described [1236b2-5].

The pleasant and the good become identified in the case of the highest type of friendship (1236b26-32, and cf. 1237a26-27). The pleasant and the good each have two objects which need to be harmonised: the good for oneself and the simply good, and the activity of loving and the thing loved. (1236b32-39). They need to be brought together, otherwise akrasia results (1236b39-37a9): here pleasure, akrasia, and friendship combine, indicating the relevance of associating these topics together under the same thematic treatment.

Just as the book on pleasure is divided between an account of akrasia and pleasure (EE VI = EN VII), while both parts are referred to by Aristotle under the term of pleasure (at 1231b2-4), friendship in the highest case needs to bridge the chasm between the same divide. Virtue brings this about and πολιτική is the art of doing so. The “road is through pleasure” (1237a6) and “the beautiful [kala] must be pleasant” (1237a6-7): the two elements have to be congruent.

Finally, a summary is made at 1238a30-32: “So then, primary friendship both because of which the other [types of friendship] are called [friendships] is friendship in accordance with excellence/virtue, and because of the pleasure of virtue.” The importance of pleasure in the primary friendship, and therefore in Aristotle’s account of the whole phenomenon of friendship, is of central importance.
9. EE VIII.

It is sometimes supposed that in line with the Magna Moralia (MM), EE VIII should be placed before the discussion of friendship (EE VII).\(^\text{199}\) In EE VIII.3, however, each good of the soul discussed in the bulk of the ethics re-appears and a summarising conclusion is reached. This is unlike its equivalent, MM B.8-10, which has no reference back to one of the three goods – pleasure – and which therefore cannot be complete (or have a complete counterpart to EE VIII.3). This lack may be connected to MM B.8-10 being positioned before the discussion of pleasure as a good of the soul has been completed, since friendship there is yet to be treated at all. Consequently, a conclusion would have been impossible at that stage, and therefore its lack of reference back to pleasure is more likely to indicate incompleteness and confusion in the MM, either in the mind of the author, or by having a garbled and damaged textual history.

The fragmentary and disjointed nature of EE VIII has been overplayed, and one recent commentator helps us see a common thread uniting the short book:

For Aristotle clearly has Socrates in mind through-out EE viii, even if it is not clear whether (and to what extent) he agrees or disagrees with Socrates. EE viii (or what remains of it) proceeds roughly as follows. Chapter 1 explicitly rejects Socrates' identification of virtue with knowledge (episteme) as Socrates conceives it, but hints at the possibility of identifying virtue with Aristotelian phronesis, which, unlike episteme, cannot be misused. Chapter 2 then rejects the Socratic attempt (in Plato's Euthydemus) to assimilate (or reduce) good fortune to wisdom (sophia), which might easily be identified with Aristotelian phronesis. In chapter 3, then, Aristotle proceeds to clarify the relationship of phronesis, first to the goods of fortune, and then to theoretical wisdom (references to which are conspicuously absent from statements of the Socratic view). It is thus possible – pace Woods and other commentators – to read EE

\(^{199}\) Cf. Woods (1982) 184. To do so is to place greater trust in the manuscript tradition of the MM where the counterpart to EE VIII is sandwiched between the chapter on pleasure (MM B.7) and the chapters on friendship (MM B.11-17). However, certain facts militate against trusting the MM’s arrangement over the EE’s. The MM counterpart to EE VIII (viz. MM B.8-10) does not follow on naturally from the prior discussion, nor does it lead logically on to the subject of friendship. So, the proposed solution provided by the MM does not rectify the criticism made to justify the need for a transposition in first place.
viii as a coherent (if fragmentary) whole in which Aristotle aims to clarify his somewhat complicated relationship to Socrates.\textsuperscript{200}

This is a useful characterisation, since the book also culminates in a discussion of φρόνησις. However, rather than examining and interpreting the whole book we will focus on EE VIII.3, where a summarising conclusion is made, whose tripartite nature reflects the tripartite structure of the work as a whole.

**EE VIII.3.**

The final chapter of the EE consists of a re-iteration of the Three Lives argument in the light of what has been argued in the bulk of the work. It consists of three discrete sections, each devoted to one of the goods of the Three Lives, mirroring the structure of the EE itself, although in a different order:

1. Virtue (καλοκαγαθία = complete ἀρετή): (1248b8-49a17),
2. Pleasure (ἡδονή): (1249a17-21),

This chapter in fact is formed around three backward references (1248b3, 1249a17, 1249b3), around which each section is based.\textsuperscript{201} These are references which correspond to the earlier treatments of the three goods of the Three Lives; virtue, pleasure, prudence.\textsuperscript{202}

\textsuperscript{200} Whiting (1996) 164-65. Tarrant (2005) 91-93 sees EE VIII.2 as explaining Aristotle’s position on issues in Plato’s *Meno*, hence once again on issues of (post-)Socratic philosophy, here on the disposition of some individuals (especially politicians) to ‘hit the mark’ repeatedly and for no obvious reason.

\textsuperscript{201} Woods alleges that “[t]his chapter is one to which there is no parallel in *EN,*” but then goes on to contradict that statement by recognising that “[i]n some respects this chapter draws together the threads of the discussion in all the rest of EE, and to that extent it may be thought to occupy the same position in EE that is occupied by *EN* X.6-9.” Woods (1982) 184. Cf. Dirlmeier (1962) 498, “[EE] VIII 3 ist überhaupt ein Kapitel der Rückbeziehungen.”

\textsuperscript{202} Reason (logos) here (at 1249b3-4) is equivalent to correct reason (orthos logos) which is identified as prudence (φρονεσία) in the book dedicated by Aristotle as examining the issue of prudence (in the broad sense) in EE I, 1216a38. The difference between the use of logos here and nous elsewhere does not affect the question of which of the Three Lives is being referred to by these terms.
We shall now examine each of these three sections of the final chapter of the EE in detail to establish that it does in fact follow this pattern and form a summarising conclusion to the work as a whole.

**Virtue** [1248b8-49a17].

[1248b8-16]:

Previously, in *EE* II.1.21-IV, the individual moral virtues were successively examined (cf. *EE* III.1, 1228a25-26). Now, in contrast, that moral virtue which arises out of the possession of all the particular moral virtues is going to be articulated. Aristotle calls this virtue καλοκάγαθία, "perfect gentlemanship" and the person who possesses it, a καλοκάγαθός, a "perfect gentleman."\(^{203}\) It is important to note that moral virtue alone is being talked about in this section, as Verdenius shows:

> There are two kinds of virtue, moral virtues and intellectual virtues (II 1, 1220a5)... no intellectual virtues are mentioned [here]; it is obviously the perfection of the moral class [that is being treated here].\(^{204}\)

So, this section presents a discrete examination of one of the three goods of the soul.

There is a necessary connexion between the individual moral virtues and καλοκάγαθία: καλοκάγαθία comes from the individual virtues in a similar manner as a healthy body for the most part comes from healthy component parts of that body. This binds καλοκάγαθία closely to the individual moral virtues, whose treatment was referred to as being representative of the political life.\(^{205}\)

---

\(^{203}\) 1248b10-11. Literally, καλοκάγαθός is someone who is beautiful/noble and good.

\(^{204}\) Verdenius, (1971) 297. Cf. 1248b13-16 with 1220a2-4. There is some leeway given with the qualification at 1248b14-16.

\(^{205}\) Cf. 1214a30-b6, 1215a32-b1, 1215b1-5, 1216a19-21, and 1216a27-b2.
Aristotle contrasts this “perfect gentleman” with the good person, the basis of the distinction is the possession by the καλόκαγοθός of an additional element, viz. τὸ καλόν. Aristotle returns to a division of goods to define this difference. Goods are either:

1. With ends: choiceworthy for their own sakes (A).
2. Not ends (B).

The category of goods which are ends (A) is then divided in turn on the basis of whether they possess τὸ καλόν as:

1. Beautiful Goods, and therefore praised because of themselves (A₁),

Examples of each category are then given:

A₁ : Justice, moderation, etc. (viz. moral virtues).

A₂ : Health, strength, etc.

Since category A comprises goods which are ends, this second division between A₁ and A₂ type goods is itself a division of ends.

The element of praise is connected to the voluntary (a requirement of fore-choice and moral virtue), something is praiseworthy only if it is up to us to do or not do. This shows that what makes moral virtue moral virtue is what is being discussed here.

The distinction between these two categories of end (A₁ and A₂) allows for the ἀγαθός and καλόκαγοθός to be differentiated by their attitude to these goods as ends. Since A₁ and A₂ are both ends, what is at issue is the correct relation between

---

206 Cf. Rhetorica 1366a33, 1364b27-28 for a definition of τὸ καλόν.
207 Cf. Broadie (1991) 376 for her analysis of this division of ends.
208 Cf. 1223a9-20.
these two ends. Both the ἀγαθός and the καλοκαγαθός possess Α₁ in some sense, either by truly doing so in the case of the καλοκαγαθός, or by co-incidence (1249a15-16) in the case of the ἀγαθός.

[1248b26-37]:
The good person and the “perfect gentleman” are now defined with this division of goods just given in mind.

Firstly, the good person is he to whom the goods by nature are good. The “goods by nature” are presumably equivalent to Α₂. The “goods by nature” are then ends which are fought-over by those considering them the greatest goods (1248b27-28), and yet they are harmful to some on account of their character (lit. their conditions), and only the truly non-virtuous fall into this category. As a result, this excludes Α₁ from the category of “goods by nature.” Examples given of goods by nature are: honour, wealth, good-fortune, virtues of the body, capabilities.

Secondly, the “perfect gentleman” is defined as the person to whom (1) the beautiful goods because of themselves arise, and (2) by being able to effect beautiful things (for their own sake).

[1248b37-49a17]:
Aristotle now addresses the correct relation between the ends (viz. between Α₁ and Α₂). He does so via a comparison reminiscent of his earlier treatment of courage, where five specious forms of courage increasingly decline away from genuine courage, with the closest approximation being political courage.

Here too a political condition (that of the Spartans) resembles the truly virtuous condition. The political condition reverses the correct relation of ends,
believing that it is necessary to have virtue for the sake of the natural goods. Therefore, persons of such a sort are good, but not καλοκαγαθοί, since virtue is treated as purely instrumental. Broadie wonders why “[Aristotle] first (1248b8-1249a16) presents a picture of nobility [καλοκαγαθία] as if that picture were complete without reference to theoria and only then (1249a21 ff.) turns to the latter.” But this is not perplexing if one takes into account that this procedure mirrors Aristotle’s treatment of moral virtue generally (in both ethics), where the account of moral virtue (EE II.1.21-IV and EN II-V) appears complete and self-sufficient, and only with the book on intellectual virtue (EE V = EN VI) is orthos logos, which sets the mean of the individual moral virtues, revealed as prudence (φρόνησις as practical wisdom) which issues its orders for the sake of wisdom (σοφία). The same scenario will unfold itself in the third section of EE VIII.3, where φρόνησις will perform the same function for καλοκαγαθία. Just as the mean of the individual moral virtues is set by orthos logos or prudence (φρόνησις), so too in the case of καλοκαγαθία (which encompasses moral virtue as a whole) is orthos logos or prudence that which issues commands for the sake of something higher.

Aristotle completes the EE’s account of moral virtue by summarising it with two elements absent from the EE’s account of moral virtue (in EE II-IV), but present in the body of the EN’s presentation of moral virtue:

1. καλοκαγαθία being treated explicitly within the context of magnanimity (EN 1124a1-5).

2. The concept of virtue being “because of itself” (and which here is the distinctive mark of the beautiful), being treated in EN 1105a31-32.

210 Cf. our discussion of EE V = EN VI and 1145a6-11.
There is no Eudemian equivalent to the two latter passages in EE II in the general introduction to moral virtue (EE II.1.21-II.11.13, 1220a13-1228a19). In fact, τὸ καλὸν is not mentioned there at all, except for καλὸς at 1226b37, which does not have the same significance. Only with the discussion of courage does the beautiful arise as the end of virtue in the EE.

We know that "[excellences] of character belong to the non-rational [part of the soul], which is disposed to follow the [part] which by nature does have reason."211 And character is defined consistently with this understanding of moral virtue.212 This is repeated throughout: "And in all [actions] the middle which is in relation to us is best; for, this is as science and reason order" (1220b27-29). "And the [excellences] of the non-rational [part], which [is the part which] has desire..." (1221b30-34). Moral virtue itself seems merely to consist in the aligning of desire with whatever reason commands:

For, courage is compliance with reason,213 and reason orders [us] to choose the beautiful. Which is also why he who endures the terrible from any other cause than this is either out of his wits or rash; but the man who does so for the sake of the beautiful is alone fearless and courageous. So then, the coward fears even what he ought not, the rash is rash even when he ought not to be; the courageous person both fears and is confident when he ought to be, and is in this sense a mean, for he is confident or fears as reason orders. But reason does not order [us] to endure what is very painful or destructive unless it is beautiful. So then, the rash is rash about such things even if [reason] does not order [him] to be so, while the coward is not confident even if it does; the courageous person alone is confident about them, if reason orders it. (1229a1-11)

This compliance with reason is hidden behind the beautiful.

But since every excellence implies fore-choice (and how we mean this we said before, that it makes [one] choose everything for the sake of something, and this is that for the sake of which, – the beautiful), it is clear that also courage, because it is an excellence, will make [one] endure the fearful for the sake of something, so that neither because of ignorance (for, it rather makes him judge

---

211 1220a10-11.
212 "Which is why let character be this, a quality of soul in accordance with commanding reason <which is non-rational>, but able to follow reason," 1220b5-7.
213 Literally, "courage is a following ἀκολοθήτης of reason," 1229a1-2.
correctly) nor because of pleasure, but because it is beautiful, since, if it be not
beautiful but mad, he does not face the danger; for, that would be disgraceful.
(1230a26-33)

A problem with Aristotle’s account in the EE, is how to address the relation between
moral virtue as being for its own sake and also being chosen for the sake of something
else (happiness or contemplation). This is because the EE lacks a discussion of
intermediate ends (like in EN I.7) which resolves how something can be both because
of itself and for the sake of something else.

Aristotle concludes the section by identifying καλοκαγαθία as complete or
perfect virtue (viz. complete moral virtue). This sets the discussion of καλοκαγαθία
as not only the summation but also the completion of the discussion of moral virtue.
Virtue necessarily accompanies an ergon, so the ergon argument is necessarily
present here. One component of the goods of the soul has been identified as perfect
virtue, and Aristotle now moves on to a second good of the soul.

Pleasure [1249a17-21].

The second backward reference marks a summary of pleasure, one of three goods of
the soul which had a claim to making its possessor happy. Despite Woods claiming
that “In fact, it is doubtful if this section [on pleasure] belongs here at all,” there are
strong reasons for considering it a necessary part of any conclusion to the EE.

Since the EE began (I.1.1, 1214a1-8) with an assertion of the proposition that
happiness (since it is the most beautiful and best of all things) is the most pleasant, a
conclusion about the status of pleasure in the happy life is not out of place or
unexpected. In fact, the EE has to make good on its implicit promise of proving its

---

215 As Dirlmeier also sees, although for slightly different reasons, “Die Rückberufung auf die
Behandlung der Lust ist hier also nicht ein unorganisch eingesprengtes Fragment, sondern gehört zum
claim that happiness involves each of these three elements. It does so via the Three Lives argument where the claim is repeated that happiness consists in three things (1214a30-32), one of which goods is pleasure (1214a33). The three goods are re-iterated and linked to corresponding lives (1215a32-b1), with pleasure matching up with the life of enjoyment (or with that of the voluptuary – 1216a16-19). And pleasure is then promised as a future topic within the treatise to settle the question of its relation to happiness (1216a29-37).

Further, we saw that each of the three goods of the Three Lives are incorporated into the *ergon* argument (1218b34-36), which provides for the basis of Aristotle’s answer for what happiness is (1219a38-39). Via the *ergon* argument happiness was concluded to be an activity (ἐνεργεία, 1219a39) which allows the happy life to be pleasurable, if pleasure is attached to perfect activities (as it is).

Firstly, the promised treatment of pleasure is referred back to by the technical terms of analysis “ποιόν τι καὶ πῶς,”\(^{216}\) which cover the treatment of pleasure in *EE VI* [= *EN VII*] where both a definition of pleasure is provided (at 1153a7-17) and how it is a good is examined by the refutation of three opinions denying that pleasure is in fact a good:

1. That no pleasure is the good (1152b8-10) is refuted in 1152b25-53a35.
2. That pleasure is not the best good (1152b11-12) is refuted in 1153b7-54a7.
3. That some pleasures are good, but most are bad (1152b10-11) is refuted in 1154a8-b34.

This accounts for the entire *EE VI.11-14* [= *EN VII.11-14*] but does not limit the treatment of pleasure to those chapters alone because Aristotle continues on to further points about pleasure not made in that section, nor even within that book.

---

\(^{216}\) Cf. Dirlmeier (1969) 498.
Secondly, the assertion that “the simply pleasant things are also beautiful and the simply good things pleasant” (1249a18-19) is made in EE VII, the book on friendship. This assertion by Aristotle forms a syllogism which connects or identifies the simply good things as beautiful [καλόν]. It thereby links the concept of τὸ καλὸν of the previous section [1248b8-16] to pleasure and thereby in turn connects the discussion of friendship (in EE VII) to the good of the Three Lives.

Thirdly, Aristotle makes the claim that pleasure does not occur except in action (1249a19). Here action (praxis) must be understood as being equivalent to energeia in order to match up with a prior claim compatible with this remark. An underlying activity being in operation is the source of pleasure. The connexion of this to the ergon argument is clear.

Aristotle links the pleasure which results from this activity to the pleasure of the happy person, and the conclusion drawn “the truly happy person will live most pleasantly” (1249a20-21). The final chapter of the EE is a conclusion about who the happy person is, this reference does not limit him to the life of the voluptuary (i.e. to one alone of the three goods), but each of the three goods are connected.

So far in this chapter virtue and pleasure belong to the happy person, what remains is the only good of the soul yet to be included in the final summation as part of the happy life and how it relates to the other two goods. The final section of EE VIII.3 provides the answer which fills this gap.

**Prudence** [1249a21-b25].

Aristotle returns to the problem which we saw was implicit within his examination of καλοκαγαθία: the standard by reference to which the καλοκαγαθος chooses the

---

217 EE VII 1235b30-36a6, 1237a4-9, 1237a26-27, 1237a32-33.
218 For a similar use of praxis in this manner cf. EN 1094a5, 17.
219 Cf. 1153a1 (and note the connexion of this with contemplation), 1153b10 and 16.
natural goods. In the first section this standard was hidden behind the term τὸ καλὸν. It is the third good of the soul which provides the resolution of this problem and so it becomes the necessary subject-matter of the final section of the chapter — completing thereby the final examination of all three goods of the soul, and the three sections together explain the relationship between those three goods.

Jennifer Whiting makes a comparable claim about the relation between the first and last sections of EE VIII.3:

Aristotle’s point [which links the two sections] seems to be that knowing the contemplative standard with reference to which natural goods are to be chosen is what distinguishes the kalokagathos from the merely agathos, and saves him from the fate of the Spartans. We needn’t take this to require that the kalokagathos himself live the contemplative life. He may be a legislator…. 220

However, since φρόνησις is an internal good (i.e. a good of the soul), the section concerns internal relations of the soul, and not relations between external parties, so the option of a legislator helping out others is not available here. What is at issue is which of the Three Lives provides happiness. In the prior two sections, both virtue (perfect virtue, καλοκαγαθία) and pleasure are present and now what is being asserted is in effect that it is requisite for the καλοκαγαθία to live the contemplative life. Pleasure necessarily accompanies perfect activities and καλοκαγαθία needs for its completion a standard provided by φρόνησις. All Three Lives are inter-related, but in such a way that the contemplative life or its good (contemplation) will be seen to be the standard.

Accordingly, this final section of EE VIII.3 treats prudence in the broad sense (our φρόνησις), while using that term in the narrow sense of practical wisdom (our φρόνησις). The promise of an examination of φρόνησις and its accompanying contemplative life was given in EE I (1214a30-33, 1215a34-b2, 1216a10-16, 27-29,

38), then linked to the human good (1218b10-14) as the end or that for the sake of which of a life, and this end also happens to be happiness (cf. 1217a39-40). Additionally, it is identified as one of the three goods of the soul contained within the ergon argument (1218b34). The promised treatment of this good is then fulfilled in EE V [= EN VI] where the nous (the equivalent of φρόνησις1) was divided into two parts which have a corresponding work (ergon) and therefore a corresponding virtue: σοφία and φρόνησις (in the sense of φρόνησις2).221 The hierarchy between these two virtues is established at the conclusion of EE V [= EN VI].

Just as the first section on καλοκαγαθία mirrored Aristotle’s treatment of moral virtue in the main part of the work, so too does the third section mirror Aristotle’s treatment of nous or intellectual virtue in EE V [= EN VI] where a prior standard required of moral virtue (which was provided by orthos logos) is then revealed as φρόνησις (in the sense of practical wisdom), which issues commands for the sake of σοφία. And these two intellectual virtues have the same relationship as that between ικτρική and ὑγίεια.222

[1249a21-b6]:
A doctor has a standard (ὅρος) with a view to which he judges whether a body is healthy or not, and how to go about correcting the situation. This standard is health. But also for a serious person (the person who possesses moral virtue) there needs to be a ὅρος too: with a view to which actions and choices of the goods by nature, which are not praised, are done or taken on. This does not refer back to the problem addressed at the start of EE V [= EN VI], the mean of moral virtue, since that issue has already been settled by φρόνησις being orthos logos:

222 EE V [= EN VI] 1138b18-32 and 1145a6-11.
In *EN V I* [= *EE V*], 1144b32-1145a2, Aristotle unequivocally adopts the position that the various virtues (in the full sense) cannot be separated from one another; equally, since the possession of (e.g.) courage, in the full sense, involves practical wisdom, there can be no question of courage’s prompting someone to make the wrong choice. So there is no need for a standard to be appealed to either in the acquisition or in the use of goods other than natural goods.223

But the involvement of practical wisdom (φρόνησις) involves additionally the fact that it issues its commands for the sake of wisdom (σοφία). And so this characterisation by Woods ignores the identity of the two standards being used and therefore leads to the following difficulty: “...the question still remains how fine [καλόν] states of character and actions are recognized as such, and to this no answer is offered.”224 Whereas the question is resolved if both the mean and the κολοκύγιαθός have the same standard.

Here Aristotle provides the answer by saying it is “as reason says.” This is an obvious reference back to *orthos logos*;225 It is the same standard, but applied to the resolution of a different, but related, issue.

This is why Monan is wrong to maintain that the ὁρφός here is not intended to furnish a standard of right and wrong action, but merely of the right and wrong use of external goods.226 As pointed out by Taylor, the validity of this distinction is doubtful, since “it is Aristotle’s view (*EN* 1178a28-33) that the moral virtues require the use of external goods; so a norm for the correct use of the latter would be *ipso facto* a norm for the former also.”227

---

224 Ibid.
225 The basis for the concept of *orthos logos* is laid in 1220a10-11 and relates to the division of the soul; it is extended in 1220b5-6 by the term *kata epitaktikon logos*, which fore-shadows its identity with prudence (practical wisdom); it is then simply referred to as *orthos logos* for the most part in 1220b6; 1220b28; 1222a9; 1222a34; 1222b7 (twice); 1225a3; 1227b17; then it also appears in the account of the virtues: 1229a2, 7, 8; 1229b6, 1231b32-33 where ὁρφός is equated with *orthos logos*; 1233a22; and 1233b6.
226 Monan (1968) 129, 131.
227 Taylor (1970) 166-7. Taylor goes on to say, “Further, while in his concluding specification of the standard (*EE* 1249b17-21) Aristotle explicitly mentions external goods only, the subject had already...
Aristotle asserts that it is necessary to live with a view to the ruling element (that is, with a view to one of two parts which is higher in a relationship of ruling and being ruled). And it is necessary to live with a view to the condition in accordance with the activity (energeia) of the ruling element (1249b7-8). An example is given; a slave lives with a view to his master (1249b8). And each lives with a view to the appropriate rule of each. That is, composite – not part/element – is referred to in 1249b8-9. And since also a human being is composed of a ruling element and a ruled element, it is necessary that each human being live with a view to their rule (1249b9-11). This distinction is obviously that between the body and soul:

And first an animal is composed of a soul and a body, of which the former is the ruling element by nature and the latter is the ruled element. 229 So, it is not at this stage a human soul alone that is being talked about in EE 1249b9, but rather the distinction between body and soul. 230 However, Aristotle now makes a point which has relevance for later distinctions he does make within the soul: the rule (ἀρχή 1249b11) with a view to which each human being lives is twofold, on the following analogy [1249b12]:

1. Medical expertise (ἰατρική): Rule type A
2. Health (ὑγίεια): Rule type B

Rule type A is for the sake of Rule type B (cf. EN VI, 1145a6-ff.). So, ἰατρικὴ (A) issues its commands for the sake of ὑγίεια (B). This distinction and relation will be

been introduced (1249a22-b3) under the heading of a standard for right action and choice of goods, while the reference (b4-5) to earlier discussions appears to refer to such topics as his treatment of the mean in Book ii (cf. e.g. 1222b6-10), where a standard is required to fix in the first instance the right amount of pleasure and pain that one should feel, which will in turn determine what kind of a man one is. 167, emphasis in the original.

228 “Each” (1249b11) refers to each human being (Solomon, Dirlmeier, Rowe), not each element (contra Verdenius), because it is a relationship between the elements.

229 Politics 1254a34-b9.

230 Cf. Politics 1277a6, and 1334b17-22. The Protrepticus also has relevant passages; Pistelli 34, 9-16; 34, 19-22; 38, 14-16; 41, 15-22; 52, 12-16.
now applied to the composite — the contemplative part of the soul — which must also have within it an element of both types of rule.\textsuperscript{231}

[1249b13-16]:

This section provides the answer as to what the identity of the requisite ruling element is with a view to which we should live our lives (first called-for by Aristotle in 1249b6-9). He begins with the following sentence: “So it holds with the contemplative \( \text{θεωρητικόν} \) [sc. part of the soul].” [1249b13]. This brief statement gives rise to two questions:

1. What is the manner indicated by “so [οὐτὸς]”?
2. What is the contemplative \( \text{θεωρητικόν} \)?

οὐτὸς according to Smyth, “generally refers to what precedes.”\textsuperscript{232} So, Aristotle is applying his twofold rule to being present within the contemplative element itself (i.e. within part of the soul, cf. \textit{EE V} [= \textit{EN VI}] 1139a6-8 \( \text{θεωρούμεν} \) applying to both parts of the λόγον \( \varepsilonχον \) part of the soul, identified as νοῦς at 1139a8 and elaborated upon at 1139a21-b13). The earlier usage at \textit{EE II.10}, 1226b25-26, is compatible with my reading.\textsuperscript{233}

\( \text{θεωρητικόν} \) here cannot be σοφία or prudence (in the narrow, technical sense of practical wisdom or \( \phiρόνησις_{2} \)) since \( \text{θεωρητικόν} \) has a distinction within itself of two elements which in turn exhibit rule type A and B. \( \text{θεωρητικόν} \) here therefore represents a pairing of two elements interrelated in the manner just listed between rule

\textsuperscript{231} \( \text{καὶ 1249b9} \) does connect to οὐθρόπος since another composite consisting of two parts has been mentioned, viz. the master/slave relation (1249b8), contra Verdenius (1971) 287. Dirimeier (1962) translates it as “auch der Mensch,” (ad loc.) in line with my interpretation.

\textsuperscript{232} Smyth (1956) 307, §1245. Verdenius (1971) 288 fails to explain how his reading makes sense of \( \phiρόνησις \) having two rules — σοφία and \( \delta \text{ θεός} \). His multiplication of entities (rules) is not required.

\textsuperscript{233} Verdenius (1971) 292 reverses the correct relationship: “The faculty of contemplation is at the same time a faculty of deliberation…” The νοῦς comprehends within itself both the contemplative and the active (practical) reasoning parts.
A and B (viz. in 1249b12). So while it cannot be either wisdom or prudence as a single element, it can be both combined (or cover both elements).

Verdenius says "θεωρητικών. The faculty of contemplation, i.e. the νοῦς." 234 This we agree with since it is in line with our interpretation of the νοῦς = φρόνησις = (σοφία + φρόνησις). 235 But Verdenius fails almost immediately to understand this by claiming that θεωρητικών is not "a term denoting the whole of th[e] rational part [of the soul]...[but] a special function" 236 i.e. only one part of the rational part of the soul, as if θεωρητικών = σοφία or φρόνησις, rather than encompassing both.

The next sentence [1249b13-15] explains this very relationship between the parts of the contemplative element (see γάρ, 1249b14). As we already know from 1249b12, the twofold rule is a "that for the sake of which" relation. Therefore, with these two types of rule (A and B), the latter is for the sake of the former: prudence is for the sake of "the god." But this "that for the sake of which" relation also has two different meanings, so the particular meaning has to be delimited. 237 So, Aristotle has now to point out which of the two he has in mind, which he immediately does at 1249b15-16.

Aristotle rules out the first option of it being for the object’s benefit (since the god is in need of nothing, 1249b15), so the second meaning of "that for the sake of which" as end is the one meant here. This is the good sought-for in the ergon argument, which embodied Aristotle’s own conception of the good. 238 So, prudence is for the sake of the god or issues commands for the sake of the god – not for the god’s

---

234 Ibid. 291.
235 Cf. our interpretation of EE V [= EN VI].
236 Verdenius (1971) 291.
237 1249b15-16: for the digression on term “that for the sake of which” cf. Physics 194a35; De Anima 415b2, 20; Metaphysics 1072b14. “For the sake of which” can mean that either A is for B’s benefit, or B is the end or standard of A.
238 Cf. EE I.8 1218b10-12 and II.1 1219a8-11.
benefit, but as the end or standard of prudence (the same relation that prudence has to wisdom).

Verdenius does not like what he sees as prudence being the ruled element in the relationship, since he claims that prudence "could not be said to command" as at 1249b15 if that were the case. But Aristotle makes a distinction between two types of ruling: ordering to something lower ("authoritative rule") and ordering for the sake of something higher ("submissive rule," like prudence in relation to wisdom), and since prudence does at least one type of ordering, it does rule even if it is for the sake of something higher than itself. An analogy for this can be given: There are levels of command in an army — up until the highest level — and each one lower is subordinate in a sense, but rules or commands no less because of that.

Dirlmeier tries to support the same position, but with a reference to MM A.35 1198b7-ff. Here Verdenius thinks that "in the present passage Ar[istotle] does not say that the rational part of the soul consists of a ruler and a subject, but that a man (ἄνθρωπος) consists of a ruler and a subject." But if the θεωρητικόν is the rational part of the soul, and the θεωρητικόν has the same relation of rule (the twofold rule on the analogy of medical expertise and health) as we have seen that it does (cf. our discussion of 1249b13), then prudence is both ruled and rules or issues commands for the sake of ὁ θεός (again, the same relation as that between prudence and wisdom).

Verdenius has to rely for his argument on a manuscript variant (not found in any Greek manuscript) from the De Bona Fortuna. However, the Latin translation of EE 1248a28-29 in the De Bona Fortuna is suspect since it is a 13th century AD Latin translation of a work passing itself off as an authentic work of Aristotle's, but in fact

---

239 Verdenius (1971) 290.
240 At EN VI [= EE V] 1145a9 and for the context, 1145a6-11.
241 Verdenius (1971) 290.
242 Ibid. 291 and 291 fn.13 he thinks that the reading is "practically certain."
consisting of selections from the *MM* and *EE* VIII, so in fact a selected compilation.243 The translation is also of Christian provenance and concerning an issue of potentially religious significance. However, the issue there is that of succeeding in the realm of chance, contrary to reason (cf. 1247b18-18 with 1248a32). Verdenius' argument reduces to the *reductio ad absurdum* of λόγος ruling for the sake of the ἐλεγχος. The connexions Verdenius draws then do not hold together.

Verdenius has to concede that Aristotle "regards human reason as divine."244 The issue of the interpretation of what Aristotle means by "the god" here is similar to the problems associated with the identity of the maker or active intellect in the *De Anima* III.5. There seems to be an irreducible duality of the intellect into human and divine elements or characteristics which should not be expected to be resolvable in an ethical treatise (if it is resolvable at all).

Kenny is "unable to settle the... ambiguities of οὕτω and θεωρητικόν [in 1249b13]."245 Fortunately, Aristotle immediately explains these two issues in the next sentence (shown by the explanatory γάρ – 1249b14). Both ὁ θεος and φρόνησις exhibit a (different) type of rule, parallel to that of the relation between health and medicine, otherwise the god would have to replace θεωρητικόν in 1249b13, to match up with the correct ruling relationship with φρόνησις. Therefore, the meaning of οὕτω here is that θεωρητικόν contains two elements (viz. that, as Aristotle says, it is twofold – the point made by him immediately before asserting that θεωρητικόν holds in the same way). If θεωρητικόν is twofold and contains something higher – the god – and something lower – φρόνησις – θεωρητικόν cannot be equivalent to σοφία alone, θεωρητικόν must therefore be the only other option given Aristotle's division

243 Cf. Appendix 6 in Thomas Aquinas (1990) for a discussion of this compilation.
244 Verdenius (1971) 291.
of the soul in EE V [= EN VI]: it must be equivalent to νοῦς (in its broad sense of νοῦς). The consequence is that “the god” is either a euphemism for σοφία or a reference to the active intellect.

There is a dispute whether “contemplation of the god” uses an objective or subjective genitive, viz. is the god the object or subject of the contemplation? But in the light of chapter five of the De Anima, it might be best to treat both as at play here since there is a distinction within the intellect between a perishable embodied intellect and an immortal, separate intellect. These are the so-called active and passive intellect. The immortal, separate intellect may be identical to the prime mover of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which is also called the god. So, since intellect is god for Aristotle, and we human beings have intellect – though it perishes and cannot always be at work in thinking – our intellect can be called divine. Or, in a way, it is the same intellect.

The twofold division of the θεωρητικόν corresponds to the division between λογιστικόν and ἐπιστημικόν in EE V [= EN VI], the unity of which is called νοῦς (our νοῦς) and both of which parts practise a type of θεωρεῖν and so can in one sense both be called when combined “contemplative” (θεωρητικόν). 246

[1249b16-21]:
The solution to the original difficulty of what ὁρος of the serious (virtuous) person is is now provided (cf.1249a24-b3). The advancement of the contemplation (θεωρίω) of the god (1249b17). Contemplation – the good of the contemplative life – is the defining limit with a view to which one must live one’s life.

246 Cf. De Anima 413b25.
Verdenius asserts that "It is extremely unlikely that Aristotle should have used the term ὀνοματικὸς to denote the human νοοτροπία." However, a quick glance at the parallel passage in *MM* 1208a19-20 where ὀνοματικὸς is simply replaced by νοοτροπία, shows the reverse of his argument that, by contrast, it is the way that the passage is to be understood.

[1249b21-23]:

This standard of contemplation is also applicable within the soul itself, and is the best defining-limit of the soul: when it least of all perceives the non-rational part of the soul (insofar as it is "of that sort," viz. insofar as it is non-rational). There is a hierarchy within the soul, from its lowest, non-rational elements up to the rational elements, and within the rational elements between the two types of rule being exercised.

[1249b23-25]:

According to Woods,

...in the text of *EE* as we have it, this chapter is not a concluding chapter, unless the final sentence (1249b24-25) is to be condemned as spurious; its wording makes it clear that the end of the chapter as we have it is only a stage of the discussion that has been reached and there is more to follow.

Woods here reads the μὲν ὁδὸν (1249b23) not as a compound but as a μὲν solitarium.

The compound μὲν ὁδὸν has a compound force which is assertive. This use of μὲν

---

247 Verdenius (1971) 290.
248 In addition cf. Plato’s *Alcibiades* I 133c4-6, where according to the best reading of the text (B) the finest part of the soul is the bit concerned with knowing and ἃ ἐφοβετόν, and this is 'its god.' The passage is very controversial, especially what follows at c8-17 in Burnet, which Tarrant (2007) has shown was not read by ancient commentators. The de-theologising of human reason seems to be of Christian provenance.
249 Woods (19821) 184.
Rather than indicating something to follow, the final sentence can accordingly be read as a conclusion.

10. Conclusion.

The EE began with the Three Lives and their corresponding goods. The ergon argument located these three goods as goods of the soul (internal goods) about which the argument of ethics as a whole is concerned. The three goods were then successively examined in the bulk of the work. Finally, a concluding chapter revisits each of these three goods and fits them together in a hierarchically arranged whole. The final section on ἕρωκήσις leads to the affirmation of the contemplative life and to the subordination of καλοκάρικα to contemplation, just as prudence sets the mean of moral virtue, and issues orders for the sake of wisdom. The final sentence of the section and of the entire EE affirms exactly the same point: “So then, what the defining-limit of ‘perfect gentlemanship’ is and what the aim of the simply good things [is], let it have been said.” And this defining limit of moral virtue is contemplation, an activity which will by its nature also be intrinsically pleasant. The three elements are combined in the end as one.

We see that very similarly to the Protrepticus the happiest life is one which expresses each of the goods that are the basis of the Three Lives – only the contemplative life offers this combination. Also, the life of philosophic contemplation is vindicated as that for the sake of which prudence (in the narrower, technical sense of practical wisdom) issues its orders. It can be regarded, then, as a fitting conclusion to the EE and a summary of its component parts and their inter-relationship.

---

251 See Appendix 2 at the end of this chapter for an examination of this feature.
### Appendix 1

The Structure of the EE’s Ergon Argument.

| 1218b | 31 | μετά δὲ ταύτ’ ἄλλην λαβοῦσιν ἀρχήν περὶ τῶν ἐπο-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>32</th>
<th>μένων λεκτέων.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>πάντα δὴ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἢ ἐκτὸς ἢ ὁμοίημα.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>καὶ τοῦτον αἱρετάτερα τὰ ἐν τῇ ἰσορροπιᾷ, καθάπερ διαφορομεθα</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td>καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις: φρόνησις γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>καὶ ἣδονή ἐν ὁμοίημα, ὅτι η ἔνια ἢ πάντα τέλος εἶναι δοκεῖ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>πᾶσιν.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3a</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>τῶν δὲ ἐν ὁμοίημα τὰ μὲν ἔξεις ἢ δύναμεις εἰσί, τὰ δὲ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3b</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>ἐνεργεία καὶ κινήσεις. ταύτα δὴ οὕτως ὑποκείσθω καὶ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
<td>περὶ ἀρετῆς, ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ βελτίστη διάδεσις ἡ ἔξεις ἢ δύναμις</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ἐκάστης, ὡς ἐστὶ τις τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ ἔργον.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 1219a</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>δῆλον δ’ ἐκ τῆς</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ἐπαγωγῆς, ἐπί πάντων γὰρ οὕτω τίθημεν. οἷον ἐμπιστευόμενον ἀρετὴ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>ἔστιν καὶ γὰρ ἔργον τι καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιστήμην τῆς ἔξεις τὸν ἐμπιστευόμενον ἀρετὴν ἔστιν. ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ πλούσια καὶ οἰκίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>ὡστε καὶ ὁμοίημα.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>ἐστὶ γὰρ τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆς.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>καὶ τῆς βελτίστονος δὴ ἔξεως ἔστω βέλτιστον τὸ ἔργον.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>καὶ ὡς</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>ἐξουσιών αἱ ἔξεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦτον πρὸς ἀλλήλα ἐκέινα.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>καὶ τέλος ἐκάστου τὸ ἔργον.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>φανερὸν τοῖν τοὺ τοῦτον ὅτι βέλτιστον τὸ ἔργον τῆς ἔξεως.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἀριστον ὡς τέλος; ὑπεκείντι γὰρ τέλος τὸ βελτίστον καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον, οὐ ένεκα τάλλα πάντα.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>ὅτι μὲν</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|        | 12 | τοῖν τὸ ἔργον βέλτιστον τῆς ἔξεως καὶ τῆς διαδέσεως, δῆ-
|        | 13 | λον. |
| 13     | 13 | ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔργον λέγεται διχῶς, τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ἐτέρων τοῦ ἔργου παρά τὴν ἡρμῆνευσιν τοῦ ὕμνου ὁμοιοδομικῆς οἰκίας|
|        | 14 | ἀλλ’ οὐκ ὡμοιοδομησις καὶ ἱστορικῆς ὕμνου διὰ ἀλλ’ οὕτως ἡ ἀριστοκρατίας ὑπερθέασις ωδῆ ἀναιρεσις, τῶν δ’ ἡ ἡρμῆνευσιν ἔργου, οὕτως ὑμνωσις ὅρασις καὶ μαθηματικῆς ἐπιστήμης ὑμνωσις. |
| 14     | 17 | ὅτι’ ἀνάγκη, δὴ ἔργον |
|        | 17 | ἡ ἡρμῆνευσιν βελτίστον εἶναι τῆς ἔξεως. |
| 14     | 17 | τὸ ἔργον δὲ τοῦ-
|        | 19 | τοῦ τὸν πράγματος καὶ τῆς ἡρμῆνευσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ὡμοιοδομησις, οἷον σκυ-
|        | 20 | τοτοκρίτης καὶ σκυτήσεως ὑποδημα: εἰ δὴ τῆς ἐστὶν ἡρμῆνευσις |
|        | 21 | σκυτοκρίτης καὶ σκυτήσεως σκυτήσεως, τὸ ἔργον ἐστὶ σκυτήσεως |

Page 110
<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>ὑπόδημα, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>ἔτι</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>ἐστω ψυχῆς ἔργον τὸ ζῆν ποιεῖν.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>τὸ ἔργον ἀνάγκη ἐν καὶ ταῦτα εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>ὅστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ ζῆν ποιεῖν, τῆς ἀρετῆς ως σπουδαία.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>τούτ' ὥρα ἐστὶ τὸ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>τέλεον ἀγαθόν, ὅπερ ἦν ἡ εὐδαιμονία.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>δήλον δὲ ἐκ τῶν</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>ὑποκειμένων (ἂν μὲν γὰρ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἀριστον,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>τὰ δὲ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>τέλη ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ τὰ ἄριστα τῶν ἄγαθῶν, &lt;τὰ ἐν&gt; αὐτῇ δὲ ἦν ἐνεργεία, ἐπεὶ βέλτιον ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς διαθέσεως</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>καὶ τῆς βελτίστης ἐξεις ἡ βελτίστη ἐνέργεια,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>ἡ δ' ἀρετή</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>βελτίστης ἐξεις, τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνεργειαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀριστον</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>εἶναι. ἦν δὲ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἀριστον.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>ἐστιν ὥρα ἦν</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἀγαθῆς ἐνεργεια.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>ἐπεὶ δὲ ἦν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τέλεον τι</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>καὶ ἐστὶ ζωὴ καὶ τελέα καὶ ἀτελῆς,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>καὶ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>ἀρετὴ ἰσαύτως (伢 μὲν γὰρ ὦλῃ, ἦ δὲ μόριον),</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>ἦ δὲ τῶν</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>ἀτελῶν ἐνεργεια ἀτελῆς,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>εἶ ἦν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ζωῆς τελειας</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>ἐνεργεια κατ' ἀρετῆν τελειαν.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2

Examples of μὲν οὖν finishing a completed section.

EE:
1230a33 (with εἰρήσται 1230a35); 1239b2 (with εἰρήσται 1239b5); 1240a5 (with εἰρήσται 1240a7); 1240b37; 1241a33 (with εἰρήστω 1241a33);

EN (plus common books):
1094b10-11; 1096a10; 1105a13 (with εἰρήστω 1105a16); 1106a12 with εἰρήσται 1106a13); 1117b20 (with εἰρήστω 1117b21); 1122a16 (with εἰρήστω 1122a17); 1123a31; 1125a34 (with εἰρήσται 1125a35); 1126b9 (with εἰρήστωσαν 1126b10); 1134a14 (with εἰρήστω 1134a15); 1138b13 (with διώρισθω 1138b14); 1139b35 (with διώρισθω 1139b36); 1143b14 (with εἰρήσται 1143b17); 1145b20; 1147b17 (with εἰρήστω 1147b19); 1149a21; 1152a34 (with εἰρήσται 1152a36); 1152b23; 1154b32 (with εἰρήσται 1154b33); 1159b23; 1163b27 (with εἰρήστω 1163b28); 1172a14 (with εἰρήστω 1172a15); 1172b7; 1174a11 (with εἰρήστω 1174a12).

Example of a μὲν οὖν having no corresponding δέ: 1146b6.
Example of δέ beginning a book without a prior μὲν: 1119b22.
Example of μὲν οὖν not requiring a δέ, while concluding a book: Politics 1274b26-34, with the μὲν οὖν at 1274b26.
Chapter Four: *The Nicomachean Ethics.*

In this chapter I will argue that the *EN* follows the pattern established in the *Protrepticus* and *EE*: the *EN* is a tripartite examination of the three goods (or lives) made whole by the continuous underlying presence of the *ergon* argument which allows for the supremacy of the contemplative life and its comprehensive inclusion within itself of all three goods of the soul.

1. Introduction.

The two main schools of interpretation of the *EN* take contrary positions on the central issues of the status of contemplation (θεωρία) and the content of happiness (εὐδοκιμία) in the *EN*. One school says that Aristotle’s account of happiness in the *EN* is “inclusive,” covering all sorts of good things – not especially contemplation, with moral virtue being predominant, the other school says that Aristotle’s account of happiness in the *EN* is “exclusive,” or where contemplation is “dominant,” and in which it is often said to be so at the expense of moral virtue. The coherence and consistency of Aristotle’s position has been challenged by both sides of the debate, since there is textual support for at least part of either side’s argument.

It was Hardie’s discussion of the *EN* which introduced these terms in which much of the interpretation of the *EN* has since been conceived. Expanding on Hardie’s ideas, Ackrill believes that Aristotle presents an “inclusive” position on happiness in *EN* I which is in tension with the conclusion in *EN* X. He thinks that

---

252 We find the following selected scholars: W. F. Hardie, Amelie Rorty, Richard Kraut, Sarah Broadie, and Terence Irwin.
253 We find the following selected scholars: J. D. Monan, J. L. Ackrill, John Cooper, Thomas Nagel, Anthony Kenny, and Kathleen Wilkes.
254 Hardie (1965).
the constituents of happiness are all those activities chosen for their own sake. Aristotle says (1098a17-18) that happiness or the human good is the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, but if there are more virtues, in accordance with "the best and most complete" virtue. This raises two problems for Ackrill about the coherence of the EN's teaching:

1. With regards to the question, "What is the criterion of right action and of moral virtue?" Aristotle "does not... take up this question [of what is the right rule and what is the standard that fixes it] in any direct way in [EN] book six" where the matter is explicitly raised in order to be then answered.256

2. With regards to the question, "What is the best life for a man to lead?" this seems to be answered ambiguously by Aristotle, since "[m]ost of the Ethics implies that good action is – or is a major element in – man's best life, but eventually in Book 10 purely contemplative activity is said to be perfect eudaimonia" and "Aristotle does not tell us how to combine or relate these two ideas."257

Ackrill believes that EN I-IX present an "inclusive" doctrine of eudaimonia, while EN X presents a "dominant" doctrine. Hardie, Ackrill, Kenny and those scholars who follow their interpretations claim that the EN I has a strong dominance view of the end, which is not inclusive, while Kraut and Richardson Lear argue the contrary.258

For the scholars who do not limit their studies to the EN, but include the EE, there is a further distinction between those who see a harmony259 or a conflict260 between the doctrines of the EN and EE on the status of happiness or contemplation. Those who see a harmony between the works are a distinct minority. However, for the

256 Ibid. 15
257 Ibid.
259 For example, Pierre Defourny (1977).
ones who see a doctrinal conflict between the EE and EN, the EE has a consistent and “inclusive” conception of happiness, while the EN has an “exclusive” and a consistent (or inconsistent) conception of happiness. Consequently, the two main Aristotelian ethical treatises are considered as at odds with each other. Such “separatists” have sometimes made the case that the EN actually presents an immoral or amoral ethical position and this has led to a preference for the EE as presenting the better moral teaching. Nightingale neatly tells us what is potentially at stake here:

if theoria has no bearing on virtuous praxis, then the theoretical philosopher does not have to be an exceptionally good person (and, correlatively, he need not practice theoria in order to engage in virtuous action). In fact, even if the theoretical philosopher does practice some virtues to live well overall, he will organize his life around the pursuit of a noetic activity that is neither practical nor political. As a private theoros, Aristotle’s philosopher is not obliged to report back to people on his findings or to justify his activity in practical terms. In fact, qua theorist, he does not interact in the social or political world. Theoretical wisdom, in short, is essentially amoral.261

The issue of the amorality of Aristotle’s ethical teaching is present both within the EN itself and between the EN and EE. Consequently, the burden of this chapter will be to show both the doctrinal compatibility of the EE and EN and the internal consistency of the EN itself. The coherence of the EN’s internal teaching will first be examined, after which its doctrinal compatibility with the EE will be apparent.

Kenny claims that “no explanation [of the EN] succeeds in the three goals which most commentators have set themselves: (1) to give an interpretation of [EN] book I and [EN] book X which does justice to the texts severally; (2) to make the two books consistent with each other; (3) to make the resulting interpretation one which can be found morally acceptable by contemporary philosophers [sc. scholars].”262

Kenny finds that the EE overcomes these difficulties by presenting a coherent moralistic teaching. We have seen in Chapter Three on the EE, that Kenny’s

moralistic reading is not sustainable, and that the contemplative life is vindicated at the end of that work.\(^{263}\)

However, our own position will be that neither the inclusive nor the exclusive interpretation of the *EN* is correct. Both interpretations take only one side of the issue and concentrate on it to the exclusion of the other. The correct resolution centres on identifying the Three Lives argument as that which limits the range of goods concerned and seeing that the *ergon* argument combines those goods together into one activity.

On the one hand, the inclusive interpretation is too broad in its inclusion of goods of all types as components of happiness, often going so far as to downplay or discount the inclusion of σοφία or νοῦς in the happiest life.\(^{264}\) the component parts of happiness are three (and only three) comprising a unified whole whose parts form a hierarchical relationship between themselves. Rather than goods of all types being included by Aristotle the goods in question are explicitly limited by him to the goods of the soul (the *ergon* argument is specifically related to the soul – 1098a7, 13, 16 and the post-ergon alignment with ένδοξα also makes this point, 1098b12-16). This excludes bodily goods and goods of fortune (viz. those goods whose possession is dependant on chance). This exclusion occurs because bodily goods and goods of fortune or chance can only be either necessary conditions for happiness or only have a negative and never a positive contribution to happiness.

On the other hand, the exclusive interpretation focuses on the predominant element of the three more-final goods (viz. σοφία or νοῦς) and excludes the presence of virtue and pleasure in the best life. The inclusive and exclusive interpretations

---

\(^{263}\) Richardson Lear (2004) attempts to reconcile all three of Kenny’s concerns. She follows Kraut (1989), but departs from him significantly as well.

\(^{264}\) Irwin (2002) is an extreme example of this, where he gives an interpretation of Aristotle’s ethics as political science, without mentioning contemplation or the contemplative life, which is the end for the sake of which prudence or πολιτική issues its orders.
combined are Aristotle’s position in the EN: The Three Lives are based on the three goods as ends which are the more-final goods (whose combination in a hierarchy make up the happiest life, viz. that of the philosopher). Put simply, happiness (εὐδαιμονία) for Aristotle is: The contemplative life, which is the activity (ἐνέργεια of νοῦς: σοφία) expressing virtue (κατ' ἀρετήν) which gives pleasure (ἡδονή). This life covers all three goods simultaneously as the component parts of happiness.

This formulation of happiness can be broken up for closer examination of its three component parts:

1. the activity (ἐνέργεια of νοῦς),
2. expressing virtue (κατ' ἀρετήν),
3. which gives pleasure (ἡδονή).

The ergon argument is the basis of each of those three elements which are more final goods (“prudence;”265 virtue, pleasure), that is to say, that the ergon argument will be present as a foundation in each of the three treatments by Aristotle of the three goods.266 The ergon argument is, to put it simply and in a preliminary manner, the coming together of the highest activity of a human being and that activity performed at the level of excellence (κατ' ἀρετήν). The realm of the highest activity is the realm where intellectual virtue can take place (the νοῦς), and there are two virtues there (σοφία and φρόνησις), but the higher of the two (σοφία) takes precedence, as provided by the conclusion of the ergon argument (at 1098a16-18) and the hierarchy inherent in the finality discussion which precedes it (at 1097a18-b6), as well as EN VI (end). Moral virtue collapses into intellectual virtue via the mean being set by orthos

265 To use the Eudemian term for the subject matter treated in EN VI [= EE V).
266 Or, in the case of moral virtue, it is one of the two bases. The other basis of moral virtue will be discussed below.
logos, which is only identified as prudence (φρόνησις) in EN VI [= EE V], where it serves a higher end (viz. sophia).

Since the component parts of happiness are examined in succession in the bulk of the EN (viz. in Books II-X.5) we can see that the work as whole mirrors the structure of Aristotle’s threefold answer as to the nature of happiness and its constituents, which can be schematically presented:

1. Proposition: Happiness = Three goods. [= EN I]
2. The Three constituent goods:
   a. Good One: Virtue. [= EN II-V]
   b. Good Two: “Phronesis.” [= EN VI]
   c. Good Three: Pleasure. [= EN VII-X.5]
3. Conclusion: The relationship between the goods. [= EN X.6-8]

The ergon argument underwrites each of the three goods, as was the case in the EE and Protrepticus. So that each good either is either based on the underlying presence of an ergon, or is that ergon.267

The inclusion of in-/continence and especially friendship as part of the treatment of pleasure needs to be examined, the double treatment of pleasure accounted for, and the transition to the Politics noted. But the anomalies are less prominent than the structure and pattern of the logical argument itself.

The scheme is internally complicated somewhat by the fact that “prudence” in the broad sense of wisdom is also used as a particular virtue in the sense of practical wisdom (an intellectual one, rather than one of character), or rather it covers two virtues – σοφία and φρόνησις – one of which carries the same name as the broader term which encompasses both. This seems to have caused others not to notice that a

267 This does not preclude a sequential development over the course of the examination of the three constituent goods, as Ronna Burger (2008) discerns.
separate good from (moral) virtue is being discussed in EN VI, as was discussed in the previous chapter.

An additional complication is that of the difference between virtue and moral virtue. The term ἀρετή (virtue) has in Greek a neutral meaning of “excellence,” except in the context of moral virtue. The treatment of moral virtue is conducted in EN II-V, and, although it is introduced in EN I and although Aristotle has a transitional chapter linking EN I to EN II (viz. EN 1.13), the two uses of ἀρετή as a generic (i.e. excellence) and specific term (i.e. moral virtue) are developed separately, and the relation between the two uses has to be carefully distinguished. Obviously, there is a connexion between the two uses, otherwise, the equivocal term would vitiate the logical validity of the argument. But it is important to point out that the ergon argument makes use of the generic, neutral ἀρετή (excellence) alone, and that the concept of moral virtue is introduced later and its introduction carries in with it added conceptual baggage. This baggage is noted twice in EN I, at 1099b29-32 and 1102a5-10 (both of which will be examined in more detail later).

Moral virtue is a composite both of excellence simply (which renders someone or something good of its kind – a direct connexion to the ergon argument) and of obedience to the laws (and therefore to the regime) of the πόλις (a new post-ergon argument addition). The latter characteristic is not identical to the first except in the peculiar circumstances of the good man (and citizen) living in the best regime. This issue of the relation between the good man and good citizen is not treated at all in the EN (or EE, MM, Protrepticus or VV) but becomes thematic only in the Politics (in Books III and VII), and so the problem of moral virtue lies outside of the scope of
Aristotle’s EN.268 The ambiguous status of moral virtue, viz. that its “morality” is relative to the political regime and the accompanying nomos that the regime reflects, is one reason why Aristotle seems less enthusiastic than some modern scholars about the “immanent”269 nature of moral virtue, providing all the solutions to “morality.” Immanence does not guarantee the goodness or justice of the actions, it merely stipulates that the intention of the doer has no ulterior motivation, whatever that original motivation may be or lead to.

2. The Plan of the EN.

As was shown in the chapter on the EE, the EE’s structure closely follows the division of the Three Lives in its component parts. Each of the Three Lives is based on a good as its end; the goods combine in the contemplative life which is intrinsically pleasant and whose prudence issues commands for the sake of contemplation (cf. EE V/EN VI and EE VIII.3.12-17). The EN shares a common overall structure and order of treatment of topics with the EE: the common books (identical in the manuscript tradition) cover part of the discussion on moral virtue (viz. there is an equivalent discussion of EN II-IV and the same discussion of justice; EN V = EE IV), all of the discussion on phronesis (to use the Eudemian term for this book; EN VI = EE V), and part of the discussion of pleasure (EN VII = EE VI, but without an equivalent to the second discussion of pleasure in EN X). Each of these three identical books covers part or all of each of the three discussions of the same three goods. From EE II.1.21-VII, the non-common material also basically follows the same topics as its counterpart in the EN, since EE II.1.21-III corresponds to material treated in EN II-IV in exactly

268 Cf. the discussion of the moral virtue, Justice. Although the distinction between the good man and good citizen is not treated there, it is raised as an issue in passing (at 1130b28-29) to be addressed later, presumably in the Politics, since it is not returned to in the EE or EN.

269 “Immanence” is the term that some scholars use for the Kantian conception of morality as consisting in acts done for their own sakes (and only for their own sakes).
the same relative position, and *EE* VII corresponds to material treated in *EN* VII-VIII in exactly the same relative position. Consequently, it should come as no surprise that the teaching of one will closely follow — if not be identical to — that of the other.

Gauthier and Jolif derive the following plan for the *EN*:

"We obtain the following plan thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Happiness</th>
<th>I, 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prelude</td>
<td>I, 2-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outline of the concept of happiness</td>
<td>I, 2-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of the concept of happiness (or components of happiness)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The happiness which the political life reveals to us:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virtue</td>
<td>I, 13-VI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendices: The half-virtue: continence</td>
<td>VII, 1-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuation of virtue: friendship</td>
<td>VIII-IX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The happiness which the life of pleasure reveals to us:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleasure</td>
<td>X, 1-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The happiness which the life of study reveals to us:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contemplation</td>
<td>X, 6-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>X, 10&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again, as in the case of their plan of the *EE* (discussed in the previous chapter) there are noticeable anomalies present. The duality of virtue is obfuscated (thereby conflating the political and contemplative lives in *EN* I.13-VI), continence is uneasily fitted in together with virtue in *EN* VII.1-11 as a subcategory of virtue (thereby missing the connexion of the subject to the life of pleasure), friendship is also placed there (and its connexion to pleasure is also thereby missed), and the first account of pleasure is simply extirpated (on the basis of unproven suppositions concerning the

---

270 "Nous obtenons ainsi le plan suivant :

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Le bonheur</th>
<th>I, 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prélude</td>
<td>I, 2-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyse de la notion du bonheur (ou les composantes du bonheur)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le bonheur que nous révèle la vie politique</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La vertu</td>
<td>I, 13-VI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendices: La demi-vertu: la continence</td>
<td>VII, 1-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La suite de la vertu: l'amitié</td>
<td>VIII-IX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le bonheur que nous révèle la vie jouissance :</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le plaisir</td>
<td>X, 1-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le bonheur que nous révèle la vie d'étude :</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le contemplation</td>
<td>X, 6-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>X, 10&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite this, Gauthier and Jolif have tried to structure their plan around the Three Lives and their corresponding claims to happiness. A plan which better fits both the structure displaying the Three Lives and the text as received is the following one based on our own understanding of the text:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goods</th>
<th>Sections</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Books</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Happiness → Human good (3 goods → 3 lives), Ergon argument</td>
<td>I.1-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Transition to Moral Virtue (on the soul)</td>
<td>I.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀρετή</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Moral Virtue</td>
<td>II.1-III.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a. Particular Moral Virtues</td>
<td>III.6-IV.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. - Justice</td>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φρόνησις</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nous: Sophia and Phronesis</td>
<td>VI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἡδονή</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>In-/continence and Pleasure I</td>
<td>VII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Friendship</td>
<td>VIII-IX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pleasure II</td>
<td>X.1-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusion: the contemplative life is best</td>
<td>X.6-9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 4.1 Outline of the EN.

However, there are differences between the EE and EN – both in the details of the similar but not identical material in each work, and in the material present in one but missing in the other work – which have obscured the recognition of a common fundamental basis shared by both works. The EN is not only longer than the EE, but has a more detailed and complicated manner of argument. This difference requires a closer and more extensive examination of this work.

The case of the first and last books of both works is particularly complicated:

1. The EE I-II.1.20 which covers all the same ground of EN I (viz. the introductory material which leads up to the examination of moral virtue starting in EN II) with roughly the same teaching, though it presents that teaching in a noticeably different manner, which is less clearly organised.
2. The last book of the *EE* (viz. VIII) seems to have no equivalent in the *EN*.\textsuperscript{271}

The conclusion to both works gives the appearance of being different.

The first point will be addressed now, the second examined later in this chapter.


The first sentence of the first chapter of the *EN* launches into the central issues around which the *EN* is constructed.\textsuperscript{272}

[1] 1094a1-2:

Aristotle here introduces what we would call the subject matter of ethics.\textsuperscript{273} In contrast to the *EE*, which begins with the denial of a (false) common opinion about happiness, the *EN* begins with a universal statement which he affirms (although with a qualification). Four areas of human knowledge and action are listed and two pairs are formed from them:

A. Art and investigation (τέχνη, μέθοδος).

B. Action and fore-choice (πράξις, προοίμιοσις).

A distinction between the two (A and B) is thereby noted, but is irrelevant to the extent that each element in both pairs is characterised as appearing to strive for (ἐφίσσομαι) a certain good. The common aim shared is the good, but it is not the same good in each case. A and B represent a distinction, not an opposition. The good is the subject under discussion both here in this chapter and in the treatise as a whole. This

\textsuperscript{271} Rees (1971) 241 is typical: "... *EN* X contains an account of the theoretical life to which there is nothing corresponding in the *EE.*" Woods (1982) xii "[EE] VIII can hardly be said to have a parallel in the other work [viz. in the *EN*]," and cf. Woods (1982) 184 and 191.

\textsuperscript{272} The introductory discussion (*EN* 1.1-2) forms the first third of Aristotle’s "preface" (περὶ ὁμοίωσις τοῦ ἀρετῆς, as he calls it at 1095a12-13). This division and description gives us three sub-sections of the investigation of the "preface":

1. Introduction to entire question of the treatise (περὶ προοίμιοσισ) 1095a12 → 1094a1-b11
2. "Method" section (πώς ἀποδεικτέον) 1092a12 → 1094b11-27
3. The Listener (περὶ ἀκροασίας) 1095a11-12 → 1094b27-95a13

\textsuperscript{273} Or, as Ross (1995) 197 puts it, "The keynote of the *Ethics* is struck in the first sentence."
is in contrast to the EE which begins with happiness and then turns to a treatment of the good.

[2] 1094a2-3:

All things aim at the good (cf. Topica 116a19-20, Rhetorica 1362a23) but this is deceptive and therefore not simply or unqualifiedly true (cf. EE 1218a30-33, cf. EN 1096b35-97a14 and 1096a29-34). The good in each case is specific to that particular area of knowledge or activity and is therefore not the same good in each specific case. So the meanings of the good have to be elicited, and Aristotle will do so via an examination of ends.274

Aristotle has gone from what may pertain only to the ends pursued by productive and active knowledge in 1094a1-2 to definitely expanding his consideration to what all things strive for (οὗ τόνυτ' ἐφίεται) by 1094a3. The distinction between ends which follows must as a consequence cover a range broader than simply a distinction between productive and active knowledge.

[3] 1094a3-6:

The difference between the goods becomes explicit with the consideration of the different ends (τέλη) which are distinct from each other while each being equally good.

The difference centres on the ends pursued as good: there are two fundamentally different types of ends. However, the different types of ends are those

274 Cf. EE 1217b1-2 in light of 1217a29-40, MM 1182b10-83b8, and 1183b19-84b6 where there are five successively introduced divisions of the good treated. Aristotle here in EN just carries out this division of the good rather than tell us that he is doing it: this is characteristic of Aristotle's approach in the EN.
ends pursued as goods in both cases (specifically in the paired items of τέχνη, μέθοδος, and προαίρεσις).

Aristotle now makes clear the principle underlying the two different types of ends:

**PRINCIPLE ONE:** The distinction of the good, as follows [1094a3-6]:

1a. Ends as activities.

1b. Ends as products apart from the actions.

In 1a, the activities are their own ends, nothing further is aimed at which comes as a result of doing them (or being at work at them). Such ends are: sight in the one who sees, contemplation in the contemplator, life in the soul, and also, as result, happiness, since it is a way of life (cf. *Metaphysics* 1050a30-b1). προαίρεσις becomes the equivalent of ἐνέργεια here (1094a4-5), therefore προαίρεσις is not being confined to “moral” action or “conduct.”

In 1b, there are two elements to the action (viz. a necessary action which acts as a condition for the result to occur and the result itself). The end as good is divided into two corresponding parts. However, the end is only completed and obtained through the attainment of the second part (viz. the product). Therefore, a greater emphasis on that second part establishes a hierarchy of the component parts of the whole action so that the second part is “more good” (βελτίω -1094a6) by its nature (sc. since it is the thing ultimately aimed at its closer relation to the end makes it be better than the mere means to achieving it).

Gauthier and Jolif initiate a trend of interpreting this passage (viz. 1094a1-6) so as to exclude contemplation from being within the range of scope of the opening sentence and the rest of the chapter.\textsuperscript{275} Their manner of trying to exclude

\textsuperscript{275} They rely on De Vogel (1955).
contemplation has major consequences for both the interpretation and coherence of the work. They critique what they call “l’exégèse traditionnelle” (primarily, Aspasius and St. Thomas Aquinas) for understanding μέθοδος as indicating contemplative science (“science spéculative”276). However, their assertions are not sustained by their interpretations.277

4. EN 1.1.3-5.

[4] 1094a6-9:

An explanation and examples now follow to support this first principle of the good. The explanation seems to apply to both sets of pairs listed at 1094a1-2 (if not in elements contained within that distinction, as μέθοδος and προαίρεσις are missing, but ἐπιστήμα is now included, 1094a7).

Each action, art, and science has its own particular good as opposed to the same general good. Specific examples follow:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The good as end for</th>
<th>medicine</th>
<th>is</th>
<th>health</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“”</td>
<td>shipbuilding</td>
<td>is</td>
<td>a ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“”</td>
<td>generalship</td>
<td>is</td>
<td>victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“”</td>
<td>household-management</td>
<td>is</td>
<td>wealth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

277 Firstly, contrary to Gauthier and Jolif’s interpretation, Aspasius does not equate μέθοδος with contemplative science, but rather offers two possible definitions for Aristotle’s choice of word here: that some think that μέθοδος is the same as τέχνη and parallels it, and that others think it is a capability (δύναμις) pertaining to opposite outcomes, cf. Aspasius (1889) 3, 2-4. Gauthier and Jolif accept the former τέχνη interpretation as being applicable here. So, Gauthier and Jolif would have to make the case that Aspasius was incorrect concerning the term τέχνη, viz. that it is “the genus of all the arts” and so encompasses the distinction of “productive and contemplative” (ibid. 2, 16-19) arts in order for their interpretation and critique of Aspasius to be correct. And they do not attempt to refute him on that ground.

Secondly, Gauthier and Jolif are correct that Aquinas does specifically relate μέθοδος (= doctrina) with contemplative intellect (intellectum speculativum), cf. Thomas Aquinas (1964) L. I, I, 8. However, Gauthier and Jolif equivocate here by not deciding between the question of whether there is a distinction between τέχνη and μέθοδος implying manual and productive science or whether the two words are synonymous. If synonymous, contemplation is let into μέθοδος by the same way as Aspasius’s interpretation of τέχνη allows for contemplation also to be potentially present. So, Aquinas’s point would then stand, and Gauthier and Jolif fail to prove their position against him.
These examples are all arts, and the comparison between (and difference from) productive arts will be used by Aristotle extensively in his discussion of moral virtue. But additionally, if this is a model to use with Aristotle’s adoption of πολιτική in the next chapter (as the presence of οἰκονομία suggests it is, since governing the οἶκος and governing the πόλις are usually analogous), we see that the science or expertise of πολιτική is in some sense separate from its end. The issue becomes what is that end for the sake of which πολιτική rules. 278

[5] 1094a9-16:

A second principle of the good is now introduced: the good and the end are identified via the phrase “that for the sake of which.” 279 Some commentators (such as Ackrill, Gauthier and Jolif) fail to see that a second principle of the good is introduced here, and think in consequence that the two principles are contradictory statements about the same distinction.

PRINCIPLE TWO: Ends can be ranked and ordered hierarchically.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Science/art/action</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Ends</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>στρατηγική</td>
<td>Highest end</td>
<td>Victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἰππική</td>
<td>Intermediate end</td>
<td>Horsemanship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>χαλινοποιική</td>
<td>Subordinate end</td>
<td>Bridle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 4.2 Hierarchy of Ends and Expertises.**

278 The art which ἡγοῦσις and therefore πολιτική is compared to is ἱερική, cf. 1145a6-11 and 1138b26-32.
279 Remembering that in the EE, the human good for Aristotle is “that for the sake of which as end” (EE 1.8.20 1218b10), which its ergon argument exemplifies.
This threefold distinction between types of knowledge or action and their respective ends will be expanded in *EN* I.7, where a distinction is made between three types of ends.

The more comprehensive ends of architectonic arts, actions, sciences are “more choiceworthy” (*αἱρετῶτερα 1094a15* – cf. the use of the comparative *βελτίω* at 1094a6) than the ends of those below them.

This second principle of the good provides the “for the sake of which” relation: when X is pursued for the sake of Y, Y is more choiceworthy than X. This establishes a hierarchy between ends, and is not simply a contrast between means and ends. It is therefore similar to the division between two types of rule in the third and final section of *EE* VIII.3, where *ταταρική* rules for the sake of *ήγεια*, and prudence issues orders for the sake of something higher.

Richardson Lear explains this “for the sake of which” relation as follows; “the higher ends provide the criteria of success for the subordinate ones.”280 This has been more fully explained by Aspasius:

> εἰσὶ δὲ τέχναι μὲν ἄλλαι ὑπὸ ἄλλας, δὲν τὰ τέλη ἑνεκέν τῶν ὑπὲρ αὐτάς ἔστι καὶ τῶν τελῶν τῶν ἐκείνων. ἀρχιτεκτονικαὶ δὲ αἱ ἀρχούσαι καὶ κρατοῦσαι τῶν ψῆ ἀυτάς; διορίζονται δὲ τρισὶ τούτως τῷ τε χρῆσαι· ταῖς ψῆ ἀυτάς τε καὶ τοῖς τέλεσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τῷ προστάσειν καὶ τῷ ἀρχιτεκτονεῖν. ὅτι δὲ τῷ τὰ τέλη τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων ἑνεκέν τοῦ τέλους αὐτῶν γίγνεσθαι ἀρχιτεκτονεῖν λέγονται, δῆλον, οἶον ἡ κυβερνητικὴ ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ ἐστὶ τῆς πηδαλιουργικῆς· καὶ γὰρ προστάσει αὐτῇ, οἶον δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸ πηδάλιον καὶ οἶον ἀρχιτεκτονεῖ καὶ γενομένη χρήται. καὶ δῆλον ὡς τὸ πηδάλιον, ὑπὲρ ἐστὶ τέλος τῆς πηδαλιουργικῆς, ἑνεκέν τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ τῆς κυβερνητικῆς.281

And Aquinas has made the same point:

281 Aspasius, (1889) 4, 29 - 5, 4: “And there are some arts under other [arts], whose ends are for the sake of [ends] above them and the ends of those [arts]. And the [arts] that rule and control those under them are architectonic; for, they are defined by these three things: [1] by using both the arts under them and their ends, and [2] by commanding them, and [3] by being their architect. And it is clear that they are said to be architectonic by the ends of the subordinated [arts] being for the sake of the their ends, like piloting expertise is architectonic over rudder-making expertise; for, it itself also issues commands, of what sort it is necessary to make the rudder and in what manner he is its architect and how he uses it once it has come into being. And it is clear that the rudder, which is the end of the rudder-making expertise, is for the sake of the end of the piloting expertise.”
These earlier readings are based on Aristotle’s *Physics* 194a27-9 and 194a36-b8, where nature (φύσις) as an end is discussed and a distinction made between the arts concerned with using and making artefacts. The relationship is complex since both types of arts rule over the material (although in different ways), but in addition the art of using the artefact issues orders to the art of making. So that the art of using is also architectonic, although this is a relationship of hierarchy between two types of knowledge. So, in art and artefacts the material and the work for the sake of which the material is moulded/produced are two separate elements. By contrast, these two aspects (making and the work) are present at the same time in natural things (since they have a nature).

πολιτική will be an expertise, art or science which is architectonic and has a separate end, unless “good-action” includes the knowledge of what good-action is.

[6] 1094a16-18:
Aristotle now says that this second principle of the good is not affected by the first principle of the good. These words mean that this second principle of the good (PRINCIPLE TWO) with its distinction of three types of end is not only compatible with the first principle of the good (PRINCIPLE ONE), but that the first principle is
used in conjunction with the second principle. This is an example of the hierarchy between two types of knowledge just previously identified.

The two subordinate ends (of χαλινοποιική and ἵππική, in the example given) fall under the end of στρατηγική (i.e. they are for the sake of it). Since the subordinate ends are of both types 1a and 1b (in PRINCIPLE ONE), Aristotle’s point is that the two subordinate ends are both subordinate to the architectonic art and its end, regardless of the distinction of which of the two PRINCIPLE ONE type ends the subordinate arts embody (viz., 1a or 1b). That is, an activity which is its own end can also be subordinated to a higher end, and activities which produce products as ends can also be subordinated to a higher end – despite already being the end result of a prior action. So, there is no necessary contradiction in moral virtue being both for itself and for the sake of something higher.

Aristotle openly claims to be consistent here. And it is the case that there is no contradiction present: Aristotle’s claim can be called into question (whether appropriately or not), but only at the cost of denying the existence of intermediate ends. The consistency is based on the division into three ends. This division provides for a category of end which can be chosen both because of itself and for the sake of something higher. This very point will be developed further by Aristotle in EN I.7 and will be examined in more detail by us later.

5. Ackrill’s Interpretation of EN I.1.

Even at this early stage in Aristotle’s argument the question is sometimes raised: How could an architectonic expertise not turn its subordinated action or its end into a mere means? The end of the higher expertise embraces the lower action’s end or of the end of the subordinate expertise. There is then an identity of what the subordinate action
would do alone by itself without a higher end attached (i.e. unsubordinated) and what that higher end achieves for its own end through making use of the lower one. So, no disparity exists between the two actions in what they achieve; they are identical in result.

As Ackrill interprets Aristotle, Aristotle “distinguishes between activities that have ends apart from themselves286 (e.g., products like bridles or outcomes like victory), and others [i.e. other activities]287 that are their own ends.”288 “After remarking that where an activity has a separate end that end is better than the activity, he says that [= PRINCIPLE TWO] one activity or skill, A, may be subordinate to another, B, and he gives some examples, cases in fact where what A produces is used or exploited by B.”289

So, Ackrill here thinks that PRINCIPLE TWO applies to PRINCIPLE ONE 1b alone and indeed is incomprehensible if applied to PRINCIPLE ONE 1a, rather than being a second principle that applies to both PRINCIPLE ONE 1a and 1b. This is the case even though 1094a16-18 “clearly” states that it “has application not only where (as in his examples) the subordinate activity produces a product [= PRINCIPLE ONE 1b] but also where the subordinate activity has no such end apart from itself but is its own end.”290

Ackrill criticises Stewart’s example291 of a builder who walks to his work. Here, an activity (viz. walking) is subordinate to an activity (building) that issues in a product (viz. a house). Ackrill counters that “walking to get somewhere” “is more like fighting for victory” in that “its success or failure depends on the outcome, and that is

286 [= PRINCIPLE ONE 1b].
287 [= PRINCIPLE ONE 1a].
289 Ibid.
290 Ibid.
291 Stewart (1892) 12.
its point.” However, Ackrill ignores the fact (which will be seen to be directly relevant to Aristotle’s purposes in a moment) that success or failure insofar as the mere activity is concerned is an irrelevant consideration. To use one of Ackrill’s examples here, those who fight and are defeated in battle fight no less than those who do so victoriously: Fighting (an activity) does not always or necessarily lead to victory or defeat (a product), it can be done for its own sake or for practice. Similarly, the activity of walking is not dependent on the successful or unsuccessful outcome of the intention imposed upon the activity, such an intention and indeed any intention is an external addition to the activity itself (which may or may not be present), already implying a higher end.

Perhaps Ackrill is conflating two issues in one by saying “walking to get to building site” (emphasis added). The first “to” here introduces an infinitive of purpose and means “in order to.” So, in other words, in Ackrill’s case, the builder is walking for the sake of arriving at work, the end of walking is subordinated to the higher end of housebuilding. Perhaps this ambiguity is already present in Stewart’s example and Ackrill has been misled. Ackrill’s point has to be that walking has to be always connected to a higher end even to exist as an activity, but this would be a debatable contention. Ackrill develops his own, rather than Aristotle’s, distinction which is simply that of the relation of part to whole, as constituents or ingredients in greater wholes. Aristotle’s own distinction does not necessarily exclude this from being true in other cases (cf. *Metaphysics* 1021b12-14), but his distinction here at *EN* I.1 is wider than Ackrill’s. Additionally, Ackrill’s distinction is besides the point which Aristotle is making here, which is consistent with *Metaphysics* 1021b23-30:

And further, those things are said to be complete/final to which a good end belongs, since it is by having the end that they are complete/final, and so, since the end is one of the extremes, transferring the meaning, we speak of degenerate things as completely ruined or completely decayed, when they lack
nothing of ruin and evil but are at the extreme point of them. And for this
reason even death is by a transference of meaning called an end, because both
are extremes, and the end for the sake of which something is is an extreme.

In contrast to Ackrill, Aquinas's interpretation better reflects the text here:

Nam frenifactiuae finis est operatum frenum; equestris uero, quae est
principalior, finis est operatio scilicet equitatio; e converso autem se habet in
medicinali, et in exercitatiua. Nam medicinalis finis est aliquod operatum, id
est sanitas. Exercitatiuae uero, quae sub ea continetur, finis est operatio id est
exercitium. 292

6. EN I.2.

[1] 1094a18-26:

Aristotle now applies the two principles of the good developed in EN I.1 directly to
the area of action (τῶν πρωτών, 1094a18-19). 293 This is a conditional argument (ὅτι,
1094a18, 24). 294

Although Aristotle's argument here is conditional, if the condition is fulfilled
its implications are now spelled out. The basis upon which the condition will later be
fulfilled needs to be carefully noted, and it is important to note that that fulfilment is
not done at this stage of the argument. The condition is fulfilled soon thereafter, but
on a different basis.

The good and the best in the realm of action (if it exists) has to be an end
which is wished for because of itself (ὅτι οὖτος, 1094a19) and the other (subordinate)
ends because of it (ὅτι τὸ τοῦτο, 1094a19); viz. it is the same type of end as the
architectonic end (PRINCIPLE TWO, such as victory, or with στρατηγική as its

292 Thomas Aquinas (1964) L. I, I, 1, 18: "For, the end of bridlemaking is a produced bridle; but the end
of horsemanship, which is more authoritative, is an activity, sc. horseriding; but it is the opposite case
in the medical art, and in gymnastics. For the end of the medical art is something produced, i.e. health.
But of gymnastics, which is contained under it, the end is an activity, i.e. exercise."

293 Cf. EE I.7.5: the word πρωτό covers two possible meanings, one related to means and the other to
the end.

accompanying expertise). If such an architectonic end exists in the case of action, the
enquiry will focus on two questions (listed at 1094a25-26):

a. What that end of πρακτικό is, (or, what is 'that for the sake of which' action is)?
b. To which capability or knowledge does this end belong?

So the EN aims at identifying and examining this end and its corresponding expertise.

[2] 1094a26-b7:
A knowledge/science or capability which has as the end over which it presides “the
good and the best [good]” (1094a22) in the area of action and choice would
reasonably be said to be of the highest authority \(^{295}\) and particularly pertaining to the
criterion of what is “architectonic” as laid out in PRINCIPLE TWO (1094a9-16).

Aristotle suggests that πολιτική best matches the criterion for this science. And then
he gives a detailed justification for this designation matching the requirements.

πολιτική meets the criteria by being the expertise:

1. a. which orders which sciences must be in cities and what sort each should learn
and until when,

b. under which we see even the most honoured capabilities, and because

2. the end of πολιτική embraces the lower ends of 1a and 1b immediately above,
since

a. it uses those ends, and

b. it legislates what right action is.

With the identification of πολιτική as the most authoritative expertise, legislation
(νομοθεσία) and right action (πράττειν) are thereby linked together: πολιτική =

\(^{295}\) By “authority” and “authoritative” I mean simply “provides a standard for.”
source of law (νόμος). This is so because πολιτική legislates in the area of action. On the face of it, the law provides the answer as to what right action is.296

Liberalism obscures this relationship between πολιτική and law. This is so because for Liberalism there exists a sphere of freedom or privacy (and “rights”), over which sphere no legislative body or group or individual is deemed to have any say. Yet, the status of that private sphere is conventional — because it is ultimately subject to enactment (if it is enacted at all).297

[3] 1094b7-10:
The end of πολιτική is now called the human good, but its scope is not limited to a single human being. This allows for the transition to the Politics at the end of the EN and for the inclusion of that work within the same science as the EN. The issue of the human good for a city and a human being will recur and be treated in further depth in Politics VII to be discussed briefly later.

[4] 1094b10-11:
At the start of the work we were told that every investigation (μέθοδος) strives for a good (1094a1-2, and cf. 1095a16). Here at the end of the “preface’s” first section we are told of a twofold end of this investigation (not directly specified, except by

296 Cf. the doctrine of universal justice in EN V.1-2 and cf. Chapter One of this thesis.
297 Cf. Moore (1993) 177: “Liberalism is itself a conception of the good, on all fours with other conceptions of the good, and deeply antithetical to many moral and religious conceptions. It is committed to the value of autonomy and its principles presuppose the importance of protecting individual autonomy above all else. Because liberal theory values autonomy, it offers people a sphere of privacy or free action in the personal sphere, and so is compatible with those moral theories that accept the liberal public-private dichotomy, and incompatible with many substantive moral conceptions that do not accept the public-private distinction.” The prevailing situation in the ancient world was quite different, Fustel de Coulanges (1979) 211-12: “The city had been founded upon a religion, and constituted like a church. Hence its strength; hence, also, its omnipotence and the absolute empire which it exercised over its members. In a society established on such principles, individual liberty could not exist. The citizen was subordinate in everything, and without any reserve, to the city; he belonged to it body and soul. The religion which had produced the state, and the state which produced the religion sustained each other and made but one; these two powers, associated and confounded, formed a power almost superhuman, to which the human soul and the body were equally enslaved.”
τότων – 1094b11). Presumably, it is the human good broken up into that of the city (τὸ [sc. ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν] τῆς πόλεως – 1094b8) and one has to supply τὸ [sc. ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν] τοῦ ἀνθρώπου as the implied contrast understood from the context. These two ends being necessarily linked together (since they are related) supply the reason for the investigation in the EN being called political, and the separation of their consideration in two treatises (either EN or EE and the Politics).

7. “Method.”

The next section (viz. the “Method” section - 1094b11-95a2) turns to the question of the secondary meaning of μέθοδος (viz. as the manner of investigation). Aristotle’s procedure here highlights this as an important component part of his investigation into “ethics.”

The classic exposition of Aristotle’s dialectical procedure (especially within ethics) is later, at EN 1145b2-7. There we get a division into three steps in dialectical argumentation:

1. τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα,
2. πρῶτον διαπορήσαντας οὕτω δεικνύοναι μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ ἔνδοξα περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τὰ πλείστα καὶ κυριώτατα,
3. ἐάν γὰρ λύηται ταῦτα δυσχέρη καὶ καταλείπηται τὰ ἔνδοξα, δεδειγμένον ἐν ἐνί ἰκανός.

298 Or, to put it in another way from the text itself, “the human good for one [person]” ταύτων ἀγαθόν... εὖ 1094b7.
300 “1. Laying down the appearances, 2. Going through first the perplexities so as to show most of all all the received opinions concerning [in this case] feelings, but if not [all, then] the most [prevalent] and authoritative, 3. for, if the difficulties are resolved and the received opinions are left behind it would have been sufficiently proven.”
The first step states what the *endoxa* on the topic are, the second step examines the perplexities involved in the differing positions, and the third proves the truth contained in the *endoxa* or what is left of them, after their examination.

This procedure is read back into what Aristotle is doing in *EN* I (and, indeed, throughout the course of the entire *EN*). But what Aristotle actually does, includes more than just a series of dialectical arguments (the argument as a whole can still be characterised as “dialectical,” in a weak sense). Aristotle’s “method” or manner of investigation in the *EN* is neither a simply dialectical one (as according to Hennis, Bien, Kuhn, Hoeffe, Poegeler, Irwin, Berti, Crisp) nor a demonstrative science (as recently claimed by Reeve). It is rather a combination of the dialectical examination of *ἐνδοξά* (received opinions) and Aristotle’s own reasoning. Part of the principles of this reasoning can be laid out by examining the *Analytica Posteriora*.301

In *An. Post.*, Aristotle distinguishes four questions which establish knowledge about a subject:

1. That something is.
2. Why something is.
3. If something is.
4. What something is.303

Questions 2 and 4 are reduced to one (*An. Post.* 90a14-15), since they amount to the same thing. Next, there is a priority rule involved in seeking these questions, as some presuppose that others have already been answered. The third question (“if something is” – now to be called the “if question”) cannot follow the answer to the question “What something is.” Usually the “if question” has to be solved before the “what question,” or simultaneously with it, but never after it.

301 Cf. Salmieri (2009) for a similar position.
302 The treatment of this topic by Natali (2007) is particularly helpful here.
For, just as we seek the why upon having the that, and sometimes they even become clear together, but it is not possible to know the why before [knowing] the that – it is clear that similarly it is not possible [to know] the “essence” or what it is to be something without [knowing] that it is. (93a16-20)

This leads up to a definition of a topic which also gives the cause or why of a thing. A nominal definition and three other more scientific definitions are distinguished. The EN also provides a nominal and more scientific definition of happiness, as EN I starts from a nominal definition in EN I.4 and culminates in Aristotle’s own definition (logos) in EN I.7 (which is the ergon argument).

“Method” 1 [1094b11-95a2].

The enquiry has to be made clear (διακεραφηβεξει 1094b12) by being in accordance with its underlying material. Since πολιτική considers τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια (“the noble/beautiful and just things”) and the nature of these things is variable (1094b15-16, cf. 1134b29-30), they seem to be purely arbitrary (νόμος μόνον 1094b16) rather than fixed in the nature of things (φύσει).

The good things (τὰ γαθὰ) are added to the list of types considered to be variable at1094b17. This variation seems to impose some sort of limitation on speaking about them. So, with this variability (πλάνην, 1094b16, 17) in mind, Aristotle draws two conclusions (1094b19-22):

1. speaking concerning and from such things (viz. variable): to show the truth “a little thickly” (or roughly, πολυκαλός, 1094b20, cf. Politics 1275b25) and in outline, τὸπο (1094b21);

2. speaking concerning and from things which hold “as for the most part”: to conclude with (συμπεραίνεσθαι) things also “as for the most part.”
Further, the things said in the investigation need to be received (ἀποδέχεσθαι χρεών 1094b23)\(^{304}\) in the same way. It is taken as belonging to an educated person to be able to discern between subject matters which do or do not allow precision, and incompetence in this is compared to the situation of receiving persuasive talking from a mathematician or demanding demonstrations from a rhetorician.

An educated person would know which type of “proof” is required in each case. Mathematical knowledge allows for maximum precision, rhetorical knowledge relies on effective enthymemes (a type of inference or syllogism) as outlined in the *Rhetorica*. Ethics, being neither of these two types of knowledge, must presumably be somewhere in between these two extremes. The intermediary position used in the *EN* is the combination of reasoning about the topic based on Aristotle’s own philosophy and a dialectical approach where opinions of others are used as corrobative evidence.

The “Listener” section (1094b27-13) follows on directly from this discussion of “method” and, as a consequence, is very significant for Aristotle’s procedure in *EN* as it refers to both his target audience and the moral agent as such. Although the end of the enquiry is not knowing simply but action (1095a5-6), knowing about these things (τὸ περὶ τοῦτον εἰδέναι, 1095a11) for those who are not young or youthful would be of great benefit (1095a10-11). Knowing, therefore, is not excluded from consideration in ethics: it may be an indispensable assistant in achieving the action required.

In the light of the structure of *EN* I, we can see that the principle of division of *EE* I’s singular discussion of μέθοδος\(^{305}\) into *EN* I’s three discussions\(^{306}\) is that the next immediate topic discussed by Aristotle after each μέθοδος section is an *endoxon* of some sort – either as providing the necessary premises for the argument to proceed,

---

\(^{304}\) Cf. 1095a12 πῶς ἀποδεκτέον and *Metaphysics* 994b32-95a20 esp. a13, and cf. 1064a10-20.

\(^{305}\) At *EE* 1.6.

\(^{306}\) At 1094b11-95a2, 1095a30-b13, and 1098a20-b8.
or as a reference to confirm the independently argued position of Aristotle (e.g. the *ergon* argument). The μέθοδοι sections bring attention back to the manner of presentation and their immediate subsequent sections are where Aristotle deviates from his own view to the consideration of the views of others.


We have seen that the arguments in *EN* I.1-2 (1094a3-6 and 1094a26-b11) are used by Aristotle in the *EE*’s *ergon* argument\(^{307}\) and in Aristotle’s own position on the good.\(^{308}\) That is to say, they form Aristotle’s own argument or reasoning independent of any *endoxa*. Therefore, Natali is wrong to suggest that the “if question” is being settled in *EN* I.1-2.\(^{309}\) Rather, Aristotle develops there a conditional argument of what the highest good is and what its requirements would be if it exists. Aristotle does not assert yet *that* it exists (and thereby settle the “if question” on a scientific basis), and so there is no fallacy involved – though one is often alleged here.\(^{310}\)

The “if question” is resolved only in the section immediately after the first μέθοδος section, viz. in *EN* I.4, where the fact that such a highest good of action exists is accepted on the basis of *endoxa*: there exists an agreement by most that such a good has a name since both the many and the refined call it happiness (ἐυδαιμονία), (1095a17-20). There may be little or no doubt that Aristotle will answer this question affirmatively, but the basis upon which he does so needs to be noted.

The question of what *πολιτική* strives for (ἐφίεται) and what the highest practical good is, is to begin with merely a repetition of Aristotle’s conditional

---

\(^{307}\) 1219a13-17.
\(^{308}\) 1218b7-16.
\(^{310}\) Cf. Vranas (2005) for a discussion which exonerates Aristotle from the alleged fallacies.
argument in *EN* I.1-2. The further addition to the argument here is the claim (made on the basis of *endoxa*) that it is happiness (εὐδαυμονία). The conditional argument (only now) has become a claim of fact, but on the basis of *endoxa*, not of scientific proof. The "if question" now passes on to a "what is?" question.

A nominal definition of happiness is now provided: "... the many and the refined call it happiness, and they suppose the good life and faring well as being the same as being happy" (1095a18-20).

The agreement on the name of the human good is superficial, however, since just as at the beginning where all things seem to aim at one good, this unity of purpose conceals the fact that different ends are being pursued as good. So the two opinions about the content of happiness also diverge in their ends pursued as good. Aristotle immediately discusses the two positions (in 1095a22-26 – the Three Lives argument – and 1095a26-28 – the Platonists’ Idea of the Good) which will be developed in chapter 5 (1095b14-16a10) and chapter 6 (1096a11-97a14) respectively.

The treatment of *ευδαυμονία* here shows that the foundation of the *EN* is a dialectical and didactic examination founded on the basis of the existence of happiness as the final end being taken for granted, because it is conceded.

"Method" 2 [1095a30-b13].

We now get another "method" discussion, in preparation for the introduction of another *endoxon* into the argument that Aristotle is developing.

Firstly, Aristotle distinguishes between arguments (λόγοι) from first principles and to first principles. Aristotle mentions Plato by name in making this distinction, which recalls Plato’s discussion in the *Republic* of the Divided Line (generally, 506d-511e, but in particular 511b). Aristotle does not make clear, however, which of the
two his own investigation consists of (cf. *Metaphysics* 1012b34-13a23, six distinct meanings of philosophical significance of the term ἀρχή).\(^{311}\)

The distinction between two types of "knowing" (which recalls the listener section) replaces the distinction between two ἀρχαί. The enquiry needs to begin from what is known, but this is equivocal; there is what is known to us, and what is known simply. The known to us is connected by Aristotle with being brought up with habits in a noble fashion, and this beginning is equated with the "that" required by the listener (the listener needs the "that" but not the "why") which is sufficient for acting, but not knowing. Aristotle then quotes a piece of Hesiod, which distinguishes three different types of person corresponding to their posture towards the "why" and "that."

The best person of all who himself knows all things must, by implication in this context, know both the "why" and the "that," of moral action. The person who obeys another corresponds to the listener who has only the "that," and the useless person has neither the "that" nor the "why."

**The Three Lives and the Good.**

A comparison with the parallel material in the *EE* shows that Aristotle treats here together and sequentially (in *EN* I.5 and I.6) the ἐνδοξα of the Three Lives and the ἐνδοξα of the wise on the idea of the good, which are separated in two places in the *EE* (viz. Three Lives based on ἐνδοξα in *EE* I.3-5 and the idea of the good in *EE* I.8.2-19). The significance of this is that ἐνδοξα on happiness and ἐνδοξα on the

---

\(^{311}\) Cf. Smith (1994). Reeve takes happiness (ευδαιμονία) as meaning a first principle used to construct a deductive argument, Reeve (1994). Firstly, it is unclear whether ἀρχή is used by Aristotle in the sense required by Reeve. Secondly, Aristotle never calls ethics an ἐπιστήμη (Reeve restricts the meaning of ἐπιστήμη to hard and soft science). Aristotle aligns πολιτική more closely to φρόνησις than to ἐπιστήμη (as shown in Chapter Three). Thirdly, Aristotle uses ἀρχή in more than one sense, and it is more plausible to suggest that Aristotle uses happiness (ευδαιμονία) as an ἀρχή in the sense of "that for the sake of which" (*Metaphysics* 1013a21) as an end or the best end (cf. *EN* 1094a18-22) than as a first principle of deductive reasoning, cf. 1102a1-4.
good are juxtaposed in the EN, without noting the change in topic from happiness to the good.

The Three Lives argument is now finally introduced and examined. More than three possible lives are examined in this chapter but there are only three contenders which are treated by Aristotle as having any claim to be taken seriously.\footnote{Cf. 1095b17-19.}

1. The life of enjoyment (ἀπολαυστικός) 1095b17.
2. The political life (πολιτικός) 1095b23, 31.
3. The contemplative life (θεωρητικός) 1096a4.

These are the same Three Lives examined in the Protrepticus and the EE, with the change, not significant for present purposes, of φιλόσοφος to θεωρητικός.

Firstly, the many and most vulgar posit pleasure as the end, since the life of enjoyment is based on bodily pleasures. This is an endoxon, paralleling the earlier reference at 1095a22-23. Aristotle's own conception of pleasure is broader than that described here, and his rejection of this life does not preclude a more serious consideration of pleasure later in the work (both within EN I at 1099a7-b8 and later in EN VII-X). Pleasure is a component of both of the other lives (the politician's and the philosopher's). So, the real contenders will at the end of the EN be reduced from three to two. This explains why those two lives are the ones examined in EN X.6-8, since pleasure will be present as a component regardless of which life wins out at the end – a fact stressed as the examination of pleasure at EN X.5 progresses.

In the second life considered the refined persons re-appear (cf. 1095a18-19) and are linked to the active persons (προακτικοί 1095b22). "Active" has the connotation of political. The endoxon of the refined persons about happiness is now examined. Here Aristotle refines the end allotted to this life by criticising and
dismissing the end of honour (it is only σχεδόν “nearly” the end of this life). Virtue (ἀρετή) is closer, but it too appears incomplete. Aristotle does not say what end this life most of all is. Kraut helpfully suggests that the end of the political life is revealed in the ergon argument as activity in accordance with virtue and not virtue simply.\(^{313}\) However, the ergon argument is compatible with each of the goods fulfilling the role of the human good and, therefore, it is also compatible with each of those three goods’ corresponding lives (cf. 1099a29-31 and context).

The third and final life – the contemplative life – is discussed very briefly (1096a4-5). If a discussion of it were to take place one would expect that it would follow the pattern set by Aristotle’s earlier treatment of the two other lives and their ends. Using that pattern as a model we would expect him to name the end of that life (as pleasure, honour, and virtue were named). The end of the contemplative life is generally taken to be σοφία or νοῦς (in its broad sense). So, we are now in a position to assess where in the work Aristotle’s promise to treat the good that belongs to this third life can possibly be fulfilled. The question reduces to where does Aristotle treat σοφία or νοῦς in any extensive detail? The answer is, in EN VI [= EE V]. So the reference here is to the book on intellectual virtue and after its extensive treatment there, it is not surprising to find Aristotle comment later in EN X that the activity of the νοῦς (the contemplative life) was perfect happiness and that the activity in question is contemplative has already been stated (sc. in EN VI [= EE V] cf. 1139a6-8, 17-18, and 26-29).

\(^{313}\) Kraut (1989) 18.
In line with my interpretation of the reference, the EE counterpart (1216a38) also refers to EN VI [= EE V] using the term φρόνησις in its broad sense, not that of practical wisdom, as was discussed in Chapter Three.\textsuperscript{314}

The money making life is not a contender, it has no end – it is all means.

The phrase λεξικοντα τελη (1096a8) applies to the life of enjoyment of (bodily) pleasure and the political life (insofar as to honour is its end), but not to the unstated end of the political (its third end unnamed by Aristotle) and the contemplative life’s end is also not mentioned here. Nor is pleasure of the non-bodily kind mentioned. Even so, some of these contenders re-appear (so the dismissal is temporary and not permanent) at 1097b2.

The ἐνδοξον\textsuperscript{315} of the wise concerning the idea of the good – presumably Platonists, although Plato is not mentioned – is now treated in EN I.6.\textsuperscript{316} This is a rival account of the good and seems to exclude the positing of the good required to establish a good which is done (πρακτον ἁγαθον).

ἐνδοξα have been given about the sought-for good, but Aristotle’s own account has not yet been presented (it certainly cannot be equivalent to bodily pleasure, honour, mere virtue, let alone money-making, nor can it be that of the idea of the good which is extensively critiqued). Aristotle has to start again from the question sought at 1095a14-20. A review of the situation at that point is also a review of the first section of the EN (I.1-2); this review provides the introduction to Aristotle’s own view (not based on ἐνδοξα).


\textsuperscript{315} Cf. ἐνδοξα 1096a17.

\textsuperscript{316} Burger (2008).
Aristotle begins by examining the multiplicity of ends, since there are more than one end type and maybe even more than one qualifying as the highest type of end (1097a22-24). The nature of ends needs to be looked into more closely, if Aristotle is to make good his acceptance of the ἐνδοξα’s identification of happiness with the final good. That Aristotle is concerned here with τέλη (ends, 1097a26) makes plain that what Aristotle examines in this section (1097a25-97b6) is finality or what constitutes an end, rather than completeness: parts and a whole are not being considered here, although the three types of end discussed may form a whole of a sort when united together under the final end of happiness. It is their status as ends that is being distinguished.

So, rather than considering “completeness” Aristotle breaks up into more detail the three types of ends briefly touched on in EN I.1 (viz. PRINCIPLE TWO of the good: 1094a9-16). The reference to EN I.1 (at 1097a24) also confirms that ends are being treated, since Aristotle links the two discussions and Ackrill was shown earlier not to be able to argue successfully that the first discussion was not about ends, but rather completeness.

The rank of ends is determined by the good (1097a28). Finality is a criterion looking towards the best end.

**Finality or End Types [1097a25-b6].**

Aristotle now provides a more detailed examination of end types. There are three grades of ends examined:
1. Some ends are chosen because of something else (like wealth, flutes, and generally tools – cf. 1094a12 and 1099b28). So, they are not final as ends, and therefore not the good. So, the end (not completeness) is located more in the thing sought than the means to it. Therefore, the tool-like end is not endlike enough to qualify as final, and what is best is final. However, if there is a plurality of final ends, the issue becomes what is the most final one, (cf. ergon argument conclusion). (1097a25-30).

2. Some ends are more final than type 1 ends. So, what is pursued καθ’ αὐτό is more final than what is pursued because of something else [viz. than end type 1]. (1097a30-31).

3. An end which is never chosen because of something else is more final than those which are chosen both καθ’ αὐτό and because of itself [= end type 2]. It matches what is final simply, is chosen always καθ’ αὐτό and never because of something else. Therefore, end types 1 and 2 are here excluded. Happiness seems to be especially final. Therefore, happiness = end type 3. (1097a31-34).

It is at this point (1097b2) that the ends of the Three Lives are re-introduced and matched to end type 2, since while they are objects of choice – chosen as goods – they are chosen by us as goods both because of themselves and because we also suppose that it is through them that we become happy. They are then intermediary goods/ends. Therefore, failed candidates for goods underlying the Three Lives such as honour and (bodily) pleasure are included here, because those candidates are suppositions about these (intermediary) goods/ends (and therefore, not necessarily soundly based). But which of the candidates can and do lead to happiness according to Aristotle out of the remainder will be examined by him and constitute the bulk and content of the EN. The important point to note at this stage is that these intermediate ends are all assigned to
end type 2 and that νοῦς (1097b2) seems to be the equivalent end of the contemplative life of EN I.5.

**Self-sufficiency [1097b6-16].**

A second criterion (viz. of self-sufficiency) is now introduced as appearing to belong to the good and therefore to happiness. The final good seems to be self-sufficient. The nature of self-sufficiency is now discussed and the tendency of the word to imply detachment from other needs, rather than being re-enforced, is undercut: Self-sufficient includes a wider range than “the one thing alone which makes life choiceworthy and in need of nothing” may otherwise suggest, since a human being is a political animal – an animal belonging to the polis, a ζῷον πολιτικὸν. The question is to be determined later.317 A definition of self-sufficiency is now provided:

We suppose self-sufficiency as that which by itself makes life choiceworthy and lacking in nothing, and we think that happiness is such a sort of thing. (1097b14-16)

Yes, happiness is “inclusive” – of all intrinsic goods, but the post-ergon argument in EN (in the EE it is the first premise of the ergon argument: 1218b32-37 parallels EN 1098b12-18) restricts the area of goods to goods of the soul (the other two goods – external and bodily – are discounted from consideration in all the ethical writings of Aristotle). Aristotle then (at 1098b24-25) lists the three goods of the soul as virtue, prudence, pleasure (the same as the EE and the Protrepticus).318 This division of three goods of the soul is tied to the Three Lives argument. And the structure of the EN also follows the successive examination of the Three Lives and their corresponding goods, just like the EE and the Protrepticus.

---

317 At EN I.9 and IX.10.
318 ἡρονησία here has been split between ἡρονησία and σοφία. However, this does not indicate a divergence from the EE’s view of the Three Lives since this merely already foreshadows the distinction to be made in EE V [= EN VI] between σοφία and ἡρονησία anyway.
This is why the inclusive interpretation is both right and wrong: the inclusivity of goods is a characteristic of Happiness, but the goods are (a) restricted to those of the soul, and (b) only three in number (viz. virtue, prudence, pleasure).

And since in both the *Protrepticus* and the *EE* the goods of the soul combine under prudence (as the good of the contemplative way of life), the difference between those two works and the *EN* consists in the way that the *EN* emphasises the disparity between *sophia* and prudence (in the narrow sense of practical wisdom). Aristotle uses this as a way to incorporate the *Politics* formally into the discussion of ethics.

**Counted-together [1097b16-21].**

That happiness includes *everything* choiceworthy in itself seems to be the point of 1097b14-15. However, happiness is most choiceworthy provided that it is not "counted-together." This argument is meant to justify the statement that "Happiness appears to be something final and self-sufficient, since it is the end of πρακτός" (1097b20-21). So, Aristotle shows here that this discussion of finality and self-sufficiency is the drawing out of the inferences involved in happiness being an end (and not a complete thing). It draws out the consequences of taking *EN* I.1-2's hypothetical condition being fulfilled: what happiness would have to be like if there is an end of πρακτός.

**10. The Ergon Argument of *EN* I.**

We saw in the chapter on the *EE* that its comparable section to *EN* I consists of two parts (on happiness and the good respectively) culminating in the *ergon* argument. A

---

comparison of parallel passages in both works shows an interesting distribution of passages:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>EN Bekker Ref.</th>
<th>EE Bekker Ref.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1094a3-6</td>
<td>1219a13-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1095b30-33</td>
<td>1219a23-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1097b22-1098a18</td>
<td>1218b31-1219a35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1098a5-17</td>
<td>1219a9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1098a5-7</td>
<td>1219a23-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1098a7.f.</td>
<td>1219a18-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1098b12-15</td>
<td>1218b32-37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1098b29-99a3</td>
<td>1219a25-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1098b31</td>
<td>1218b36-37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1102b7-8</td>
<td>1219a23-25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 4.3 Parallel Passages.**

**Ergon Arguments**

*EN* 1097b22-1098a18

*EE* 1218b31-1219a35

The distribution of passages shows that while all of the *EN*’s parallel passages are contained within the *EE*’s discussion of the *ergon* argument (1218b31-19a35), the reverse is not true: the *EE*’s *ergon* argument has parallel passages falling outside of what is traditionally regarded as the *EN*’s treatment of the same argument (1097b22-98a18), spread across the first to last chapter of *EN I*.

And notably, the first parallel passage occurs in the 2nd sentence of the *EN*. Whereas the two topics (viz. happiness and the good) under discussion in the first books of both ethics are treated sequentially and separately in the *EE*, (and they only combine later in its *ergon* argument), in the *EN*, by contrast, the two topics are treated simultaneously. This change means that the *ergon* argument and the good are both treated thematically from the very beginning of the *EN*. This is why the parallel passages are so dispersed in the *EN*. The *EN*’s *ergon* argument is less fleshed out than the *EE*’s because parts of that argument are treated elsewhere in the same Book.
The ἐργὸν (ergon)\textsuperscript{320} argument is presented at EN 1.7.9-16 (1097b22-98a21), and can be summarised in the following table:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Introduction: Happiness and the best</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Art Analogy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Application of analogy to human beings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Soul: Two lower capabilities excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>What remains in the human soul: 1 Part having reason 2 Part obeying reason</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[ \rightarrow ] 5 &quot;Mērgosan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Summarising inference #1: Human ergon = activity of soul with reason</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[ \rightarrow ] 7 In accordance with virtue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Inference #2: Human Ergon = a certain life → activity and actions of soul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[ \rightarrow ] 9 According to the appropriate virtue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Inference #3: Human Good = activity of soul kat'ergon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[ \rightarrow ] 11 If more than one virtue, according to the best and most final</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Complete Life</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 4.4 Summary Outline of the Structure of the EN's Ergon Argument.**

The indented sections of Table 4.4 (5, 7, 9, and 11) are logically dependent on, and qualify, the section which is immediately above them. See Appendix 1 at the end of this chapter for a full break-up of the text of the ergon argument which is linked in to Table 4.4's 12 sections.

\[0 = 1097b22-25\]

After establishing that the sought-for good (happiness) is an end (in the sense of "that for the sake of which") at 1097a15-24 and noting that the argument has arrived at the place where it started (compare 1097a22-24 with 1094a18-19), Aristotle seeks further clarification about what happiness and the best are, since the conclusion that happiness is the best (good) now appears to be settled. So the ergon argument is presented to provide the necessary content of what happiness is: the ergon argument presents what the human good actually is. This is not a nominal definition (λόγος),

\textsuperscript{320} Ergon can either have an active sense of "work" meaning activity, or a passive sense meaning the finished "product" as a result of that activity. "Function" is a popular translation but may tend to add in the idea of "purpose" as well, thereby implying design, which is not present in Aristotle's argument.
but Aristotle’s own λόγος concerning happiness. Aristotle tentatively suggests this could occur “if the ergon of a human being [i.e. of an individual as representative of the species “human being”] could be grasped” (1097b24-5). The good sought-for from the beginning,\(^{321}\) which was the end of the things that are done,\(^{322}\) whose attendant expertise is πολιτική,\(^{323}\) and which commonly has the name “happiness,”\(^{324}\) is the work that the ergon argument describes. This work is the foundation upon which the bulk of the rest of the work is built: the sections on (moral) virtue (EN II-V), prudence (EN VI = EE V), and pleasure (EN VII-X.5) – the respective goods of the Three Lives – all have to conform or align to this argument to qualify as fitting Aristotle’s definition of happiness: the rest of the EN fills out the component parts of this definition.

\[1 = 1097b25-28\]

Aristotle now commences the so-called ergon argument proper. It begins with an analogy to art (πέχνη). What presumably is being described then is ποίησις (though this term is not used). An artisan (πέχνητης) has a work (or product, ἔργον) and action (πράξεις), and “the good and well [done]” (τἀγαθὸν... καὶ τὸ ἔδω) seem to reside in the work/product (ἔργον). Before seeing how this can relate to a human being we have to see how this relates to the task of explicating the art’s counterpart to happiness and the best. The point seems to be that in art there are two separate elements (a work/product) and action (and both together = ποίησις), and within that couple the good resides in the product/work rather than the action. This reminds one of the beginning of the work where there was a distinction of ends, where for type 1b ends

\(^{321}\) 1094a1-2, cf. 1095a14-15 and 1097a15.
\(^{322}\) 1094a18-19.
\(^{323}\) 1094a27-28, cf. 1095a15-17.
\(^{324}\) 1095a17-20.
(of PRINCIPLE ONE) the ends (and therefore the good) were located in the work/product. This explains the relevance of the appearance of the EE’s ergon argument (1219a6-11) within its ergon argument at EN 1094a3-6 as a parallel passage. So for the arts, the ἔργον is the end (and good) and the προσεξίας is the means. Therefore, ἔργον here (in the case of τέχνη) has a passive meaning of product.

Is there a human counterpart to this? And if so to which end type does that human ergon correspond? The art-like 1b type end or to type 1a? Or, in other words, is the ἔργον in this case active or passive? Is the work that the ergon argument articulates an activity or a product?

[2 = 1097b28-33]

Aristotle’s approach to the questions raised at the end of the previous section is indirect. He begins by listing the bodily component parts of a human being (eye, hand, foot, etc.) each of which are organs, i.e., they biologically perform a task (ἔργον). But bodily biological functions are immediately discarded, so what Aristotle is after is restricted to the soul (though this is not explicitly said at this time).\(^{325}\)

Natural bodies (i.e. things which have a φύσις) differ from artefacts (i.e. products of art) by being their own ends, and not having separate products.\(^{326}\) Therefore, ἔργον in this case is active, in contrast to the τέχνη comparison in the previous section, and so is an activity. The τέχνη comparison was therefore merely a provisional analogy in the case of human beings, and is henceforth obsolete.

\(^{325}\) Cf. De Anima 413a20-22.

\(^{326}\) Cf. De Anima 414a18-19 and Physica II, form = end for natural beings (separate for artefacts), ergon = end, cf. EE’s ergon argument.
The first immediate candidate as the work of the human soul is of course life. Life is a capability (δύναμις) of soul arising out of its being as the form of a natural body (De Anima 412a19-21). As life is not reducible simply to the nutritive soul that constitutes the limit of a plant’s life (cf. De Anima 414a33), what Aristotle is excluding here is not life itself, but the lower subdivisions of life. However there are more capabilities in the soul than one, and here we see a division of the capabilities of the soul which are treated in more detail in the De Anima: θεραπευτική and ἀναθετική, and ἀνασθητική.

So, the plantlike aspects of life have to be removed from consideration (viz. nutritive, θεραπευτική, and augmentative, ἀναθετική, life). The sort of life which remains is that of sense-perception, but this too is shared (this time by every animal) and so must be removed. Two capabilities have now been excluded, and yet on the basis of Aristotle’s De Anima two still remain (viz. motion and thinking).

“What remains” (despite being a singular verb) covers two capabilities. This singular covering two ends explains Aristotle’s double-barrelled answer here as to what does remain:

1. an active [life],
2. of what has reason.

327 Cf. Republic 353d3-10, Plato’s own ergon argument, and EE 1219a23-28 and, later, EN 1098a18, in the conclusion of the argument.
329 Aristotle must be still talking about “life,” ζωή, for the gender of ἐπομένη δὲ ανασθητική τῆς (1098a1-2) needs a feminine referent from the previous sentence, and only ζωή qualifies.
“Active” does not exclude contemplation. What has reason is also split into two:

1. having reason as in being obedient to reason,
2. having reason and actually thinking with it.

The first alludes to moral virtue, whereas the second alludes to intellectual virtue. This life is peculiarly human: a certain active life of what has reason (λόγος, 1098a3) and this can only be the soul or parts of the soul.331

\[5 = 1098a5-7\]

And even this is said in two senses: presumably as a ἔξος and as an ἐνέργεια (which is the more authoritative sense).332

\[6 = 1098a7-8\]

The first of three major inferences drawn from the main body of the argument (sections 6, 8, 10 in Table 4.4), each of which has a qualifier attached concerning virtue (sections 7, 9, 11). Life is replaced by soul, indicating the area where the human good is to be found and that it has to be a good of the soul.

\[7 = 1098a8-12\]

This is the introduction of virtue into the argument. It is to be noted that κατ’ ἀρετήν is an adverbial expression, and not necessarily moral virtue, but a neutral virtue.333

330 Cf. Politics 1325b14-32 regarding the compatibility of πρᾶξις and θεωρία.
331 Cf. 1102a27 f. and 1098a4-5: the division of the soul into rational and non-rational.
332 Cf. De Anima 414a4-12, 417a21-b2, and Metaphysics 1050b6-34.
333 Urmson (1990) 31: “The translation of Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia as energeia kat’aretén (E.N. 1098a17) into ‘activity in accordance with virtue’ is particularly unfortunate. kat’aretén is an adverbial expression meaning ‘excellently’, and energeia kat’aretén is activity excellently performed, whatever the as yet undetermined activity may be.” Emphasis added.
This is the second major inference of the *ergon* argument: Aristotle supposes the work of a human being to be a certain life (ζωήν τύπο) and this life is activity and actions of the soul with reason (1098a12-14).

This has to be done “in accordance with the virtue pertaining to the work (*ergon)*.”

The third major inference defines what the human good is (a question sought-for since *EN* I.2 cf. 1094b7, 1096a6-7, 1097a15). Aristotle sums up happiness then in terms of the human good as “activity of soul in accordance with virtue” (1098a16-17). This is the culminating inference of the *ergon* argument.

Moral virtue has not yet been defined. This division, i.e. the plurality of virtue – already prepared for by the division at 1098a4-5 between the two parts of the soul – allows Aristotle room for where the composite nature of the human soul and its work is examined more fully in *EN* VI [= EE V]. Now, as stated here by Aristotle, virtue (ἀρετή) is ambiguous. Virtue can mean simply excellence or having virtue in the sense of moral virtue. And this issue of ambiguity becomes explicit and is discussed self-consciously by Aristotle in the very next sentence. There Aristotle splits virtue into a plurality of individual virtues and the most complete or perfect virtue.
On 1098a17-18, Ackrill thinks “most final” must be the set of all the virtues, he relies on EE 1219a35-39 but where the superlative is not used. The use of the superlative here seems to limit and qualify the virtue, rather than to imply inclusivity.

[12 = 1098a18-20]

This is really a supplementary consideration. It simply adds that it is necessary to have a complete life, or a life which attains the end sufficiently. This seems an indeterminate amount of time, but at least it can not be short (but that too is indeterminate).

The EN's ergon argument has now been completed and it remains for the rest of the EN to give this conception of the human good some content.

"Method" 3 [1098a20-b8].

This section explicitly refers to the earlier discussions of “method” (1098a26) and seems to combine all the points previously made with regards to precision and the sources of knowledge.

Firstly, the Geometer and Carpenter are distinguished by Aristotle, and the question arises, which is more like the person who has “moral knowledge”? With precision not being required, it seems that knowledge of principles or causes is the real issue: and this issue is now explicitly brought up.

Secondly, the ἄρχαί are discussed (1098a33-b8) which distinguish the nature of the first principles relied on in the argument.

But beyond these discussions of method there is also the question of how Aristotle actually proceeds in the course of the work. EN I is characterised by two

types of argumentation; firstly, that of the *ergon* argument in I.7 and then a comparison of it with ἐνδοξα in I.8 ff. (cf. 1098b9-12): what is true becomes established through the correspondence of Aristotle’s own *logos* with received opinion (ἐνδοξα).

11. *EN I.8-13.*

Aristotle returns to ἐνδοξα (cf. 1098b10, 17-18, 28) to match up his *logos* (1098b10) to received opinions in *EN I.8.*

Four points of consistency are noted. Firstly (at 1098b12-18), he distinguishes goods into three categories [1098b12-13]:

1. External goods [1098b13].
2. Goods of the soul [1098b13-14].
3. Goods of the body [1098b14].

He asserts that goods of the soul are most authoritatively and especially goods (1098b14-15). On the basis of this, he makes clear that for the *ergon* argument the actions and activities of the soul belong in the category of goods of the soul, which is an opinion in accord with philosophers. This has seemed to some to be a tautology, but it unequivocally places the relevant “actions and activities” as internal operations of the soul, not “moral” actions. It also removes from Aristotle’s conception of happiness goods which belong to the other two categories – external goods and goods of the body.

Secondly (at 1098b18-20), Aristotle connects certain actions and activities with the end. These are actions and activities of the soul – another feature of the *ergon* argument) so that happiness (as the end sought-for) would belong to the goods of soul,

---

335 Cf. Heinaman (2007) for an extensive examination of this section of the *EN* which focuses on its consistency with the *ergon* argument presented in *EN I.7* where happiness is described as an activity.

336 Cf. *EE* 1218b32-35 where the point being made is that “the more choiceworthy of these [three types of good] are those in the soul;... for, prudence, virtue and pleasure are in the soul.”
not external (or bodily) goods. The human good and finality (possession of the end) come together in both accounts.

Thirdly (at 1098b20-22), that “living well” (ἐὖ ἔξν) and “faring well” (ἐὖ πράττειν) belong to the happy person (cf. 1095a19). Aristotle, by applying the abstract noun counterparts to those terms (ἐὖξωια and ἐὖπροξια) to the ergon argument, states that this claim “has just about already been said” (sc. in the ergon argument).337 Ackrill’s view of ἐὐπρόξια (discussed at the beginning of this chapter) precludes contemplation from being compatible with it, but Aristotle makes the ergon argument compatible with contemplation (being an activity), and the ergon argument is referred to as ἐὐπροξια.338 “Good action” and contemplation are for Aristotle therefore not mutually exclusive, but potentially the same thing.339

Fourthly (at 1098b22-26), all the things sought-after concerning happiness occur (ὑπάρχειν) to the argument that Aristotle has presented (viz. in the ergon argument). These turn out to cover the goods of the Three Lives (virtue, prudence, pleasure). Aristotle compares the views of various unidentified groups about these goods, which may explain why φρόνησις is split between φρόνησις and σοφία τις here (although together they comprise broad φρόνησις in the sense used in the EE to cover the contemplative life anyway). In addition to all these, “others” also throw in external prosperity (a view not shared by Aristotle because it runs counter to his ergon argument). However, it does raise a problem which Aristotle soon addresses.

Examples of virtue (1098b30-99a7) and pleasure (1099a7-21) link those who do καλὰ κἀγαθὰ to the life of virtue and that the life of such persons is a pleasant life.

---

337 Consequently, when these terms re-appear later (at 1139a34, b3, and 1140b7), they can be seen as references back to the ergon argument, relating to a good within the soul, not to “moral” action.
(1099a7, 13-16), combining two goods of the soul into the attributes of one life already.

Actions which are καρδιανέμεσα (1099a21) are not only pleasant, but good and beautiful. This leads to happiness being as a consequence the best, most beautiful and most pleasant thing (cf. EE I.1.1). These characteristics arise for the best activities (a point which connects the Three Lives back again to the ergon argument). Thus these or the best one of these activities is happiness. Therefore, the ergon argument must be the basis of each of the three parts of happiness (as we will show is in fact the case): and so the basis for virtue (moral virtue), for prudence (intellectual virtue), and for pleasure. This describes the bulk of the EN: the best activity (nous) combines in itself the three attributes of happiness via the operation of its own work.

External prosperity is introduced as an additional requirement, but this is now seen to be dependent on chance, so the question of the status of good-fortune arises for Aristotle. The ergon argument again supplies the answer to this perplexity: since it asserts that the good of the soul (being a certain sort of activity of soul in accordance with excellence) is happiness, the other type of goods (viz. those external or of the body) are either necessary conditions for happiness or useful for it in the manner of tools (1099b25-28).

This characterisation also agrees with what was said at the beginning by Aristotle (in EN I.2 and I.4), since the best end was said to belong to πολιτική and happiness is that best end. Consistent with this, the possessor of πολιτική takes most care to make his fellow citizens a certain sort, namely:

a. good (for the latter characteristic, cf. the ergon argument), and

b. able to effect beautiful things (καλλό).
And here good is the result of the activity of the soul being performed at excellence, while the ability to effect beautiful things is the expression of that excellence (cf. 1101b31-32).

The same point that a human life has an additional need for the good provided by fortune returns again, yet still the activities in accordance with excellence are authoritative over happiness (1100b8-11 and re-affirmed at 1100b33-34). What counts is that which does not depend on chance: the internal goods of the soul. The λόγος (i.e. the ergon argument) is used again to resolve the present perplexity (1108b11-12), where stability arises most especially in activities in accordance with excellence. Continuity arises as well because activities in accordance with excellence are those which the blessed spend their lives in. Further, “for, always or most of all [the happy person] will do and contemplate the matters in accordance with excellence” (1100b19-20).

In the final chapter of EN I, Aristotle begins his transition to examine the three component parts of happiness. The first which he chooses to examine is virtue (ἀρετή). The additional reason to examine virtue is that the true politician (ὁ καρτ’ ἀληθείαν πολιτικός – 1102a8) has most of all laboured concerning virtue: the true politician wishes to make his citizens good and subservient to the laws. Aristotle cites Sparta and Crete as examples of this concern (although they ultimately fall short, cf. Politics 1333b5-35).

Virtue has now become moral virtue consisting of obedience to law (being a good citizen) and fulfilling the requirements of the ergon argument (being a good human being): the two are presumed to coincide. Only in the Politics will Aristotle make clear that their coincidence occurs in the best regime alone (cf. Politics 1276b16-34, but even within the best regime, φρόνησις in the full sense belongs to
the rulers, cf. 1276b34-1277a25). It is only their coincidence in the case of the citizen-rulers in the best regime (and insofar as they coincide) that achieves what we are accustomed to call "morality" in the full sense: the law-abiding citizen of a defective regime cannot be (fully) just except in a purely legal sense.

The consideration of the soul also relies on the ergon argument, where the soul is divided into rational and non-rational parts (1102a27-28) and the lower, non-rational part of the soul is excluded (1102a28-b12, cf. the ergon argument's similar exclusion at 1097b33-1098a5). The part of the soul which has reason covers both the rational and non-rational parts of the soul, since the term "has reason" is used in an equivocal sense, with virtue acquiring its dual sense of moral virtue (which belongs to the non-rational part of the soul strictly speaking) and of intellectual virtue (which has reason in the strict sense of the term, 1103a1-3).


Firstly, with regards to the first good of the soul which is examined: excellence of character or moral virtue belongs to the non-rational part of the soul (1102b13-14), yet by its nature it is disposed to follow the part of the soul which does have reason (1102b25-03a1 and 1103a3). The political life was seen earlier to be dedicated to virtue (though virtue by itself may be something rather incomplete – 1095b22-96a4). The "true politician" is concerned with this type of virtue (1099b29-32 and 1102a5-10). The examination of moral virtue (EN II-V) is therefore an examination of the good attached to the political life.

The discussion of moral virtue follows naturally on from Aristotle's definition of happiness given in the ergon argument (cf. 1102a5-6 with 1098a16-18). Aristotle's virtue must by its nature accompany a corresponding work (ergon): the connexion to
and dependence on this good to the *ergon* argument and the definition of happiness is
clear. This is made explicit when Aristotle provides a description of what sort of thing
(moral) virtue is (at 1106a14-26). During the course of defining what moral virtue is
Aristotle refers back to the *ergon* argument as a necessary part of his conception of
virtue:

So, it must be said that every excellence [ἀρετή], as well as bringing that of
which it is the excellence to completion in a good condition, also makes it
yield work [ἔργον] of a good kind, as the excellence [ἀρετή] of the eyes
makes both the eye and its work [ἔργον] first-rate, since by means of the
excellence [ἀρετή] of the eye we see well. Similarly, the excellence [ἀρετή] of
a horse both makes it a first-rate horse, and makes it good at running, at
carrying its rider, and at holding still in the face of enemies. So if this is the
way things are in all cases, then also the excellence [ἀρετή] of a human being
would be the condition from which one becomes a good human being and
from which one will yield up one’s own work [ἔργον] well. (1106a15-24)

The particular individual virtues such as courage, moderation and justice are
elaborated and examined in detail, matching the discussion which occurs in *EE* III-IV.

13. Prudence [*EN VI = EE V*].

We saw in the previous chapter on the *EE* that the discussion of prudence (φρόνησις)
which constitutes the whole of *EN VI [= EE V]* treats the second good of the Three
Lives argument.\(^{340}\) This particular good of the soul was the basis of the philosopher’s
life or of the contemplative life. The book consisted of an examination of that part of
the soul to which that life is dedicated.

The division between moral and intellectual virtue masked the fact that the
two are different in kind and that in the discussion of intellectual virtue in *EN VI [=*
*EE V]* a different good from virtue is being treated, namely φρόνησις – to use this
term in its broad sense. Aristotle obfuscated this important distinction by defining

\(^{340}\) I recapitulate here in brief the main points of the argument presented in fuller form in the

Page 163
φρόνησις in this Book as “practical wisdom” and only using it there in that narrow, technical sense, despite having referred to the entire Book earlier as treating φρόνησις in a broader sense. The EN has a less explicit reference to it, in the Three Lives argument (at 1096a4-5), which promises a future discussion of the contemplative life.

To summarise briefly the results of the previous chapter on this book: Each of the two intellectual virtues — σοφία and φρόνησις — are virtues because they are perfections of the two parts of the soul which “study” the truth.341 The ergon argument applies here since the thinking part of the soul has two works (erga) within it relating to two different types of truth (contemplative and active) which each part achieves through its activity.

This book also begins and ends with an important analogy. It starts by now saying that although the mean of moral virtue is set by ὁρθός λόγος,342 this has to be more exactly spelled-out. Just like medical expertise or a doctor issues commands or instructions with some determinate defining-limit (ὄρος), in this case health. The books ends with the resolution of this problem, just as medical-expertise issues orders (ἐπιτάττει) for the sake of health, so does prudence in the narrow sense of practical wisdom, issue orders for the sake of wisdom.

But indeed, neither is [prudence] authoritative over wisdom nor over the better part [of the soul], just as neither is medical-expertise authoritative over health; for it does not use it, but sees how it may come into being; so it issues orders for its sake, but does not issue orders to it.343

This settles the relationship between moral virtue and intellectual virtue but also between practical and contemplative wisdom. Contemplative wisdom corresponds to the role played by health in the analogy, and practical wisdom to medical expertise.

341 θεωροῦμεν 1139a7 (1139a6-11 for the context), and 1139b12-13.
342 The term ὁρθός λόγος (orthos logos) is usually translated as “correct reason” or “right reason” (and sometimes as “right rule”).
343 “Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κυρίω ʹ ἐστὶ τῆς σοφίας οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίωνος μορίου, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ τῆς ὑγείας ἢ ἰατρείας οὐ γὰρ χρήσται αὐτή, ἄλλα ὁρθὸς ὁποῖος γεννηται ἐκείνης ὁμν ἐνεκα ἐπιτάττει, ἄλλη όνει ἐκείνη.” (1145a6-9)
Within 1138b18-34 there is a development (starting at 1138b25) of the argument arising out of the problematic nature of determining *orthos logos* (correct reason). Aristotle could not begin his account of *orthos logos* (correct reason) at 1138b35 from its proper point of commencement at the beginning without showing—as he does—that the prior material requires what follows, and that the prior material itself is required by Aristotle’s previous commitments, viz. that moral virtue must be determined by *orthos logos* (correct reason) which would be explained later.

The entire discussion of moral virtue (*EN* II-V, and *EE* II.2-IV) has been conducted on the basis that the \(\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\nu\ \xi\chi\circ\nu\) part of the soul is one and indivisible. This indivisibility was re-enforced, or its problematic and divisible nature made inconspicuous by Aristotle’s use of the phrase “in accordance with \(\varphi\theta\circ\varsigma \lambda\circ\gamma\circ\varsigma\)” as setting the mean. It also has the function of re-enforcing the integrity or “immanence” of moral virtue. Aristotle now (1139a2-3) revisits the “psychology” of *EE* II (and *EN* I) by dividing the \(\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\nu\ \xi\chi\circ\nu\) into two parts (ultimately, this division will be that between \(\sigma\circ\phi\circ\alpha\) and \(\varphi\rho\circ\nu\varsigma\circ\zeta\circ\zeta\)), each having its own *ergon* (1139a16-17 and 1139b12-13) and therefore a corresponding virtue. The *ergon* argument is therefore retrospectively affected or has to be now re-considered in the light of this new division. The highest *ergon* is now \(\sigma\circ\phi\circ\alpha\): \(\varphi\rho\circ\nu\varsigma\circ\zeta\circ\zeta\) issues commands for the sake of \(\sigma\circ\phi\circ\alpha\), and both these virtues together constitute \(\varphi\rho\circ\nu\varsigma\circ\zeta\circ\zeta\). Moral virtue hereby collapses into \(\varphi\rho\circ\nu\varsigma\circ\zeta\circ\zeta\), an intellectual virtue: the mean is set by it.

Thirdly and finally, the good that remains to be discussed by Aristotle is that of pleasure (ἡδόνη).\textsuperscript{344} Much of this discussion is identical to that of the \textit{EE} (because of their shared book, \textit{EE VI} = \textit{EN VII}), so we summarise here the results of the common material discussed in the previous chapter. We saw there that pleasure was the third good of the soul examined, one of three such goods on which the \textit{ergon} argument was premised (\textit{EE II.1 1218b32-36}).\textsuperscript{345} The \textit{ergon} argument has relevance to Aristotle’s definition of pleasure because pleasure is an unimpeded activity\textsuperscript{346} or results from such an activity.\textsuperscript{347} The \textit{ergon} which Aristotle has in mind therefore as the human good, if not identical to pleasure, is at least able to include pleasure as one of its by-products by the operation of its own work.\textsuperscript{348} Happiness or the human good was defined as an activity of soul (provided in the \textit{ergon} argument at \textit{EN I.7}), so if there are pleasures of the soul in addition to bodily pleasures, the happy life will also be a pleasant life, achieving the attainment of two goods via the operation of one and the same \textit{ergon} (and the attainment of all three goods of the soul if that operation is done at excellence, thereby including virtue). This is why contemplation (the being at work of the \textit{mous}) is linked to pleasure in \textit{EN X} via an activity of soul:

\begin{quote}
...that way of being at work is best that belongs to what is in its best condition, directed toward the best of what is perceptible by it. This would be the most
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{344} In this discussion of pleasure my thesis is that the whole of \textit{EN VII-X.5} contributes to the treatment of pleasure. This is not to maintain that the material was all written for this purpose, as opposed to being adapted and placed where appropriate. The philological question about the double treatment of pleasure in the \textit{EN} is not the main focus here, nor is chronological speculation about their date of composition. However, the greater unity of the corresponding parts of the \textit{EE} (which also contains a discussion of friendship, but is without the double treatment of pleasure) suggests a possible intention to arrange what may have originally been disparately composed material into a whole of a sort and that it is of importance that the “pleasure section” is precisely the section that this range of material has been placed (and in both treatises).

\textsuperscript{345} The approach of the \textit{EN} is a re-ordering which confines the relevant goods to those of the soul after its \textit{ergon} argument (at 1098b12-16) and then elaborates what those goods are consistently with those of the \textit{EE} (at 1098b22-29).

\textsuperscript{346} \textit{EE [= EN}] 1153a15, 20; 1153b10, 16, 18, 23.

\textsuperscript{347} \textit{EN} 1174b31-33.

\textsuperscript{348} For an argument stating a strong case for pleasure as the human good cf. Weinman (2007) esp. chp. 11.
complete and most pleasant. For, there is a pleasure that goes with each of the
senses, and similarly with thinking and contemplation, and [contemplation’s]
most complete activity is most pleasant, and it is most complete when it
belongs to a power that is in good condition directed toward that which is of
most serious worth among the things apprehended by it, and the pleasure
brings the activity to completion. (1174b18-23).

However, it could seem that this section which treats pleasure as the third good of the
soul is more disjointed than the discussions of virtue and of prudence, leading
commentators astray in not being able to see the common thread around which the
separate parts of EN VII-IX (with the added problem here of the additional account of
pleasure in EN X) are woven. Not only does the discussion of continence and
incontinence seem at first glance to be unconnected to the discussion of pleasure
which follows in EN VII [= EE VI], but in addition a treatment of friendship on our
account is also likewise – contrary to first appearances – associated by Aristotle with
the topic of pleasure.

Firstly, as regards to the two discussions which make up EN VII [= EE VI],
(viz. EN VII.1-10 on continence and EN VII.11-14 on pleasure) there is a clear
indication that the two are not strictly separate in Aristotle’s view. We saw that in the
EE there was a forward reference to this book at EE 1231b2-4: “And it must be
determined more precisely concerning the kind of pleasures in the things said later
concerning continence and incontinence.” And that ὀξισιὰ was being associated by
Aristotle with the topic of pleasure, regardless of whether the reference is to EN
VII.1-10 or EN VII.11-14, and maintained that it sufficed that the topic of pleasure
was connected with the discussion of continence and incontinence for it to be included
or associated with Aristotle’s projected discussion of pleasure.

In our examination of the EE in the previous chapter, we saw that there were
two good reasons why the topic of friendship was associated by Aristotle with that of
pleasure: Firstly, the importance of pleasure as a component part of friendship
(especially in the best type of friendship); and secondly, because Aristotle’s final summation on the topic of pleasure included points made within the friendship book (viz. in EE VII). In addition to this, the discussion of friendship in EE is very close doctrinally with the one presented in the EN, which would seem to indicate a consistency on this matter in both ethics.\footnote{Rowe (1971a) 52; “If there is any difference between the two accounts of the individual virtues, there is even less between those of friendship. There may be slight differences of emphasis; but there is not a single point at which the doctrines of EE and EN differ to any significant extent. Once again, EN is simply longer and – for the most part, at least – more dialectical.”} We cannot provide a full or extensive examination of Aristotle’s view of friendship in the EN. We can merely indicate the central importance of pleasure within his account of friendship which allows him to associate the two topics closely.

After generalising about friendship and raising issues in dispute about it in EN VIII.1, Aristotle begins a more systematic examination in VIII.2 by examining what the loveable (φιλητόν) is (1155b17-18). The loveable is divided into three categories (1155b18-19):

1. good,
2. pleasant,
3. useful.

The first two are identified as loveable as ends, rather than means, as in the case of the useful (1155b11-21). This division into three categories of the loveable provides the basis for the three kinds of friendship (1156a7-8):

1. the useful (1156a10-12),
2. the pleasant (1156a12-16),
3. the good (1156b7-32).

The first two are identified as being only incidentally friendship since the useful friendship relates to what is good for themselves, and the pleasant friendship is based
on what is pleasant to themselves (1156a14-19). The friendship based on the good, however, is characterised as complete or perfect friendship (1156b7) as there is a mutual recognition of each person’s goodness (1155b7-11).

However, this does not preclude the perfect friendship of the good from being also useful and pleasant (1156b14-17). In fact, all three categories of the loveable are present in the perfect friendship (1155b21). Just as at EN I (1099a7-15) there is an identity between the simply good and the simply pleasant (1156b22-23, cf. 1157a1-2, 35) in the best case. So, the pleasant and the good become identified in the case of the highest type of friendship. And just as friendship of the highest sort is good and pleasant, life is good and pleasant (cf. 1170a13-b19; 1171b32-72a8).

Further, Aristotle connects friendship to contemplation:

And so [the decent person] wants good things for himself, or those that seem so, and does them (for, it belongs to the good person to work hard at the good), and for his own sake (for, they are for the sake of his thinking part [δυναμενημονον], which seems to be each person), and he wants himself to live and be preserved, and especially that in him by which he thinks [εποιηται]... and each person would seem to be his activity of thinking [το νοον], or that most of all. (1166a15-23)

το νοον recurs at 1178a6-7 as the decisive element in the happy life (of contemplation), and this intellectualism is further elaborated later on:

But it would seem rather that it is such a person [viz. a friend of the best sort] who is a lover of self; at least he takes for himself the things that are most beautiful and most good, and gratifies what is most authoritative in himself, and obeys this in all things... And people are called self-restrained and unrestrained according to whether intellect [νοος] masters them or not, as though this [sc. νοος] were each person; and the things people seem most of all to have done themselves and willingly are the things they have done with reason [λογον]. So then, that this [sc. νοος] is each person, or is so most of all, is not unclear, nor that a decent person loves this [sc. νοος] most. (1168b30-69a2).

And

Every intellect [νοος] chooses what is best for itself, and the decent person obeys the intellect [νοος]. (1169a17-18).
Aristotle uses friendship to bridge the gap between the non-political face of the contemplative life with the political concern for others of the life of virtue. Resolving thereby the relation and coherence of the account of happiness in *EN* I and X. *EN* X seems to award contemplation (θεωρία) the prize of being the exclusive end or highest good, but the relation of this to moral virtue could be seen to be problematic, since virtue may then be purely a means to contemplation, rather than an end in itself.

This leads to the following moral problem:

...If the contemplative [person] lacks moral virtue, there is nothing to prevent him from being quite ruthless in pursuing his goal [viz. contemplation]. For example, he may by betraying a friend gain a large sum of money and thereby assure himself years of leisure for philosophizing. What would hold him back?  

Kenny extends this moral jeopardy further by extending the concern beyond friends to "neighbours":

... if Aristotle made contemplation alone a constituent of perfect happiness, then in cases where there is a conflict between the demands of moral virtue and the demands of contemplation, Aristotle must say that the agent should engage in contemplation, even if the alternative is saving his neighbour from a burning house.  

The problem here can be expressed as; "Will the contemplative [person] of [EN] book 10 in fact possess the moral virtues?" or "... what demands, according to Aristotle, does morality really make of the person of contemplative excellence?" As Monan points out:

...such a primary position of contemplation [as the *EN* presents in its last Book] presupposes a hierarchical order of parts of the soul, with contemplative *nous* occupying such a 'separate' [*EN* 1177b28, 1178a19-22] position that it is man. The key phrase which in the *Protrepticus* and in the *EN* X determined the essential component of happiness as contemplation was: 'reason (nous) more than anything else is man.' [*EN* 1178a7-8, 1177a13-22, *Protrepticus* 43, 3-5].
So, the question remains, "If he [viz. the contemplative person] really did everything else for the sake of contemplation, why should he rescue his neighbour from burning if it distracts from contemplation?"\footnote{Kenny (2001) 28.}

The answer to this question lies in Aristotle's understanding of the nature of friendship and its place in the happy life, as there are dramatic similarities of thought and expression between the account of the happy life and of the friendship based on true self-love which extends to our neighbours (EN 1166a1-2).

At the conclusion of Aristotle's statement (1177a12-1178a8) that the contemplative life constitutes perfect happiness, he refers back to an earlier point in the text which he says now harmonises with this conclusion:

And each person would seem to be this part [sc. νοῦς], if it is the authoritative and better part; so, it would be strange if anyone were to choose not his own life but that of something else. What was said before [= 1170a16-b19; esp. 1170a31-1170b6, & 1170b10-14] will harmonise also now: what is appropriate by nature to each being is best and most pleasant to each, and so, for a human being, this is the life in accord with intellect [νοῦς], if that most of all is a human being. Therefore, this life is also the happiest. [1178a2-8]

This strengthens the coherence and consistency of the EN since its component parts would then inter-relate tightly. Kenny tries to forestall this by denying that the νοῦς of EN IX and X are the same νοῦς.\footnote{It is noteworthy that νοῦς here, in EN 9, is νοῦς in the broad sense: the rational part of the soul, controlling the irrational part in consort with the moral virtues; it is not the purely contemplative νοῦς of EN 10." Kenny (1996) 53n. If Kenny were correct that the νοῦς of EN IX and X were two different varieties of νοῦς, then there would be three conceptions of νοῦς in the EN (viz., νοῦς, νοῦς, and the nous of EN IX). A more likely scenario which does not multiply entities is that the broad νοῦς of EN IX and X are the same νοῦς (in contrast to the narrowly defined νοῦς of EN VI.6 [= EE V.6]. The texts are compatible with the broad conception of νοῦς as the λόγον ἐγγον part of the soul discussed in the previous chapter on EE V [= EN VI]. Broad νοῦς has a hierarchy within itself (between ὑπόκεια and narrow ἑρωτοκοινοδοκία) that Kenny fails to appreciate.} But he in fact fails to see that the rational part of the soul is contemplative, and that (for this very reason) it is also the good of the contemplative life.\footnote{Cf. 1139a6-8 and our discussion of EE V [= EN VI].} The EN comes back full circle to the ergon argument at
1170a14-24, where what is authoritative resides in the activity (cf. 1097b26-27), and life is that activity (cf. 1098a3-4, 13).

With a view to a friend, the beautiful qualifies what seems to be the selfish nature of this understanding of friendship (1169a19-b2). Starting from EN 1166a1-2 Aristotle builds up a type of friendship founded on self-love but which extends to others outside of oneself. Through this section the self which is loved turns out to be directly related to “what is most authoritative in [one]self” [EN 1168b9-1169a30; esp. 1168b28-1169a3; compare 1168b30 with 1178a5-6] which happens to be intellect (φυσικά), just as in EN X (1168b34-1169a3 & 1169a17-8).

Also of note is that the self-sufficiency requirement of the good which was set down in EN I.7 (1097b6-20) is addressed and resolved here, where the solitary life precludes friends but the life of the φυσικά requires friendship (1169b29-70a12).

Since Aristotle concludes that the person who is going to be happy will need friends (EN 1170b18-9), and links up his discussion of happiness with friendship, the happy person must have a relationship to and concern for others beside himself (or at least for some others) that mitigates the seeming immorality of having contemplation as the highest end.


The final chapters of the EN (before the transitional chapter which links the work directly to the Politics) are the counterpart to the final chapter of the EE: they present Aristotle’s final teaching on happiness by deciding on which of the Three Lives (after the examination of their corresponding goods in the bulk of the EN) is consistent with
his conception of happiness.\textsuperscript{358} We saw in the previous chapter that \textit{EE} VIII.3 was a concluding statement that arranged the goods of the soul which the bulk of the \textit{EE} had examined and which vindicated the contemplative life. The contemplative life of the philosopher combined all three goods within itself and set the defining limit of virtue, and therefore was the life which prevailed, just as in the \textit{Protrepticus}.

\textit{EN} X.6-8 performs this same function: it vindicates the contemplative life as perfect happiness (1177a17, b24, and 1178b7) and as the happiest life (1178a8). Whereas in \textit{EE} VIII.3 three goods/lives are interrelated in a hierarchy – with the contemplative life encompassing the other two lives or their goods – in \textit{EN} X.6-8 two lives are placed in a hierarchy (viz. the contemplative in \textit{EN} X.7 and the political life in \textit{EN} X.8).\textsuperscript{359} As both those lives have pleasure as an accompaniment, it seems that Aristotle decided that pleasure did not need to be treated separately in such a contest.

The subject-matter here (in \textit{EN} X.6-8) is happiness (cf. 1176a31), not contemplation. The contemplative life is discussed and vindicated as being consistent with Aristotle's conception of happiness (esp. 1177a19-b26 where six consistencies are noted), but the basis of that life – the \textit{νοῦς} – was treated in \textit{EN} VI [= \textit{EE} V] where the two parts of \textit{νοῦς} have their own particular work (and therefore their own particular virtue: \textit{σοφία} and \textit{φρόνησις} respectively).

The points which will identify the winning candidate are now briefly recalled. They are points which depend upon the \textit{ergon} argument's identification of the human good as an activity. Firstly, that happiness is not a condition, but an activity.

\footnote{358 As established in \textit{EN} I, both with respect to the \textit{ergon} argument in \textit{EN} I.7 and the Three Lives argument in \textit{EN} I.5. With respect to the latter, cf. Richardson Lear (2004) 178: "... Aristotle's use of \textit{bios} in \textit{EN} I.5 can guide us in the interpretation of this word in \textit{EN} X. That is because in \textit{EN} X.6-8 he settles the question he first raised in \textit{EN} I.5 of which of the three traditional happy lives — the voluptuary's, the politician's, or the philosopher's — is the best."}

\footnote{359 Cf. Bostock (2000) 200: "The most natural way of taking Aristotle's position is surely this. He means to compare and contrast two 'lives,' one being the life of contemplation (or perhaps, more generally, of study), and the other the life of political activity. These are each two different ways of organizing and structuring one's whole life, and are distinguished by what one may fairly call the \textit{dominant activity} in each." Emphasis in the original.}
Secondly, Aristotle makes a distinction between activities: some are necessary, others are choiceworthy because of something else, and some are choiceworthy because of themselves (cf. 1099b25-28 where three types of goods – external, bodily, and of the soul – are similarly classified). Here finality (being choiceworthy in itself) and self-sufficiency (needing no further product or work beyond itself) are brought together. Thirdly, that actions expressing excellence are of this sort, since doing beautiful and serious things belong to those things which are choiceworthy because of themselves. This last point may give the impression of pointing towards moral virtue, however the contemplative life also is concerned both with καλά (1179a24-32 and perhaps 1177a15) and is something which is σπουδαίο (1176b18-19, cf. 1177a1-6, 1177b19).

If happiness is “activity in accordance with excellence” (i.e. happiness as it is defined in the ergon argument, cf. 1098a3-18), Aristotle says that it would be well-reasoned for it to be in accordance with the best excellence – the multiplicity of virtue being a possibility left open by the ergon argument and confirmed both by the split between moral and intellectual virtue as well as by the split within intellectual virtue between σοφία and φρόνησις. Because virtue is relative to its corresponding activity, and that activity is located in an area of the soul (being a good of the soul), the question reduces to what the best part of the soul is, and this is identified as νοῦς (1177a12-13). This is confirmed at 1177a16-17: “the activity of this [sc. νοῦς] in accordance with its particular virtue would be perfect happiness.” It is not multitude of excellences (implying a multitude of hexeis), but it is rather multitude of parts of the soul (viz. their respective erga) that causes this multiplicity of virtue – so it is not a contrast between intellectual and moral virtue, but the hierarchy of parts of the soul that is at issue (and further, within the intellectual part of the soul).
Broadie thinks that "νοῦς here" is both practical (ruling and guiding) and theoretical (its objects are eternal entities), and that as a consequence there is a different conception of νοῦς at play here than in *EN VI* [= *EE V*]. But this is the same mistake that Broadie made with respect to the interpretation of the end of *EN VI* [= *EE V*], where σοφία is authoritative over prudence. νοῦς here is in the same position as the god in the *EE* which rules not in the manner of issuing commands, but by being the end of prudence, viz. by being that for which prudence issues commands.

When Aristotle now says "that it is contemplative has been said," the subject of ἐστι (1177a18) is ἡ τοῦτον ἐνέργεια (1177a16), not ἡ τελεία ἐνδαίμονία (1177a17). This is confirmed by the fact that the six points of consistency (1177a19-b26) between the contemplative life and Aristotle's conception of happiness relate to happiness understood as an activity (αὐτή... ἡ ἐνέργεια 1177a20) and that this activity is the activity of νοῦς (1177a20-21). The nature of this activity is both human and divine:

To be most human is to seek an understanding of the cosmos, to think about universals rather than particulars. It is thus to be separated from, to be a 'stranger' to, the commonplace or political; it is somehow beyond the human,

---

360 Rowe and Broadie (2002) 441.
361 Ibid. 384: "For wisdom [σοφία] to give orders to intellectual accomplishment [σοφία] would be for it to dictate research programmes and the like." On the contrary, it would be dictating what contemplative truth is and has no relation whatsoever to contemporary notions of "academic freedom," cf. 1139a26-31. Further, "Some interpreters suppose that, for Aristotle, all wise [σοφία] decisions, either on the personal or on the political level or both, are directed towards promoting intellectually accomplished activity [σοφία]. But (since Greek city-states were not theocracies) the simile here [at 1145a9-11] suggests that this is or should be just one of several important responsibilities for the wise [σοφία] person" (ibid.). But, firstly, the end is not one "responsibility" among many, rather it determines what the responsibility in question is: Aristotle specifies only one end here (as the example of the art of medicine having health as its end, rather than all sorts of other ends, shows). Secondly, comparison with *EE* VIII.3 (with which this present text has strong verbal similarities) leads in precisely the opposite direction to Broadie's interpretation.
362 *EE* 1249b13-16 and cf. our discussion of *EN VI* [= *EE V*] and our previous chapter on *EE* VIII.3. Richardson Lear (2004) 191 makes a similar case to ours: "The activity of nous is choiceworthy for its own sake alone, while the activity of practical virtue (certainly, at least, in paradigmatic cases) is subordinate to it. The former, then ought to be authoritative over the latter. Aristotle hinted as much at the end of book VI when he assured us that theoretical wisdom would not take orders from *phronesis*." 363 For the discussion of these six points cf. Curzer (1990) and Szaif (2006).
for it is to emulate the divine (which is famously described in *Metaphysics* 12.9 as ‘thought thinking itself’). In short, to be most human is to cease, as much as possible, to be merely human.364

After Aristotle has listed the six points of consistency which award the best life of the Three Lives to the contemplative life of philosophy, he admits that a human life is a composite life. However, it is important to note that the two lives of contemplation and politics are not mutually exclusive since prudence (φρόνησις in the sense of practical wisdom) still issues orders for the sake of σοφία in any event (cf. 1145a6-11), so what is actually being addressed in EN X.7-8 is not exactly σοφία versus φρόνησις, but whether dedication of one’s life to σοφία alone is possible (for a human being) or a combined life of σοφία and φρόνησις (where φρόνησις still has σοφία as its end).365 The relation between these two is a rank order, and the life in accordance with the “other virtue,” viz. prudence, is placed second (1178a9).

15. The *Politics*.

If our “intellectualist” reading of the *EN* (and *EE*) is correct one would expect that the *Politics* would also reflect the primacy of contemplation in its teaching, and that it may help to explain the relationship between the contemplative and active life in *EN* X. This is what we find when we come to the discussion of the best regime in *Politics* VII-VIII. In *Politics* VII.13-15, the contemplative life wins out over the active life, for it is the best life available to human beings. Aristotle begins by re-considering the

---

364 Roochnik (2008) 732. Cf. also Richardson Lear (2004) 192 who, in contrast to Roochnik, makes the argument less abstract and connects it with the *ergon* argument: “For the most final human end is the human function [*ergon*], and our function defines our essence. When Aristotle says that we are *malista nous*, he is not restricting this as a description of our essence. Rather, he means to say that the activity of *nous*, divine as it may be, is also the fullest expression of our human nature, where this is to be understood as the most final end toward which human nature as whole strives.”

365 This is in contrast to Richardson Lear (2004) 195: “The actualisation of *phronesis* is not theoretical contemplation, but it is... *theoria... tis*. That is to say, the activity of practical wisdom is contemplation... of a sort.” This misconstrues Aristotle’s point here [1178b32]. θεωρία τις is human as opposed to divine contemplation. This better fits the subject matter which from 1178b7-32 has contrasted human and divine contemplation (and contemplation in the sense of contemplative, not practical, wisdom).
nature of happiness, which is defined there as "the complete activity and use of virtue," (1332a9) and is the end both of the city and the individual human being (1331b39-40).

Since we assert that the virtue of citizen and ruler is the same as that of the good man, and the same person must be ruled first and ruler later, the legislator would have to make it his affair to determine how men can become good and through what pursuits, and what the end of the best life is. 366

The end of the best life is happiness, and since happiness is the same for both a city and for a human being (cf. 1324a5-8), there should be a consistency of teaching here with Aristotle's main treatise on happiness. Aristotle now makes a division of soul in accord with that made in his ethical writings:

Two parts of the soul are distinguished, of which one has reason in accordance with itself, while the other does not have it in accordance with itself, but is able to listen to reason; to which we assert belong the virtues in accordance with which a man is spoken of as in some sense good. As to which of these the end is more to be found in, what must be said is not unclear to those who distinguish in the way we assert should be done. 367

And this division establishes a hierarchy between the parts:

For, always the worse is for the sake of the better... and the part which has reason is better. And it is divided in two, in the manner we are accustomed to divide it; for, there is active and contemplative reason. 368

The division just made is the same as that presented in EN VI [= EE V] and in EN X.7-8.

So, it is clear that also this part [of the soul] must be divided in the same way. And we will also say that the actions are in a proportionate condition, and it is necessary for the [actions] of the [part] by nature better are more choiceworthy for those able to attain either all of them or on both two [lesser parts]; for, always for each [individual] this is most choiceworthy: to attain what is highest. 369

Therefore, this division of parts of the soul is necessarily a relation of better and worse, where one part is for the sake of the other, higher part (cf. 1333a33-36). This is

366 Pol. 1333a11-16.
367 1333a16-21.
368 1333a21-25.
369 1333a26-30.
why the political person (like prudence issuing orders for the sake of wisdom) “must legislate looking with a view to all [these] things in the case both of the parts of the soul and of their actions, but particularly to the things that are better and are ends” (1333a37-39). It follows necessarily from Aristotle’s argument that contemplative reason (if available to the individual in question) is the better part by nature and is the “that for the sake of which” or end of the lower parts. This is equivalent to Aristotle’s argument for the contemplative life in EN X. And it also provides a strong “intellectualist” or contemplative reading of the following:

and reason and intellect [νοῦς] are the end of our nature, so that it is with a view to these that birth and concern with habits should be handled; then just as soul and body are two things, so also do we see two parts of the soul, the non-rational part and the part having reason, and the conditions belonging to these are two in number, one of which is desire and the other intellect [νοῦς], and just as the body is prior in birth to the soul, so also is the non-rational part to the part having reason. And this is also apparent; for, spiritedness and will, and further appetite, are present in children immediately on their being born, but calculation and intellect [νοῦς] develop naturally in them as they go along. Which is why, first, the care of the body must precede that of the soul, then that of desire, however that of desire is for the sake of the intellect [νοῦς], and that of the body for the sake of the soul. [1334b15-1334b28]

By identifying reason and intellect Aristotle closes off Kraut’s reading of Politics VII, which obfuscates the significance of the distinction between the two parts of reason which correspond to the political and philosophic life respectively: “The two ways of leading the best life discussed in VII.2-3, one philosophical and the other political, have the virtuous employment of reason as their end.”370 The teaching of Politics VII is identical to that of EN X and EE VIII.3: contemplation is the ultimate “that for the sake of which” of politics.

---

370 Kraut (1997) 146.
16. Conclusion.

The *EN* began with an examination of the good and happiness, which included the Three Lives and their corresponding goods (in *EN* I.5). The *ergon* argument located these three goods as goods of the soul (internal goods) about which the argument of ethics as a whole is concerned (*EN* I.7). The three goods were then successively examined in the bulk of the work (*EN* II-X.5). Finally, concluding chapters (*EN* X.6-8) revisited the two main contenders and put them in a relation of hierarchy. There is an affirmation of the contemplative life which leads to the subordination of the political life, just as prudence sets the mean of moral virtue, and issues orders for the sake of wisdom. And this defining limit of moral virtue is contemplation, an activity which will by its nature also be intrinsically pleasant. The three elements are combined in the end as one.

We see that very similarly to the *Protrepticus* and the *EE*, the happiest life is one which expresses each of the goods that are the basis of the Three Lives – only the contemplative life offers this combination. Also, the life of philosophic contemplation is vindicated as that for the sake of which prudence (in the narrower, technical sense of practical wisdom) issues its orders.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APPENDIX 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1097b | 'Ἀλλ’ ἵσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὅμω-
23 λογοῦμενον τι φάινεται, ποθέται δ’ ἐναργέστερον τί ἐστιν ἔτι
24 λεκθῆναι. τάχα δή γένοιτ’ ἀν τοῦτ’, εἰ λαράθει τὸ ἔργον
25 τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. |
| 1 | ὀσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῆ καὶ ἀγαλματοποιή καὶ
25 παντὶ τεχνίτη, καὶ ὅλως ἀν ἐστιν ἔργον τι καὶ πράξεις, ἔν
26 τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τάγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὗ, οὕτω δοξειν ἄν καὶ
27 ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἐστι τί ἔργον αὐτοῦ. |
| 2 | πότερον οὖν τέκτονος
28 μὲν καὶ σκυτέως ἐστιν ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξεις, ἀνθρώπου δ’
29 οὐδὲν ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ἄργον πέφυκεν; ἢ καθάπερ ἄφθαμοῦ καὶ
30 χειρὸς καὶ ποδὸς καὶ ὅλως ἐκάστου τῶν μορίων φαίνεται τι
32 ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ πάντα ταύτα θείη τις ἄν
33 ἔργον τι; τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ’ ἄν εἰπὶ ποτὲ; |
| 3 | τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν κοινὸν
33 εἴναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς, ξητείται δὲ τὸ ἱδίον. ἄφορι-
34 στέον ἄρα τὴν τέθετι καὶ τὴν αὐξητικὴν ζωήν. ἐπομένη
2 δὲ αἰσθητικὰς τὰς ἀν εἰπ., φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ κοινή καὶ ἱππῳ
3 καὶ βοϊ καὶ παντὶ ζῷῳ. |
| 1098a | 1 λείπεται δὴ πρακτικὴ της τοῦ λόγου
3 ἐχοντος’ τοῦτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ, τὸ δ’ ὡς
4 ἐχον καὶ διανοοῦμενον. |
| 4 | διττός δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης
5 τὴν κατ’ ἐνέργειαν θετέον· κυριότερον γὰρ αὐτὴ δοκεῖ λέγε-
6 σθαι. |
| 5 | 7 ei δ’ ἐστιν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον
8 ἡ μὴ δὲν λόγου, |
| 6 | 7 ei δ’ ἐστιν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον
8 ἡ μὴ δὲν λόγου, |
| 7 | 8 τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ φαμεν ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γένει
9 τοῦτε καὶ τοῦτε σπουδαίου, ὀσπερ κιβαριστοῦ καὶ σπουδαίου
10 κιβαριστοῦ, καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ τοῦτ’ ἐπὶ πάνταν, προστιθεμένης
11 τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὑπεροχὴς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον· κιβαριστοῦ
12 μὲν γὰρ κιβαρίζειν, σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εὗ. |
| 8 | 12 ei δ’ οὕτως, ἀνθρώ-
13 που δὲ τίθεμεν ἔργον ζωῆν τινα, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν |
καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου.

σπουδαίου δ’ ἄνδρος εὖ ταῦτα καὶ
καλῶς, ἐκαστὸν δ’ εὖ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται.

εἰ δ’ οὗτο, τὸ ἄνθρωπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται
κατ’ ἀρετήν.

εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ
teleiotάτην.

ἐτὶ δ’ ἐν βίω τελείῳ, μία γὰρ χελιδῶν ἦσαν οὖ
ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα· οὗτο δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα
μία ἡμέρα οὐδ’ ὀλίγος χρόνος.
Chapter Five: Conclusion.

This thesis was begun as an investigation into the foundations of Aristotle's ethics by examining Aristotle's implicit claim that ethics as a type of knowledge is possible. That the investigation undertaken in the *EN* is a πολιτική τις is a claim that it is a specific type of knowledge. If this claim is established it allows for the possibility of excluding divine revelation or inherited traditions as a basis for ethics and relying on reason alone. The question is: is this possible? And what makes it possible?

Wittgenstein claims that it is not possible (as a type of human knowledge, since it is "supernatural"), but he fails to establish his case. He relies on the authority of the fact/value distinction: "ethics... can be no science," i.e. it has, according to Wittgenstein, no authentic claim to knowledge; - it is just "supernatural," and since "our words will only express facts," ineffable. But this depends upon an understanding of science which excludes ends: contemporary Biological science includes allowance for a type of end (teleonomy): a human being is an animal, i.e. as a biological entity it has internal ends. This is a possible basis to establish ethics as an authentic type of knowledge.

In contrast to Wittgenstein, Anscombe affirms the possibility of ethics on an Aristotelian basis. She saw that the "moral ought" was absent in Aristotle (therefore, no violation of the fact/value distinction), and so that Wittgenstein's critique of ethics (which she accepted) may not apply to Aristotle. But her arguments are not good enough (as shown by the critiques by Pigden).

Pigden challenges Anscombe's (and Geech's) positive assessment: he claims that Aristotle's account is wrong, but Pigden's critique of Aristotle is itself open to

---

challenge. Pigden raised the question "Can Aristotle's ideas be revived in the context of modern assumptions?"\textsuperscript{372} He sets out the necessary requirement for this: It would be necessary to "extract some set of natural requirements either from the concept 'man' or from human nature itself."\textsuperscript{373} And this requirement is met by Aristotle with his \textit{ergon} argument. This argument asserts that the human good resides in the distinctive work – \textit{ergon} – of a human being. Happiness is the human good, so the main task of Aristotle's ethics is to identify the distinctive work of a human being as human being. One then only has to do that work excellently and one will live by definition a happy life (which satisfies for Aristotle the requirements of living what we would call an ethical or moral life).

However, is this vitiated by Aristotle's biology, which is false? Only if the \textit{ergon} argument relies on teleological not teleonomical ends, since the latter ends are employed by contemporary biological science. The end required for the \textit{ergon} argument is rather an internal end which maintains itself in the functioning of its own activity and so identical to a teleonomic process (and so potentially viable today).

The attempted revival of ethics from within philosophy by Rawls in his book \textit{TJ} rests on an apparent similarity to Aristotle's. Rawls employs a "reflective equilibrium" which analyses people's various opinions about ethical beliefs and it bears a passing resemblance to Aristotle's dialectical approach.

But Rawls rejects Aristotle's "perfectionism" because of his thesis of an "original position" (a hypothetical construct which is required for Rawls' conception of justice). The perfectionism of Aristotle was embodied in the \textit{ergon} argument: happiness is activity in accordance with virtue (\textit{ἀρετή} – "excellence," i.e. a type of perfection). But as Rawl's presuppositions are neither self-evidently true nor

\textsuperscript{372} Pigden (1990) 147.
\textsuperscript{373} Ibid.
universally accepted, the approach of Aristotle has a viable claim to being a more secure and better basis for ethics.

To get back to Aristotle's argument on these issues it was necessary to examine modern approaches to Aristotle's ethics itself. In particular, Werner Jaeger, who studied a broader range of Aristotelian texts to determine their teaching (including especially the *Protrepticus*), thereby attempting to ground his interpretation more firmly, provided a model to follow. He tries to include all of Aristotle's authentic ethical writings (especially, the *Protrepticus*, although he excludes the *VV* and the *MM*) in his account of Aristotle's philosophy.

For Jaeger, this broader examination led to the discovery of a chronological development of Aristotle's which was reflected in the various ethical texts from "early" to "late" in his career. With Jaeger's interpretation of the *Protrepticus* setting the basis for Aristotle's trajectory, that development veers away from "Platonism," and culminates in the *EN* (allegedly the most non-Platonic ethical treatment).

Monan also thought that the *Protrepticus* lays the basis for the development of Aristotle’s thought. Using an interpretation applied to *Protrepticus* which discovers a tension between two ideal types of life – the non-intellectual and the contemplative – but which is progressively resolved by Aristotle, culminating in its complete resolution in the *EE* (which is most likely then to be the final ethics of Aristotle). (Kenny develops a similar thesis to Monan's). This position however is based on an exaggerated view of the tension, and a distorted understanding of the relation, between the lives that are at issue (there are in fact three, not two, lives involved here).

As a consequence, the philosophic critiques (by Wittgenstein, Anscombe, Pigden, and Rawls) and the classicists' interpretations (by Jaeger, Monan, and Kenny)
serve to highlight the importance of a correct understanding of two arguments present within Aristotle’s ethical writings, which are of fundamental significance and determine the ethical argument as a whole:

1. The *ergon* argument.

2. The Three Lives argument.

This set the agenda for our examination of the ethical writings of Aristotle — a close study of the *ergon* argument was required, as well as a consideration of ways of life and their various inherent claims to happiness, or their claims of being the best way of life.

In Chapter Two on the *Protrepticus*, we re-examined the *Protrepticus* with the use of the interpretative basis now made possible by Hutchinson and Johnson, whose method of reconstruction has made the Aristotelian sections within Iamblichus identifiable and shown that they are extensive and sequential. This had allowed the philosophic argument in that lost Aristotelian text to be examined afresh for new and more secure interpretations. What became apparent in the examination of the text were two important points:

First, that the structure of the extant portions of the *Protrepticus* was tripartite. It was based on a successive examination of the three goods of the soul (virtue, prudence, and pleasure) which formed the basis of the Three Lives (political, philosophic, and voluptuary) each having a claim to the happy life (the solution to ethics for a eudemonistic ethics).

Second, within each of the three sections devoted to the three goods an *ergon* argument occurred which established the attainment of the happy life to the good in question. Firstly, for virtue it was because of the fact that virtue of the better part is

---

374 Hutchinson and Johnson (2005).
better, and so not only is body and soul put in a hierarchy (with the soul being better), but within the soul itself there are differentiated parts with corresponding virtues which are hierarchically arranged between better and worse parts (the worse parts being for the sake of the better parts). So the virtue of the better part of the soul is best (since it is the highest possible end within a human being) and this is the rational part of the soul which has a work (*ergon*) which is therefore its authoritative virtue: which leads to the supremacy of the philosophic life.

Secondly, for prudence it was shown that a human being, as a natural being, has a natural end (*telos*). And that prudence is this end (prudence is an activity or *ergon*). So, a human being both has an end and a “that for the sake of which”) as a result of its very nature. This aligns with a teleonomic conception of the *ergon* argument.

Thirdly, for pleasure, “he is more alive who thinks correctly and who most of all attains truth.” (58, 5-6). The perfect life is ascribed precisely to those who think and who are prudent (58, 10). So, when the *ergon* argument is applied directly to life the result for prudent persons is that it is the “perfect and unprevented activity” (58, 15) of prudence, which produces pleasure.

The *Protrepticus* concluded with a combination of these Three Lives and their goods at the conclusion of the work in the life of philosophy (i.e. the contemplative life), which is dedicated to the good of prudence (*φρόνησις*), since such a life contains within itself the other two goods (viz. virtue and pleasure).

In Chapter Three on the *EE*, we saw that it began with an examination of the Three Lives and their corresponding goods. The *ergon* argument located these three goods as goods of the soul (internal goods) about which the argument of ethics as a whole is concerned. The three goods were then successively examined in the bulk of
the work. Finally, a concluding chapter revisited each of these three goods and fits them together in a hierarchically arranged whole. The final section on ἀρνητικός led to the affirmation of the contemplative life and to the subordination of κοινοκάγια to contemplation, just as prudence sets the mean of moral virtue, and issues orders for the sake of wisdom. Very similarly to the Protrepticus the happiest life was the one which expresses each of the goods that are the basis of the Three Lives – only the contemplative life offers this combination. Also, the life of philosophic contemplation was vindicated as that for the sake of which prudence (in the narrower, technical sense of practical wisdom) issues its orders.

In Chapter Four on the *EN*, we saw that it began with an examination of the good and happiness, which included the Three Lives and their corresponding goods (in *EN* I.5). The *ergon* argument located these three goods as goods of the soul (internal goods) about which the argument of ethics as a whole is concerned (*EN* I.7). The three goods were then successively examined in the bulk of the work (*EN* II-X.5). Finally, concluding chapters (*EN* X.6-8) revisited the two main contenders and put them in a relation of hierarchy. There was an affirmation of the contemplative life which led to the subordination of the political life, just as prudence sets the mean of moral virtue, and issues orders for the sake of wisdom. And this defining limit of moral virtue is contemplation, an activity which will by its nature also be intrinsically pleasant. The three elements are combined in the end as one. We saw that very similarly to both the Protrepticus and the *EE*, the happiest life was the one which expresses each of the goods that are the basis of the Three Lives – only the contemplative life offers this combination.

In the course of this thesis we have seen that the Three Lives argument and the *ergon* argument of each ethical writing of Aristotle work together, shaping the
structure of the argument as a whole. The Three Lives argument explains why certain goods are treated in the ethics and gives the work its structure. Those goods around which the structure is built are the three goods which belong to the soul. φρόνησις, ἀρετή, ἡδονή are these goods of the soul to which those Three Lives are dedicated, and they are sequentially treated in each of the ethical writings of Aristotle. This can be presented schematically as follows. Firstly, in the Protrepticus:

1. Chapter VII (43, 27 - 44, 26), (ἀρετή),
2. Chapters VIII-X, (φρόνησις),

Secondly, in the EE:

1. EE II.1.21-IV, (ἀρετή),
2. EE V, (φρόνησις),
3. EE VI-VII, (ἡδονή).

Lastly, in the EN:

1. EN II-V, (ἀρετή),
2. EN VI, (φρόνησις),

And this successive examination on each occasion is framed within an introduction (EN I; EE I-II.1.20; Protrepticus Chapters VI-VII375) and a conclusion (EN X.6-9; EE VIII.3; Protrepticus Chapter XII).

The ergon argument provides the basis upon which (a) to sustain the structure of the works and (b) to allow the parts of that structure to be able to be brought together in the conclusion.

---

375 This includes only the first part of Chapter VII, covering in full Pistelli (37, 3 - 43, 25).
(a) The definition of Happiness provided by the *ergon* argument is wide enough to include both any of the three individual goods of the soul and the subsequent development of the argument which narrows and combines those goods of the soul into manifestations of one good (viz. φρόνησις or νοῦς): the good of the contemplative life.

(b) The *ergon* argument allows for the conclusion – the common element of all three goods of the soul is that each has or is an *ergon*: These seem at first to be three separate *erga*, but become reduced in the end to different manifestations of one *ergon*: the being-at-work of the νοῦς (or φρόνησις in its broad sense): the good of the contemplative life.

When performed at the level of excellence the νοῦς displays the intellectual virtue of σοφία, and the unimpeded activity of it produces pleasure. This also contains all the characteristics attributed to happiness by the *endoxa* on the subject.

Thus, the structure of Aristotle's ethics is a successive examination of the three goods of the soul which are the constituent parts of Happiness. However, a development takes place through the course of that examination. So, what starts out as being three goods of the soul (namely, virtue, prudence, pleasure) – each having its own individual *ergon* (and in the *Protrepticus* its own individual *ergon* argument) actually ends up being one *ergon* (the best one, to be sure) which by its being-at-work expresses or actualises all three goods (simultaneously by its own work).

Aristotle's ethical teaching is a unified whole in the case of each work. The three works share fundamentally the same structure, and employ the same arguments to reach the same conclusions. Aristotle's ethics is a vindication of the life of philosophy as the best way of life for a human being.


Bibliography

Primary Sources

Grinnell, Iowa. The Peripatetic Press.


University of Notre Dame Press.


Akademie-Verlag.

Akademie-Verlag.

Universitatis Gothoburgensis.


Gauthier, René Antoine and Jolif, Jean Yves. 1970. L’Éthique a Nicomaque:
Introduction, Traduction et Commentaire. Louvain. Publications
Universitaires.

Cambridge University Press.


**Secondary Sources**


Allan, Donald J. 1975. “A Passage from Iamblichus in Praise of the Contemplative Life.” *AGPh*, 57. 246-68.


Hardie, William F. R. 1977. “Aristotle’s Doctrine that Virtue is a Mean,” in Barnes. 33-44.


*Philosophical Topics*, 15. 109-34.


Jackson, Henry. 1912. “Eudemian Ethics...” *JPh*, 32. 170-221


http://aristotle.tamu.edu/~rasmith/Research/undemonstrated-science.pdf accessed on 20/05/10.


