WAYS OF KNOWING
IN THE
ANGlicAN EUCHARISTIC
TRADITION:

RAMIFICATIONS
FOR
THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION

BY

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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

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I hereby certify that the work embodied in this thesis is the result of original research and has not been submitted for a higher degree to any other University or Institution

(Signed) ___________________________________________________________
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I also acknowledge the contribution to my life of my mate Ron who died at the time I was finalising this thesis. His love and friendship will always sustain me – May be rest in peace and may light perpetual shine upon him.
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This thesis concerns ways of knowing in the Anglican eucharistic tradition. It also explores the ramifications of these ways of knowing for theological education in the Anglican tradition of Christianity. The thesis uses Anglican eucharistic theology as a source of case study, and attempts, using a methodology of phenomenology to examine critically the particular interests and philosophical assumptions underlying eucharistic theology in the Anglican tradition from the time of the Reformation to the present day. Phenomenology is chosen as the methodology since it allows access to the diverse experience of the Anglican eucharistic tradition, suspending judgment until a later time when essences are extracted from the case studies. This has the potential to avoid exclusive commitments to particular technical and hermeneutic interests within Anglicanism while at the same time recognising the multiformity of the Anglican eucharistic tradition and fostering a critical approach to the examination of the experience of the Anglican eucharistic tradition and Anglican theological education.

In examining ways of knowing in the Anglican tradition, the thesis acknowledges the usefulness for eucharistic theology and theological education of philosophical enquiry. The three ways of knowing (technical, hermeneutic and critical) proposed by the philosopher, Jurgen Habermas (1971 and 1973) are used to assist in understanding the knowledge of the Anglican eucharistic tradition presented in the case studies. The further insights of Habermas (1984 and 1989) are used in recommending a dialogue approach, based on the intersubjectivity of communicative action, for theological education concerned with the teaching of eucharistic theology in the Anglican tradition.

Philosophical reflection is also employed in an examination of the underlying philosophical assumptions of the case studies of eucharistic theology in the Anglican tradition. A model of the Anglican eucharistic tradition based on the philosophical concepts of realism and nominalism, to both the moderate and immoderate degrees is developed and proposed as a way of promoting a critical interest in the Anglican eucharistic tradition beyond the merely technical or hermeneutic interests commonly found in various church parties of the Anglican Communion. The work of the Australian philosopher David Armstrong (1989, 1995, 1997 and 2004) is foundational to
the development of a model for the Anglican eucharistic tradition and the examination of its experience in the case studies.

The principal findings of the study suggest that the prevailing essence of the Anglican eucharistic tradition is a multiformity of eucharistic doctrine, such that eucharistic theology is most often expressed using the philosophical assumptions of realism and nominalism to the moderate degree and according to varying technical and hermeneutic interests.

The thesis also seeks to draw out the educational implications of these differing ways of knowing for theological education in the Anglican tradition and specifically for the teaching of eucharistic theology. The principal recommendation of the thesis for theological education is the application of a dialogue approach in the teaching of eucharistic theology in Anglican theological education, where dialogue involves the development of an ideal communicative community in which participants seek shared meaning on the basis of the intersubjectivity of communicative action.
Organisationally the thesis is presented as a bound thesis and a compact disk (CD) containing the extensive case study material.

As regards the bound thesis, Chapter 1 contains introductory material on the Anglican Communion and theological education and a pointing towards the phenomenological method. Chapter 2 addresses the phenomenological methodology for examining the experience of the Anglican tradition, while Chapter 3 examines the philosophical background relevant to this study centring on a discussion of the problem of universals and the philosophical assumptions of realism and nominalism to both the moderate and immoderate degrees. Chapter 4 contains the essences of the Anglican eucharistic tradition extracted from the phenomenological examination of the Anglican eucharistic tradition presented in the form of case studies (see CD accompanying the thesis). Chapter 5 contains the ramifications for theological education in the Anglican tradition, suggesting the use of a dialogue approach and the application of communicative action as a strategy for the study of eucharistic theology in Anglican theological education. The final chapter (Chapter 6) provides a conclusion and suggests future directions for research in the area of theological education in the Anglican tradition concerned with eucharistic theology, principally suggesting the increased use of dialogue in Anglican theological education considering eucharistic theology.

The accompanying Case Study CD contains the case study material of the Anglican eucharistic tradition which is arranged historically in four sections:

- Section 1 – The Period of the Reformation
- Section 2 – The Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries
- Section 3 – The Nineteenth Century
- Section 4 – The Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries

Case studies are presented on the works of various Anglican theologians concerning the Eucharist, Anglican eucharistic liturgies and other Anglican documents which treat eucharistic theology. Case study material is classified in a preliminary way according to
the philosophical concepts of realism and nominalism to both the moderate and immoderate degrees, but in the main interpretation is handled in the bound thesis volume. Case studies are numbered using two numbers separated by a full stop (e.g. 1.1). The first number refers to the sections outlined above and the second number is the number of the case study in that section. Users of the CD should click on the section first and then the appropriate numbered case study in order to access the desired case study.

The case study material presented on the CD is only a sample of the vast amount of experience possessed by the Anglican eucharistic tradition. It is acknowledged that other case study material exists but that it is beyond the scope of this thesis to present an exhaustive treatment of the experience of the Anglican eucharistic tradition. The case studies presented here are however an attempt to be representative of the Anglican eucharistic tradition.
Chapter 1

Laying the Foundation of Phenomenological Method: The Challenge of a Critical Approach to Theological Education in the Anglican Tradition

1.1 The Anglican Communion

The Anglican Communion is a tradition of Christianity with approximately 80 million members, which exists on every continent. It is a fellowship of churches in communion with one another and the Archbishop of Canterbury, who is acknowledged as ‘first among equals’. The Anglican Communion maintains that it is part of the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church and yet it has divergent traditions within it, based on varying national, cultural, historical, theological and ecclesiological interests. The relationships between the member churches of the Anglican Communion throughout the world traditionally derive from the Church of England, sharing a common history and tradition of doctrine, discipline, worship, mutual responsibility and mission (Anglican Consultative Council, 2003: 143). In the twenty-first century however, a more diverse pattern of development among the various parts of the Anglican Communion is emerging, where national and cultural forces are creating distinctive forms of Anglicanism (see Douglas and Pui-Lan, 2001 for some of the ways this is occurring). More extensive information on the nature of Anglicanism can be obtained from Avis (1989), Bunting (1996) and Sykes, Booty and Knight (1998) however such fuller treatment is beyond the scope of this thesis. It is nonetheless important in this thesis to note that the Anglican Communion is not and never has been monochrome in terms of its beliefs and practices. Significant theological and philosophical differences exist among Anglicans with some describing themselves as Evangelicals or Catholics or Liberals (see Bunting, 1996 for a fuller description of the use these distinctions and labels). The ‘naming game’ that operates within Anglicanism “is
really part of the rhetoric of claiming publicly defensible parts of the tradition for oneself and ascribing other less defensible parts to others” (Kaye, 2003: 2). Some Evangelicals, for example, argue that their commitment to power is based on the maintenance of the heritage of the English Reformation of the sixteenth century, whereas some Catholic Anglicans argue their commitment to power is based on the theology and practice of the Caroline Divines of the seventeenth century or to the Oxford Movement of the nineteenth century, or to both. Still other Anglicans see liberal views or the charismatic movement or the ecumenical convergence of the twentieth century as the source of power for their commitment to Anglicanism in the modern world. There are some within the Anglican tradition who see their particular interest as having more of ‘the truth’ than others. Rowan Williams, the Archbishop of Canterbury, has recently pointed to this, arguing that “it is true that witness to what is passionately believed to be the truth sometimes appears a higher value than unity” (Williams, 2006: 2). This suggests that the Anglican Church for some has become more political as people and groups test the power of their groupings and their particular interests. A ‘political power model’ typifies much of the activity within the Anglican tradition (Kaye, 2003: 5) and is often played out by various parties in the promotion of their particular interests. Bill Lawton addresses this in relation to the Anglican Church of Australia, citing Moore Theological College in the conservative Evangelical Diocese of Sydney as being “vocal and strident within the Australian church as a power-bloc” (Lawton, 2002: 183). Lawton argues that Moore College, heavily influenced by the conservative Evangelical Broughton Knox, Principal from 1959-1985, presents God’s mind through preaching in a propositional and rationalist manner (Lawton, 2002: 190). Lawton cites a distinctly different approach as that adopted by the liberal Catholic, Archbishop Peter Carnley (the Primate of the Anglican Church of Australia from 2000-2005) who denies the propositional nature of revelation and emphasises the importance of experience (Lawton, 2002: 190). Such differences can not only be seen in relation to significant national issues but also in relation to international and ethical issues affecting Anglicanism, such as the ordination of women and practising homosexuals to the priesthood and episcopate. A political power model, operating within Anglicanism, results in a situation where institutional authority is less strong and therefore open to more challenge because of particular commitments to various party hermeneutics or interests.
This in turn lessens the critical interest of Anglican theological reflection since it concentrates the source of power in the maintenance of party position and interest.

Peter Carnley argues there are important differences in the way Anglicans practise theology. Some, he argues, such as conservative Evangelicals within the Diocese of Sydney, favour a more rationalistic understanding of faith in terms of intellectual assent to abstract doctrines, rather than a more experiential engagement with the divine (Carnley, 2004: 5). Where this rationalistic mentality exists it often locates the object of faith in the past, essentially as something to be thought about and assented to, rather than seeing faith as an experience of the present. Such differences in theological thinking and method are essentially based on differing philosophical positions, where those who see faith as rationalistic, favour linguistic propositionalism in the development of theology, such that the revelation of ‘truth’ is found in a body of information, namely the text of the Christian scriptures. Broughton Knox, a former Principal of Moore Theological College within the Diocese of Sydney, argues for example, that, “the view of the Bible is that revelation is essentially propositional” (Knox, 2005: 1, Online). Others who see God interacting with people in the present in an experiential manner are more likely to identify with a realist philosophical position, where signs and what they signify are linked in a real way and where God is seen to work in the world through things of this world in the present. The sacraments for example function in such a way that ‘truth’ is found in doing, and in God’s using of material objects of this world as a means of revelation. Carnley observes that:

“Christian claims to encounter the presence of Christ in the breaking and sharing of the bread of the Eucharist tend to be set aside by Sydney Anglicans in favour of an approach to the Eucharist also as a rationalistic mental act, a remembering with gratitude of the saving death of Christ upon the Cross in the past. Instead of doing something in a liturgy of an experiential kind in commemoration of the death of Christ, it is a matter of mentally remembering in the course of doing something. An entry into liturgical experience thus becomes incidental to the having of right thoughts.” (Carnley, 2004: 6).

Evangelical Anglicans sometimes object that realist ways of thinking in relation to the Eucharist are a return to pre-Reformation thinking and are subject to abuses that cannot be substantiated from the biblical record and so cannot be part of what is assumed to be the normative Reformation heritage of Anglicanism. Robert Doyle, an Anglican Evangelical, in referring to realist thinking about the Eucharist, argues that the Anglican Church “ought
to strive to exclude these interpretations” (Doyle, 1995: 2) since they are seen to cloud the teachings of the Bible. Doyle therefore rejects those modern eucharistic liturgies which he sees as being “unambiguously a return to the pre-Reformation notion of the Lord’s Supper or Eucharist as a sacrifice, a true re-presentation, a true re-offering of Christ’s sacrifice which he offered, once and for all on our behalf to the Father, on the first Good Friday” (Doyle, 1995: 2-3). Doyle is really arguing against the whole idea of sacramentality, as Peter Carnley would understand it, that is, that God uses things of this world to reveal God and God’s grace to people. In much the same way, the *Sydney Doctrine Commission Report on A Prayer Book for Australia* (1996) rejects the modern eucharistic liturgies of *A Prayer Book for Australia* (1995), the current prayer book of the Anglican Church of Australia, because they are seen as “a return to the idea of pre-Reformation liturgies in which the Eucharist was believed to be saving itself” (*Sydney Doctrine Commission Report on A Prayer Book for Australia*, 1996: 465) and “contrary to the practice of BCP [that is, the sixteenth century Reformation Prayer Book of Anglicanism] (*Sydney Doctrine Commission Report on A Prayer Book for Australia*, 1996: 467). For these Evangelical Anglicans in the Diocese of Sydney, certain interpretations of the words of Scripture and the Reformation tradition of Anglicanism are determinative and normative, as opposed to the power of any present experience, which may occur through the use of physical objects such as bread and wine in the Eucharist.

Within Anglicanism there is a wide-ranging diversity of viewpoints or traditions, which some say “is the necessary outcome of the surpassing mystery of God” (Carnley, 2004: 21). In a situation where such wide divergence of opinion exists, it is argued by writers such as Peter Carnley that it is necessary to adopt an inclusive approach and to embrace a willingness to understand the opinions of others with openness and frankness in order to strengthen the Communion. This view has much in common with the work of the contemporary philosopher, Jurgen Habermas and his notion of communicative action (Habermas, 1984 and 1989) based on the intersubjectivity of speakers and hearers, reached through a process of dialogue and emphasising shared understanding. This view is not accepted by some Anglicans however, since the adoption of particular technical and hermeneutic interests by some within Anglicanism, both Evangelicals and Catholics, is viewed as privileged or sacred knowledge providing power within particular parties and the Anglican tradition as a whole. Accordingly some Anglicans reject the view that wide-
ranging diversity is a necessary or good thing and remain content with the sacred nature of their own particular hermeneutic interests.

Tradition within Anglicanism, Bruce Kaye argues, represents “a way of characterising a particular pattern of ideas, relationships, habits and activity which persist through time” (Kaye, 2003: 32), but further, he says, it is also important to note that tradition within Anglicanism is diachronic (Kaye, 2003: 31) and not synchronic. This being so Anglicanism faces the difficulty of finding workable categories that enable the interpretation of Anglican pluralism or multiformity, even in the face of resistance to the possibility of wide-ranging diversity. Bruce Kaye argues that from the 1960’s through to the mid 1990’s, Anglicanism was struggling with these new pluralisms (Kaye, 2003: 84) and that the struggle continues. Kaye puts the case that Anglicanism is in need of re-imagining or re-invention that will assist with this struggle. This is not merely a matter of replacing organisational structures or the acceptance of the diachronic nature of the tradition, but a re-invention of the very categories through which theological reflection is carried out. If this is not done, argues Kaye, then the Anglican tradition will be tempted to withdraw into discrete and narrow sectional groupings, defining themselves by an increasingly narrow range of interests and values (Kaye, 2003: 95). Such a situation can only limit the power and confidence of the tradition as a whole and prevent it from engaging in a more plural multi-directional public conversation. This must also inevitably lessen the effectiveness of the Anglican Communion as a whole and Anglican theological education in particular, since it will remain splintered and lacking in essential unity, without any way of knowing itself in a critical and reflective manner. What is needed, argues Kaye, is a re-configuring of the issues and the questions. Kaye sets out his challenge in these words:

“What we need, rather, is a moderated and community-supported theology which enables us to re-configure the way in which we actually conceptualise these questions, so that the alternatives that are before us are better seen because they arise from the underlying truths of the Anglican tradition, and a sense of the presence of God in the created order and, at the same time, can resonate with the categories of modern culture.” (Kaye, 2003: 251).

More recently, Rowan Williams, the Archbishop of Canterbury has stated that: “what our Communion lacks is a set of adequately developed structures which is able to cope with the diversity of views that will inevitably arise in a world of rapid global communication and
huge cultural variety” (Williams, 2006: 3). Clearly the challenge for both Kaye and Williams is one of development, reflection and rethinking in the light of diversity, multiformity and change.

This thesis takes up Kaye’s and Williams’ challenge and seeks a re-invention of the Anglican eucharistic tradition through an attempt to re-configure the way in which eucharistic theology is conceptualised. This involves an examination of the philosophical assumptions underlying eucharistic theology within the Anglican tradition and the development of a model of Anglican eucharistic theology utilising contemporary philosophical reflection or ‘the categories of modern culture’ of which Kaye and Williams speak. The tools for re-inventing are found in the use of a modern interpretation of the ancient philosophical problem of universals, set within the concepts of realism and nominalism, to both moderate and immoderate degrees. The contemporary Australian philosopher David Armstrong (1989, 1995, 1997 and 2004) has worked in this area and his insights will be used extensively in this thesis. The use of the philosophical assumptions of realism and nominalism to both moderate and immoderate degrees allows for the development of a more satisfying model of Anglican eucharistic theology than the tradition or hermeneutic bound theologies that presently exist and which continue to promote party spirit and interests. Such a model holds out the hope of providing the Anglican eucharistic tradition with a methodology that is truly communicative and focuses the interaction of subjects in dialogue rather than the acrimony of party political debate. It is in this sense that this thesis attempts to provide what Kaye calls a ‘re-configuring’ of the tradition.

Habermas (1984 and 1989), another contemporary philosopher, also has valuable insights concerning what he calls ‘communicative action’ and these will be applied to theological education in the Anglican tradition in the development of a dialogue approach based on the intersubjectivity of shared understanding in an attempt to assist with re-configuring and re-inventing the Anglican tradition. Rowan Williams advocates this when he argues that being Anglican at this time “involves certain concessions and unclarities but provides at least for ways of sharing responsibility and making decisions that will hold and that will be mutually intelligible” (Williams, 2006: 3). Dialogue and covenant are favoured as the means by which this process will proceed, allowing for the mutual understanding of different
interests within Anglicanism (see Towards an Anglican Covenant, 2006 and Williams, 2006). This thesis also suggests that the methodology of phenomenology can function as a tool for examining the Anglican eucharistic tradition as a whole which allows for greater understanding of the multiformity of the tradition by all its members. This thesis applies this phenomenological methodology in the area of eucharistic theology through the detailed examination of the Anglican eucharistic tradition in the form of case studies (see CD – The Case Studies) and the subsequent analysis of this experience (Chapters 4, 5 and 6).

Such a process of re-invention or re-configuring has important ramifications for the Anglican tradition as a whole and for Anglican theological education in particular. It holds the promise of moving the tradition and theological education beyond the bounds of party interests and acrimony and supplying a more satisfying model of Anglican eucharistic theology that will allow the tradition to work within the pluralisms and the multiformity of Anglicanism in such a way that the extent of diversity and the quality of diversity is tolerable within the tradition as a whole. Not only does it offer the chance to work within diversity, but it also presents the opportunity to appreciate the diversity and to develop a greater interdependence of theological difference built upon corporate ownership of a diverse tradition as a whole. The development of a model of Anglican eucharistic theology, based on differing philosophical assumptions, is seen as crucial to this purpose. Such a model functions as a way of encouraging and sustaining conversation between differing theological interests, which flow over into theological education, and depends on attending to and listening to the voices of other interests with respect and understanding. In such a situation:

“listening means listening not only to the words but to the world out of which the words come, not just to what is said but to the experience which is shared and the actions which are displayed” (Kaye, 2003: 234).

The insights of Jurgen Habermas concerning communicative action and the lifeworlds of differing theological interests will be particularly useful at later stage (Chapter 5) when this listening is taken up again in relation to the Anglican eucharistic tradition and theological education within the Anglican tradition.
1.2 Theological Education in the Anglican Tradition

Theological education is one of the areas where significant differences exist in the Anglican tradition and where re-invention is needed to balance the over dependence on particular party influences which see education as merely a matter of appropriating privileged knowledge. Evaluative work currently being carried out throughout the Anglican Communion on the authority of the Primates of the Communion (the world wide leaders of the Anglican Communion – see Anglican Communion web site for details of Provinces and Primates of the Anglican Communion) suggests that there is a wide divergence of approaches to theological education. Theological education is considered by the Primates to be a matter of importance for the entire Anglican Communion and worthy of serious study.

The Primates began, at their meeting in 2002, a reconsideration of what comprises the main characteristics of theological education in the Anglican Communion (Primates of the Anglican Communion - Action Plan for Theological Education, 2002, Online). The Primates decided to explore the learning outcomes, core curriculum, resource sharing, the use of the Internet and continuing education for bishops (Primates of the Anglican Communion, 2002, Online) as important aspects of theological education in the Anglican tradition. At a subsequent meeting in May, 2003, the Primates widened their focus somewhat and affirmed their belief that all Anglican Christians should be theologically alert and sensitive to the call of God and that people should be thoughtful and prayerful about this call. They recognised the major challenges throughout the Anglican Communion in terms of theological education, especially in the non-English speaking provinces, in regard to resources and particular cultural contexts. For the Primates, there was, nonetheless, what they called “a distinctly Anglican approach to theological study” (Primates of the Anglican Communion, 2003: 2) which was reflected not only in the way worship and liturgical life express belief, but also in the way Scripture is read in relation to the tradition of Anglicanism. They also acknowledged respect for exploration and experimentation while at the same time honouring the differences in theological education in each local context of the Anglican Communion. The uniqueness of each part of the Communion and the diversity of approach to theological education was affirmed and acknowledged, but at
the same time the Primates wanted to develop common standards of theological education worldwide (Primates of the Anglican Communion, 2003, Online). It seems that not only are the Primates acknowledging the existence of different interests particular to various parts and groups of the Anglican Communion, but they are also suggesting that there are some more widely accepted universal standards that need to be considered.

In November, 2003, a working group entitled ‘Theological Education for the Anglican Communion’ (TEAC) was established by the Primates and it met (Anglican Communion News Service 3688, 2003) committing itself to theological education as a priority for the life of the Anglican Communion. The Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, as worldwide leader of the Anglican Communion, speaking at the first meeting of TEAC, made the point that theological education was of vital importance “for mission because it is only when we properly understand our faith that we can share with others the good news of what is different and new” (Anglican Communion News Service 3688, 2003). While the Archbishop’s words suggest the need for a more critical edge for theological education throughout the Anglican Communion, the work of TEAC, at this early stage, lacked detail about the nature of theological education as a critical discipline or way of knowing, as well as direction about how theological education throughout the Anglican Communion should proceed. At present it seems that particularities, such as the attitudes of individuals and specific national and cultural contexts are taking precedence over more universal issues in the collection of information by TEAC. This may well prejudge the findings, giving too much weight to the interests of particular powerful or voluble groups and traditions within Anglicanism, with their particular technical or hermeneutic interests, while at the same time limiting access to more broadly based and critical questions relating to theological education in the Anglican tradition. This thesis suggests that a more critical approach to the examination of theological education in the Anglican tradition may be a more useful way to proceed. Such a critical approach is employed in this thesis in the examination of Anglican eucharistic theology, using a methodology of phenomenology to examine the experience of the Anglican eucharistic tradition in terms of the underlying philosophical assumptions of Anglican eucharistic theology from the time of the Reformation to the present day. This detailed phenomenological approach will be undertaken in a preliminary way in the case studies (see CD accompanying this thesis) and subsequently with an
analysis of this material in Chapter 4, where essences of the Anglican eucharistic tradition will be extracted.

In March, 2004, the Anglican Communion News Service revealed that a questionnaire constructed by TEAC (*Theological Educational Questionnaire*, 2004, Online) was being sent to all primates, provincial secretaries, Anglican theological institutions and other interested parties in order to gather information about the current state of theological education in the Anglican Communion (Anglican Communion News Service 3800, 2003, Online). Part of the purpose of the questionnaire was to assess what was called ‘The Anglican Way’ and how this ‘way’ operated throughout the Anglican Communion in relation to theological education (see *The Anglican Way*, 2004, Online). ‘The Anglican Way’ was seen to concern the distinctive theological method of Anglicanism, including its doctrine, liturgy and expression of theology; its use of Scripture, reason and tradition; and its defining characteristics commonly associated with Anglican identity, such as via media, Lambeth Quadrilateral, *Book of Common Prayer*, polity, comprehensiveness, unity in diversity and balance of freedom and order (*The Anglican Way*, 2004: 1, Online). The specific links of ‘The Anglican Way’ to theological education were also highlighted, in terms of the existing resources of the Anglican Communion, its teaching and its identified need for new resources (*The Anglican Way*, 2004: 1-2, Online). The process put in place by TEAC is very open ended with the questionnaire seeking advice from various parts of the Anglican Communion in regard to the current practice of theological education. Respondents were asked, bearing in mind ‘The Anglican Way’, to list the characteristics they believed were relevant today in their local context as well as seeking information about the ignored aspects of Anglicanism that respondents perceived need to be taught and developed in a better way. Respondents were also asked to list resources presently used, including ecumenical contacts and to make judgments about the quality of theological education presently being undertaken in their part of the Anglican Communion (*Theological Education Questionnaire*, 2004, Online). A Provisional Report on the finding of this questionnaire was released in February, 2005 (*Theological Education for the Anglican Communion – Provisional Report*, 2005, Online). This provisional report revealed that out of the 350 questionnaires distributed throughout the Anglican Communion in 2004, 60 responses were received, with a third of these responses coming from the Province of England. The responses revealed
that many saw certain characteristics of Anglicanism as particularly relevant today. Especially important in many respondents’ local context was the importance of Anglican liturgy and worship but many also pointed out that the Anglican way was ‘diversity in unity’ (*Theological Education for the Anglican Communion – Provisional Report*, 2005: 1, Online). The idea of a ‘collegiality between worlds’ was also mentioned (*Theological Education for the Anglican Communion – Provisional Report*, 2005: 2, Online). These concepts of ‘diversity’ and ‘collegiality’ were seen as important in the area of theological education, but very little other specific information emerged concerning the nature and role of theological education in the Anglican tradition. In another report of TEAC (*Theological Education for the Anglican Communion – Rationale Document and Section Reports*, 2005, Online) education was seen as central for the equipping of Christians for mission, in the Holy Scriptures, in the teaching of the Church and in practical application of that education. The role of reflection in this process of education was highlighted, but several difficulties were described which limit the educational process. These included: a lack of theological literacy; and inadequate engagement with contemporary thinking, culture and society (*Theological Education for the Anglican Communion – Rationale Document and Section Reports*, 2005: 1, Online). Part of the problem here was isolated in the concern that theological education in the Anglican Communion takes little account of Anglican history, formularies and spirituality (*Theological Education for the Anglican Communion – Rationale Document and Section Reports*, 2005: 2, Online). Little specific information however, emerged about any of these issues in relation to theological education in the Anglican Communion.

This thesis suggests that the focus of information collection undertaken by TEAC is too dependent on the particular interests of the respondents alone. This means that the technical and hermeneutic interests of particular groups within Anglicanism may dominate in the results of the questionnaire, thus limiting the critical nature of the findings. Perhaps it may have been more useful to provide a more objective assessment of what was actually occurring within the Anglican Communion to ensure greater detachment from personal, regional and theological interests and to focus more on the broader and critical elements of theological education. Information presently available from TEAC makes it very difficult to draw any specific conclusions about the nature of theological education in the Anglican Communion. Further information from TEAC is awaited.
This thesis adopts an alternative strategy to TEAC in its examination of one area of Anglican theological study, that is, Anglican eucharistic theology. This thesis attempts to access, by using a methodology of phenomenology, a wide range of the phenomena of the Anglican eucharistic tradition (writings of theologians on the Eucharist, eucharistic liturgies and church statements concerning the Eucharist), to describe these phenomena, categorising them in a preliminary way, using the philosophical concepts of realism and nominalism, suspending judgment and at a later time making an assessment of the phenomena through the extraction of the essences of Anglican eucharistic theology (Chapter 4). At the same time it is acknowledged that the selection of material for examination as case studies, while extensive, is by no means exhaustive. There remains much other case study material that could be examined from the Anglican eucharistic tradition, however the selection of material has at least attempted to be representative of the tradition as a whole, both historically and theologically.

The methodology of phenomenology used by this thesis has the potential to isolate the essences or themes of Anglican eucharistic theology and to reflect on these essences in a critical manner, drawing out implications for theological education and the teaching of Anglican eucharistic theology. This is undertaken in Chapter 5 where specific ramifications for theological education are discussed and recommendations made in the context of a model of theological education based on a dialogue approach. This approach, it is hoped, has the potential to address the issues of unity in diversity and collegiality between worlds that TEAC sees as so important, by considering the multiformity of the Anglican eucharistic tradition. The discussion of ramifications for theological education in Chapter 5 will be set within a Habermasian framework of communicative action, emphasising the intersubjectivity of participants in theological education and the relationship of lifeworlds to the system paradigm of the Anglican eucharistic tradition as a whole. This methodology is seen to have the advantage of distancing the description of the phenomena of the Anglican Communion from the particular interests of the researcher and the influence of one or more technical or hermeneutic interests within the Anglican Communion. TEAC’s approach seems too influenced by particular groups within Anglicanism who may choose to respond to the questionnaire. Groups such as Evangelical or Catholic Anglicans, or
groups from various national or cultural traditions within Anglicanism, may choose to respond according to their own interests, thereby providing judgments without bearing the phenomena of the wider Anglican Communion in mind as a whole. The thesis acknowledges the difficulty of leaving aside the national, cultural and theological issues and biases which operate as particular and divergent hermeneutics throughout the Anglican Communion, but at the same time, differently from TEAC, the thesis seeks a broader understanding of the search for shared meaning that is part of theological education in the Anglican Communion. The phenomenological methodology of this thesis seeks to avoid the difficulties of particularity and sectional interests by describing the phenomena of the Anglican eucharistic tradition, suspending judgment to a later time and then on the basis of the essences making assessments and judgments regarding the nature of Anglican eucharistic theology and theological education in the Anglican tradition. This, it is argued, has the potential of delivering information that is useful to the Anglican tradition as whole and to Anglican theological education in particular, which may assist in re-inventing or re-configuring the tradition, rather than merely rehearsing the particular interests of the parties and traditions of the Anglican Communion.

1.3 Theological Education in the Anglican Church of Australia

In order to examine theological education in more depth, and in the absence of detailed information from the TEAC questionnaire, specific information from some of the theological institutions in one Province of the Anglican Communion, that is, the Anglican Church of Australia will now be undertaken. This examination will help to establish that particular theological institutions often operate within a particular hermeneutic and that this hermeneutic, influences not only educational methodology but also the expression of theology.

Theological institutions within Australia are geographically isolated and have distinctive histories. This has resulted in each of the major centres of theological education having particular theological interests (Sherlock, 2000: 476).
Moore Theological College reflects the strongly Evangelical ethos of the Diocese of Sydney and has been particularly shaped by some of its previous principals, such as Nathaniel Jones (1897-1911), T.C. Hammond (1936-1953), Broughton Knox (1959-1985) and Donald Robinson (Vice-Principal from 1959-1972 and later Archbishop of Sydney from 1982-1993). This trend continued with the appointment of Peter Jensen (Principal from 1985-2001 and Archbishop of Sydney from 2001) and John Woodhouse (Principal from 2001), both of whom are prominent Evangelical Anglicans. Moore College, under the leadership of these significant principals, reflects a ‘Reformed and Evangelical tradition of Anglicanism’ (Moore College Web Site) and the appropriation of this particular tradition or hermeneutic interest remains an important aim of the College, significantly influencing Moore’s expression of theology and model of theological education. Moore College’s style presents a distinctive ecclesiology, stressing the sovereignty of God and the rational nature of divine revelation and has produced a large number of influential Evangelical scholars (Sherlock, 2000: 477) who subscribe to these views.

St Mark’s National Theological Centre in Canberra has operated since 1995 as the School of Theology within Charles Sturt University (CSU), a large, multi-campus regional university, and presents a distinctly different hermeneutic interest to that of Moore College. St Mark’s provides theological education within a secular university, while at the same time expressing a special interest in the formation and training of priests and deacons for the Anglican Church of Australia. St Mark’s web site does not openly align it with any particular party of Anglicanism as Moore College’s site does. St Mark’s seeks to be inclusive, while engaging with other traditions of Christianity and the wider Australian society and culture. At the same time, however, St Mark’s particular interest provides theological education that seeks to address critical issues confronting Australian society (St Mark’s Web Site). CSU also entered into a collaborative enterprise with the Anglican College of St John the Evangelist at Morpeth in 1997 and the United Theological College in Sydney (a college of the Uniting Church of Australia) in 1999. This suggests that St Mark’s is committed to more than one hermeneutic interest, since St John’s College at Morpeth has been traditionally associated with the Catholic tradition of Anglicanism and the United Theological College is part of the Reformed tradition of Christianity. It seems that St Mark’s is comfortable with diversity and does not seek the appropriation of one
particular hermeneutic interest. Critical interest is also a feature of St Mark’s educational offering since, “the School has developed a vigorous research focus and is committed to fostering a scholarly theological community that engages with contemporary society” (Charles Sturt University School of Theology web site) through a number of research centres.

Trinity College Theological School in Melbourne, operates within Trinity College, a college of the University of Melbourne. Trinity’s website until recently spoke of a Catholic tradition of Anglicanism, also described as ‘liberal catholic’ (Sherlock, 2000: 478), a tradition which Trinity maintained for many years since the foundation of its theological school in 1877. More recently (2006 web presence) this ‘Catholic’ (capital ‘C’) emphasis been modified to suggest a more inclusive approach and the word ‘catholic’ (small ‘c’) is now used, suggesting a more universal nature for the Christian ministry it offers (see Trinity College Theological School Web Site – ethos and purpose). Trinity’s web site now declares that its theological school “seeks to embody the catholic faith in the context of corporate work, with openness to the questions of contemporary society” and that “it is committed to the exploration and articulation of the wholeness of the Anglican tradition in terms of its history, theology, liturgy, spirituality and mission” (Trinity Theological School Web Site – ethos and purpose). Trinity had previously described itself as representing “the breadth of the catholic tradition in theology, worship and spirituality, and seeks to embody the Anglican way in critical, reflective and articulate style in dialogue with the contemporary world” (former Trinity College Theological School Web Site). Trinity’s approach now seems to express a more inclusive style of catholic faith and a desire to take into account the ‘wholeness’ of the Anglican tradition. In reality it seems that much of the Catholic tradition of Anglicanism remains at Trinity, but there is a willingness to explore the diversity of the Anglican tradition. This is suggestive of dialogue with others about faith and theology, which is further enhanced by the involvement of the Trinity Theological School in an ecumenical faculty of theology. Trinity does this by sharing resources in an ecumenical association with the Melbourne College of Divinity and the United Faculty of Theology in Melbourne (representing institutions from Roman Catholic, Anglican and Uniting traditions of Christianity which combine as one teaching body). In participating in this ecumenical approach to theology Trinity also affirms that “it pursues critical
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scholarship and excellence in teaching” thereby suggesting that it is attempting to move beyond the mere appropriation of a particular hermeneutic interest by adopting a critical approach to theological education (Trinity Theological School Web Site – ethos and purpose).

Ridley College in Melbourne, on the other hand, reflects a Reformed and Evangelical tradition of Anglicanism (Ridley College Web Site), also operating as a university college outside a university and independent of the Melbourne College of Divinity and the United Faculty of Theology and its ecumenical connections. Moore College in Sydney and Ridley College in Melbourne form the major base for scholarly conservative Evangelical theology in Australia (Sherlock, 2000: 477). As such these two colleges present an Evangelical hermeneutic interest within the Anglican theological education scene in the Anglican Church of Australia.

In the other states of Australia, ecumenical approaches to theological education dominate. In Adelaide, the Anglican, Uniting and other colleges make up the Adelaide College of Divinity in association with Flinders University. In Perth a similar pattern is found in an association with Murdoch University (Sherlock, 2000: 478). In Queensland, biblical studies were introduced into the Arts degree at the University of Queensland in 1938 and a Bachelor of Divinity degree was offered in 1953 (Breward, 1997: 16). More recently the Catholic, Anglican and Uniting theological colleges have combined into the Brisbane College of Theology (BCT) and a relationship between the BCT and Griffith University has emerged (Sherlock, 2000: 479), where the BCT effectively operates since July, 2006 as a faculty of theology for the university. St Francis College, the Anglican theological college in Brisbane now functions as part of this ecumenical arrangement with the BCT and Griffith University.

The formation of The Australian and New Zealand Association of Theological Schools (ANZATS) signals closer ecumenical relationships between the Christian denominations and their theological schools, where the emphasis has been on theological scholars sharing a critical interest apart from their particular denominational interests. This more critical interest in theology and theological education has also been found in the increasing number
of theological journals and the scholarly articles published in Australia (see Sherlock, 2000: 480 for details of the journals).

Theological education in Australia in the Anglican tradition is diverse (just as TEAC suggests for the Anglican Communion as a whole), with some theological institutions operating in an independent fashion as private providers of higher education (e.g. Moore College and Trinity College) while others are officially linked with universities as faculties of theology (e.g. St Mark’s National Theological Centre in Canberra is linked with Charles Sturt University and St Francis Theological College in Brisbane is linked with Griffith University). The processes of ecumenical and university engagement which have occurred in Australia in more recent times, seem to be allowing theological education to grow beyond sectional, geographical and denominational interests (Sherlock, 2000: 480) while other non-aligned theological institutions are keen to maintain their particular hermeneutic interests. Within Anglicanism in Australia however, it is the varying traditions or interests of Anglicanism (typically categorised as Catholic or Evangelical but also including the labels Reformed, Protestant, Liberal or Conservative) that often also reflect quite different approaches to theological education. These varying hermeneutic interests have the potential to impoverish and fetishise theological education in the Anglican tradition since an emphasis on the appropriation of particular traditions has the potential to limit critical reflection in theological education and the intersubjectivity of the shared search for meaning.

The differing hermeneutic interests of Anglicanism have usually been described as either Anglican Evangelical or Anglican Catholic interests. These interests have influenced the nature of theological education in the Anglican tradition. Bill Lawton argues, in relation to the Evangelical tradition of Anglicanism, that:

“Protestant theology focuses specifically on the Bible. But this is revelation about God in the human condition, about redemption and reconciliation. The focus is grace: the grace of divine forgiveness and the grace of at-one-ment between humanity and God, and humanity with itself. Jesus the mediator between God and us, and us with each other is the centre of orthodox Christian theology. The good news of the gospel is that human sinfulness finds forgiveness through the cross of Christ. God enters human searching and forsakenness, and speaks reconciliation and liberation. God’s final word is not judgement, but salvation and grace to all who are distant, and that is precisely the
lost, the poor and the marginalised. To them is given the gospel, the story of God’s acceptance.” (Lawton, 2002: 179-180).

While all Christians acknowledge the work of God’s grace through Christ, there remains an uneasy tension about the proclamation of that grace. Differing traditions relating to the incarnation and atonement are valued by varying hermeneutic interests within Anglicanism, with an Evangelical view of the atonement being expressed by writers such as Morris (1983) and a Catholic view, expressed by writers such as Carnley (1987). These differences remain real and can result in quite distinctive interpretations of the one theological concept.

In the Catholic tradition of Anglicanism, the traditions of the church, including its ordained ministry, liturgical worship and the sacraments are important aspects, set alongside the exercise of reason. Bill Lawton argues that:

“...The Catholic Anglican is drawn to a vision of God as the other, transcendent, revealing himself in his incomprehensible Trinitarian life to humankind by taking up and transforming the created order in the Incarnation of the Son’. The incarnation is God engaging human flesh and by it lifting humanity and the entire fractured universe into the divine life. … The eucharist ... is the ‘Eternal Now’, the intersection of human longing and the promise of redemption. … This teaching sees Christ incarnate in his world of the lost and forsaken.” (Lawton, 2002: 181).

Anglicans also vary on the basis of conservative or liberal attitudes to a range of issues. Conservatives (both Evangelical and Catholic Anglicans) often emphasise the appropriation of the tradition’s established knowledge from the past, whereas Liberals (both Evangelical and Catholic Anglicans) are often more open to new insights and to critical and reflective analysis of the tradition (see Bunting, 1996 for fuller descriptions of these labels). All the institutions of theological education in the Anglican Church of Australia, mentioned above, seem to work towards the development of higher order critical thinking in students and programs, but there remains in them all (as acknowledged by their web sites) some aspects of the specific tradition (their particular technical or hermeneutic interests) which each institution seeks that students appropriate. Moore College for example, expresses a conservative Evangelical attitude and tradition whereas St Mark’s/CSU has a more liberal attitude and tradition and Trinity College Theological School expresses a more catholic tradition. Not only do these differences influence the expression of theology but they also influence thinking about ways of knowing in the
various institutions. Conservative attitudes sometimes limit a critical interest with an emphasis on the appropriation of an existing tradition and on technical and hermeneutic interests at the expense of the critical interest, while liberal attitudes sometimes undervalue the tradition and fail to reflect critically on it, emphasising a hermeneutic of questioning and development.

This thesis argues that at times, specific technical knowledge or hermeneutic interests, while being of importance to a particular party or tradition, can nonetheless blunt the critical edge of knowing within theological education in Anglicanism. Appropriation of a tradition’s particular hermeneutic interest sometimes requires the suspension of critical judgment in favour of this prevailing tradition and its privileged view of theology. Appropriation of an Evangelical or Catholic hermeneutic interest within Anglicanism can mean for example that a particular view of the theology of the Eucharist is also appropriated. This thesis puts the case that there is a need for emancipation within Anglican theological education from these technical or hermeneutic interests, and that the development of a more critical interest is needed, which focuses the educational intent away from narrowly focussed intentions of privileged knowledge and towards more critical ways of knowing.

It may be helpful at this point to give a specific instance of how these narrow hermeneutic interests function within the Anglican Church of Australia.

In recent times a focus on particular hermeneutic interests within Anglicanism in Australia is expressed in relation to the eucharistic liturgies of the latest Australian Anglican prayer book, *A Prayer Book for Australia (APBA)* (1995). While most Anglicans within the Catholic tradition of Anglicanism in Australia are comfortable with the theology of the Eucharist expressed within *APBA* (1995) (Richardson, 1997), some Catholic Anglicans are not. Reference to the manual entitled *The Holy Eucharist* (1995/2002) issued by Bishop Silk in the conservative Catholic Anglican Diocese of Ballarat shows that he attempts to provide what he calls ‘a more Catholic interpretation’ of the eucharistic liturgies in *APBA* (1995). Bishop Silk’s objections to *APBA* (1995) are based on his and his diocese’s particular interests, that is, the conservative Catholic strain of Anglicanism, and are developed
through certain interpretations of technical liturgical and theological expressions based on realism (e.g. particular interpretations of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, the remembrance (*anamnesis*) of Christ’s sacrifice in the Eucharist and particular technical wordings for the expression of the *epiclesis* or invocation of the Holy Spirit over the bread and wine of the Eucharist). At the same time other Anglicans are also not comfortable with using *APBA* (1995) on the basis of their particular Evangelical interests (e.g. Mason, 1995; Woodhouse, 1995; Sydney Doctrine Commission Report on *APBA*, 1996; Doyle, 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1998). Realism (often expressed as the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist and concepts of *anamnesis* and *epiclesis*) is rejected by these Evangelicals as are the more general notions of sacramentality (the sacramental principle) and instead a nominalist separation of the signs of the Eucharist (bread and wine and their offering) from the signified (Christ’s body and blood and Christ’s remembrance in the Eucharist) is emphasised.

In each case, in both the Evangelical and the Catholic traditions of Anglicanism, particular technical or hermeneutic interests determine a ‘correct’ or ‘pure’ view of the Eucharist, and at the same time suspend critical reflection on eucharistic theology as a whole, by seeking power in the appropriation of a particular view while at the same time seeking to limit the power of another view. The prosecution of these particular technical and hermeneutic interests works against any intersubjectivity or communicative action based on shared understanding since it establishes one view as ‘holy’ and excludes other views as false or disloyal to some perceived and privileged view of Anglican eucharistic theology. Evangelical Anglicans often privilege the Reformation theology of early Anglican leaders, such as Archbishop Thomas Cranmer, the theology of prayer books such as the 1662 *Book of Common Prayer* or statements of faith such as *The Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion*, while Catholic Anglicans often privilege the catholic theology expressed by the early church, the seventeenth century Caroline Divines, the Oxford Movement of the nineteenth century and the ecumenical liturgical and theological convergence of the twentieth century.

This thesis argues that if eucharistic theology within Anglicanism is based on party interest alone (say Catholic or Evangelical Anglican interests alone) then Anglican eucharistic theology becomes impoverished and fetishised and fails to represent the multiformity of
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the tradition as a whole. This in turn has the potential to impoverish and fetishise programs of theological education since these programs sometimes seek only to support the appropriation of narrow technical and hermeneutic interests (either Catholic or Evangelical) and this in turn limits the critical interest of theological education. A more useful model, it is argued, is looking for more general and critical interests within the Anglican eucharistic tradition as a whole, and basing theological education on these more general interests, rather than the particular interests or hermeneutics of individual church parties. The purpose of the case study material contained on the CD accompanying this thesis therefore, is to allow access to the broad range of theological interests within the Anglican tradition and to extract from this material the essences of the Anglican eucharistic tradition. A methodology of phenomenology is adopted in order to allow this seeking after essences to proceed. Knowledge of these essences and acceptance of the multiformity of the Anglican eucharistic tradition, it is proposed, have ramifications for theological education in the Anglican tradition, both in relation to the specific study eucharistic theology and to theological education generally. An acceptance of the view that different essences exist means that one particular hermeneutic interest cannot be equivalent to the Anglican eucharistic tradition as a whole, and so impels theological education into a dialogue of shared meaning between differing traditions, rather than focussing on the appropriation of one hermeneutic interest alone. These ramifications will be explored in greater depth in Chapter 5 of this thesis.

Where religious education reflects the narrow view it often results in conflict between various religious groupings. Such conflicts between various religious groupings have become part of the modern world order, especially in relations between some of the more extreme versions of both Christianity and Islam (Lovat, 2003). Often such conflicts and entrenched positions create negative attitudes and these carry over into religious education. Such a situation has existed within the Anglican Church of Australia in the provision of theological education, such that individual colleges and dioceses have adopted and valued a particular hermeneutic interest and valued other hermeneutic interests to a lesser degree. This in turn has limited the development of a critical approach to theological education in the Anglican Church of Australia since it often aims at the appropriation of narrow interests at the expense of the critical interests. For Lovat, religious education generally,
where it adopts a critical approach to knowledge, is more than cerebral education but rather the means “for changed attitudes and new behaviours” which have the potential to “not only renew a world order” but to function in such a way that education “can actually help us to understand our own culture (including our faith culture) in renewed fashion” (Lovat, 2003: 3). Such an appeal to critical knowing is made “on the understanding that the supreme form of knowing is to be found in a measure of self-knowing” (Lovat, 2002b: 34) where critical reflection on the self as a learner and on knowledge itself has the potential to emancipate individuals from the narrow confines of technical and hermeneutic interests.

For Lovat, “religious education as an area of the curriculum must be free to play its vital personal and social role for the individual and society it is serving” (Lovat, 2002b: 29). Religious education functions therefore in more ways than simply classroom techniques and educational programs of work, or specific knowledge within the confines of particular historical, theological or denominational traditions. Religious education has the potential to transform individuals and the societies of which they are part. Lovat’s thinking resonates with that of Bruce Kaye who argues for the re-configuring of Anglican theology and the re-invention of the tradition as whole (Kaye, 2003) in order to promote critical interest and the re-configuring of the Anglican tradition. This thesis seeks the same sort of critical re-configuring in relation to Anglican eucharistic theology in an effort to broaden the praxis of theological education and to contribute to a process of emancipation within the Anglican tradition as a whole.

1.4 Research into Theological Education in the Anglican Church of Australia

Limited research and writing on theological education in Australia has been carried out (Treloar, 1997: 4). The model of theological education in nineteenth century Australia was inherited from England, with theological colleges being established and controlled by various dioceses, each committed to particular interests, but with no formal connection to the universities (Breward, 1997: 8). Indeed several of the early universities, such as the University of Sydney and the University of Melbourne, specifically excluded theological study from their curriculum in order to exclude sectarian interests from academic pursuits (Breward, 1997: 8). Bishops Broughton and Tyrrell were successful in alienating both the Senate and the first professors of the University of Sydney by “trenchantly arguing a case
against a ‘godless university’” (Davis, 1966a: 49). In some parts of Australia however, generous bequests, such as that of Thomas Moore in 1856, made the establishment of Moore Theological College in Sydney possible, apart from a university. It was Bishop Frederic Barker’s decision in Sydney to commit to Moore College that seems to have committed the Anglican Church in Australia to what became “the private, vocational institution, separated from the University” (Davis, 1966a: 50). In Melbourne, Trinity College, a college of the University of Melbourne, was established in 1872 and began the training of ordinands in the context of a university college in 1877, despite the refusal of the University to establish a school of theology. In other parts of the Anglican Church of Australia bishops made their own arrangements and some, such as Bishop Tyrrell of Newcastle, tutored prospective clergy themselves (Davis, 1966a: 49). Later in the nineteenth century, diocese after diocese established its own theological college, e.g. St Barnabas in Adelaide in 1880; Perry Hall in Bendigo in 1893; St Francis in Brisbane in 1896; St John’s in Armidale in 1898 (later transferred to Morpeth in 1926); St Aidan’s in Ballarat and St Columb’s in Wangaratta in 1903; St Wilfred’s, Cressy in 1904 and Goulburn in 1906. Colleges were also begun in Melbourne with St John’s in 1906 and Ridley in 1910 (Breward, 1997: 11). The majority of these theological colleges are now closed but at the time of establishment each bishop wanted their own independent college to suit their particular theological style. The colleges in Victoria and the colleges in New South Wales were distinguished by their particular churchmanship with Trinity (Victoria) and St John’s Morpeth (New South Wales) being of the Catholic tradition of Anglicanism and Ridley (Victoria) and Moore (New South Wales) being of the Evangelical tradition. The proliferation of theological colleges in Australia suited the bishops’ purposes but it seriously affected their standard and quality (Davis, 1966a: 48), since colleges competed with one another and often remained disadvantaged by small student numbers and lack of human and physical resources. The failure of the Anglican Church to cope with secularism was in part due to the theological bankruptcy of their ministries and the failure of the Church to develop a rational policy for theological education on a national basis (Davis, 1966a: 50). Much of this failure can be attributed to the competing nature of church parties and diocesan structures, each keen to protect and project its own hermeneutic interest.
St John’s College at Morpeth presents an interesting case study of the progress and difficulty of one of these theological colleges. Under the guidance of an energetic group of academics led by Ernest Burgmann, the Principal in the 1920’s and 1930’s St John’s represented a change in the pattern of nineteenth century theological education. The theological curriculum Burgmann implemented at St John’s has been described as taking the changing world seriously (Breward, 1997: 16). Peter Hempenstall in his biography of Burgmann refers to ‘the Morpeth mind’, the development of which was to be brought about by a four-year program of study including language, history, science and philosophy along with the traditional theological subjects of theology and church history (Hempenstall, 1993: 117). Burgmann’s bold plans were severely constrained by the shortage of suitable candidates and the lack of episcopal vision. Burgmann also received criticism from within the Anglican Church because the type of theological education he was developing was not dogmatic and traditional enough for those who preferred the more traditional Anglo-Catholic hermeneutic (Hempenstall, 1993: 126). Burgmann’s plans seemed to advance somewhat in the 1930’s as he pushed for connection with a university in order to escape the mediocrities of the Anglican system (Hempenstall, 1993: 117) but all these plans came to nothing. Burgmann persisted with the provision of theological education at Morpeth and sought to link more closely with the modern world in a way that was critical. Engagement with the local community and the publication of a journal, the Morpeth Review, assisted Burgmann’s plans, but these ventures ceased when he left to become Bishop of Goulburn. In the Morpeth Review Burgmann had the chance to express some of his thinking, arguing against what he called ‘the party man’. He argued:

“He best serves the whole who becomes most completely personal, and his personality grows in the range and quality of his love. It is in love that life becomes fully personal and conscious … the purely party man as a rule becomes an unlovely figure and hardens and narrows with age. When we set a limit to our love we have made a cabin for death in our souls.” (Burgmann, Morpeth Review, cited in Hempenstall, 1993: 132).

Here is a statement of theological intent and critical interest that attempts to move past the hermeneutic of party opinion and embrace a more critical vision of life in an attempt to “recapture a creative religion, grounded in the spirit of the radical Christ” (Hempenstall, 1993: 133). All this was most clearly summed up in Burgmann’s vision for St John’s College as an Anglican think-tank, where research and postgraduate study was carried out.
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and where scholars would visit. Burgmann’s vision of theological education, embracing a critical interest, stood in stark contrast to other theological institutions firmly wedded to a particular hermeneutic interest of Anglicanism. Burgmann’s vision of theological education was that it could spark change (Hempenstall, 1993: 135) rather than maintain the status quo. Following Burgmann’s departure for Goulburn in 1934, the Morpeth mind began to disintegrate. Burgmann’s successor, T.M. Robinson, was a conservative English Anglo-Catholic, who returned theological education to the prevailing hermeneutic interest of the Anglican Catholic heritage – “the final triumph of Burgmann’s ... opposition group?” (Hempenstall, 1993: 153). Burgmann’s vision had to await the establishment of St Mark’s Library in Canberra in 1957, begun with the specific vision of providing a place of theological scholarship in Australia, fulfilling Burgmann’s vision for “an institution which would become like a permeable membrane between the church and the university work done in a secular city” (St Mark’s web site, History of St Mark’s). This vision has developed into St Mark’s National Theological Centre, linked from 1995 with Charles Sturt University as a School of Theology functioning within that university and aiming to express a critical interest for theological education by providing a place of undergraduate and postgraduate study and research in theology. This vision for St John’s College has continued with the recent linking of the College with Charles Sturt University’s School of Theology and with present day discussion about establishing a School of Theology at the University of Newcastle.

Government interest in theological education in Australia has never been significant (Treloar, 1997: 6). The 1964 Martin Report entitled *Tertiary Education in Australia*, significantly however, included a chapter on ‘Theological Training in Australia’ (Martin, 1964: II, 143-155). The Report acknowledged a general lack of information on theological training in Australia and took the step of inviting a group of representatives from the major Christian denominations to investigate on its behalf (Martin, 1964: II, Para 15.1). Information was produced showing the location of theological colleges and the numbers of staff members and students (Martin, 1964: II, Para. 15.4) but not engaging in any significant way with the nature of theological education in those institutions, apart from acknowledging that “within the same church, there is some diversity in methods and standards of training” (Martin, 1964: II, Para. 15.6). As regards the Anglican Church (then
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known as the Church of England in Australia) variations were shown to exist in regard to the nature of the courses undertaken (university or theological college) (Martin, 1964: II, Para. 15.11) and entry standards of students and subjects studied (Martin, 1964: II, Para. 15.13). No comments were made on the varying parties of the Anglican Church or their particular technical or hermeneutic interests, nor was there any reference to a critical interest in the theological institutions of Australia. The Report, significantly using the word ‘training’, acknowledged however, that the purpose of ‘theological training institutions’ was to ‘train clergy’ and took the view that the furtherance of religious beliefs was the responsibility of the various church bodies (Martin, 1964: II, Para. 15.51). The Report also stated that institutions of tertiary education in Australia, other than theological colleges, might undertake courses in “comparative religion, theological (including biblical) history, early specialist languages for the understanding of manuscript material and original texts, classical languages and literature, ancient history and archaeology” (Martin, 1964: II, 15.53).

Geoff Treloar reflecting on the period following the Martin Report, comments that, “the attempt to broaden provision for theological training has met with some good measure of success in the thirty years since the Martin Report. A number of denominational colleges did follow the suggestion to affiliate with universities” (Treloar, 1997: 6). The Martin Report however, seems to be making a clear distinction between technical and hermeneutic interests (“the furtherance of religious beliefs”, Martin, 1964, II, Para. 15.51) and other critical interests, such as those listed above from Paragraph 15.53. This suggests that ‘the furtherance of religious belief’ was seen to have no place in a tertiary institution and should remain the concern of the churches alone in their various theological training colleges. The fact that the Martin Report further suggested that the Commonwealth Government provide assistance to theological students undertaking university courses but not to those students in theological training colleges, places a higher value on such university courses than courses in a theological institution (Martin, 1964: II, Para. 15.54). The implication of the Martin Report in relation to what it calls ‘theological training in Australia’ is that such ‘training’ lacks a critical interest. Perhaps this view was formed because the Commonwealth Government was not willing to assist church run theological institutions, but it could also be that such institutions were seen to be pursuing particular technical and hermeneutic interests that did not have the critical interests of university education. Theological education appeared at this time to be as it had always been, “denominational,
sometimes competitive, often sectarian, and in some cases of dubious quality” (Treloar, 1997: 6).

Comment on the Martin Report seems to back up these conclusions, with one commentator arguing that “the Commission obviously regards religion as standing in a world apart, that is, religion as it reads in this land, the religion of denominationalism” (Roberts-Thomson, 1965: 105). This suggests that in the view of the Martin Report, theological education was “a sectional matter” (Roberts-Thomson, 1965: 105) which is the result of “the image which the Churches have themselves fostered over the years” (Roberts-Thomson, 1965: 105). Churches in their pursuit of their own technical and hermeneutic interests of theological education had excluded themselves it seemed from the recognition of providing more critical interests of educational programs.

A significant conference on theological education was held at St John’s College Morpeth in 1966 (The Morpeth Papers, edited by Davis, 1966). This conference was remarkable, not only because of the serious way that it pursued the nature of theological education, but also because it did this in an ecumenical context (representatives of the Roman Catholic and Reformed traditions were present and gave papers) and because it advocated, encouraged by the recommendations of the Martin Report (1964), that theological education had a legitimate place in the universities and was concerned with critical interests. The Bishop of Newcastle at the time (The Right Reverend James Housden) said in the Foreword to The Morpeth Papers, that there was a “need for Christians to re-examine the basis of theological education with a view to its re-establishment as a field of study alongside other disciplines of learning, as well as its application in the training of the ministry” (Housden, in Davis, 1966: Foreword) in the context of an ecumenical approach. The bishop’s words were taken up by those who presented papers at the conference, suggesting recognition of the place of both technical/hermeneutic interests and critical interest. R.L. Sharwood, Warden of Trinity College, University of Melbourne, in his paper presented at the Morpeth Conference, acknowledged that theological education in Australia was far from satisfactory because the Anglican Church has shirked theological education, not being prepared to allocate it the necessary resources (Sharwood, 1966: 4). Sharwood observed that with theology excluded from the universities in Australia, theological colleges had been unable
to promote theology adequately as a scholarly endeavour (Sharwood, 1966: 7). Ministry training had been substituted for critical intent and as a result the theological colleges had become “sectarian, seminarian and second-rate” (Sharwood, 1966: 8). Sharwood acknowledged that this was not solely the fault of the Churches since the universities excluded theology because of a suspicion that sectarian division would be introduced into the university scene. Sharwood however was keen to see theology, as a critical interest, introduced into the universities of Australia, in such a way that the academic study of theology should be clearly distinguished from denominational dogma. At the same time he argued that where theological colleges continue to exist as separate entities they should pursue theology in an academic and scholarly manner (Sharwood, 1966: 11). Clearly Sharwood was not content to endorse a continuation of sectarian interests in the Anglican theological colleges of Australia.

William Ginnane (Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the Australian National University) also presented a paper at the Morpeth Conference of 1966. His paper, entitled ‘Theology in the University’, argued the case for the inclusion of theology in the university since it is one of the ‘sciences’, not in the sense of physics or chemistry, but as “systematic human knowledge” (Ginnane, 1966: 22) and therefore deserving of a place in the institution “where all sciences co-habit” (Ginnane, 1966: 22), that is, the university. He argued that the benefits of such a placement would be for both theology and the other sciences, with theology acting not as some sort of “supernatural policeman directing the natural academic traffic” (Ginnane, 1966: 21) but as a dynamic and critical academic discipline, having its own subject matter and methodology, together with standards of academic objectivity and excellence (Ginnane, 1966: 24). Ginnane argued for theology as a critical interest “subject to the canons of criticism” (Ginnane, 1966: 25), apart from any hermeneutic interest that it might also have, perhaps related to vocational training and pastoral ministry. In a university, he argued, it is not necessary for theology, as a science, to require agreed doctrine, thus suggesting that any perceived problems of ‘denominational’ theology were not as great a threat to critical inquiry as they might at first appear (Ginnane, 1966: 26-27). In this sense Ginnane compared the teaching of theology to the teaching of philosophy, which did not require agreed ‘doctrine’, but at the same time acknowledged that people may not agree about doctrines (Ginnane, 1966: 27). The thrust of Ginnane’s argument was
that theology could be taught within Australian universities as a critical discipline in its own right without denominational dogmas or party hermeneutic interest necessarily destroying theology’s critical interest. At the same time, theology taught in this way could legitimately acknowledge diversity and multiformity as part of its critical interest.

J.G. Tulip (Lecturer in English, University of Sydney) considered both theological and tertiary education in his contribution to The Morpeth Papers. The problem as he saw it was that theological education in Australia had been treated as an exception in tertiary education, whereas this was not the case in overseas universities since there theology was an accepted part of a university’s academic work (Tulip, 1966: 28). Tulip criticised the Martin Report of 1964 because it accepted the status quo of theological colleges in Australia and in so doing fixed the situation in precisely the form that had created the difficulty (Tulip, 1966: 29). This criticism can be just as legitimately applied to the work of Theological Education in the Anglican Communion (TEAC) at present, since TEAC, in accepting the status quo of Anglican theological education has the danger of fixing theological education in the form that seems to be the problem. Importantly however, Tulip disputed the distinction between ‘dogmatic’ and ‘non-dogmatic’ theology, arguing that if the universities were restricted to ‘non-dogmatic’ theology this would “place unfortunate restrictions on the academic freedom and usefulness of those theological studies admitted into a university” (Tulip, 1966: 30). This comment was an endorsement of critical interest, since it argued that theology in a tertiary study should be able to consider dogmatic theology in a critical manner, without the obligation to assent to a particular hermeneutic interest.

The Morpeth Papers (Davis, 1966) were remarkable for the vision of theological education they expressed. The bringing together of academics to discuss theological education in an ecumenical context and with a willingness to develop new models of theological education was impressive and suggested that the time was right for change in Anglican theological education. This however was not immediately the case, although Stuart Piggin expresses the view that the Morpeth Conference of 1966 strengthened the move of theological colleges to link with the universities (Piggin, 1997: 37). Despite this, Piggin also argues that the “story of theological colleges in Australia is one of an unromantic, uphill struggle
against anti-intellectualism and the paucity of resources” (Piggin, 1997: 40). St John’s College is a good example of the difficulty Piggin outlines. With the exception of a few theological students who undertook a combined BA/ThL degree at both the University of Newcastle and St John’s College, Morpeth in the 1970’s and 1980’s, no real linking of the College with a university occurred until 1997 when St John’s College made a formal link with Charles Sturt University’s School of Theology in Canberra. In the period between 1966 and the 1990’s, St John’s College continued as a theological college within the Catholic tradition of Anglicanism, concentrating on preparing candidates for the ordained ministry, with numbers of both staff and students remaining small and educational resources limited. In this period St John’s College linked with the degree and diploma granting institutions of the Australian College of Theology and the Melbourne College of Divinity in order to provide academic qualifications for its students, but due to a lack of adequate resources never achieved the status of granting its own degree qualifications at the local level. The linking of St John’s College with Charles Sturt University’s School of Theology as an affiliated campus, following an earlier partnership with St Mark’s National Theological Centre in Canberra in 1995, which in effect became the CSU School of Theology, represented a significant development in theological education for St John’s College. This linking with CSU came about following a major review and reform of the College’s operation when a new Principal (The Rev’d Dr Ann McElligott) was appointed in 1995, and was seen to raise the status of the College significantly and to set it on a new direction of theological education with the focus on a more critical interest in theological education for both lay and ordained vocations. St John’s College was now able to offer the full range of university degrees from certificates in theology to doctoral studies, as well as specific programs of professional ministry preparation (theological reflection, liturgical practice, pastoral matters and homiletics) and spirituality programs through what was known as the St John’s College Professional Ministry Certificate (St John’s College Ministry Centre Handbook, 2005: 5-7). With the resignation of the Dr McElligott in 2002, the College was at another point of review where issues considered were of a more operational nature. The questions of where and how the College should operate, which university it should be linked to and whether or not it should operate at all were considered (Anglican Encounter, September, 2002). At the time of writing the sale of the St John’s College site is proceeding and discussions are occurring with the University of Newcastle regarding the
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The establishment of a School of Theology at that university. The continuation of theological education as a critical interest remains a possibility for the future.

On the national level, Kirkaldy (1992) carried out a review of the Anglican theological institutions of the Anglican Church of Australia on behalf of the General Synod of the Anglican Church of Australia. Kirkaldy’s work however, focused mainly on operational aspects of theological education, such as organisation and governance, but did not attempt to comment on broader aspects of theological education, such as the underlying philosophy of education or whether or not that teaching reflected a critical interest in its approach to knowledge. Kirkaldy was content to describe each theological institution in the context of its own hermeneutic, without any attempt to look at the more critical aspects of theological education.

From the late 1980’s onwards there has been considerable discussion of tertiary education in Australia with governments putting in place significant legislative measures that have impacted on theological education. During the time John Dawkins was Federal Minister for Education (1987-1992) new joint degree programs were developed between theological colleges and the universities and there was an expansion of the ecumenical approach to theological education. Sherlock (2000) provides details of these developments and some of these have been mentioned above. It is important to note however, that where the study of theology, previously carried out in a theological college, has been linked with a university, students and faculties of theology have received Federal Government financial assistance. When St Mark’s National Theological Centre linked with Charles Sturt University in 1995 and became that university’s School of Theology within the Faculty of Arts, students were able to receive Austudy, and the work of the faculty was financed by grants from the Federal Government. In Queensland, students at St Francis Theological College will receive financial assistance from the Federal Government under the FEE-Help scheme from 2007 due to the Brisbane College of Theology and Griffith University arrangement. This means that from the 1990’s onwards these theological institutions and their programs of theological study were being partly financed from government funds. This development represents not only a significant departure from previous government reticence to subsidise theological education, but it also suggests that the Federal
Government has recognised the theological programs of these institutions as genuinely academic and tertiary in nature. This further suggests that the programs of theological education are seen to reflect a critical interest, beyond the technical and hermeneutic interests of particular Christian traditions. This development also means that the distinction made by the Martin Report of 1964 between university education and education intended for the furtherance of denominational belief, is no longer made by government authorities, since St Mark’s/CSU and St Francis both undertake the study of theology as an academic discipline, and they also undertake specific ministry training within the specific denominational tradition of Anglicanism. The objection which Tulip (1966) made to any distinction between ‘dogmatic’ and ‘nondogmatic’ theology (a distinction which was supported by the Martin Report of 1964) seems to be vindicated by the present programs of theological education undertaken in a university setting and including sectional interests within their programs. Programs related to specific professional ministry training, such as pastoral care, are now, in modern theological circles, seen as having a critical interest in that they have a subject matter and methodology of their own which focuses on a professional practice and research (see Pattison, 2000 and McGrath, 2000a, for an overview of the modern theory and theology of pastoral care). The critical interest of professional practice and research in pastoral theology seems to have been recognised by both the Federal Government and the universities that have schools of theology.

In even more recent times, the reforms of tertiary education undertaken by the Howard Government (elected 1996 and beginning its fourth term in 2004), directed by the Minister for Education, Science and Training, Dr Brendan Nelson, have brought about some further significant involvements of government in theological education. The reforms to Australian higher education, passing through parliament in 2004, have recognised the significant contribution of private providers of higher education, by allowing students of these institutions to receive financial assistance with their fees. The Federal Government scheme, called FEE-HELP, provides money to pay the fees of students in institutions which are not presently linked with a university and so do not receive Austudy or whose courses did not previously have access to student loans for higher education. Moore College, Ridley College and Trinity College, for example, announced on their web sites that such help was now available to their students. Moore College fees are stated to be in the
vicinity of $12 000 a year and the College advises its students that this amount can be obtained by students from the Federal Government FEE-HELP scheme (see College website, Fees and Bursaries). The implementation of this scheme means, that like those institutions linked with universities (such as St Mark’s/CSU and St John’s Morpeth), the programs of private institutions of higher education (such as Moore and Trinity) are approved and recognised as genuine tertiary education. The willingness of the Federal Government to provide funds for student loans and to accredit these private institutions suggests that these private providers of higher education courses of theological education have a critical interest acceptable to the Federal Department of Education, Science and Training, despite the hermeneutic interests which remain, such as Moore College’s Reformed, Protestant and Evangelical emphasis and Trinity’s traditional commitment to liberal Catholicism in the Anglican tradition.

The Australian and New Zealand Association of Theological Schools (ANZATS), in recognising the benefits of FEE-HELP to students, also observes that the financial assistance is conditional on the private institutions of higher education reporting to the Commonwealth Department of Education, Science and Training and also being audited by the Australian Universities Quality Agency. Staff of the theological institutions will also be given access to the proposed National Institute for Learning and Teaching in Higher Education (ANZATS web site). ANZATS acknowledges that the full ramifications of these developments are not yet understood, however ANZATS’ Council meeting of May, 2004 notes that one implication will be an increased administrative load for institutions in meeting the accreditation procedures imposed by the Federal Government (ANZATS web site). Despite this warning, these developments represent significant governmental recognition of the work of non-university, private, higher education in theological colleges. The fact that the government is funding, accrediting and supporting these theological colleges suggests that they are at the very least perceived as being critical in their approach and genuinely part of the higher education scene in Australia, along with the universities, despite the continued commitment of these private providers of higher education to their particular hermeneutic interests.
Despite these significant developments in governmental policy in relation to theological education in Australia, the work of theological education throughout the Anglican Communion, such as the evaluation presently being undertaken by TEAC, and in the Anglican Church of Australia (Kirkaldy, 1992), seems to be in need of broader perspectives in order to assess and evaluate the nature of the task. TEAC’s work seems too focused on particular hermeneutic interests of parts of the Anglican Communion and Kirkaldy (1992) lacked any critical assessment of theological education in Australia. Bruce Kaye argues that in the last one hundred and fifty years, despite the significant linking with universities and the funding of private institutions of higher education, the theological education curriculum has narrowed in a way that is no longer appropriate for the post Christendom situation of a plural society such as that which exists in Australia. Such a situation, he argues, is no longer helpful to the Christian tradition (Kaye, 1997: 203). In order to address this situation Kaye suggests that theology and theological education needs to be shaped and defined by the realities of the society in which they operate (Kaye, 1997: 209). Theology therefore needs in this view to be the theology of how people live and how their Christian lives are nurtured (Kaye, 1997: 213). One way of doing this is to look at the wider work of epistemology as this relates to education, where there is an attempt to move beyond the idea that the theological curriculum is a body of knowledge to be communicated, to an appreciation of differing ways of knowing within theological education. This involves a willingness to embrace conceptual change whilst at the same time being prepared to involve theological education in a fundamental critique of the society in which people live (Kaye, 1997: 214). Pryor (1997: 200) for example, argues that theological colleges in Australia have not yet fully engaged postmodernism, because of the epistemological commitments of varying groups within Anglicanism and because of the lack of philosophical sophistication in Australian theological education. Lawton (2002: 191) agrees, giving the example of the Diocese of Sydney (see Jensen, 1999) where postmodernism is rejected because it is seen to sideline absolutes. Carnley (2000) on the other hand argues that the role of the Christian Church is to engage the modern world such that people become makers of the tradition handed on to the future. Both Pryor and Lawton are suggesting that a consideration of these deeper philosophical issues of modern theology is yet to occur in any adequate manner but at the same time these issues have a necessary role to play in theological education. This thesis aims in part to address this
situation by a re-configuring of the conceptual nature of eucharistic theology in the Anglican tradition and the underlying philosophical assumptions of that tradition. This involves a willingness to look at different ways of knowing in relation to education in general and in theological education in particular. The work of the contemporary philosopher, Jurgen Habermas will be considered below in an attempt to begin a consideration of these different ways of knowing.

1.5 Habermas and Theological Education

The writings of the critical theorist, Jurgen Habermas, hold potential for examining the nature of theological education and eucharistic theology in the Anglican tradition in a broader and more satisfying manner than the particular interests of the various Anglican traditions and parties. Siobhan Garrigan has recently pointed this out in relation to sacramental theology generally in her 2004 work entitled Beyond Ritual: Sacramental Theology after Habermas. Here Garrigan argues that the work of Habermas presents a useful conversation between contemporary philosophy and theology in the area of sacramental theology (Garrigan, 2004: viii). Habermas, she argues, in a linguistification of the sacred presents a sounding board for the question of what is a sacrament and what is the sense of the sacramental in the present day, where sacraments function within the context of a socially-engaged activity at the heart of a just society (Garrigan, 2004: viii). These observations have potential usefulness in the area of Anglican eucharistic theology as well.

Jurgen Habermas (born 1929) is a German philosopher who has written extensively on epistemology, arguing for “the idea of a broadly conceived critical theory of society” (Outhwaite, 1994: 152) and using critical theory to investigate “how is reliable knowledge possible” (Habermas, 1971: 3). For Habermas this search for reliable knowledge involves more than positivism or empirical scientific method, both of which rely on technical control. Science, it could be argued, attempts to clarify the structure and processes of the world through patient observation of sensible phenomena and by subsequent construction of hypotheses, formed on the basis of these observations. Scientific conclusions are therefore provisional and dependent on further experience, which can lead in turn to either a profound scepticism or to a desire for a more secure and emancipatory way of knowing.
which is not dependent on the uncertainties of theoretical fashion (Lawson-Tancred, 2004: xii). This is where philosophical reflection has its place, in a seeking after a more satisfying account of how the world is.

Habermas’ “deep grounding in the philosophical tradition” is matched by “a remarkable openness to a wide variety of contemporary philosophical and social theories” (Outhwaite, 1994: 5), the most obvious source being the broad Marxist tradition. Outhwaite describes Habermas’ relationship with Marxism “as one of positive critique” (Outhwaite, 1994: 17) in that Habermas, like Marx, values the quest for human liberation. For Habermas this quest takes form in the emancipatory nature of critical reflection as a way of knowing. This interest in the emancipatory potential of the critical way of knowing, as compared to other ways of knowing, such as the scientific and the technical, is not simply rationalisation on the part of an individual since “rationalisation is not emancipatory” (McCarthy, 1978: 36). Indeed Habermas’ work in *Knowledge and Human Interests*, published in 1971 and in *Theory and Practice*, published in 1973, “is centrally concerned with the philosophical and sociological issues raised by scientism, the reduction of all knowledge to that furnished by the empirical sciences, where these are conceived as an unproblematic reflection of reality” (Outhwaite, 1994: 20). Habermas’ concern is with ‘scientism’ not ‘science’ as such, where in scientism, technology and science can become ideology, inherently oriented to possible technical control, such that the rationality of science and technology come to pervade the whole world (Outhwaite, 1994: 21). Habermas calls this a “technocratic consciousness” and argues that it “affects the human race’s emancipatory interest as such” (Habermas, 1970: 111). Outhwaite argues that this ‘technocratic consciousness’ transforms practical questions, that is, moral-political questions, into technical ones, that in turn “excludes ideas of critique and emancipation” (Outhwaite, 1994: 22).

Garrigan, in much the same way, but more specifically in relation to the focus of this thesis, argues that sacraments should be seen as ‘acts’ rather than texts, technical procedures or articles of faith (Garrigan, 2004: ix) and in so doing moves beyond the idea of sacraments as purely technical or hermeneutical interests and thereby focuses debate about sacraments in the area of social justice-oriented discourse. This has particular relevance for this thesis, since it is argued that the dominance of technical and hermeneutic interests in the Anglican
eucharistic tradition have to a great degree excluded critical reflection due to commitments to either technical or hermeneutic interests of particular groups within Anglicanism, such as Catholic or Evangelical Anglicans. It is also argued that such commitments to technical and hermeneutic interests, at the expense of critical intent and reflection, have impoverished and fetishised the Anglican eucharistic tradition and theological education, limiting the discourse of the Anglican tradition to a privileged or ‘holy’ technical or hermeneutic interest. This means that the eucharistic theology of particular interests, groups or traditions within Anglicanism (such as the Catholic or the Evangelical tradition) have become a form of scientism, rather than an exercise in the more critical science of theology generally. An interpretation of sacramental theology as scientism in some particular interests of the Anglican tradition, such as some Evangelical and some Catholic Anglicans, has focused eucharistic theology on technical issues, such as ‘How is Christ present in the Eucharist?’ and ‘How is Christ’s sacrifice remembered?’ At times this technical interest has manifested itself or been interpreted in a realism which borders on the fleshy (Christ’s fleshy presence in the Eucharist and Christ’s sacrifice re-iterated in the Eucharist) or a nominalism which separates the signs of the Eucharist (bread and wine and the remembrance of Christ’s sacrifice) from the signified (the nature of Christ’s body and blood and Christ’s sacrifice) as mutually exclusive entities without any identity between the two. Where theology becomes this sort of scientism, it focuses too closely on the technical: a fleshy presence in extreme realism or a nominalism founded on a subject-predicate discourse of abstract reference, based on a metalinguistic framework of semantic propositionalism which excludes sacramentality, or it focuses too closely on the expression of a particular hermeneutic interest – be that Catholic or Evangelical interests. Where eucharistic theology functions as scientism it is really fetishised theology, which tends to exclude critical reflection on the Anglican eucharistic tradition as a whole, due to its commitment to particular technical or hermeneutic interests. This in turn prevents the emancipation of knowledge and a justice-oriented discourse within the Anglican eucharistic tradition and within programs of theological education.

Habermas’ understanding of knowing extends beyond the technical. For Habermas, “no matter how far our power of technical control over nature is extended, nature retains a substantial core that does not reveal itself to us” (Habermas, 1971: 33). Nature therefore
seems to be more than the conceptual or semantic products of the human mind or human interests and precedes human history. This suggests that there is something universal in the nature of things, which critical reflection is capable of accessing to some degree, and which technical and hermeneutic interests fail to access adequately due to their concentration on the particular. In the case of Anglican eucharistic theology, the particular eucharistic theology of groups or church parties within Anglicanism concentrates on the particular technical facts or hermeneutic interest of a church party, thereby failing to access whatever is universal or the essence of Anglican eucharistic theology. This thesis seeks to access this more universal aspect or essence of Anglican eucharistic theology through a phenomenological methodology of case study where significant expressions of eucharistic theology in the Anglican tradition are examined in depth (see CD accompanying this thesis) and essences extracted (Chapter 4) and interpreted (Chapter 5). This methodology has much in common with the purposes Habermas sets himself, that is, critical science involving self-reflection, moving beyond technical and hermeneutic interests such that critical reflection “releases the subject from dependence on hypostatised powers” (Habermas, 1971: 310) so typical of the commitments of particular groups within a tradition.

Habermas in, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, explains these apparent divisions in knowledge by reference to three interests or ways of knowing, already mentioned above – technical, historical-hermeneutic and critical-self reflective interests – here known more simply as technical, hermeneutic and critical ways of knowing. These three interests have particular relevance to the purposes of this thesis and will now be examined in greater detail.

The first interest or way of knowing, the technical, relates to an empirical-analytic type of knowledge typically associated with facts and figures, emphasising observation and experimentation in the form of empirical verification. Habermas says,

“the approach of the empirical-analytic sciences incorporates a technical cognitive interest” where “the frame of reference that prejudices meaning of possible statements establishes rules both for the construction of theories and their critical testing. Theories comprise hypothetico-deductive connections of propositions, which permit the deduction of lawlike hypotheses with empirical content” (Habermas, 1971: 308).
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The second interest or way of knowing, what Habermas calls the historical-hermeneutic, concerns understanding, where “access to the facts is provided by the understanding of meaning, not observation. The verification of lawlike hypotheses in the empirical-analytic sciences has its counterpart here in the interpretation of texts” (Habermas, 1971: 309). This second level is about the negotiation of meaning through communication in either verbal or written forms. Often the meaning reached through such communication achieves the status of the ‘holy’ or the ‘sacred’ in particular hermeneutic traditions and this knowledge becomes the focus of appropriation for those who seek to maintain or join the hermeneutic tradition. Evangelical Anglicans sometimes view the Reformation formularies of the Anglican Communion as privileged texts, whilst Catholic Anglicans are often committed to various liturgical and sacramental forms that they in turn privilege.

The third type of knowledge, the critical-self reflective sciences, Habermas suggests, remains unsatisfied by both the technical and the historical-hermeneutic sciences. Instead the critical-self reflective sciences are concerned with “the critique of ideology” which produces “an emancipatory cognitive interest” (Habermas, 1971: 310). As Smith and Lovat comment:

“For Habermas, it is only when we have reached the third level that we are guaranteed true knowledge because true knowledge demands that we be free. At the first two levels, we are still liable to be controlled, to be insulated from critiques that are outside our immediate frame of reference. The so-called ‘truth’ that we receive at these levels can be the result of ideology or ‘unreflective action’”. (Smith and Lovat, 2003: 89).

It is this unreflective action which often functions within the Anglican eucharistic tradition as the ideology of a particular technical or hermeneutic interest of the Anglican tradition (Catholic or Evangelical church parties) and which in turn limits critical intent due to its privileged or ‘holy’ status.

Habermas’ third level of knowledge alerts us to the power of this so-called ‘critical theory’. As Smith and Lovat comment:

“Without the third level of reflection, any learning does little more than offer information about data which is outside, and apart from ourselves. It is critical theory, implicit in the third level of reflection, which forces us to scrutinize and appraise the adequacy of this information and to evaluate its meaning for ourselves. Without critical theory, the information which comes from any
subject can become a means of bondage, rather than emancipation, a way of oppressing people or keeping them in straitjackets.” (Smith and Lovat, 2003: 90).

Habermas’ discussion of knowledge and human interests in terms of these three ways of knowing has significance for this thesis in terms of an examination of the Anglican eucharistic tradition. By means of a methodology of phenomenology, using the philosophical concepts of realism and nominalism, this thesis seeks to investigate the epistemology of the Anglican eucharistic tradition in a way that is emancipated from the narrow confines of particular interests that exist within Anglicanism. At a later time (Chapter 5) this discussion will be broadened to include Habermas’ treatment of communicative action, where intersubjective dialogue promotes critical interest and the sharing of understanding between the participants of a tradition who act as both speakers and hearers of each other’s views and the tradition as a whole. This has particular ramifications for theological education in the Anglican tradition and these ramifications will be discussed more fully in Chapter 5 of the present thesis.

Where technical and hermeneutic interests dominate, such a situation can lead to the impoverishment or fetishisation of the Anglican eucharistic tradition and educational programs that seek to teach eucharistic theology within the confines of such narrow technical or hermeneutical boundaries. Habermas’ insights in critical theory, when applied to Anglican eucharistic theology, suggest that critical reflection on the essences of the Anglican eucharistic tradition as a whole would lead to less dependence on and dominance by technical and hermeneutic interests and that this in turn would allow for the emancipation of the Anglican eucharistic tradition from the bondage of these narrow interests.

The critical theory of Habermas will be taken up again in later chapters of this thesis, particularly in relation to theological education in the Anglican tradition and specifically in relation to Anglican eucharistic theology, however it is now intended to examine some of the broader issues related to the nature of theological education found in the work of various writers and theorists on theological education. The relevance of Habermas’ insights will be referred to at times throughout this discussion.
1.6 The Nature of Theological Education

One way of analysing the nature of theological education would be to consider pedagogical and operational questions. While these questions are no doubt important and indeed occupy the time of theological educators and controlling bodies of institutions, there is nothing distinctive about these questions in a theological sense, since they are appropriate questions for any educational enterprise, not just for theological institutions. What then is distinctive about theological education? Robert Banks contends that since the 1980’s theological education has been considered in a new way, which he describes as seeking answers to theological questions (Banks, 1999: 10). Such theological questions represent for Banks a move away from the examination of operational issues (such as those considered by Kirkaldy, 1992 in his study of theological education institutions in the Anglican Church of Australia) and a movement towards broader issues concerning the nature of theological education itself. Banks suggests that these broader issues concern matters such as the aims and purposes of theological education.

Banks argues that generally, in recent times, theological questions have become more apparent in the evaluation of theological education, focussing on ethos, goals, context and curriculum in general. Banks argues that this shifting from the operational to the theological focus has produced a new genre for reflecting on theological education. He explains this shift in the following way:

“In the current debate on theological education, the pragmatic questions that have mostly preoccupied theological institutions give way to a number of more profound issues, challenging the standard terms in which many traditional concerns have been posed, along with the conventional wisdom that has been applied to them. There is a desire to go behind the operational concern, ‘How well are we doing?’ to the deeper theological one, ‘What should we be doing anyway?’” (Banks, 1999: 12).

Banks’ comments are helpful in that they point theological education away from the more operational concerns to the deeper and more critical interests of what theological education should be doing and what is theological about theological education. In attempting to answer the question, ‘What should we be doing anyway?’ Banks is attempting to look critically at the nature of theological education and the epistemologies it uses. Whilst Banks’ comments are helpful, perhaps his analysis does not move us far enough, since it is
the responsibility of any educational institution to address the deeper issues of its particular 
area of study, theology included, and to get behind the operational concern. Admittedly 
Banks develops his theme and suggests that theological education should have what he 
describes as a missional focus, rather than a purely academic focus. This is not to say that 
Banks’ deeper analysis is not without merit. Banks’ contribution is in developing ideas for 
thological educational which help to focus the endeavour on its missional task of 
communicating the Gospel, a kind of praxis approach, but this does not seem to be getting 
at the heart of what are the different understandings or ways of knowing in theology and 
how these are taught in different theological educational institutions. A deeper and 
different level of analysis seems necessary to get at these sorts of issues. This is precisely 
where the implications of Jurgen Habermas’ three ways of knowing are useful. Habermas’ 
discussion of critical interests as opposed to technical and hermeneutic interests has the 
potential of allowing theological education to move past the more operational issues and 
engage a critical dimension that has less dependence on the technical and hermeneutic 
interests of particular traditions within Anglicanism. Such a critical focus looks not only at 
what should be done, as Banks suggests, but also at how it should be done in terms of the 
ways of knowing that are appropriate to theological education. Habermas’ three ways of 
knowing raises the issue of whether it is sufficient for theological institutions to provide for 
the appropriation of particular technical information and hermeneutic traditions, or 
whether institutions of theological education need to move past these technical and 
hermeneutic interests and to function according to a more critical way of knowing. These 
matters are not unconsidered by theological educators and some of the insights of 
thological educators from the wider Christian tradition will now be examined in order to 
gain greater understanding of the nature of theological education.

David Kelsey in his 1993 book Between Athens and Berlin: The Theological Education Debate, 
provides some suggestions that may also aid the quest for this deeper understanding of 
issues. Kelsey contends that the nature of theology has been understood in different ways, 
arguing that there are “contrasting voices in the debate, including what is at stake regarding 
the nature of theology itself” (Kelsey, 1993: 2). The voices that make up the debate have 
claims for themselves, as reference to the Australian theological institutions presented 
above has suggested, but at the same time they are also involved in an interplay of
contrasting insights and themes. Kelsey conceptualises this as “the debate’s internal movement and structure” (Kelsey, 1993: 2). This analysis seems to move us more towards ‘the deeper issues of theological education’ than say Kirkaldy’s concern with operational issues (Kirkaldy, 1992) or Banks’ specific focus on a missional theology (Banks, 1999). It is not sufficient, suggests Kelsey, to summarise what each voice is saying, as Kirkaldy and Banks appear to be doing, rather the debate impels us “to see how tensions among their contrasting but equally valid insights actually bind them together and force us to find new conceptualities, new frames of reference for our analyses of what is theological about theological education” (Kelsey, 1993: 2). This insight forms part of what this thesis attempts to do, in that it seeks by a methodology of phenomenology to access the equally valid differing insights of the Anglican eucharistic tradition and to find new conceptualities and frames of reference for eucharistic theology in the Anglican tradition through a critical examination of the underlying philosophical assumptions of these differing insights in the Anglican eucharistic tradition. Further discussion of this must await a later time in this thesis (Chapters 4 and 5), however for the moment some further investigation of Kelsey’s model will now be undertaken in an effort to bring more meaning to the nature of theological education generally.

Kelsey conceptualises the voices of theological education around the axis of what he calls two models of ‘excellent’ education – models that he describes as the Athens model and the Berlin model. Each of these models will now be considered.

The Athens model is so named because of its links with the model of education found in the culture of the ancient Greeks. At the heart of this model of education is paideia, meaning a process of ‘culturing’ the soul, where schooling aims at character formation and the acquiring of the virtues. It is the most ancient model of education in the Christian tradition, and continued through the Middle Ages to the present day. The American theological educator, Edward Farley, for example, promotes the Athens model at the end of the twentieth century in what he describes as a “Christian paideia” (Farley, 1983: xi). What this means in effect is that theological education as paideia has as its goal knowledge of God in Christ and through the Holy Spirit and the forming of people to be holy. This seeking after the divine virtues (knowledge of God and holiness) is not something that can
be taught, but is rather a means whereby a person takes on or appropriates the culture, together with its beliefs and values. The teacher merely has the role of indirectly assisting the student’s own moment of insight. Such insight, often accompanied by the study of texts, requires a conversion, where the student turns around and focuses on the ‘Good’, following a period of growth and nourishment in a communal situation (Kelsey, 1993: 4). Appropriation of culture in the context of community characterises this model of theological education. The difficulty here though seems to be, that what Farley describes as ‘Christian paideia’, can easily become technical knowledge or a particular Christian hermeneutic interest, that is, the narrow pursuit of a party position. Such narrow interest has often been part of the Anglican theological education, and has been referred to above in the discussion of theological institutions in the Anglican Church of Australia and by others such as Davis (1966a), Sharwood (1966), Kirkaldy (1992) and Treloar (1997). Individual theological institutions often pursued particular traditions of Anglicanism, requiring students to appropriate that particular tradition. This often resulted in not only the appropriation of particular traditions of Anglicanism by theological institutions (be it Catholic or Evangelical) but also particular theological interpretations and a rejection of other traditions and the interpretations they brought. In relation to eucharistic theology, for example, Catholic Anglicans usually appropriate a realist theology of the Eucharist based on the sacramental principle, where sign and signified are linked in a real way. Evangelical Anglicans, on the other hand, often adopt a nominalist separation of sign and signified, rejecting both the sacramental principle and realist eucharistic theology, basing eucharistic theology on a response of faith alone where there is no realist link between sign and signified. Where such appropriation becomes a distinct and privileged part of the particular tradition or hermeneutic of Anglicanism, then critical interest is often limited and theological education operating as appropriation alone becomes impoverished or fetishised since the particular technical and hermeneutic interests become the focus of theological education to the exclusion of critical interest. This has certainly been the case in the Anglican eucharistic tradition.

The other model of excellent theological education proposed by Kelsey (1993) is known as the Berlin Model, taking its name from the decision in 1810 to include a faculty of theology in the newly founded University of Berlin. This type of theological education stresses
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orderly, disciplined and critical research (in German *wissenschaft*) on the one hand and professional education for ministry on the other (Kelsey, 1993: 5). Enquiry in this sort of theological education is far more critical than any theological education involving *paideia*, since it begins by requiring all knowledge, authorities and truth to be justified. Antiquity, esteem, divine inspiration and revelation are not sufficient to justify the acceptance of any opinion as an authority, since this is seen only to come about through critical enquiry (*wissenschaft*). Typically in a theological education emphasising the Berlin model various aspects of theology are studied, such as the historical, the systematic and the philosophical. All these aspects can involve critical enquiry and lead to the determination of normative rules for the carrying out of practice, based on the best available research evidence. There is therefore interdependence between critical research and professional education and practice in the Berlin model of theological education. The theological institutions of the Anglican Church of Australia (reviewed above) each say on their Internet web sites that they adopt a critical approach to theological education, but all at the same time are committed to particular hermeneutic interests (e.g. Catholic or Evangelical, liberal or conservative) that have the potential to prejudge critical enquiry.

Kelsey summarises the differences in approach of the two models of theological education in the following ways. In the Athens model, “theological education is a movement from source to personal appropriation of the source, from revealed wisdom to the appropriation of revealed wisdom in a way that is identity forming and personally transforming” (Kelsey, 1993: 8). In the Athens model, “appropriation does not come about through direct instruction” (Kelsey, 1993: 8) but tends to focus more on formation, assisted most certainly by study of texts, ideas and the practice of the Christian life, but this is not seen to take the place of personal appropriation of wisdom about God and about the self in relation to God. This means that teachers and students are both seeking appropriation at the same time and that those who teach, according to the Athens model, are not only knowledgeable about texts, ideas and practices, but are also skilled in helping others to appropriate revealed wisdom. Kelsey describes this role for the teacher as being a ‘midwife’ (Kelsey, 1993: 9). There is a tension here, as Kelsey explains:

“If ‘learnedness’ is overstressed, education tends to slip into direct communication of information, subverting the basic character of this type of education. On the other hand, if the personal gifts for this sort of teaching are
Communication of information could become the mere transmission of technical knowledge or the appropriation of a particular hermeneutic interest, at the expense of critical interest and reflective practice on a broader scale. Clearly there are implications here for the communal nature of education in the Athens mould as well, since while it is inherently communal it is also essentially individualistic in that each student must appropriate revealed wisdom on his or her own while being attended by the ‘midwife’. This means then that: “theological education of the ‘Athens’ type is unavoidably done in public and is unavoidably engaged in self-conscious cultural transactions with its host culture” (Kelsey, 1993: 9). The danger perhaps lies in the fact that the Athens model of excellent education can easily become indoctrination into an established body of technical information or into the prevailing party hermeneutic, without adequate attention to critical enquiry. Such a narrow enfaiting model of education contains the danger of being less than adequate for developing the skills of engaging knowledge in a broad and critical way that has the potential to develop new understanding within an established tradition and within the individual learner.

The Berlin model of theological education on the other hand “is a movement from data to theory to application of theory to practice” (Kelsey, 1993: 9). The Berlin model therefore involves direct communication, as well as questions about the methods of research and the subject being researched. The teacher must communicate the process of research and the answers research produces, directly to the student. The teacher therefore does not exist for the student in the role of ‘midwife’, as is the case in the παιδεία of the Athens model of education. Wissenschaft in the Berlin model requires that the teacher is basically a researcher who works with the student to help achieve the goal of research. This is done in a cooperative context. The teacher acts in a way that assists others to nurture a consciousness of God in a professional manner through scholarly research. Clearly there seems to be a more critical edge to the Berlin model of excellent theological education, however its danger seems to lie in the possibility of ignoring the importance of a tradition’s
hermeneutic interest or technical knowledge in the pursuit of objective detachment from the particular interests of a tradition.

Kelsey’s distinction between Athens and Berlin is useful, but the lines cannot be drawn too firmly since in reality theological education seems to be a combination of both the Athens and the Berlin approaches. The principal usefulness of both models seems to be in distinguishing approach and highlighting emphasis.

What relevance then does Kelsey’s distinction between Athens and Berlin models have for theological education in the Anglican Church of Australia? It seems that in the Anglican Church of Australia both models are found and used, as is evidenced by the Anglican theological education institutions reviewed above. Some analysis of the approaches to theological education employed by some of these institutions will now be set out with the Athens and Berlin models in mind.

There seems to be a consistent integration of the Athens and Berlin models of theological education across the Australian theological institutions examined above. There are however some differences of emphasis, particularly in terms of sources and revealed wisdom to be appropriated according to the Athens model and the critical research to be conducted according to the Berlin model of theological education. In relation to the Athens model of theological education, Moore College and Ridley College emphasise the appropriation of biblical knowledge as propositional revelation and the revealed wisdom of the biblical text in the context of an Evangelical community and a Reformed and Protestant expression of Anglicanism. This appropriation is intended to form the identity of individuals and to transform them in a personal way. At Trinity College, there is also emphasis on the appropriation of the source and the revealed wisdom of the tradition, however the source is seen to be broader than the Bible alone and has traditionally included recognition of the Catholic tradition of Anglicanism. The Bible is seen to be part of the source and the revealed wisdom at Trinity, but there are other elements that are important (the traditions of the Church, liturgy, sacramental worship and reason). At Trinity, the corporate nature of worship is also a major part of what the student is meant to appropriate.
In relation to the Berlin model of theological education, the critical research and reflection which Trinity and St Mark’s aim to carry out is related to a tradition which includes a biblical perspective but is not solely dependent on that perspective. The assumption is made that other disciplines of human endeavour can contribute to the task of theological education. At St Mark’s National Theological Centre scholarly research in theology is carried out in the context of a secular university and through several specific agencies of research (e.g. The Centre for Ageing and Pastoral Studies and the Institute of Public Theology). At Moore College on the other hand the nature of critical enquiry and research is more firmly linked to and focused on the propositional revelation found in the text of the Bible. The Moore College Mission affirms this in the following words:

“Moore College exists to serve the gospel of Jesus Christ by equipping ordination candidates, and other men and women to:

1. deepen their knowledge of God as revealed in the Bible,
2. proclaim the gospel of Jesus Christ in all the world,
3. facilitate the building of the church and care for their fellow Christians,
4. develop in Christian faith, maturity and service.” (Moore College Mission, Moore College web site).

This seems closer to the missional focus outlined by Banks (1999).

Whereas all the theological institutions see the appropriation of tradition as important, they each interpret what is to be appropriated in a different way and so each institution values the appropriation of differing traditions. The difficulty is that the nature of theological education in each institution can be overly influenced by the particular hermeneutic interest with insufficient attention being given to critical reflection on the nature of theology and theological education.

1.7 A Way Forward

Kelsey’s use of the Athens or Berlin models of theological education is one way of describing the practice of theological education in the Anglican institutions surveyed within the Anglican Church of Australia. It helps in understanding what these institutions are attempting to achieve and the nature of the theological education they provide according to
their varying technical, hermeneutic and critical interests. It seems however that to use Kelsey’s models of Athens or Berlin exclusively is too narrow since there is a danger of focussing too closely on a particular tradition or hermeneutic without adequate consideration of the broader critical issues underlying theology and the implications of this for theological education generally.

This thesis intends therefore to take up Robert Banks suggestion (Banks, 1999: 12) and attempt to go behind the operational concerns of theological education and look at the theological concerns of theological education in the particular area of Anglican eucharistic theology. More than this, however, this thesis intends to take up Kelsey’s challenge and look at the competing voices in the debate of theological education. As Kelsey argues, it is not sufficient merely to summarise what each voice is saying, such as can be found in the above analysis of the approaches to theological education in various institutions. This listening to the voices is helpful and indeed the methodology of phenomenology used in this thesis attempts to listen to the voices of the Anglican eucharistic tradition and to extract the essences of the Anglican Eucharistic tradition. What is needed however, is a way of understanding what lies behind the different voices or essences in theological and philosophical terms. This thesis attempts to do this in relation to Anglican eucharistic theology. Some deeper level of critical analysis seems to be needed in order to allow this to happen. This thesis suggests that the means for providing this deeper level of critical analysis is not only to examine the voices and essences of the Anglican eucharistic tradition, by means of a methodology of phenomenology, but also to attend to the philosophical assumptions underlying the voices. Such an attempt is seen to have the potential of not only isolating the essence (or essences) of the Anglican eucharistic tradition but also broadening the understanding of ways of knowing within that tradition and within theological education in the Anglican tradition. The use of the insights of modern philosophers, such as Jurgen Habermas, therefore has the potential to direct this research to ways of knowing which move past technical and hermeneutic interests alone and to the engagement of critical interest. This has the potential of emancipating the Anglican eucharistic tradition and Anglican theological education from narrow interests and discovering what is theological about theological education. This will be addressed more fully in Chapter 5 of this thesis. At this point however, the insights of other theorists will
be reviewed as this provides additional material for critical reflection on theological education.

1.8 The Insights of Other Theorists

Edward Farley, in his 1988 work, *The Fragility of Knowledge: Theological Education in the Church and the University*, argues that there is a need for a:

“shift from theology as a cluster of sciences … to theology as historically situated reflection and interpretation. The outcome of that shift is that the structure of theological study or pedagogy is recognised to be determined by basic modes of interpretation rather than by sciences.” (Farley, 1988: 128).

In Farley’s view these modes are: *traditio* – the sweep of Christian experience; *veritas* – the truth of the Gospel; and *praxis* – Christian life and action. Often according to Farley these modes are locked in what he calls ‘the house of authority’ where “the essential features of the house of authority is its presumption that the historical vehicles through which the community of faith preserves its tradition (Scripture, dogmas, magisterium) have as such, a priori, the character of truth” (Farley, 1988: 125). This seems to be the case with the various traditions within Anglicanism in relation to eucharistic theology. It may be this presumption works against a critical and reflective approach to eucharistic theology and maintains the purely technical and hermeneutic interests of specific traditions or parties within Anglicanism such that their desire is to have others appropriate those interests without entering into adequate dialogue with other voices of the tradition in a critical manner. If eucharistic theology within Anglicanism continues to be expressed in the technical and hermeneutic interests of church parties alone (e.g. Evangelical or Catholic Anglicans) then the Anglican eucharistic tradition privileges particular voices and stands in danger of losing its critical edge. This in turn works to ensure that Anglican theological reflection and theological education remains impoverished or fetishised. This thesis suggests that this is the case with Anglican eucharistic theology since commitments to the appropriation of particular technical and hermeneutic interests by church parties have lessened the critical focus of theological reflection and impoverished and fetishised theological education concerned with eucharistic theology.
Another theorist, Paul Knitter, supports Farley’s view and argues that theological education is failing in “its job of enabling Christian ministers and laypersons effectively ‘to reflect’ on their ‘existence and action in the world’ or to ‘reconstruct Christian identity … in relation to practice’” (Knitter, 1991: 151). Knitter claims that:

“one of the reasons for this is theological education has been and remains so mono-religious. Theological educators are going about their job of reflecting and reconstructing on the basis of an exclusive, or too restrictive, use of Christian tradition and experience. They are not able effectively and engagingly to reflect on and reconstruct Christian tradition and identity because they have closed themselves to, or are not sufficiently open to, other religious traditions and identities.” (Knitter, 1991: 151).

While Knitter makes this criticism in relation to engagement between the various world religious traditions (Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and Judaism) the same argument can as easily be applied within the Christian tradition itself and within specific denominations of the Christian tradition such as Anglicanism. This thesis argues that reflection and reconstruction within Anglicanism is limited because of the exclusive and restrictive practices of the various traditions within Anglicanism. These traditions in the pursuit of their own technical and hermeneutic interests are not always open to other traditions. This in turn limits critical reflection, since all that narrow interest requires is appropriation of particular traditions.

The methodology of this thesis however, through the examination of the philosophical concepts underlying the phenomena of the Anglican eucharistic tradition aims at providing a means for greater reflection and reconstruction on eucharistic theology within Anglican theological education which has the potential of encouraging a more critical edge to the study of eucharistic theology. This does not mean that tradition lacks importance and indeed Knitter states in relation to tradition that:

“we need to acknowledge and keep hold on who we are; though we don’t want to be locked in our own house, neither can we forget that it is our home. At the same time, our postmodern cultural-political context feels bound to acknowledge and even celebrate pluralism” such that “there is no one, abiding foundation for the search for truth”. (Knitter, 1991: 153-154).

This suggests that theological institutions and traditions within Anglicanism should value their own hermeneutic interests (e.g. Evangelical or Catholic, Conservative or Liberal) but
Knitter however is careful to argue that while valuing one’s technical and hermeneutic interests is a worthy pursuit, remaining there creates difficulties. He comments that, “although we cannot forget that tradition is our home, we do have to venture out of it to meet the many others” (Knitter, 1991: 154). Part of this venturing out is the recognition of other traditions within Anglicanism, but more than this it also implies engagement with methodologies other than those traditionally associated with theology, including the social sciences (such as phenomenology) and philosophy. For the Anglican tradition this means recognising that differing interests exist and that each interest makes a valid contribution to the tradition as a whole. This type of dialogue requires an acknowledgement that ‘truth’ is more than particular technical or hermeneutic interests and that critical reflection requires engagement with traditions other than one’s own. The deeper levels of analysis that philosophy can provide often assist such engagement. This has particular implications for Anglican theological education since any program of theological education in eucharistic theology, needs to recognise the existence of varying interests and varying philosophical models underlying the expression of that eucharistic theology. A dialogue approach to theological education has the potential for allowing this recognition of varying interests to assist in the promotion of critical interest in theological education.

A dialogue approach to theological education means that the distinction between tradition and pluralism for Knitter cannot be absolute, and instead he calls for engagement and interpretation (Knitter, 1991: 154-155). The danger here, as Knitter sees it, is that:

“Tradition is caught in a house of authority not just because … it is viewed too uncritically (as possessing a priori truth) but also because it is viewed too isolately. The claim being made here is that although Christian tradition is certainly the focal content of Christian theology, it cannot be the only content. Indeed, one effective way of unlocking the door of the house of authority that
confines the current notion of Christian tradition is to recognise that there are other traditions that also claim us.” (Knitter, 1991: 155-156).

This leads to “a better balance between tradition and pluralism” (Knitter, 1991: 156). This thesis seeks just such a balance in the investigation of the philosophical assumptions underlying the Anglican eucharistic tradition and in the encouragement of critical reflection on the phenomena of the Anglican eucharistic tradition as a whole through a process of dialogue based on the intersubjectivity of communicative action. Such a balance suggests that:

“Truth, therefore, must be both ‘critical’ (the result of our efforts to be … attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible) and ‘corporate’ (the result of our conversations with others who are also seeking to be critical). So our stumbling affirmations of what is true and good are not simply the result of our ideas ‘corresponding’ to reality, nor solely of their coherent order; rather, truth has the quality of a happening, an almost miraculous disclosure, resulting from conversing with others. … We need conversation with others not only in order to affirm our own truth but also in order to be saved from it.” (Knitter, 1991: 159).

Knitter therefore concludes that, “if some such conversational model is indeed part of the hermeneutical task, there will have to be a major rehauling in the structure of theological education” (Knitter, 1991: 160). Principally this means that “in the conversational approach to truth, based on our new awareness of pluralism, we recognise that the Christian truth that we have discovered, or that has been given to us by God, can be neither ‘the whole truth’ nor ‘nothing but the truth’” (Knitter, 1991: 160-161). This is so, argues Knitter, since if “God has indeed ‘spoken in sundry forms’ to all our brothers and sisters (Heb. 1:1), then what has been made known to others must be respected by us, and it must have meaning for us too” (Knitter, 1991: 161). Such a conversation on the meaning of the Eucharist in the Anglican tradition is needed to avert further acrimony between Church parties, such as that experienced in the Anglican Church of Australia in relation to the eucharistic liturgies of A Prayer Book for Australia (1995) and referred to above. An appropriate place for such a conversation will be in theological education institutions as well as in the wider educational practice of the Anglican Church. Perhaps the methodology of this thesis can contribute towards the beginning of just such a conversation in its attempt to access a critical interest, as opposed to the domination of technical and hermeneutic interests, in relation to eucharistic theology in the Anglican tradition. Further discussion of this issue will be taken up later in this thesis in Chapter 5.
of this thesis when a dialogue approach to theological education is proposed on the basis of Habermas’ theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1984 and 1989).

Barbara Wheeler is another American theological educator who puts the view that “in recent years, theological education has undergone the beginning of a reexamination … a new critical self-consciousness about both the theology and the education of theological education.” (Wheeler, 1991: 7). Reasons for this reexamination, according to Wheeler, include the critical examination of the process of theological education by participants in the scholarly tradition. This has resulted in writing and discussion that moves past the merely technical and engages in critical reflection on theological education. Such critical reflection has helped to move theological education past the idea that it is just a course of preparation for clergy in their ministerial task (technical information about how to do the job and perhaps the appropriation of a hermeneutic tradition) to a position which argues that theological education involves a more general search for knowledge and understanding of God and the world. The essence of theological education is seen to be more than authoritative text as the basis for practice, but rather in the idea that historical, philosophical and practical disciplines also help to determine the nature of theological education.

The views put by Moore College in the Diocese of Sydney (see Moore College web site) in relation to theological education and by the Sydney Doctrine Commission Report on APBA (1996) in relation to A Prayer Book for Australia (1995), support a particular interest in an exclusive manner and militate against critical interest. These conservative Evangelical voices are concerned with communicating what is described as the ‘clear word of Scripture’ and the maintenance of ‘the’ Reformation tradition of Anglicanism through access to the writings of important historical figures, such as Archbishop Thomas Cranmer and important historical documents, such as the Book of Common Prayer (1662) and the Thirty-Nine Articles. This privileges one form of ‘truth’, that is, an Evangelical Anglican interpretation of truth, over others. It is argued by others however (e.g. Hardy, 2001) that such a narrow position can no longer be considered an adequate basis for a critical and reflective approach to theological education since it is too closely linked with a particular hermeneutic interest of Anglicanism. In the same way, Bishop Silk’s attempt in The Holy
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Eucharist (1995/2002) to define a correct Catholic interpretation of the Eucharist is an example of a purely technical and hermeneutic interest with the purpose of establishing the purity of one view of truth, that is, a Catholic Anglican view. Silk’s view is also lacking a critical element of reflection and dialogue with the tradition as a whole. It privileges one voice of the Anglican tradition over the other voices and in so doing limits critical interest.

Wheeler further notes that the:

“pattern, which divides theological study into four areas (Bible, theology, history of the church, practices) was created by what were once strong and self-conscious convictions about the structure of theological knowledge and the sources of theological authority – the conviction, for instance, that the Bible, explicated but critically unquestioned, is the sole and comprehensive source of norms for all other theological knowledge and for religious action.” (Wheeler, 1991: 11).

She argues that this pattern can no longer be completely adequate. Indeed such a structure:

“brings outmoded assumptions and norms to bear on our current educational practice. It forces us into certain patterns of thinking and acting. The theory-to-practice procedure, for instance, so common in most discourse about theological education and in so many educational programs, is codified and continuously represented to us by a structure that consists of three ‘theoretical’ disciplines that are defined as in some way grounding a cluster of practical ones.” (Wheeler, 1991: 11-12).

In such a structure, Wheeler argues, there is “no currently convincing rationale or internal logic” but rather “fragmentation by diverse movements and developments” which function as “an obstacle to educational coherence” and as such are “an obvious candidate for fundamental review and reform” (Wheeler, 1991: 12). Wheeler therefore advocates questioning of this structure and the development of new and more appropriate ways of carrying out theological education. Thus she says:

“Real and lasting reform waits on a thorough examination of the structure of studies, the exposure of the presuppositions and goals it supports, the critical evaluation of its subdivisions and their diverse contents, and the fundamental restructuring of the pattern of studies along the lines of purposes and values we most seriously seek to advance.” (Wheeler, 1991: 14).

This does not imply that structure is not needed in theological education, and indeed Wheeler argues that theological education is
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“in constant danger of reductionism and irresponsible self-service. Yet theology without structure and divisions, even if oriented to compelling new purposes, may find it difficult to set a steady course and to resist the corrupting influence of powerful disciplinary structures elsewhere.” (Wheeler, 1991: 25).

This thesis also makes the fundamental distinction between structure and its purpose. If structure is intended for the maintenance and appropriation of particular technical and hermeneutic interests alone, then that structure lacks a critical edge. If structure however, such as Habermas proposes in his three ways of knowing (Habermas, 1971) and in the dialogue of communicative action (Habermas, 1984 and 1989), is intended to provide an emancipatory approach to theological education, through redirection of rational intent rather than its abandonment, then it moves the purpose of theological education beyond the technical and hermeneutic interests, and functions in a way that frees the learner to be critical and reflective about their own learning and learning in general. This has implications for the focus of study in this thesis, that is, the nature of theological education in regard to the teaching of eucharistic theology, in that such teaching, to be emancipatory, requires a critical edge and a freeing of the learner from the narrow constraints of the technical and hermeneutic interests church parties sometimes impose on eucharistic theology. This thesis aims to contribute towards the real and lasting reform of which Wheeler speaks and in so doing seeks to provide a structure in which critical evaluation in one area of Anglican theology (that is, eucharistic theology) can proceed. This structure, in the form of a model of Anglican eucharistic theology, based on a methodology of phenomenology and using the philosophical concepts of realism and nominalism will be explored in great detail in the next two chapters (Chapters 2 and 3). Furthermore, the specific implications for theological education in the Anglican tradition will also be explored in Chapters 4 and 5 of the thesis. It is in this sense that this thesis contributes to a redirection of rational intent rather than abandoning it. For the present, however, some further exploration of the views of theorists of theological education will be undertaken.

Another theorist, Don Browning, observes that recent philosophical investigations have taught us much about the practical nature of human knowledge (Browning, 1991: 295). He cites Jurgen Habermas, believing that his philosophical investigations “are influencing theological education and the way we envision the structure and movement of theology” (Browning, 1991: 295). This is especially so in what he terms ‘practical philosophy’ and...
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states that “much of the turn to practical philosophy is presently characterised by an emphasis on dialogue and conversation” where there is “critical reflection on the church’s dialogue with Christian sources and other communities with the aim of guiding its action towards social and individual transformation” (Browning, 1991: 296-297). For Browning ‘practical philosophy’ refers

“to a loosely associated group of philosophical positions that emphasise the importance of *phronesis* (practical wisdom) in contrast to the modern fascination with *teoria* (theoretical knowledge and thinking) or *techne* (technical knowledge and thinking). Since the Enlightenment, the modern experiment increasingly has been dedicated to the improvement of human life through the increase of objective scientific knowledge that is then applied to the technical solution of human problems. … Issues pertaining to the goals of human action are generally reduced to the technical solution of perceived problems. … The rebirth of practical philosophy is designed to question the dominance of theoretical and technical reason, to secure in the university a stronger role for practical reason, and to demonstrate that critical reflection about the goals of human action is both possible and necessary, and that, as a matter of fact, practical reason does indeed function in much wider areas of human life than we realise – even, in fact, in the social and natural sciences.” (Browning, 1991: 297).

Browning points to the work of Thomas Kuhn, whose “hermeneutical theory helped first alert us to the tradition-laden and historically situated nature of the natural sciences” (Browning, 1991: 300). In his book, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Kuhn has importantly drawn attention to the tradition-laden nature of science (Kuhn, 1996). In much the same way this thesis, following the lead of theorists such as Habermas and Kuhn, attempts to draw attention to the tradition-laden nature of the Anglican eucharistic tradition and to suggest an alternative critical approach, which has important implications for theological education, particularly related to the teaching of eucharistic theology.

All this suggests that there are different models of religious and theological education that need to be kept in mind in any discussion of the nature of theological education. The distinction between ‘enfaithing’ models of religious and theological education and ‘interfaith’ models has been drawn as one way of allowing these different models of religious and theological education to be discussed. Some attention to the important insights of these various models will now be undertaken.
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1.9 Enfaithing and Interfaith Models of Religious and Theological Education

Charles Wood argues that theological education over the last two hundred years has “come out from under dogmatic and ecclesiastical control … to develop into independent, critical disciplines” (Wood, 1985: v). While, as Wood suggests, this is true in some cases, especially where theological education has become part of university education, it is not universally true, especially where theological education remains under the control of a denominational tradition and the prevailing hermeneutic of that tradition. This finding is supported by the evidence provided above in relation to theological education in the Anglican Church of Australia from the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries.

Wood argues that where theological education has emphasised critical enquiry then it has developed the opportunity for people “to reflect upon the relationships among its parts, and to put things together in their own minds” (Wood, 1985: vii). This involves raising questions, seeing connections, and developing useful habits of reflection and enquiry. It also encourages, as Banks (1999) suggests, reflection on the nature of the discipline, on relationships between disciplines and on the purposes of theological education. It is in this sense that Wood defines Christian theology “as critical enquiry into the validity of Christian witness” (Wood, 1985: 21), where by Christian witness he means “a comprehensive sense, roughly equivalent to a similarly broad sense of ‘Christian tradition’, that is, one embracing both the activity of bearing witness (or handing on the tradition) and the substance of what is borne or handed on” (Wood, 1985: 21).

Wood points up the valuable distinction between a model of theological education that exists purely to enfaith its adherents and a model of theological education that exists to promote critical enquiry and reflection. There is much is common here with Kelsey’s distinction between what he describes as the two excellent model of theological education known as the Athens model and the Berlin model (see Kelsey, 1993) and Habermas’ distinction between technical/hermeneutic ways of knowing and critical ways of knowing (Habermas 1971 and 1973). Lovat (2002a) makes this same distinction in his treatment of models of religious education, describing them as ‘enfaithing’ models and ‘interfaith’ models, but provides the important advance of suggesting that both models can be
Lovat discusses this combination in a new integrated model of religious education, which he calls the ‘critical’ model (Lovat, 2002a: 62-65). Lovat’s critical model combines aspects of both the interfaith and the enfaithing models of religious education, and it is here that Lovat feels the critical model has its strengths, combining aspects of praxis with the methodology of the social sciences, principally phenomenology and typology. The praxis model has strengths in combining critical theory with the learning taking place in an enfaithing model of religious education, while in the interfaith model, phenomenology and typology have the ability to employ the methodology of the social sciences in an attempt to observe the phenomena of religion, while at the same time suspending judgment and being aware of the influence of one’s prototype religious experience. All this means that aspects of both the enfaithing and the interfaith models of religious education have relevance for each other. Lovat suggests that there is a “complementarity of purpose” (Lovat, 2002a: 64) between these two approaches. For Lovat, the praxis of the enfaithing model and the phenomenology of the interfaith model of religious education, give the critical approach to religious education the kind of “bite” (Lovat, 2002a: 64) that is needed.

The praxis element, which Thomas Groome describes as a “way of knowing” and which has “reflective engagement in a community setting” (Groome, 1981: 153) has much in common with Kelsey’s Athens model of theological education. Lovat however suggests that praxis provides a means for “combining theory and practice with a view to change” (Lovat, 2002a: 22). Both Groome’s and Lovat’s arguments suggest that praxis becomes vitally important as the learner, in a community of learners, critically reflects on learning and seeks to bring about new levels of understanding and knowledge. Such learning, while valuing the wisdom of the community, does not automatically exclude critical reflection on learning itself. Such critical reflection is one of the main aims of this thesis as case studies of Anglican eucharistic theology (see the case studies of this thesis presented on the accompanying CD) are considered with a view to isolating what are the essences of Anglican eucharistic theology. The intention here is to move past the mere expression of party interest, and to engage in a critical and reflective manner with the community of Anglican theological opinion (both present and past), which hopefully has the potential of drawing out the essences of the Anglican eucharistic tradition and the implications of these
essences for theological education in the teaching of eucharistic theology. This will be attempted in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis.

Charles Wood argues that such a process of reflection gives Christian theology a critical edge since:

“Christian theology is distinguished from other inquiries by its concern with the complex question of the validity of Christian witness. This concern identifies it as a *critical* enquiry, that is, one whose aim is to make certain sorts of judgments concerning its subject matter. A critical enquiry generally has as its subject-matter some prior, ongoing human activity. It aims to bring that activity to reflective awareness, and in particular to identify and apply some appropriate standards of judgment (criteria) to the activity and its products. It is this concern with reflection, with the formation of reasoned judgments, which marks enquiry as critical.” (Wood, 1985: 23).

Wood argues however, that in some conservative traditions critical enquiry is under suspicion. This occurs when the *habitus* of theology is “that which is known or believed, rather than either the knowing or believing of it (the *habitus*) or the process of its acquisition and testing” (Wood, 1985: 30). This means, “the focus is still kept on the product rather than the reflective process” (Wood, 1985: 30). Product here could refer to either the technical or hermeneutic interests of particular parties, such as would be found in the eucharistic theology of particular parties of Anglicanism, as opposed to critical and reflective knowing, which seeks to isolate the essence of Anglican eucharistic theology for the whole tradition and to access this essence in a process of dialogue aimed at shared understanding. Really what Wood is pointing to here is “the long-standing tension between a *habitus*-oriented theological tradition and the enterprise of critical theological enquiry” (Wood, 1985: 34). It seems that Wood’s distinction has much in common with the work of Jurgen Habermas (1971 and 1973) who distinguishes between technical and hermeneutic interests and the critical-reflective interest and who advocates a seeking for shared understanding through the dialogue of communicative action (Habermas, 1984 and 1989).

For theological education, this type of thinking is the critical model of which Lovat (2002a) speaks, and has the potential of freeing enquiry from the constraints of narrow enfaiting party traditions and as a consequence involving theological education in a more broad
based, critical and reflective emancipatory process. Where the epistemological process is prominent there is emphasis upon “the development of genuine theological competence, with all that this involves by way of self-knowledge, the extension of one’s capacities as a human being, etc., as well as by way of gaining mastery of the methods of enquiry” (Wood, 1985: 32-33). All this however, Wood argues, “is easily neglected in favor of a preoccupation with factual knowledge” (Wood, 1985: 33). Factual knowledge is typical of an enfaithing model of religious education that often depends on the appropriation of a technical interest in Habermas’ terms. Wood suggests that such an emphasis lacks a critical and reflective edge and therefore argues that the essence of theology is theological enquiry where the process emphasises critical reflection.

In explaining this process Wood proposes three main sorts of questions in Christian theological enquiry where Christian theology is defined as “the self-criticism of the Christian community with regard to its own being and activity as Christian community” (Wood, 1985: 38). The first question relates to historical theology, that is:

“the use of the resources and methods of historical study to pursue the theological question of the ‘Christianess’, i.e., the faithfulness to what is normatively Christian, of Christian witness. It is a study of the Christian tradition which seeks to discern what makes Christian witness Christian. It asks by what criteria the ‘Christianess’ of something might be judged, and it asks how such criteria might be applied in various sorts of cases; and it proceeds then to make appropriate judgments and proposals. Both of these questions involve historical enquiry: the first because the pertinent criteria are supplied by historical data, and the second because it is essentially a question about historical continuity – about the possible and actual relationships within a tradition.” (Wood, 1985: 42).

This thesis intends to use the type of process Wood is suggesting, by examining the historical data or phenomena of the Anglican eucharistic tradition. The pertinent criteria (realism and nominalism to both moderate and immoderate degrees) are supplied by interaction with the historical data. What this thesis intends is what Wood describes as “the necessity for some sort of critical sifting of what has been mediated historically” (Wood, 1985: 42). This means that historical theology “investigates the Christian past so as to inform and enhance contemporary reflection upon the problems of the identity, continuity, unity, and representativeness of Christian witness” (Wood, 1985: 42). This is the phenomenological methodology examined in greater detail in Chapter 2 of this thesis.
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The second question Wood suggests concerns philosophical theology, that is, “the methodological orientation of this branch of theological enquiry” such that “the philosophical study of any human activity aims at exhibiting the ‘logic’ of that activity, that is, at uncovering the principles relevant to its understanding and criticism” (Wood, 1985: 45). Philosophical theology “aims to discover and display the sorts of meaning the discourse and activity of Christian witness involve, including the sorts of claims to truth which that witness may make” (Wood, 1985: 46). This thesis intends to use the concepts of realism and nominalism in order to examine the underlying philosophical assumptions relevant to understanding the Anglican eucharistic tradition and then to critique that tradition in terms of the implications for theological education. These philosophical issues will be considered in depth in Chapter 3 of this thesis and the essences and implications for the Anglican theological education will discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.

The third question concerns what Wood calls practical theology. Practical theology:

“calls attention to the fact that Christian witness is a practice, a deliberate, purposeful activity; and it identifies this fact about that witness as the distinctive concern of the discipline which bears this name. Practical theology examines Christian witness as practice, i.e., with respect to its enactment. It asks by what standards this practice is to be judged, and it proceeds to make the relevant judgments concerning past, present, or prospective instances of it.” (Wood, 1985: 47).

This is clearly a praxis model of theological education. In this thesis, Chapters 4 and 5, seek to highlight what are the implications of such a practical theology for theological education in the Anglican tradition in regard to the teaching of eucharistic theology. A dialogue approach based on the intersubjectivity of communicative action represents the application of the type of practical approach Wood suggests. This will be explored at greater depth in Chapter 5 of this thesis.

This thesis in its application of a methodology of phenomenology follows Wood’s suggestions in terms of the Anglican eucharistic tradition – reflecting on the phenomena of particular case studies (historical theology) and trying to understand them by means of philosophical theology (realism and nominalism to both moderate and immoderate degrees) in light of the whole tradition, while trying the put the particular in its appropriate place. Such practical theology has important implications for theological education in
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regard to eucharistic theology. Instead of presenting eucharistic theology as a piece of technical knowledge for appropriation (e.g. ‘How is Christ present in the Eucharist?’ and ‘How is Christ’s sacrifice remembered in the Eucharist?’) or as the hermeneutic interest of a particular tradition which needs to be acquired (be that Catholic Anglican or Evangelical Anglican) together with its attendant theological position, this thesis seeks to reflect on the particular and the whole in light of each other. This means that it is not seen as sufficient to dwell on a particular historical writer, theological view or interest alone, but it is necessary, if a critical process of enquiry is to operate, to consider not only the particular (writer, liturgy, interest) but also to consider the whole tradition (the multiformity of the realist and nominalist philosophical assumptions) in order to isolate the essences of Anglican eucharistic theology. As Wood argues: “Historical research, yielding an acquaintance with the substance of Christian tradition, must obviously precede philosophical (‘systematic’) reflection upon that tradition, and both should inform one’s deliberation as to the shaping of that tradition for the future” (Wood, 1985: 63). This is indeed the purpose behind this thesis and its methodology.

For Wood though, a paradox is suggested in that:

“If Christian theology is rightly regarded as a critical enquiry, … then the basic movement of the theological disciplines toward greater critical freedom – the movement which led over the past two centuries or so to their emergence as independent, ‘secular’ disciplines – has been, for all its difficulties, a movement in the right direction. It has promoted that freedom from tradition upon which a radical faithfulness to tradition depends. It has fostered critical reflection upon the Christian tradition with respect to its genuineness, its meaning and truth, and its fitting enactment.” (Wood, 1985: 59-60).

This again is what this thesis is seeking to do, that is, promote a ‘radical faithfulness’ in order to enhance the Anglican tradition itself, especially in relation to the educational ramifications of this research in the area of Anglican eucharistic theology. Critical interest depends, Wood says, on theological education having both ‘vision’ and ‘discernment’. Vision “like its ancient counterpart theoria, points to a general, synoptic understanding of some range of data or field of objects: an ‘overview’, a grasp of things in their wholeness and relatedness, a seeing of connections” (Wood, 1985: 67). Discernment “points to insights into particular things or situations in their particularity: If vision sees the totality, discernment is the grasp of the individual; the appreciation of differences; discrimination,
rather than synthesis” (Wood, 1985: 68). For the purposes of this thesis then, vision involves a methodology of phenomenology which overviews the Anglican eucharistic tradition by case study method, and in so doing seeks connections in the form of the essences of the Anglican eucharistic tradition. Discernment is the ability to grasp a particular instance of this Anglican eucharistic tradition and to discriminate this particular from others, while considering the essences of the Anglican eucharistic tradition as a whole. This is important in theological education if it is to have a critical focus which is not dependent entirely on the hermeneutic interest of a particular tradition, or refuses to admit any particular other than its own. This thesis argues that the expression of eucharistic theology in the Anglican tradition has often lacked just such a critical edge since the expression of that theology has been restricted by the dominance of particular technical and hermeneutic interests within Anglicanism. The methodology adopted here in the use of phenomenology and philosophical reflection, together with the dialogue of communicative action, seeks to redress this imbalance between technical/hermeneutic interests and critical interests.

Any broadening of vision and use of discernment suggests, Wood argues, that:

“In an age of philosophical pluralism such as ours, it is becoming reasonably clear that the task here is not to ‘vindicate’ Christian witness by demonstrating its agreement with some reigning metaphysical scheme which is taken to represent reality. It is, rather, to explore and exhibit the rationality of Christian witness – its ways of meaning, the character and relationships of its various claims to truth, the ways in which it seeks to serve as the context with which all of life might be understood.” (Wood, 1985: 69).

A methodology of phenomenology utilising the philosophical concepts of realism and nominalism, adopted in this thesis, has the potential to do just what Wood suggests. In the case of this thesis such potentiality is in relation to the epistemology of the Anglican eucharistic tradition, and as such represents the primary focus of this thesis. Instead of making a particular interest (e.g. a technical or hermeneutic interest) the particular for the universal, and thereby ascribing universal validity to a narrow vision, this thesis attempts to find a way of making the dialectic of vision and discernment the ‘envisioning’ moment which is also counterbalanced by a ‘discerning’ moment (Wood, 1985: 73). This is critical reflection in line with the thinking of Habermas (1971 and 1973), and stands in opposition to the type of theology that may be inherited, or appropriated on the enfaitthing model of
authority of teachers or traditions alone. Such academic and ecclesiological expectation may indeed force a premature close to judgment and assessment, without the emancipatory potential of critical reflection. Wood argues that when premature closure occurs, such judgments made:

“often lack suppleness and vitality. Since they have been acquired at second-hand rather than formed for oneself, their possessor is apt to have little feeling for the degree of firmness or tentativeness with which they should be held, and may be poorly equipped to engage in ongoing reappraisal of one’s judgments which is one mark of intelligent conduct. … It is not the mere possession of ‘a theology’ that is the measure of a theological education; it is rather one’s ability to form, revise, and employ theological judgments that counts. Vision and discernment are exhibited in practice.” (Wood, 1985: 82).

This suggests “that theological education is essentially engagement in theological enquiry for the purpose of developing and strengthening the capacity for that enquiry” (Wood, 1985: 82). If this is so then theological education is about learning to engage that activity and not merely appropriating the technical and hermeneutic interests of a tradition. This is the role that communicative action and dialogue plays in theological education. Wood speaks of the process as one where:

“Theological ‘formation’, then, is something quite different from mere indoctrination or habituation. The theological habitus sought is not ‘habit’ in the popular modern sense, i.e., a thoughtless, repetitive behavior. … It is rather a matter of bringing to conscious scrutiny behavior which might otherwise be governed by habit, or convention, or unconscious motives, or various other factors.” (Wood, 1985: 87).

This does not mean that Wood excludes the faithful transmission of a tradition from theological education since “there can be no theological education which is not, in some sense, an encounter with tradition” (Wood, 1985: 89). What he criticises is the type of theological education which is lacking in critical reflection and which brings theological education into collision with critical enquiry (Wood, 1985: 89). He acknowledges though that:

“theological education as a matter of handing on the tradition seems particularly important in some ‘confessional’ branches of the church, where the maintenance of sound doctrine is regarded as the key to faithful and vigorous Christian existence.” (Wood, 1985: 89).
Such an approach however, faces the danger of being too concerned with the ‘content’ to the neglect of the ‘function’ of theological enquiry.

Nonetheless Wood says that:

“doctrine plays a key role in theological education. It is largely through these paradigms or principles of Christian witness known as ‘doctrines’ that the student has access to the substance of the Christian tradition – that is, to the heritage of earlier judgements and proposals as to what constitutes valid witness – and is able to reflect upon it. But how exactly does the process of critical reflection comport with the enterprise of transmitting ‘sound doctrine’ which some regard as the principal business of theological education?” (Wood, 1985: 92).

He answers this question by saying that “critical enquiry requires an emancipation from tradition: it means the freedom to make one’s own judgments, rather than to accept what has been handed down. Education as ‘tradition’ is then as incompatible with the spirit and intentions of critical enquiry as education as ‘formation’” (Wood, 1985: 93). This clearly suggests that theological education, when viewed as critical enquiry is not opposed to the appropriation of a tradition, but that it is in tension with the versions of the tradition that see themselves as the only truth. The importance of this for this thesis rests on the idea that the Anglican eucharistic tradition, if it is to engage in critical enquiry, must submit itself to a measure of self-criticism, or radical faithfulness, in order to emancipate the tradition from narrow constraints, that is, if it is to ever access its essence. This thesis seeks to achieve this purpose in relation to the Anglican Eucharistic tradition and also to reflect critically on the nature of theological education in the Anglican tradition.

Wood (1985) has argued that doctrine plays a key role in theological education. The Anglican eucharistic tradition and Anglican theological education seem to possess a multiformity of eucharistic doctrine with some adopting an Evangelical hermeneutic and other adopting a Catholic hermeneutic on the basis of particular theological and educational commitments. A multiformity also exists in relation to the philosophical assumptions underlying eucharistic doctrine in the Anglican tradition. Some Anglicans adopt realist assumptions (linking the sign and signified in the Eucharist) while others adopt nominalist assumptions (separating the sign and the signified). These different hermeneutic interests and philosophical assumptions impact significantly on the Anglican tradition as a whole and on theological education. While appropriation of a particular
hermeneutic interest is seen as essential by some, others structure educational programs so as to promote a more critical awareness of the Anglican eucharistic tradition as a whole. Whereas some within the Anglican tradition focus on particular hermeneutic interests and accept certain philosophical assumptions while at the same time rejecting others, still others within the Anglican tradition are prepared to acknowledge a multiformity of hermeneutic interests and philosophical assumptions. The challenge for this thesis is to examine this multiformity and to assess the significance of this for theological education, specifically related to eucharistic theology. At a later stage (Chapter 5) a dialogue approach to theological education will be discussed as a way forward for theological education in the Anglican tradition that allows for intersubjectivity in the Anglican tradition. The Case Studies (on the accompanying CD) will serve as the means for examining the experience of the Anglican eucharistic tradition and it is on the basis of the essences extracted from this diverse material that analysis of the Anglican eucharistic tradition will be made and ramifications for theological education drawn. The insights of contemporary philosophical reflection will be employed to assist this analysis. The experience of the Anglican eucharistic tradition will be examined in such a way that commitments to particular hermeneutic interests can be avoided. The employment of this phenomenological approach is intended to allow access to the breadth of the experience of the Anglican eucharistic tradition with judgment suspended to a later time when a more critical assessment of the tradition can be made and ramifications for Anglican theological education can be drawn out (Chapters 4, 5 and 6).

Chapter 3 will explore the philosophical concepts in depth and then these concepts will be applied to the experience of the Case Studies (see the accompanying CD) as well as being of significant importance in Chapter 4, 5 and 6 where the ramifications of these essences are discussed in relation to the Anglican eucharistic tradition and theological education in the Anglican tradition.

Before these philosophical concepts are examined in depth in Chapter 3, the next chapter (Chapter 2) will examine the phenomenological methodology and its application to the experience of the Anglican eucharistic tradition.
Chapter 2

Phenomenological Method: A Means for Examining the Experience of the Anglican Eucharistic Tradition

2.1 The Methodology of Phenomenology

In this chapter a methodology is proposed, drawing principally from phenomenology as a useful way of examining the experience or the phenomena of the Anglican eucharistic tradition.

The methodology of phenomenology followed in this thesis is that proposed by Edmund Husserl in his work, The Idea of Phenomenology, and employs what Husserl calls *epoche*, that is, description of the phenomena with assessment and judgment suspended (Husserl, 1907/1964). *Epoche* literally means ‘withholding’ of assent and dissent, that is, suspension of judgment on the understanding that “it is stupid to assent to what you do not know” (Kirwan, 1995: 248). In more recent times Jean-Luc Marion in his book Being Given: Towards a Phenomenology of Givenness, has also advocated phenomenology in a nonmetaphysical mode as a question of knowing (Marion, 2002). The methodology of phenomenology is also influenced by other theorists and practitioners of religious education (e.g. Smart, 1976 and Lovat, 1995 and 2002a) and these will also be discussed below. Echoes of this methodology are also to be found in some prominent Anglican theologians (e.g. Newman, 1837; Stone, 1909; Temple, 1924; Buchanan, 1968, 1975 and 1985 and Spinks, 1999 and 2002) who have in various ways examined the phenomena of the Anglican tradition. The insights of these writers will be reviewed in this chapter in an attempt to refine the phenomenological methodology of this thesis.
At a later time in this thesis (Chapter 4) an attempt will be made to assess and judge the phenomena, in what Husserl calls the eidetic science or reduction, in a way that allows the essences of Anglican eucharistic theology to be more clearly identified. Such an attempt has important implications not only in encouraging a more critical approach to eucharistic theology but for theological education as well, in terms of the teaching of eucharistic theology within Anglican institutions of theological education.

Husserl in his work *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, published in 1913, speaks of phenomenology as the descriptive analysis of essences (Husserl, 1913/1980). By essences he means not only objects, such as an object of sense perception, but also acts of consciousness. These ‘acts’ must be ‘reduced’ to an essence or eidos by a process Husserl calls eidetic reduction, such that the phenomenologist is not concerned with individual acts of sense perception, but with the common features common to all such acts (Inwood, 1995: 383). Jean-Luc Marion describes this as “letting appearances appear in such a way that they accomplish their own apparition, so as to be received exactly as they give themselves” (Marion, 2002: 7) or “the manifestation of what manifests itself” (Marion, 2002: 11). Marion calls this “givenness”, such that “the correlation between reduction and givenness determines the essence of the phenomenon itself” (Marion, 2002: 21).

The methodology employed in this thesis therefore distinguishes between description and assessment in a way that limits the making of premature judgment about the Anglican eucharistic tradition at the time of description and delays the assessment until the tradition can be viewed as a whole in assessing the essence or givenness of the Anglican eucharistic tradition. The use of this descriptive methodology of phenomenology will be employed (in the case studies – see accompanying CD) such that the writings of Anglican theologians on the Eucharist and various eucharistic liturgies and other documents concerned with the Eucharist from the time of the Reformation to the present will be examined as case studies of the Anglican eucharistic tradition. Assessment and judgment of the phenomena and the implications for theological education will be delayed until Chapters 4 and 5. The phenomena however, will be classified in a preliminary manner in each of the Case Studies, using the philosophical concepts of realism and nominalism, to both moderate and immoderate degrees (see accompanying CD). In the next chapter (Chapter 3) these philosophical concepts of realism and nominalism, to both moderate and immoderate
degrees, will be discussed at greater length and set within the philosophical debate on the problem of universals. These philosophical concepts are seen as important in the description of the Anglican eucharistic tradition and in the understanding of the assumptions that have guided the thinking of theologians and various technical and hermeneutic interests.

Before discussing the philosophical assumptions (Chapter 3) and extracting the essences of the Anglican eucharistic tradition (Chapter 4) some attention will be given to other models of religious education as they apply to the examining of experience.

2.2 Models of Religious Education – The Link to Phenomenology

Terence Lovat argues that religious education functions according to differing models of education and uses differing epistemologies to achieve its purposes. Lovat (2002a) has succinctly analysed these as typically either, the ‘enfaithing models’ or the ‘interfaith models’ of religious education. These two models will now be examined in relation to the purposes of this thesis.

Interfaith models of religious education have been developed essentially to meet the needs of the public curriculum (Lovat, 2002a: 33), and have “aimed at greater understanding of the world we live in, without any interest in, or intention of, evangelising” (Lovat, 2002a: 33). Such a critical and reflective approach to religious education aims at the development of understanding between different religious traditions. It is important that Australia as “a multi-cultural and multi-faith society cannot afford to allow a religious illiteracy gap to persist” (Lovat, 1995: 1). Interfaith models of religious education depend very much on exposure to and description of the phenomena of religion.

Another model of religious education, which Lovat calls, the ‘enfaithing model’, has however typically been more interested in evangelising and passing on the beliefs of a particular religious tradition. Enfaithing models of religious education are mostly associated with particular religious traditions, such as the various theological institutions of the Anglican Church of Australia (reviewed in Chapter 1) that seek the appropriation of
particular traditions in students of theological education. Often these institutions seek to impart particular technical knowledge and have the student appropriate a particular hermeneutic, such as the Catholic Anglican or the Evangelical Anglican tradition and the particular theological stance associated with that hermeneutic interest. Enfaithing models, pursuing evangelistic purposes and the appropriation of a particular tradition or hermeneutic interest, sometimes focus narrowly and exclusively on those interests, limiting the development of critical and reflective interests.

Each of these models, interfaith and enfaitiing, will now be examined in more detail.

The ‘interfaith model’ of religious education functions in a number of different ways. Lovat (2002a) classifies these as the ‘social science models’, the ‘phenomenological model’ and the ‘typological model’.

The sociological approach of the interfaith model, Lovat argues, has the “capacity to promote a greater understanding of society and of people as social beings” (Lovat, 2002a: 40). Such an approach recognises the importance of social construct and a cultural form, with a critical focus being brought to bear on the aspect of culture known as religion and on forms of religious education. The advantage Lovat sees in this approach of the social sciences to religious education centres around drawing the subject religion into the mainstream of education and modern research (Lovat, 2002a: 42), while at the same time portraying an impartial and objective stance and resisting involvement in the internal controversies of particular religious traditions (Lovat, 2002a: 43). The focus here is to move beyond the particular concerns of religious traditions and their particular technical and hermeneutic interests and to look in a more scientific manner at the nature of religion and how it functions in human society. It is this more critical interest of such sociological approaches that has value for the present thesis, as an attempt is made to use these approaches to move beyond the particular interests of church parties and seek the more general nature or essence of the Anglican eucharistic tradition.

The phenomenological approach is one such sociological approach and owes much to the work of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) who introduced the main ideas of phenomenology in his lectures in Gottingen, Germany, in 1907. These lectures are published in Husserl’s
book, *The Idea of Phenomenology* (Husserl, 1907, trans. 1964). Husserl reacts against the idea that philosophy can be reduced to scientific fact. Instead Husserl deals with essences, universals and abstract entities, the phenomena that are not identified with perceptual objects but are known by intuition. In all this Husserl distinguishes between what he calls “science of the natural sort and philosophic science” (Husserl, 1964: 13). For Husserl:

“only with epistemological reflection do we arrive at the distinction between the sciences of a natural sort and philosophy. Epistemological reflection first brings to light that the sciences of a natural sort are not yet the ultimate science of being. We need a science of being in the absolute sense. This science, which we call *metaphysics*, grows out of a ‘critique’ of natural cognition in the individual sciences.” (Husserl, 1964: 18).

This means that for Husserl, “the task of clarifying the essence of cognition and of being an object of cognition … will be phenomenology of cognition and of being an object of cognition” (Husserl, 1964: 18) and that phenomenology “denotes a science, a system of scientific disciplines. But it also and above all denotes a method and an attitude of mind, the specifically *philosophical attitude* of mind, the specifically *philosophical method*” (Husserl, 1964: 18-19). Such a philosophical attitude and method is distinguished from that of the natural sciences and is Husserl’s reaction against the prevailing empiricism of his day (Inwood, 1995: 382). Furthermore, for Husserl, philosophy does not have the task of either implementing or completing the work of the natural sciences, but rather it follows its own methodology, “a phenomenology of cognitions, construed as a theory of the essence of pure cognitive phenomena” (Husserl, 1964: 37) where “to each psychic lived process there corresponds through the device of phenomenological reduction a pure phenomenon, which exhibits its intrinsic (immanent) essence (taken individually) as an absolute datum” (Husserl, 1964: 35). This is the eidetic reduction. There is the distinction here between the particular and the universal, with Husserl arguing that it is the universal that the methodology of phenomenology seeks. Marion in much the same way argues against the mere subjective impression or effect of consciousness, since this creates nothing more than “an idolatrous mirror where the mind refers to itself an impression that impresses only it” (Marion, 2002: 20). Evidence therefore is something beyond the lived experience of consciousness and this is the phenomenon itself, where “the evidence, blind itself, can become the screen of appearing – the place of givenness” (Marion, 2002: 20). This means the place of givenness in phenomenology is “not its origin but rather its point of arrival: the origin of givenness remains the ‘self’ of the phenomenon” (Marion, 2002: 20).
Cognition in this sense is not merely measurable perceptual abilities such as being able to determine ‘redness’, rather, what distinguishes phenomenology from the objectivising natural sciences is it methods and goals. Husserl states:

“Phenomenology proceeds by ‘seeing’, clarifying, and determining meaning, and by distinguishing meanings. It compares, it distinguishes, it forms connections, it puts into relation, divides into parts, or distinguishes abstract aspects. But all within pure ‘seeing’. It does not theorize or carry out mathematical operations; that is to say, it carries through no explanations in the sense of deductive theory. As it explains the basic concepts and propositions which function as principles governing the possibilities of ‘objectivizing’ science (but finally it also takes its own basic concepts and principles as objects of reflective explanation), it ends where ‘objectivizing’ science begins. Hence it is a science in a completely different sense, and with completely different problems and methods. The procedure of ‘seeing’ and eidetic abstraction with the strictest phenomenological reduction is exclusively its own: it is the specifically philosophical method, insofar as this method belongs essentially to the meaning of the critique of cognition and so generally to every sort of critique of reason.” (Husserl, 1964: 46).

The eidetic science which Husserl refers to here “is concerned with establishing essentials, appraising what it is that lies at the heart, or is the ‘essence’, of whatever it is under investigation” (Lovat, 2002a: 89). This is what Marion calls ‘givenness’ (Marion, 2002: 20). It is this critical and reflective aspect that distinguishes the process of phenomenology as an eidetic science from other sciences and which links well to the idea of three ways of knowing as proposed by Habermas (1971 and 1973). Instead of going beyond the phenomena to talk about and interpret them, a person attends instead to the phenomena themselves in an attempt to “recognise that universal objects and states of affairs attain self-givenness” (Husserl, 1964: 48). By perceiving and exercising phenomenological reduction a person arrives at the pure phenomenon or pure abstraction by a process of critical reflection and interest. This givenness of essences:

“is constituted not only on the basis of perception and the retention which is bound up with it, in such a way that we, so to speak, pluck a universal from the phenomenon itself; it is also constituted by universalising the object of appearance, positing a universal while gazing on it” in the sense that “a fully evident grasp of essence refers back to some particular intuition on the basis of which it must be built up, but there not necessarily to a particular perception, which has given us the paradigm of individual thing as something present in a genuine ‘now’”. (Husserl, 1964: 53).
This suggests something more than a physical presence and so points to the distinction Husserl makes between ‘existence’ and ‘essence’, where these ideas signify two modes of “being manifest” in “two modes of self-givenness” (Husserl, 1964: 55) where ‘existence’ suggests a particular instance (say a red thing) and ‘essence’ suggests the universal (redness), that is, “different types of objectivity” (Husserl, 1964: 56).

Phenomenology therefore allows people to distinguish between what Husserl call “the primary temporal object” (Husserl, 1964: 56) (the red thing) constituted in perception and “the consciousness of universality” (Husserl, 1964: 56) (redness) which is built up from perception and imagination and hence eidetic. Husserl’s and Marion’s work also links well with the philosophical concepts of realism and nominalism proposed in this thesis as a preliminary way of categorising the phenomena of the Anglican eucharistic tradition. The problem of universals will be taken up in much greater detail in the next chapter of this thesis (Chapter 3) where a model of the Anglican eucharistic tradition is proposed which combines the methodology of phenomenology with the philosophical concepts of realism and nominalism. This model holds the potential of emancipating the Anglican eucharistic tradition from the dominance of technical and hermeneutic interests and encouraging a more critical interest in the assessment of Anglican eucharistic theology based upon the isolation of the essences of that tradition. Such a method, it is argued, has important implications for Anglican theological education, especially in relation to the teaching of Anglican eucharistic theology, since education in order to be authentic needs to address the question of what are the essences of the Anglican eucharistic and to engage in dialogue with others on the nature of the Anglican eucharistic tradition.

Phenomenology then is seen to have great relevance to the study of religion and religious education. Ninian Smart, for example, studied religion according to the phenomenological approach. In his BBC series of films, entitled The Long Search, Smart followed and observed religious phenomena across the world. His aim was an “empathic entering into a representative sample of religious experience, a ‘stepping into the shoes’ of its followers, as the best way of coming to ‘know’ in this unique sense” (Lovat, 1995: 8-9). The series reserved judgment, and instead, as an example of the phenomenological approach, portrayed a description of what was observed. This is what Husserl describes as epoche (Husserl, 1964: 34), where the cognitive act or the pure essence or phenomenon is
distinguished from an individual’s own cognitive acts or psychological phenomenon (Husserl, 1964: 33). Lovat describes this as “a suspension of judgment” where there are:

“the twin elements of good phenomenology. First, one must suspend the judgments to which one is liable owing to our dominant empiricist ways (these will blind and distract one from seeing what is simply there to be seen), and one must not be too concerned with the facts but concentrate on seeing through the facts, as it were, to find the essence, the pure phenomena.” (Lovat, 1995: 6-7).

Smart makes the comment that:

“Religion is not something that one can see … significance needs to be approached through the inner life of those who use externals … the history of religion must be more than the chronicling of events: it must be an attempt to enter into the meanings of those events. So it is not enough for us to survey the course which the religious history of mankind has taken: we must also penetrate into the hearts and minds of those who have been involved in that history.” (Smart, 1976: 11).

This is very much the intention of the case studies of this thesis (see accompanying CD) where an attempt is made to describe not only what Anglicans theologians have described in their eucharistic theology, but an attempt is also made to see at a deeper level what are the philosophical assumptions which guide this thinking. It is in the pursuit of this thinking that the essences of the Anglican eucharistic tradition are extracted (Chapter 4) and used to assess the ramifications for Anglican eucharistic theology and for Anglican theological education (Chapter 5).

It is important to note however, that phenomenology is not without its critics. L. Philip Barnes, for example, argues against the phenomenological assumption that there is such a thing as the ‘essence’ of religion and that such an essence is found in religious experience. Further Barnes questions the assumption that there is a distinction or dichotomy between religious experience and religious language (Barnes, 2001a: 453). Barnes also questions whether the unique character of religion is best revealed by the procedural neutrality and eidetic reduction or vision of phenomenology (Barnes, 2001a: 454). He argues that:

“The phenomenological approach conveniently distinguishes the experiential heart of religion from its conceptual articulation in rival doctrinal/propositional schemes; being secondary, critical discussion of the latter is deemed unnecessary in religious education.” (Barnes, 2001a: 455).
Such criticism fails however, to distinguish in an adequate way between what Husserl calls *epoche* on the one hand and eidetic science on the other. The notion of *epoche* argues that assessment and judgment are suspended so that cognitive and conceptual preconceptions, such as technical and hermeneutic interests, do not prejudice conclusions. In this sense phenomenology is only descriptive. The eidetic science however, allows for judgment and assessment, once phenomena have been considered in the widest possible way, in an effort to isolate the essence from the phenomena. This includes consideration of what is religious truth, as well as what is religious experience and so does not exclude doctrinal and propositional schemes. Barnes seems not to realise this point and instead argues that: “The study of religion in an educational context should involve not just knowing what religious people believe and do, and leaving it there, but should go on to investigate matters of religious truth and relevance” (Barnes, 2001a: 457). This means for Barnes, “understanding religion is not achieved by attempts to intuit its essence but by coming to know its public discourse and by being able to enter into the world where the discourse is an expression and a part” (Barnes, 2001a: 457-458). For Barnes this means “that the phenomenological approach to religious education is deeply flawed and should be abandoned” (Barnes, 2001a: 458) because the fundamental assumptions and procedures of phenomenology are no longer tenable.

In reply to Barnes’ criticisms of phenomenology, Lovat denies the philosophical difficulties raised by Barnes (Lovat, 2001). Lovat asserts that Barnes’ difficulties with phenomenology arise from his misunderstanding concerning the work of Husserl. Lovat instead puts the view that there is a distinction between the descriptive phase of phenomenology (*epoche*) and that later stage of assessment and judgment (the eidetic science). Phenomenology therefore not only concerns description, but also conceptual issues (Lovat, 2001: 566). Husserl’s phenomenological method was not only a reaction to empiricism, but also a reaction against the forming of pre-emptive judgments by researchers that had the tendency to constrain knowing and understanding, thus hastening closure on a subject through ungrounded generalisations that led to dogmatic certainty (Lovat, 2001: 566). Lovat argues that this putting up of one set of dogmatic religious claims, one against the other, which Barnes seems to approve, is methodologically undesirable because it closes enquiry and limits critical reflection (Lovat, 2001: 566-567). Lovat points specifically to the work of Jurgen Habermas (1971 and 1973) who argues for a recognition of varying ways of
knowing and distinguishes between those ways of knowing which close enquiry (technical and hermeneutic) and those which encourage it (critical). Lovat is therefore suggesting the value of the phenomenological method in facilitating critical enquiry. For Lovat:

“It is not that phenomenology forbids meaningful comparison or even closure on any topic … but it slows down the judgments that impel these via the rigours of *epoche*, so ensuring the maximum exposure to the data relevant to drawing comparisons allowing informed closure. In a word, it allows space for education to happen.” (Lovat, 2001: 569).

Phenomenology therefore, argues Lovat, cannot be legitimately condemned if its critics have certain erroneous understandings of it.

In his reply to Lovat, Barnes continues to argue that phenomenology imposes “an alien schema of interpretation whereby religious experience is first divorced from religious doctrines and then accorded priority over that later” (Barnes, 2001b: 572). In fact Barnes goes so far as to say that “it is the language of religion that makes religious experience possible” (Barnes, 2001b: 577). This seems to make a case for the priority of language over experience in the study of religion and in fact Barnes makes the point that phenomenology tends to create a situation where consciousness by the observer of religious experience takes priority over language and culture (Barnes, 2001b: 579). This is suggesting therefore that consciousness is in some way a false trail that has tended to decontextualise and dehistoricise religion from the true trail of its linguistic and conceptual basis. Phenomenology disputes this and sees language as only one of the elements in religion, not ‘the’ element. Other elements, such as sensory experience, faith, emotional response or experience of the transcendent or immanent presence of the holy, beyond and within the self, are given priority along with language and conceptual schemes. Clearly there are important educational implications for whichever opinion is accepted. If Barnes’ view is accepted then religious language and religious concepts are what will be seen as crucially necessary to develop an understanding of religion. If Lovat’s view (and that of phenomenology) is accepted then religion is developed by a whole range of experiences, including language and conceptual schemes, without priority being accorded to language and its propositional nature. The importance of phenomenology lies in its suspension of judgment during its descriptive phase and the later critical assessment of phenomena. Lovat argues that this makes learning more robust since it limits the making of premature
judgments on the basis of technical and hermeneutic interests and encourages the development of a critical interest (Lovat, 2002b).

This has particular relevance for this thesis, since it is argued that a critical interest or way of knowing in Anglican eucharistic theology is independent of the cognitive commitments of various technical and hermeneutic interests within Anglicanism, typically found in church parties. The suggests that a critical way of knowing accesses an essence or universal which exists independently of the cognitive commitments of individuals or groups. Such a realist argument implies that critical knowing is not dependent on semantic and cognitive notions, but rather on the intuition and imagination of the individual as the process of eidetic reduction takes place. It seems that Barnes does not acknowledge such a realist analysis since he gives priority to the cognitive and conceptual schemes of individuals based on language. Barnes’ approach has much in common with the conservative Evangelical understanding of propositional revelation that has currency within the Anglican Diocese of Sydney. The propositional nature of revelation through preaching of the word (that is, the text of the Bible) is based on cognitive and conceptual schemes, heavily based on language in its syntactic and semantic forms. Dependence on such a propositional methodology is well established as a philosophical assumption of some Anglican theologians who adopt a nominalist analysis of eucharistic theology (e.g. Robert Doyle – see Case Study 4.27) but at the same time it must be realised that other philosophical assumptions also exist within the Anglican tradition. Realist philosophical assumptions are a major part of Anglican eucharistic theology as well and these will be explored at greater depth in the case studies (see accompanying CD) and Chapter 4 where the essences of the Anglican eucharistic tradition are extracted. The value of the phenomenological methodology is that it recognises all these philosophical assumptions as having a legitimate place in the experience of the Anglican eucharistic tradition as essences of that tradition. Any analysis however, that claims a privileged place for certain types of knowledge, such as is sometimes found in the writings of both Catholic and Evangelical Anglicans, and it seems in the work of Barnes where he privileges propositional thinking in the form of conceptual and cognitive schemes of belief and doctrine, limits the investigation of the Anglican Eucharistic tradition and its critical interest as a whole and relies too heavily on impoverished and fetishised accounts of knowing.
Fuller treatment of these philosophical issues must await the next chapter, however, it is important to note that the history of the Anglican eucharistic tradition indicates that at times, various groups within Anglicanism have favoured a particular interpretation of the tradition and that this has often occurred on the basis of rational schemes based on language and conceptual knowledge. Recent writers (e.g. MacCulloch, 1996, 2001a and 2001b and Spinks, 1999) have, for example, drawn attention to the priority given by the nineteenth century Oxford Movement and its successors to certain negative interpretations of the eucharistic theology of the theologians of the Reformation, e.g. Cranmer (Case Study 1.1) and Perkins (Case Study 1.12) and the positive interpretations the Oxford Movement gave to the eucharistic theology of the theologians of the later Reformation and the restoration period (e.g. Taylor (1.36), Cosin (1.19), Andrewes (1.16) and Hooker (1.7)). Other Anglican theologians, such as Doyle (4.27) and Jensen (4.33) have in much the same way given privileged status to the very writings of the Reformation that others do not. Phenomenology has the advantage of describing all the phenomena, not privileging any, and at a later stage interpreting the phenomena by the extraction of essences. Such a methodology has the potential to examine the experience of the Anglican eucharistic tradition in a more critical manner while at the same time acknowledging the technical and hermeneutic interests and commitments of various parties within the Anglican Communion. Details of these theologians’ views can be had by reference to their particular case studies on the accompanying CD of this thesis.

Criticisms of phenomenology (such as those made by Barnes 2001a and 2001b) when applied to any assessment of the Anglican eucharistic tradition using phenomenological method implicitly lead Anglican eucharistic theology into party position, where there is an emphasis on the propositional nature of doctrines and beliefs. This approach points towards the narrowed interests of the technical and the hermeneutic rather than the broader purpose of a critical approach to knowing. In such a situation judgment has not been suspended to allow adequate assessment of the Anglican eucharistic tradition as a whole. This thesis argues that it is only after a period of epoche, or descriptive phenomenology, that the essences of the Anglican eucharistic tradition can be seen, using what Husserl calls eidetic reduction. A phenomenological approach therefore, such as Lovat suggests, is adopted in this thesis, where it attempts, as a way forward for the Anglican eucharistic tradition, to examine eucharistic theology in the Anglican tradition, in
its diversity and difference, accepting the view, as Spinks suggests, that the Anglican eucharistic tradition is diachronic rather than synchronic (Spinks, 1999: 173). Christopher Cocksworth makes much the same point arguing that there can be no such thing as a single Anglican eucharistic tradition since it is such an amorphous tradition (Cocksworth, 1991: 49). Indeed Cocksworth makes the point that Anglican eucharistic theology has the characteristic of multiformity and not uniformity. Such critical distinctions as those drawn by both Spinks and Cocksworth concerning knowing are at the heart of the phenomenological method and explicate the three ways of knowing (technical, hermeneutic and critical) as proposed by Habermas (1971 and 1973) and as discussed in the previous chapter. The phenomenological approach is also at the heart of the purpose of this thesis and has significant implications for the teaching of eucharistic theology in Anglican theological institutions since a critical approach to theological education must suspend judgment in order to allow an adequate examination of the evidence of the tradition before judgment is made. Such judgments will be made in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. In the mean time however, it seems that Barnes’ criticisms of phenomenology fail to deal in any adequate manner with the distinction between phenomenology in its descriptive and in its analytical form and at the same time fail to address the important issues of the technical and hermeneutic ways of knowing compared to any critical way. Further exploration of these matters in relation to eucharistic theology and educational implications must await a later time in this thesis.

Some attention must now be given to the enfaithing models of religious education as these too have relevance for this thesis.

Lovat describes Enfaithing models as those approaches where “the major goal is to convince, convert or strengthen commitment to a particular faith tradition” (Lovat, 2002a: 1). Typically enfaithing models are used by particular religious traditions to convey knowledge of and encourage adherence to the religious beliefs espoused by that tradition. There is emphasis on the acquiring of knowledge, skills and attitudes that allow the adherent to affirm a particular tradition, with little emphasis on other knowledge, skills or attitudes outside the tradition. Often an enfaithing model of religious education has a narrow focus and is highly selective in its choice of content to be learned. Examples of such enfaithing models of theological education were discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis.
where particular theological institutions within the Anglican Church of Australia were shown to encourage the appropriation of particular technical and hermeneutic ways of knowing, such as Catholic, Evangelical, Conservative, Reformed and Liberal, in theological education. Moore College in Sydney, for example, was discussed in terms of its commitment to a hermeneutic interest described as Reformed, protestant and Evangelical, whilst Trinity College in Melbourne was discussed in terms of its hermeneutic commitment to the Catholic tradition of Anglicanism. The enfaithing model also has much in common with the Athens model of theological education (see Kelsey, 1993) reviewed in Chapter 1 of this thesis.

Lovat argues that the enfaithing model of religious education is often quite prescriptive, setting out a statement of belief in the form of doctrines, creeds and catechisms with the intention of passing on specific information about a particular faith to adherents or to students studying within particular religious traditions (e.g. the extensive *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 1994 or the somewhat briefer, *A Catechism. Questions and Answers on Christian Faith and Conduct*, of the Anglican Church of Australia that is printed in *A Prayer Book for Australia*, 1995: 814-818). The material in both these catechisms is tradition specific and technical in nature in that there is little room for interpretation, but rather, only acceptance of specific religious facts or dogmas.

‘The Praxis Model’ is another enfaithing model of religious education referred to by Lovat (2002a) which holds promise for a more critical approach to religious education. This model is based on the work of the so-called critical theorists, such as Jurgen Habermas. Habermas proposed, as has been discussed in Chapter 1, that a learner’s knowledge and interest could be more than technical or hermeneutic interests, but a ‘critical’ interest or way of knowing (Habermas, 1971 and 1973). Habermas proposed that where the interest of the learner was at the critical level, then learning became reflective, and emancipated the learner from the previously developed and imposed constraints of knowledge. Reflection allowed the learner to be emancipated from the interests of others who controlled knowledge. Lovat has taken up this view in his writing on religious education (Lovat, 1995, 2001, 2002a, 2002b and 2003). In relation to the study of religion, Lovat argues that this means the learner will question and reflect on the knowledge of the past religious tradition, including its creeds, doctrines and dogmas, and think deeply about this knowledge.
Processes involved could include expressing a point of view, acknowledging other points of view, suggesting an alternative, reading widely, investigating, researching, surveying and interviewing, in order to gain a more critical awareness of knowledge (Lovat, 2002a: 22). Van Manen (1977) similarly argues that such a critical approach to knowing promotes a more genuine type of learning, where authenticity, justice and equality are important aspects of the learning process for individuals. It is in this sense that ‘praxis’, that is, “a combining of theory and practice with a view to change” (Lovat, 2002a: 22) becomes vitally important as the learner critically reflects on learning and seeks to bring about new levels of understanding and knowledge. Critical reflection of this type has the potential to emancipate the learner from the narrow confines of technical and hermeneutic interests. This idea will be taken up at a later stage (Chapter 5) when a dialogue approach based on the intersubjectivity of communicative action is discussed as the way forward for the Anglican eucharistic tradition.

A praxis model of religious education was developed by Thomas Groome who describes the praxis way of knowing as reflective engagement in a social setting (Groome, 1981: 153) and as reflection within a community where lived experience is seen as important (Groome, 1981: 152). Groome argues that education is seen as more than an ahistorical abstraction but rather a human activity where education is what people do and want to do (Groome, 1981: 3). It was in this sense that Groome argued that “all good education can be called religious” (Groome, 1981: 21) since all education is a reaching towards the transcendent. Religious education in particular is conducted in a praxis context since “from its beginning the Christian community has perceived the purpose of its educational efforts as the promoting of lived Christian faith” (Groome, 1981: 56). A praxis model of religious education for Groome has twin moments – reflection and action (Groome, 1981: 137) occurring as lived experience. For Groome this means that human knowing is an expression of historical human praxis, where authentic knowing should be a transforming activity, which should transform reality towards human freedom and emancipation and where there is no dichotomy between theory and practice. This does not mean however, that praxis in Christian education should be merely material (in the Marxist sense of reducing humankind to the products of its own labour) or an individual’s own doing (an extreme form of pelagianism, that is, seeking salvation by one’s own efforts). Instead for Groome, Christian praxis in religious education is “an active/reflective relationship with
our created world, but also ... a lived relationship with God as this is encountered and
reflected upon in a Christian community and in the whole community of mankind”
(Groome, 1981: 168). Groome may be influenced by Habermas in these matters, since
Habermas also points to the philosophical deficiency in the Marxist understanding of
praxis. Whereas Marx advocated the twin moments in human praxis of reflection and
action, this view was seen by Habermas to be impoverished. For Marx, action is reduced
to labour as a tangible productive activity, and the reflective moment is praxis reduced to
production feedback from that labour, in such a way that “Marx reduces the process of
reflection to the level of instrumental action” (Habermas, 1971: 44). Groome observes that
Marxism “limits the scope and breadth of the active moment and the depth and
importance of the reflective moment in praxis” (Groome, 1981: 168-169). Habermas in his
1971 book, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, offers a broader view of both the active and
reflective moments in praxis which overcome the fetishisation, reification and limitation of
Marx’s position and in so doing he provides a new basis for uniting theory and praxis
through the constitutive interest of the knowing subject. Knowledge constitutive interest
shapes the outcome of what is known since the ‘interest’ brought to the knowing process
unites theory and praxis, such that the knowing subject and the world come together and
the subject knows in order that they may act. This idea has been expanded by Habermas in
speaks of participants in dialogue as speakers and hearers engaged in shared meaning and
understanding. This work will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5 of this thesis,
however it is important to say at this point that Habermas’ notion of communicative action
is intended to move the focus of knowing beyond the instrumental nature of the technical
and hermeneutic interest and to engage the learner in a more critical interest.

Where theory and *praxis* is not united there is fetishisation and reification of knowing, as is
found in some parts of the Christian tradition, such as those in both the Catholic and
Reformed traditions, which adopt particular party positions in relation to theology. In
Anglicanism, for example, some Evangelical and Catholic Anglicans limit their theological
reflection to the adoption and rejection of particular doctrines and dogmas (e.g. *The Holy
Eucharist*, 1995/2002 from the Anglican Catholic Diocese of Ballarat and the Anglican
These fetishised or reified interests often centre on either the text of the Scripture in a

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propositional manner - what has been called “the textual calculus of the real” (Pickstock, 1998: 3 – see Case Study 4.41) or the traditions of the Church in a prescriptive model of enfaiting their tradition, without adequate critical reflection on the underlying philosophical issues. This seems to be the case in both of the works cited above from both Ballarat and Sydney as they each reject particular aspects of the eucharistic liturgies of *A Prayer Book for Australia* (1995) from the context of their particular technical and hermeneutic interests without adequate critical reflection on the Anglican eucharistic tradition as a whole. This will be explored in greater detail in subsequent chapters of this thesis when what is seen as a more adequate Christian praxis for the exploration of eucharistic theology in the Anglican tradition is proposed within a model of the Anglican eucharistic tradition (see Figure 1 in Chapter 3) which offers a method for critically examining the Anglican eucharistic tradition and which unites theory and praxis in a more satisfactory manner.

Habermas, argues Groome, turns to human reason and critical reflection as the essential ingredients of the ongoing human quest for emancipation, such that human reason and critical reflection “unite the object of knowledge with the constitutive activity of the knowing subject within a historical process” (Groome, 1981: 181, note 3). It is in this way, Groome argues, that Habermas has taken a step towards a more adequate praxis for Christian education since it unites theory and *praxis* (Groome, 1981: 170). The present Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, has adopted just such an approach, uniting theory and praxis in his writing on sacramental theology. He argues that sacraments are about transformative action where “there is action, the making of new things” (Williams, 2000: 197) and expresses an emancipatory aspect of sacramental theology, arguing that, “we make signs, and make ourselves through signs” (Williams, 2000: 199-200). William’s argument and the importance it has for religious education will be presented in greater detail later in this thesis (see also Case Study 4.52 on the accompanying CD and refer to Chapter 5), however, it is sufficient to say at this stage that praxis as transformative action (the making of signs) is united with the theology of the Eucharist (the theory) and has important implications for the purposes of this thesis as it seeks such a unity for the Anglican eucharistic tradition and the drawing out of the implications of this unity for theological education.
Lovat’s review of the enfaithing model of religious education ends with a solid endorsement of the praxis model of religious education, however he makes the point that the capacity of the other enfaithing models to support all the goals of a suitable religious education program needs to be questioned (Lovat, 2002a: 31). Despite the inadequacies of the approach used by Groome and others, Lovat still feels that there is much of value within the praxis model of religious education, but that further development is needed. This Lovat does in his consideration of what he calls ‘the critical model’ of religious education (Lovat, 2002a: 62-65).

Lovat’s critical model combines aspects of both the interfaith and the enfaithing models of religious education, and it is here Lovat feels the critical model has its strengths, combining aspects of the enfaithing model of praxis with the methodology of the social sciences, principally the use of phenomenology and typology in the interfaith model of religious education. The praxis model has strengths in combining critical theory with the learning taking place in an enfaithing model of religious education, with phenomenology and typology having the ability to employ the methodology of the social sciences in an attempt to observe the phenomena of religion, while at the same time suspending judgment and being aware of the influence of one’s prototype religious experience. This means that aspects of both the enfaithing and the interfaith models of religious education have relevance for each other.

2.3 Phenomenology and the Anglican Tradition

It is this same combination of enfaithing models and interfaith models that will be employed in this thesis in the examination of the phenomena of the Anglican eucharistic tradition (see the case studies on the CD which accompanies this thesis) and in the assessment and judgment of these phenomena at a later stage (Chapters 4 and 5). By examining the experience of the Anglican eucharistic tradition (see Case Studies on CD) and by extracting the essences of that tradition (Chapter 4) this thesis seeks to provide the type of ‘bite’ that Lovat advocates. This thesis examines the praxis of the Anglican eucharistic tradition through the phenomena of the case studies and then interprets the phenomena in a typological manner using the philosophical assumptions of realism and
nominalism to the moderate and immoderate degrees. This process, it is suggested, provides the critical edge for the examination of the Anglican eucharistic tradition, allowing it to move past the technical and hermeneutic interests of particular church parties, while at the same time recognising the importance of the enfaiting models these parties seek to privilege. It is the methodology of the social sciences (phenomenology and philosophical reflection) that moves this project from the solely enfaiting model of religious education to the more critical approach of the interfaith models of religious education.

Following this review of models of religious education it is important to point towards the relevance of some of these models of religious education for the purpose and process of this thesis. This thesis attempts to take up Lovat’s suggestion and combine the praxis methodology of the enfaiting model with the phenomenological methodology of the interfaith model, to investigate an important area of education in the Anglican tradition of Christianity, that is, theological education regarding Anglican eucharistic theology. In this thesis the insights of the praxis model, using the three ways of knowing (technical, hermeneutic and critical) are seen as important considerations for any analysis of the Anglican eucharistic tradition and theological education in the Anglican tradition. Whereas this thesis argues that Anglican eucharistic theology has typically emphasised the technical and hermeneutic interests of various church parties and that this has carried over into the work of theological institutions and the expression of theology by these church parties, this thesis also seeks by the development of a more satisfying and unified model of the Anglican eucharistic tradition, to develop a more critical approach of eucharistic theology in the Anglican tradition. This, in turn, is seen to have important implications for theological education in the area of eucharistic theology, since theological education has the potential of being itself emancipated and emancipating learners from the technical and hermeneutic interest of these church parties when it is based on a more critical interest or way of knowing, such as those proposed by Habermas (1984 and 1989) in his theory of communicative action (see Chapter 5).

This is also seen to be important for Anglicanism as a whole, as the Eucharist is central to much of the enfaiting life of Anglicanism as the recent report of the International Anglican Liturgical Consultation (IALC) entitled Our Thanks and Praise, has pointed out (Holeton, 1998: 7). Often however, eucharistic theology has been the source of acrimony
in the Anglican tradition because particular church parties (such as Catholic Anglicans or Evangelical Anglicans) are wedded to the various technical and hermeneutic interests of their respective enfaithing traditions without adequate critical reflection on the tradition as a whole. In the Anglican Church of Australia, for example, the particular Evangelical theology of the Eucharist adopted by the Diocese of Sydney and expressed in its Sunday Services (2001) and the particular Catholic theology of the Eucharist in the Diocese of Ballarat, expressed in its manual The Holy Eucharist (1995/2002), suggest not only that there are particular technical and hermeneutic interests regarding eucharistic theology for each of these interests, but that these univocal interpretations and expressions of eucharistic theology become normative and exclusive for each group and remain substantially unconsidered in any critical fashion in relation to the Anglican eucharistic tradition as a whole. This paradoxically stands alongside the distinctly multi-vocal theology of the Eucharist expressed in the latest official prayer book of the Anglican Church of Australia (A Prayer Book for Australia, 1995) that also lacks adequate critical reflection provided by a more unified model of eucharistic theology. APBA (1995) has eucharistic liturgies designed to appeal to different parties within the Anglican Church of Australia, with the Second Order of the Eucharist designed to appeal to Catholic Anglicans, while the Third Order of the Eucharist is designed to appeal to Evangelical Anglicans. More detailed reference to these eucharistic liturgies can be found in Case Study 4.54 that focuses on Anglican eucharistic liturgies of the twentieth century (see the CD accompanying this thesis). This divergence of eucharistic liturgical form and theology suggests as Spinks (1999) has argued that the essence of Anglican theology is essentially diachronic and not synchronic or as Cocksworth (1991 and 1993) has suggested Anglican eucharistic theology is essentially multiform rather than uniform. At the same time however, the persistence and strength of various technical and hermeneutic interests among the various church parties tend to contrive exactly the opposite conclusion in their particular seeking of a synchronic and uniform eucharistic theology as ‘the’ eucharistic theology of Anglicanism. In such a situation, the difficulty remains that there is no unified model of eucharistic theology which allows the debate to move past the technical and hermeneutic interests of particular church parties, and engage in analysis of the Anglican eucharistic tradition in a more critical manner such that the essences of Anglican eucharistic theology can be more easily assessed.
This thesis therefore in part attempts, through the development of a unified model of eucharistic theology, to examine the Anglican eucharistic tradition in a critical manner, using both the insights of an enfaithing praxis model and the interfaith phenomenological model of religious education. It also seeks on the basis of this reflection to make recommendations for the practice of theological education within the Anglican tradition. The methodology involves a consideration of the theological writings and liturgical products of the Anglican Communion from the time of the Reformation to the present, looking on these writings as the phenomena of the tradition, existing in all their diversity but at the same time realising that it is not possible, due to the constraints of space and time, to consider every piece of Anglican writing on the Eucharist. A selection of writing, representing the various technical and hermeneutic interests of the Anglican eucharistic tradition has therefore been made and these are found on the CD of case studies (accompanying the thesis). The case studies are interpreted and discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 of the thesis. This methodology operates as descriptive phenomenology (Husserl’s epoche), where each piece of writing or liturgy is described, suspending critical assessment and judgment (Husserl’s eidetic science) to a later point in the process (that is, Chapter 4), but nonetheless attempting to bring some preliminary categorisation to the phenomena at the point of discussion by means of the philosophical concepts of realism and nominalism to both moderate and immoderate degrees. As Lovat points out, the use of such a phenomenological methodology, “privileges and preserves the testimony … rather than the values and perspectives of the researcher” (Lovat, 2002a: 93), that is, the voices speaking in the Anglican eucharistic tradition rather than the voice of the researcher or one or more particular church parties and their technical and hermeneutic interests. It is these voices of the tradition as a whole that hopefully will determine the direction of the study and lead to greater understanding of the essences of Anglican eucharistic theology.

There are some indications that the application of the phenomenological methodology, described above, is not in conflict with the historical tradition of Anglicanism and that in fact several Anglican writers have employed what is essentially a phenomenological approach in their consideration of religion generally and eucharistic theology in particular.

William Temple, the Archbishop of Canterbury from 1942-1944, writing in the Gifford Lectures of 1932-1934, examining the experience of religion, debates the distinction
between natural and revealed religion, putting the argument that the distinction between
the two is not concerned with the subject matter of either natural or revealed religion, but
with the method of discussion. For Temple it seems that when the experience of religion
is examined there is something deeper than the mere subject matter of religion, its
doctrines and statements of belief, and that this deeper level seems to relate to a
methodology or way of examining the experience of religion. This is the point which
Lovat (2001) makes in his defence of phenomenology and which Barnes (2001a and 2001b)
does not appreciate in his criticisms of phenomenology.

Temple defines natural religion as “thoughts about God – the grounds for belief in His
existence, the evidence of His character, and so forth – as might be conducted without
reference to the Bible” (Temple, 1924: 4-5) whereas revealed religion is seen as “man’s
response in thought and feeling and purpose to the self-disclosure held to be contained in
the Bible” (Temple, 1924: 5). The supposed distinction between the two, Temple sees as
illusory since “whatever the Bible may contain of divine self-disclosure, it is also the record
of a very rich and significant human existence” (Temple, 1924: 6). The Archbishop’s
concern is not so much with the content of belief, the subject matter, and whether that
belief is derived from natural or revealed religion, but with the principle determining the
method of examination of the subject matter, as he calls it (Temple, 1924: 7). Temple’s
concern is with the methodology allowing for the examination of experience and not
exclusively with the knowledge itself or the source of that knowledge. This has much in
common with Husserl’s approach to phenomenology as discussed above and Habermas’
notion of communicative action, as well as the intentions of this thesis in relation to study
of Anglican eucharistic theology.

Temple also considers what he calls ‘the sacramental universe’. Temple, again examining
experience, warns against dividing the ‘spiritual’ from the ‘material’ such that matter and
spirit are kept apart from one another in the thought processes that underlie sacramental
theology. Temple rejects the view that the ‘real’ is to be found only in certain factual or
technical areas of knowledge (such as chemistry or physics) and further rejects the idea that
other areas of knowledge (such as aesthetics, ethics or theology) are in some way less real.
Temple argues that there is a distinctive principle of unity between the material and the
spiritual. For Temple the reality of matter allows us to reach the conviction of the
supremacy of spirit, since matter is the vehicle of spirit and the spirit is realised in the controlling of matter (Temple, 1924: 473-495). Clearly for Temple, ways of knowing are important in any methodology that aims at the examination of experience. Temple’s insights reflect both the importance of a methodology of phenomenology in examining experience and the consideration of different ways of knowing. His work, resonating with the insights of the social sciences and philosophy, sets the whole project within a theological framework.

Temple’s phenomenological approach, that is, the idea of ‘the principle determining the method of examination’ and his attention to the philosophical concepts concerned with ways of knowing, also underlie the methodology of this thesis in relation to the Anglican eucharistic tradition. More specifically this thesis seeks to examine, using the methodology of phenomenology and the philosophical concepts underlying one area of Christian theology (that is, eucharistic theology in the Anglican tradition) ways of knowing, as they exist in the Anglican eucharistic tradition. This methodology of phenomenology is an attempt to move beyond what Temple calls ‘the subject matter’ (that is, the historical data of theologians on the Eucharist and eucharistic liturgies or even the concepts of realism and nominalism as a way of categorising the data) and to examine instead what Temple calls ‘the method of discussion’ or ‘the principle determining the method of examination’ (that is, the ways of knowing in the Anglican eucharistic tradition). Temple’s work in phenomenology and philosophy links with Husserl’s work in his book *The Idea of Phenomenology* (Husserl, 1907/1964) and the similar work of this thesis in the specific area of Anglican eucharistic theology. Temple’s concern is with critical ways of knowing rather than the narrow focus of technical and hermeneutic interests. Temple’s endorsement of a methodology of phenomenology is not however unique within Anglicanism.

John Henry Newman (while still an Anglican) pleaded a similar cause in his *Via Media of the Anglican Church*, written between 1830 and 1841. Newman, speaking in what encompasses a phenomenological approach, complains that:

“We have a vast inheritance, but no inventory of our treasures. All is given us in profusion; it remains for us to catalogue, sort, distribute, select, harmonize, and complete. … What we need at present for our Church’s well-being, is not invention, nor originality, nor sagacity, nor even learning in our divines, at least in the first place, though all these gifts of God are in a measure needed, and never
can be unseasonable when used religiously, but we need peculiarly a sound judgment, patient thought, discrimination, a comprehensive mind, an abstinence from all private fancies and caprices and personal tastes, - in a word, divine wisdom.” (Newman, 1837/1918: 24-25).

Newman’s purpose seems to centre on a desire to make sense of what he describes as knowledge in profusion, through an appeal to general principles and to what he calls ‘divine wisdom’. He seeks a way of moving past the particular to access the universal. His suggested methodology is akin to that of phenomenology: cataloguing, sorting, distributing, selecting, harmonizing and completing, although he does not name them as a phenomenological method. He also moves past the purely technical and the hermeneutic interests of private and group opinion (fancies and caprices and personal tastes, as he calls them) in an appeal to the underlying and essential principles (or essences) and the philosophical basis of the vast inheritance of the Christian faith. Newman is keenly aware that the sifting of evidence must precede the forming of judgment, lest judgment, too readily formed, will be unduly influenced by the particular interests of individuals and parties. This thesis pursues the same theme as that enunciated by both Newman and Temple, using a phenomenological methodology of case study of Anglican eucharistic theology, suspending judgment in favour of gathering information and at a later stage (Chapter 4) making judgments and assessments and drawing out the ramifications for theological education (Chapter 5).

More recently Daniel Hardy in his book *Finding the Church: The Dynamic Truth of Anglicanism*, published in 2001, takes up the same theme as Newman and suggests that what the Anglican Church needs in the modern era is a seeking after wisdom if it is to come to terms with the position and goals of human knowledge, understanding and practice (Hardy, 2001: 41). Such wisdom involves being able to place the dynamics of fundamental dimensions of the world and God relative to each other and in so doing providing “a configuration for the multidimensionality of the world and God, and how they are and should be related” (Hardy, 2001: 41). Hardy argues that, “the wisdom of this world is best known and lived within the grace of God” (Hardy, 2001: 61). Hardy connects this search for wisdom closely with both the work of the university and theology, involving both the abstract and the concreteness of praxis, and realising that wisdom is interwoven in the division and disunities of the world (Hardy, 2001: 52). As such the seeking after wisdom involves taking
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into account the profusion of evidence and the multidimensional character of the world and seeking meaning through a sifting of these phenomena in order to find what Hardy calls “the universal constituting factors which make it what it is” (Hardy, 2001: 56). This is essentially what this thesis is aiming to do through the extraction of essences from the extensive case study material of Anglican eucharistic theology (see CD) and the interpretation of that material (see Chapters 4 and 5).

Earlier at the beginning of the twentieth century, Darwell Stone employed an important use of phenomenological methodology in his work entitled, *A History of the Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist*, published in 1909. In this work Stone attempted to collect material on the doctrine of the Eucharist from many sources, including Anglicanism, and to present this material without judgment or assessment. He states that the aim of his work:

“is to set out in as simple and clear a form as may be possible the doctrines about the Holy Eucharist which have been current among Christians. It is not the aim of the author to enter into controversial arguments or theological reasonings to any extent beyond that which the intelligible treatment of the facts necessarily involves.” (Stone, 1909: I, 1).

Stone presents material from various theologians on the Eucharist in a descriptive manner with assessment and judgment suspended. Stone’s methodology allowed the wide and varied experience of the Christian tradition to be explored using this methodology of phenomenology and it was intended to allow the reader to reflect critically on the essence of the Eucharist following exposure to the phenomena. Stone’s work extended however, only to the beginning of the twentieth century. The case studies of this thesis (see accompanying CD) take up the challenge of extending Stone’s work in the remainder of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries in relation to Anglican eucharistic theology at least with a representative sample of the work of Anglican theologians from the period of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

A similar technique to Stone’s has been adopted more recently by Colin Buchanan in his three extensive surveys of the Anglican eucharistic liturgies of the second half of the twentieth century (Buchanan, 1968, 1975 and 1985). Buchanan’s methodology is descriptive, that is, he surveys the phenomena (the eucharistic liturgies from many provinces of the Anglican communion) without any critical assessment or judgment of the
eucharistic theology implied in these liturgies. The task of critical assessment and judgment he leaves to the reader.

Stone’s and Buchanan’s approach of descriptive phenomenology stands in stark contrast to the approach of many others in the Anglican tradition who have sought to take a party position and argue it with some force. Dom Gregory Dix for example, in his famous work, *The Shape of the Liturgy*, first published in 1945, takes a decidedly Catholic and anti-Evangelical stand in relation to eucharistic theology (Dix, 1945 – see Case Study 4.28). James Packer on the other hand takes a decidedly Evangelical and anti-Catholic stand in his work as editor of the book entitled *Eucharistic Sacrifice*, which collects together the addresses of the Oxford Conference of Evangelical Churchmen, held in 1961 (Packer, 1962 – see Case Study 4.39). Both these works adopt particular technical and hermeneutical interests in their positions, which limit critical reflection on the Anglican eucharistic tradition as a whole.

In more recent times, Bryan Spinks has attempted something of the same purpose as Stone, but on a much more restricted canvas. In his 1999 book, *Two Faces of Elizabethan Anglican Theology*, Spinks looks more broadly, at two distinctly different Elizabethan theologians, William Perkins, a Puritan (see Case Study 1.12), and Richard Hooker, an Anglican (see Case Study 1.7), in an attempt to isolate the distinctive theological positions of both men regarding sacramental and salvation theology. Spinks’ aim is to let the theologians speak and to counter the view that there was one prevailing hermeneutic interest among Anglicans in Elizabethan times. The phenomena he presents, albeit on a somewhat limited scale in that he only deals with two theologians, nonetheless suggests that there was considerable divergence in theological position in Elizabethan times. In his 2002 book, *Sacraments, Ceremonies and the Stuart Divines*, Spinks examines sacramental theology and liturgy in England and Scotland in the period 1603-1662, using the same phenomenological approach but employing a much larger number of case studies, in order to assess the essence of sacramental theology in this latter period of the Reformation. Descriptive phenomenology is followed by assessment and judgment of the material presented. Spinks makes the point that the argument advanced by the Oxford Movement in the nineteenth century that there was a unified Anglican position on the Eucharist dating from this later Reformation period and accessible in the works of divines favoured by the
Oxford Movement, theologians such as Hooker, Andrewes, Cosin and Laud, cannot be substantiated due the diachronic nature of Anglican sacramental theology in this period. The variety of views on the Eucharist from the later Reformation period is established by a methodology of descriptive phenomenology (examining the phenomena of the period) and at a later stage making assessments and judgments about the Anglican eucharistic tradition as a whole.

This thesis attempts to follow the example of Stone and Spinks, but to broaden the scope of their phenomenological methodology to include not only description of the Anglican eucharistic tradition from the time of the Reformation to the present, but also preliminary classification of the phenomena according to the philosophical concepts of realism and nominalism to both the moderate and immoderate degrees. The three ways of knowing developed by Jurgen Habermas (technical, hermeneutic and critical) are also used in this thesis, allowing for a distinction to be made between the particular interests of church parties (the technical and hermeneutic interests) and the critical interests relevant to the Anglican eucharistic tradition as a whole. Taken together these methodologies represent an attempt (following on from the work of Lovat, 2002a) to develop a critical model of religious education appropriate to the Anglican eucharistic tradition and a critical methodology for analysing the Anglican eucharistic tradition which applies the praxis approach of the enfaithing model of religious education with the phenomenological approach of the social sciences, often employed in the interfaith model of religious education.

2.4 A Phenomenological Approach to the Anglican Eucharistic Tradition

This thesis argues that Anglican eucharistic tradition varies significantly in relation to the underlying philosophical assumptions that are brought to any critical consideration of the Eucharist, especially as this relates to the nature of sacramentality in general and to the eucharistic theology in particular. It is also argued that these issues have generally remained unconsidered in any systematic and unified model within the Anglican tradition. There have been some attempts to provide descriptive assessments of the Anglican eucharistic tradition, such as Stone (1909), but not for the Anglican eucharistic tradition as a whole up
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to the present day. Other attempts such as Spinks (1999 and 2002) have attempted the application of a phenomenological approach on a limited scale in relation to the study of Anglican eucharistic theology and with accompanying analysis of the essences extracted, while others such as Buchanan (1968, 1975 and 1985) have used it specifically in relation to eucharistic liturgies.

This thesis attempts to use the methodology of phenomenology in relation to the Anglican eucharistic tradition. Combined with philosophical reflection, the thesis argues that there is the potential to bring greater unity to the Anglican eucharistic tradition than presently exists. Specifically this philosophical analysis relates to the concepts of realism and nominalism and to the way in which the signs of the Eucharist (the bread and wine and their offering) are considered by the theological reflection of the Anglican eucharistic tradition to be linked or not linked to the signified of the Eucharist (the nature of Christ’s body and blood and the nature of Christ’s sacrifice). The fact that these philosophical issues remain for the most part unconsidered and unorganised within the Anglican tradition is problematic, since the underlying philosophical differences in eucharistic theology remain generally unorganised and yet have important ramifications for the teaching of sacramental theology. As such, consideration of these issues represents one of the more profound issues of the Anglican eucharistic tradition and its associated theological education. Without adequate consideration of these philosophical issues, theological education will always lack unity and a critical edge and depend too heavily on technical interests (e.g. answers to questions like: ‘How is Christ present in the Eucharist?’ and ‘How is his sacrifice remembered in the Eucharist?’) and hermeneutic interests (e.g. the theological position of particular parties, such Anglican Catholic or Anglican Evangelical, with their particular historical and theological biases, within the wider tradition of Anglicanism). Often the technical interests are closely related to the hermeneutic traditions of parties within Anglicanism and together the technical and hermeneutic interests are often determinative and normative for the eucharistic theology adopted by different traditions within Anglicans. Catholic Anglicans for example, mostly answer the question of how Christ is present in the Eucharist by reference to realist notions involving a real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, in a general way as the whole eucharistic action of priest and people together and more specifically focused in the eucharistic elements of bread and wine. Catholic Anglicans also refer to realist notions of dynamic remembrance
or *anamnesis*, where the effects of Christ’s historic sacrifice are known in the present in the Eucharist. Evangelical Anglicans, on the other hand, often do not think within such realist frameworks and so deny the notions of real presence and *anamnesis*, and use a nominalist separation of sign and signified, where the eucharistic elements function to remind a faithful communicant of past and completed event (that is, Christ’s sacrifice contextualised in a metalinguistic and propositional manner rather than in any real way dependent on the sacramentality of signs and their use). For these Evangelicals there is no realist identity of Christ in the present with the Eucharist or the elements of bread and wine but only in a faithful remembering or bringing to mind by conscious thought of a past and completed event, that is, Christ’s sacrifice on the cross.

These philosophical concepts of realism and nominalism will be examined in depth in the next chapter of the thesis (Chapter 3). The profound nature of the methodology of phenomenology and the underlying philosophical assumptions of realism and nominalism for the Anglican eucharistic tradition, has the potential to raise theological reflection and theological education in eucharistic theology above the party-based issues of particular hermeneutic interests by critically considering the Anglican eucharistic tradition as a whole in terms of its philosophical foundations rather than merely examining the commitments of particular technical and hermeneutic interests. This in turn has the potential of providing a more satisfying and unified approach to the understanding and teaching of sacramental theology in general and eucharistic theology in particular. Such an approach is distinguished by its critical interest or way of knowing.
Chapter 3

Realism and Nominalism within the Problem of Universals: A Philosophical Model for conceptualising the Anglican Eucharistic Tradition

3.1 Philosophy and Theology

The methodology of phenomenology was discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis as a way of examining the varied experience of the Anglican eucharistic tradition without privileging particular technical and hermeneutic commitments. This experience will be examined in depth in the Case Studies (see accompanying CD) and the essences of the Anglican eucharistic tradition will be extracted (Chapter 4) and the ramifications for theological education drawn out in Chapters 5 and 6. Another important way of examining the experience of the Anglican eucharistic tradition is to consider the philosophical assumptions underlying the theology of the Eucharist. This chapter aims at discussing these philosophical assumptions.

This thesis argues that in any consideration of Anglican eucharistic theology and the particular interests of church parties, the philosophical assumptions underlying those theologies and interests are important, since these assumptions influence the ways of knowing within these particular interests. The technical and hermeneutic interests of Catholic Anglicans are often dependent on the philosophical assumptions of realism centring around a principle of the sacramental activity of the divine in the world through things of the world, whereas the interests of Evangelical Anglicans are often dependent on the philosophical assumptions of nominalism centring around semantic propositionalism focussed in the text of the Scriptures and personally adopted by the individual believer. An
awareness of the distinctions between these philosophical assumptions allows eucharistic theology to function with greater critical interest and intent. Furthermore, awareness of these philosophical assumptions also has important ramifications for the design and delivery of programs of theological education in eucharistic theology in allowing these programs to engage critically with particular and differing ways of knowing, and not just with the particular technical and hermeneutic interests of certain groups or parties alone. The promotion of such an interfaith model of religious and theological education focuses on the development of critical interest, allowing the acknowledgment of the varying theological and philosophical commitments of a tradition. At the same time awareness of the philosophical assumptions underlying eucharistic theology allows for the acknowledgment of the importance of enfaithing models of religious and theological education and the particular technical and hermeneutic interests these models promote but does not privilege these over other technical and hermeneutic interests since such awareness admits the multiformity of interests. Programs of religious and theological education need to keep both these interfaith and enfaithing models in mind in order to promote a critical approach to the education they provide.

In the previous chapters it was suggested that if theological education was to move beyond the technical and hermeneutic interests of particular church parties within Anglicanism and to embrace a critical view of knowledge, then theological education has the potential to be emancipated from the constraints of narrow party interests alone. An examination of the philosophical assumptions underlying the phenomena of the Anglican eucharistic tradition is therefore seen as part of the development of a critical approach to knowing. While both technical and hermeneutic interests seem to dominate in Anglican eucharistic theology and in theological education, then critical interest and the emancipation this brings to education, will be limited, and religious and theological education will remain fetishised and impoverished.

This chapter aims to provide some detailed background to the philosophical assumptions, underlying the phenomena of the Anglican eucharistic tradition that are examined using a phenomenological methodology in the case studies presented in this thesis (see The Case Studies on the accompanying CD).
Modern thinking in both philosophy and theology, among both secular and Christian thinkers, has addressed the distinction between realist and non-realist or anti-realist assumptions. Peter Byrne observes that the current literature of both philosophy and theology is full of discussion of realism (Byrne, 2003: 1) where realists are those philosophers who “affirm that reality exists independently of the mental” (Byrne, 2003: 2). On the other hand those who argue that reality is a product of the mind, existing in rational structures like propositional language are called non-realisits or anti-realists. The core claim of realism is that there is a mind-independent reality and that it is a structured and formed reality, whereas non-realists or anti-realists deny this (Byrne, 2003: 3-4). When this is applied to theology, the fundamental question becomes, “Can the apparent intent behind talk of God to refer to an entity existing in some sense beyond us and the universe be taken seriously?” (Byrne, 2003: 4). Theistic realists answer this question in the affirmative with the governing intent behind the concept of God as transcendent and mind-independent, such that the truth-makers are independent of the concepts and beliefs belonging to and known to human communities and individuals. Theistic anti-realists deny that there is a structured, mind-independent world to which human beings can refer and make statements that are true or false (Byrne, 2003: 6-7). Anti-realists argue that the world is moulded by our beliefs and concepts and therefore deny the existence of a world of things and properties existing independently of people. A theistic realist would be someone like John Macquarrie (1997), while a theistic anti-realist would be someone like Don Cupitt (1993).

While this distinction between realism and anti-realism is current in modern philosophy and theology, the distinction itself is not the real concern of this thesis. Instead this thesis argues that a more vital distinction in Anglican eucharistic theology is the distinction between realism and nominalism within the larger philosophical question of the problem of universals. The distinction between realism and nominalism is the focus of significant contemporary secular philosophical reflection (principally in the work of David Armstrong) but has generally not been as widely associated with theology in the modern era, although it was in earlier times, especially in the scholastic and medieval periods (see Copleston, 2003: 136-155, for a detailed treatment of the problem of universals, including discussion of realism and nominalism in the medieval period). These medieval issues are not of crucial importance for this thesis and will not be examined in detail here. The modern distinction
between realism and nominalism (using principally the work of Armstrong) will however be the focus of detailed exploration below in this chapter of the thesis.

The distinction between realism and nominalism will be explored in much great detail below but for the present it is sufficient to distinguish between realism and nominalism on the basis of whether or not there is any linking in a real way between particulars and universals, which will be referred to here as ‘signs’ (the particular) and ‘signified’ (the universal). Whereas realists argue that signs and signified are linked in a real way (that is, signs instantiate, or are an instance of the signified), nominalists deny this, arguing that any categories of classification (like instantiation) are optional and unconstrained by any pre-existent kinds of properties in the world apart from propositional thinking and semantic structures. These philosophical assumptions impact on eucharistic theology in that a realist theology implies acceptance of the philosophical assumptions underlying a sacramental principle (that is, where God is seen to use signs: things of this world such as bread and wine, to convey or to contain the signified: things of a divine nature such as the nature of Christ’s body and blood). Nominalists, on the other hand, deny the realism of the sacramental principle and argue that knowledge of a divine reality occurs by rational and semantic propositionalism, principally reflection on the preaching and hearing of the text of Scripture, without any realist linking or instantiation of sign and signified. The experience of the Anglican eucharistic tradition suggests that the philosophical assumptions of realism and nominalism underlie the technical and hermeneutic interests and ways of knowing in the two main strains of Anglican eucharistic theology: those that accept the sacramental principle and those that do not. This distinction between realist and nominalist philosophical assumptions, within the broader question of the problem of universals, will be used as the principal and preliminary means of discriminating between the experience of the Anglican eucharistic tradition as presented in the case studies of the thesis – see the CD accompanying this thesis.

Both ancient and modern philosophy and theology distinguish between realism and nominalism within the context of the problem of universals. A detailed examination of this distinction will be undertaken in the work of modern philosophers at the beginning of this chapter, together with reference to a number of pre-modern philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas. This thesis suggests that reference to the work of these
ancient and modern philosophers is useful in providing the foundation for understanding eucharistic theology in terms of the distinction between realism and nominalism within the problem of universals. The approach of considering and adapting existing philosophical schemes and assumptions in theology is not without precedent. Augustine, for example, applied Plato’s work in the development of his eucharistic theology and Aquinas did the same using the philosophical insights of Aristotle. The fact that the philosophical models used by both Augustine and Aquinas were not essentially Christian does not seem to be important. In the same way it is suggested that modern secular philosophical insights can also be used to analyse and model Anglican eucharistic theology. Such an approach has the promise of re-configuring or re-inventing the Anglican eucharistic tradition, in the way that Bruce Kaye suggests is appropriate for Anglicanism generally (see Chapter 1 where the work Kaye, 2003 was discussed). The intention of such an approach is to provide the Anglican eucharistic tradition with a more critical edge or way of knowing. Such an approach also has the potential to limit the fetishisation and impoverishment of the Anglican eucharistic tradition where that tradition is based on technical and hermeneutic interests of church parties alone to the exclusion of more broadly based philosophical models that allow for a greater degree of critical analysis of the tradition as a whole. This development of critical interests has important ramifications for theological education in relation to eucharistic theology (see Chapter 5) in that it has the potential to emancipate the Anglican eucharistic tradition from the constraints of the particular technical and hermeneutic interests of church parties and their theologies of the Eucharist. This thesis therefore presents a significant potential development for re-configuring Anglicanism and eucharistic theology in particular.

Modern philosophers have built upon ancient and medieval philosophical analysis, concerning the distinction between realism and nominalism within the problem of universals. This area of philosophical analysis has recently received significant attention from secular philosophers (e.g. Armstrong, 1989, 1995, 1997, 2004; Loux, 2002; Marion, 1995; and Tooley, 1999) as well some limited reference by Christian philosophers (e.g. Ford, 1995; Patterson, 1999; Moore, 2002). The work of these philosophers will be explored below and linkages made to Anglican eucharistic theology.
3.2 Michael Loux and some ancient philosophers

Michael Loux has written extensively in the area of metaphysics and recently published the second edition of a book entitled *Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction*. Loux’s work will be used to introduce the distinction between realism and nominalism. Loux distinguishes realists and nominalists in the following way:

“Realists claim that where objects are similar or agree in attribute, there is some one thing that they share or have in common; nominalists deny this. Realists call these shared entities universals; they say that universals are entities that can be simultaneously exemplified by several different objects; and they claim that universals encompass the properties things possess, the relations into which they enter, and the kinds to which they belong.” (Loux, 2002: 20).

Loux sees an implicit realism in nature, arguing that:

“the objects we talk and think about can be classified in all kinds of ways” but “it is not as if we just arbitrarily choose to call some things triangular, others circular, and still others square; they are triangular, circular, and square. Likewise, it is not a mere consequence of human thought or language that there are elephants, oak trees, and paramecia. They come that way, and our language and thought reflect these antecedently given facts about them.” (Loux, 2002: 21).

Indeed Loux argues that there are “objective similarities among things” and that such a claim is “not a claim born of any metaphysical theory” (Loux, 2002: 21). Rather, such a claim can be described as “a prephilosophical truism” and as such “one that has given rise to significant philosophical theorising”. The whole issue goes back, argues Loux, to the origins of metaphysics itself and concerns “whether there is any general explanation for the prephilosophical truism that things agree in attribute” (Loux, 2002: 21).

This is not a new idea and indeed Plato had an affirmative answer to the question of a general explanation in his work *Parmenides* where he says: “there exist certain Forms of which these other things come to partake and so to be called after their names; by coming to partake of Likeness or Largeness or Beauty or Justice, they become like or large or beautiful or just” (Plato, *Parmenides*, 130E-131A, Online). Following Plato many other philosophers were attracted to this scheme. Augustine (died c. 604) was the principal channel through which this form of Greek thinking came into Christian Europe and Christian thinking. Augustine based his theology on a Platonic realism, arguing that there
are eternal and immutable Forms that are exemplars of the divine mind. Augustine argued, for example “when the mind confesses that it too is changeable because of its failure and success in wisdom, it finds that above itself exists an unchangeable truth” (Augustine, *Eighty-three Different Questions*, 45, 1, edn. Mosher, 1982: 76). This unchangeable truth for Augustine was transcendent, ultimately being found in God, but nonetheless in a realist way participating in and identifying with material objects. It was through the sacraments, for example, that the truths participated in the material in a transcendent way. Augustine argued that it was through the sacramental signs of bread and wine that the faithful communicant received the reality of Christ’s body and blood and sacrifice, even though Christ’s body and blood as something with universal significance stood apart from the physical objects of bread and wine in space and time. There was in Augustine’s scheme a linking of sign and signified in a realist philosophical manner. Augustine says, as an example, “That bread which you see on the altar, consecrated by the word of God, is the body of Christ. That chalice, or rather, what the chalice holds, consecrated by the word of God, is the blood of Christ” (Augustine, *Sermons*, 227, cited in Muldowney, 1977: 196).

This realist language does not however function in a crude physical or fleshy manner, but rather a real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, not dependent on immoderate fleshy characteristics but on participation of the earthly signs in heavenly realities. Augustine says therefore, denying a fleshy notion of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist, “to eat that food and to drink is to abide in Christ and to have him abiding in oneself” (Augustine, *Tractates on the Gospel of John*, 26, 18, edn. Rettig, 1988: 274).

Later theologians adopted a more immanent realist theology of the Eucharist relying on a notion of change in substance. Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274) for example, says:

“Now it is evident that Christ’s body does not begin to be present in this sacrament by local motions. First of all, because it would follow that it would cease to be in heaven; for that which is moved locally does not come anew to some place unless it quit the former one. … Consequently it remains that Christ’s body cannot begin to be anew in this sacrament except by change of the substance of bread itself. But what is changed into another thing, saving the truth of this sacraments, the substance of the bread cannot remain after the consecration.” (Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, III, 75.2, edn. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 1981: 2441-2442).

Aquinas’ immanent realism, deriving from Aristotle, operated in terms of properties and relations, that is, the nature or essence of the body and blood of Christ and of Christ’s
sacrifice were seen to be present in the particulars of bread and wine and their offering. This brings the universal and the particular together in an immanent realist framework, whereas Augustine separated the universal and the particular, with the particular (the bread and wine on earth in the Eucharist) participating, nonetheless in the universal Form (the body and blood of Christ in heaven) in a transcendent manner. Aquinas’ immanent realism resisted the idea of too simple a participation of universals in particulars (such as is found in Augustine’s transcendent realism) and instead sought to define more closely the link between the sign and the signified. Aquinas expressed this through the idea of a change in substance, where the substance of the bread and wine became (philosophically described as instantiated) the substance of the body and blood of Christ, but with the accidents (that is, the outward appearance of the bread and wine) remaining. This was called transubstantiation. Like Augustine, Aquinas did not advocate a fleshy or physical presence of Christ in the Eucharist, but rather a change of substance. Aquinas says:

“Christ’s body is not in this sacrament in the same way that a body is in a place, which by its dimensions is commensurate with the place; but in a special manner which is proper to this sacrament. Hence we say that Christ’s body is upon many altars, not as in different places, but sacramentally: and thereby we do not understand that Christ is there only as in a sign, although a sacrament is a kind of sign; but that Christ’s body is here after a fashion proper to this sacrament.” (Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, III, 75.1, edn. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 1981: 2441).

This immanent realist theology of Aquinas is different from Augustine’s transcendent realist theology of the Eucharist, although the realism expressed by both Augustine and Aquinas operates in what this thesis will later call moderate realism, that is, a realism not dependent on a fleshy or physical presence, but on a real presence (of substance) nonetheless. Indeed Aquinas argues “in no way is Christ’s body locally in this sacrament” (Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, 76.5, edn. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 1981: 2453). This is an important distinction and one not always understood. Aquinas is careful to deny any sense of a fleshy presence or bloody sacrifice in the Eucharist, but at the same time careful to affirm that the substance or essence (the nature of Christ) is present in the Eucharist in a real way.

Nominalism on the other hand was a reaction to the extreme and uncompromising realism of the Middle Ages (Carre, 1961: 36) that led to corruptions of Aquinas’ carefully nuanced
philosophical position and spoke instead of a fleshy or immoderate presence and sacrifice of Christ in the Eucharist. The writings of Abelard (1079-1142) and William of Ockham (c. 1285-1347) prepared the way for later nominalist theologies of the Eucharist. Ockham, for example, argued that signs were not part of the things they signified, in the way that realism asserted (Carre, 1961: 101-125). Huldreich Zwingli (1484-1531), the Swiss Reformer, adopted a nominalist position in relation to the Eucharist. He said “to eat sacramentally can be nothing else than to eat the sign or figure” (Zwingli, Works, ii, 212, quoted in Stone, 1909: II, 40). For Zwingli the words of Christ, saying ‘This is my body’ in Luke 22: 19, could only mean, ‘This signifies my body’ (Zwingli, Letter to Matthew Alber Concerning the Lord’s Supper, edn. Pipkin, 1984: II, 139). For Zwingli there could be no realist participation of bread and wine in the body and blood of Christ or any instantiation of the substance of Christ’s body and blood in the bread and wine of the Eucharist. Christ could only be eaten in the Eucharist with the heart and mind (Zwingli, An Exposition of the Faith, edn. Bromiley, 1953: 258) such that any eating or drinking was an act of faith alone and not dependent on or given by or with the signs of bread and wine. For Zwingli there was a nominalist separation of sign and signified in the Eucharist and this separation profoundly influenced future Reformed theology of the Eucharist. Some of the echoes of Zwingli’s theology can be heard in the case studies of Anglican eucharistic theology (see the CD of case studies accompanying this thesis) and have persisted to the present day within the Anglican eucharistic tradition. The Reformation Anglican theologian Thomas Cranmer (see case study 1.1) and the modern day Anglican theologian Robert Doyle (see case study 4.27) express a theology of the Eucharist based on this nominalist separation of sign and signified.

Modern secular philosophers also differ according to whether or not they adopt a realist or nominalist position. Philosophers such as Russell (1912), Strawson (1959), Wolterstorff (1970), Donagan (1976), Loux (1978) and Armstrong (1989) adopt a realist philosophical position while others such as Goodman and Quine (1947) adopt a nominalist position and reject the idea that there are abstract entities such as classes, relations and properties (Goodman and Quine, 1947: 1).

There are also some differences between realists. Whereas Plato and subsequently Augustine speak of things participating in a divine or eternal Form, others such as Aristotle
and Aquinas, say that things ‘instantiate’, ‘exhibit’ or ‘exemplify’ a single property, quality or attribute. Even though the terms differ, Loux argues that these philosophers are called metaphysical realists or just realists. Metaphysical realists distinguish between two types or categories of objects: particulars and universals. For the realist:

“What is peculiar to particulars is that each occupies a single region of space at a given time. Universals, by contrast, are construed as repeatable entities. At any given time, numerically one and the same universal can be wholly and completely exhibited or, as realists typically put it, exemplified by several different spatially discontinuous particulars. Thus, different people can exemplify the same virtue at the same time; different automobiles can simultaneously exemplify the same shape; and different houses can, at a given time, exemplify literally the same colour. The virtue, the shape, and the colour are all universals. The claim of the metaphysical realist is that familiar particulars agree in attribute in virtue of their jointly exemplifying a single universal.” (Loux, 2002: 22-23).

Nominalists however:

“deny that there are universals; and the central motivation for their view is the belief that our metaphysics should exhibit simplicity of theory”. Nominalists “believe that it is possible to provide fully satisfactory accounts of attribute agreement, subject-predicate discourse, and abstract reference that posits only particulars or individuals.” (Loux, 2002: 54).

There are different forms of nominalism. “The most extreme version endorses an ontology incorporating only particulars and holds that all claims apparently about universals are just disguised ways of making claims about concrete particulars.” (Loux, 2002: 54) Other philosophers find serious difficulties with this extreme version and so “endorse a metalinguistic form of nominalism. This view agrees that the only things that exist are concrete particulars, but holds that claims apparently about universals are really disguised ways of talking about linguistic expressions” (Loux, 2002: 54). Loux lists the different forms of nominalism as: austere nominalism, metalinguistic nominalism and trope theory. Austere nominalism argues that, “a particularist ontology provides us with all the resources we need for understanding the phenomena of attribute agreement, predication, and abstract reference” (Loux, 2002: 61). Austere nominalism posits, “the only things that exist are concrete particulars … things like individual persons, individual plants, individual animals, and individual inanimate material objects” (Loux, 2002: 61). Further Loux says that “what austere nominalism wants to claim is that an ontology of concrete particulars provides the resources for dealing with all the phenomena the metaphysical realist claims presuppose an ontology of multiply exemplifiable entities” so “we do not need universals
to handle the phenomena of attribute agreement” and “we are not to explain the phenomena at all. Instead, we are to take agreement in attribute to be a fundamental and unanalysable feature of the world” (Loux, 2002: 62). This is the view of Quine (1954) and Price (1953). In their view there “is an irreducibly basic fact about the world that different objects agree in attribute” and “there are no prior facts that serve to explain these facts” (Loux, 2002: 62).

The metalinguistic account of nominalism argues for “the ontological simplicity of austere nominalism and the explanatory simplicity of realism” and “agrees with austere nominalism in holding that only concrete particulars exist, but it rejects the austere nominalist’s analysis of abstract reference” (Loux, 2002: 73). The metalinguistic account of nominalism is therefore that “sentences incorporating abstract referring devices are implicitly metalinguistic: they are disguised ways of making claims about the linguistic expressions we use when we talk about non-linguistic objects” (Loux, 2002: 73). The metalinguistic account is ancient, according to Loux, who attributes its first use to Rosecelein of Compiegne in the 12th century, who put the idea “that talk about universals is really talk about certain linguistic expressions” (Loux, 2002: 74). Abelard, however was more specific and stated that “universals are meaningful linguistic expressions” (Loux, 2002: 74). Nominalists, observes Loux, face the problem of explaining how predicatable expressions can be meaningful in the absence of multiply exemplifiable entities. Ockham and Abelard took the view that only meaningful linguistic expressions can be universals, but they appealed to an inner language of the soul or language of thought to explain this view. “So the original nominalists all agreed that talk about universals is just talk about the elements of a language” (Loux, 2002: 74). This type of nominalism was not fully developed however until the second half of the twentieth century in the work of Wilfrid Sellars. Unlike the early nominalists, Sellars did not argue that a metalinguistic expression was to be understood as a type of universal. His view was that linguistic roles can be understood and analysed by reference to linguistic rules and these linguistic rules can be understood without reference to universals, but to concrete particulars alone (Sellars, 1976). Modern day Anglican Evangelicals adopt this metalinguistic approach in their understanding of theology. In the Anglican Diocese of Sydney for example a propositional account of revelation is attributed to the pioneering work of Broughton Knox, the one time Principal of Moore Theological College (Lawton, 2002: 190).
Where the austere and the metalinguistic forms of nominalism agree is in holding that the only things that exist are concrete particulars. Another group of theorists however, called trope theorists, argue that in addition to concrete particulars there are also attributes, but they deny that these attributes are multiply exemplifiable entities. “They hold that there are things like colours, shapes, sizes, and characters traits; but against the realist, they hold that these things are particulars” and that “concrete particulars have colours, shapes, and the like; but the attributes those particulars have are every bit as particular or individual as their possessors” (Loux, 2002: 84). Trope theorists argue, “it is metaphysically impossible for numerically distinct things to have numerically one and the same attribute” (Loux, 2002: 84). Trope theorists do not object to common or shared properties but they point out that we never meet exact similarity among concrete particulars. Although there are similarities, trope theorists argue that different concrete particulars have numerically different attributes. “So their rejection of shared attributes rests not on the empirical possibility of exact similarity, but on what they take to be categorical facts about attributes. They believe that by their very nature attributes are particulars and so can be possessed by just one concrete particular” (Loux, 2002: 84-85). Trope theorists also:

“believe that not just concrete particulars can be similar to each other; their attributes can as well. Thus, they will say that two red sweaters from the same dye lot have colour attributes – rednesses – that are alike, perhaps even exactly alike, but insist that exact similarity of attributes must be distinguished from numerical identity of attributes. … They will concede that we can say that the sweaters ‘have the same colour’, … but they will claim that when we say this, we are speaking loosely. Properly understood, these non-philosophical attributions of sameness are really just attributions of exact similarity to numerically different properties.” (Loux, 2002: 85).

Examples of trope theorists are: Stout (1930) and Campbell (1990).

Michael Loux’s work is useful in a definitional sense, but the work of David Armstrong is more developed in terms of a unified model of reality, and as such has particular relevance to this thesis and its consideration of Anglican eucharistic theology as a whole. A detailed examination of Armstrong’s work in relation to realism and nominalism and the problem of universals will now be undertaken.
3.3 David Armstrong

David Armstrong (born 1926) is a contemporary Australian philosopher and was from 1964 to 1991 the Challis Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sydney. Armstrong’s work in philosophy ranges over many of the main issues in epistemology and metaphysics and his influence and status is such that he has helped to shape philosophy’s agenda and terms of debate (Campbell, 1998: 31). A consistent theme running through Armstrong’s work is a naturalism that holds all reality to be spatio-temporal. Since the 1970’s Armstrong has given much attention to the question of universals, arguing a case for immanent realism in which properties, relations, universals and particulars are constituents of what he calls states of affairs. He has argued his case in four significant books: Nominalism and Realism. Universals and Scientific Realism (first published in 1978 and reprinted in 1995), Universals. An Opinionated Introduction (1989), A World of States of Affairs (1997) and Truth and Truthmakers (2004). Armstrong’s work on realism and nominalism and the problem of universals is proposed, by this thesis, to have relevance to the phenomena of the Anglican eucharistic tradition since it provides a means for critical reflection on the philosophical assumptions of the tradition as a whole, potentially emancipating it from the narrow boundaries of technical and hermeneutic interests which often exist within the Anglican tradition and its church parties. In turn, a unifying model of the Anglican eucharistic tradition (Figure 1 – to be discussed below), deriving from Armstrong, has significant implications and ramifications for the conduct of religious and theological education in the Anglican tradition. These implications and ramifications will be given fuller attention in Chapter 5 of this thesis, however at this point additional detail concerning the problem of universals and the concepts of realism and nominalism will be undertaken.

3.3.1 The Problem of Universals

For Armstrong, “the problem of universals is the problem of how numerically different particulars can nonetheless be identical in nature, all be of the same ‘type’” (Armstrong, 1995: 41). The problem is an old one, going back to Plato at least, as Loux (2002) has pointed out (see above) and involving the distinction between ‘token’ and ‘type’, drawn by the American philosopher C.S. Peirce in the nineteenth century (Armstrong, 1989: 1). Armstrong uses the following display to make the distinction between ‘token’ and ‘type’:
He asks the question: ‘How many words are there in the display?’ There are of course two answers. One answer would be that there are two words and another answer would be that there is one word. There are two tokens of the one type (Armstrong, 1989: 1-2). This distinction between ‘token’ and ‘type’ is ubiquitous and applies to words as it does to almost everything else there is. “The chief philosophical problem here is posed by sameness of type. Two different things, different particulars, can be of the same type” (Armstrong, 1989: 2). The meaning of the word ‘same’ needs careful consideration. ‘Same’ could mean ‘identical’ in a strict sense, but the two tokens are in a different place spatially, one being at the right side of the display and the other being at the left side of the display. Is there therefore something else then that makes them ‘of the same type’?. The two tokens have the same property (i.e. the combination of letters in a particular order and of a particular size and font style) but they are not strictly identical since they each occupy a different spatial position. Armstrong suggests that a better way of looking at the problem is to distinguish between ‘strict identity’ and ‘loose or popular identity’. “Strict identity is governed by a principle that is called Indiscernibility of Identicals. This says that if \( a \) is strictly identical with \( b \), then \( a \) and \( b \) have exactly the same properties. Sameness of thing gives sameness of properties” (Armstrong, 1989: 3). In the display above this principle cannot apply. ‘THE’ can only be strictly identical with ‘THE’ if they share exactly the same properties (e.g. size, position, colour, orientation etc). It is obvious using this definition that the two tokens are not strictly identical since the property of position is not exactly the same. Identity, Armstrong argues, in the display may better be described in the ‘loose sense’. Something can therefore be ‘the same’ (in the loose sense) without being ‘the same thing’ (in the strict sense) (Armstrong, 1989: 4). Armstrong reiterates this argument in his later book, *A World of States of Affairs* (1997), arguing, “there are two senses of the word ‘same’, one strict, classical, identity, and the other a looser sense of the word” (Armstrong, 1997: 15). Moderate realists, as Armstrong terms them, are those who argue for this loose sense of identity, whereas immoderate or Platonic realists argue that being the same implies a strict identity (Armstrong, 1989: 5). Nominalists, on the other hand, argue that a loose and popular identity applies to “two things of the same type because the same word is
applied to them” (Armstrong, 1989: 6). This is what Loux (2002: 73) calls ‘metalinguistic nominalism’. The two words ‘THE’ are of the same type in a nominalist analysis because the predicate ‘are words’ or the mental concept ‘word’, or a resemblance can be applied to both the words in a propositional manner. Sameness of type in the nominalist analysis is heavily dependent on semantics in the form of propositional statements.

Another example, offered by Armstrong (1989: 6), may be useful here. Examine this display:

![THE A](image)

Are the two tokens of the same type? The two tokens are obviously not the same word, but they are of the same type (words). The two tokens have a number of properties in common (e.g. capitals, font, words) but differ in others (e.g. position in the display, number of letters, configuration of letters and of course the letters themselves). The two tokens are not strictly identical but they are identical in a loose sense, being of the same type, that is they are both words.

### 3.3.2 Armstrong and Universals

Armstrong in, *Nominalism and Realism. Universals and Scientific Realism* puts the case that universals exist independently of the classifying mind. It is on this basis that he accepts realism and rejects nominalism (Armstrong, 1995: xiii). He goes on to argue that contemporary philosophy has two main lines of argument for the existence of objective universals. The first line of argument (realism) is that many different particulars can all have what appears to be the same nature. There is such a thing as identity of nature (Armstrong, 1995: xiii). The second line of argument (nominalism) concerns the identification of universals with many different meanings, arguing that there is therefore a movement from meaningful general words to the existence of universals. This second line of argument Armstrong sees as unsound, since a theory of universals must precede the semantics of general terms. Nominalism, heavily based on semantics, fails to do this (Armstrong, 1995: xiv). For Armstrong, universals, described as properties and relations,
cannot be identified with semantic notions such as propositional predicates, concepts or resemblances. The acceptance of this argument represents for Armstrong “an emancipation of the theory of universals from the theory of semantics” (Armstrong, 1995: 6) and leads to an acceptance of objective universals that cannot exist independently of particulars. Many others however, continue to operate in a nominalist framework and some of these theorists have been cited above in this chapter. Within the Anglican eucharistic tradition for example there are also those who base their eucharistic theology on nominalist assumptions (e.g. Doyle, 1996 – see Case Study 4.27 and Jensen – see Case Study 4.33) while at the same time there are other Anglicans whose eucharistic theology is based on realism (e.g. Macquarrie, 1997 – see Case Study 4.36 and Williams, 2002 – see Case Study 4.52). The eucharistic theology of these and other theologians is outlined in much greater depth in the case studies of this thesis found on the CD accompanying this thesis.

3.3.3 Nominalism and Realism

Nominalists and realists have different solutions to the problem of universals, that is, “the problem of how different particulars can nevertheless have the very same properties and relations” (Armstrong, 1995: 64). Both nominalists and realists agree that particulars (such as a sheet of white paper which is on a table) have properties (the paper has the property ‘white’) and stand in relation to other particulars such as a table (the paper stands in relation to the table in that it is ‘on the table’). Nominalists and realists however, dispute the analysis given to these properties and relations. “Nominalists deny that there is any genuine or objective identity in things which are not identical. The fundamental contention of nominalism is that all things that exist are only particulars” (Armstrong, 1995: 12). While nominalists agree that the paper has the property white and that another particular, such as a pen, can also have the property white, they deny that the paper and the pen have any objective identity (the property ‘white’). The nominalist may also agree that the paper and the pen both stand in relation to the table, in that they are both on the table, but deny that there is any objective identity (the relation ‘on the table’) independent of the classifying mind. The nominalist will argue that there is no objective identity in terms of property and relation, but only the same semantic propositions applicable to both particulars, the paper and the pen. Both particulars, the paper and the pen, ‘are white’ and both particulars, the paper and the pen, ‘are on the table’. For the nominalist this is all there is.
Realists, on the other hand, argue that more things exist than particulars and these are universals. Realists argue that “there genuinely is, or can be, something identical in things which are not identical” (Armstrong, 1995: 12). The paper and the pen are clearly not identical but there is something identical in them in that they both have the property ‘white’ and share the relation ‘on the table’. It is these properties and relations that Armstrong describes as universals (Armstrong, 1995: 6), arguing, “that particularity and universality, irreducible to each other, are both involved in all existence” (Armstrong, 1995: xiv). “A particular cannot be wholly present in a multitude of different places and times. But a property can. This is to say no more than: a number of different particulars can have the same property” (Armstrong, 1995: 79). For Armstrong therefore, “if we admit that things have objective properties and relations … then we are accepting a version of realism. It has been tacitly assumed that objective properties and relations are universals” (Armstrong, 1995: 77). To use the example above, the realist would argue that the property ‘white’ is a universal and the relation ‘on the table’ is also a universal, which can be instantiated (an instance of) in different particulars such as the white piece of paper and the white pen, both of which are white and both of which are on the table.

Armstrong, importantly for this thesis, distinguishes between those who hold ‘moderate’ and ‘immoderate’ views of both nominalism and realism (Armstrong, 1989: xii-xiii). Moderate nominalism, argues Armstrong, admits properties and relations but takes them to be particulars, capable of semantic and cognitive analysis, rather than universals. Moderate realism admits properties and relations but takes them to be universals. It brings the universals down to earth in an immanent way, into space-time. Universals in moderate realism are therefore capable of multiple location, being found wherever the particulars that instantiate the universals are found (Armstrong, 1989: 98). Immoderate nominalists substitute predicates, concepts, classes and resemblances for properties and relations. They do not admit the existence of universals but only particulars, each of which is a self-contained entity, related only by the semantic and cognitive analyses, such as predicates, concepts and resemblances, that apply to the particulars. Immoderate realists express a Platonic realism where earthly particulars may participate in eternal Forms. This however creates the difficulty of uninstantiated universals, or universals that may not be instantiated in any earthly particular. An example of such an uninstantiated universal Form would be
‘unicorn’, which is not instantiated on earth in any particular. Where are these uninstantiated universals to be found? Somewhere is needed to put them (a Platonic heaven?) since they are not found in the ordinary world of space and time. The Platonic view of immoderate realism results in two realms - a realm of universals and a realm of particulars - universals in ‘heaven’ and particulars in space-time. Universals and particulars, in immoderate realism, are therefore separated, with particulars participating in the universals (Divine Forms). The universals, for Plato, are therefore transcendent in immoderate realism, with instantiation implying a relation between universals and particulars (participation) that crosses between the two realms (Armstrong, 1989: 76) such that the universal participates in the particular in a strict or numerical sense. Armstrong considers each of these alternatives and rejects both immoderate nominalism and immoderate realism since he believes they are implausible (Armstrong, 1997: 22). He sees some plausibility in moderate nominalism (Armstrong, 1989: xi) but opts for moderate realism as the most plausible solution to the problem of universals (Armstrong, 1997: 22). In A World of States of Affairs (1997) he argues for moderate realism in what he terms a ‘state of affairs’. This will be discussed in greater depth below, however some other matters of definition need attention before this task is undertaken.

### 3.3.4 Nature and Identity

Armstrong in his discussion of realism uses the terms ‘identity’ and ‘nature’. In relation to ‘nature’ he says, “It is an intelligible possibility that there should be two particulars with exactly the same nature” (Armstrong, 1995: 82). By ‘nature’ Armstrong means the “single, all embracing spatio-temporal system” (Armstrong, 1995: 138) such that “to speak of the nature of a thing … is to speak of the properties of that thing” (Armstrong, 1995: 103). There can be two particulars, a piece of paper and a pen, but each shares exactly the same nature (the property ‘white’ and the relation ‘on the table’). “It is universals [properties and relations] that give a thing its nature, kind or sort.” (Armstrong, 1989: 94). Universals are therefore strictly identical in their different instantiations (Armstrong, 1997: 27). “The demand that universals be strictly identical in their different instances, the ‘powerful truism’, entails that for two instantiations of the same universal, the sameness of type involved must be strict identity” (Armstrong, 1997: 28). Despite the differences between particulars (the paper and the pen), the universal property ‘white’ and the universal relation ‘on the table’, are strictly identical, even though the particulars (the paper and the pen
themselves) are not strictly identical. It is the strict identity of the universal that is implied in moderate realism whereas it is the strict identity of the particular with the universal that is implied in immoderate realism.

Further, in regard to ‘identity’ Armstrong says, “Different particulars may be (wholly or partially) identical in nature.” (Armstrong, 1995: 109). This statement however, needs some clarification. Armstrong argues that there are two senses of the word ‘identity’. There is he says, ‘identity in nature’ and ‘numerical identity’ (Armstrong, 1995: 111). The paper and the pen are identical in nature (in that they both have the property ‘white’ and both stand in the relation ‘on the table’) but they are not numerically identical (a piece of paper is not strictly identical with a pen). Identity in nature is akin to loose identity and numerical identity is akin to strict identity.

3.3.5 Relational and non-relational realism

Numerical identity (or strict identity) Armstrong describes in terms of ‘relational realism’, where “particularity and universality are related constituents of particulars” (Armstrong, 1995: 102). In the example being used, numerical identity could only exist where the particularity of paper and the property ‘white’ are related constituents of a pen. Paper cannot however, be a constituent of a pen. Armstrong rejects such a union and argues for identity in nature (loose identity) or what he describes as ‘non-relational realism’. He says, “What is required is some more intimate union between the particularity and universality of particulars than mere relation. We require a non-relational form of immanent realism” (Armstrong, 1995: 107). This ‘non-relational realism’ acknowledges that different things (e.g. a piece of paper and a pen) lack a numerical identity in that a piece of paper is not strictly identical with a pen, but it also acknowledges they nonetheless share the same property (they are both white) and stand in the same relation (they are both on the table). Non-relational realism therefore does not require strict identity of particulars even though the properties or relations (universals) may be strictly identical. Armstrong concludes, “such identity in nature is literally inexplicable, in the sense that it cannot be further explained” (Armstrong, 1995: 109).
One Anglican writer, David Ford, the Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge University has taken up exactly this point in his discussion on what happens in the Eucharist (Ford, 1995). Here Ford (see Case Study 4.29) argues that the identity between bread and wine of the Eucharist and Christ’s body and blood is not relational realism but non-relational realism, that is, the bread and wine of the Eucharist instantiates the nature of Christ, such that the nature is strictly identical in both instantiations of bread/wine and body/blood, but that the particulars of bread and wine of the Eucharist are not strictly or numerically identical with the particulars of Christ’s body and blood, even though both particulars (bread/wine and body/blood) instantiate the same universal (the nature of Christ). Relational realism implies a fleshy or immoderate presence and sacrifice of Christ in the Eucharist, where bread and wine and their offering and Christ’s body and blood and sacrifice are seen as strictly identical. Relational realism therefore means that Christ is present in the Eucharist in a fleshy, bloody or carnal manner, where the bread and wine literally becomes flesh and blood and where Christ is re-sacrificed on the altar in the Eucharist. In other words this is called immoderate realism. Non-relational on the other hand implies a moderate or non-fleshy presence of Christ’s nature in the Eucharist, where bread and wine and Christ’s body and blood possess a loose identity, both instantiating the nature of Christ. In other words this is called moderate realism. This argument and the distinction between moderate and immoderate realism will be taken up in greater depth and applied in the consideration of case study material of this thesis (see the CD accompanying this thesis).

3.3.6 States of Affairs
Armstrong uses the term ‘states of affairs’ in a way similar to Wittgenstein’s use of the term ‘facts’. Wittgenstein says that, “The world is the totality of facts, not things.” (Wittgenstein, 1921/1995, *Tractatus*, 1.1). Armstrong argues, “that the world is a world of states of affairs” (Armstrong, 1995: 114) and sees ‘states of affairs’ and ‘facts’ as substantially the same (Armstrong, 1997: 1). Armstrong however, suggests that the word ‘facts’ is too much part of ordinary speech and so sees it as unsatisfactory. Instead he prefers the less colloquial ‘states of affairs’ (Armstrong, 1997: 19). For Armstrong “a state of affairs involves both particulars and universals and exists if and only if a particular (at a later point dubbed a thin particular) has a property or, instead, a relation holds between two or more particulars. The properties and relations are universals, not particulars.” (Armstrong, 1997: 114)
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1. Armstrong argues however that, “we should think of the world as a world of states of affairs, with particulars and universals only having existence within states of affairs.” (Armstrong, 1989: 94). States of affairs are seen as the “fundamental tie between particulars and universals” (Armstrong, 1997: 118).

Armstrong distinguishes, seemingly following Wittgenstein, a ‘factualist’ position from a ‘thingist’ position. It is Armstrong’s contention that a ‘thingist’ position has dominated Western philosophy based on a substance/attribute distinction, inherited from Aristotle, where substance was seen as being capable of independent existence (Armstrong, 1997: 4). This is the basis of Aquinas’ transubstantiation in the Eucharist (see Aquinas’ Summa Theologica) where the substance of Christ’s body and blood is present in bread and wine with the outward appearance of bread and wine (the accidents remaining). Armstrong argues however that properties are not like things. Properties exist as entities, not things. Properties are the way things are (Armstrong, 1997: 25). Accordingly Armstrong’s main aim in his book A World of States of Affairs, “is to defend a version of Factualism, that is, to defend an ontology of facts or states of affairs.” (Armstrong, 1997: 5). He says that, “A philosophy that admits both particulars and universals ought to admit states of affairs (facts), which have particulars and universals as constituents (not parts).” (Armstrong, 1989: 93). This means that:

“The Aristotelian realism about universals defended [by Armstrong] … brings universals, properties and relations, within states of affairs. The states of affairs, organised as they are organised, in turn constitute the whole of reality (space-time if the thesis of Naturalism is accepted). Given these universals, the world is unified in a way that it is not unified in Nominalist ontology. Identities run across the states of affairs.” (Armstrong, 1997: 265).

In a state of affairs, particulars instantiate (are an instance of) universals as properties and relations (e.g. a particular piece of paper instantiates the property ‘white’ and a particular pen instantiates the relation ‘on the table’). But asks Armstrong, ‘Why recognise states of affairs?’ And further, ‘Why not recognise simply particulars, universals (properties and relations) and instantiation of universals by particulars?’. Armstrong sets out his argument for recognising states of affairs in the following abstract way: if \(a\) (a particular) is \(F\) (a property), then \(a\) exists and \(F\) exists. \(a\) being \(F\) therefore involves something more than \(a\) and \(F\). There is something more than what Armstrong describes as the fundamental tie or nexus of instantiation. The existence of \(a\) and \(F\) and the instantiation does not amount to
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a’s being $F$ (i.e. $a$ could exist and $F$ could exist yet it fails to be the case that $a$ is $F$, e.g. $F$ is instantiated but not in $a$). The something more must be $a$’s being $F$. This ‘being’ is a state of affairs (Armstrong, 1989: 88) dependent on moderate realism and identity in nature or loose identity. Armstrong’s argument can be expressed more concretely in terms of the example given above in this way: a particular piece of paper instantiates the property white, so the particular piece of paper exists and the property white exists. The particular piece of paper being an instantiation of the property white involves something more than the particular piece of paper and the property white. There is something more than the fundamental tie or nexus of instantiation. The existence of the particular piece of paper and the property white and the instantiation of ‘white’ in the particular piece of paper does not amount to pieces of paper being white (i.e. the particular piece of paper could exist and the property white could exist, yet it fails to be the case that the particular piece of paper is white, e.g. being white is instantiated but not in the particular piece of paper in that another piece of paper could be another colour). The something more must be pieces of paper being white. It is whatever this ‘being’ is that is a state of affairs. All this depends on the distinction between what Armstrong calls ‘nature’ and ‘identity’. This distinction will now be considered again.

3.3.7 Nature and identity Again

Armstrong defines nature as “the single, all embracing spatio-temporal system” (Armstrong, 1995: 138) such that “to speak of the nature of a thing … is to speak of the properties of that thing.” (Armstrong, 1995: 103). Two particulars therefore can each have the same nature without having a strict or numerical identity. In relation to the Eucharist, following the argument of Ford (1995), bread and wine and the body and blood of Christ can have the same nature (Christ’s identity of nature) without having a strict or numerical identity. This means that bread and wine can have Christ’s identity of nature without being the particular of his literal flesh and blood. This suggests that Christ’s identity of nature is something more than either flesh/blood or bread/wine. The two (bread and wine on the one hand and body and blood on the other) in such a moderate realist analysis, share the same nature, that is, Christ’s identity of nature. The universal, Christ’s identity of nature, it must be emphasised is strictly identical in both instantiations, but the particulars are not. This means nothing more than that Christ’s identity of nature is in both instantiations of bread and wine and body and blood. It is the universal, Christ’s identity in nature, that
gives both particulars their nature since Christ’s identity in nature is instantiated in both particulars, that is the bread and wine on the one hand and Christ’s body and blood on the other. Care needs to be taken in using the terms ‘nature’ and ‘identity’. Nature has the sense of a loose identity, or identity in nature. There are therefore two senses in which Armstrong uses ‘identity’. There is ‘identity in nature’ (loose) and ‘numerical identity’ (strict). Where the word ‘identity’ is used in relation to the particulars of the Eucharist, it must be clearly differentiated whether ‘loose’ or ‘strict’ identity is meant. In the case of moderate realism, identity in nature (loose) is meant (the universal, Christ’s nature, is present in both particulars of bread/wine and body/blood) and in the case of immoderate realism, numerical identity (strict) is meant, where both particulars are seen as being identical (e.g. bread and wine is literally Christ’s body and blood). This latter form of realism, immoderate realism, is generally rejected by the Christian tradition.

The connection here to the Eucharist seems to be that bread and wine being the body and blood of Christ is not simply a matter of strict identity, in that bread and wine are in some way the fleshy body and blood of Christ, but more a matter of loose identity or identity in nature, where both particulars, bread and wine on the one hand and Christ’s body and blood on the other, instantiate the universal, that is, Christ’s nature. Interpreting Armstrong, this means that the Eucharist in such a realist analysis is described as a state of affairs, acting as the fundamental tie between the particulars and the universal. Armstrong in a critical sentence says, “identities run across states of affairs.” (Armstrong, 1997: 265). This means that the universal, Christ’s identity of nature, runs across the state of affairs that is the Eucharist and that there is an identity in nature between the different particulars of the Eucharist. This is the argument put by Ford (1995) when he speaks of non-relational realism and where he distinguishes between an immoderate form of realism (i.e. Christ is present in the bread and wine in a fleshy and bloody manner) and a moderate form of realism (i.e. Christ is present in the particulars of the Eucharist in nature but not in a fleshy or bloody manner).

The argument that Armstrong uses in his book, *Universals: An Opinionated Introduction* (1989: 88) and which is recounted above must therefore be applicable to the Eucharist in order to recognise the Eucharist as a state of affairs. Following Armstrong’s line of argument and inserting relevant details the argument runs as follows in relation to bread and wine and the
nature of Christ: If bread and wine (each a particular) is (that is, instantiates) Christ’s identity of nature (a property), then bread and wine exist and the nature of Christ exists. Note that the word ‘is’ refers to identity of nature (moderate realism) and not numerical identity (immoderate realism). Bread and wine being Christ’s identity of nature therefore involves something more than bread and wine and the nature of Christ. There is something more than what Armstrong describes as the fundamental tie or nexus of instantiation. The existence of bread and wine and Christ’s identity of nature does not amount to bread and wine being Christ (i.e. bread and wine could exist and the nature of Christ could exist yet it fails to be the case that bread and wine is the nature of Christ, e.g. the nature of Christ is instantiated but not in bread and wine as indeed it was in the person of Jesus and as it can be in the Word and the Church as the body of Christ). The something more must be bread and wine being Christ’s identity of nature (just as it could be said that the something more is the Word or the Church being Christ’s identity of nature). This is a state of affairs. This means that in any realist argument, bread and wine being the nature of Christ is the state of affairs called the Eucharist. This argument expresses therefore a moderate realist theology of the Eucharist.

3.3.8 Thin and Thick Particulars

Armstrong (1989) uses the terms ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ particulars to refine his argument and to distinguish between identity and instantiation. If \( a \) instantiates property \( F \), then \( a \) is \( F \). The ‘is’ is not the ‘is’ of identity (strict or numerical) as in \( a \) and \( F \) is \( F \). \( a \) and \( F \) are different entities - one a particular and the other a universal. This seems to suggest that \( a \) is what Armstrong terms ‘a bare particular’, that is, one lacking any properties. The property \( F \) seems to remain outside \( a \) in the way transcendent Forms remain outside the particular in immoderate realism (Plato’s theory of Forms). Armstrong however, maintains that seeing \( a \) as having no properties can be met by using the distinction between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ particulars. The thin particular is \( a \), taken apart from its properties. It is linked to its properties by instantiation, not by identity. \( a \) is an instantiation of \( F \), but it is not identical with \( F \). A particular piece of paper is not identical with the property white, but rather an instantiation of it. To present this argument in relation to the Eucharist, bread and wine are not identical with Christ’s body and blood, but an instantiation of the nature of Christ, that is, an identity in nature. It is only in this sense of moderate realism that the statement, ‘bread and wine is Christ’s body and blood’ can be used where this means that bread and
wine instantiate Christ’s nature. The word ‘is’ here must be interpreted in the moderate
realist sense of ‘being’. Indeed it is argued in this thesis that a lack of critical analysis of the
idea ‘bread and wine is Christ’s body and blood’ is the source of much confusion in the
Anglican eucharistic tradition, since often church parties rely on their technical and
hermeneutic interests alone with some assuming that this statement means that the bread is
now a piece of Christ’s human flesh and the wine is a cup of Christ’s human blood. This
analysis was certainly behind Zwingli’s rejection of realism and interpretation of the ‘is’ as
meaning ‘signifies’ in an attempt to distance himself from any fleshy or immoderate realist
interpretations (Zwingli, Letter to Matthew Alber Concerning the Lord’s Supper, edn. Pipkin,
1984: II, 139). To use ‘is’ in the sense of immoderate realism would mean that bread and
wine is both a piece of Christ’s human flesh and a cup of his human blood. Such an
immoderate position does not seem to exist within the Anglican eucharistic tradition (at
least in the case studies presented in this thesis on the accompanying CD) so the
expression ‘bread and wine is Christ’s body and blood’ needs very careful philosophical
analysis in order to bring out the meaning that bread and wine instantiates the nature of
Christ.

It is the use of ‘is’ as instantiation (loose identity or identity in nature), rather than strict or
numerical identity, that is characteristic of states of affairs. What Armstrong calls the ‘thick
particular’ is a state of affairs (i.e. the particular clothed with its properties) a being F or a
piece of paper being white, or to extrapolate, bread and wine being Christ’s body and blood.
What Armstrong calls a ‘thin particular’ is therefore propertyless, while a thick particular
enfolds properties within itself and is a state of affairs (Armstrong, 1989: 94-95). “The
properties of a thing are ‘contained within it’ because they are constituents of this state of

Armstrong uses the terms ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ to distinguish between identity and instantiation
(Armstrong 1989: 94-95). If bread and wine instantiate Christ’s identity in nature, then
bread and wine is Christ’s identity in nature. The ‘is’ is not the ‘is’ of identity (strict or
numerical) as in bread and wine is bread and wine and Christ’s identity in nature is Christ’s
identity in nature. Bread and wine and Christ’s identity in nature are different entities - one
a particular and the other a universal. This seems to suggest that bread and wine is what
Armstrong would term ‘a bare particular’, that is, one lacking any properties (apart from the
properties of ‘breadness’ or ‘wineness’ that is). The property the nature of Christ seems to remain outside bread and wine in the way transcendent Forms remain outside the particular in immoderate realism (Plato’s theory of Forms). Armstrong may well maintain therefore that seeing bread and wine as having no properties can be met by using the distinction between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ particulars. The thin particular is bread and wine, taken apart from its properties. It is linked to its properties by instantiation, not numerical identity. Bread and wine is an instantiation of Christ’s identity in nature, but it is not identical with Christ’s identity in nature. The thick particular is a state of affairs (i.e. the particular clothed with its properties) bread and wine being the nature of Christ, despite the fact that often in the Anglican eucharistic tradition this has been expressed as ‘bread and wine is Christ’s body and blood’. The thick particular or state of affairs must therefore be the Eucharist. A thin particular is therefore propertyless, while a thick particular enfolds properties within itself and is a state of affairs. The properties of a thing are ‘contained within it’ because they are constituents of this state of affairs.

3.3.9 The Truthmaker Argument
Armstrong also advances a powerful argument which he calls the ‘truthmaker argument’ (Armstrong, 1997 and 2004) and this also has relevance for this thesis and its consideration of the Anglican eucharistic tradition. Truthmakers can be traced back to Aristotle where he distinguishes between what is true and what is false (Metaphysics, 1011b, 26-29, edn. McKeon, 1971: 749 and in Categories, 14b, 14-22, edn McKeon, 1971: 60). The Scholastic philosophers also noted the existence of truthmakers, but after them the idea went underground for some centuries. Truthmakers resurfaced in the work of Russell (1940, 1948 and 1959) where Russell spoke of a ‘verifier’ (Armstrong, 2004: 4-5). Wittgenstein in the Tractatus (1921: 4.04) also discusses the issue of truthmakers through his theory of Sachverhalte which suggests that objects of the world configure together such that “an elementary sentence is true iff the simple objects designated by its constituent simple names are configured together in a Sachverhalte whose constituents correspond one-to-one with the constituents of the sentence” (Mulligan, Simons and Smith, 1984: 309). [Note: ‘iff’ is used by philosophers in logic to mean ‘if and only if’.] In more recent times reference to truthmakers has become more common in the work of Mulligan, Simons and Smith (1984) and of course in the work of Armstrong (1997 and 2004). For Armstrong, acceptance of truthmakers also necessitates acceptance of a realist theory for these truth. He says, “there
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is something that exists in reality, independent of the propositions in question, which makes the truth true. What makes the proposition a truth is how it stands to this reality” (Armstrong, 2004: 5). Armstrong, as opposed to Wittgenstein however, makes no demand for one-to-one correspondence for truth and truthmaker (Armstrong, 2004: 105). He accepts correspondence theory, “but in a form where it is recognised that the relation between true propositions and their correspondents is regularly many-many” since he says, “I do not think that we ever get a one-to-one” (Armstrong, 2004: 16). This suggests that a theory of correspondence (realism) dependent on one-to-one correspondence (strict or immoderate realism) is a mistake and that the way forward is to be found in moderate realism (the many-many situation of loose identity). This suggests further, in relation to this investigation of Anglican eucharistic theology, that while a correspondence theory of truth is possible, where it is found it is to be preferred in a moderate form of realism, such as has been briefly argued above. More will need to be said about this at a later stage, especially following consideration of the phenomena of the Anglican eucharistic tradition (see The Case Studies on the CD accompanying this thesis) and in the discussion of the essences of the phenomena in Chapter 4. For the present though, more needs to be said about the nature of truthmakers as proposed by David Armstrong.

Armstrong explains the truthmaker argument more fully in the following way:

“Let it be the case that particular \( a \) instantiates universal \( F \). \( a \) is \( F \). Must there not be something about the world that makes it to be the case, that serves as an ontological ground, for this truth? … The truthmaker or ground cannot be \( a \), at any rate if \( a \) is taken as the thin particular, the particular apart from its properties. Can it be the pair \( a \) and \( F \)? This is getting a little warmer. But what appears to be the decisive argument against this suggestion is that it is possible that \( a \) and \( F \) should both exist and yet \( a \) not be \( F \). \( F \) may be instantiated elsewhere.” (Armstrong, 1997: 115).

He continues: “We are asking what in the world will ensure, make true, underlie, serve as the ontological ground for, the truth that \( a \) is \( F \). The obvious candidate seems to be the state of affairs \( a ' s \) being \( F \). In this state of affairs \( a \) and \( F \) are brought together.” (Armstrong, 1997: 116). Armstrong goes on to say:

“I conclude that we can accept the truthmaker argument for states of affairs. No fatal or even unacceptable consequences flow from it. In particular there is no call to bind together the constituents of a state of affairs by anything beyond the state of affairs itself (in philosophical terms, an infinite regression). The
instantiation of universals by particulars is just the state of affairs itself.” (Armstrong, 1997: 119).

States of affairs therefore do not require further analysis. Armstrong says: “Instantiation of a universal is not something different from the states of affairs themselves” (Armstrong, 1997: 127) and so it can be argued that the constituents of states of affairs are restricted to the ordinary universals and ordinary particulars. “There is no universal, we may assert, of ‘being a state of affairs’ and so no universal of ‘instantiation.’” (Armstrong, 1997: 127). This means that states of affairs do not require further analysis and are therefore not subject to infinite regression.

Armstrong’s argument in his book, *A World of States of Affairs* (1997: 115-116) can be applied to the Eucharist as a state of affairs. Following Armstrong’s line of argument and inserting the relevant details the argument runs as follows in relation to bread and wine and the nature of Christ: Let it be the case that particular bread and wine instantiates the universal, Christ’s identity of nature. Bread and wine is Christ’s identity of nature. Note that ‘is’ indicates identity in nature (moderate realism), not numerical identity (immoderate realism). Must there not be something about the world that makes it to be the case, that serves as an ontological ground for this truth? The truthmaker or ground, as Armstrong calls it, cannot be bread and wine, at any rate if bread and wine are taken as the thin particular, the particular apart from its properties. Can it be the pair bread and wine and the nature of Christ? This is getting a little warmer. But what appears to be the decisive argument against this suggestion is that it is possible that bread and wine and the nature of Christ should exist and yet bread and wine not be the nature of Christ. The nature of Christ may be instantiated elsewhere. The nature of Christ is instantiated, for example, in the body and blood of Christ, in Scripture and in the eucharistic celebration and assembly, as well as in bread and wine. It is therefore being asked what in the world will ensure, make true, underlie, serve as the ontological ground for, the truth that bread and wine is Christ’s identity of nature. The obvious candidate seems to be the state of affairs bread and wine *being* Christ’s identity of nature, just as it could be Scripture *being* Christ’s identity of nature or the eucharistic assembly *being* Christ’s identity of nature. In the state of affairs ‘bread and wine *being* Christ’s identity of nature’ bread and wine and the nature of Christ are brought together in an immanent realist manner where the particular (bread and wine)
instantiates the universal (the nature of Christ). Armstrong concludes therefore that the
truthmaker argument for states of affairs can be accepted. This truthmaker argument
therefore for the Eucharist as a state of affairs can also be accepted, although it needs to be
pointed out that Armstrong nowhere accepts this argument specifically in relation to the
Eucharist. This thesis has however applied Armstrong’s truthmaker argument to the
Eucharist in a moderate realist manner as a contribution to the continuing development
and expression of the Anglican eucharistic tradition.

3.3.10 The Question of Truth

The question of ‘truths’ is an important one for Armstrong. He puts the following case:

“consider the truth that $a$ is hot and that $a$’s molecules are in more or less violent
motion. The two statements are surely not the same statement: the difference in
their meaning ensures that here we have two different truths. Yet we do not
have here two different states of affairs. … So two truths with only one

Truthmakers (states of affairs or their constituents) therefore entail truths. Truth therefore
attaches in the first place to propositions that have a truthmaker (Armstrong, 1997: 131).

Armstrong concludes therefore:

“When we say that the world is a world of states of affairs, and when we say that
it is a spatio-temporal system, we are describing the one world in two different
ways, ways that are linguistically and conceptually to a degree orthogonal to each
other but which describe the one realm, a realm which is truthmaker for the true
statements in both vocabularies. The hypothesis advanced in this thesis is that
the description of reality in terms of states of affairs is, if rather abstract,
ontologically more fundamental. The description in terms of a spatio-temporal
system is, undoubtedly, much more accessible epistemically and conceptually.
But the two descriptors are describing the same reality” (Armstrong, 1997: 136-
137).

The question of ‘truths’ is vital in this argument and is used in this thesis in relation to the
Eucharist. In the Eucharist we have more than one truth or instantiation. The particulars
of bread and wine and the body and blood of Christ are two truths which instantiate the
universal, the nature of Christ. The presence of Christ in the reading of the Scriptures, in
the eucharistic celebration and assembly are other truths which also instantiate the same
universal, the nature of Christ. There are several instantiations yet there is only one state of
affairs - the Eucharist in which the universal, Christ’s nature, is known. There is more than
one truth but there is only one truthmaker (Armstrong, 1997: 130). Truthmakers (states of affairs and their constituents) therefore entail truths, which in this thesis is being called an instantiation. Truth therefore in the first place attaches to propositions that have a truthmaker (Armstrong, 1997: 131). This thesis investigates whether or not the truthmaker argument for the Eucharist can be a state of affairs based on moderate realist assumptions and uses the witness of the Anglican eucharistic tradition to assist in making this judgment. The case studies of this thesis (see CD) and the critical analysis of the essences of the Anglican eucharistic tradition (Chapter 4) will assist in this process. Ramifications of these essences for theological education in the Anglican tradition (Chapter 5) will follow that discussion. The debt to the philosophical insights of Armstrong is considerable in the pursuit of this investigation, however, a more definite answer must await later analysis following consideration of the phenomena in the form of case studies.

It must be realised that the above argument depends on the acceptance of a realist analysis, such as Armstrong proposes. At the same time it also needs to be recognised that within the Anglican eucharistic tradition there are those who do not accept realism in relation to eucharistic theology (e.g. signs are not seen to be linked with the signified, nor is the sacramental principle accepted by some, that is, where God is said to use things of this world to convey God’s presence and grace). There are those within the Anglican eucharistic tradition who accept a nominalist analysis, where truthmakers dependent on realism, as well as universals and the idea of Christ’s identity of nature are not accepted as philosophical assumptions (e.g. Robert Doyle, 1997 – see Case Study 4.27). In such a nominalist analysis as Doyle presents, bread and wine on the one hand and Christ’s body and blood on the other hand are both particulars, without any realist identity in nature and without any talk of universals and states of affairs being necessary to explain how the world is. The value of Armstrong’s work for the Anglican eucharistic tradition is that a consideration of both of these positions, realism and nominalism is described and that the way each operates in moderate and immoderate degrees is considered. This thesis seeks to investigate whether such an analysis is congruent with the evidence of the Anglican eucharistic tradition and if so what implications such an analysis has for theological education in that tradition. Consideration of both realism and nominalism in the Anglican eucharistic tradition, to both moderate and immoderate degrees, may not only help in understanding the multiformity of theological opinion within the Anglican tradition, but
may also assist in helping some within the tradition adopt a more nuanced understanding of eucharistic theology. This is particularly so among those Evangelical Anglicans who sometimes accuse other Anglicans of teaching a literal or fleshy theology of Christ’s presence and sacrifice in the Eucharist (immoderate realism), without adequately considering the philosophical distinction between moderate and immoderate realism. This thesis works towards establishing a unified model of reality within the Anglican eucharistic tradition, influenced by the work of Armstrong and others, and proposing a more satisfying and critical way of representing what is the Anglican eucharistic tradition. This is done with the realisation in mind that the Anglican eucharistic tradition is characterised by what seems to be a fundamental multiformity of view, both realist and nominalist philosophical assumptions underlying its eucharistic theology, and that such a critical way of considering the tradition as a whole is more preferable than the expression of particular technical and hermeneutic interests alone.

Armstrong is clearly not alone in his contemporary discussion of the problem of universals and related matters such as the distinction between realism and nominalism, states of affairs and truthmakers. The work of other contemporary philosophers will therefore now be considered in relation to the purposes of this thesis.

3.4 Michael Tooley

Michael Tooley’s (born 1941) account of realism and nominalism is distinguished by his use of the terms ‘concepts’ and ‘properties’ and the abstract nature of his discussion. He argues that ‘property’ refers “to entities that are postulated to explain objective sameness in the world” (Tooley, 1999: vii) whereas ‘concept’ is used “to refer to entities that are postulated to serve as semantic values of predicates” (Tooley, 1999: viii). This suggests that properties imply realism, and concepts imply what Loux calls metalinguistic nominalism.

Tooley, like Armstrong, says “particulars can be characterised as entities for which the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles does not hold – the idea being that it is precisely the particularity of particulars that make it possible for two particulars to resemble each other exactly without being identical” (Tooley, 1999: viii). This means that the following analytical statement applies:
“$x$ is a particular $\iff$ It is logically possible for there to be a $y$ which does not differ quantitatively from $x$, but which is not identical with $x$.” (Tooley, 1999: ix).

[Note: $\iff$ is used by Tooley for ‘iff’ meaning ‘if and only if’.

This is a statement of moderate realism where “exact resemblance is naturally understood as entailing the presence of shared properties” (Tooley, 1999: ix). This means that while properties are shared (quantitatively or as loose identity) there is no numerical or strict identity between two particulars (identical), hence moderate realism. This is useful in terms of this thesis since it provides an analytic statement of moderate realism which can be applied to the Eucharist where $x$ and $y$ are the particulars of bread/wine and Christ’s body/blood. Both are particulars which are not strictly identical with each other but nonetheless do not differ quantitatively in that they both instantiate the universal nature of Christ in the state of affairs known as the Eucharist. Another way to describe this universal nature would be in the theological terms of Christ as Word or logos, such that Christ existed as the logos of God for all time but was present at a point of time such that the logos became flesh and dwelt among people in the person and work of Jesus Christ (John 1: 14).

Tooley also defines ‘universal’, saying a “universal appeals to a fact about the relationship between universals and the things that have them — namely, the idea that universals are supposed to explain how two things can be objectively the same in some respect by being present in different things, even though those things do not spatio-temporally overlap each other. Tooley explains this by saying:

“$x$ is a universal $\iff$ It is logically possible for there to be two things, $y$ and $z$, such that $x$ is a part of $y$ and $x$ is part of $z$, but where there is no spatiotemporal region, $w$, such that $w$ is a part of $y$ and $w$ is a part of $z$.” (Tooley, 1999: ix).

This is also a very useful logical statement for the purposes of this thesis since it is a realist analytic statement of the relationship between particulars and the universal in the Eucharist, which could read more concretely as:
The nature of Christ or *logos* is a universal ⇔ It is logically possible for there to be two things, *the body and blood of Christ* and *the bread and wine of the Eucharist*, such that the *logos* is part of *the body and blood of Christ* and the *logos* is part of *the bread and wine of the Eucharist*, but there is no spatiotemporal region, such that this spatiotemporal region is part of *the body and blood of Christ* and *the bread and wine of the Eucharist*. This statement affirms moderate realism, affirming the strict identity of the universal in both instantiation but denying that the particulars are strictly identical. This analysis denies immoderate realism since it speaks of the instantiation of a universal in different particulars (loose identity), but at the same time denies strict or numerical identity of the particulars. Immoderate or Platonic realism however seeks a spatio-temporal region where Forms exist and where the particulars participate in these Forms.

It is important to note that Tooley does not apply this statement of moderate realism to the Eucharist, but that such an application nonetheless seems possible in the context of this thesis.

Tooley also considers nominalism, saying commitment to “nominalism involves the claim that the world contains no properties at all: it consists simply of featureless particulars” (Tooley, 1999: x). This means “sameness is nothing beyond belonging to some class, or falling under the same predicate” (Tooley, 1999: x). Tooley cites Goodman and Quine (1947) and Goodman (1956) as exemplifying this position. Tooley sees this position “as difficult to accept” (Tooley, 1999: x).

Tooley considers other forms of nominalism as well, arguing that ‘natural class nominalism’ “holds that the world consists of featureless particulars that involve neither tropes nor universals, but which nevertheless fall into ‘natural’ classes” (Tooley, 1999: xi). Quinton (1957) holds this position but Tooley argues that there are a number of objections to this view. Tooley says:

“First, the notion of a natural class appears to be a very dubious candidate for classification as a primitive notion. For what makes it the case that two objects belong to the same natural class? One would like to be able to say that it is something about the intrinsic nature of the objects, or the fact that they resemble one another in some way, that makes them members of a natural class.
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According to the present position, however, the fact that a class is natural is supposed to be an ultimate fact, not capable of further explanation. Second ... if one considers a property that is possessed by a number of things, the existence of the property in question is not dependent upon its possession by any particular entity: The property would still have existed even if all but one of the things that have that property had never existed.” (Tooley, 1999: xi).

Clearly Tooley does not accept this position either.

Tooley states that: “the most moderate type of nominalism among those that reject properties is Resemblance Nominalism”, with Price (1953) being cited as an example of someone who holds this view. In this view “particulars involve neither tropes nor universals, but they do stand to one another in relations of resemblance” such that “particulars do fall into natural classes” (Tooley, 1999: xi). Tooley however, argues that “the combination of the two claims that particulars do resemble other particulars, even though they possess no properties at all – either tropes or universals – is an incoherent position” (Tooley, 1999: xii), thereby not accepting this position either.

Tooley also considers trope theory, saying that in this theory, “particulars have properties, but where these properties are themselves particulars, rather than universals” (Tooley, 1999: xii). Trope theories are in two main versions – that advanced by Stout (1921-23) “according to which green things, for example, all possess particularised properties that fall into a certain natural class by virtue of exhibiting a ‘distributive entity’” (Tooley, 1999: xii). Tooley argues that Stout sees this as an ultimate and unanalysable type of unity. Tooley characterises Stout’s argument as “murky and unconvincing” (Tooley, 1999: xii) and so rejects it. The second way of formulating trope theory is that set out by Williams (1953) and Campbell (1981). Tooley says:

“According to this version, objects have particularised properties, and the latter can resemble one another to various degrees. In some cases, what one has is exact resemblance ... and for two objects to have ‘one and the same’ property can thus be analysed as having particularised properties that exactly resemble each other, and so which belong to one and the same equivalence class.” (Tooley, 1999: xii).

Tooley suggests that:

“the idea of equivalence classes of exactly resembling particularised properties provides Exact Resemblance Trope Theory with something that will do much of
Tooley sees this as better. This may in fact be the type of analysis that Cocksworth (see Case Study 4.25) has suggested in his analysis of Evangelical eucharistic theology in the Anglican tradition (Cocksworth, 1991 and 1993).

Tooley next considers realism, arguing that according to this view:

“reality involves both particulars and properties, but the latter, rather than being particulars, are universals. So if two objects are exactly the same shade of red, what one has is not exact resemblance between the redness of one and the redness of the other, but numerical identity: one and the same entity – redness of a specific shade, a universal – is part of both particulars.” (Tooley, 1999: xii-xiii).

Tooley’s use of ‘numerical identity’ is not suggesting immoderate realism, but rather taking up the same point which Armstrong makes when he says that universals are strictly identical in their different instantiations while the particulars express a loose identity (Armstrong, 1997: 27-28).

In conclusion Tooley argues that “Extreme forms of nominalism are unacceptable” (Tooley, 1999: xiv) philosophically. It cannot however be concluded that extreme or immoderate nominalism is unacceptable theologically since it is the preferred eucharistic theology of some of the Evangelical Anglican theologians reviewed in the case studies of this thesis (e.g. Doyle, 1997 – see Case Study 4.27).

Following Tooley, though, if extreme forms of nominalism are put aside, then there are two options which he sees as viable: Exact Resemblance Trope Theory and Realism. He concludes in favour of realism, as does Bertrand Russell who argued “if one tries to avoid postulating universals by appealing to resemblance, one is still left with one universal – namely, that of the relation of resemblance itself” (Russell, 1948: 95). Clearly Russell, like Tooley, concludes in favour of realism.
Tooley’s suggestion that exact resemblance tropes theory and realism are viable and his preference for realism, has importance for this thesis since both help to account for the divergent views on eucharistic theology within Anglicanism where some opt for a realist analysis of what happens in the Eucharist and others do not. There seems to be a sufficient number of both realist and non-realist analyses within the Anglican eucharistic tradition to suggest that Tooley’s preferences are a useful device for categorising the phenomena of the Anglican tradition, however it also seems that one of the weaknesses of Tooley’s approach, which is overcome by the work of Armstrong, is that Tooley speaks of realism as some consistent and undifferentiated whole. Armstrong’s approach differentiates between realism (and nominalism) in both a moderate and an immoderate degree, suggesting a strict and a loose form of realism. This analysis seems to be more consistent with the expression of eucharistic theology throughout Christian (and indeed Anglican) history and so seems to suit the purpose of this thesis, that is, finding a way to categorise the phenomena of the Anglican eucharistic tradition in a preliminary way before critical analysis and judgment at a later time. The application of both a moderate and immoderate degree in a nominalist account as well, accounts for additional variety within a significant strain of eucharistic theology, that is, Reformed or Evangelical Anglican theology, that does not depend on a realist analysis. Overall it seems that while Tooley, like Loux, has valuable insights which can be utilised in this thesis, the work of Armstrong is more satisfying in terms of a unified model, allowing for critical reflection on Anglican eucharistic theology. It is for this reasons that Armstrong’s work will be the basis for any consideration of the phenomena of the Anglican eucharistic tradition and for the subsequent assessment and judgment of the phenomena in relation to any ramifications for religious and theological education.

3.5 Jean-Luc Marion

Jean-Luc Marion, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Paris, in his book *God without Being*, reflects philosophically on the Eucharist and his work has particular relevance for this thesis. Marion argues for the abandonment of the ‘onto-theo-logical’ approach that confines God in terms of ‘Being’ (Tracy, 1995: xi). Marion argues for a theology which ceases being theo-*logy* and becomes theo-*logy*, and in so doing achieves a postmodern
version of theology which is revelation-centred, noncorrelational and postmetaphysical (Tracy, 1995: xi). Marion’s approach to God without Being, is written at the border between philosophy and theology (Marion, 1995: xix). What is at issue in Marion’s approach is not the possibility of God attaining being but rather “the possibility of Being’s attaining God” (Marion, 1995: xx). God is not therefore reduced to human measure in order to exist, since argues Marion, “if, to begin with, ‘God is love’, then God loves before being” and “He only is as He embodies himself” (Marion, 1995: xx). Marion does not mean however to insinuate that God is not, or that God is not truly God. In fact Marion says, “God, before all else, has to be” (Marion, 1995: 2), but at the same time he argues, “because God does not fall within the domain of Being, he comes to us in and as gift” (Marion, 1995: 3). This is essentially a realist position since Marion is arguing for a universal such that the universal is instantiated in Being as gift. This relates to the Eucharist since Marion argues that “one way of proceeding, as far as God is concerned, stems from the Eucharist: in it the Word leaves the text to be made flesh … love makes the body (rather than the reverse). … The Eucharistic gift consists in the fact that in it love forms one body with our body” (Marion, 1995: 3-4). This suggests a realist linking between a transcendent and mind independent reality and particulars of this world. In order to explain this in more depth, Marion speaks of the distinction between the ‘idol’ and the ‘icon’, where “the icon and the idol determine two manners of being for beings, not two classes for beings” (Marion, 1995: 8). The idol is comparable to what has been called in this thesis, immoderate realism (a fleshy reality) whereas the icon is comparable to moderate realism (an instantiation). Marion says: “The idol consigns the divine to the measure of a human gaze” and “presents a certain low-water mark of the divine” (Marion, 1995: 14) suggesting that any presence of Christ in the Eucharist as an idol is a physical or fleshy presence, dependent on the human senses such as touch or sight to apprehend the presence. Such a presence Marion sees as a lesser presence (‘low-water mark of the divine’) and is what this thesis calls immoderate realism, “since the idol offers the materially visible original of [God]” and consists of “what portion of it a gaze can bear” (Marion, 1995: 14). On the other hand, “the icon does not result from a vision but provokes one” (Marion, 1995: 17). The icon has much in common with what this thesis calls moderate realism, not dependent on a physical or fleshy presence, but a presence nonetheless, which instantiates the divine by provoking a vision of the divine. This analysis resonates with Rowan Williams’ discussion of sacramentality being about the making of signs and the making of
ourselves through signs (Williams, 2000: 199-200) and Williams’ additional analysis of the Eucharist as gift, compared to instruments of control or objects of accumulation such as an idol might suggest (Williams, 2000: 218). For more detail of Williams’ position see Case Study 4.52 (on CD).

Marion’s rejection of metaphysics is really the rejection of an idol, where the conceptual structures function to know “the divine in its hold”, to name God and to define God (Marion, 1995: 29). This is what Williams speaks about when he refers to the desire among some for control and accumulation in the Eucharist, such that people and traditions attempt to control the presence of Christ in either texts or in the sacramental elements. Marion, in opposition to these sorts of attempts, seeks emancipation and extends the suspicion of idolatry to every conceptual enterprise concerning the divine, arguing that:

“Metaphysics gives itself a concept of ‘God’ that at once marks the indisputable experience of him and his equally incontestable limitation; by thinking ‘God’ as an efficiency so absolutely and universally foundational, and hence finally as the withdrawal of the foundation into itself, metaphysics indeed constructs for itself an apprehension of the transcendence of God, but under the figure simply of efficiency, of the cause, and of the foundation.” (Marion, 1995: 35).

In order to release God from the idolatry of metaphysics, Marion suggests that it is necessary to “reach a nonidolatrous thought of God” and that it is this “which alone releases ‘God’ from the quotation marks by disengaging his apprehension from the conditions imposed by onto-theology”. In short, “one would have to manage to think of God outside of metaphysics” (Marion, 1995: 37). The question Marion therefore asks is, “if ‘God’ is, he is a being; but does God have to be?” (Marion, 1995: 44). Being is clearly too limited for God in Marion’s estimation.

Marion’s desire to withdraw God from the idea of idol revolves around the notion that people not undertake the idea to think God and this only occurs when God is freed from metaphysics. “Being is found in him, but he is not found in Being. … Being … is only uncovered in being dispensed as gift” (Marion 1995: 75) and it is here that Marion’s work has particular relevance for any consideration of the philosophical assumptions underlying the Eucharist.
Specifically Marion argues that Christ abolishes “the gap between sign and referent” (Marion, 1995: 140) suggesting a realist interpretation where sign and referent are linked, that is, not as idol (immoderate realism) but as icon, where sign instantiates the referent (signified), that is, as moderate realism. It is significant that Marion speaks here of ‘Christ’, since by Christ he is referring to the divine nature as found in the Word or Logos. By this he does not mean spoken word or the text of any book, rather he says:

“The Word is not said in any tongue, since he transgresses language itself, seeing that, Word in flesh and bone, he is given as indissolubly speaker, sign and referent. The referent, which here becomes the locutor, even if he speaks our words, is not said in them according to our manner of speaking. He proffers himself in them, but not because he says them; he proffers himself in them because he exposes himself in them; and exposes himself less as one exposes an opinion than as one exposes oneself to danger: he exposes himself by incarnating himself. Thus speaking in our words, the Word redoubles his incarnation, or rather accomplishes it absolutely, since language constitutes us more carnally than our flesh. … Incarnate in our words, the Word acquires in them a new unspeakableness, since he can be spoken in them only by the movement of incarnation that is, so to speak, anterior to the words, which he speaks and which he lets speak him.” (Marion, 1995: 141).

Marion is making a distinction here between the Word (the Christ or the Logos) and words (language and text). It is the Word, not words, which reveals the nature of the divine by an incarnation that is anterior to human language in spoken or textual form. For Marion, “a theology must be conceived as a logos of the Logos, a word of the Word, a said of the Said” (Marion, 1995: 143). This means that for the theologian it is not a matter “of reaching that which his discourse speaks … of God, but of abandoning his discourse and every linguistic initiative to the Word, in order to let himself be said by the Word, as the Word lets himself be said by the Father”. Further, “the theologian lets himself say (or be said) by the Word, or rather lets the Word let him speak human language in the way that God speaks in the Word” (Marion, 1995: 144). This means that in relation to the death and resurrection of Christ, “the text does not coincide with the event or permit going back to it, since it [the text] results from it” (Marion, 1995: 145). The text of the New Testament then, remains only words after things have happened. Such was the case for the disciples, since it was the text that remained after the events had happened. The events referred to in the text are lacking for us as they were for the disciples. So then, how should the event be experienced? Marion explains as follows:
“We cannot lead the biblical text back as far as that at which it nevertheless aims, precisely because no hermeneutic could ever bring to light anything other than a meaning, whereas we desire the referent in its very advent. When the disciples interpret what is said of the event, their correct interpretation can reach only one meaning – the meaning of an elapsed event, whose visible contemporaneousness does not even become envisageable to them: ‘their eyes were kept from recognising them’ (Luke 24: 16). It happens – a new event, which coins the Paschal event – that the referent in person redoubles, completes, and disqualifies the hermeneutic that we can carry out from this side of the text, through another hermeneutic that, so to speak, bypasses its text from beyond and passes on this side.” (Marion, 1995: 147).

In Luke’s Gospel, Jesus himself interprets the text to the disciples on the road to Emmaus starting from Moses and all the prophets and then speaks of the fact that he had to suffer and die (Luke 24: 15, 25-27), and it is this speaking of the Word that becomes a decisive Paschal event when it receives its adequate interpretation. “The referent (unspeakable Word), transgresses the text to interpret it to us” (Marion, 1995: 148). This means that the “theologian must go beyond the text to the Word, interpreting it from the point of view of the Word” (Marion, 1995: 149).

Where is all this leading? Marion reaches his climax when he says that it is:

“the Eucharistic celebration where recognition takes place; for immediately after the breaking of the bread, not only did the disciples ‘recognise him’ and at last ‘their eyes were opened’ (Luke 24: 31), but above all the hermeneutic went through the text as far as the referent: … The Eucharist accomplishes, as its central moment, the hermeneutic (it occurs at 24: 30 and 24: 32). It alone allows the text to pass to its referent, recognised as the nontextual Word of the words. Why? We know why: because the Word interprets in person. Yes, but where? Not first at the point where the Word speaks of the Scriptures, about the text (24: 27-28), but at the point where he proffers the unspeakable speech, absolutely filial to the Father – ‘taking bread, he gave thanks …’ (24: 30). The Word intervenes in person in the Eucharist.” (Marion, 1995: 150).

This means then “if the Word intervenes in person only at the eucharistic moment, the hermeneutic (hence fundamental theology) will take place, will have its place, only in the Eucharist” (Marion, 1995: 151). This is a statement of realism, where the referent is instantiated in the sign, not as an idol, but as an icon, such that “the unspeakable Word saturates each of the signs of its text with the absolute: the absolute of the referent reflects, so to speak, on the most trivial of signs – each of which takes on spiritual meaning” (Marion, 1995: 156).
Marion’s eucharistic theology is based on moderate realism, rejecting any carnal sense of Christ’s presence, yet he observes that in Christianity, “explanation, even theological, always seems to end up in a ‘eucharistic physics’” (Marion, 1995: 161) such as that found among metaphysical explanations like transubstantiation. Marion argues that transubstantiation, dependent as it is on change of substances, imposes an idolatry on eucharistic theology, where God becomes ‘canned’ in the reserved sacrament, exhibited in the exposed sacrament or brandished in the processed sacrament. This means that:

“the community would seek to place ‘God’ at its disposal like a thing, to reassure its identity and strengthen its determination in that thing. Of this ‘God’ made thing, one would expect precisely nothing but real presence: presence reduced to the dimensions of a thing.” (Marion, 1995: 164).

In this way real presence becomes nothing more than “the idolatrous reduction of ‘God’ to a mute thing, a vainly impotent presence” where God agrees “to consecrate (Himself) in a thing distinct from the community” (Marion, 1995: 165). This shares much in common with Rowan Williams’ discussion (see Case Study 4.52) of the ways in which people try to control and accumulate the eucharistic presence and sacrifice of Jesus (Williams, 2000). Marion also shares much in common with the work of Catherine Pickstock (see Case Study 4.41), when Pickstock speaks of those who either think in an immoderate realist or fleshy manner or who encase Christ in a text, as being “a spatial reality without depth” (Pickstock, 1998: 3) where the reification results in nothing less than a necrophilia, that is, a love of a dead body which has no reality in the present (Pickstock, 1998: 134). Both Marion and Pickstock reject this fleshy or immoderate realism and opt for the moderate realist presence of Christ in the Eucharist. Marion however argues, that even though transubstantiation may have lost the legitimacy of a real presence, the notion of presence remains, displaced from the eucharistic ‘thing’ to the eucharistic community. “The present consciousness of the collective self is substituted for the concentration of the present of ‘God’ under the species of a thing” (Marion, 1995: 166). Presence therefore, ceases to rely on the thing and “henceforth depends entirely on the consciousness of it possessed, here and now, by that community communion” (Marion, 1995: 166). This is an expression of moderate realism in an ecclesial sense, but not restricting the instantiation to the community alone. Sensible mediation (immoderate realism) disappears in such a scheme, since “the bread and wine serve as a simple perceptible medium for a wholly intellectual or
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representational process – the collective awareness of the community by itself” (Marion, 1995: 166-167). This does not deny a real presence in the moderate realist presence though, since Marion also argues that:

“What the consecrated host imposes, or rather permits, is the irreducible exteriority of the present that Christ makes us of himself in the thing that to him becomes sacramental body. That this exteriority, far from forbidding intimacy, renders it possible in sparing it from foundering in idolatry, can be misunderstood only by those who do not want to open themselves to distance. Only distance, in maintaining a distinct separation of terms (of persons), renders communion possible, and immediately mediates the relation. Here again, between the idol and distance, one must choose.” (Marion, 1995: 169).

This idea of distance is what the Anglican theologian Sue Patterson (1999: 14-15) speaks of in her analysis where distance suggests moderate realism (or what Marion calls the icon) and where Patterson argues that the sign cannot be identical to the signified or it will be confused with the signified. For Marion ‘distance’ is rightly thought of in a ‘mystical’ sense rather than a ‘true’ sense (akin to Armstrong distinction between loose and strict identity), where the ‘mystical body’ refers to the eucharistic body as opposed to any fleshy body. The mystical body however for Marion is nonetheless real and he argues that:

“The mystical character of the eucharistic present implies a full reality; thus one can speak of the ‘the true manducation of the mystical flesh of Christ’ (Anastasia the Sinaite): the flesh, though becoming mystical, remains nonetheless really edible. More, the mystical character of the eucharistic present not only does not destroy its reality, but carries it to a completion above suspicion, before which the reality of the here and now itself becomes a simple relay and support; common reality becomes mystagogy for the true reality, that of the eucharistic present as gift that itself is given as mystical.” (Marion, 1995: 180).

Marion’s argument here is picking up the distinction between res and sacramentum, where res refers to the bread and wine consecrated and transubstantiated into the Body and Blood of Christ, while at the same time remaining a sacramentum. It is the ecclesiastical body, the Church however, that he purely calls res. This means that:

“the bread and wine are real, the consecrated bread and wine are real as bread and wine, sacramental (‘mystical’ in the ordinary sense) as Body and Blood of Christ, whereas the ecclesiastical body remains purely sacramental (‘mystical body’, according to a modern accetaption). … The real is exclusively ‘that which the eye has not seen, that which the ear not heard, and that which has not risen to the heart of man’, but that ‘God revealed to us by the Spirit’ (1 Cor. 2:9) – all the rest has only a sacramental and indicative function. The real is exclusively that which seems ‘mystical’ to the ordinary gaze – the Body of the Christ and his ecclesiastical body.” (Marion, 1995: 180-181).
Marion is aware that this presents the danger of immoderate realism (the idol) and so he argues that:

“Whoever fears that an idolatry of presence according to the here and now might ensue from the theology of transubstantiation admits by this very fact that he does not see that only the eucharistic present touches, in the consecrated host, the ‘real’, and that what he fears as overvalued only plays there the role of sacramentum. In a word, the common objection can be raised only from the most radically nontheological point of view, the only one on the basis of which one can, even for a single moment, imagine that the theology of transubstantiation is interested in the here and now of the species, whereas through the species it attempts to approach the mystical res of the Body and of the blood. The eucharistic present is deduced from theological, mystical ‘reality’ alone.” (Marion, 1995: 181).

Marion argues that what separates many Christians from an adequate comprehension of the eucharistic present has to do with the conception of time and hence the metaphysical discourse of presence. For Marion, however, the Eucharist is dependent on a theological perspective and not a metaphysical perspective. It is in this sense that Marion’s philosophical reflection on the Eucharist operates as moderate realism, which distances eucharistic theology from any form of immoderate realism (a fleshy nature) and the semantic propositionalism of a nominalist separation of sign from signified.

Marion’s work reflects another attempt to express eucharistic theology using moderate realist assumptions. It is significant that he does this from the perspective of a philosopher who is also a Christian. Marion’s work lends support to moderate realist eucharistic theology.

3.6 Philosophy and The Bible

Armstrong, Loux and Tooley were not, of course, reflecting philosophically specifically in relation to the Eucharist, but their ideas are nonetheless applicable to any understanding of the Eucharist as a state of affairs, as has been discussed above. Marion however, presents a clear philosophical analysis that includes discussion of eucharistic theology. It may be useful at this point to look at how an analysis such as that put by Armstrong and the other philosophers, operates theologically and fits with the biblical evidence.
In John 1: 14 the words, “And the Word became flesh and lived among us” (NRSV) suggest that Christ’s nature as Word or Logos, can be seen as a universal, instantiated in flesh (the particular historic person of Jesus) and the two, divine and human, become one. This is confirmed by reference to John 6: 32-59. Here the incarnate Jesus speaks of himself as “the true bread from heaven” (John 6: 32 NRSV) that “comes down from heaven and gives life to the world” (John 6: 33 NRSV). Further Jesus describes himself as “the bread of life” (John 6: 35 NRSV) and as “the living bread that comes down from heaven.” (John 6: 51 NRSV). He also says, “Whoever eats this bread will live forever, and the bread that I will give for the life of the world is my flesh” (John 6: 51 NRSV). Finally Jesus declares:

“Very truly, I tell you, unless you eat the flesh of the son of Man and drink his blood, you have no life in you. Those who eat my flesh and drink my blood have eternal life, and I will raise them up on the last day; for my flesh is true food and my blood is true drink. Those who eat my flesh and drink my blood, abide in me, and I in them. Just as the living Father sent me, and I live because of the Father, so whoever eats me will live because of me. This is the bread that came down from heaven, not like that which your ancestors ate, and they died. But the one who eats this bread will live for ever.” (John 6: 53-58 NRSV).

The instantiation of the universal, Christ’s nature as Word or Logos, in the person and work of Jesus has universal applicability, since those who eat his flesh abide in him, and he in them, and they will live for ever. The question to be resolved however is what does Jesus mean by eating his flesh. It seems unlikely that he meant eating and drinking his actual, physical and carnal flesh and blood (immoderate or fleshy realism), although theoretically this would have been possible (but unlikely) for those listening at Capernaum in the first century AD. Rather it seems that he was encouraging those who listened to share in his nature by eating and drinking bread and wine, not in some carnal or fleshy manner, but rather in what David Armstrong and this thesis would call moderate realism. It must surely have occurred to the early Christians that this eating and drinking were linked with the Eucharist, as well as with faith and the hearing of the word in the eucharistic celebration and assembly. A denial of any carnal or fleshy eating and drinking is confirmed in the next few verses when he says, “It is the spirit that gives life; the flesh is useless. The words that I have spoken to you are spirit and life. But among you there are some who do not believe.” (John 6: 63-64 NRSV). This of course in no way suggests that any form of spiritual eating and drinking is not a real eating and drinking, just that the eating and
drinking is not a fleshy action. The reality of the eating and drinking is a reality that depends on identity of nature (moderate realism) not strict identity (immoderate realism) in relation to the particulars of bread and wine on the one hand and the particular Christ’s body and blood on the other.

What the various passages from the Gospel of John seem to be saying, in Armstrong’s ‘states of affairs language’, is that Christ’s identity of nature as the *Logos* was instantiated in the person and work of Jesus as particulars and that this had universal applicability for all people and for all time. Christ’s identity of nature was instantiated in a physical way in the person Jesus, during the first century AD, however that particular instantiation is no longer physically present. The particular way in which the universal, Christ’s nature, is instantiated in the present, is what concerns the purposes this thesis. John’s witness seems to suggest, and Armstrong’s concept of moderate realism supports this, that the universal, Christ’s identity of nature, is indeed available and received in the present, not only in the Eucharist, but also in the church by faith and in the hearing of the word in the assembly.

For the early Christians these passages from John must certainly have had meaning in the context of the Eucharist (Deiss, 1986: 20) as they reflected on how Christ was present with them as the Body of Christ. Robert Jenson, a Lutheran theologian, suggests that the reflection of modern ecumenical ecclesiology suggests the same meaning. He argues for a “mutuality of ecclesiology and sacramentology” where “we are called upon to interpret the Church by the sacraments that occur in her and the sacraments by the church in which they occur.” (Jenson, 1997: 207). Christ’s identity of nature (the Word or *Logos*) is instantiated in the Eucharist, not by physical flesh and blood, but by bread and wine, as well as by the reading of the Scriptures and in the eucharistic celebration as the members of the Church meet together as the Body of Christ, that is, as Jenson suggests, ecclesially. Paul in 1 Corinthians 10: 16-17 uses language to support this idea of ecclesial instantiation in the context of the Church, arguing, “The cup of blessing that we bless, is it not a sharing of the blood of Christ? The bread that we break, is it not a sharing of the body of Christ? Because there is one bread, we who are many are one body, for we all partake of the one bread.” (NRSV). Paul’s words suggest that it is the particular of the cup and the bread that instantiate (by taking, blessing, sharing and breaking) the universal, Christ’s identity of nature, the Word or *Logos*, as a real presence of his body and blood in the context of the
Church as the Body of Christ. It is this intertwining of the two concepts of body (σώμα) and communion (κοινωνία) that Jenson emphasises. It is, he argues, when we come to Paul’s accusation against the Corinthians of violating the body and blood of Christ by their behaviour to each other in the meal assembly of the Church (1 Corinthians 11:17-27) that we must ask the question, “Is the violated body the church, or is it the bread and the cup of the table?” (Jenson, 1997: 208). Jenson answers that plainly Paul, by the intertwining of the concepts of body and communion, intends them both at once, since “the bread and the cup are the body of Christ and the assembly is the same body of Christ. A closer mutuality of church and sacraments is hardly conceivable.” (Jenson, 1997: 208). Jenson’s argument lends support to a general theme of moderate realism in relation to the Eucharist. Christ’s identity of nature is instantiated, not only in the sacramental elements of bread and wine but also in the Church, both of which are the body of Christ. This, of course, in no way means that the body is a physical, carnal or fleshy body, but a body no less. As Jenson puts it: “Of course the church is not an organism of the species homo sapiens and so not what we will first think of as a human body. But Paul was not so ontologically inhibited as we are.” (Jenson, 1997: 209). Indeed it could be argued, as indeed some of the phenomena of the Anglican eucharistic tradition are shown to argue in the case studies of this thesis (see CD), that the particulars of the Eucharist (bread and wine) are not an organism of the species homo sapiens (in this case the human body of Jesus), nor are they what we normally think of as a human body. Rather, they like the Church are an instantiation of the universal, Christ’s identity of nature. Moderate realism is the philosophical assumption that underlies this type of thinking.

In 1 Corinthians 11:26 Paul also says, “For as often as you eat this bread and drink this cup, you proclaim the Lord’s death until he comes” (NRSV). Paul’s words here suggest that the particulars of the bread and the cup instantiate (by proclaiming) the universal, the nature of Christ, and his sacrifice, as anamnesis. It is the eucharistic presence and sacrifice in the bread and wine and eucharistic celebration that instantiate the universal, Christ’s identity of nature, the Word or Logos, in the Eucharist in the present. The historic presence and sacrifice of the man Jesus (his physical or carnal presence and sacrifice on earth) no longer instantiate the universal, Christ’s identity of nature, in the same way they did in the first century AD, since Christ’s presence and sacrifice is not and cannot be physically present or re-iterated on earth in the present as an immoderate realism. Christ’s nature has
universal applicability, for all time and all people, but Christ does not instantiate the
universal (his nature) in the same physical way today as he did in the person of Jesus. In
line with Armstrong though, it is crucial to emphasise that the universal (Christ’s identity of
nature) is strictly identical in both instantiations (historic and eucharistic), although the
particulars (the historic and the eucharistic presence and sacrifice) are not. The particulars
have a loose identity or identity in nature in both their historic and eucharistic
instantiations, whereas the universal in strictly identical in both cases. This is what makes
such a state of affairs realist, or more strictly moderate realist, that is, following Armstrong
(1997: 27-28) Christ’s identity of nature (the universal) is strictly identical in both his
historic form (Jesus) and in the Eucharist (bread and wine). This does not mean that the
bread and wine are literal flesh and blood, but that Christ’s identity of nature is in both
Jesus’ body and blood and the bread and wine of the Eucharist. The witness of John and
Paul seems to support this line of argument by suggesting that Christ’s identity of nature,
rather than his physical presence, is instantiated in the Eucharist (as well as in the word and
the church as the Body of Christ). The argument of scripture seems to have much in
common with the realist analysis put forward by Armstrong (1997 and 2004).

This type of states of affairs language, derived from Armstrong, is not, it is suggested,
foreign or opposed to other parts of the New Testament. In Philippians 2: 6-11, the
Christological hymn speaks of Christ Jesus being “in the form of God” (2: 6) but emptying
himself and “being found in human form” (2: 7). Paul, in writing to the Philippians is
distinguishing a divine form from a human form, both of which nonetheless instantiate the
nature of Christ and his work of salvation. Christ shared “equality with God” (2: 6) but
was “born in human likeness” (2: 7). The universal, Christ’s identity of nature (in
Philippians described as ‘form’ but in John’s Gospel as Word or Logos) was instantiated in
both the human and divine. Clearly there seems to be an identity of nature that is
instantiated in Christ Jesus, as Philippians sees it. This suggests assumptions of moderate
realism.

Some Anglicans and their particular theological hermeneutic however, do not accept this
states of affairs thinking and language based on moderate realism in relation to the
Eucharist. This is some cases has led to confusion and acrimony in the Anglican
eucharistic tradition, such as that occurring in the Anglican Church of Australia, where
some Evangelicals Anglicans reject the eucharistic liturgies of *A Prayer Book for Australia* (1995) since realist assumptions regarding Christ’s presence and sacrifice in the Eucharist underlie these liturgies. For some there is a failure to distinguish the eucharistic presence and sacrifice from the historic presence and sacrifice as different instantiations of the universal, Christ’s identity of nature. Some, such as Doyle (1997 – Case Study 4.27), have argued that there can be no real presence or *anamnesis* or dynamic remembrance of Christ and his sacrifice in the Eucharist, such that Christ’s sacrifice is present by its effects, since it is impossible for Christ to be present in any carnal or physical manner in the Eucharist. For Doyle, operating on empirical assumptions, where realism in the Eucharist only means a fleshy presence and sacrifice, Christ can only be physically present in heaven and only present on earth through his word (that is, through the text of the Bible). Any realist understanding of Christ’s presence and sacrifice is rejected. What Doyle describes as ‘a sacramental ontology’ is rejected and ‘a word ontology’ is accepted (Doyle, 1996: 12). Participation in Christ can only therefore be by means of faith in the promises of the word (Doyle, 1996: 13). Doyle’s argument seems to rest on a nominalist analysis, where particulars are seen as self-enclosed (the particulars of Christ’s body and blood are only in heaven and on earth we have the particulars of bread and wine) with no realist identity between the particulars, instantiated as Christ’s nature, seen as possible. Such a view fails to acknowledge the possibility of identity in nature (loose identity) or the distinction between the eucharistic instantiation and the historic instantiation of Christ’s nature as a universal. Doyle’s position therefore assumes that identity means only strict or numerical identity. Further Doyle in his criticisms of the eucharistic liturgies in *APBA* (1995) assumes that any realist view of the Eucharist is based on a substance metaphysic, involving a carnal and physical view of Christ’s presence and sacrifice where there is a strict or numerical identity between Christ’s physical presence and sacrifice and the bread and wine of the Eucharist and the eucharistic celebration. Such a view of realism is both limited and deficient. It may be, as John Macquarrie suggests, that the substance metaphysic, developed by Aquinas in his *Summa Theologica*, and seemingly such a source of confusion for many, not only within the Anglican tradition but throughout Christianity generally, is no longer adequate as a philosophical basis for eucharistic theology, and that the way forward for the Anglican eucharistic tradition is to be found in some other philosophical framework. Macquarrie wonders “if perhaps in terms of modern philosophical thinking, it is possible to think out a theory which will throw some light on
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the mystery, and do for our age what transubstantiation did for a former age.” (Macquarrie, 1997: 132). Perhaps the insights of Armstrong, aided by Loux, Tooley and Marion (and others), where realism and nominalism are distinguished to both moderate and immoderate degrees, provide such a new way of understanding what happens in the Eucharist. This is indeed the intention of this thesis in using philosophical reflection for just such a purpose.

Any criticism of a realist understanding of Christ’s presence and sacrifice in the Eucharist, based on criticisms of a substance/attribute metaphysic alone seems limited and problematical and fails to give due acknowledgement to alternate philosophical frameworks, such as states of affairs based on moderate realism, where strict or numerical identity is distinguished from identity in nature. At the same time Armstrong’s insights allow for the development of a unified model of Anglican eucharistic theology that accounts for not only the realist view (accepted by some Anglican theologians), but also the nominalist view (accepted by other Anglican theologians) and does this to both moderate and immoderate degrees. It is here that significant value lies for the interpretation of Anglican eucharistic theology and for religious and theological education. This suggestion will be considered in greater detail later in this thesis in Chapters 4 and 5, where essences of the Anglican eucharistic are extracted and ramifications for theological education in the Anglican tradition are drawn on the basis of the case study material (see the case studies on the CD accompanying this thesis).

3.7 A Model of the Anglican Eucharistic Tradition

This thesis suggests that the philosophical reflection of Armstrong (1989) is useful in the application of a methodology of phenomenology to the Anglican eucharistic tradition. The distinction between realism and nominalism will be used, with Armstrong’s further classification of both realism and nominalism to the moderate and immoderate degrees. The model could therefore be formed as follows:
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<tr>
<th>Immoderate Realism</th>
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<td>Immoderate Nominalism</td>
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Figure 1: A Theoretical Model of the Anglican Eucharistic Tradition

Explanatory notes on the above model

**Moderate Realism**: a philosophical notion referring to identity of nature or loose identity as philosophers call it. This means that the sign instantiates the signified in a loose way, that is, identity of nature, rather than as strict identity. In the terms of eucharistic theology this means that the signs of bread and wine, for example, instantiate the nature of Christ as word or logos, in much the same way that the person of Jesus instantiated the nature of Christ as word or logos (John 1:14). Jesus therefore instantiated the nature of Christ as a person on earth and the bread and wine of the Eucharist instantiate the nature of Christ as well. In terms of eucharistic sacrifice this means that the nature of Christ’s sacrifice is instantiated in the Eucharist by a process of dynamic remembrance (known as anamnesis) such that the effects of Christ’s sacrifice in the past are instantiated in the Eucharist in the present by means of the eucharistic action. Some of the theories of moderate realism are known as the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist and transubstantiation. Moderate realist notions of eucharistic presence and sacrifice are frequently found in the eucharistic theology of the Anglican Church, expressed in theological statements and eucharistic liturgies.

In moderate realist eucharistic theology the statement: ‘This is my body’ means that the signs (‘this’) instantiate the nature of Christ and the signs are the means whereby the benefits of Christ’s presence and sacrifice are conveyed to people in the Eucharist. This is sometimes known as the sacramental principle, that is, God working in this world through the things of this world (e.g. bread and wine, or memorial remembrance) in order to convey grace to people by means of these signs. People therefore in consuming the elements of the Eucharist are not receiving real flesh and blood in the their physical sense but rather the
nature of Christ which is nonetheless real and effective in that the signs convey or are the vehicles of the grace of Christ. John Macquarrie or Christopher Cocksworth would be examples of Anglican theologians who adopt a moderate realist eucharistic theology (see Macquarrie Case Study – 4.36 or Cocksworth Case Study – 4.25, on the CD accompanying this thesis).

**Immoderate Realism:** a philosophical notion referring to strict identity as philosophers call it. This means that the sign and the signified are strictly identical in every way, physically as well as metaphysically. In terms of eucharistic theology this would mean that the signs of the Eucharist, the bread and wine, become the physical, carnal or bloody body and blood of Christ in the sense that real flesh and real blood is on the altar following consecration. In terms of eucharistic sacrifice, immoderate realism would imply that Christ is sacrificed again or really in the Eucharist (a re-immolation of Christ or a re-iteration of Christ’s sacrifice). Immoderate notions of eucharistic presence and sacrifice are found in corrupted views of eucharistic theology, such as those that were common in some medieval theologies of the Eucharist where it was sometimes believed that the bread, once it had become the fleshly presence of Christ on the altar was capable of bleeding in a gross sense of Christ’s presence and sacrifice. Generally the Roman Catholic and Anglican Churches reject immoderate notions of eucharistic presence or sacrifice, although at times some theologians have made statements that are suggestive of immoderate realism (see Donovan – Case Study 4.26 and Bennett – Case Study 3.1, on the CD accompanying this thesis) although they do not fully adopt such a position.

It is important to note that transubstantiation (as defined by Thomas Aquinas), the real presence notion of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist and the idea of memorial remembrance as anamnesis are not immoderate realist concepts but moderate realist in the eucharistic theology that they present.

In an immoderate realist eucharistic theology the statement: ‘This is my body’ means that the signs (‘this’) become the body and blood of Christ in a fleshly and physical manner such that real flesh and blood (with all the physical characteristics of flesh and blood) are present on the altar in the Eucharist and consumed by the communicant in a gross manner. No evidence has been found of an Anglican theologian adopting this position, although some have made statements suggestive of it. Such statements have been however, usually been clarified or denied as being immoderate realism.

**Moderate Nominalism:** a philosophical notion referring to the idea that whatever exists is a particular and nothing but a particular. This means that signs do not instantiate any signified universals since the existence of universals is denied. All that exists are particulars – bread and wine that are used in the
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Eucharist are one set of particulars and Christ’s body and blood which existed in the first century AD and which no longer exists in that form are another set of particulars. The nature of Christ as a universal notion is therefore not instantiated in the signs of the Eucharist in a moderate nominalist analysis since the existence of universals is not admitted. The Eucharist therefore is about remembering what happened in the past and receiving the benefits of Christ’s presence and sacrifice by faith alone. The benefits or grace of Christ are not received through any signs on earth even though the sacraments are the context in which the remembering occurs and the grace is received by faith.

In a moderate nominalist eucharistic theology the statement: ‘This is my body’ means that the signs (‘this’) signify the body and blood of Christ but do not become the body and blood in either a moderate or immoderate realist sense. The particulars (the bread and the wine on one hand and the body and blood of Christ on the other) remain separated entities and the signs of bread and wine are not therefore the vehicles of grace. The presence of any universal (e.g. the nature of Christ, in either a loose or strict sense of identity) is denied and so the sacramental principle is denied in any realist sense, even though the sacraments function as the context for the remembering and the receiving of grace by faith alone. Handley Moule would be an example of an Anglican theologian who adopts a moderate nominalist position in his eucharistic theology (see Case Study 4.12 on the CD accompanying this thesis).

Immoderate Nominalism: a philosophical notion referring to the idea that whatever exists is a particular and nothing but a particular. The existence of universals is denied and the idea that signs instantiate the signified is also denied. All that exists are particulars — bread and wine which are used in the Eucharist and Christ’s body and blood which existed in the first century AD and which no longer exists in that form and is not instantiated in the signs of the Eucharist. The Eucharist is not the means whereby Christ is remembered by faith since this is only seen to occur through the rational and propositional statements found in the words of Scripture. Whereas moderate nominalism admits that the benefits of Christ’s presence and sacrifice are known by faith in the remembering that occurs in the context of the Eucharist, immoderate nominalism does not admit this, and instead argues that the benefits of Christ’s can only be known through the words of Scripture. This knowing through Scripture occurs through the promises of God which Scripture presents as the word is read and proclaimed. Immoderate nominalists therefore deny that there is any presence or sacrifice of Christ in the Eucharist in a realist sense through signs and also deny that the benefits of Christ are known in the Eucharist by a process of remembering as the communicant participates in and receives communion. The benefits of Christ can only be known in an immoderate nominalist analysis through bearing and receiving the promises of God that are found in the
words of Scripture, proclaimed and preached. The immoderate nominalist therefore rejects the notion of participating in Christ sacramentally (either in the realist sense using the signs which instantiate the signified or in the moderate nominalist sense of by faith alone). God therefore is only seen to work in the world directly through God’s word and not sacramentally through signs. Sacraments are therefore seen as something created by people and of a lesser status than the ‘word’ of Scripture which is seen to be created by God. Sacraments are therefore signs of God’s promises that are known through the word alone and not through sacramental signs. People participate in Christ by faith alone, but this occurs, not through the sacraments, as moderate realism and moderate nominalism suggest, but through the word alone. Robert Doyle (see Case Study 4.27 on the CD accompanying this thesis) is an example of a theologian who adopts an immoderate nominalist eucharistic theology.

The use of the model above (Figure 1) suggests that sameness of type (the problem of universals) in the Anglican eucharistic tradition can be analysed in two ways – according to realist and nominalist philosophical assumptions, to both moderate and immoderate degrees. In general Anglican theologians have not used these terms, and the use of the model across the whole of the Anglican eucharistic tradition represents an innovation in describing the Anglican eucharistic tradition. This is perhaps what John Macquarrie has argued is needed as a replacement for the substance metaphysic present in eucharistic theology, with both acceptance and rejection, for so long (Macquarrie, 1997: 132). The advantage of the model proposed above is that it allows for the multiformity of the Anglican eucharistic tradition to be expressed and does not privilege one theological position and its philosophical assumptions over others. The potential exists therefore for the Anglican eucharistic tradition to engage in dialogue with other theological and philosophical positions. At the same time it needs to be recognised that the functioning of the model depends on the acceptance by participants in the dialogue that a multiformity exists in the Anglican eucharistic tradition. Where such an acceptance is not admitted then dialogue is difficult and the views of particular technical and hermeneutical interests will be privileged over other technical and hermeneutic interests. At the same time, where such an acceptance is not admitted critical interest will also be limited by commitments to particular narrow interests.
Anglicans have however, at times spoken of a realist interpretation of Christ’s presence and sacrifice in the Eucharist (e.g. Macquarrie, 1997 and Cocksworth (1993) express a moderate realist position in their eucharistic theology). Other Anglicans have rejected realism and suggested that the particulars of Christ’s body and blood and the bread and wine are self-enclosed, with no identity between the particulars (e.g. Doyle, 1997; Jensen, 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c and 2003d). This is nominalism, although Doyle and other Evangelicals do not use this philosophical concept to describe their conception of what happens in the Eucharist. The essential difference between theologians such as Macquarrie and Cocksworth as realists and Doyle and Jensen as nominalists is in regard to whether or not the sacramental principle and the realist philosophical assumptions that underlie this principle are accepted or rejected. Whereas Macquarrie (1997) accepts the sacramental principle, that is, putting the realist view that God works through the material, things such as bread and wine in the sacraments, Doyle (1997) rejects the sacramental principle and in so doing the philosophical notion of realism in relation to the sacraments. For Doyle, God does not work through the material (bread and wine) but only through the words of Scripture. This important distinction seems to be at the heart of the variation in Anglican eucharistic theology and so will be used as a way of bringing some preliminary categorisation to the phenomena of the Anglican eucharistic tradition as each phenomenon of the Anglican eucharistic tradition is considered in the case studies of this thesis (see CD).

3.8 Realism and Modern Theological Reflection

Armstrong (1989, 1995, 1997 and 2004) takes a realist view of truth, arguing that truth is determined not by what people believe but by the way the world is. Philosophers call such a view a correspondence theory of truth. Armstrong argues however, that in Western philosophy the substance/attribute metaphysic has dominated realism. This in turn seems to have dominated the expression of Eucharistic theology that is also dominated by a substance/attribute metaphysic, classically expressed by Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologica. Armstrong describes this metaphysic, inherited from Aristotle, as not having “entities, only things and classes in the world” (Armstrong, 1997: 114). Substances seen as things become unknowable and ungraspable and attributes tend to float up to some other
realm. The way substances and attributes stand to each other is, in Armstrong’s opinion, incomprehensible and the whole analysis of things in terms of subjects and attributes is a mistake (Armstrong, 1997: 113). For Armstrong, “there are just things” (Armstrong, 1997: 113) and he rejects analysis in terms of substances and attributes. Instead he argues, “that the world contains both particulars and universals” and “it would certainly seem that if this is so, then something is needed to weld them together” (Armstrong, 1997: 115). For Plato this weld was called ‘participation’ (Parmenides, 129-132), for Strawson (1959, ch. 5, secs. 2-3) ‘non-relational tie’, and for Anderson (1962: 117) ‘copula’. Armstrong however, speaks of ‘instantiation’ (Armstrong, 1997: 115). What gives general support to all of these thinkers is what Armstrong calls ‘the truthmaker argument’ (Armstrong, 1997: 115). A truthmaker for a particular truth is some existent reality, some portion of reality, in virtue of which that truth is true. This analysis is dependent on the acceptance of a realist theory for truth, where “there is something that exists in reality, independent of the propositions in question, which makes the truth true” (Armstrong, 2004: 5). This thesis suggests that the nature of Christ, as Word or logos, functioning as moderate realism is the truthmaker or state of affairs for the truth of the sacramental principle in relation to the Eucharist, that is, where Christ is present and Christ’s sacrifice is known in the eucharistic celebration in the present, in the eucharistic assembly. This analysis has been discussed in detail above and has great relevance for this thesis. Those who accept this position (realists) are distinguished from those who do not (nominalists) and it is this distinction that this thesis seeks to apply to a consideration of the phenomena of the Anglican eucharistic tradition in an attempt to exemplify what is a basic distinction in sacramental theology in the Anglican tradition. Utilising this distinction it is suggested brings greater meaning to the Anglican eucharistic tradition and has at the same time significant ramifications for religious and theological education involving sacramental theology.

In suggesting states of affairs or truthmakers as a more satisfactory realist philosophical framework for the Eucharist than say a substance metaphysic, the insights of Armstrong are seen as useful. In any such investigation the relevance of his philosophical ideas will need to be considered in relation to eucharistic theology. This is an undertaking in Anglican eucharistic theology that has not been frequently pursued since eucharistic theology has tended to operate within the confines of various hermeneutic interests and traditions, using the language of those interests and traditions. The issue that needs to be
investigated though is whether philosophical analysis and assumptions are seen to have a legitimate place in theology, and in this particular case, Anglican eucharistic theology. In recent times several Anglican theologians have engaged with the idea of examining the philosophical assumptions underlying theology. Some of these theologians who argue that philosophy has such a legitimate place will now be examined in an attempt to show that consideration of philosophical assumptions in Anglican eucharistic has some place at present.

David Ford argues that “the question of how or whether one maintains some sort of realism … is central to much current theological debate” (Ford, 1992: 209). Ford is placing an emphasis on realism and his presentation represents a sustained and developed attempt to explicate non-relational realism in relation to eucharistic theology. Reference should be made to case study 4.29 for additional information on the position taken by David Ford.

Sue Patterson, in her 1999 book entitled *Realist Christian Theology in a Postmodern Age*, has twin concerns: the nature of theology and the nature of reality, where the issue that links them both is the role of language (Patterson, 1999: 1). She examines realism in relation to Christian theology, arguing that:

“Theological realists … regard theology as having a scientific character in that, like scientific observation and theory-building, it is governed by its object. The being of God reflected in contingent creaturely being has an intrinsic rationality which the human knower comes to know in the same way that he or she comes to know worldly reality – that is, by ‘grasping it in its depths’ through participating in the given (revealed) structures of its being. This approach, therefore, asserts a universal rationality that is in the first place divine and in the second place, contingently, cosmic or worldly. The argument is that our concepts become true concepts as they come to be coordinated with the rational structure of reality (whether divine or worldly) through our indwelling of that reality.” (Patterson, 1999: 1-2).

There is resonance here with the work of Habermas (1971 and 1973 and 1984 and 1989) who speaks also of the science of critical reflection (Habermas, 1971: 310) but who does not interpret the word ‘science’ in an empirical sense relying on scientific method and logical positivism. Habermas also speaks of the rationality of communicative action and its sharing of understanding through intersubjective dialogue (Habermas, 1984 and 1989). Patterson’s view, in harmony with Habermas, presents an inherent realism as she speaks of
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the ‘intrinsic rationality’ of the human knower, operating as the science of critical reflection. Such critical reflection occurs as a person knows and grasps reality in its depths. For Patterson there is something universal about this process of knowing, where, “realist theology asserts that Christian truth claims only make sense if they correspond to an extra-linguistic reality beyond inherited traditions of belief and practice and the claims of human religious experience” (Patterson, 1999: 3). There is an inherent acknowledgement of universals here – entities which exist beyond language, traditions and religious experience. She goes on to say that:

“on this realist reckoning, the dynamic and innovative character of Christian thought and practice is a function of its participation in a reality transcendent of human formulations” and then compares this with what she calls the ‘revisionist view’ where Christian thought “is a function of (‘classic’ text enabled) engagement with the ‘limit-character of common human experience’ through which we encounter and are able to interpret divine transcendence.” (Patterson, 1999: 3).

Such a classic text enabled structure is very much like Habermas’ idea of hermeneutic interests or the textual determination of reality and its appropriation within a particular tradition. This has also been taken up by Catherine Pickstock when she speaks of “a textual calculus of the real” (Pickstock, 1998: 3) and of a world “disposed to treat words as capital” (Pickstock, 1998: 10). Such a hermeneutic interest is often to be found in particular church parties of the Anglican tradition, where a textual calculus and words function to determine meaning without adequate attention to critical and reflective interests (e.g. The Holy Eucharist, 1995/2002 and Sydney Doctrine Commission Report on APBA, 1996). Patterson argues that Christians couch their beliefs in terms of their allegiance to certain views and that interpretation is often in line with these views. She says that “inevitably, then, hermeneutics will be done from some position of commitment to certain beliefs … so that to employ a so-called general hermeneutic will be simply to operate from some faith position other than the one upon which the hermeneutic is being brought to bear” (Patterson, 1999: 55). This accords with Habermas’ description of hermeneutic knowing – operating within a tradition and the need for emancipatory knowing to move beyond this level. This also accords with the suggestion made in this thesis, that often within the Anglican tradition there is a dependence in theology and eucharistic theology on a particular party’s hermeneutic interest, which tends to impoverish the tradition, since it fails to employ a critical-reflective interest in the fullest sense and concentrates knowledge
into one specific hermeneutic interest, be that Catholic Anglican or Evangelical Anglican. Armstrong’s point that truth is determined, not by what is believed, but rather by the way the world is (Armstrong, 1997 and 2004), suggests that hermeneutic knowing alone, apart from critical and reflective interests, does not adequately determine truth.

For Patterson (like Pickstock and Armstrong), it seems, “there is reality outside of texts and their interpreting traditions, a reality which awaits conversion to the text and the tradition, but which itself brings aspects of itself in a dialectical encounter with the special revelation” (Patterson, 1999: 10). Clearly this is suggestive of a critical and reflective interest that has realist philosophical assumptions. Patterson explains this more fully in relation to signs and how they work, saying:

“For when we adopt something, sensible or intelligible, as a sign for something else our attention does not rest upon the sign but on what it indicates or points to: it is, so to speak, a transparent medium through which we operate. That is to say, the natural orientation of the human mind is, in this sense at least, quite ‘realist’. Accordingly, a sign, if it is to do its job properly, must be to some extent arbitrary, detached from the signified, incomplete or discrepant, or it will be confused with the things it is supposed to be representing. On the other hand, a complete arbitrariness in which the sign has ‘no natural bearing on the reality for which it is said to stand’ renders it ‘semantically useless’. In other words, it is necessary to be able to distinguish between sign and signified, but not to the extent that the connection is purely arbitrary. … A middle way must be trodden between nominalism and the idealist consequence of the total substitution of concept for object, which is the logical conclusion for correspondence.” (Patterson, 1999: 14-15).

Patterson is rejecting both nominalism and immoderate realism. Immoderate realism is rejected by the suggestion that the sign must in some way be detached from the signified, thus preventing the sign being strictly or numerically identical with the signified. Nominalism is rejected since the sign cannot be completely arbitrary in such a way that the sign and the signified become self-enclosed and separated entities. The talk of the sign being ‘a transparent medium’ which ‘indicates or points’ to the signified suggests moderate realism in the sense that recent Anglican theologians have spoken about the functioning of signs (e.g. Rowan Williams, 1998 and 2000 – see Case Study 7.52). Immoderate realism is clearly excluded in the discussion of the sign being ‘detached’ from the signified. If the sign is not detached from the signified then it is confused with the thing it is representing. This detachment of sign and signified is though, not purely arbitrary, since such
nominalism renders the sign useless. The middle way that Patterson is seeking here is what
this thesis, following Armstrong, calls moderate realism. Armstrong’s insights however,
have the potential to move Patterson’s work to the next level. Armstrong (1997: 27-28)
makes the point that universals are strictly identical in their different instances, such that
the powerful truism entails that two instantiations of the same universal, the sameness of
type involved, must be strictly identical. Patterson’s work in rejecting strict identity and
opting for what she calls ‘a middle way’, fails to appreciate this point and so limits the
depth of realist analysis. Strict identity between universal and particular is of course not
possible in a moderate realist analysis, but this does not limit the strictly identical nature of
the universal in its different instantiations in the same moderate realist analysis. This point
suggests that Anglican theological reflection which opts for a realist analysis (such as
Patterson does) would benefit from the insights of secular philosophical reflection such as
is found in the work of David Armstrong. This thesis aims to take advantage of these
reflections.

Patterson argues further that in Christian theology:

“We cannot avoid correspondence in the realism required by Christianity, but it is
not the correspondence we thought it was. We are talking, rather, of a
correspondence between God’s world-under-God’s-description and a
regenerated, redeemed world-under-human-description. The name and the
means of the correspondence is incarnation, where this is taken to embrace the
whole of human history and rationality, including its eschatological judgment and
fulfilment. Its method of verification is revelation.” (Patterson, 1999: 27).

The incarnation clearly functions in Patterson’s analysis in a realist way, where the incarnate
Christ corresponds to the divine reality, but in a moderate realist way by loose rather than
strict correspondence. To put this another way, the incarnate Christ instantiates the nature
of Christ. Indeed she argues that:

“Christian theology’s internal logic is such that it is required to be realist, in that
its self-consistency requires the upholding of certain central truth claims. However, while on a realist view physical reality has an existence independent of
our cultural and linguistic structuring, this view must reckon with the
postmodern insight that language (and the language-user) has for good or for bad
the power to construct a reality which is also an integral component of the
universe, and that both construction and discovery are not only inevitable and
inherent in human linguisticality, but also inevitably partial, flawed, perverse and
idolatrous.” (Patterson, 1999: 31-32).
For Patterson there is a correspondence element inherent in realism (as opposed it seems to anti-realism and nominalism). This implies for Patterson that, “the World under human description seeks verification and redemption in terms of the world under God’s description, that is, in the person of Jesus Christ who is the incarnate meeting place of divine and creaturely reality.” (Patterson, 1999: 32). At the same time however, Patterson is clearly acknowledging that for some, such realism is not a viable option, and that meaning is to be found, for such people, in a reality constructed in human linguisticality, that is, where there is a nominalist separation of sign and signified and a dependence on semantic propositionalism. Evidence of both realism and nominalism in the Anglican eucharistic tradition seems to accord with this view. There are those who adopt a realist position in relation to the Eucharist, linking sign and signified, and those who adopt a nominalist position, separating sign and signified. The case studies on the CD accompanying this thesis will help to establish if this distinction is in fact present in the Anglican eucharistic tradition.

Another modern Anglican theologian who speaks of realism is Andrew Moore, who in his recent book, *Realism and Christian Faith. God, Grammar and Meaning*, published in 2003, makes the claim that:

“when Christian faith is subjected to philosophical scrutiny, typical realist claims are that (1) God exists independently of our awareness of him and of our will, but that (2) despite this, we can know him and that (3) human language is not an inadequate or inappropriate medium for truthful speech about God.” (Moore, 2003: 1-2).

Further Moore argues that philosophy has a legitimate place in a Christocentric realism and theology. He says that: “the Christian faith is a proper object of philosophical scrutiny” and that “theology is bound to ‘take every thought captive to obey Christ’ (2 Cor. 10:5), and that includes philosophical thoughts” since “Christianity and philosophy are conversation partners” (Moore, 2003: 9).

Moore argues that realism has three sets of claims, which are:

1. “Ontologically, the realist holds that there is a reality external to human minds and that it exists as it does independently of the concepts and interpretative grids in terms of which we think about it. Its being what it is does not depend on our conceiving of it (as idealists hold), or on our conception of it (as Kantians hold), or indeed our conceiving it at all. Reality is there to be discovered as it
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objectively is; it is not subjectively invented, constructed or projected.” (Moore, 2003: 1)
2. “Epistemologically, the realist holds that reality can be (approximately) known as it is and not just as it appears to us to be (as empiricism holds).” (Moore, 2003: 1)
3. “Semantically, the realist holds that it is possible to refer successfully to, and so make (approximately) true statements about reality. That is, in classical terms, the truth of a proposition is a matter of its corresponding to reality independently of our being able to verify or otherwise confirm it.” (Moore, 2003: 1).

As an example of the use of philosophical reflection in theology Moore argues, “that we cannot know things as they are ‘in themselves’ (their noumenal reality) but only as they ‘appear’ to us to be (their phenomenal reality)” (Moore, 2003: 15). This has particular relevance to this thesis since it suggests we cannot know the physical body and blood of Christ and its offering (immoderate realism or noumenal realism as Moore calls it) but this does not preclude us from knowing the body and blood of Christ and its offering as they appear to us in the phenomena of bread and wine and their offering in the Eucharist (moderate realism or phenomenal reality). Indeed Moore argues “the grammar of the Christian faith is God himself” (Moore, 2003: 108) and that “when I say that God himself is the grammar of faith I mean that it is he who regulates our practices (including theological ones), teaches us their point, and thereby keeps our language in good order: God enables us to show his independent reality because he shows himself through the practices of faith” (Moore, 2003: 110). Among these ‘practices’ Moore includes the Eucharist, arguing that, “these practices assume a grammar of faith and see themselves as open to the authority of God because he reveals himself through them” (Moore, 2003: 113). This is a realist statement about the Eucharist. Moore however issues a warning that “Christians need to guard against thinking that the only agents in their practices are human and/or that their practices can be pursued autonomously: practices do not have their rationale in themselves but in the God who gave them as a means of sustaining divine-human fellowship” (Moore, 2003: 113). Moore also argues that “the link between practices and presence is contingent; there is no necessity by which the practices automatically convey the character of God” (Moore, 2003: 114). This suggests that any presence in the Eucharist is dependent on God and not on the performance of the practice, as the Corinthian experience of not discerning the body suggests (1 Cor. 11: 17-34). As Moore explains:
“Paul assumes that the crucified and risen Lord will make this food and meal a (the?) primary locus of his activity in the church, and that that activity brings to present effect the reality of judgement and grace enacted in Christ’s reconciling death. Thus, the Lord’s Supper is celebrated in grateful obedience to the one whose death is memorialised in it, and who is now alive as transforming presence giving meaning to Christian practices in the present” (Moore, 2003: 115).

This seems to be equivalent to what Armstrong has called moderate realism and to what is addressed by many within the Anglican eucharistic tradition in terms of real presence and anamnesis. Moore argues that non-realists, like Hart, argue that in the sacraments “much of what occurs … occurs in the perception of the participants and is not something that happens irrespective of these perceptions” (Hart, 1993: 86). Hart’s view is clearly that of anti-realism or non-realism. Moore comments that “this anthropocentric construal of the sacrament’s meaning combines conveniently with post-Structuralism so that Hart elides ‘discerning the body’ into ‘the importance of discerning the signifiers’” (Moore, 2003: 117). Moore shares much in common here with the approach of Pickstock (1998). This means for Moore that the non-realist puts the view that “eucharistic significance or meaning is a human creation: there is no transcendental signified, no signified body, only an endless chain of naturalistically interpreted signifiers” (Moore, 2003: 117). Clearly Moore is rejecting such a non-realist or anti-realist view in favour of a realist view in relation to practices such as the Eucharist. Moore’s realism though is in regard to the whole of the Eucharist where the sign of the signified is a practice rather than linking specific signs, such as bread and wine and their offering, with the signified body and blood and sacrifice of Christ. Indeed he says that, “where word and sacrament are duly administered, God is their self-presencing grammar. These practices are means of God’s presence to those who participate in them whether or not the realist meta-rule is explicitly admitted. Paul adds his realist meta-rule to bring out what is happening amongst the Corinthians” (Moore, 2003: 120-121). This is brought out when he speaks of anamnesis in I Corinthians, saying,

“he [Paul] issues reminders about what lies before our eyes, reminders of what we were in danger of forgetting because of confusions about grammar, reminders, in this case, that turn remembering into anamnesis. Anamnesis is eschatological: it looks forward by looking back to Christ’s death and resurrection as the proleptic consummation of God’s purposes. Anamnesis expects the Lord to make the eucharist the holy place where he meets his people in judgement and grace, and equips them to bear witness to him. In short, in judging and giving grace God acts in such a way that our lives are interrupted and brought into correspondence with him.” (Moore, 2003: 121).
This argument limits the sense of instantiation and heightens the sense of remembering in a particular holy place where theological concepts (judgement and grace) are what seem to be instantiated rather than the nature of Christ as a universal. Moore even goes as far in his realism to reject external means, saying that, “just as the Lord’s act in calling Paul to apostleship [the Damascus road experience] cannot be proved by external means, so neither can the Lord’s acting as Paul teaches he does in the eucharist” (Moore, 2003: 122).

While this certainly seems to reject immoderate realism in relation to external means it also has the consequence of limiting the sense of instantiation implied in moderate realism, pointing away from the signified through the signs and restricting the realism of the Eucharist to some sort of powerful reminder or memory and reducing the realism of the Eucharist to a psychological event. Despite this Moore argues that when a person names Jesus as Lord, this is to affirm that Jesus is the object we have in knowing God (Moore, 2003: 128). “The church … cannot avoid speaking of Jesus as an object since it is a person in space and time of whom we are talking, but not only a person in space and time but of this particular person in relation to the one he addressed as Father” (Moore, 2003: 128).

This is very realist language since it is the object (Jesus) that allows people to know God. This realism does not seem to be carried over to the Eucharist though, such that the object or sign of the Eucharist (bread and wine and their offering) allows people to know God in a moderate realist manner. Indeed Moore seems very suspicious of any approach that attempts to do this and rejects theological realism. He argues that in theological realism “an ideal and representationally perspicious language is sought, founded on the new universal: abstract, theoretical rationality. Science is seen as the supreme exemplar of this and the end to which theological speech should strive. However, as we have seen, the loss to theology is its own distinctive internal logic” (Moore, 2003: 130-131). Moore’s emphasis is a Christocentric realism (Moore, 2003: 133) and for him this means that neither “philosophy nor theology should be regarded as a universal method rendering the particular fully perspicious” (Moore, 2003: 133). Further he argues that his:

“understanding of the relationship between theology and philosophy might broadly be described as fideistic. That is, my claim is that knowledge of God is given by him as a gift of faith; neither is it a product of a priori reasoning nor is it deduced from what is evident to the senses. Faith does not have an empirical component, but it is the history of God’s involvement with his people, consummated in Jesus Christ. … Christian belief is based not on reason but on revelation.” (Moore, 2003: 134).
Moderate realism is not seen in this thesis as the means of faith by reasoning on the part of human beings, but rather a philosophical way of speaking about how God’s revelation occurred. In a moderate realist account the divine was instantiated in the person and work of Jesus Christ and also in the signs of the Eucharist. Moore seems to accept the former but is much less accepting of the latter. Indeed Moore’s reticence to embrace realism in its philosophical form is signalled by the distancing of his argument from what he describes as “the Scholastic debate between ‘nominalists’ and ‘realists’ over the status of universals” arguing that this “is somewhat, though not wholly, remote from our present concerns” (Moore, 2003: 2). This dismissal of the distinction between realism and nominalism ignores however the current modern usage of these terms in the work of present day philosophy (e.g. David Armstrong) which is not dependent on the Scholastic debate but remains viable in its own modern usage. Some analysis therefore is needed into the specific, although limited, application of the concepts of realism and nominalism to eucharistic theology in the Anglican tradition. This is attempted below.

During the 1940’s several writers argued that Archbishop Thomas Cranmer, the leader of the early English Reformation, was a follower of the theology of Zwingli, whose philosophical position on the Eucharist was derived from nominalism (Dix, 1945: 613-734; Timms, 1947, Dix, 1948, Richardson, 1949, Ratcliff, 1949). Cranmer it was argued, by following Zwingli, adopted a nominalist analysis in his eucharistic theology as was evidenced in his works on the Eucharist (Defence, 1550 and Answer, 1551) and in the eucharistic liturgy of the 1552 Book of Common Prayer. McGee (1964) following these earlier writers put the view that Cranmer in his theological works showed clear evidence of his Nominalism (McGee, 1964: 190). What McGee describes as Cranmer’s nominalism is defined as “not merely a set of theological and philosophical positions, but as a method of approach in theology and philosophy which is non-metaphysical in character, that is, one which does not abstract from notions of time and place” (McGee, 1964: 190). At the same time, according to McGee, this clearly seems to be a rejection of the realism inherent in a metaphysical approach to the sacraments and the Eucharist in particular. McGee makes the point that:

“It is customary to define Nominalism in relation to the question of universals. The Nominalist treatment of universals was a logical rather than a metaphysical or existential one. If the universal concept ‘man’ be taken as an example, an extreme Realist would say it exists outside the mind as a reality, and that
individual men are merely a reflection of it [Platonic realism or immoderate realism]. An extreme Nominalist, on the other hand, would say only individual men exist, and that the universal idea ‘man’ is just a convenient name. A moderate Realist, such as St. Thomas Aquinas, would say that the universal idea ‘man’ exists in God’s mind as a reality, in man’s mind as an abstraction, and outside of man’s mind as individuated. Thus, an extreme Realist tends towards pantheism, whereas an extreme Nominalist tends towards an atomistic individualism.” (McGee, 1964: 203).

McGee’s observations resonate strongly with the work of David Armstrong and his discussion of realism and nominalism, but what distinguishes them is the fact that whereas Armstrong makes no mention of the Eucharist, McGee certainly does, suggesting a link between the Anglican eucharistic tradition and the theory of universals. McGee argues that in Cranmer’s nominalist scheme, the signs of bread and wine in the Eucharist and the signified body and blood of Christ are self-enclosed entities and therefore distinguished from one another in an empirical manner. This suggests a rejection of realism by Cranmer and an adoption of nominalism in his eucharistic theology. McGee’s position is however rejected by Courtenay (1964) who argues not against the distinction between realism and nominalism, but against the view that Cranmer was a Zwinglian and therefore a nominalist. Courtenay describes McGee’s argument as “the old caricature of Nominalist Eucharistic theology” (Courtenay, 1964: 367) however, what seems clear is that Courtenay is rejecting the assembled opinions concerning Cranmer as a Zwinglian and McGee’s understanding of nominalism and not the distinction between realism and nominalism per se.

Another writer however suggests that Cranmer was not consciously a nominalist (Bromiley, 1956: 17) but still another writer argues that Cranmer’s was “hamstrung by nominalism” (Mascall, 1958: 121). A little later the Roman Catholic theologian, Francis Clark, in considering eucharistic sacrifice and the Reformation, makes the point that Cranmer’s eucharistic theology seems to reflect a nominalist framework (Clark, 1967: 300). Horton Davies makes the point also that Cranmer was a nominalist who structured his eucharistic theology on an empirical basis rather than a metaphysical. Davies argues that for Cranmer, as a nominalist, Christ, empirically, could not be present in heaven and on an altar on earth at the same time, since the metaphysical concept of thinking where the accidents were separate from the substance, was in a nominalist framework impossible (Davies, 1996a: 81). Diarmaid MacCulloch in his 1996 work, Thomas Cranmer. A Life, comments that “attempts
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to produce a comprehensive interpretation of Cranmer’s thinking in nominalist terms have not been especially successful” (MacCulloch, 1996: 491). The work he cites as not being especially successful is that of McGee (1964), examined above, who attempted to argue that Cranmer was expressing a nominalist separation of sign and signified in his eucharistic theology. MacCulloch criticises McGee on the basis of the argument advanced by Courtenay (1964) and in so doing, like Courtenay attempts to rebut the arguments put forward by McGee. It seems that MacCulloch is distancing himself from any attempt to examine Cranmer’s eucharistic theology in terms of nominalism at least. The problem here though, is that the deficiencies in McGee’s analysis, as pointed out by Courtenay, and accepted by MacCulloch, do not in themselves constitute sufficient reason for completely ignoring the philosophical dimensions of realism and nominalism in Anglican eucharistic theology in the period of the Reformation and beyond. In this sense MacCulloch is quite correct in saying that no comprehensive interpretation of Cranmer’s eucharistic theology exists in nominalist terms, but he rightly stops short of suggesting that it is improper to search for or construct such a scheme. What also seems clear is that no comprehensive analysis of the philosophical assumptions of Anglican eucharistic theology exists either, and what does exist seems inadequate due to its dependence on technical and hermeneutic interests of particular church parties. This thesis aims to make this dependence clear through the extraction of the essences of the Anglican eucharistic tradition in the case studies (see CD and Chapter 4) and to make the case for a more critical and reflective interest in the Anglican eucharistic tradition, which at present, does not seem to have emerged in any developed manner.

This thesis, in adapting the work of the contemporary philosopher David Armstrong, has attempted, as Macquarrie (1997: 132) proposes, to use modern philosophical thinking to provide a more comprehensive interpretation of Anglican eucharistic theology, using the categories of realism and nominalism to both moderate and immoderate degrees. Such an attempt holds the hope of providing a more unified model of knowing within the Anglican eucharistic tradition and emancipating it from the technical and hermeneutic interests that tend to deprive the tradition of a critical and reflective approach.

A crucial question for this thesis is: Does the Anglican eucharistic tradition sustain analysis according to the model proposed in Figure 1 above? Preliminary observation and reading
of case study material (as contained on the CD) supports the view that it does, with both realist and nominalist assumptions being part of the Anglican eucharistic tradition as essences of that tradition. Final judgment must however await the assessment of the phenomena in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis.

Another crucial question is: Does the conceptualisation of the Anglican eucharistic tradition as a state of affairs, using moderate realism, present a more satisfactory description of the tradition than the ‘classic’ description of real presence or indeed the prevailing Roman Catholic description, known as transubstantiation and which is based on a substance metaphysic and a change of substance? Does such a description move past the tension and the confusion involved in notions of substance and change of substance in both the past and the present? Attention needs to be focused on the question of whether the ‘classic’ metaphysical restatement of Anglican eucharistic theology in the seventeenth and eighteenth century and its reinterpretation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, remain a satisfactory way of expressing what happens in the Eucharist in the present day? If the answer to this question is in the negative then it seems that the continued use of a substance metaphysic poses serious difficulties for the Anglican eucharistic tradition in general and for theological education in particular and points to the need for a new model of the Anglican eucharistic tradition. Indeed it may well be that continued use of a substance metaphysic perpetuates acrimony and misunderstanding in the Anglican eucharistic tradition. Evangelical Anglicans, such as Doyle (1997 – Case Study 4.27) for example, in their criticisms of the Second Order eucharistic liturgies in *A Prayer Book for Australia* (1995), accuse Catholic Anglicans of immoderate realism in the Eucharist (that is, a fleshy notion of both Christ’s presence and sacrifice in the Eucharist) on the basis of an inadequate understanding of the philosophical assumptions underlying realism in particular and the Anglican eucharistic tradition in general. In a similar way, some Catholic Anglican expressions of eucharistic liturgy (e.g. *The Holy Eucharist*, 1995/2002) depend too heavily on a substance metaphysic and so perpetuate the acrimony and confusion by encouraging a suggestion of immoderate realism. A theology of the Eucharist based on states of affairs, such as that suggested by Armstrong (1989, 1995, 1997 and 2004) and adapted and applied to the Eucharist in this thesis, has the potential to overcome this acrimony and to emancipate the Anglican eucharistic tradition through a process of communicative action based on the intersubjectivity of a dialogue approach to theological education. Such
dialogue has the potential of allowing participants in the communicative community of Anglicanism to develop shared meaning. Further discussion of this potential will be undertaken in Chapter 5 of this thesis.

Some consideration of the perpetuation of the substance metaphysic in Anglican eucharistic theology may be useful at this point, to explicate more clearly the possible confusions that can occur through its continued use. Pusey, the nineteenth century leader of the Oxford Movement, for example, argues that ‘substance’ does not involve the properties of a body (in the terms of this thesis ‘immoderate realism’) but at the same time argues that in the Eucharist the body and blood are present in their substance. Pusey says:

“Since then the body and blood of Christ are present in their substance (for otherwise they could not be present at all) but the presence of that ‘substance’ does not involve the presence of any of the ordinary properties of a body, so neither does the conversion of the substance of the bread and wine into the substance of the body and blood of Christ involve the conversion of any of the properties of the bread and wine” (Pusey, 1870, cited in Stone, 1909: I, 546).

By substance Pusey means ‘essence’ or οὐσία of a thing, that is, whatever it is, its quidditas. In so doing he rejects the Medieval doctrine of transubstantiation and unknowingly, it seems, goes some way towards expressing a theology of the Eucharist as a state of affairs, but persists in using the metaphysic and language of substance. It seems that Pusey’s talk of ‘substance’ is very similar to what has been proposed above as the universal, Christ’s identity in nature as Word or Logos. Pusey’s words are also suggestive of what Armstrong says is “the demand that universals be strictly identical in their different instances, the ‘powerful truism’, entails that for two instantiations of the same universal, the sameness of type involved must be strict identity” (Armstrong, 1997: 28). It may be that Armstrong and Pusey are saying much the same thing, but it seems that Armstrong says it without the confusion of the substance metaphysic. When Pusey speaks of substance he seems to be really speaking of nature. Unfortunately his continued use of the word ‘substance’ is confusing, since it suggests the substance metaphysic of scholasticism. He is in fact, it seems, moving some way towards the notion of a state of affairs and moderate realism, but the continued use of the language of substance creates confusion between immoderate and moderate realism. It is this confusion that some Anglicans have picked up on in their criticism of realism in general (e.g. Doyle, 1997 and Sydney Doctrine Commission Report on APBA, 1996). Pusey acknowledges this himself, saying, that
“under the ‘species’ which remain, and which are the veil of the unseen presence, we may understand the φυσις or nature, including all those properties of which the senses are cognizant, and with them, or among them, the natural power of supporting and nourishing our bodies.” (Pusey, 1870, cited in Stone, 1909: I, 546). The continued use of the substance metaphysic as the basis of his moderate realism is, it is suggested, a difficulty for Pusey and Anglican eucharistic theology in general. Pusey himself seems to recognise this, admitting that the value of the Aristotelian philosophy to Christian theology has introduced difficulties into the understanding of the Eucharist, principally related to the word ‘substance’. (Pusey, 1870, cited in Stone, 1909: I, 456-457). Despite this Pusey, seemingly in the absence of an alternative, continues to conceptualise the Eucharist using a substance metaphysic. It is suggested therefore that conceptualising the Eucharist as a state of affairs, for those who wish to accept a eucharistic theology based on moderate realism may be a more satisfactory model for the Anglican eucharistic tradition since the notion of instantiation avoids the difficulties associated with the language of a substance metaphysic.

To some extent the Catholic view of the Eucharist in Anglicanism has become stuck on ideas of substance (e.g. Pusey’s attempt at a moderate use and the suggestion of immoderate realism in the Ballarat manual on the Eucharist (The Holy Eucharist, 1995/2002) seem to base their thinking on notions of substance). Evangelicals have reacted against this not only in relation to the more extreme realist view (such as that expressed in the Ballarat manual) but also in relation to the less extreme realist view expressed in the Second Order eucharistic liturgies of A Prayer Book for Australia (1995: 119-165). In so doing some Evangelicals have rejected any realist notion of a eucharistic real presence and a eucharistic sacrifice along with the idea of an immoderate realist notion of a re-iteration of the historic presence and sacrifice (e.g. Doyle, 1997 – see Case Study 4.27 and Sydney Doctrine Commission Report on APBA, 1996 – see Case Study 4.54). Evangelicals have generally tended to confuse the moderate use of realism with the immoderate use of realism and in so doing rejected any theology of the Eucharist based on a realist framework (both immoderate and moderate). This is especially so in the confusion between eucharistic and historic presence and sacrifice. The idea of a state of affairs attempts to break this impasse, seeing Christ as being present by instantiation, rather than by notions of substance. The substance metaphysic speaks of change in substance either by conversion of the substance of the bread and wine into the substance of the body and blood of Christ with only the
accidents remaining (as in Aquinas and transubstantiation) or by the conversion of the bread and wine into Christ’s body and blood without any conversion of the substance of the bread and wine (as in Pusey and non-fleshy real presence). The idea of a state of affairs and instantiation does not confuse the historical fleshy body and blood with the eucharistic real presence nor does it require the notion of a conversion of substances (either immoderate or moderate). It also distinguishes the universal and the particular in a way that means the universal is strictly identical in its instantiations but does not mean that the particulars (bread/wine and body/blood) are strictly identical. Instantiation accepts that both the historic and the eucharistic body and blood/sacrifice exist, but that the historic is not instantiated in the Eucharist, even though, following Armstrong (1997: 28), the universal, the nature of Christ, is strictly identical in both instantiations. The eucharistic body and blood/sacrifice is an instantiation or instance of the universal, that is, Christ’s identity in nature in the Eucharist, but not a re-iteration of the historic body and blood/sacrifice. The eucharistic presence and sacrifice of Christ is however, really present, operative and received in the context of the eucharistic celebration, as a particular instantiation of the universal, Christ’s identity in nature, but not as the particular of the historic body and blood/sacrifice.

The question which this thesis seeks to resolve is whether or not the model of the Anglican eucharistic tradition (Figure 1) is a viable way of describing that tradition, allowing it to avoid the difficulties of a substance metaphysic and to reflect more adequately the varied nature of the tradition, that is, its different philosophical bases and technical and hermeneutic commitments. If this is the case, then the model has particular relevance as a way forward for Anglican sacramental theology and for the teaching of eucharistic theology within theological education generally. The acceptance of such a model has the potential to move any consideration of Anglican eucharistic past narrow enfaithing models of theological education and to avoid exclusive commitments to particular hermeneutic interests. It is this quest to establish the usefulness of such a model that represents the critical interest of this thesis in relation to the Anglican eucharistic tradition with subsequent benefits for theological education in the Anglican tradition. The model put forward here argues that the philosophical assumptions underlying Anglican eucharistic theology are multiform, varying between realist and nominalist assumptions and that these assumptions further vary according to the moderate and immoderate degree. It is these
philosophical assumptions that are often foundational in the various hermeneutic interests of the Anglican tradition and which are manifested as the views of particular church parties and the various institutions of theological education. Habermas’ work (1971 and 1973) suggests that various technical and hermeneutic interests underpin the thinking of particular groupings within a tradition and in turn determine the approach to learning adopted in these groupings. Often enfaithing models of religious education focus on the appropriation of particular technical and hermeneutic interests whereas interfaith models of religious education usually seek to apply a more critical approach to ways of knowing. This thesis argues that in the Anglican eucharistic tradition it is important to distinguish between these narrow and more critical approaches to Anglican eucharistic theology by acknowledging the different philosophical assumptions underlying eucharistic theology in the Anglican tradition and the effect these have in the various church parties within Anglicanism. Where particular interests focus on a narrow enfaithing model of religious education then the tradition can become fetishised and impoverished by exclusive commitments to these interests without adequate attention to critical interest, but where an interfaith model of religious education is adopted then the tradition often adopts a more critical approach to religious education and becomes more aware of the influences of particular technical and hermeneutic interests and the ways these interests function in theological education. At a later stage (Chapter 5) a dialogue approach will be suggested as one way that Anglican theological education concerned with eucharistic theology can promote a critical interest apart from the sometimes narrow and exclusive commitments of particular hermeneutic interests.

It remains for the case studies to demonstrate whether or not this analysis is consistent with the evidence they present. The next chapter of the thesis (Chapter 4) therefore extracts the essences of the Anglican eucharistic tradition from the case studies (see accompanying CD). Critical assessment of the case study material and ramifications for religious and theological education will be suspended for the present and follow (in Chapter 5) once these essences have been extracted using the methodology of phenomenology.
Chapter 4

Essences of the Anglican Eucharistic Tradition
Extracted from the Case Studies: A Classification of the Experience

4.1 Introduction

This thesis is suggesting on the basis of the case study evidence that the philosophical assumptions underlying Anglican eucharistic theology are varied and multiform. Some expressions of eucharistic theology in the Anglican tradition associate the signs of the Eucharist more closely with what they signify than others. The distinction between realism and nominalism to both moderate and immoderate degrees is therefore seen as important in understanding how the sign and the signified is understood by the various hermeneutic interests of the Anglican tradition. It has been argued in the previous chapter that it is important to know what these philosophical assumptions are if there is to be a critical awareness of the Anglican eucharistic tradition apart from the particular technical and hermeneutic interests of church parties and traditions and the educational strategies they adopt as ways of knowing. The extraction of essences (or themes) from the diverse experience of the Anglican eucharistic tradition is therefore seen as important in understanding the ways of knowing in the Anglican eucharistic tradition, in terms of particular interests, philosophical assumptions and models of religious education. An awareness of these essences not only demonstrates the multiformity of the Anglican eucharistic tradition but assists educators who seek critical understanding of the tradition.

This chapter aims to extract the essences (or themes) from among the profuse experience of the Anglican eucharistic tradition. These essences will be drawn from the material presented as case studies of the thesis (see the CD accompanying this thesis) and will be
organised according to the various historical periods of the Anglican eucharistic tradition, as used on the CD, that is:

- Section 1: The Period of the Reformation
  - 1.1 The Early Period of the Reformation – up to 1558
  - 1.2 The Later Period of the Reformation – 1558-1662
- Section 2: The Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries
- Section 3: The Nineteenth Century
- Section 4: The Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries
  - 4.1 The Early Twentieth Century – up until WWII
  - 4.2 The Later Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries – following WWII

It is not intended to reference the case study material in detail in this chapter already referenced in the case studies on the CD accompanying this thesis and in the Bibliography. Essences will generally be discussed in this chapter without again supplying the detailed experience of the Anglican eucharistic tradition that can be found in the case studies. The names and numbers of case studies however, will be noted so that details can be followed up by reference to the individual case studies found on the CD or in the Bibliography. The case studies are identified by two numbers separated by a full stop – the first numbers referring to the section of the case studies (1, 2, 3 or 4) and the second number referring to the number of the case study in a particular section of the case studies. This means for example that Case Study 1.1 refers to Section 1 of the Case Studies and Case Study number 1. This is intended to allow particular case studies to be more easily accessed by the reader when referring to the CD.

Whilst an effort has been made to present a representative sample of case studies from the Anglican eucharistic tradition from the Reformation to the present, it is acknowledged that not all the phenomena of the Anglican eucharistic tradition has been accessed in the case studies. It is acknowledged that many other Anglican theologians, liturgies and statements remain to be discussed and it is beyond the scope of this project to present an exhaustive treatment of the entire Anglican eucharistic tradition. The material presented in the case studies (on the accompanying CD) nonetheless represents a substantial part of the
Anglican eucharistic tradition and it is from this material that essences of the Anglican eucharistic tradition have been extracted. The process begun here is a work in progress and many other statements on Anglican eucharistic theology remain to be accessed and interpreted in the form of additional case studies.

4.2 Essences extracted from the Case Studies

Section 1 of the Case Studies: The Period of the Reformation

The Early Period of the Reformation – up to 1558

The case studies of the early period of the Reformation (Case Studies 1.1 to 1.15 extend up until the accession of Elizabeth I in 1558) and present a variety of philosophical assumptions underlying eucharistic theology.

Reformed Doctrine

Case studies suggest that many of the Anglican theologians of this period were committed to a Reformed doctrine of the Eucharist. Not only was transubstantiation rejected as a way of speaking of the presence of Christ in the Eucharist, but the various medieval abuses were also rejected. None the cases studies of the early period of the Reformation accept transubstantiation and some specifically reject it (e.g. 1.1 Cranmer; 1.3 Ridley; 1.4 Latimer; 1.5 Becon; 1.6 Bradford; 1.8 Hooper; 1.10 Jewell; and 1.15 The Black Rubric). Richard Hooker (1.7) argues that speculation on the means of the presence of Christ in the Eucharist, such as is found in transubstantiation, is unnecessary, and rather the certainty of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist is all that it is needed. Notions of a carnal presence of Christ or a fleshy re-iteration of Christ’s sacrifice in the Eucharist (that is, immoderate realism) are also frequently rejected (e.g. Cranmer 1.1; Book of Common Prayer 1.2; Ridley 1.3; Bradford 1.6; Hooker 1.7; Hooper 1.8; Jewell 1.10; Nowell 1.11; and The Black Rubric 1.15) in this early period of the Reformation. Cranmer’s Defence of 1550 and Answer of 1551 are a sustained expression of Reformed eucharistic doctrine (1.1). The 1549 and 1552 Book of Common Prayer (1.2) are despite their traditional liturgical shape, also an expression of Reformed doctrine (e.g. the change from ‘become’ to ‘be to us’ in the ἐπίλεισις of the 1549 BCP and the offering not of a sacrifice but of praise and thanksgiving in the prayer
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following communion). Jewell’s (1.10) use of the term ‘figure’ to describe Christ in the Eucharist is a distinct change from the idea that Christ was really present (either in the moderate or immoderate senses) and picks up on Reformed doctrine, whilst Perkins (1.12) adopts the agenda of the extreme Reformers and questions whether sacraments are really necessary at all. Further Perkins expresses the Reformed view that sacraments are only reminders or props to faith and perform the function of assisting the believer in understanding, rather than being a means of delivering grace.

Realism and Nominalism

There is substantial evidence to suggest that there is a multiformality of views in regard to the philosophical assumptions underlying the eucharistic theology in this period, with both nominalism and realism being present. Cranmer (1.1), using nominalist assumptions, separates the signs of bread and wine from the signified body and blood of Christ on the basis of an empirical separation of Christ’s heavenly presence from the earth, even though he sees Christ as being spiritually present by the power of divinity in the ministration of the sacrament. Cranmer argues that if Christ is present (as an empirical thing) in heaven then he cannot logically be present in any real way on earth. The substance of Christ (whatever Christ is) can only in Cranmer’s mind be present in an empirical manner and not in any metaphysical or realist manner as an instantiation of Christ’s nature on earth. The same nominalist separation between sign and signified applies for Cranmer in regard to the sacrifice of Christ. Christ was sacrificed in the past and that sacrifice cannot be present in any way in the present, other than in the thanks and praise of the faithful communicant as a memory or remembrance of a past and completed action. Cranmer’s theology of the eucharist is heavily dependent on a nominalist separation of sign and signified. Becon (1.5) speaks of the communicant receiving the promises of God in the Eucharist and not the body and blood of Christ because the sign for him cannot be the thing itself. Spiritual eating (by faith) is distinguished from sacramental eating (on earth) in that Christ is present to the communicant by faith but is not present in the sacramental signs. There is for Becon a distinct nominalist separation of sign and signified. Hooper (1.7) admits no participation of Christ in the Eucharist and no instantiation of the nature of Christ in the elements of the Eucharist. For Hooper, the dominical phrase, ‘This is my body/blood’, means ‘This represents my body/blood’ without any realist philosophical assumptions linking sign and signified. Signs are for the purpose of remembering only and cannot be
the signified thing itself. Signs function as a token of God’s promises, to be given by faith and sacraments relate to memories of completed events. Hutchinson (1.9) also distinguishes the sign from the signified, only admitting that the name of the signified is given to the sign (i.e. bread and wine are called Christ’s body and blood but are not Christ’s body and blood in any real sense other than in the sense of a linguistic proposition). Christ can only be present in the Eucharist as a house is present in a lease – not really, but in effect. Jewell (1.10) expresses a nominalist separation of sign and signified in the Eucharist. Christ’s body is in heaven and not on earth, but the eucharistic elements are not bare signs. Jewell affirms a nominalist separation of sign and signified, arguing that the divine nature is not present in the signs. The Puritan, Perkins (1.12), separates sign and signified, arguing that the grace and mercy of God cannot be tied to signs. His theology of the Eucharist rests on a propositional structure, where actions in the Eucharist occur (e.g. bread is broken and wine is poured) but there is no realist linking of the sign and signified. All that happens for Perkins is that the actions cause the faithful to meditate. The application of the actions is to the faithful and not the signs. Sandys (1.13) acknowledges sign and signified but also distinguishes them in a nominalist separation. Bread and wine for the faithful are declared to be a mystical participation in the body and blood of Christ, but there is no realist linking of the sign and signified, the participation occurring by faith apart from the signs at the time the bread and wine are received. Grindal (1.14) states categorically that the sacrament is not Christ. Not only is this a denial of immoderate realism, but it is also a denial of moderate realism, since he argues that receiving Christ can be by faith alone. Christ is empirically in heaven for Grindal and so cannot be present in any real way on earth in the Eucharist.

Realist philosophical assumptions in relation to the Eucharist are however present in this early period of the Reformation. Ridley (1.3) argues that Christ is present by his divinity in the Eucharist, in that Christ is present by his working. This suggests realism, where the divine nature is instantiated in the Eucharist as a divine action. Indeed Ridley goes so far as to say that the bread is converted into the body of Christ, by an operation of divinity, and is not merely a figure. Ridley also speaks of ‘the Lamb’ being present at the table and not just in the people that receive communion. He is careful to qualify all this talk of presence though by calling it an ‘unbloody’ presence. This suggests moderate realism, whereby the divine nature of Christ is instantiated in the Eucharist and in the bread and wine. Latimer
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(1.4) speaks of a spiritual true presence of Christ in the Eucharist. He says that the same ‘substance’ is present in both Christ’s flesh and the bread and wine of the Eucharist. This suggests moderate realism where the divine nature of Christ is instantiated not only in the flesh of Christ but in the elements of the Eucharist. He argues in the same way that the divine nature of Christ’s sacrifice is also present in the earthly Eucharist, thereby suggesting a moderate realist instantiation of the divine nature of Christ. Bradford (1.6) speaks of a ‘coupling’ of the sign and the signified in the Eucharist, thereby also suggesting a moderate realist framework. Hooker (1.7) speaks of ‘participation’ such that there is a real participation of Christ by means of the sacrament. This suggests moderate realism, whereby the divine nature is instantiated in the Eucharist. The basis of Hooker’s theology lies in the incarnation, such that the divine nature was instantiated in Jesus Christ and born in human flesh. In the same way the divine nature is present in the bread and wine of the Eucharist that Hooker describes as conduits and conveyances of divine grace. The signs for Hooker convey the signified and there is a givenness of gift. The divine and the earthly participate in one another so that there is what Hooker calls a ‘conjunction’ between the two. This is a realist philosophical assumption.

Some of those theologians who adopt nominalist assumptions in relation to the signs and signified of the Eucharist, also speak of a presence of Christ in the administration of the Eucharist. Cranmer (1.1) excludes both immoderate realism and moderate realism in relation to the bread and wine of the Eucharist but argues at the same time that the force, grace and virtue of Christ’s body are present spiritually in those who receive the sacrament. For Cranmer, there seems to be a realist linking between Christ’s body and those who receive, despite his nominalist separation of the signs and signified of the Eucharist. Cranmer’s descriptions of the faithful receiving Christ, after lifting their hearts and minds heavenward, are very realist. The communicants are said to eat Christ’s flesh and drink his blood springing from his side, but this is totally unrelated to the sacramental actions on earth. These are separated from the divine nature of Christ, which can only be accessed by a spiritual ascension of the faithful to the presence of Christ in heaven. Hutchinson (1.9) makes similar comments, arguing that Christ is present in the faith of the communicant and in the ministration alone. Realism is therefore present in some ecclesial sense where the spiritual linking of Christ with his faithful people occurs in a heavenly and spiritual manner only. Jewell (1.10) also argues that Christ is not present in the bread and wine but only in
the faithful during the holy ministration. Perkins (1.12) also adopts this view arguing that grace is present in the sacrament only in the right use of the sacrament. The presence of Christ is a moral not a physical instrument, where Christ in present, not by signs but by faith in ministration. In this sense the signs function only as reminders and do not instantiate the divine nature of Christ in any real way. Like Cranmer, Perkins distinguishes between a 'mystical' and a 'sacramental' presence. There is no mystical presence of Christ associated with the elements since the things signified can only come to the mind by use of the signs. The signs serve a sacramental purpose only with no realist linking to the signified divine nature or presence of Christ in the Eucharist. This position of the presence of Christ in the ministration alone is based on the philosophical assumptions of nominalism where the signs of the Eucharist are not linked in any real way with the signified divine nature or body and blood of Christ. Linking of the faithful communicant with Christ occurs only in a spiritual and mystical manner. The Black Rubric (1.15) was printed in the 1552 BCP and spoke of there being no 'real and essential' presence of Christ in the Eucharist, thereby not only rejecting immoderate realism but also it seems any moderate realist presence of Christ in the Eucharist that might be suggested by the words 'real and essential'. This suggests that the insertion of this Black Rubric in BCP 1552 was aimed at rejecting the idea that there was any link between the signs of the Eucharist and the signified nature of Christ. The philosophical assumption behind this insertion of the Black Rubric was therefore seemingly nominalism.

Some of the theologians who adopt a realist position in relation to the Eucharist, speak of a change in the nature of the signs of the Eucharist, but not in their substance. Ridley (1.3) for example speaks in this way, arguing for a change in 'nature' or a change 'properly' but not in substance. There is, says Ridley, a 'change in being' but 'no mutation of substance'. Bradford (1.6) and Hooker (1.7) speak in this way also. Jewell (1.10) admits no change in substance but does speak of a change in nature. It seems that those theologians at this early Reformation period are attempting to distance themselves from the doctrine of transubstantiation (i.e. a change in substance of the bread and wine, such that they become the substance of Christ’s body and blood, with the accidents remaining) but not from a moderate realist position based on a change in nature. The words 'change in nature', although problematic in that the words depend on technical distinctions between nature and substance, nonetheless suggest that theologians such as Ridley (1.3), Bradford (1.6) and
Hooker (1.7) are using a moderate realism in their search for an acceptable eucharistic theology, whereby there is an instantiation of the divine nature of Christ in the bread and wine of the Eucharist. Bradford (1.6) for example distinguishes between signs as figures and signs that give the signified. Signs as figures suggest a nominalist separation of sign and signified (such as Jewell (1.10) would argue) but signs which give the signified suggests moderate realist philosophical assumptions, whereby sign and signified are clearly linked (as Hooker (1.7) argues). Others speak of the Eucharist as a means of grace. Hooker (1.7) for example speaks of the signs of bread and wine as conducts of life and conveyances of Christ’s body and blood.

The early period of the Reformation presents a variety of philosophical assumptions relating to the Eucharist. Both nominalist and realist philosophical assumptions are present in the eucharistic theology of this period, suggesting that there was from the very beginning of the distinctly Anglican period, following the break with Rome, more than one theology of the Eucharist present and a variety of philosophical assumptions underlying eucharistic theology.

**The Later Period of the Reformation – 1558 - 1662**

The case studies of the later period of the Reformation (Case Studies 1.16 – 1.44) extend from the accession of Elizabeth I (1558) to the publication of the 1662 *Book of Common Prayer*. A variety of philosophical assumptions underlie the eucharistic theology of this period.

*Transubstantiation and Immoderate Realism Denied*

Most of the case studies from the later period of the Reformation deny both immoderate realism and transubstantiation in their expression of eucharistic theology on the basis of a Reformed theological position. Those that do not specifically deny immoderate realism or transubstantiation do not commit to these notions either. Laud (1.29) rejects transubstantiation but acknowledges that moderate realism (real presence of Christ in the Eucharist and in the elements) may be accepted without accepting any conversion of the substance of the bread and wine.
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Moderate Realism

Moderate realism is a common feature of the eucharistic theology of this later period of the Reformation, although there are several ways that this moderate realism is expressed. Some of these moderate realist interpretations will be reviewed below.

Many writers use the idea of a sacramental principle in expressing their eucharistic theology. Some base their theology on the incarnation of Christ and others speak of a hypostatical union between the human and divine natures of Christ. Andrewes (1.16) bases his moderate realist theology of the Eucharist on the incarnational principle, where the divine nature is seen to participate in the Eucharist in the same way that the divine nature participated in the incarnate Jesus. Andrewes speaks of a hypostatical union of sign and signified in the Eucharist where the two natures of Christ (human and divine) are united each in its own nature without any conversion of substance. He therefore expresses a moderate realism while denying transubstantiation. Instead of arguing, as Cranmer (1.1) did, that the communicant ascends to heaven in heart and mind and there receives Christ, Andrewes argues that Christ comes from heaven to hallow people. In the receiving of the bread and wine people receive Christ’s body and blood, therefore suggesting that Christ is in and with the sacraments. Andrewes’ eucharistic theology speaks of types and antitypes meeting and is based on the philosophical assumptions of moderate realism and suggests an instantiation of the nature of Christ in the bread and wine of the Eucharist in the same way that there was an instantiation of the nature of Christ in the incarnation. Bramhall (1.18) also refers to a hypostatical union between deity and elements where the divine nature is conveyed by earthly elements, thereby suggesting instantiation based on moderate realist philosophical assumptions. Herbert (1.26) argues that the things or signs of the Eucharist bring God to people, such that Christ is present and given to people by signs of bread and wine. Jackson (1.28) expresses the means of Christ presence in the Eucharist as moderate realism in the same way that the incarnation of Christ is based on moderate realism. Nicholson (1.33) speaks of a relation between the sign and the signified which is ‘a mutual union’ and which is also a ‘mystical union’ or ‘conjunction’. In this way the sacraments are seen a ‘conduit pipes’ of grace. This way of speaking has much in common with Richard Hooker’s eucharistic theology (1.7). Taylor (1.36) argues, affirming the sacramental principle, that by sensible signs spiritual grace is received. Taylor also makes the distinction between ‘species’ and ‘genus’ in the Eucharist. For him ‘species’ implies a
carnal or immoderate realism, whereas ‘genus’ implies a moderate realism. In the Eucharist he argues Christ’s body is made “more universal by being made more particular” (Taylor, *Real Presence*, edn. Bohn, 1944: II, 732). It is this reference to the particular in the Eucharist that suggests the instantiation of the genus, Christ’s nature, in the Eucharist, rather than any change in the substance of the species. Taylor’s eucharistic theology is expressed in his Eucharistic Office of 1658 where the liturgy prays that the bread and wine ‘become’ Christ’s body and blood. This *epiclesis* prays that the communicants partake of Christ body and blood in a real way in the Eucharist.

The 1559 *BCP* (1.39) combined the 1549 and 1552 *BCP* words of administration to produce a more realist wording. The words ‘The body/blood of our Lord Jesus Christ’ were now linked with the elements as they were administered indicating use of the sacramental principle. The 1662 *BCP* (1.40) also made some more definite realist statements. The word ‘offertory’ was now used at the time of placing the bread and wine on the altar, although this prayer book did not go as far as the Scottish Prayer Book of 1637 (1.34) which spoke of the bread and wine being ‘offered up’. The Black Rubric (1.15) was also restored to the Eucharist in the 1662 *BCP* but with a significant change. The denial of any ‘corporal presence’ was now made but the previous words excluding a ‘real and essential presence’ were omitted. This prevented any immoderate realist doctrines of Christ’s presence but did not prohibit moderate realist doctrines. The Puritan, Richard Baxter, in his eucharistic liturgy entitled *The Reformation of the Liturgy* or *The Savoy Liturgy* (1.41), used moderate realist concepts. He named the service in a realist manner, calling it the ‘sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ’. He argued that signs and signified were linked stating that “flesh and blood be to us meat and drink” (Baxter, *The Savoy Liturgy*, edn. Thompson, 1988: 398-399). Baxter (1.41) expresses in this liturgy the moderate realist view that the bread and wine of the Eucharist are sacramentally Christ’s body and blood. Various catechisms speak of the Eucharist in this period. In 1548 Cranmer in a catechism (1.42) spoke in a very realist manner, saying that Christ’s body and blood were truly present in the Eucharist and received with the bodily mouth under the form of bread and wine. Some saw this as teaching transubstantiation and Cranmer in his *Defence* of 1550 denied that this is what he meant. In the *Defence* he speaks only of a presence in the use or ministration of the sacrament. Later editions of Cranmer’s catechism did not contain these realist statements.
Writers also speak of the presence of Christ in the Eucharist as a ‘true’ or ‘real’ presence that is nonetheless spiritual, mystical, ineffable, miraculous and imperceptible. Where this occurs there is a linking between the sign and the signified in a realist manner. Bramhall (1.18) affirms what he calls ‘a true real presence’, where the elements are spoken of as ‘instruments’ and where they convey the merits of Christ’s passion in the Eucharist in the present. Cosin (1.19) links the body and blood of Christ with the bread and wine of the Eucharist in what he calls a ‘real presence’. Early in his writings he speaks of an objective presence of Christ in the Eucharist but moderates this over time to a more spiritualised view, even though Christ is still seen to be really present at both stages of his thinking. Christ is present in a mystical and real manner, although later in his life his views move closer to receptionism in that the presence of Christ is expressed in relation to the use of the elements. Moderate realism nonetheless underpins what he says throughout his life and the elements are seen to be more than mere figures or bare signs. The signs are seen to be linked with the signified and to experience change to a different use in the eucharistic celebration. Crakanthorp (1.20) speaks of the signs in the Eucharist as not only figures but also as bestowing the real body of Christ instrumentally and spiritually. Forbes (1.23) states that the body and blood of Christ is received in a spiritual manner which is miraculous and imperceptible, arguing that it is a ‘substantial presence’, meaning that by the power of God people partake of the substance of Christ’s body and blood. Hammond (1.25) speaks of Christ’s corporal body and blood being in heaven and not on earth in the Eucharist, but also argues for an ineffable and mystical manner of change in the elements whereby the communicant receives both bread and wine and Christ’s body and blood, with the bread and wine remaining in their natural substance. He calls this a ‘eucharistical action’ where the body and blood of Christ is communicated to people, not locally but really. He also calls the Eucharist a federal rite in that it unites Christ and people. L’Estrange (1.30) states that God blesses the elements in the Eucharist so that they become the body and blood of Christ and refers to the 1549 BCP model where the epiclesis and the manual acts of the priest sustain a moderate realist view of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist. Morton (1.32) says that the sign communicates the thing signified and sealed, with the gift of Christ’s body and blood conveyed by word and sacrament. Real presence for Nicholson (1.33) is not imagined (a mental or semantic structure) or corporal (immoderate realism) but spiritually, divinely and sacramentally in true believers and in the sacrament. ‘Real’ is here
distinguished from ‘corporal’. ‘Real’ is not seen as an empirical things (as Cranmer (1.1) saw it and so excluded it from his eucharistic theology) but mystical. This mystical sense of the presence of Christ in the Eucharist is not however seen as anything less than real. The Scottish Prayer Book of 1637 (1.34) presents a realist theology of the Eucharist in its request for the bread and wine to be blessed and sanctified, so that ‘they may be unto us’ the body and blood of Christ. This *epiclesis* presents a realist linking of sign and signified. Sutton (1.35) speaks of Christ’s body and blood being conveyed ‘under’ bread and wine. The substance of the bread and wine is not removed but the grace of Christ’s body and blood is said to be joined to them in an ineffable and spiritual manner. Real presence for Taylor (1.36) is not carnal, nor is it merely a figure or bare sign. Real presence is also more than what is implied by receptionism, since the nature of Christ is instantiated in the elements apart from the moment of reception. The devotional manual *The Whole Duty of Man* (1.37) links the consecrated bread and wine of the Eucharist with the body and blood of Christ as a seal of the covenant between God and people and as a means of grace. In the 38 Articles of 1563 (1.38) however, the body of Christ was said to be ‘given, taken, and eaten in the Supper only after a heavenly and spiritual manner. And the mean whereby the body of Christ is received and eaten in the Supper is faith’. There was a definite change in theology from previous statements of the Articles since the body of Christ was not said to be ‘given’ by faith, only ‘received and eaten’. Carnal presence (immoderate realism) was still denied but the presence is affirmed as ‘given’, suggesting moderate realism as the means of this givenness. The 39 Articles of 1571 (1.38) maintained this distinction between ‘given’ on the one hand and ‘received and eaten’ on the other, thereby also presenting a moderate realist notion of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist. Overall (1.43) argues that in the Eucharist the body and blood, the whole Christ, is present, received and united to the sacramental signs, which not only signify the grace of Christ but conveys it to those who receive. There is a linking of sign and signified here.

Some writers such Field (1.22) and Jackson (1.28) refer to the virtue, grace or power of Christ’s body and blood being mystically communicated to the faithful by the signs of bread and wine. Field argues that the signs communicate the virtue, grace and power of Christ’s body and blood in the Eucharist, and that these are mystically communicated to people. Signs not only represent but also communicate the signified. Jackson (1.28) says that there is no local presence of Christ in the Eucharist but links sign and signified,
arguing that Christ’s Spirit from heaven brings virtue to the earth in such a way that Christ’s body and blood is ‘with’ the elements of bread and wine.

Other writers talk of a gift being given in the Eucharist which not only represents but presents or exhibits Christ to the communicant. Andrewes (1.16) and Bramhall (1.18) state that the presence of Christ is a gift in the elements of bread and wine, which not only represents Christ but presents Christ to those who receive the elements. Nicholson (1.33) says that God by sacraments presents, exhibits, and seals redemption. Sacraments function as instruments to convey Christ’s merits with the signs linked to the signified. God is the source of the grace not the sacrament but the grace is nonetheless given in and by the sacrament. Jackson (1.28) goes so far as to say that there is an objective presence of Christ in the Eucharist because it is received by the worthy as well as the unworthy and therefore not dependent on the faith of the communicant. Others deny any receptionist interpretation of the Eucharist. Forbes (1.23) specifically denies receptionism and affirms a givenness of presence in the elements. Givenness suggests an instantiation of the nature of Christ in the Eucharist. The 1662 BCP (1.40) according to the interpretation of the Laudians presents a lessening of any receptionist doctrine by the inserting of the manual acts of the priest in the Prayer of Consecration. Consecration is therefore specifically associated with the manual acts of the priest (taken, breaking, laying on of hand on the bread and cup) rather than the act of reception. The ‘Amen’ at the end of the Prayer of Consecration in the 1662 BCP also suggests a separation of the consecration from any reception and therefore a lessening of receptionist doctrines.

Some writers speak of a change in the elements. Andrewes (1.16) says that the Word has the power to change the nature of the elements with the substance remaining, such that there is a union between the visible sacrament and the invisible reality. Cosin (1.19), Crakanthorp (1.20) and Sutton (1.35) say there is change in use but not in substance. Field (1.22) speaks of a ‘change’ or ‘mutation’ in the elements of the Eucharist such that the earthly signs become the sacrament of the true body and blood of Christ. Montague (1.31) speaks of ‘change’, ‘alteration’, ‘transmutation’ and ‘transelementation’ of the elements so that they become more than ordinary bread and wine and assume a ‘sacramental being’ such that Christ is imparted to the communicant by the bread and wine. Morton (1.32) speaks of a divine alteration whereby Christ is exhibited in a spiritual and supersubstantial
manner which is based on a moderate realist presence of Christ in the Eucharist, dependent on the alteration and not only on the use or ministration of the sacrament. Nicholson (1.33) argues that the substance of the bread and wine is not changed but that there is a change brought about nonetheless by the relationship between the elements and Christ. Taylor (1.36) argues that the elements are changed after a sacramental manner following consecration and that Christ is really and effectually received by the communicant. He says, ‘It is bread. It is Christ’s body’. While these writers speak of a ‘real’ presence which is the result of some sort of change or alteration of the bread and wine, they are clear in asserting that this is not a carnal or fleshy change. Moderate realism is the basis of any discussion of a real presence although some (e.g. Andrewes (1.16) speak of a linking between the signs of bread and wine and the nature of Christ) whereas others (e.g. Field – 1.19) speak about the link between the bread and wine and the body and blood of Christ.

The 42 Articles of 1553 (1.38) specifically deny any immoderate realist presence of Christ, however they do this by denying any ‘real or bodily’ presence. It seems that the term ‘real’ as used here means ‘bodily’ (i.e. immoderate realist presence) but that the term ‘real’ is also used in a moderate realist manner (e.g. Taylor, 1.36 says that spiritual in this sense is more real than corporal, even though ‘real’ does not equate with ‘natural’). Hammond (1.25) speaks of the bread and wine remaining in their natural substances, even though he affirms Christ’s presence in the Eucharist. Laud (1.29) argues against any conversion of the substance of the bread and wine but at the same time affirms a mysterious, secret, spiritual and ineffable manner of the Christ’s presence in the Eucharist. Taylor (1.36) suggests that it is the genus (the divine nature) which is instantiated in the bread and wine of the Eucharist rather than suggesting any change in the substance of the species of bread and wine.

The Catechisms of this period present a variety of opinions – some affirming moderate realism and others denying it. A Short Catechism of 1553 (1.42) presented a nominalist separation of sign and signified, however the 1604 BCP Catechism (1.42) added questions concerning the Eucharist which some have interpreted in a realist manner. Others have however interpreted the same questions in a nominalist manner. The 1662 BCP Catechism
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(1.42) maintained these questions and the variety of interpretation also seems to have been maintained in various commentaries on the Catechism.

Others argue that Christ is adored in the Eucharist, thereby suggesting a real presence of Christ in the Eucharist. Andrewes (1.16) says that wherever Christ is he is adored, including in the sacrament, but that it is Christ that is adored and not the sacrament. Bramhall (1.18), Cosin (1.19) and Sutton (1.35) state that Christ is adored in the sacrament. Forbes (1.20) says that Christ is worshipped in the Eucharist although the reverence given to the sacrament is a lesser kind than that given to Christ himself.

Some writers in this period argue for an increased use of outward signs (candles, incense, vestments, altar frontals etc) in worship to correspond to philosophical assumptions of moderate realism. Andrewes (1.16) advocates increased use of ritual and ceremonial in the Eucharist. Laud (1.29) suggests that acts of bodily worship (e.g. bowing towards the altar as a place worthy of praise) be used. The 1559 BCP (1.39) included what became known as ‘The Ornaments Rubric’ and which stipulated that the ornaments to be used in churches were those of the second year of Edward VI (i.e. 28 January, 1548 - 27 January, 1549). This meant that the traditional eucharistic vestments and altar fittings were stipulated to be used as late as 1559, although in practice this was not always done. The 1662 BCP (1.40) used the word ‘offertory’ at the time the bread and wine were placed on the altar and also stipulated that any consecrated bread and wine should be ‘veiled’ after the administration to show reverence to them and that they should be consumed in the church and not given to the priest for his use as the 1552 BCP (1.2) had directed. These ceremonial directions suggest reverence towards the Eucharist in general and the elements in particular and are in line with a eucharistic theology based on moderate realism. Such increased use of outward ritual and ceremonial represents a significant departure from the early period of the Reformation which presented a style of worship that was outwardly plain. Despite this increase in outward forms of worship, it is argued that the philosophical assumptions of realism underlying eucharistic theology were not an innovation in this later period of the Reformation. Those who suggest that this later period of the Reformation was abandoning some form of pure Reformation theology due to increased outward forms (e.g MacCulloch, 2001a and 2001b and Case Study 4.35), fail to consider the evidence of moderate realism present in the eucharistic theology of the early period of the Reformation (e.g. Ridley 1.3,
Bradford, 1.6 and Hooker, 1.7), even though it was not accompanied by the outward forms of worship adopted by people such as Lancelot Andrewes (1.16) in the later period of the Reformation. The assumption that there was one genuine Reformed theology of the Eucharist in the early period of the Reformation fails to take into account the diversity of philosophical assumptions which have been pointed to in the case studies of the early period of the Reformation. It also confuses and equates outward ceremonial with the underlying philosophical assumptions, ignoring the fact that moderate realism was found in the early period of the Reformation, despite the limited use of outward ceremonial in the eucharistic worship of the period.

**Nominalism**

Several writers in the later period of the Reformation base their eucharistic theology on philosophical assumptions of nominalism. Bayly (1.17) speaks of the sign and the signified in the Eucharist being separated and states that Christ is not brought down to earth, but the faithful receiver lifts heart and mind up to Christ in heaven, thus separating the elements from the body and blood of Christ. Hales (1.24) states that there is only bread and wine in the Eucharist and that these signs do not exhibit Christ nor is Christ eaten in the sacrament in any sense – literally, metaphorically or really. For Hales the Eucharist is a commemoration alone and testimony to the union with Christ and other people. Horneck (1.27) speaks of subjective eating which is spiritual and where the bread and wine are figures or remembrances alone. Christ is not seen to be ‘in’, ‘with’ or ‘under’ the elements and there is a distance between sign and signified. The communicant contemplates on Christ’s crucified body and eating Christ means to apply the benefits of Christ’s passion. Morton (1.32) although he expresses a moderate realism in some places, also separates the sign and the signified in other places in relation to Christ’s presence in the Eucharist. In some of the liturgies other than the *Book of Common Prayer* (1.41) there are nominalist assumptions underlying eucharistic theology. John Knox in *The Form of Prayers* (1.41) expresses a theology of the Eucharist which separates sign and signified, with a thanksgiving over the bread and wine only and no prayer of consecration. In the *Westminster Directory* (1.41) there is a nominalist separation of bread and wine from the body and blood of Christ, despite the fact that the words of administration seem to link them.
Receptionism

Some writers express receptionist doctrines of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist. Bayly (1.17) says that Christ gives his body and blood at the moment of receiving. Christ is in the use of the sacrament and not in the elements. Horneck (1.27) and Morton (1.32) state that Christ is only present by the faith of the sincere believer. Receptionism is a form of realism, since Christ is seen to be present at the moment of reception although Christ’s presence is limited to that moment (not prior to or after it) and is effective by means of the communicant’s faith.

Manner of Presence not Closely Defined

Several writers express the view that it is a mistake to attempt to define the nature of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist too closely. Andrewes (1.16) states that the manner of the presence is not a matter of faith but a matter of theory. The presence of Christ in the Eucharist is said to be real but the manner of the presence is not closely defined by Andrewes. Bramhall (1.18) believes that the manner of the presence is not an article of faith but subject to theory. Laud (1.29) sees transubstantiation as defining the manner of the presence too closely. He accepts that Christ is present but rejects transubstantiation as a manner of explaining that presence. Montague (1.31) argues that people should be content to know that the bread and wine of the Eucharist is Christ’s body and blood and not worry about ‘how’ the presence of Christ comes about. Sutton (1.35) says that the manner of the presence cannot be closely defined and Taylor (1.36) says that it is a mistake to define the manner of the presence too closely. The Catechisms (1.42) and Overall (1.43) say that Christ is received in the Eucharist but the manner of that presence is not closely defined. The Catechisms seem to allow for a variety of interpretations in relation to Christ’s presence in the Eucharist, such that different interpreters have used them to validate a realist view while others have used them to express a nominalist view.

Sacrifice and the Eucharist

Discussion of sacrifice in relation to the Eucharist is frequently part of the writings of theologians in the later part of the Reformation. Where sacrifice is seen to be part of eucharistic theology it is based on assumptions of moderate realism. Some speak of sacrifice in the Eucharist as a renewal of the covenant where the benefits of Christ’s sacrifice are shown forth. Andrewes (1.16) says that in the Eucharist there is a renewal of
the covenant by virtue of the sacrifice in the present. He is careful to deny immoderate realism but at the same time he says that the sacrifice is more than a memory of a past event. Rather he says that there is one sacrifice (that of the cross) but there is also a continual showing forth in the Eucharist of that one sacrifice. This he argues is not a mental or verbal activity but a thing done, where there is breaking of bread and pouring of wine in which Christ’s sacrifice is shown forth. Hammond (1.25) speaks of a sacrifice of supplication and praise but also of commemoration of the continual sacrifice of Christ in heaven, which is a ceremony of the covenant. As such it is an offering up of thanks and praise and it is a eucharistical action where the benefits of Christ’s passion are received. Talk of a ‘sacrifice eucharistical’ here is based on moderate realist assumptions.

Bramhall (1.18) states that sacrifice in relation to the Eucharist is not propitiatory but distinct nonetheless from the cross. It is commemorative, in that the sacrifice of Christ is represented in the Eucharist and the benefits of the sacrifice are received. Bramhall describes this as ‘impettrative’ sacrifice, whereby the fruit of sacrifice is applied in the Eucharist. Cosin (1.19) also speaks of a commemoration of Christ’s sacrifice in the Eucharist. Crakanthorp (1.20) states that the sacrifice in the Eucharist is not propitiatory but eucharistic and commemorative. Cudworth (1.21) speaks of a feast on the past and true sacrifice in the Eucharist where the Eucharist is what he calls a ‘federal’ rite. He distinguishes between ‘typical’ sacrifice (i.e. once only on the cross) and feasts upon that sacrifice which are symbolically continued and repeated but not as new sacrifices. Cudworth thereby expresses a moderate realism in relation to eucharistic sacrifice. Laud (1.29) affirms that the Eucharist is a commemorative sacrifice in broken bread and poured wine and that it is a sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving as well as a sacrifice of self. He is careful to say that sacrifice in the Eucharist is a commemoration of the historic sacrifice and not a re-iteration of it. L'Estrange (1.30) argues that the Eucharist is ‘elemented of nothing but sacrifices and oblations’ and that there are four senses in which the Eucharist is a sacrifice: presenting of bread and wine at the altar; consecrating and presenting the bread and wine to God so that they become sacramental; sacrifice of prayer and praise; and self oblation. He also says that the Eucharist is more than a mere calling to mind, but a commemoration in the present as a ‘sacred action’. Montague (1.32) denies that the Eucharist is propitiatory but admits that it is representative of Christ’s sacrifice and that it is remembrative and spiritual. The devotional work *The Whole Duty of Man* (1.37) sees the
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sufferings of Christ set out in the Eucharist with a moderate realist linking of sign and signified. Baxter in his ‘Savoy Liturgy’ of 1661 (1.41) says that the Eucharist does not merely remember Christ’s death but represents it. He acknowledges that the grace of Christ is given through the sacraments and that there is a renewal of sacrifice by the linking of the signs of the Eucharist with the signified sacrifice of Christ, the benefits of which are received in the Eucharist. There is however no specific offering of the elements in Baxter’s liturgy. There is nonetheless realist language expressed by Baxter when he says: ‘See here Christ dying in this holy representation! Behold the sacrificed Lamb of God, that taketh away the sins of the world! It is his will to be thus frequently sacrificed before our eyes” (Savoy Liturgy, edn Thompson, 1988: 396-397 – 1.41). In view of Baxter’s Puritan stance it seems however that this language can only be moderate in its realism.

Taylor (1.36) says that the Eucharist is a commemoration and representment of Christ’s death and commemorative sacrifice offered still in heaven and on earth in the Eucharist. It is the same sacrifice he says offered in both, whereby the purpose of the Eucharist is to ‘celebrate and exhibit the Lord’s death’ in sacrament and symbol. This suggests that the historic sacrifice of Christ is strictly identical with the eucharistic in its universal nature even though the particulars are linked by a loose identity only. There is a linking a sign and signified based on moderate realist assumptions, where the ministry of people on earth are able to represent Christ’s sacrifice and to apply it in present and future ministries. There is therefore propitiation, adoration, impetration and homage in the Eucharist where the benefits of Christ’s passion are obtained for people. Taylor is clear that the Eucharist does not repeat the sacrifice of Christ (immoderate realism) but it applies it and obtains its benefits for people. This is a eucharistic theology based on moderate realism which Taylor develops in his eucharistic liturgy of 1658. In this liturgy there is an anamnesis, not only as thanksgiving but as a uniting to and pleading of Christ’s sacrifice in the Eucharist.

Some speak of the Eucharist as propitiatory, not in the sense that the work of the Eucharist forgives sins, but in the sense that the benefits of Christ’s sacrifice are impetrated in the Eucharist. Field (1.22) argues that Christ’s sacrifice once offered has everlasting force and efficacy and therefore it can be said that Christ is offered daily on our altars by commemoration and lively representing. This is moderate realism where the outward form and inward form are linked such that there is an eternal and perpetual propitiatory sacrifice,
not re-iterated but having eternal significance. Forbes (1.23) also speaks of the Eucharist as propitiatory – not that it effects the propitiation and forgiveness of sins (i.e. the work of the cross) but as ‘impetrating the propitiation’. Jackson (1.28) speaks of propitiation in the Eucharist because Christ is really present and therefore the Eucharist is more than a mere calling to mind of a past event. For Jackson the Eucharist is an assurance in the present of the virtue of Christ’s body and blood. He is careful to state that the cross was a bloody sacrifice and that the Eucharist is a ‘present exercise of His everlasting priesthood’ whereby Christ’s blessing communicates the virtue and efficacy of his sacrifice. This he says ‘distils’ from heaven to the worthy receiver, thereby suggesting an instantiation based on moderate realism. Nicholson (1.33) speaks of ‘Christ crucified before our eyes’ in the Eucharist and by this means that the benefits of Christ’s passion are before the eyes of the communicants in a real way in the Eucharist, but not in any bloody or re-iterative manner. The Scottish eucharistic liturgy of 1637 (1.34) makes a memorial of Christ’s passion in close association with the bread and wine of the Eucharist, stating that the memorial is made ‘with these thy holy gifts’. This suggests an offering in moderate realist terms that is more than the offering of grateful thanks alone but an offering linked with the eucharistic signs.

Section 2: The Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

What is referred to here as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries covers the period from the publication of The Book of Common Prayer (1662) to the end of the eighteenth century. Once again case study material (Case Studies 2.1-2.28) reveals a variety of philosophical assumptions underlying Anglican eucharistic theology.

Realism and Nominalism
Both realist and nominalist philosophical assumptions are found in the eucharistic theology of various theologians and liturgical products, however, it seems that the majority of writers base their eucharistic theology on moderate realist assumptions.

Moderate Realism
Moderate realism is the dominant philosophical assumption behind the eucharistic theology of the case studies reviewed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Many
writers speak about ‘partaking’ of the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist (Aldrich, 2.2; Beveridge, 2.3; Tilloston, 2.22; and Wake, 2.23) and also affirm a ‘real presence’ of Christ in the Eucharist (Aldrich, 2.2; Beveridge, 2.3; Brett, 2.4; and John and Charles Wesley, 2.28). Some of the eucharistic theology presented in this period contains quite realist phrases. A eucharistic manual entitled *A Week’s Preparation Towards the Worthy Receiving of the Lord’s Supper* (2.1) talks of Christ being set forth in the Eucharist and speaks of that presence as ‘meat’ and ‘blood’ which is ‘true food’. Implications of immoderate realism by the use of such expressions are lessened when the writer qualifies the presence as Christ being received by the communicant in a spiritual manner, such that the communicant partakes of Christ’s divine nature and not the corporal nature. Another manual entitled, *The Whole Duty of the Communicant* (2.20) also states that the bread and wine of the Eucharist are Christ’s body and blood but denies what is called any ‘gross opinion’ about the nature of the presence and affirms that the presence is according to faith. Yet another manual, *The New Week’s Preparation for a Worthy Receiving of the Lord’s Supper* (2.19) also says that the bread and wine are called Christ’s body and blood, but denies any natural or corporal presence of Christ’s body and blood. Forbes (2.9) also says that the consecrated bread and wine are Christ’s body and blood but qualifies this realist statement by also saying that the presence of Christ’s body and blood is not natural but spiritual. Beveridge (2.3) speaks of the bread as the ‘very body’ and the wine as the ‘very blood’, but at the same time is careful to distinguish between the outward and inward natures of the elements, thereby suggesting that the ‘very’ body and blood is not a physical presence, but a presence that is nonetheless really present and received. Ken (2.12) makes the same distinction between ‘inward’ and ‘outward’, suggesting that the inward is spiritual and conveys the grace of the blessed body and blood ‘under’ the bread and wine. Aldrich (2.2) states that the communicant is ‘put in possession of Christ’ but at the same time affirms that Christ is locally absent. The eucharistic hymns of John and Charles Wesley (2.28) also present some startlingly realist expressions in relation to Christ’s presence and sacrifice in the Eucharist, such as in hymn 30 where they speak of Christ being before the communicants with ‘Thy vesture dipp’d in blood’ and in hymn 28 where they speak of the communicant seeing the blood which seals their peace. Rattenbury (1996: 98) however, argues that despite the very realist imagery, the Wesley brothers did not imply any physical presence of blood, only a symbolic one, thereby suggesting that a moderate realist eucharistic theology must be implied in these hymns.
Other writers present a moderate realist theology of the Eucharist but are less likely to present such startling images. Brett (2.4) argues that the bread and wine are the body and blood of Christ in a sacramental manner by representation that makes the bread and the cup Christ’s body and blood by power and effect, such that a life-giving effect is received by the communicant. Johnson (2.11) also argues that material bread and wine is the sacramental body and blood of Christ but this is not a literal presence, nor is the presence in the form of Christ’s human nature. The Nonjurors in their eucharistic liturgies (2.27) were greatly influenced by Johnson and put much the same view. Wake (2.23) affirms that the Eucharist is more than a bare commemoration of Christ and also affirms that the bread and wine remain in their natural substances, but at the same time states that the body and blood are received spiritually by the faithful in a heavenly and real manner.

Many writers specifically link the ‘sign’ of the Eucharist (bread and wine) with the ‘signified’ (Christ’s body and blood and the benefits received thereby). A Week’s Preparation Towards the Worthy Receiving of the Lord’s Supper (2.1) links sign and signified in the Eucharist. Ken (2.12) argues that the elements or signs signify invisible grace and as such the bread and wine are the signs of Christ’s body and blood that are ‘verily and indeed’ taken and received by the faithful. Law (2.13) says that the sign and the signified are linked in that Christ is signified and exhibited in the signs. Rattray (2.16) identifies the signs with the signified as does Sparrow (2.18). The New Week’s Preparation for a Worthy Receiving of the Lord’s Supper (2.19) says that the sign is the means for receiving the signified and the Wesley brothers (2.28) in hymn 71 state that ‘the sign transmits the signified’. Waterland (2.24) says that the symbols of Christ’s body and blood are in ‘construction and certain effect’ but not substance, the same as what they stand for, such that the bread is a symbol ‘exhibitive’ of the one true body of Christ which is truly present in a spiritual sense. Waterland (2.24) also argues that the sign cannot be the thing signified, that is, the sign (bread and wine) cannot be the literal body and blood of Christ, rather the signs allow people to receive Christ’s body and blood but are not the literal or fleshy body and blood itself. Waterland (2.24) puts the case that is seemingly a mid-way position between those who deny the invisible and inward grace in the Eucharist (e.g. Zwinglians) and those who destroy the visible and outward sign by asserting a change in the substance of the signs (e.g. some extreme and immoderate view of eucharistic presence that were present in the popular
Many writers also argue that in the Eucharist, spiritual effects and benefits are received. Brevint (2.5) states that sacraments make the thing they represent. Bread and wine are said to remain in their natural forms but are also said to have an additional ‘character’ given by God and received by the communicant. The signs therefore are not bare representations even though they maintain their ordinary use as bread and wine, but are given a ‘glorious character’ that is the value of Christ’s body and blood given in the Eucharist. Ken (2.12) argues in a similar way that when the bread and wine are taken and received by the faithful there is a real communication of Christ’s body and blood with its spiritual grace. Law (2.13) says that in the Eucharist, by the signs, we receive the ‘nature’ and ‘being’ of Christ but not in the form of his physical flesh. *The New Week’s Preparation for a Worthy Receiving of the Lord’s Supper* (2.20) speaks of spiritual and real effects being affirmed in the Eucharist but denies that these have any natural form. Rather the bread and wine convey grace as Christ’s body and blood convey natural flesh and blood and the bread and wine are called the body and blood of Christ to all spiritual intents and purposes with the grace and blessing of Christ ‘annexed’ to the holy rites. Wake (2.23) speaks of the Eucharist as Christ’s last will and testament given to a son and heir, whereby Christ conveys to us all his benefits and we receive them in the Eucharist. Aldrich (2.2) however argues that more than effects and benefits are received in the Eucharist and that Christ is really present and received, even though there is no local presence.

In affirming the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist and linking the signs of bread and wine with the signified body and blood of Christ, several writers address the question of change in the bread and wine. While all writers deny immoderate realism (that is, a change in the bread and wine such that they become the literal body and blood of Christ), several speak of other kinds of change in the signs. Deacon (2.8) says that the bread and wine are not destroyed or annihilated following consecration, but the signs are nonetheless
sanctified, with the result that they are not changed in substance but in quality. Comber (2.7) in stating that the symbols are Christ’s body and blood by his order, also says that they have the ‘image of God’ stamped on them in the Eucharist. This does not produce a substantial change, but it produces a linking of sign and signified such that Christ’s power makes the elements ‘become’ sacramentally the body and blood of Christ. Thorndike (2.21) speaks of the bread and wine remaining but also of Christ’s body and blood ‘brought forth and made to be in the Sacrament of the Eucharist’.

The *Scottish Liturgy of 1764* (2.17) invokes the Holy Spirit so the bread and wine will ‘become’ Christ’s body and blood, thereby suggesting some sort of change in the elements. Rattray (2.16) also argues that in the Eucharist the Holy Spirit is invoked to ‘make’ the bread and wine the body and blood of Christ, also suggesting some sort of change. Sparrow (2.18) argues that Christ is present in the Eucharist and that before consecration the elements are bread and wine, but that after consecration the elements are ‘profitable to salvation’ because the action of Christ ‘makes’ them Christ’s body and blood. Patrick (2.15) while denying any local presence of Christ in the Eucharist, states that Christ is present by the power of the Holy Spirit, but that any change is in the souls of the communicants and not in the elements. Wake (2.23) states that after the prayers have sanctified the bread and wine (being careful to exclude any notion of transubstantiation) they have a ‘holy use and signification’ where Christ is now really present in the Eucharist but in a manner other than local or physical.

Some writers in this period of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries present a deeper philosophical analysis of the nature of the presence of Christ in the Eucharist suggestive of the moderate realist notion of instantiation where the nature of Christ is present in the particulars of the Eucharist. Bull (2.6) talks of a ‘hypostatical union’ between the signs of the Eucharist and the body and blood of Christ, picking up on the language of the early Church Fathers who spoke of ‘antitypes’, ‘corresponding types’, ‘figures’ and ‘images’. Bull is however clear that he does not imply any transubstantiation in his discussion of what happens in the Eucharist. Wake (2.23) picks up the same language and speaks of the bread and wine as ‘types and figures’ which convey the signified in such a manner that there is a ‘co-existence’ of Christ’s natural body in heaven at the same time as the Eucharist. Waterland (2.24) also speaks of a ‘hypostatic union’ of Christ’s body and blood and the
elements of the Eucharist where Christ ‘accompanies’ them as a union of ‘concurrency’ but not in any sense of infusion or inherence. Patrick (2.15) also speaks of Christ being present ‘with’ the bread and wine, but not ‘in’ the bread and wine. Patrick’s words suggest some sort of relational presence of Christ in the Eucharist. Thorndike (2.21) however, in suggesting that the elements of the Eucharist are no mere signs, speaks of them as a ‘mystical representation’ whereby a person receives Christ, not only figuratively and symbolically, but also ‘in’ and ‘under’ the elements.

Immoderate Realism Specifically Denied

Many writers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries specifically distance themselves from any presence of Christ in the Eucharist that could be described as fleshy or physical (that is, immoderate realism). Some speak of a spiritual presence alone and of spiritual eating (A Week’s Preparation, 2.1) while others also deny any physical or corporal presence of Christ in the Eucharist (Aldrich, 2.2; Beveridge, 2.3; Brett, 2.4; Bull, 2.6; Comber, 2.7; Deacon, 2.8; Johnson, 2.11; Ken, 2.12; Law, 2.13; Nelson, 2.14; Patrick, 2.15; New Week’s Preparation, 2.19; Whole Duty of Communicant, 2.20; Thorndike, 2.21; Wake, 2.23; Waterland, 2.24; Wilson, 2.25; and the Wesleys, 2.28). Comber (2.7) argues that any physical presence of Christ in the Eucharist would be in vain. Others argue that the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist are present in power and effect (Deacon, 2.8; and Rattray, 2.16). There is a clear stream of evidence denying any immoderate realist notions of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist but at the same time affirming a moderate realist presence.

Nominalism

Hoadly (2.10) views the Eucharist as a ‘remembrance of a past transaction’ and argues that the sacrifice is not present at the Eucharist. He separates the sign from the signified, arguing that the bread and wine are memorials only, taken to assure us and call us to remembrance. Cyril Dugmore argues that Hoadly’s work of 1735, A Plain Account of the Nature and End of the Sacrament of the Lord’s Supper, was in response to the realist devotional manuals of his day (e.g. A Week’s Preparation, 2.1). For Hoadly, the Eucharist was only about a meeting together of Christians where they ate bread and drank wine in remembrance of Christ’s body and blood. Stone (1909: II, 489) describes Hoadly’s theology of the Eucharist as Zwinglian. The signs are purely figurative for Hoadly without any real linking with the signified body and blood of Christ. Tillston (2.22) sees the
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Eucharist as a solemn remembrance with no link between the signs and the signified, since the Eucharist is a pledge only of a past event by reason of the fact that Christ is now absent from us.

Eucharistic Sacrifice

There is considerable evidence to support the view that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Anglican theologians considered the Eucharist to be a sacrifice in some sense. In all cases the realism used in relation to eucharistic sacrifice was to the moderate degree.

Beveridge (2.3) said that the sacrifice was not a true or proper sacrifice but a commemoration or representation. He distinguishes fleshy sacrifice from eucharistic sacrifice and argues that there is no propitiatory sacrifice in the Eucharist although Christ’s sacrifice is shown but not repeated. Brett (2.4) states that in the Eucharist the elements are offered to God as an oblation and sacrifice. Christ’s words ‘do this’ are seen to have sacrificial meaning as an offering, but importantly, this offering is not a new offering, but the one offering of Christ. Brevint (2.5) talks of ‘memorial remembrance’ where the effects of Christ’s sacrifice are available in the present as if ‘it were newly done’. The sacrifice for Brevint is not available in its ‘true Being’ (immoderate) but by its virtue (moderate). Bull (2.6) sees the Eucharist as a prayer of oblation and a Christian sacrifice. The sacrifice however is described as a ‘reasonable’ sacrifice without blood and as a commemorative sacrifice that is more than mere remembering of a past event. For Bull, in the Eucharist, we plead the sacrifice of Christ and receive the blessings of that sacrifice. Comber (2.7) believes that the Eucharist is a visible sign that sets forth the passion of Christ since it ‘imitates’ and is in ‘conjunction’ with the heavenly intercession of Christ. The Eucharist is therefore seen to plead the virtue and merit of Christ’s sacrifice and as such is an oblation and a sacrifice. Comber (2.7) also describes the Eucharist as a perfect oblation and sufficient sacrifice, but denies any suggestion that Christ is sacrificed again. For Comber the Eucharist is an unbloody sacrifice since Christ is not offered up again. The offering of the Eucharist is nonetheless an effective means of grace since it is a lively representation which is offered up to both remember and receive the benefits of Christ’s one sacrifice. Deacon (2.8) describes the Eucharist as a ‘feast upon Christ’s sacrifice’, where Christ’s body is offered mystically under bread and wine. Forbes (2.9) talks of a ‘constant’ and ‘lively’ remembrance with effects in the present, by which he distinguishes the Eucharist
from mere remembrance of a past event. Johnson (2.11) also speaks about an unbloody sacrifice which he describes as rational and spiritual and states that this sacrifice in the Eucharist is more than a mere mental or figurative sacrifice. Law (2.13) says that in the Eucharist we offer, present and plead by faith before God the atonement of Christ’s body and blood. Nelson (2.14) says that in the Eucharist the consecrated bread and wine is presented to God as symbols of Christ’s body and blood, in the sense that they plead his sacrifice. Patrick (2.15) states that anamnesis in the Eucharist is not a bare recording or registering in the mind of Christ’s sacrifice, but a solemn declaration of sacrifice performed before God, such that it is a spiritual sacrifice of corporal elements that show forth and plead the sacrifice of Christ. Rattray (2.16) argues that the Church offers a sacrifice in the Eucharist that communicates the divine mysteries of the altar to nourish us. The perpetual offering of Christ in heaven is linked to the offering in the Eucharist where bread and wine are offered as a memorial sacrifice, which is a pleading and oblation of an unbloody sacrifice. The Scottish Liturgy of 1764 (2.17) speaks of offering bread and wine in the prayer of oblation that is placed after the prayer of consecration and before the communion of the people. The prayer of oblation contains words of offering where the signs of bread and wine are linked with the signified sacrifice of Christ (the words ‘our sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving’ do not refer solely to self offering but to the offering of bread and wine in the Eucharist). Sparrow (2.18) speaks of the priest offering up the sacrifice of the Holy Eucharist as praise, thanksgiving and of self. The New Week’s Preparation for a Worthy Receiving of the Lord’s Supper (2.19) says that the Eucharist is a commemorative sacrifice presented in heaven and in the Eucharist. There is commemoration and representation of the Passion in heaven and on earth, such that there is pleading of the sacrifice with effect. The Whole Duty of the Communicant (2.20) argues that the benefits of Christ’s sacrifice are conveyed to the soul of the communicant in the Eucharist. Wake (2.23) argues that the Eucharist communicates to people the real and spiritual grace of Christ’s death and passion. Wilson (2.25) says that the benefits of Christ’s sacrifice are received in the Eucharist. For Wilson, Christ’s words, ‘do this’, mean that bread and wine are offered as a sacrifice to God, not as a real body but in a sacramental manner, as a memorial of the real body. The Catechism of the 1689 Liturgy of Comprehension (2.26) (a failed attempt at liturgical revision) argued that ‘the benefits of the sacrifice of Christ’s body and blood are verily and indeed taken and received by the faithful in the Lord’s Supper’, thereby suggesting that in the Eucharist there is more than mere remembrance of the past sacrifice.
of Christ. The Nonjurors Liturgies (2.27) also present the suggestion that there is more than mere remembrance of the sacrifice of Christ in the Eucharist. The Wesleys (2.28) in their eucharistic hymns state that the signified grace of Christ’s sacrifice is applied by means of the signs in the Eucharist.

Waterland (2.24) says that ‘oblation’ can be used in the offering of Christ himself in the sacrament but not of Christ absolutely. This seems to be distinguishing between an immoderate sense of the offering of Christ in the Eucharist (absolutely) and a moderate sense (offering of Christ himself in the sacrament). This is confirmed when Waterland speaks of the grand sacrifice of Christ (the signified) and of the representation and commemoration of that grand sacrifice in the sign. Sacrifice and oblation can therefore be used in relation to the Eucharist, says Waterland, but not in the strict or proper sense of sacrifice and oblation, since Christ is not sacrificed again in the Eucharist. There are therefore two types of sacrifice, according to Waterland: the historic sacrifice of the cross, which is strict and proper and described as smoky or bloody; and the eucharistic sacrifice, which is a memorial of the sacrifice of Christ and which is described as unsmoky and unbloody. The historic sacrifice was on the cross alone, but there is a memorial of that sacrifice in the Eucharist. This means, for Waterland (2.24), that the material elements of bread and wine cannot be the Christian sacrifice. The only sacrifice that is proper for Christians in the Eucharist is a spiritual sacrifice, where Christians feast upon the grand sacrifice of Christ in the Eucharist. The grand sacrifice was offered but once, however, its virtue is commemorated, exhibited and participated perpetually in the Eucharist. Such a commemoration is described by Waterland as a ‘gratulatory’ sacrifice and not a ‘propitiatory’ sacrifice. A gratulatory sacrifice is one where the signs allow people to gain the benefit of Christ’s propitiatory sacrifice, but the signs are not the sacrifice. Waterland is expressing a moderate realist view of eucharistic sacrifice.

In contrast to Waterland (2.24), Thorndike (2.21) uses both ‘propitiatory’ and ‘impetratory’ in relation to the prayers of the Eucharist. He says that the ‘species’ or elements are properly called ‘sacrifices’ in a commemorative or representative sense and that when they are consecrated by the prayers they are truly counted as oblations and sacrifices. Thorndike (2.21) argues that the Eucharist is the sacrifice of Christ on the cross since it ‘represents’, ‘renews’, ‘revives’ and ‘restores’ it and at each representation it is the same thing that it
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represents since it ‘tenders’ and exhibits’ what it signifies. If the sacrifice of the cross is propitiatory and impetratory, then the sacrifice of the Eucharist must be also, since the ‘that which representeth is truly said to be the thing which it presenteth’. Thorndike (2.21) goes so far as to say that the Eucharist, by virtue of the consecration, becomes the sacrifice of Christ upon the cross. Despite the implication of immoderate realism here, Thorndike is clear in saying that the elements are not the sacrifice of the cross. Rather it is the representing, renewing, reviving and restoring in the Eucharist that presents the nature of the sacrifice, not the sacrifice itself. Any immoderate realism would be what Thorndike describes as an ‘improper nature’, and he specifically excludes ‘an action done in the person of Christ’, however what is described as a ‘proper nature’ could be interpreted in term of moderate realism where the nature of Christ’s sacrifice is instantiated in the Eucharist.

Johnson (2.11) also argues that the sacrifice of the Eucharist is true and real and calls it both expiatory and propitiatory for the remission of sins. He is careful however to distinguish the sacrifice in the Eucharist from the sacrifice of the cross, thereby limiting any immoderate realist notion.

Reference to eucharistic sacrifice is extensive in the period of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and although there is considerable variation and different emphases in the way the Eucharist is described as a sacrifice or in the way sacrificial language is used, the prevailing philosophical assumptions behind these references is moderate realism.

The Role of the Holy Spirit

Several Anglican theologians in this period refer to the role of the Holy Spirit in relation to the Eucharist. Brett (2.4) states that the power of the Holy Spirit is essential to consecration and that the spiritual presence is a real presence. The Spirit, he says, ‘makes’ the bread and wine the body and blood of Christ. Bull (2.6) argues that by sacerdotal benediction the Spirit of Christ descends on the elements so that they are the body and blood of Christ. Comber (2.7) speaks of the sanctifying of the bread and wine (presumably by the power of the Holy Spirit) so that they may ‘become’ sacramentally Christ’s body and blood. Both Forbes (2.9) and Johnson (2.11) say that the Holy Spirit performs the operation to ‘make’ bread and wine Christ’s body and blood by ‘power and effect’. Patrick (2.15) attributes the power of the Eucharist to the Holy Spirit, while Rattray (2.16) says that
the Holy Spirit makes the bread and wine ‘verily and indeed His Body and Blood’. For Rattray (2.16) the Spirit is united to the bread and wine so that they have the virtue, power and efficacy no longer of ordinary bread and wine. The *Scottish Liturgy of 1764* (2.17) invokes the Holy Spirit over the bread and wine so that they ‘become’ Christ’s body and blood. Wilson (2.25) says that the Holy Spirit ‘accompanies’ the elements and makes them an effective means of grace by making them Christ’s spiritual body. The Holy Spirit, he says, ‘makes’ the bread the body of Christ and the cup the blood of Christ. The Wesleys (2.28) in their eucharistic hymns invoked the Holy Spirit to realise the sign and infuse life into the bread and power into the wine (e.g. hymn 72).

Thorndike (2.21) argues that the Holy Spirit comes upon the elements to make them the body and blood of Christ, not in a natural sense, since the substance of the bread and wine remain, but in the sense of instruments of God to convey the grace of Christ in the Eucharist. Therefore, for Thorndike, bread and wine can be called Christ’s body and blood and any change in the elements is a mystical one, where they are changed, translated, turned into the substance of Christ’s body and blood, as a sacrament by consecration and not by the faith of the communicant. There is no change in the substance of the bread and wine, but an ‘accumulation’ of that substance with the substance of the body and blood of Christ as a spiritual grace, as a result of the action of the Holy Spirit.

Waterland (2.24) rejects the view that the Holy Spirit can be invoked on the elements, ‘enriching’ them with virtues and graces of the personal body of Christ and thereby making them the very body and blood of Christ. Rather, Waterland accepts that the Spirit of Christ (which he describes as the *logos*) descends on the elements uniting them to their Lord as Christ’s human body was united to Christ in the incarnation. The hypostatical nature of the incarnation is emphasised here. Waterland (2.24) goes on to argue that the role of the Holy Spirit translates or changes the elements from the common to the sacred, from elements to sacraments, from natural to supernatural, so that they become exhibitive symbols of our Lord’s natural body and blood in a mystical and spiritual way. There is however, for Waterland, no change of substance in the bread and wine, only change to the outward state, use or office of the elements.
Reservation

Some Anglican writers in the seventeenth and eighteenth century allow for the reservation of the elements of the Eucharist for the sick, following the administration of the elements in the service. This suggests moderate realism in that the objective presence of the body and blood of Christ is seen to persist past the consecration and past the act of reception. Rattray (2.16), Sparrow (2.18), Thorndike (2.21) and the Nonjuror Liturgies (2.27) say that the elements can be reserved for the sick. Thorndike (2.21) goes on to say that once reserved the elements are worthy of ‘reverence’ as the Lord is present in the sacrament.

Symbols Not Adored

Several of the Anglican theologians who present moderate realist philosophical assumptions in relation to the Eucharist, also make the point that the symbols of the Eucharist should not be adored. These include Aldrich (2.2) and Sparrow (2.18) who argue that the elements should not be adored and Beveridge (2.3) who opposes both adoration of the elements and their reservation. Bull (2.6) specifically objects to the elevation of the elements in the Eucharist since this suggests idolatry, while Johnson (2.11) argues that we cannot worship what is seen. The main reason for opposing any adoration of the symbols seems to be the possibility of an immoderate realist interpretation.

Offering at Last Supper and not at the Cross

A number of Anglican theologians in this period argue that the sacrifice of Christ was offered (or began to be offered) at the Last Supper and not at the cross. Deacon (2.8) argues that Christ’s sacrifice was not offered on the cross but that he was slain there and that in fact the offering of the sacrifice was made at the institution of the Eucharist at the Last Supper. Johnson (2.11) says that Christ offered his body and blood at the Last Supper as a feast upon a sacrifice to come and that Christians offer this same feast upon a sacrifice but not in any fleshy sense in the Eucharist. Rattray (2.16) says that the offering of the Eucharist by Christ at the Last Supper was followed by Christ being slain on the cross. Wilson (2.25) connects the offering of the sacrifice of Christ with the institution of the Eucharist and not with Christ’s death at Calvary. The priest therefore, offers the same sacrifice in the Eucharist as Christ offered at the Last Supper, but this sacrifice so offered is not the sacrifice of the cross.
Section 3: The Nineteenth Century

Case Studies in this period correspond roughly to the Victorian period and present significant differences in the philosophical assumptions underlying eucharistic theology arising from the varying hermeneutic interests of writers. Case studies 3.1 to 3.32 will be examined with a view to extracting the essences of Anglican eucharistic theology in the writings of these Anglican theologians.

Moderate Realism

Many Anglican theologians expressed the view in the nineteenth century that Christ was in some way present ‘in’ or ‘under’ the signs of the bread and wine of the Eucharist or that the bread and wine ‘become’ in some sense the body and blood of Christ, thereby asserting philosophical assumptions of moderate realism often described using the term ‘the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist’. In general these writers were careful to deny that Christ is present in any physical or fleshy manner (immoderate realism). Bennett (3.1) said that Christ was present ‘in’ the sacrament under the form or veil of bread and wine. Benson (3.2) argues that the bread and wine acquire a heavenly virtue by incorporation into Christ’s glorified substance, such that Christ comes to us by ‘an inflow of divine force’ which is substantive, personal, affectionate, regenerating, nutritive, purifying, divine, sanctifying, glorifying and ‘a stream of supernatural power’. By use of the word ‘substance’ however, Benson excludes any fleshy presence, stating that Christ died in the natural body but rose in a spiritual body incapable of any earthly measurement or form and so is not in space. It is the nature of this spiritual body and presence that enables Christ to be present on many altars in the Eucharist without any multiplication of Christ’s body. Bright (3.3) argues that the presence of Christ in the Eucharist is based on the incarnation where the Word becomes flesh in order to impart spiritual life to believers and that the same efficacy is present in the Eucharist, such that there is a mysterious participation of the sacred body and blood of Christ present and imparted in a spiritualised and glorified state in the Eucharist. Denison (3.4) states that the consecrated elements ‘become’ the sign of the body and blood of Christ without any change in their natural substance, in that the inward part or signified is the body and blood of Christ, received by all in the Eucharist in an objective way which is not dependent on the faith of the communicants. Enraght (3.5) expresses a similar belief in an ‘objective real presence’, where following consecration bread
and wine do not cease to be bread and wine but, by the ‘miracle’ of consecration ‘become’ the body and blood of Christ – both God and Man. The sign and signified are linked by the ‘infusion’ of Christ into humanity, such that Christ’s body and blood is eaten in a real way (not corporal, but heavenly and spiritual). Enraght uses the term ‘type’ to indicate the sign and ‘antitype’ to indicate the signified. Both the type and the antitype he says are eaten in a real way in the Eucharist since Christ’s body and blood is ‘under the form of bread and wine’. A.P. Forbes (3.6) says that Christ is present in the Eucharist really and rejects any view that argues that Christ is present in ‘power’ and ‘effect’ only. He also presents an ecclesial view of Christ’s presence, where people not only receive Christ’s body and blood, but also ‘become’ Christ’s body and blood. Forbes (3.6) also argues for a change in the elements following consecration in that the elements ‘become’ the body and blood of Christ. G.H. Forbes (3.7) states that the bread and wine are ‘made’ the body and blood of Christ not only in a symbol, type and figure, but in ‘quickening energy, spirit and power and efficacy’ without any change in their substance or nature. He says that bread and wine ‘become another thing’ incomprehensibly. Hamilton (3.9) presents the view that bread and wine become (supernaturally, heavenly, invisibly, incomprehensibly and spiritually) the body and blood of Christ as a result of consecration by means of a ‘hypostatic’ union but that they remain in their natural substance. The bread and wine (the outward) he says, receive an inward part (the body and blood of Christ), which is really present in the Eucharist in such a way that it is present ‘without us’ and not ‘only in the souls of the faithful receiver’. Jolly (3.11) argues that bread and wine are ‘sure pledges of the real substance’ of Christ’s body and blood and ‘His virtual flesh and blood’. The signs, he says, are linked with the signified and ‘raised’ to a ‘value’ beyond ordinary bread and wine by consecration. Keble (3.12) sees Christ imparting his true self to the hand of the communicant in the Eucharist but also speaks of a presence in people’s hearts which is not a fleshy presence but a real presence, nonetheless, ‘under the form of bread and wine’. This presence is a ‘real objective presence of Jesus Christ in the holy Eucharist’ and in the ‘especial tokens’ which remain in their own nature. Real presence for Keble means a ‘substantial’ presence where substance means Christ’s body and blood but not in any ‘proper’ sense (i.e. a fleshy presence). Knox (3.13) argues that bread is the ‘communion’ of the body of Christ and the cup is the ‘communion’ of the blood of Christ. These external and visible signs are seen as the ‘medium’ through which Christ’s body and blood is received and the grace of Christ is ‘conveyed to us in and through this visible ordinance’.
For Liddon (3.14), the body of Christ is received sacramentally and the Eucharist is seen as a channel of grace where the sign conveys the signified. The signified is seen as Christ’s divinity not his flesh. Littledale (3.15) says that after consecration, the body and blood of Christ are present on the altar under the form of bread and wine and that the body and blood in the Eucharist are the same body and blood of Christ conceived by the Holy Spirit, born of the Virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate and ascended to heaven, but not present in the same manner as when Christ was on earth. He describes the manner of the presence in the Eucharist as not naturally but supernaturally. Maurice (3.16) says that Christ is present in the Eucharist and that the signified presence is associated with the bread and wine. Bread and wine are described as the ‘transparent medium’ through which Christ is manifested to people, thus linking sign and signified. The elements, he says, are not changed in essence or virtue following consecration, but changed in ‘use’ so that they become ‘purely sacramental’. The presence of Christ in the Eucharist is not seen as being dependent on the faith of the communicant nor is the presence of Christ dependent upon a descent of some power upon the elements. Maurice (3.16) also presents an ecclesial sense of presence, where people become the body of Christ. In the *Memorial presented to the Archbishop of Canterbury* in 1867 (3.18), the writers state that the signified body and blood of Christ are really present in a spiritual and ineffable manner in the Eucharist ‘under’ the outward and visible sign or form of bread and wine. Mozley (3.19) rejects transubstantiation because the idea of change it presents is described as too ‘definite’, but nonetheless does not reject a more ‘indefinite’ idea of change in the elements which makes them the true and real body and blood of Christ. The change for Mozley is from a physical to a spiritual food, in that the Lord’s body is external to the mind but is ‘joined to bread and wine’ such that it is ‘co-existing with it in one sacrament’. It is not a natural substance but a spiritual substance that is eaten spiritually, and this does not happen by means of the natural mouth. The bread and wine are the signs of the body and blood of Christ and the ‘medium’ by which the spiritual is eaten by faith. Neale (3.20) says that the signs show a deeper reality, such as the real presence, where signs of bread and wine reveal a sacramental presence of Christ’s body and blood. Newman (3.21) states that Christ is present in the Eucharist ‘on the table’ and it is this presence that faith adores. Presence is spiritual, not in the sense of just a word, but a presence that is not seen or heard. The presence is not carnal but a real presence nonetheless which is a mystery and which ‘is’ given to people in the Eucharist, thereby being more than a figure or a presence dependent on the faith of the
communicant. Christ therefore is to be found objectively ‘under the veil of sensible things’ in the sense that Jesus’ presence in the Eucharist is a ‘type’ of the incarnation. Paget (3.22) states that the signified is unseen in the Eucharist, but the sign delivers the signified in the same way the Word was made flesh in the incarnation. In the Eucharist the material is hallowed to effect the work of God and bear unseen grace. Paget speaks of this as an ‘invasion and penetration of the material by the spiritual’. Palmer (3.23) argues that a real, spiritual and heavenly presence of Christ’s body is in the Eucharist but not according to a change in substance. A change occurs after the ‘blessing’ and ‘consecration’ where there is change from an earthly to a heavenly or divine thing. Phillpotts’ (3.24) view is that the elements are offered on earth and invisibly sanctified such that they are made the body and blood of Christ, not carnally but sacramentally and ineffably. Pusey (3.25) speaks of a ‘true, real, actual, though spiritual communication of the body and blood of Christ to the believer through the holy elements’. The spiritual presence, Pusey says, is more real than a natural presence and independent of a person’s faith, and yet a channel of his blessed presence to the soul. Pusey (3.25) is wary of specifying the mode of the presence apart from a spiritual and ineffable ‘mode’, but he does affirm that the elements ‘remain in their natural substance’, not becoming a carnal substance. The mode is mystical, sacramental and spiritual in an ineffable and supernatural way. ‘Real’ for Pusey does not mean ‘natural’ and being present ‘in’ a real way does not always mean ‘local’ but ‘in a supernatural, divine, ineffable way’ which is Christ present ‘under the form of bread and wine’. A real presence is ‘under the outward veil’ on our altars and so it is an objective presence. The ‘miracle’ therefore through which Jesus makes his word of power present is ‘above’ but not ‘against’ the senses, and yet people cannot know ‘the hidden cause’. The body and blood of Christ are present as a substance, since Pusey (3.25) argues there is no other way for them to be present, but the substance does not involve the ordinary properties of a body or conversion of the substance of bread and wine into the substance of the body and blood of Christ, since by ‘substance’, Pusey means essence or οὐσία, that is, its quidditas or whatever it is. Under the veil of an unseen presence, therefore, the φύσις or nature is understood, but there is no contradiction here for Pusey, if the natural properties of bread and wine remain.

The Tractarians (3.30) in their writings on the Eucharist argue that there is an objective truth (a dogmatic principle) beyond the individual, thereby putting a realist view, dependent
on universals. It is these universals, they argue, which participate in things as a sacramental principle, in what Pusey (3.30) calls a ‘medium of figures’, by which is understood both ‘types’ and ‘archetypes’. Types (or signs) resemble the archetypes (signified) and so the types can be divine. God therefore, according to the Tractarians (3.30), performs works through the ‘instrumentality’ of people and things which become channels of grace. This sacramental principle used by the Tractarians, based on the philosophical assumptions of realism, was influenced by both the Romanticism of the nineteenth century (that is, the divine is known through nature) and the works of earlier Anglicans who spoke of a sacramental principle (e.g. Bishop Joseph Butler) and those who applied this principle to eucharistic theology (e.g Lancelot Andrewes – 1.16). Realism, for the Tractarians (3.30), meant that things of this world (the signs of the Eucharist) made the divine present (the signified) in a way that was described as a ‘real presence of Christ in the Eucharist’. Faith, for the Tractarians, did not produce grace, even though grace came through the sacraments, however faith was seen as the path for grace. Wilberforce (3.32), a Tractarian, presents an extended and philosophically developed account of the eucharistic presence using realist assumptions. He argues that the body and blood of Christ are sacramentally present in the Eucharist under the forms of bread and wine. Sacraments are seen to be ‘the extension of the Incarnation’ where the signified is ‘joined’ to a visible sign by consecration, such that the thing signified and the benefits of the sacrament are communicated through the outward sign. The sign, therefore, is not only a pledge of the inward gift given, but the means by which it is communicated. Wilberforce (3.32) speaks of a ‘hypostatic union’ of Christ’s body and blood and the Godhead in the incarnation, which is the same in the Eucharist. In the Eucharist he states there is a hypostatic union of the Godhead with the bread and wine of the Eucharist as an order of grace not nature. Such a union is not carnal but supernatural, sacramental and real. Controversially, since it presents that image of a fleshy or immoderate realist presence, he argues that what is given in the Eucharist is Christ’s humanity, and not his Godhead, since if the incarnation is admitted, then it is the body of Christ not the Godhead of Christ that is the medium for the gifts of Christ. In the same way, he argues, the gifts of Christ’s Godhead are communicated through Christ’s body and blood. For Wilberforce (3.32), the ‘is’ in Christ’s words, ‘This is my Body’, can mean either ‘representation’, which is subjective, with the efficacy of the Eucharist depending on the disposition of the receiver, or ‘identification’, which is objective, with the manner of the presence being supernatural, functioning as a
‘mysterious law of consecration’ where sign and signified are ‘whole’ as a ‘sacramental identity’. Some, he says, have emphasised the subjective view and so lessened the importance of the ‘sign’ (e.g. Zwingli) while others have emphasised the objective view and so overemphasised the importance of the sign, such that it becomes a fleshy or natural presence. Wilberforce (3.32) sees problems with both of these emphases and argues for a proper balance between the two, which he summarises in a three-fold process:

1. The Godhead imparts itself to the Son in an eternal generation;
2. The Son unites himself to human nature in the incarnation;
3. Christ communicates himself to people as a real presence in the Eucharist.

All of these three are in Wilberforce’s view a communication of ‘substance’ and so, for Wilberforce, it is proper to argue that there is a communication of substance in the Eucharist. This reasoning is based on the assumptions of moderate realism.

The Archbishops of Canterbury and York in 1896, in *Saepius Officio* (3.27), speaking somewhat differently to the Tractarians state that the consecration in the Eucharist means that the gifts ‘may become to us the Body and Blood of Christ’. Staley (3.28) states that bread and wine are consecrated at Christ’s command to be his body and blood. Such a real presence, so consecrated, ‘becomes’ Christ’s body and blood as a spiritual reality. F. Temple (3.29) argues that realism in regard to the Eucharist is nowhere condemned by the Church of England and so it is a possible interpretation for its members, just as non-realist views are also possible.

Despite the differences of emphasis, the Anglican theologians of the nineteenth century, reviewed above, present extensive evidence of a moderate realist position in relation to the presence of Christ in the Eucharist.

*The Sacramental Principle – A Moderate Realist Notion*

Several nineteenth century Anglican writers in speaking of the Eucharist use moderate realist philosophical assumptions in discussing what is called the sacramental principle, that is, the idea that God uses material things to communicate grace in the sacraments. Those who advocate the sacramental principle believe that God has chosen to use the means of
earthly and common things (such as the signs of bread and wine) for the communication of grace and the benefits of Christ sacrifice to people.

Benson (3.2) says that God raises the things of nature to become the supernatural and that this is the natural action of God. Denison (3.4) specifically links the sign and the signified in the sacramental scheme. Enraght (3.5) sees God communicating the divine to things of this world. A.P. Forbes (3.6) affirms the necessity of the substance of the sign as the means by which God works in the world through the sacramental principle. He specifically objects to transubstantiation in relation to the Eucharist since it involves the desition (termination of being) of the sign, thereby denying the sacramental principle. Knox (3.13) sees the elements of the Eucharist as the vehicles of saving and sanctifying power and representatives of Christ’s incarnate person. Liddon (3.14) says that sacramentality is based on the incarnation where sacraments are channels of supernatural grace. He rejects the idea that the sacraments are merely tokens and badges and the view that the sacraments are purely human acts in which God takes no part. Rather, Liddon (3.14) sees the sacraments as ‘effectual signs’ of grace where God works in people. Neale (3.20) states that sacramentality provides ‘divine illustration’ where ordinary objects and human actions are elevated beyond their common use and thereby serve a higher purpose. Sacraments therefore are channels and instruments of God’s grace and Neale (3.20) argues (on the basis of realism) that there is a connection between the spiritual and matter in the linking of the sign and the signified. Newman (3.21) sees outward rites and devotional acts as channels of invisible gifts. The sacraments are the means of sacramental presence which is not dependent on immoderate notions. Paget (3.22) argues for a sacramental system where God uses ‘sensible’ objects, agents and acts as instruments of divine power. Pusey (3.25) advocates ‘sacramental mediation of God’s gifts and graces’, where God’s own unity puts itself forward in a variety of manners, but with one cause. In reference to bread and wine in the Eucharist, Pusey (3.25) says that ‘they can be elements of this world and yet His very Body and Blood’ following the doctrine of the incarnation where the eternal Word takes human flesh into itself, that is, where Christ gave his life to flesh. In the same way, he argues, Christ puts life into bread and wine. The Tractarians (3.30), expressing the sacramental principle, believed that God used things of this world to convey grace. They were influenced not only by Romanticism, believing that the divine is present through nature, but also by earlier Anglicans who argued for a sacramental principle. Keble (3.30)
for example, in his poetry speaks of God making a direct impression on people using things of this world and Newman (3.30) acknowledges the debt to earlier writers such as Joseph Butler, who spoke of a sacramental principle. Pusey (3.30) in his *Lectures on Types and Prophecies*, speaks of ‘types’ and ‘archetypes’ and applies these to a ‘sacramental union’ which is the work of God depending on the mediation of the type (sign) where the sign is ‘knit together’ with the archetype (signified). The archetype, Pusey argues, is only conveyed to the mind through the type in such a way where God has joined together the signs as types in the Eucharist with the signified archetypes. Wilberforce (3.32) states that sacraments derive their efficacy from the perpetual intervention of God’s will. God, he argues, appoints external forms to bestow gifts, not according to the order of nature, but according to the order of grace.

The application of a sacramental principle to the theology of the Eucharist is based in these writers on philosophical assumptions of moderate realism.

*Worship of Christ in the Eucharist*

For many in the nineteenth century who adopted the sacramental principle on the basis of moderate realism the logical conclusion was that Christ could be worshipped in the Eucharist. Hamilton (3.9) however, clearly excluded any adoration due to the bread and wine. Denison (3.4) said the body and blood of Christ could be worshipped in the Eucharist supernaturally and invisibly, but that Christ’s body and blood were really present under the form of bread and wine. He was careful however to exclude any notion of worshipping the elements. Forbes (3.6) argued that adoration was due to the body and blood of Christ mysteriously present in the gifts of bread and wine without any change in their substance. He too was careful to exclude any worship of the gifts even though he believed that Christ was adored ‘in’ the gifts. Keble (3.12) argued for the worship of Christ in the Eucharist, where Christ was present after consecration and before communicating. Keble argued that ‘the Person of Jesus Christ our Lord, wherever it is, is to be adored’ and therefore could be worshipped in the Eucharist since it was present there in the consecrated signs of bread and wine. Keble too was careful to exclude any worship of the signs of bread and wine. Littledale (3.15) said that Christ is both God and man and that therefore Christ’s true nature was forever joined in one person. Christ’s Godhead therefore, must be wherever Christ’s body is and if the body of Christ is in the Eucharist,
then it can be worshipped there. The *Memorial to the Archbishop of Canterbury* (3.18) repudiates adoration of the sacramental bread and wine since that was seen as idolatry, but at the same time regards the signs with reverence because of their sacramental relation to the body and blood of Christ. Mozley (3.19) points to the confusion which arises when the signs of the Eucharist are associated not only with the body and blood of Christ but also with the divinity of Christ. Where this happens, says Mozley, the signs become the object of the worship of Christ’s divinity (an immoderate realist possibility emerging) and this detracts from the real linking of the signs (bread and wine) with the signified (the body and blood of Christ). Pusey (3.25) states that adoration of Christ in the Eucharist is possible. He compares the worship of Christ present in human flesh by the Magi to the presence of Christ in the bread and wine of the Eucharist. Christ is seen to be present in both places (the human flesh of the baby Jesus at his birth and the bread and wine of the Eucharist) and can therefore be worshipped and adored in both places. In a similar but less specific way, Frederick Temple (3.29) argues that Christ is present in the Eucharist and can therefore be worshipped there.

The idea of the worship of Christ in the Eucharist is based on the philosophical assumptions of moderate realism. There is no fleshy or immoderate presence of Christ in the Eucharist implied by such worship in the work of the writers reviewed above, but Christ is worshipped truly because Christ is seen to be present in a real way in the Eucharist and in the signs of bread and wine.

*Type of Worship suggests Realism*

Some nineteenth century writers and theologians in their discussion of worship express moderate realist philosophical assumptions in relation to the worship conducted as part of the Eucharist. Bennett (3.1) argues that outward forms of worship, such as candles, incense at the holy sacrifice, eucharistic vestments and the elevation of the Blessed Sacrament, are signs which link to the signified in eucharistic worship. Enraght (3.5) agrees, stating that ritualistic practices are associated with eucharistic worship. Neale (3.20) argues that architecture, symbols and ornaments present a ceremonialism that suggests realism and a sacramental principle, providing what Neale calls a ‘divine illustration’ of catholic teaching in relation to the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist and eucharistic sacrifice. Neale (3.20) cites the use of a pix containing the consecrated elements and the
reservation of the consecrated elements in a tabernacle as means of allowing people to be
closer to the sacramental presence of Christ on the understanding that the sacramental
elements were the body and blood of Christ as a sacramental but not natural presence.
Phillpotts (3.24) cites the specific eucharistic prayer called the *Agnus Dei* as indicating
realism in that it says, ‘Lamb of God that takest [not tookest] away the sins of the world’.
The use of the present tense in this prayer is important for Phillpotts since it suggests a
continuous presence of Christ’s propitiatory and sacrificial work in the Eucharist, not
restricted to the moment of the cross.

Immoderate Realism Excluded in relation to Presence

The writers reviewed above, and other writers who do not use realist assumptions in their
theology of the eucharistic presence of Christ, reject the idea of a fleshy presence of Christ
in the Eucharist (immoderate realism).

Benson (3.2) says that Christ’s presence is not measured by earthly means or by space.
Enraght (3.4) states that carnal eating is distinguished from spiritual eating in the Eucharist,
but both are real, and the carnal type of eating is not present in the Eucharist. Enraght
quotes John 6 saying that flesh profits nothing to support his view opposed to carnal
eating. Hamilton (3.9) argues that the substance of the bread and wine does not change.
Keble (3.12) says the presence of Christ is real in the Eucharist in the heart and hand but
with the bread and wine remaining in its own nature. Christ, says Keble, is ‘feasted upon’
but not in any carnal manner. Knox (3.13) denies what he calls the ‘gross’ sense of Christ’s
presence in the Eucharist. Liddon (3.14) states that sacraments point to Christ’s divinity
and not to his flesh. The writers of the *Memorial to the Archbishop of Canterbury* (3.18) deny
that there is a corporal presence of Christ’s natural flesh and blood and that there is any
change in the natural substance of bread and wine in the Eucharist. Mozley (3.19) rejects
any idea of a natural eating of Christ’s body and blood in the Eucharist and states that there
is only spiritual eating. Newman (3.21) says there is no carnal presence in the Eucharist
and asserts only a heavenly or spiritual presence, rejecting all local notions of presence.
Palmer (3.23) also rejects carnal notions which he describes as ‘corporal’ or ‘organical’.
Phillpotts (3.23) rejects the idea of carnal presence in the Eucharist. Pusey (3.25) says that
a spiritual presence is more real than a physical and denies that he holds any physical,
corporeal or carnal idea of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist and instead argues for a
spiritual, sacramental, divine and ineffable presence which has no ‘physical union’ of the body and blood of Christ with the bread and wine of the Eucharist. Staley (3.26) argues that a real presence in the Eucharist is a spiritual reality and that such a spiritual presence is not unreal or figurative but supernatural and not in any way carnal. Frederick Temple (3.29) states that the idea of a carnal presence in the Eucharist is excluded. The Tractarians (3.30) in advocating a sacramental principle and a sacramental union of sign and signified argue that such a view ‘is opposed to fleshy or carnal since it depends on mediation of the type’. The Tractarians argue that any view of the presence of Christ in the Eucharist which clings to the type (sign) without looking to the archetype (signified) is an error since it produces a carnal view of the presence and that a mistake is also made if the sign and the signified are separated (nominalism). The type they argue does not exist for itself, therefore those they call ‘pseudo-spiritualists’ (those who advocate a spiritual religion) and those who advocate a carnal religion (those who cling to the type) see nothing but the bare element (either separated from the signified or too closely associated with the sign) and that by so doing they deprive themselves of the spiritual benefit. Wilberforce (3.32) states that the Eucharist is not a physical but a moral instrument of salvation, not in the order of nature but in the order of grace. For Wilberforce there is a hypostatic union of Christ’s Godhead and Manhood (body and blood) such that they are joined inseparably in the eucharistic presence as they were joined in the incarnation of Jesus Christ, but in the Eucharist, this joining is not fleshy or carnal but is of grace rather than any physical nature.

Several Anglican theologians who adopt nominalist philosophical assumptions in regard to the Eucharist, also exclude any idea of a carnal presence. Goode (3.8) denies both a local or superlocal presence of Christ in the Eucharist, either spiritually or supernaturally. Ryle (3.26) and Vogan (3.31) state that there is no real presence of Christ in the Eucharist in any sense at all in the elements.

**Moderate Realism regarding Eucharistic Sacrifice**

Many Anglican theologians and writers refer to eucharistic sacrifice using the philosophical assumptions of moderate realism. This essence of the Anglican eucharistic tradition will be summarised in the following material.
Chapter 4

Some talk of ‘pleading’ the sacrifice of Christ. Bright (3.3) speaks of pleading the sacrifice of Christ in the Eucharist as a pleading of the atonement as propitiation. Bright does not mean that the eucharistic sacrifice is associated with what Christ did on the cross but with what Christ is continually doing in heaven and sacramentally in the Eucharist. Hamilton (3.9) speaks of the Eucharist as a sacrifice where that sacrifice is pleaded on earth as it is in heaven by Christ. Keble (3.12) speaks of pleading Christ crucified in the Eucharist and presenting to God the body and blood of God’s incarnate Son with his wounds, merits and mercies, that these may be accepted. Remembrance for Keble is a perpetual presentation of Christ’s body and blood in heaven and on earth. The *Memorial to the Archbishop of Canterbury* (3.18) spoke about Christ ever offering himself before God and pleading by his presence his sacrifice of the cross and argued that on earth the same body and blood is offered and pleaded before the Father by the priest. Phillpotts (3.24) stated that he saw the Eucharist joined with the one great sacrifice of Christ, pleading it before the Father, such that the atonement was seen to be finished on the cross but the sacrifice is continuous and its propitiatory virtue is also continuous. Pusey (3.25) speaks of a ‘pleading of our Lord’s passion in act’ where we present bread and wine to be ineffably and supernaturally the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist. *Saepius Officio* (3.27) also speaks of pleading and representing before God the sacrifice of the cross. Staley (3.28) says the pleading of the sacrifice in the Eucharist occurs as Christ pleads in heaven, not as a bloody sacrifice and not in line with the sacrifice of Calvary but as the pleading of that sacrifice in heaven.

Enraght (3.5) says the historic sacrifice and its benefits are continually applied in the Eucharist. A.P. Forbes (3.6) argues that the eucharistic sacrifice is the same ‘substantially’ with that of the cross. He does not argue that the cross is re-iterated in the Eucharist but by speaking of the same substance of the cross in the Eucharist he argues that Christ is commemorated and pleaded in the Eucharist. The substance, he says, is the same in both but the events are different – one being the historic event of the cross and the other being the event of the Eucharist. This language contains the sense of a strict identity of the universal in both the instantiations of the cross and the Eucharist, but a loose identity for the particulars of the eucharistic and the historic sacrifice. This is in line with the position taken by Armstrong (1989, 1995, 1997 and 2004) and discussed at length in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Mozley (3.19) distinguishes between the original propitiation of the cross (a fleshy sacrifice) and the ‘borrowed propitiation’ in the Eucharist (a non-fleshy sacrifice).
G.H. Forbes (3.7) says that bread and wine by their very placement on the altar with or without words are offered to God as a memorial of Christ’s oblation, not only in symbol, type and figure but in energy, spirit and power and efficacy. Knox (3.13) speaks of the ‘ineffable virtues’ of Christ’s crucifixion and death being received through the Eucharist whereas Liddon (3.14) argues that Christ’s divinity is pointed to by the Eucharist, such that the divinity ‘irradiates the perpetuity and the reality of their power’. Maurice (3.16) also speaks of the power of Christ’s sacrifice in the Eucharist through the signs, where the eucharistic ‘feast’ is sacrificed. Newman (3.21) is cautious about dismissing the idea of eucharistic sacrifice. He distinguishes between the ‘sacrifices of the masses’ (a re-iteration of Christ’s sacrifice in the Eucharist) and the ‘sacrifice of the mass’ where Christ’s sacrifice is remembered in the present in the Eucharist but not re-iterated. Palmer (3.23) also argues against re-iteration but not against eucharistic sacrifice per se. Pusey (3.25) says that the forgiveness of sins is real and effective in the Eucharist, as a work of the cross, given through the Eucharist in a real way. He describes this as ‘an application of His [Christ’s] One Oblation once made upon the cross, poured out for us now, conveying to our souls, as being His Blood, with other benefits of His Passion, the remission of sins also’. For Pusey (3.25) there is application of the sacrifice of Christ in the Eucharist, not a re-iteration of it. The Archbishops in Saepius Officio (3.27) affirm eucharistic sacrifice, saying that the Eucharist in the Anglican tradition is not a ‘nude commemoration of the sacrifice of the cross’. Rather they affirm the offering of gifts in the Eucharist to signify oblation and sacrifice which is the perpetual memory of the death of Christ. Staley (3.28) also says that there is a perpetual memory of Christ’s death before the Father in the Eucharist. He describes it as a feast upon a sacrifice, where ‘do’ in Christ’s words, ‘Do this in remembrance of me’, means ‘offer’ and where ‘remembrance’ has a sacrificial meaning. The sacrifice of the mass he says is an ancient and Catholic sense of the continual remembrance of the sacrifice of Christ where there is feeding of souls through the Eucharist. Wilberforce (3.32) states that the Eucharist is a sacrifice and that the eucharistic oblation is real. Christ, according to Wilberforce, is not just a store of grace but a great high priest through whose flesh people have access to God. Chiefly through the Eucharist people have access to the benefits of Christ’s death, but not in the strict sense of slaughter. In the Eucharist there is a perpetual sacrifice which is not restricted to the moment of Christ’s death. The Eucharist is not only a ‘feast upon a sacrifice, but likewise of a sacrifice itself’, where the sacrifice is in reference to the one, perfect propitiation and by virtue of
the one abiding sacrifice in heaven. In this sense Wilberforce (3.32) argues that it is a real sacrifice where sign (the external signs of bread and wine presented before God in the Eucharist) and the signified (the very sacrifice of the cross) are linked.

Keble (3.12) speaks in his poetry of Christ bleeding in the Eucharist and of days when the Eucharist is not celebrated as the day when the priest keeps back ‘our glorious sacrifice’. Not only is Keble saying that the Eucharist is a sacrifice, but he also argues that the priest has the power to control it. Keble however, calls the eucharistic sacrifice an ‘unbloody sacrifice’ which nonetheless is an offering up of Christ’s sacrifice and argues that the Eucharist is the place where Christ comes to be ‘feasted upon’ but not sacrificed; where there is ‘the transference for the time to earth of the great perpetual commemorative sacrifice in heaven’.

Jolly (3.11) presents a view of the eucharistic sacrifice which has much in common with the view of the Nonjurors (2.4, 2.8 and 2.27) and others like Johnson (2.11), who argue that the oblation of Christ was performed at the Last Supper and that Christ was then subsequently slain at the cross. The oblation is linked with the bread and wine and Christ is said ‘to suffer and die, under the symbols or substitutes of bread and wine’. Jolly (3.11) however presents this view in a moderate realist sense since, although he argues that the sacrifice is presented in a real way in the Eucharist, it is offered as a ‘memorial of the infinitely meritorious passion and death of His Son’.

Many Anglican writers in the nineteenth century present a moderate realist view of eucharistic sacrifice. They argue that the sacrifice of Christ is presented, pleaded and offered in a real way in the Eucharist, using the signs of bread and wine as they are offered to God, but they exclude the view that the eucharistic sacrifice is offered in a bloody manner or that Christ’s sacrifice is re-iterated or added to in the Eucharist.

The Role of the Spirit in the Eucharist

A number of Anglican theologians in the nineteenth century, adopting moderate realist philosophical assumptions, assign a specific role to the Holy Spirit in the Eucharist, where the Spirit is seen to act in the Eucharist and to be the source of power and effect in relation to the signs of bread and wine.
Benson (3.2) says that the ‘sacraments are the means through which the Spirit acts’ with the Spirit taking the consecrated bread and wine into the body of Christ. G.H. Forbes (3.7) sees the Spirit as the source of changing the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ without any change in the nature or the substance of the bread and wine. Forbes speaks of the Spirit bringing about a ‘quickening energy’. Jolly (3.11) argues that by the power and grace of the Holy Spirit the elements, without change in substance, become the body and blood of Christ in spirit and power, in divine virtue and life-giving efficacy. The Holy Spirit, Jolly says, acts so that the bread and wine is ‘highly enriched and consecrated’ and by the power of the Holy Spirit ‘made Christ’s body and blood in virtue, power and efficacy’, so that it conveys the benefits of his death. Knox (3.13) speaks of the operation of the Holy Spirit in relation to Christ as bringing about the ‘vivifying influences of His incarnate Person, and the ineffable virtues of His crucifixion and death’. The Memorial to the Archbishop of Canterbury (3.18) says that the Holy Spirit is involved in consecration in such a way that the signified body and blood of Christ are really present ‘under’ the outward signs or form of bread and wine. Newman (3.21) argues that the Holy Spirit’s role is that of agency for the presence of Christ ‘in’ and ‘by’ the sacrament. Staley (3.28) speaks of the power to consecrate by the power of the Holy Spirit, such that bread and wine ‘become’ Christ’s body and blood. Frederick Temple (3.29) similarly argues that the power of the Holy Spirit makes the bread and wine of the Eucharist the body and blood of Christ. Wilberforce (3.32) states that the Spirit and the Word have a crucial role in that the presence of Christ in the Eucharist is brought about by their efficacy.

Anglican theologians in the nineteenth century, adopting nominalist assumptions in relation to the sign and the signified in the Eucharist, interpret the role of the Holy Spirit in a different manner to those who use moderate realist assumptions. Goode (3.8), for example, sees the Spirit as enabling the communicant to know the presence of Christ through the power and the influence of Christ’s body and blood, but does not allocate a role to the Spirit in relation to the consecration of the bread and wine of the Eucharist. For Goode, the Spirit does not have any effect on the elements but only an effect on the communicant, since, for him, it is the faith of the communicant which determines the presence of the benefits of Christ’s presence and sacrifice and not any linking between the signs of bread and wine and the signified body and blood of Christ.
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Immoderate Realism excluded in relation to Sacrifice

Bright (3.3) and Enraght (3.5) exclude notions of the repetition of the atonement, new redemption or satisfaction by eucharistic sacrifice. For Bright (3.3), using Article XXXI as an authority, there is no re-iteration or supplementation of the sacrifice of Christ in the Eucharist in an immoderate realist sense. Hamilton (3.9) says that the sacrifice is not re-iterated. Jolly (3.11) argues that in the eucharistic oblation there is no physical suffering of Christ and no re-iteration of his sacrifice. Keble (3.12) says there is no blood in the eucharistic sacrifice and describes it as an ‘unbloody sacrifice’. The writers of the Memorial to the Archbishop of Canterbury (3.18) say there is no fresh sacrifice and oblation in the Eucharist apart from the all sufficient sacrifice and oblation of the cross. Palmer (3.23) excludes carnal notions (e.g. sacrifices of the masses) from the Eucharist and describes these as the ‘vulgar and heretical doctrine of re-iteration of Christ’s sacrifice in the Eucharist’. Pusey (3.25) speaks of ‘application’ of the sacrifice of Christ and not of re-iteration of the sacrifice of the cross, since that sacrifice was ‘once made upon the cross’. Staley (3.28) excludes the idea of offering in the Eucharist by the priest for the quick and the dead. He uses the term ‘sacrifices of the masses’ to describe this sort of carnal sacrifice and distinguishes it from the eucharistic sacrifice which is not carnal and not a distinct sacrifice from Christ’s sacrifice on the cross, nor it is a repetition of it either. Wilberforce (3.32) excludes any strict sacrifice in the sense of slaughter from the eucharistic sacrifice.

Several writers who present nominalist philosophical assumptions in relation to the Eucharist also exclude immoderate realist (as well as moderate realist) notions of sacrifice in the Eucharist. Meyrick (3.17) says there is no propitiation in the Eucharist. Ryle (3.26) argues that no sacrifice in the Eucharist can be inferred from the New Testament evidence and that there is no need for further sacrifice in the Eucharist following Christ’s sacrifice on the cross. Vogan (3.31) states there is no sacrifice in the Eucharist apart from that of praise and thanksgiving and the offering of the self.

Immoderate notions of sacrifice in the Eucharist are excluded from the writings of many Anglican theologians in the nineteenth century.
Realism which appears Immoderate

Despite the frequent denial of immoderate realism in the Eucharist, some Anglican writers in the nineteenth century used language which gave the impression of a natural or fleshy presence of Christ in the Eucharist and of a repetition of or addition to the sacrifice of Christ on the cross in the Eucharist.

Bennett (3.1) spoke of the ‘real, actual, and visible presence of our Lord upon the altars of our churches’. Bennett went so far as to argue that the consecrated elements should be adored. This led to the suggestion by some that he was arguing for the adoration of the outward elements and not the inward presence. The immoderate suggestions here were modified in later editions of his work so as not to refer to any adoration of the elements. Denison (3.4) said that the body and blood of Christ are naturally present in heaven but supernaturally, invisibly and really present in the Lord’s Supper through the elements by virtue of the act of consecration. Denison described this as Christ’s very body and very blood present ‘under the forms of bread and wine’, thereby suggesting an immoderate realist presence. A.P. Forbes (3.6) argued that ‘the bread of the Eucharist is the natural body of Christ or his incarnate flesh’ and that the eucharistic sacrifice is the same substantially with that of the cross. His argument suggests that the sign is the signified in the strict or immoderate sense, even though in other places he denies this interpretation. An alternative explanation which seems more likely places Forbes’s work in a sophisticated philosophical scheme where the universal (the nature of Christ and his sacrifice) is said to be strictly identical in terms of the instantiation in both particulars (the historic and the eucharistic sacrifice) but to possess a loose identity in relation to the particulars of the bread and wine on the one hand and the sacrifice of Christ on the other. This philosophical scheme is expressed in the eucharistic theology of other Anglican theologians (e.g. Andrewes – Case Study 1.16) and is used by secular philosophers in modern times (e.g. Armstrong, 1989, 1995, 1997 and 2004) in their discussion of realism. Reference to Chapter 3 of this thesis will provide additional details of this philosophical analysis.

Jolly (3.11) describes the bread and wine of the Eucharist as sure pledges of Christ’s flesh and blood and says that Christ suffers and dies under the symbols or substitutes of bread and wine. This immoderate realist sounding language is qualified by the argument that there is no physical manner to the presence or sacrifice in the Eucharist and that it is ‘in
effect’. Newman (3.21) says that Jesus ‘vouchsafes to us his flesh’, but this immoderate expression must be judged alongside Newman’s other predominant moderate realist theology. Palmer (3.23) talks of people receiving in the Eucharist, not only the flesh and blood of Christ, but Christ himself, both God and man. He does however deny a corporal presence in other places. Wilberforce (3.32) says that the same substance is in both the sign and the signified, but is careful not to speak of any carnal or fleshy presence or sacrifice in the Eucharist. When Wilberforce says that the outward and the inward are identical in the Eucharist he is speaking of the substance of Christ being the same in both the sign and the signified and not of an immoderate or fleshy presence or sacrifice. This is similar to the philosophical distinction made by Forbes and Armstrong (see above).

The problem created for the Anglican eucharistic tradition by some of these immoderate realist sounding expression is that it has led others to assume that a doctrine of immoderate realism is being taught in relation to Christ’s presence or sacrifice in the Eucharist (e.g. Doyle’s assessment of realist eucharistic theology – see Case Study 4.27). The use of the word ‘substance’ is also problematical for some such as Doyle since it suggests a return to pre-Reformation eucharistic theology and the doctrine of transubstantiation. It is for this reason that some Anglican writers reject the notion of eucharistic sacrifice expressed in either a moderate or immoderate realist sense. The problem seems to be in the interpretation of and understanding of the language and the philosophical assumptions underlying that language.

Transubstantiation Denied

Transubstantiation is frequently denied by Anglican writers in the nineteenth century. It is not seen as having a place in Anglican eucharistic theology (e.g. Benson, 3.2; Forbes, 3.6; Hamilton, 3.9). Often this is on the basis of the exclusion of transubstantiation in Article XXXI. Others deny the specific form of moderate realism called transubstantiation and the notion of any change in the substance of the bread and wine (the philosophical basis), but not moderate realism per se (e.g. Enraght, 3.4, Forbes, 3.6; Mozley, 3.14; Newman, 3.21; Temple, 3.29). Forbes (3.6) argues that transubstantiation may have an ‘innocent interpretation’ (i.e. moderate realist real presence of Christ in the Eucharist) but argues at the same time that transubstantiation involving any change in the substance of the bread and wine relies on the desition (termination of being) of the sign and therefore works
against the sacramental principle. Newman (3.21) and Palmer (3.23) while rejecting the notion of change in substance implied by transubstantiation do not reject the idea of change of substance completely. Where the change of substance is related to a change from a natural to a spiritual or supernatural substance (not bound by distance, place or movement) then, they argue, it can be accepted. Pusey (3.25) puts the view that transubstantiation must be denied in the sense that it implies a physical change, but that Anglican statements (e.g. the Articles – see Case Study 1.38) do not exclude change completely (such as in the case of change from the natural to the spiritual). The implication of this for Pusey is that transubstantiation can be accepted where it does not imply a change of physical substance and does not overthrow the nature of a sacrament. On the basis of sacramentality, expressed in the sacramental principle, Pusey puts that case that Anglicanism does not deny transubstantiation in all senses.

The important point to note from the discussion of this essence is that the basis for the acceptance or rejection of transubstantiation seems to be whether or not it involves moderate realism. If moderate realism is meant then transubstantiation can be accepted by some theologians and if it is not meant then transubstantiation is denied by these theologians in the Anglican eucharistic tradition.

Nominalism relating to the Eucharist
Several Anglican writers and theologians in the nineteenth century deny realist assumptions in relation to the Eucharist and adopt nominalist philosophical assumptions in their theology of the Eucharist.

Goode (3.8) emphasises a real presence to the faithful receiver only and separates the signs of bread and wine from the signified body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist. Christ is present, he says, only by faith and the sign only reminds the communicant of the spiritual blessings derived from Christ’s work. Any realism can only be associated with receptionism or with the presence of Christ with the faith of the communicant at the moment of reception, not the elements, which as sensible objects are only prompts to faith in the spiritual blessings of Christ. In a similar way the effects of Christ’s sacrifice are present, not by the linking of the sign with the signified in the Eucharist, but by participation of the soul in the body and blood of Christ by faith. ‘Real’, for Goode (3.8),
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means the real encounter of faith alone. Christ’s sacrifice is therefore limited to a past event.

Hebert (3.10) states that Christ’s body and blood are in heaven and not here on earth, except in the thought of the faithful communicant. Limiting the presence and sacrifice of Christ to the mind and heart of the believer suggests that there can be no real presence or sacrifice in the Eucharist and that there is an empirical separation of sign and signified in the Eucharist.

Meyrick (3.17) although admitting that the Eucharist is a remembrance, a sacrifice, a means of feeding, a means of incorporation and a pledge, qualifies all this by saying that:

- Remembrance only calls to mind Christ’s sacrifice.
- Sacrifice is an offering of worship to God where the bread and wine are gifts of homage with no propitiation implied in their offering.
- Feeding is not by the elements but only by faith.
- Incorporation is only of people into the body of Christ which is Christ’s mystical body.
- The pledge assures people of God’s past forgiveness with no linking of that pledge with the signs in the present in the Eucharist in a realist fashion.

Ryle (3.26) says that the Eucharist is a remembrance of the death of Christ and the benefits received by that death. The bread and wine for Ryle, only function to remind people of Christ’s body given on the cross with no linking of the sign and signified in any real way in the present in the Eucharist. The signs serve only the purpose of an aid to memory, albeit a forcible manner. The death of Christ, says Ryle, is the ‘hinge and turning point’ on which benefits depend and not the Eucharist. For Ryle (3.26) Christ’s words therefore, ‘This is my body/blood’ mean ‘This is a symbol of my body/blood’. The Eucharist therefore is entirely about remembrance and in Ryle’s view this was the position of the Reformers of the sixteenth century. For Ryle (3.26) the promises of God are pledged in the Eucharist and this, not the signs, is the source of the Eucharist’s power. The signs are not seen as the means of delivering grace since this can only be achieved through the promises of God. The Eucharist therefore in Ryle’s view does not deliver grace nor does it make peace with God since only the action of Christ in the past and the promises of God in the present can
achieve this. ‘Real presence’ for Ryle can only mean ‘Christ in the heart’ and so moderate realism and the sacramental principle forms no part of Ryle’s eucharistic theology.

Vogan (3.31) was another nineteenth century Anglican writer who saw no real link between the sign and the signified in the Eucharist. For him the use of the words ‘body and blood of Christ’ was only figurative since Christ’s death and sacrifice were in the past and not contextualised in any real way in the present in the Eucharist. There was therefore no possibility of speaking of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist or the pleading or offering of the eucharistic sacrifice. Sacrifice in the Eucharist was for Vogan (3.31) only a sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving and a sacrifice of self in worship. For Vogan (3.31) any feasting on a sacrifice in the Eucharist was a feasting upon a past sacrifice by remembering it and not upon a present sacrifice in any real way.

Negative reactions to the eucharistic theology of the Tractarians (see Case Study 3.30) in the nineteenth century was expressed by many Evangelicals who rejected the moderate realism of the Tractarians and spoke instead of a ‘spiritual religion’ which had no need of sacramental mediation. Outward signs in the sacraments were considered by many Evangelicals to be tokens and emblems only and were not seen as objective or instrumental causes or means of grace. This line of thinking was common among writers such as J.B. Sumner, C.R. Sumner and Charles Simeon (see Case Study 3.30). Others, particularly those labelled liberals by the Tractarians, favoured a more rational type of religion and so rejected the mysterious elements of both Romanticism and the sacramental principle because they were not easily and clearly definable. Writers such as Thomas Arnold and Renn Hampden (see Case Study 3.30) rejected the idea of sacramental mediation because it seemingly lacked empirical verification. In rejecting sacramental mediation these writers rejected the moderate realism inherent in the sacramental principle advocated by the Tractarians (see Case Study 3.30).
Chapter 4

Section 4: The Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries

4.1 The Early Twentieth Century – up until WWII

Case studies in this period are from the early period of the twentieth century, up until the end of the 1940’s. Case Studies 4.1-4.21 will be examined with a view to extracting the essences of Anglican eucharistic theology in the writings of Anglican theologians. Once again a variety of philosophical assumptions is found in the eucharistic theology in the case study material of this period.

Realism

Realism is the dominant philosophical assumption underlying Anglican eucharistic theology in the early part of the twentieth century. Writers in the period begin to apply greater sophistication to the philosophical analysis of eucharistic theology. The sacramental principle is well supported in this period with many writers acknowledging that God links signs with the signified, such that the signs are the vehicles for the delivery of grace.

The Anglo-Catholic Congresses (4.1) held in 1921, 1923, 1927 and 1948, presented papers showing significant interest in realist assumptions for eucharistic theology. The sacramental principle (God using material things to convey grace) was the basis of this realist thought. The real presence of Christ in the Eucharist was frequently mentioned and this was often linked with incarnational theology, where, Christ was said to be ‘incarnated’ with his people in the humble forms of bread and wine. Realism expressed in this way had the potential of reflecting an immoderate or fleshy realism, since incarnated means ‘enfleshed’, but writers were generally careful to exclude any immoderate notions of Christ’s presence or sacrifice in the Eucharist. The notion of identity was frequently used in the papers of the Anglo-Catholic Congresses (4.1) where sign and signified were linked. Signs such as bread and wine were linked with or identified in a realist manner with the body and blood of Christ, as the earthly altar was with the heavenly altar, but this linking was in the sense of a loose identity and not in a strict identity. The Eucharist nonetheless was seen as the means whereby the signified supernatural reality was made present on earth in the form of the sacramental sign. The idea that there was no causal link between the
sign and the signified of the Eucharist was firmly denied by many writers, and the sign was seen as instrumental in the transmission of grace to the faithful. The particulars of the Eucharist (bread and wine) were seen to be the vehicles for the grace of God.

Charles Gore at the Conference at Fulham Castle in 1900 (4.2) and in other places (4.7) linked the sign and the signified in a realist manner but also stated that the sign remained in its natural reality while at the same time being the spiritual reality of Christ’s body and blood. Faith is not seen as the starting point but the work God demands in response to God’s initiative in the sacraments. Faith is seen to receive the gift but not to create it, nor is faith the same as the gift. Gore in his acceptance of the sacramental principle acknowledged the key role of the doctrine of the incarnation, not merely as an idea but the supreme example of God’s means of working in the world. Just as the incarnation is sacramental in that it uses material and natural elements, so the sacraments use material and natural elements to convey the grace of God. Moss (4.11) argued that the incarnation was the greatest application of the sacramental principle where Christ is present in the form of a human being. It is this materiality that is important for Moss, both in the incarnate Christ and in the Eucharist since humans must approach God through the material and cannot approach God through the purely spiritual. The Eucharist therefore commemorates the incarnation most fully, more so than Christ’s death, since Christ’s death is only part of the incarnation. The Eucharist for Moss however, is more than merely symbolic since it actually conveys grace.

The report *Doctrine in the Church of England* (DCE) (4.4) also acknowledged the idea of sacramentality as the realist philosophical framework for sacramental theology where the sign and the signified were linked. Eck (4.5) spoke of the importance of the incarnation in eucharistic theology, stating that Christ was ‘under’ the form of bread and wine and that this was caused by the power of the Holy Spirit at the consecration in the Eucharist. He also stated that faith was not the means of linking the sign with the signified since the body and blood of Christ existed independently of faith. Newbolt (4.18) stated that the body and blood of Christ are present in the heart of the devout communicant but more than this they are conveyed by the sacrament of the Eucharist. The bread and wine are substantially and really present in the Eucharist but the signified body and blood of Christ are also really and truly present, but in a spiritual and ineffable manner. In such a way, Newbolt (4.18)
argued, the sign and signified are linked such that the body and blood of Christ are ‘under’ the forms of bread and wine as a sacramental expression of the incarnation. Stone (4.21) also argued that the incarnation and the Eucharist are connected intimately. The Eucharist, Stone says, carried out the work of the incarnation, where the life of Christ is received by signs, which are the signified body and blood of Christ. Weston (4.20) similarly argued that Christ is in the Eucharist ‘in’ and ‘amid’ matter. Waggett (4.19) importantly distinguished between ‘material’ and ‘spiritual’ realism, acknowledging that in the modern world many often only see reality as a material thing, whereas reality can be spiritual as well as material.

Ramsey (4.15) presents the view that the actions of Christ on the cross had significance beyond Christ’s own life and death, with the Eucharist linking in a real way with not only the Last Supper but also a new covenant which reaches beyond both time and place. The Eucharist therefore breaks into the history of the eternal through signs. Spens (4.16) also saw the signs of the Eucharist as effectual, not just in their message but also in their result for all time. He used the example of a coin and its intrinsic worth where a value is associated with the coin. We do not, he argued, carefully separate the value of the natural properties of the coin from its purchasing power, but rather we combine them, such that the natural properties and the purchasing power of the coin are effectual. In the same way, he suggested, God invests particular objects with properties to make them effective signs (e.g. bread and wine). Based on the fact of the incarnation, he said, and the dispensation of the Spirit, divine glory is ‘tabernacled’ among people in signs and the benefits of Christ’s sacrifice are received by these signs. Faith is not seen as the determinative factor here, but faith is seen as necessary for full reception of the benefits of grace.

Underhill (4.18) saw the symbols of the Eucharist as significant images which help people to apprehend the spiritual reality of a sacrament. She saw the Eucharist as a significant deed which used particular temporal things that give value to eternal things and convey a spiritual reality. Her realist understanding is based on an incarnational philosophy where the supernatural draws near to people through the natural. Symbols, for Underhill, ‘represent’ but sacraments ‘work’ and so are more than mere symbols. Sacraments are an effective way of conveying the spiritual by means of a material process. The sign or token is seen to be inferior to the signified reality but nonetheless conveys it. Realism undergirds Underhill’s reflection on the sacraments and the Eucharist in particular.
Other writers in the early twentieth century attempted to examine the Eucharist using a rigorous philosophical framework based on realism. The work of some of these writers will now be examined. Farrer (4.6) saw sacramentality as the basis of eucharistic theology, arguing that God works in the world in particular historical facts but that God also works supernaturally. For Farrer, God works supernaturally in the Eucharist but not by way of nature, although God chooses to use natural means like bread and wine. Farrer made the important distinction between God acting ‘in’ nature (a moderate realist conception) and God acting ‘according to’ nature (suggestive of fleshy or immoderate realist concepts). Relying on the work of Aquinas, Farrer argued that the supernatural moves from the First Cause (God) to the Second Cause (the sign). The supernatural is not the First Cause alone since this would have God as no part of the finite world. Accordingly the bread and wine of the Eucharist are united with divinity or ‘supernaturalised’, not naturally but supernaturally in such a way that Farrer (4.6) speaks of ‘tremendous images’ where this process occurs. The Eucharist is one of these tremendous images. Faith for Farrer does not discern the image but what the image signifies. This means that mediation through images is necessary. Such mediation of the signified through signs is based on realist philosophical assumptions.

Quick (4.7) acknowledged realism in distinguishing between the outward and the inward parts of sacraments. Causality and instrumentality are applied to the signs of the Eucharist which link them to their significance. The ultimate or the universal is seen to be beyond time and space and yet present and identified with the signs within the constraints of time and space. Quick rejects any carnal interpretation as well as rejecting any notions of the presence of Christ in the Eucharist being dependent on subjective knowledge.

William Temple (4.17) argued that reality is not merely related to the material or to the scientific forms of thought, but also to the less quantifiable such as the spiritual or to the idea of ‘value’, where substance is seen to equal value. Substance for Temple in sacramental theology can be its value without any necessary material sense. This led him to a view of realism where the whole universe is interpreted as sacramental and where everything is seen as an expression of and actualisation of God’s will. This he calls ‘transvaluation’ which he defines as the true form of transubstantiation, that is, where
natural things (bread and wine) are indwelt with the fullness of Christ’s body and blood in such a way that the bread and wine are transvalued or transubstantiated by an indwelling of value. Temple also saw the doctrine of incarnation as important for eucharistic theology since there is a universal principle in the incarnation. Symbol is seen as an instrument by which the communicant receives Christ himself as an objective gift not limited by the communicant’s capacity to understand the gift. Realism is at the heart of Temple’s discussion of eucharistic theology.

**Sacrifice**

Discussion of eucharistic sacrifice is also important in the writing of many theologians in the early part of the twentieth century. Moderate notions of realism dominate with writers arguing that Christ’s sacrifice cannot be repeated or added to in the Eucharist, but that it is nonetheless offered and the eternal sacrifice of Christ is linked with the earthy eucharistic sacrifice in a realist manner.

The *Anglo-Catholic Congresses* (4.1) stated that the sacrifice of Christ is not offered again in the Eucharist but offered as a ‘consummated’ sacrifice where the sacrifice has already been achieved. The sacrifice of Christ is however offered in the Eucharist, not as the immolation of the cross but as the sacrifice of the altar where the church’s sacrifice on earth is linked with the eternal sacrifice of Christ. The eucharistic sacrifice is not about destruction of life but dedication of life. Farrer (4.6) argued that only Christ could offer sacrifice in a fleshy sense and that the disciples of Christ could not do this. The bread and wine of the Eucharist however, establish an equivalence with Christ’s body and blood by means of the consecration and therefore the sacrifice is sacramentally realised in the Eucharist in a way that is more than mere memory but a presentation of the sacrifice in both heaven and earth. The presentation of the sacrifice on earth is linked with the heavenly sacrifice by its offering and taking by God. Gore (4.7) spoke of a ‘bloodless sacrifice’ where bread and wine are presented before God by consecration and where in a mystical sense the Eucharist is a sacred rite of divine life. Gore rejected the need for further propitiation in the Eucharist following the work of Christ, but this does not mean a lack of need for sacrifice, since there are sacrifices proper to humans. These he states are: sacrifices of praise and thanksgiving; almsgiving; doing good; self sacrifice; prayers and intercessions; suffering; and sacrifices offered to God. The Eucharist has this sacrificial
character not as a repetition of Christ’s sacrifice but rather as a connection between the earthly and the heavenly sacrifice where the eternal sacrifice of Christ has a perpetual application in the Eucharist.

Hicks (4.9) discussed sacrifice in terms of its Jewish background, arguing that the meal tradition of Judaism was inherited by Christianity, and the basis of this meal tradition is sacrifice. Sacrifice, he argued, is not merely concerned with death but with Christ’s redemptive work as a whole and therefore the eucharistic sacrifice is a pleading of Christ’s sacrifice linked in a realist manner with the entirety of Christ’s redemptive work. There have been times, argues Hicks, when this link has been unbalanced. In medieval times propitiation was emphasised, such that in the popular conception of what happened in the Eucharist there was sometimes an emphasis on sacrifice as death and killing. The death of Christ on the cross was emphasised in such a way that sacrifice equalled destruction rather than transformation. The signs of the Eucharist (the bread and wine and their offering) came to be too closely and literally associated with the sacrifice of Christ such that sacrifice was equal to destruction and death in an immoderate realist manner. The Reformation reacted against this unbalanced view and emphasised communion rather than sacrifice. The result was that the link between the signs of the Eucharist and the signified sacrifice of Christ was lessened, resulting in a nominalist separation of sign and signified. ‘Wrong medievalism’ as Hicks calls it has profoundly influenced anti-Roman teaching where material notions are condemned and in so doing the entire idea of eucharistic sacrifice is also condemned. This applies as much to Anglican Catholic eucharistic theology based on moderate realism as it does to eucharistic theology generally. Hicks (4.9) argued for a view of eucharistic sacrifice based on moderate realist assumptions where there is transformation rather than physical destruction.

Moss (4.11) similarly argued that the Eucharist is a sacrifice but not in the sense of immolation or a new and repeated sacrifice. The Eucharist is a sacrifice in the sense of being offered to God. Christ’s death was on the cross but Christ’s sacrifice is perpetually a self-offering in heaven and Christ’s eucharistic sacrifice is seen as a feast upon this sacrifice and one that is united with Christ’s sacrifice. Signs therefore are linked with the signified in a real way and offered to God. As with Hicks (4.9) Moss (4.11) pointed to the wrong association of sacrifice with death and immolation and instead emphasised the realist
linking of eucharistic sacrifice with the perpetual and heavenly offering of Christ. Newbolt (4.13) saw the Eucharist as a memorial of the sacrifice of Calvary but more than mere remembrance. In the Eucharist, he said, we offer the same body once sacrificed, but sacramentally, with no re-iteration or replacing of the sacrifice of the cross with the sacrifice of the altar. Instead Newbolt argued that the sacrifice of the cross and the sacrifice of the altar are linked in a realist manner. Ramsey (4.15) expressed this in a different way arguing that by eating and drinking in the Eucharist people are brought within Christ’s death, partaking of the sacrifice in a way that feeds and nourishes them spiritually. The signs are seen to unite people with the death of Christ as a real act in the present and in future. Christ is said to ‘invest’ his death with meaning which declares its power by the tangible and earthly signs in a realist way such that the Eucharist as sacrifice is a focus for the whole Church on the truth of Christ’s act for all time and not just a reminder of a past event. Spens (4.16) also argued that in breaking bread and drinking wine people are partaking in a sacrifice and the blessings of that sacrifice. For Spens the eucharistic sacrifice participates in Christ’s sacrifice and proclaims it in an effectual way. William Temple (4.17) said that the repeating of Christ’s words at the Eucharist gave it sacrificial overtones. Christ’s words, ‘Do this’, are sacrificial, but the universality of Christ’s sacrifice found in the Eucharist is not the specific event of the cross nor is the universal nature of that sacrifice specific to the historical particular of Christ’s sacrifice. Rather, by receiving the gift of the Eucharist, the communicant participates in Christ’s one sacrifice that is something more than the event of the cross. Underhill (4.18) described sacrificial worship here and now as carrying a super-sensual reference in such a way that the Eucharist is not merely remembrance but presentation of Christ’s sacrifice. The sacrifice of time and space however, that is, the sacrifice of Calvary, is not the sacrifice of the Eucharist. Calvary is not repeated or added to but rather heaven penetrating earth at a point of sacrifice where the Eucharist becomes the vehicle for the supernatural. Waggett (4.19) described this as Christ ever appearing before the Father. The actions of the Eucharist are seen as part of this eternal sacrifice where Christ’s oblation on the cross is identified with the eucharistic oblation. This identity, he argued, lifts the Eucharist up to the unending sacrifice and the power of this eternal oblation is emphasised not its physicality or fleshiness.
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Stone (4.21) stated that sacrifice is often associated with the finding of the divine. Sacrifice brings about communication and communion with spiritual beings. The Eucharist functions in this way and is a presentation of the body and blood of Christ offered in sacrifice to the Father, in that the bread and wine are vehicles of spiritual grace. The Eucharist is seen as the Church’s sacrifice, where the Church presents the life of the Lord to the Father, pleading his passion and death as well as his risen and ascended life.

Moderate realist assumptions underlie these statements in relation to sacrifice in the Eucharist and are frequently found in this early period of the twentieth century in relation to Anglican eucharistic theology.

Immoderate realism distinguished from moderate realism

Many writers in the early twentieth century period distinguish any carnal or immoderate realist assumptions from moderate realist assumptions in the Eucharist, carefully distinguishing the carnal and the physical from the spiritual and yet real. These include Anglo-Catholic Congresses (4.1), Conference at Fulham Castle, 1900 (4.2), Doctrine in the Church of England (4.4), Hicks (4.9), Newbolt (4.13), Quick (4.14), Spens (4.16) and Underhill (4.18). Eck (4.5) excluded immoderate realism from his eucharistic theology, arguing that the signs of the Eucharist are not the human body and blood of Christ but his glorified body and blood. The spiritual and glorified body and blood of Christ is not opposed to ‘real’ but opposed to ‘natural’ and therefore the spiritual presence of Christ in the Eucharist is not dependent on Christ’s natural presence. Gore (4.7) excluded immoderate realism saying that the mystical interpretation of Christ’s body and blood present in the Eucharist is as remote as possible from any notion of cannibalism. Hicks (4.9) in rejecting immoderate realism stated that material sacrifice is not part of the eucharistic sacrifice. Moss (4.11) denied the material sense of Christ’s body and blood in the Eucharist since Christ’s eucharistic body and blood does not refer to a dead body or to any material or local dimension. Ramsey (4.15) pointed out that carnal interpretations of Christ’s presence and sacrifice in the Eucharist are corruptions focussing on his death alone. Temple (4.17) rejected the carnal assumptions and proposes the idea of transvaluation where Christ is nonetheless present in the local forms of bread and wine. Waggett (4.19) rejected the view that ‘real’ is only material. Reality, he says, does not depend on a physical real presence (which is seen and felt) but on a spiritual presence. The spiritual lifts the physical into a
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true reality where the carnal is distinguished from the glorified body. Carnal ideas of sacrifice are also rejected since the eucharistic oblation is identified with the eternal oblation before the Father but not in a fleshy or physical manner. Weston (4.20) and Stone (4.21) despite very realist language in relation to worshiping Christ ‘in’ and ‘amid’ matter, insisted that such worship is in Spirit, not flesh through matter and that Christ is not sacrificed in a physical but spiritual manner in the Eucharist.

Heightened and Enhanced Efficacy of Elements

The idea that the elements of the Eucharist had a heightened and enhanced efficacy following consecration was frequently argued by writers in the early period of the twentieth century. The Anglo-Catholic Congresses (4.1) stated that this heightened and enhanced efficacy came about as a result of the consecration which produced spiritual effects in the elements in that they ‘became’ the body and blood of Christ. The effect however, was not seen as physical or material but rather ‘opportunities of spiritual experience’. Halifax at the Conference at Fulham Castle in 1900 argued that there was a change in the elements after consecration but the change was sacramental and not physical, such that the signs of the Eucharist were linked with the signified body and blood of Christ. Eck (4.5) stated that the consecration made the elements what they were not before, that is, the body and blood of Christ. This change he says is not achieved by the faith of the believer but faith is the means by which the change is recognised and received, since Christ’s body and blood existed independently of the faith of the communicant. Gore (4.7) said that consecration causes the bread and wine to become something higher or diviner, which is the spiritual food of the flesh and blood of Christ. Moss (4.11) put the case that consecration effects a change in the bread and wine so that there is a real presence of Christ in the Eucharist where the bread and wine becomes the body and blood of Christ, but where the change is a heavenly and spiritual change, not a material change, and where the change is nonetheless real. Newbolt (4.13) said that the bread and wine after consecration are something more than they were before consecration. Spens (4.16) stated that the elements are changed and transfigured so that they have new properties by the action of God in the consecration of the bread and wine. He suggested the use of the terms ‘convaluation’ or ‘transvaluation’ to indicate a change in value so that the bread and wine following consecration possess spiritual blessings not there before. The signs are therefore linked with the signified in a realist manner. Temple (4.17) argued that by consecration the elements are ‘transvalued’,
with their value becoming Christ’s body and blood. Faith, he said, is the means whereby
the communicant realises this heightened presence but not the cause of it. Underhill (4.18)
said that consecration takes the bread and wine and lifts them to a new sphere of reality
making them what they were not before – a higher sphere of reality. Faith does not create
this higher sphere but merely ‘looks towards’ it. Waggett (4.19) argued that there is a real
gift in the Eucharist which is more than a symbol. The power of Jesus’ words and actions
are seen to provide the means of bringing about the change in the elements and this he says
is ‘spiritual identification’. In such a scheme the natural substance of the elements is said to
remain but the elements become something else as spiritual gifts and are taken into the
mystery of the gifts, becoming the body and blood of Christ. Stone (4.21) argues that
Christ exists transformed and made spiritual in the Eucharist in the bread and wine which
become capable of being spiritually bestowed, such that the bread and wine are ‘made to
be’ the body and blood of Christ.

Moderate realist assumptions underlie these statements of heightened and enhanced
efficacy since the signs of the Eucharist are linked with the signified gifts in a real way.

Transubstantiation

Despite a long tradition of distancing Anglican eucharistic theology from the doctrine of
transubstantiation (beginning with the Articles of Religion – see Case Study 1.38), several
writers in the early twentieth century began to explore ways that transubstantiation could
be part of Anglican eucharistic theology while others continued to reject it. Gore (4.7)
rejected it on the basis of antiquity, scripture and reason. Moss (4.11) while rejecting the
term transubstantiation, argued that corruptions of transubstantiation (material and local
presence notions) have led to a rejection of transubstantiation in all its forms. The
problem he said is that ‘substance’ has often been interpreted in a popular (physical and
local) sense rather than a philosophical sense.

Newbolt (4.21) argued that the spiritual undergirding of the Eucharist brings about the
‘transubstantiation’ of an individual into Christ where there is no change in the substance
of the elements but a change in sacramental life. Specifically in relation to eucharistic
presence Newbolt stated that transubstantiation does not mean a carnal presence of Christ
in the Eucharist, rather it is an attempt to explain Christ’s eucharistic presence. He
acknowledged that transubstantiation has been corrupted by immoderate realist interpretations and that philosophical difficulties surround the idea of substance, but at the same time he saw it as a way of interpreting the presence of Christ in the Eucharist as long as it excluded notions of a local or material presence and focused on moderate realist assumptions instead. Quick (4.14) while arguing that transubstantiation is generally rejected by Anglicanism on grounds of the carnal corruptions and because it is against sense, nonetheless acknowledged that transubstantiation can be understood in a spiritual and non-carnal manner and could be accepted as teaching the spiritual presence of Christ in the Eucharist. Spens (4.16) stated that the idea of a heightened and spiritual value of the bread and wine after consecration in the Eucharist can be described as transubstantiation, but not that form of transubstantiation which is condemned in the Anglican formulæs as overthrowing the nature of a sacrament (see the Articles of Religion – case study 1.38). Spens (4.16) argued that if transubstantiation means a moderate, non-carnal mode of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist, where the signs are effectual signs, then transubstantiation could have a place in Anglican eucharistic theology. Temple (4.17) similarly opts for the moderate realist interpretation of transubstantiation which he defined as ‘transvaluation’. Underhill (4.18) spoke of ‘transfiguration’ or ‘transmutation’ of the elements such that there is an eternalising of the created order where bread and wine and people become the vehicles of God’s glory. God’s glory is revealed in a way that is familiar (through the elements of bread and wine) and this has the function of not dazzling humans by an overwhelming disclosure of reality.

In all these discussions of whether or not transubstantiation could be part of Anglican eucharistic theology the debate proceeded on the basis of moderate realist assumptions.

Adoring Christ in the Eucharist

Some writers at the beginning of the twentieth century spoke of the adoration of Christ in the Eucharist. The Anglo-Catholic Congresses (4.1) spoke of adoring Christ present in a human and divine form in the Eucharist by the power of his incarnation. Spens (4.16) said that the Eucharist gives the presence of the Lord as a sacrifice and a full expression of our worship of the Lamb. Waggett (4.19) argued that the reality in the Eucharist is spiritual but that reality can be adored since it is present in the elements of bread and wine. Weston (4.20) spoke of adoring Christ in the Tabernacle (a cupboard like structure contained
behind the altar in a church for the reservation of the consecrated elements and for the purposes of adoration) where Christ is found in and amid matter. The Spirit is present through matter but nonetheless it is worshipped and adored.

**Nominalism**

Nominalism continued to be part of Anglican eucharistic theology in the early twentieth century. Dimock (4.3) saw the Reformed view of the sacraments as one concerned with language only where names of sacramental signs were interchangeable with the thing signified but where there was no real reception of the signified given by the sign. For Dimock the sign and the signified were separated in the Eucharist. He distinguished ‘sacramental’ from ‘real’ in such a way that ‘real’ implied an empirical presence (immoderate) and ‘sacramental’ meant signs and seals which are only received by faith. Any realist link for Dimock (4.3) between the sign and the signified exists in the mind and faith of the believer and not in any linking between the elements of bread and wine and the body and blood of Christ.

Griffith Thomas (4.8) spoke of a ‘transaction’ already accomplished by Christ in his death and therefore the signs in the Eucharist must remain at some distance from the signified. There is therefore no real presence of Christ in the Eucharist and the signs are not channels or pipes of grace but merely seals, pledges and guarantees of grace. The signs function as pictures, promises, proofs and pledges of grace. Grace is only conveyed by God through the response of faith on the part of the believer. The Eucharist therefore can only be about remembrance of Christ’s sacrifice and death in the sense that it is a bringing of that accomplished transaction to the mind of the faithful believer. For Griffith Thomas (4.8) there can be no realist identification of the signs with the signified since both (the elements and Christ’s sacrifice and death) are separate particulars. Communion is therefore seen to be a spiritual event only, where spiritual means not physically real and signs are not linked with or identified with the signified. The signified therefore is not part of the sacrament, and even though Griffith Thomas (4.8) does not deny the existence of objective grace, at the same time he dismisses the idea that grace can be linked to sacramental signs in an objective way. He therefore dismissed any idea of a real presence of Christ in the Eucharist and assumed that ‘real’ can only mean ‘material’ and that there can be no material sense of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist. The way in which he equated ‘real’ and
‘material’ prohibited any sense of a real and material presence of Christ in the Eucharist (that is, moderate realism). In the same way for Griffith Thomas there can be no realist sense in which Christ’s sacrifice is offered in the Eucharist since that sacrifice is an accomplished transaction as a past event which cannot be offered in any way in the present in the Eucharist. Christ’s sacrifice was completed at the cross, according to Griffith Thomas (4.8), and so any moderate realist idea of a renewal or pleading of that sacrifice is ruled out, just as a repetition of that sacrifice is also ruled out. Sacraments for Griffith Thomas (4.8) are always conditional and have no spiritual power apart from the Spirit of God on God’s part and faith on the human part. This means that for Griffith Thomas grace is not present in sacraments as an objective fact and the efficacy of the sacrament does not depend on any heightened or enhanced state of the elements following consecration, but only on the subjective faith of the individual receiving the sacrament in response to the promises of God. Hence in Griffith Thomas’s theology of the Eucharist there is a nominalist separation of sign and signified, each being considered a particular without any realist identification of one with the other.

Knox (4.10) stated that the Eucharist is about spiritual communion without any linking between the sign and the signified. Moule (4.12) argued that sacraments are not a means of grace but a ministration where Christ uses tokens to meet faith. Christ touches the believer through faith, not signs, and signs therefore are not identified with the body and blood of Christ. Signs function only as pledges or tokens of a covenant already established by faith. Realism, in Moule’s view is seen to lack the evidence of Scripture and so there can be no realist linking of sign and signified in the Eucharist. The body and blood of Christ therefore refers to the death of Christ on the cross. The ‘is’ in the words ‘This is my body’ means ‘in a certain manner’ and the manner is by faith and not in any real sense. In the words, ‘Do this in remembrance of me’, ‘do’ means merely to remember and has no realist sense of a pleading or offering of Christ’s sacrifice. Remember is for Moule (4.12) a deliberate inward act of an individual’s will rather than a joining of the heavenly sacrifice to earthly signs and actions. Moule at the Conference at Fulham Castle (4.2) in 1900 spoke in a way that has been called ‘realistic receptionism’. Moule speaks of Christ being present at the Eucharist and consecrating the elements, giving them sacredness, but not associating any presence of Christ with the signs of bread and wine and their offering. The sacredness of the elements relates to the eyes of faith alone, such that the presence of Christ in the
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Eucharist is clearly separated from the signs or elements of the Eucharist. Christ is known to the communicant at the reception of the elements and through reflection by faith on the action of Christ in the Eucharist, but not in the signs of bread and wine being linked with the signified body and blood of Christ and their offering.

4.2 The Later Twentieth Century and the Twenty-First Century – from WWII

Case studies in this period are from the later period of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century. Case Studies 4.22-4.56 will be examined with a view to extracting the essences of Anglican eucharistic theology in the writings of Anglican theologians and liturgies.

Realism

Realism is commonly found as the basis of eucharistic theology in the later part of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century. Signs are frequently linked with the signified in a realist manner with many writers accepting the idea of the sacramental principle based on realist philosophical assumptions. Dom Gregory Dix (4.28) argued that prior to the Reformation there was a corrupted eucharistic theology which focussed on the personal devotion of an individual before a ‘thing’ (that is, the host), but that the Reformation in correcting this view, presented another corrupted view based also on personal devotion, that is, overemphasis on the faith of the individual believer. Both views, the pre and post Reformation views, created what he calls a subjective view that broke the essential link between the sign and the signified, and focussed eucharistic theology on either the eucharistic species or the faith of the individual. In Dix’s (4.28) view a realist (that is, a moderate realist) eucharistic theology, based on the sacramental principle, avoids both of these corruptions and also helps to re-establish the eschatological dimension, which he sees as an essential part of eucharistic theology. It is the Eucharist, he argues, that links the context of time with the eternal fact of the kingdom of God through Jesus, so that in the Eucharist the Church continually recalls and enters into the sacrifice of Christ for all time.

The Anglican Roman Catholic International Commission (ARCIC) documents (4.22) state that in the Eucharist Christ is offered to people by a sacramental presence through bread and
wine. This is described as a true presence where Christ is effectively signified by bread and wine which are said to ‘become’ his body and blood in a mysterious manner. *ARCIC* (4.22) calls this ‘sacramental realism’ and rejects the view that the Eucharist is concerned with ‘mere symbolism’. This real presence is said to be more than a physical presence since the sacramental body and blood of Christ is not seen as a physical body and blood. *ARCIC* rejects the idea of linking the signs too closely to the signified since this suggests physical presence (what this thesis calls immoderate realism), and at the same time *ARCIC* rejects a eucharistic theology which does not link the signs with the signified closely enough (what this thesis refers to as nominalism).

Brown and Loades (4.23) affirm the sacramental principle in the Eucharist, based on realism within an overall incarnational theology. They speak of ‘enmattered reality’ where the idea of body is important in the sense of Christ’s body in the Eucharist and where communicants become part of Christ’s body. All this is based on realist assumptions. Brown and Loades argue that Christianity has two books – Nature and Scripture. Nature uses symbols appropriately for Christians – natural things like water, bread and wine, while Scripture uses words. Both Nature and Scripture signify the Word (Christ) in a realist way. In opposition to some Evangelical theologies of the Eucharist, Brown and Loades argue that Word cannot be elevated above the idea of a sacramental principle, since Word (as in ‘Word made flesh’) is itself an example of the sacramental principle. Word and flesh in the view of Brown and Loades (4.23) are not opposites but examples of the same sacramental principle. Carnley (4.24) also affirms the sacramental principle based on realism in that the Eucharist involves a sharing in the divine nature by means of eucharistic action, symbol and community. Herbert (4.31) also sees sacraments as effectual signs, where the signs convey grace. The bread and wine of the Eucharist are effectual signs by the power of the Holy Spirit. The *International Anglican Liturgical Consultation* (4.32) also adopts this realist framework, identifying the bread and wine of the Eucharist with the body and blood of Christ. Mascall (4.37) based his sacramental theology on realism, expressed as a sacramental principle where the incarnation is central. He rejected extreme realism (physical presence or immoderate realism) and at the same time the separation of sign and signified since the incarnation is firmly based on the linking of sign and signified in the historical process. Rayner (4.42) also supports the idea of a sacramental principle based on the incarnation which he sees as God’s supreme sacrament. He argues that the material
world is good and used by God to show signs of God’s love and grace. This sacramental scheme, based on realism, links sign and signified in such a way that the outward sign conveys the inward and signified grace. John Robinson (4.44) argues that God’s use of the common in the sacraments is important and that it is not the holy but the common that becomes the carrier of the unconditional. Common bread and wine are where Christ is made known in the Eucharist in that the holy is really found in the depth of the common. Robinson’s theology is based on realism where Christian action is seen to mediate and make present Christ’s presence and action in its efficacy and power. For Robinson (4.44), realism relates to more than things such as bread and wine, but also to the lives of people as Christ’s body in the world. The incarnation is a central concept in the scheme of using matter to make holy, such that there can be no wedge between the ‘holy’ and the ‘common’. The papers contained in the English publication *Thinking about the Eucharist* (4.51) have realist assumptions underlying the sacramental theology expressed. The doctrine of the incarnation is the basis for the views expressed, where there is a conjunction between sign and signified, such that the sign is revalued but where notions of immoderate realism are rejected. Many of the catechisms of the twentieth century (4.55) express a eucharistic theology based on realism where there is a linking between the sign and the signified in the Eucharist. Discussion of eucharistic presidency in the twentieth century (e.g. the English House of Bishops – Case Study 4.56) has also expressed realist assumptions in expressing eucharistic theology. Similarly other writers (e.g. McGowan, 2004 – Case Study 4.56) in arguing against lay presidency of the Eucharist, base their eucharistic theology on realist assumptions.

Oulton (4.38) considers the ways in which the Eucharist is apprehended in the Scriptures. In the Synoptic Gospels, he argues, the Eucharist is apprehended as a mystery-type where the Lord as priest sits at a meal and uses sacrificial language. In John’s Gospel there is also a mystery-type of apprehension where the Lord is in the sacrament and talks about people eating his body and drinking his blood. The Pauline interpretation is seen to be ecclesial where those united with Christ are united with one another. The indwelling of Christ is apprehended in the members of his mystical body. There is also an eschatological apprehension in the writing of Luke and Paul where the Lord’s death is proclaimed until he comes. In these different apprehensions Oulton speaks of a distinction between a faith means of presence and a material means of presence. He sees a problem when one of
these is viewed as the exclusive means of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist. Oulton (4.38) accepts moderate realism but rejects nominalism and immoderate realism. He asks whether or not the Eucharist functions within a scheme of universals and particulars. Are the relations and properties in the Eucharist a function of the reasoning mind (nominalism) or is there a universal apart from a particular and the reasoning mind? He opts for the realist analysis of universals and particulars.

Cocksworth (4.25) speaks as an Evangelical of a ‘real participation in Christ’ where the reality of Christ’s gift of himself to people is made in the Eucharist. His view represents a lessening of the party tension and acceptance that the sacramental principle, based on realism, can function within Evangelical eucharistic theology. There is, he argues, an intrinsic relationship between Gospel, Bible and Sacrament, where people experience these dimensions of Christ’s presence in a real and personal way. It is important to note that Cocksworth’s idea of a real presence does not merely relate to bread and wine, and indeed he argues that to link Christ’s presence exclusively to bread and wine, limits the presence of Christ and links the idea of Christ’s presence too closely with particular party positions within Anglicanism. Cocksworth (4.25) seeks a unitive approach between gospel, Bible and sacrament, where each has the power to reveal the presence of Christ in a personal manner. It is in this sense that he rejects the idea that Christ’s presence is not just the power of his death, but the power of his whole being, including his resurrection and ascension as these are known and proclaimed in gospel, Bible and sacrament. People are therefore seen to participate in the glorified life of Christ in the Eucharist.

Some writers are less cautious. Donovan (4.26) sees the sacraments as means of grace where the outward signs convey the inward spiritual grace. The signs of bread and wine are the means by which Christ is really present and the life of Jesus conveyed since following consecration the bread and wine are said to ‘become’ the body and blood of Christ. Donovan describes this as Jesus concealing himself under the ‘veils’ of bread and wine such that he is truly present as he was in Bethlehem and Galilee. The danger here seems to be that there is a focus on the bodily without any adequate philosophical distinction between the physical and eucharistic body of Jesus such as the distinction between moderate and immoderate realism provides. It may be that Donovan is referring here to the instantiation of the universal nature of Christ in a strict sense in both the
particulars of Christ’s body and blood (at Bethlehem) and in the particulars of bread and wine in the Eucharist and at the same time viewing each of the particulars are being identical in nature, that is, a loose identity, but this not clear from what Donovan says. Donovan’s work therefore needs careful analysis or additional information in order to avoid any suggestion of immoderate realism.

Several writers in the twentieth century in adopting realist assumptions have argued that philosophical analysis should have a greater place in the expression of eucharistic theology. Macquarrie (4.36) argues that philosophy can assist in the formulation of modern theology in best expressing modern theology for the secular culture of modern times. Macquarrie also acknowledges a place for the ‘natural’ in his theology. He argues that Christ is really present in the Eucharist in a number of ways: temporally, spatially or locally and personally. He is cautious about describing Christ’s real presence as a ‘thing’ since this implies a physical, bodily presence in the Eucharist. Macquarrie (4.36) rejects this immoderate realist sense of presence, although he acknowledges the local or spatial sense of Christ’s presence, in that Christ is present ‘here’ in a place in the Eucharist. At the same time he acknowledges that Christ is present temporally, now, as well as in the past and in the future and that Christ is present personally, in the sense that Christ is present to a person, in a way not dependent on time or space. Christ’s presence therefore is said to be multidimensional and not restricted to time and space. Christ can be present in the word, in the reading and proclaiming of the Gospel, in the action of the Eucharist, in the faithful as an extension of the incarnation, in the bishop or priest and in the sign. None of these means of presence can be emphasised too closely or exclusively, argues Macquarrie, however he does describe the presence in the sign as presence par excellence. All means of presence, noted by Macquarrie, are based on a moderate realism where there is identity between particularity and universality. For Macquarrie (4.36) the universal is Christ as the divine Logos and it is God who chooses to make this universal known in the particular, such as the incarnation and the Eucharist. It is, says Macquarrie, the particular ‘thingy’ presence which provides a moment of intensity so that people can know the universal.

Ford (4.29) presents a developed philosophical analysis of eucharistic theology. He argues that Jesus’ transformation at the Eucharist is a particularisation of a universal, such that he transforms the covenant theme of scripture with reference to ‘my body’ and ‘my blood’ as
he transforms the Last Supper. Ford describes this as a ‘scandal of particularity’ where the remembering of Jesus in the event of the Eucharist has implications for people’s lives, in that through particular things, such as bread and wine, the face of Jesus is seen. He distinguishes between ‘strict’ and ‘identical’ repetition (what this thesis has called immoderate realism) and non-identical repetition (what this thesis has called moderate realism). For Ford (4.29) the Eucharist is an example of non-identical repetition (moderate realism) which is the characteristic form of universality with particularity. Immoderate realism and nominalism are rejected by Ford. Mascall (4.37) in earlier years presented much the same idea of moderate realism, arguing that God instantiates universals in particulars. This argues Mascall is the way God works in the world and is not simply a philosophical scheme to which the Christian facts are made to conform. There is, he says, an organic relation between the order of nature and the order of grace in that grace works through nature even though the two orders are distinct. This distinction means that sacramental efficiency based on realist assumptions and incorporating universals instantiated in particulars, is at a distance from the subjective responses of believers. Signs therefore re-present, make present and effect what is re-presented. There is, he argues, an effective causality based on realism which is moderate. Any form of immoderate realism is rejected by Mascall (4.37) since he argues it lacks the representative signification which underlies the way God works in the world.

In more recent times Catherine Pickstock (4.41) has also used philosophical analysis to reflect in a sophisticated manner on the nature of the Eucharist. She presents a eucharistic theology based on realism and analyses the philosophical assumptions which underlie such a theology. She speaks of the coincidence of ‘sign’ and ‘body’, arguing in a startling manner that there is no necrophilia in the Eucharist: that is, looking back to a dead body and completed sacrificial event. For Pickstock (4.41) the Eucharist has life by the linking of sign and signified. She condemns what she calls the ‘textual calculus of the real’ (Pickstock, 1998: 3) by which she means any scheme where language dominates the liturgical world and where a linguistic world exists independently of space and time and where rationality is used to suppress embodiment and temporality. She advocates instead a realist sacramental principle and in so doing condemns nominalism. She advocates ‘non-identical repetition’ (a phrase picked up by Ford above – see Case Study 4.29) as the basis of a eucharistic theology founded on moderate realism. In such a scheme ‘infinity does paradoxically
invade the finite’ (Pickstock, 1998: 66) thereby suggesting the instantiation of the universal in the particular. Identical repetition (immoderate realism) is rejected and a case for signs as places for power is advanced. She rejects the idea of reification since it seeks identical replication (immoderate realism) and argues true nature is not found in ‘thingness’ but in non-identical repetition. This moderate realist view is opposed to any scheme which separates existence from Being such that essence becomes a Being of reason rather than Being that is instantiated in the natural. This is the crucial distinction between realism and nominalism. Whereas realism instantiates Being in the natural, nominalism separates Being and essence and finds Being only in the rational. Such nominalism operates within much of Evangelical eucharistic theology (see Cranmer Case Study 1.1 and Doyle Case Study 4.27) where an implicit empiricism views reality as an act of cognition alone.

Pickstock (4.41) also distinguishes between the holism of Aquinas’ thought which brings God together with the world, such that God is present in the bread and wine of the Eucharist in a moderate realist fashion, and the virtual existences of Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, where Christ’s body is ontically in two places at once because God wills it, that is, in heaven and on earth at the same time. But Pickstock argues that a third alternative in eucharistic theology, that of rational acts, exists among some theologians, where Christ is in heaven but not on earth in the Eucharist at some point of time. In such a scheme realism is rejected as a philosophical basis and there are only rational acts of cognition on earth, what she describes as necrophilia, or the looking back to a dead body in the past. This type of nominalism is put forward by such Anglican writers as Cranmer (1.1) and Doyle (4.27). Clealy Pickstock (4.41) rejects this view.

Sykes (4.50) points out that in much Evangelical theology there is a tendency to emphasise the Word as ‘interiority’, where there is a separation between sign and signified such that there emerges a scripturalism where the cult of the heart produces an interiorisation which militates against any of the power of the sacramental signs based on realism. This is the case with the eucharistic theology of Robert Doyle (4.27) who argues for a word ontology over any sacramental ontology.

Pickstock (4.41) also argues that at times in the past, such as the later medieval period, there was emphasis on the dead body of Christ in the empirical and historical sense such
that the dead body was seen to be present in the Eucharist (identical repetition or immoderate realism). This occurred at the expense of the sacramental body (signs and signified linked such that particular signs instantiate the signified universal) and the ecclesial body (Christ present as his body the Church). Identical repetition, she argues, led to the Eucharist as miracle instead of the Eucharist as a sacramental community event. It is only, she says, when bread and wine are assumed in the body and blood of Christ that they are genuinely signs (what she earlier has called infinity paradoxically invading the finite), since it is then that the signs point away from themselves to disclose the gift-character of the body and blood of Christ. Bread and wine are not things that hide the body and blood of Christ, but rather signs which reveal the body and blood of Christ. This for Pickstock (4.41) is not just figurative talk but something that is real. For her, real and symbolic are not alternatives, since in a scheme of moderate realism, signs are seen to include and repeat the mystery where there is what she calls, a collapsing together of sense and referent where bread and wine (sense) disclose the invisible depth of body and blood (referent).

Pickstock (4.41), writing with another Anglican theologian, John Milbank, specifically embraces the sacramental principle, arguing that God uses material things so that humans can know the immaterial. Signs, pointing away from themselves, point to what they represent. The incarnation is seen as the ground for the realist philosophical thinking, such that things are true as they participate in God. Christ therefore mediates divine truth to humans through that which is touchable by the senses.

Rowan Williams (4.52) also speaks about signs and the making of signs. He argues for a realist eucharistic theology, but expresses some doubt on the usefulness of the sacramental principle in the philosophical assumptions underlying his eucharistic theology. He argues that objects such as bread and wine point us to other things and that such a scheme is predicated on the Logos where the divine was known through Jesus. The ideal is known through the material and through sense objects, but the ideal is seen to be alien to this world and so must be shown or signified materially. The sacramental principle however, where the world is seen as naturally sacramental, is for Williams problematic since something evoked, he argues, as a prelude to sacramental theology (that is, a naturally sacramental world) runs the risk of obscuring the idea that signs are made in historical and material practice where the Eucharist assists people to know the self in the context of time.
and an historical group. Despite this qualification of the sacramental principle Williams (4.52) affirms that realism underpins the idea of the making of social and ritual signs. Jesus therefore is a sacrament since in the Eucharist Jesus is set before people as a sign: the form of the new people of God as praxis rather than as sacralized objects. This avoids immoderate realism and affirms moderate realism, but at the same time this is not seen as a solely rational process of the mind but as a Christian action or praxis where Jesus ‘passes over’ into symbolic forms. The Lord, he argues, puts himself in the hands of other agents by signing himself as a thing to be handled and consumed.

Williams (4.52) in distancing himself from what others call ‘the sacramental principle’ (that is, the divine being present in all things) argues that the divine presence is apprehended not by sameness but by seeing in all things their difference: their particularity or not-God-ness. It is this paradox of difference that underpins moderate realism. Sign is not strictly identical to signified since each, the sign and the signified, have a particularity. Bread and wine on the one hand and body and blood on the other, each have their own particularity, yet the one instantiates the other. It is the differences in the particularity, argues Williams (4.52) that distinguishes moderate realism from immoderate realism.

In the various eucharistic liturgies of the later twentieth century there is a preference for realist philosophical assumptions. In Case Study 4.54 many eucharistic liturgies have been identified as expressing a realist eucharistic theology. These include: The English Common Worship, as well as the eucharistic liturgies of the Scottish Episcopal Church, the Episcopal Church of the United States of America, the Church of the Province of Southern Africa, the Churches of North and South India, the Church of Ireland, the Anglican Church of Canada, the Anglican Province of Aoteroa, New Zealand and Polynesia and the Second Order eucharistic liturgy from A Prayer Book for Australia (1995). In these liturgies there are clear indications of signs instantiating the signified in a moderate realist manner.

**Sacrifice**

Realist philosophical assumptions are frequently found in discussion of eucharistic sacrifice in the later twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Shepherd (4.45) argues that understandings of the eucharistic sacrifice distinguish the traditions of the Anglican Communion. The realist understanding of Christ’s sacrifice being mediated by the
Eucharist, present among some Anglicans, especially Catholic Anglicans, is distinguished from those who adopt a non-realist understanding of sacrifice in the Eucharist. Although realist assumptions concerning sacrifice in the Eucharist are frequently found in the Anglican eucharistic tradition, most theologians carefully distinguish between moderate and immoderate forms of realism. Stevenson (4.46) for example, argues that there is no physical sense of sacrifice in the Eucharist (immoderate realism) but that the Eucharist involves more than a mere bringing to mind of a past and completed event, that is, the sacrifice of Christ on the cross.

The ARCIC documents (4.22) affirm that Christ’s death was a once for all event in history and that it was a perfect and sufficient sacrifice with no repetition of the sacrifice or addition to it possible in the present, however they also affirm the realist idea of anamnesis or making effective in the present an event in the past, that is, Christ’s sacrifice. ARCIC (4.22) expresses the view that Christ’s sacrifice is not merely a calling to mind of a past event but rather that it is effectively proclaimed in the present as God’s mighty act. It is in this sense that the sacramental body and blood of Christ are described as ‘an offering’ at the Eucharist. The idea of anamnesis is seen as both biblical and primitive, resting on realist assumptions. It is in this sense that the eucharistic sacrifice of Christ is spoken of by ARCIC in the Eucharist in the present and the historical sacrifice of Christ is spoken of as an unrepeatable sacrifice. This distinction rejects immoderate realism in the Eucharist (the repetition of the historical sacrifice) and accepts moderate realism (the eucharistic sacrifice as pleaded or offered).

Carnley (4.24) argues that the Eucharist involves sacrifice where the priest pleads the eternal sacrifice of Christ, such that the sacrifice is not merely a past and completed event. The effect of Christ’s sacrifice, described using the term anamnesis, is said to be known in the present as eucharistic sacrifice but not as a propitiatory sacrifice.

Cocksworth (4.25) distinguishes between those who limit sacrifice to a past event and those who see the eucharistic action as being united to one movement of oblation (anamnesis). He also notes that there are those who speak of the sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving. His own view is based on realism since he puts the view that in the Eucharist people are celebrating the reality of salvation in Christ through the action and form of the Eucharist.
At the same time he rejects immoderate notions of sacrifice in the Eucharist. When Cocksworth (4.25) speaks of pleading the sacrifice of Christ he sees this as a pleading of its application and not a pleading for its acceptance. It is this notion of pleading for application that distinguishes the eucharistic sacrifice from the historic sacrifice, since application involves the sacrificial actions of people in the present (praise and thanksgiving, offering the life of Christ and the Church) not the historical action of Christ on the cross in the past. Cocksworth’s eucharistic theology therefore rests on moderate realist philosophical assumptions.

Dix (4.28) sees the Eucharist as an action of anamnesis, that is, ‘recalling or re-presenting before God an event in the past, so it becomes here and now operative by its effects’ (Dix, 1945/1986: 161). The moderate realism Dix uses is not merely a bringing to mind of a past event but a real remembrance through signs. It is the action with signs that brings about the signified (the partaking of the body and blood of Christ). It is in this sense that Dix (4.28) speaks of sacrificial actions in the Eucharist (taking, giving thanks, breaking and communion). There is no fresh sacrifice or immoderate realism for Dix but rather a recalling and energising of the Church in the one sacrifice of Christ that looks forward to the coming of God’s kingdom. This is moderate realism. Dix’s emphasis is on the repeating of the sacrificial actions of Christ in order to recall Christ’s sacrifice and it is in this sense that the Eucharist offers the same sacrifice as Christ.

Ford (4.28) states that remembering in the Eucharist is about Jesus’ death and resurrection and it is by this remembering that people are identified with Christ in ordinary things (such as the offering of bread and wine). This is an expression of moderate realism since it is these ordinary things that take people into the most momentous events. This Ford describes as non-identical repetition: that is, not strict repetition, but an identity of nature or loose identity, nonetheless based on moderate realism.

Hebert (4.30) puts the case that the Eucharist is a sacramental showing of the one sacrifice of Christ and the offering up of the members of Christ through union with him. The signs are linked with the signified sacrifice in a moderate realist sense which avoid what he calls ‘materialistic perversion’ (immoderate realism) of the sacramental principle. There is also a moderate realist identification between people and the body of Christ, but this identity
between particulars does not have strict correspondence either. For Hebert anamnesis is more than a bringing to mind but a concrete and objective bringing back from the past into the present such that people come into the actual presence of Christ’s victory over sin, death and the devil and where the mystery of redemption is set forth objectively in the one point of the Eucharist. He qualifies this very realist description by specifically rejecting the idea of a fresh immolation of Christ in the Eucharist in the present and arguing in a moderate realist sense that in the Eucharist there is a participation in Christ’s sacrifice.

Herbert (4.31) speaks of celebrating the Eucharist as participating in Christ’s sacrifice under the shadow of the cross. Christ alone is able to plead the once and for all sacrifice of the cross and people identify themselves with him and this sacrifice in the Eucharist.

Moderate realist assumptions underlie the work of the International Anglican Liturgical Consultations (IALC) (4.32). Charles Sherlock in IALC V (4.32) makes the distinction between ‘eucharistic atonement’ and ‘eucharistic sacrifice’. Whilst eucharistic atonement has implications of immoderate realism and is excluded by IALC V as having a legitimate part to play in the Eucharist, eucharistic sacrifice implies moderate realism and performs a legitimate role in the Eucharist. This is a similar distinction to that made by ARCIC (4.1) when it speaks of historical (immoderate) and sacramental (moderate) sacrifice.

Sykes (4.50) also distinguishes what he calls the ‘atoning sacrifice’ from the commemoration of that sacrifice in the Eucharist. For him the sacrifice of Christ has a contemporaneity about it in the Eucharist, which distinguishes it from what he calls ‘the cult of heart’ (that is, subjective views of salvation such as those which see salvation by faith alone and which argue that visible sacrifice and its commemoration is unnecessary and redundant). This cult of the heart, he argues, has become over rationalised just as did some medieval theories of sacrifice in the Eucharist. Sykes’ (4.50) idea of a contemporaneity of the sacrifice of Christ in the Eucharist is based on moderate realism, where God is approached through eucharistic sacrifice, such that Christ’s death is not merely ‘a’ sacrifice but ‘the’ sacrifice establishing a new covenant perpetually. It is this covenant that is celebrated and experienced in the Eucharist and in eucharistic sacrifice.
Chapter 4

Mascall (4.37) also distinguishes between the historical and the eucharistic senses of sacrifice, such that the historical sense is a physical sacrifice but the eucharistic sense is a glorified sacrifice. It is in this way that Mascall can speak of two distinct senses of sacrifices where the Eucharist ‘offers’ what Christ ‘immolated’. For Mascall, the Eucharist is not only about death but also about life, incarnation, resurrection, ascension and glorification of Christ.

Macquarrie (4.36) takes the view that the sacrifice of Christ is pleaded before the Father in the Eucharist. For him anamnesis is not merely remembering a past event but a remembering which brings about a personal encounter with Christ. This is not an immoderate realist statement since Macquarrie specifically denies any material notions of sacrifice in the Eucharist. Instead he affirms the eternal character of Christ’s sacrifice to be present in the Eucharist. This is interpreted broadly as the offering of something to God and not merely killing something. For Macquarrie (4.36) a moderate realism acknowledges that Calvary was a final point but also that Christ’s sacrifice nonetheless touches the present and is renewed, represented and applied in the present in the Eucharist. Christ’s sacrifice is not seen as a moment of death in past time but rather as a dynamic remembering based on the moderate realist notion of anamnesis. This view is also reflected in many of the Anglican Catechisms throughout the world. In the North Queensland Catechism (4.55) the Eucharist is seen as pleading the sacrifice of Christ, whereas the Catechism in A Prayer Book for Australia (1995) (4.55) states that remembrance is the important point of the Eucharist. The Church of England Revised Catechism of 1962 (4.55) describes the Eucharist as a means of receiving the benefits of Christ’s sacrifice by continual remembrance. The Catechism of the Episcopal Church of the United States of America (4.55) when speaking of the Eucharist refers to it as a sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving but also as a way of making Christ present. The English House of Bishops document Eucharistic Presidency (4.56) makes the point that the Eucharist is a means of sharing in the sacrifice of Christ through the Holy Spirit, such that the Eucharist commemorates sacramentally the death and resurrection of Christ.

Pickstock (4.41) argues for non-identical repetition in regard to eucharistic sacrifice. This idea, essentially moderate realism, speaks of a situation where sacrificial return is encountered. She argues that the events of Christ’s sacrifice exceed their context in
repetition and re-division, not because the original was inadequate, but because of the event’s excess. Christ’s words are therefore seen to leap beyond, from the controlled and arbitrary, to the eternal Logos. This she describes as ‘exploding in gestures, paradigms, and words’ (Pickstock, 1998: 226). This happens when the universals configure in signs rather than being limited to a particular time or in a set textual form. This is clearly a moderate realist framework, where offering of Christ in the Eucharist involves non-identical repetition or a ‘coming back’ of gift where the sign participates in the universal offering of Christ.

Rayner (4.42) states that sacrifice and offering in the Eucharist does not involve any physical sacrifice of Christ (immoderate realism) since Christ’s sacrifice cannot be repeated or added to in any way. Rather, people are joined to the continuing sacrifice of Christ in the Eucharist.

JAT Robinson (4.44) expresses the view that the Eucharist as Christian action mediates and makes present in its efficacy and power the saving act of God in Christ once for all wrought on Calvary. The Eucharist is seen as the place where this work of Christ is constantly renewed. Such a realist framework is not limited to a past and a place alone, but is present through signs of the Eucharist linked with the signified in such a way that the sacrifice of Christ is not repeated or added to in any way. Anamnesis is seen as more than mere remembrance but rather the way in which the sacrifice of Christ is actually effective in the here and now of the Eucharist. This involves for Robinson (4.44) a re-presentation and not a repetition. The English report Thinking about the Eucharist (4.51) expresses a similar view and distances any discussion of eucharistic sacrifice from the idea of a repetition of Christ’s sacrifice. The idea of sacrifice is however seen as a useful and indispensable concept for understanding the Eucharist.

Williams (4.52) seeks to lift his discussion beyond what he calls the ‘weary controversies’ over eucharistic sacrifice by referring to the praxis of the Church. He argues that it is the making of signs that makes sense in any discussion of the Eucharist and what allows us to move through the sign to the ideal. Any discussion of eucharistic sacrifice must therefore be interpreted as an action now in the sacrament and as our attempt to render present an
absent divine act or promise. This ‘making of signs’ is dependent on assumptions of moderate realism.

Any discussion of the sacrifice of Christ in the Eucharist which suggests an immoderate realist view is quite rare within the Anglican eucharistic tradition. Donovan (4.26) however, says that the Eucharist is Christ’s offering to God which is the sacrifice of Jesus Christ. Donovan goes on to speak of the Eucharist as a good work which gives glory to God and which obtains mercy for the living and the departed and makes us one with Jesus. These expressions, suggestive of immoderate realist notions of eucharistic sacrifice, are usually avoided within the Anglican tradition.

Nominalism
Nominalist assumptions concerning the Eucharist remain a consistent strain of eucharistic theology in the later twentieth and early twenty-first century. Doyle (4.27) specifically distances the signs of the Eucharist from the signified. For him there is no re-offering or re-presenting of Christ in the Eucharist in a realist way since the offering of Christ occurred only once at Calvary in the first century on the cross. There can therefore be no identity between the signs and the signified in the present, even if the historic sacrifice is distinguished from the eucharistic sacrifice. For Doyle (4.27) eucharistic sacrifice can only mean a re-immolation of Christ in the Eucharist and this cannot occur in the Eucharist since for him that act was completed at the cross and cannot be repeated, represented or re-presented. The only sacrifice he allows is a spiritual sacrifice which means a sacrifice of praise, thanksgiving and penitence and these are clearly separated from the sacrifice of Christ at Calvary. Doyle (4.27) in this discussion equates ‘really’ with ‘substantially’ in the sense that ‘real’ is a physical, substantial and empirical notion. There is no attempt to distinguish between degrees of real using the philosophical differentiation between moderate and immoderate realism. Doyle therefore denies the sacramental principle and argues that God does not work through things sacramentally but only through God’s Word. Sacramental actions must therefore be subordinated to God’s Word. He calls this a ‘word ontology’ and distinguishes this type of propositional theology from what he calls a ‘sacramental ontology’. Words (propositions) are fundamental and not sacramental actions or principles. It is in this sense that the words of Scripture are not signs but propositions which come directly from God as God’s promises without depending on the mediation of
sacramental actions or principles. Doyle’s nominalism therefore functions at the immoderate level since it denies the efficacy of the sacraments and attributes all efficacy to Scripture alone.

Peter Jensen (4.33) also argues that the Eucharist is not above the word or even on a parity with the word. Rather, for Jensen, the Eucharist is an expression of the word where there is emphasis on the death of Jesus on the cross. The Eucharist therefore is about a memory of Jesus and it acts as an effective reminder about a past event. Jensen (4.33), like Doyle (4.27), distances himself from what he calls a ‘bread/body analogy’ and speaks instead of a vivid metaphor which has no realist link between sign and signified. The eating of bread is therefore in no way connected to the eating of Christ, but functions only as an act of faith and trust. Eating and drinking at the Eucharist is in this way a means of entering a contract with Jesus where people accept God’s promises, trust them, believe them and act on them. In all this the death of Christ is the key for Jensen (4.33), such that the sacrificial death of Christ is sufficient and never to be repeated or added to, not even sacramentally. This means for Jensen there can be no realist linking of sign and signified in the Eucharist and therefore no realist conception of Christ’s presence and sacrifice in the Eucharist. Jensen’s eucharistic theology also functions as immoderate nominalism.

Much of the theology of the Eucharist expressed by both Doyle (4.27) and Jensen (4.33) owes a great deal to a Reformed and Evangelical scriptural interpretation as well the work of Broughton Knox, a former principal of Moore Theological College in Sydney. Knox (4.34) expresses a strong commitment to the Reformed theology of justification by faith alone, where a person takes hold of the promises of God in a personal way by trust and self-committal. There can be no justification by works. Sacraments are seen as only faith in action and as a means whereby people take hold of the promises of God. As the Gospel is preached the benefits of the Gospel are appropriated. Faith takes hold of the promises and God grants the believer the promised blessings. Such blessing can in no way depend on the signs of the Eucharist. There is no realist link between the sign and the signified since the sacraments are only an expression of faith and it is faith which conveys the blessings, not the signs. Receiving the bread and wine of the Eucharist can only therefore be an expression of or act of faith and not a means of grace in any realist sense. Any link between the signs and faith is a rational and linguistic link alone based on a nominalist and
propositional separation of sign and signified. Sacramental therefore only has a figurative sense and not a real sense. Sacraments are only understood propositionally using language and any seemingly realistic language such as ‘This is my body’ can only be understood metaphorically where ‘is’ means ‘signifies’ and cannot imply any real presence either in a moderate or immoderate realist sense. Any presence of Christ can, for Knox (4.34), only refer to Christ’s empirical and physical presence in heaven, which cannot be contextualised in any real way in the Eucharist in the present through signs.

Packer (4.39) expresses similar views arguing that Christ’s sacrifice was completed at the Cross and that there can be no realist identification of that sacrifice in the present in the Eucharist or any offering of eucharistic signs to identify with that sacrifice. Christ’s sacrifice therefore, he argues, cannot be presented again in any way – physical or not physical.

Parsons (4.40) puts the case that subjective faith is more important in the Eucharist than any linking to the signs of bread and wine. His concern in the Eucharist is with the inwardly signified and a person’s faithful remembering of a past event, not with outward signs. Eating and drinking of the outward signs in the Eucharist can therefore only be a means of assisting the remembering of a past event with no realist link between the sign and the signified. There can be no real presence in the Eucharist or any new sacrifice in the Eucharist. No repetition of Christ’s sacrifice is possible in the Eucharist since Christ’s work was finished on the cross and the Eucharist acts only as a constant reminder of that event. For Parsons (4.40) bread and wine cannot be Christ’s body and blood in any sense since the presence of Christ is seen to be dependent on faith and repentance alone.

Donald Robinson (4.43) argues that there can be no new offering of Christ in the Eucharist. The placing of elements on the altar (the offertory) in the Eucharist is therefore only an incidental and utilitarian act in order to supply the bread and wine for the Eucharist. He therefore disputes the realist notion of the bread and wine of the Eucharist being joined with the eternal sacrifice of Christ and rejects the idea that the Eucharist is in some sense a sacrifice. In so doing he separates the sign of the Eucharist from any signified reality and adopts a nominalist theology of the Eucharist.
Stibbs (4.47) sees the idea of eucharistic sacrifice as unscriptural and therefore an unauthorised and new use of the sacraments. The measure of eucharistic doctrine is the warrant of Scripture and the Reformers and he sees the Evangelical party of the Church of England as espousing ‘purity’ in relation to eucharistic doctrine. For Stibbs (4.47) there can be no offering possible by people in the Eucharist. The only offering can be from God and all people can do is respond to that and appropriate the benefits of Christ’s death in the present by an act of faith. Eucharistic offering can therefore only refer to God’s offering to people since the sacrifice is a past event – the death of Christ. Any suggestion that the Eucharist is in some way an offering to God is rejected since it diverts people from the central idea of the unique, atoning sacrifice offered by Christ once and for all on the cross. This theology essentially separates sign from signified in the Eucharist on the basis of nominalist assumptions.

Stott (4.48) argues the Eucharist is a means for stimulating the minds of people so that they remember the death of Jesus on the cross. Remembrance therefore for Stott means bringing of a past event to mind and that past event is the death of Jesus on the cross, not his resurrection, ascension or glorification. The bread and wine are not seen to be linked to the signified body and blood of Christ but merely a means of drawing attention to Christ’s death. Stott (4.48) sees the process involved in the Eucharist as look, listen, understand and remember. He does argue that people ‘participate’ in Christ’s body and blood but for him this means remembering Christ’s death and the benefits obtained by that death. It is not the benefits of his life that are received but the benefits of his death and this can only be done by faith. The sacraments therefore are seen to stimulate faith with the expression ‘the body and blood of Christ’ as a figure of speech. Sacrifice in relation to the Eucharist is seen by Stott (4.48) as referring only to the past sacrifice of Christ and therefore there can be no real offering in the Eucharist.

Several writers from the Anglican Diocese of Sydney (4.49) deny any realist linking between the sign and the signified in the Eucharist and instead opt for a nominalist interpretation, viewed as the true, protestant, reformed position. The purity of such a party position is seen to derive from the Reformation and the adoption of that Reformation position in the present. The Reformation is seen to have recaptured what is thought to be the true position in relation to the Eucharist and this true position is set alongside what is often
called medieval abuse. Such medieval abuses are often aligned with any realist understanding of what happens in the Eucharist in modern eucharistic theology and are accordingly rejected. Salvation is seen to be possible only through personal appropriation by faith and not by any sacramental ministry or sacramental principle at work.

Zahl (4.53) dismisses the idea of mediation in relation to the sacraments and argues for the direct encounter where sacrament is word made manifest. By this he means that grace is received through auditory reception of the word. The hearing of the word preached is what is necessary and not mediation by means of sacraments. Zahl’s analysis effectively separates the eucharistic signs of bread and wine from the signified body and blood of Christ in a nominalist analysis.

Several liturgies developed in the Diocese of Sydney and others developed for use by Evangelicals (4.54) use forms of words which separate the signs of the Eucharist from the signified body and blood of Christ. Sunday Services Revised (1972), the First Order of An Australian Prayer Book (1978), the Experimental Sunday Services (1993), the Third Order of A Prayer Book for Australia (1995) and Sunday Services (2001) all express a nominalist separation of sign and signified.

The catechism What We Believe (1985) (4.55) expresses a Reformed character in relation to the Eucharist where feeding in the Eucharist is seen to be by faith alone as a heavenly event. Thanks and praise are seen to be the only form of sacrifice to be offered in the Eucharist. This catechism lessens realist notions and expresses a nominalist separation of sign and signified in the Eucharist.

In discussing the issue of eucharistic presidency, Peter Jensen (see Case Study 4.56) adopts a Reformed view of the Eucharist pointing away from the role of the priest in the Eucharist to an ecclesial focus. The focus for Jensen is not on sacerdotal action but on pastoral need where there is a spiritual union with Christ through a lifting up of the heart to heaven. The Eucharist is seen to be about justification by faith rather than expressing any notion of Christ being present in a real way through signs. Eating and drinking of Christ’s body and blood is described as a ‘mental act’ of remembering where there is a ‘union with Christ by faith’. Any suggestions of reservation of the sacramental elements or extended
communion are opposed to such an ecclesial and rational view and are therefore rejected. The presence of Christ is in the gathering of the people and on the basis of faith alone rather than on any realist idea of presence in the signs of the Eucharist.

MacCulloch (4.35) explains this type of Reformed thinking, based on nominalism, by arguing that the shift from medieval Catholicism to Reformation thinking was a movement from objects and actions in the medieval mass to words in the Reformation. In MacCulloch’s analysis there was a move from realist sacramental thinking (the linking of sign and signified) to a nominalist propositional thinking (the separation of sign and signified) and the structuring of rational and propositional forms of subjective thought.

Transubstantiation

Transubstantiation has often been seen as opposed to any Anglican thinking about the Eucharist. The exclusion of transubstantiation is generally based on the Thirty Nine Articles, especially Article XXVIII (see Case Study 1.38) where this is discussed in detail. The twentieth century however, has seen renewed discussion of transubstantiation in the Anglican eucharistic context.

The Anglican Roman Catholic International Consultation (ARCIC) (4.22) moderates previous criticism of transubstantiation by arguing that transubstantiation is about the ‘fact’ of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist and not about explaining ‘how’ Christ is present. ARCIC’s discussion of transubstantiation therefore proposes a form which adopts a realist assumption regarding Christ’s presence without the scholastic philosophy of the past.

Cocksworth (4.25) as an Anglican Evangelical acknowledges that transubstantiation classically expresses the view that Christ is present in the Eucharist as gift and that Christ is therefore not summoned by faith but a summons to faith. This analysis is at some distance from the typical Evangelical view where Christ is not seen to be present in the Eucharist in an objective fashion.

Macquarrie (4.36) argues that transubstantiation is a theory to explain eucharistic presence and as such he sees it as having much to commend it since it rules out any magical or local notions of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist. He acknowledges however, that popular
piety often misunderstands transubstantiation and attributes to it notions of a local or fleshy presence of Christ in the eucharistic elements, with too much emphasis on the spatio-temporal dimension. For Macquarrie (4.36) however, transubstantiation does not involve any physics or chemistry of change since the change of substance about which it speaks is not an empirical notion.

Mascall (4.37) acknowledges that transubstantiation is a form of moderate realism, and he interprets transubstantiation as transformation, where instead of substance being taken away and replaced with another higher substance, there is a change in value, such that the bread and wine of the Eucharist is elevated to a higher value, which is not carnal but sacramental.

Pickstock (4.41) views transubstantiation as an important doctrine. She speaks of it as a collapsing together of sense (bread and wine) and referent (body and blood) where things appear to be no guarantee of what they really are.

The discussion document *Thinking About the Eucharist* (4.51) argues that it is possible to use the doctrine of transubstantiation in relation to the Eucharist in an Anglican theological setting as long as by the use of this term moderate realism is meant.

*Change*

Related to the discussion of transubstantiation is the idea of change in the elements after consecration. The *ARCIC* documents (4.22) see the bread and wine of the Eucharist as changed after consecration in that they ‘become’ the body and blood of Christ, not in a material sense of change however, but in the sense of a sacramental change. The *ARCIC* documents also argue that the idea of change in the Eucharist is wider than merely the elements. In the Eucharist there is change in community, preaching, fellowship, heart of believer and gifts of bread and wine. Change is said to be sacramental and not material and such change is brought about by the action of the Holy Spirit, such that the Holy Spirit appropriates the bread and wine so that they become food of a new creation.

Cocksworth (4.25) observes that whereas Catholic Anglicans often speak of Christ ‘in’ the elements, Evangelical Anglicans often speak of Christ ‘with’ the elements. Catholic
Anglicans see the words of consecration effecting a change in the elements so that they become the body and blood of Christ, present and received. Evangelical Anglicans see the words of consecration affecting the spirituality of the participants in the Eucharist, leading to a deepening of belief and faith in Christ.

Many of the eucharistic liturgies of the later twentieth and twenty-first centuries (4.54) also speak of change in the Eucharist as a result of the consecration, both in the elements and in the participants.

Multiformity not Uniformity

Many writers in the later twentieth and early twenty-first centuries acknowledge that the Anglican eucharistic tradition is about multiformity and not uniformity. ARCIC (4.22) recognises the various eucharistic theologies present in Anglicanism. Cocksworth (4.25) sees Anglicanism as heterogeneous in its eucharistic theology. Ford (4.29) argues that the truth of Christianity becomes freshly embodied in different contexts as testimony to God’s creativity and abundance. Therefore he sees in Anglicanism a flourishing of distinctive and different realisations in relation to eucharistic theology, such that Anglican eucharistic theology is extravagantly over determined with a superabundance of meaning. The work of Talley (1994) for the International Anglican Liturgical Consultations (IALC) (4.32) makes the point that there is unlikely to be one eucharistic prayer in the Anglican Communion since there is no theological consensus or one eucharistic theology. Stevenson and Spinks (1994) also make the point that the Eucharist is variously understood in the Anglican Communion. Stott (4.48) acknowledges differences between Christians on the importance of the Eucharist which affect the way they think about and celebrate it.

Some Anglicans however argue for a pure form of Anglican theology on the basis of the Reformation. Knox (4.34) argues that there is only one genuine Evangelical position in relation to the Eucharist and that is not a view based on realism or the sacramental principle. Stibbs (4.47) argues for the ‘purity’ of Reformation doctrine in eucharistic theology and that this ‘purity’ is to be found in the Evangelical tradition. Peter Jensen (4.33) as a conservative Anglican Evangelical in advocating Reformed theology as the basis of Anglicanism has been himself accused of being un-Anglican (e.g. Milley, 2003: 15) since the advocating of a pure view lacks the comprehensiveness and diversity which is typical of
Anglican theology in general and Anglican eucharistic theology in particular. This is supported by MacCulloch (4.35) who states that the English Reformation did not completely reject sacramental realism for propositional nominalism, and this has led in turn to a tension in Anglicanism concerned with a multiformity of views.

Macquarrie (4.36) acknowledges that there have been many ways of interpreting Christ’s presence and sacrifice in the Eucharist and in Anglicanism. Mascall (4.37) acknowledges a Catholic and Protestant view of sacrifice in the Eucharist in Anglicanism. Shepherd (4.45) speaks of the two traditions of the 1549 Book of Common Prayer and the 1552 Book of Common Prayer in Anglican eucharistic theology. He argues that a Catholic (and realist) tradition follows the pattern of the 1549 book while an Evangelical (and nominalist) tradition follows the 1552 book. Zahl (4.53) argues that there has been both a Catholic/Apostolic and Protestant/Reformed face to Anglicanism and that each face has been prominent at different times. He suggests that Anglicans seek a balance or resolution of the tension created by these two faces and that there could be what has been called a Catholic Evangelicalism or a Reformed Catholicism. He concludes however that such a third way should be rejected and that the multiformity of both the Catholic and Reformed face of Anglicanism needs to be acknowledged.

Oulton (4.38) goes further than merely acknowledging that these two faces of Anglicanism exist. He argues that the task for Anglicanism, especially in its eucharistic theology, is an entering into dialogue between the various traditions of the Anglican eucharistic tradition. For Oulton this requires a standing apart from one’s own view and an acknowledgement that all views have a place within Anglican eucharistic theology. It is this search for dialogue, while acknowledging the multiformity of the Anglican eucharistic tradition, that will occupy the discussion in the final chapter of this thesis.

4.3 The Anglican Eucharistic Tradition – A Summary of the Essences

The most fundamental conclusion coming from the essences extracted from the case study material of all the historical periods reviewed above (see CD) is that the Anglican eucharistic tradition is characterised by multiformity of theological and philosophical
assumptions in relation to the Eucharist. Any view which suggests that the Anglican eucharistic tradition has one pure or uniform nature cannot be supported from the evidence of the case studies.

The multiformity of the Anglican eucharistic tradition, as demonstrated by the case study material, centres on the distinction between the philosophical assumptions of realism and nominalism and it is from this distinction that the differing theological views of the Eucharist emerge. Both the realism and nominalism of the Anglican eucharistic tradition are expressed in the moderate degree as the philosophical assumptions underlying Anglican eucharistic theology. Moderate realism links sign and signified in such a way that the sign instantiates the signified in a real way. Moderate realism invokes the sacramental principle, implying that God chooses to work in a real way in this world using objects of nature, such as bread and wine, to convey supernatural realities, such as Christ’s body and blood or the nature of Christ as Word or logos to those who receive the elements of the Eucharist. Moderate realism therefore speaks of the universal (the nature of Christ) being present in the Eucharist in a strict identity in various particulars, such as bread and wine and Christ’s body and blood, although the particulars are not themselves strictly identical. The particulars share a loose identity or an identity of nature. Moderate nominalism, while not linking sign and signified in any real way, argues that Christ is present to the receiver of the bread and wine by the power of God’s promises and by the faith of the believer in the context of the sacrament of the Eucharist. These two philosophical assumptions, moderate realism and moderate nominalism, are shown by the case studies of this thesis, to be present consistently throughout the Anglican eucharistic tradition.

While moderate realist and nominalist assumptions appear to be the consistent essences across the Anglican eucharistic tradition, this does not mean that other essences are excluded from the Anglican eucharistic tradition, since there are at varying periods other points of emphasis. In the Reformation period for example, reformed doctrine is frequently found in any discussion of the Eucharist by Anglican writers and theologians, whereas in the nineteenth century realist sacramental theology, expressed in the form of a sacramental principle, is frequently encountered in the writings of Anglican theologians. The expression of realist eucharistic theology, based on the sacramental principle has
continued throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries in a sustained and significant manner.

In general immoderate realist and nominalist assumptions are denied or infrequently found in the Anglican eucharistic tradition. Immoderate nominalism is present only in the eucharistic theology of some of the more conservative Evangelicals (e.g. Doyle – see Case Study 4.27 and Jensen – see Case Study 4.33). The evidence of the case studies and the essences also supports the view that whilst both nominalism and realism are found in the moderate degree as the sustained philosophical assumptions underlying Anglican eucharistic theology throughout Anglican history, moderate realism is more frequently the philosophical assumption of the Anglican eucharistic tradition than nominalism. The frequency with which moderate realism is found varies from period to period in the Anglican eucharistic tradition but it appears to be always present in a sustained form. In the Reformation period moderate realism is present but it is muted by the profusion of reformed doctrine and by strong Reformation reactions to medieval Catholicism. In the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century moderate realism is the dominant philosophical assumption, among both Anglican Catholic and Anglican Evangelicals, although a sustained strain of moderate nominalism is also present among some conservative Evangelical Anglicans, notably in the Anglican Diocese of Sydney.

It is also apparent that twentieth century Anglican theologians frequently express a moderate realism in relation to the Eucharist with an increasing philosophical sophistication, e.g. William Temple (4.17), Christopher Cocksworth (4.25), David Ford (4.29), Eric Mascall (4.37), Catherine Pickstock (4.41) and Rowan Williams (4.52). In some cases this has allowed for the use of the term ‘transubstantiation’ as a moderate realist way of describing the presence of Christ in the Eucharist.

It needs to be carefully noted however, that there emerges from the case studies, a crucial distinction between the philosophical bases of moderate realism. This represents what can be seen as a further consistent essence of the Anglican eucharistic tradition. Whereas some theologians distinguish between the signs of bread and wine as particulars and Christ’s body and blood as the Form or universal, others tend to see both the bread and wine on the one hand and the body and blood of Christ on the other as particulars, that is,
particular instantiations of the universal nature or essence of Christ. Field (1.19) in the later Reformation period and Moss (4.11) in the early twentieth century distinguish between the particulars of bread and wine and the universal Form of Christ’s body and blood, such that the particulars of bread and wine identify with the universal Form Christ’s body and blood. Others (such as Andrewes (1.16), Ford (4.29) and Pickstock (4.41) at varying periods of the Anglican eucharistic tradition) view both bread and wine on the one hand and Christ’s body and blood on the other as particulars and the universal as the nature of Christ (as Word or logos), where this nature of Christ is instantiated in both sets of particulars. This seems to represent two distinct philosophical schools of thought – one deriving from the work of Plato and the other from Aristotle. Plato speaks of Forms (see Parmenides, 130E-131A, Online) and this has been taken up at a later date by Augustine (see Eighty-three Different Questions, 45, 1, edn. Mosher, 1982: 76). Aristotle (see The Categories and The Metaphysics) speaks however of properties and relations and the nature, substance or essence of things instantiated in various particulars and this has been taken up by Aquinas (see Summa Theologica). Throughout the Anglican eucharistic tradition both of these philosophical schools of thought have been the basis of various expressions of realist eucharistic theology, however it seems from the evidence presented in the case studies that where the Platonic form has been used there is less separation between the particular signs of the Eucharist (bread and wine) and the signified universal Form (Christ’s body and blood) and that there has been the danger of too closely associating the sign with the signified (e.g. see Bennett’s (3.1) description of eucharistic presence in the nineteenth century which leans towards an immoderate interpretation; or Jolly’s (3.11) description of the bread and wine as flesh and blood; or Donovan’s (4.26) description in the twentieth century of Jesus concealing himself under the ‘veils’ of bread and wine). On the other hand where the Aristotelian school of thought has influenced Anglican eucharistic theology there has been much more cautious and nuanced philosophical distinctions made which maintain more separation between the different particulars of bread and wine in the one case and Christ’s body and blood in the other. This has led in some cases to a renewed acceptance of transubstantiation where the doctrine is seen in moderate realist terms as an instantiation of the universal nature of Christ in different particulars (e.g. Temple 4.17) as opposes to any notion of a change in substance. Instead of identifying bread and wine with Christ’s body and blood too closely, Anglican eucharistic theology functioning on an Aristotelian framework, has spoken of the instantiation of Christ’s nature or essence in the
particular of both bread and wine and Christ’s body and blood. This has tended to avoid the danger of too closely associating the sign with the signified and thereby suggesting immoderate realism in the gross sense that seems possible in the Platonic scheme. Indeed it is this very criticism of moderate realism that has been picked up by some nominalists in their criticism of moderate realists and their eucharistic theology (e.g. Robert Doyle in his criticisms of the eucharistic liturgies in A Prayer Book for Australia, 1995 – see Case Studies 4.27 and 4.54). Other Anglican theologians have based their eucharistic theology on an Aristotelian framework of moderate realism. These include Andrewes (1.16), Bramhall (1.18), Nicholson (1.33), Montague (1.31) and Taylor (1.36) in the early period of Anglicanism; Newman (3.21), Forbes (3.6), Pusey (3.25) and Wilberforce (3.32) in the nineteenth century; and Macquarrie (4.36), Ford (4.29) and Pickstock (4.41) in the modern era. Whilst moderate realism has been a consistent essence of the eucharistic theology in the Anglican tradition, there have been different philosophical bases for its expression.

When the signs of bread and wine have been linked with Christ’s body and blood as a universal Form (a Platonic focus) there arises an increased danger of confusing the particulars of bread and wine with Christ’s body and blood in too close an identity, such that there is the danger of strict identity or immoderate realism between particulars and universals. It is admitted however, that most Anglican writers who use this philosophical scheme as the basis of their eucharistic theology are careful to deny any immoderate realist notions. Despite this, some other Anglican theologians, fail to acknowledge the distinction between moderate and immoderate realism and condemn all forms of realism. The use in this thesis of the philosophical reflection of David Armstrong (1898, 1995, 1997 and 2004) has been an important innovation for Anglican eucharistic theology, since his distinction between realism and nominalism, to both the moderate and immoderate degrees, linked with an Aristotelian framework based on the instantiation of the universal in the particulars, has usefully distinguished between loose identity (moderate realism) and strict identity (immoderate realism). It is this philosophical model applied to Anglican eucharistic theology in this thesis, that allows for a more satisfactory means of expressing moderate realism in the Anglican eucharistic tradition than the Platonic model with its inherent dangers of immoderate realism. Armstrong’s work is useful here in distinguishing between ‘nature’ and ‘identity’. He argues that there can be two particulars with the same nature (Armstrong, 1995: 82) but that these particulars are not strictly identical in their
particularity. This means that universals (e.g. the nature of Christ) can however be strictly identical in their different instantiations, that is, the nature of Christ can be identically instantiated in both bread and wine of the Eucharist and in the body and blood of Christ. Many Anglican theologians have addressed this very idea in reference to the incarnation in relation to both the Eucharist and the presence of Christ on the earth, since both are an instantiation of the same nature. The nature of Christ is seen to be instantiated in the Eucharist in the particulars of bread and wine in the same philosophical scheme that sees the nature of Christ instantiated in the person of Jesus as body and blood. Armstrong, as has been noted in Chapter 3 of this thesis, refers to this as “the ‘powerful truism’” which “entails that for two instantiations of the same universal, the sameness of type involved must be strict identity” (Armstrong, 1997: 28). Taylor (1.36) and Thorndike (2.21) speak in this way of the eucharistic sacrifice being an instantiation of the nature of Christ. Law (2.13) also speaks of receiving the ‘nature’ and ‘being’ of Christ in the Eucharist, while Comber (2.7) speaks of ‘the image of God’ being stamped on the signs. Newman (3.21) at a later time in much the same way says that the Eucharist is a type of the incarnation.

The work of Armstrong (reviewed extensively in Chapter 3 of this thesis) helps to explain more of the philosophical basis behind the eucharistic theology of Anglican theologians. Forbes (3.6), for example, in his reference to ‘the bread of the Eucharist’ as ‘the natural body of Christ or his incarnate flesh’ is not adopting an immoderate realist position but arguing for the instantiation of the nature of Christ in the bread and wine of the Eucharist. It was unfortunate for Forbes that the degree of acceptance of this type of nuanced philosophical thinking was not generally appreciated in his day and so he faced significant censure. In the present however, when an attempt is made to assess the essences of the Anglican eucharistic tradition, such as has been attempted in this chapter of the thesis, Armstrong’s model, based as it is on an Aristotelian framework, presents a useful analysis which has implications for understanding the place of moderate realism in the Anglican eucharistic tradition.

The extraction of the essences from the case studies of this thesis suggests that there is some correction necessary in the analysis of Anglican eucharistic theology by some writers. Some historians (e.g. Diarmaid MacCulloch) have put the case that the Catholic revival of Anglicanism by the Caroline Divines of the later Reformation and by the members of the
Chapter 4

Oxford Movement in the nineteenth century stands in contrast to a more Reformed theology of the early Reformation period. MacCulloch puts the argument, for example, that the importance of the Eucharist was a rediscovery by some theologians in the later Elizabethan period. He argues that these “churchmen began rejecting the assumptions of predestinarian theology and emphasising the role of the sacraments in the Church’s life, in particular the importance of the eucharist” (MacCulloch, 2001a: 78). It is argued that concentration on the writings of the earlier centuries and the virtual exclusion of the work of the Reformers “constituted an attempt at theological revolution” (MacCulloch, 2001a: 79). MacCulloch names people such Andrewes, Overall, Hooker and Laud as examples of the churchmen to which he refers (MacCulloch, 2001a: 78-86). While those named certainly had a liking for the more Catholic and outward forms of worship, they also shared a realist theology with earlier theologians who did not necessarily favour the more Catholic and outward forms of worship. Ridley and Latimer from the earliest days of the Reformation express realist notions in relation to the Eucharist, even though it seems they were less favourably disposed towards the Catholic forms of worship than some later Anglican divines. MacCulloch himself admits that Ridley in his Paul’s Cross sermon of 1547 endorsed the reality of Christ’s presence in the eucharistic bread and wine, saying in regard to the bread of the Eucharist “that unto this material substance is given the property of the thing whereof it beareth the name” even though he also argued that “the material substance of bread doth remain” (Ridley, Works, edn. Christmas, 1841: 163). For these words he suffered some condemnation in future years (Ridley, Works, edn. Christmas, 1841: 259-260, 264-265) but it seems that what Ridley was arguing here was a moderate realism which was not clearly understood by the more extreme elements of the Anglican Reformation. Ridley clearly denied that the bread became the carnal body of Christ since he said that the material substance of the bread remained, thus denying immoderate realism, but at the same time he seems to be arguing that the particular (the bread) is not merely given the name of the signified (the body of Christ) but also the property. This linking of the sign and the signified appears to be an acknowledgement of moderate realism in the Eucharist. What Ridley is saying here is remarkably similar to the argument advanced as moderate realism in this project, where particulars, such as bread and wine, instantiate the universal nature of Christ. MacCulloch does not acknowledge this analysis.

MacCulloch argues that Lancelot Andrewes for example, was a person who was:
“largely ignoring the work of the sixteenth-century reformers to concentrate on the writings of the Fathers of the early Church, expressing a sensual delight in the beauty of God’s creation, emphasising the eucharist as the ultimate fruit of creation, and stressing the role of human reason in appropriating the truths of Christianity.” (MacCulloch, 2001a: 82).

This comment implies that Andrewes, in ignoring the work of the Reformers (if indeed he did this) was thereby departing from some form of normative interpretation of Reformed theology. The case studies from the Reformation period discussed in this project (see Section 1 of this chapter above and the case studies on the accompanying CD) have shown that no such assumption of a normative theological or philosophical position can be assumed to exist. A variety of opinion concerning the philosophical underpinnings of the Eucharist is shown in the case studies of this early period of the Reformation. MacCulloch’s argument also implies that there was a particular liturgical arrangement and form of words, that is, the one adopted by the early Reformers, and that these arrangements were also in some sense normative. According to this argument, any form of worship which involved more symbolic use of material objects (‘sensual delight’ and ‘God’s creation’ as Andrewes expresses it) is immediately suspect, since it does not conform with the supposed normative use of the Reformers. The case studies suggest however that such conclusions cannot be reached as definitely as MacCulloch seems to require. What he focuses on is outward forms of Catholic worship, putting the proposition that the early Reformers rejected these, and that later Reformers, such as Andrewes adopted them again. This seems to be reasonably accurate, however, MacCulloch limits his analysis to the outward forms and does not comment on the underlying philosophical bases of the Reformers’ theology, especially their eucharistic theology. It seems that MacCulloch’s analysis has not gone deeply enough into the theological understanding of the Reformation period and that he has based his argument on only part of the evidence available. MacCulloch’s conclusions that “the chief battleground became questions of liturgy and ceremony rather than the debate about predestination and free will” (MacCulloch, 2001a: 82), such that “a group of churchmen began boldly to enunciate views which took the English Church in a very different direction, and which for a brief period in the 1620s and 1630s, succeeded in capturing its leadership” (MacCulloch, 2001a: 142) seem to go only part of the way to understanding what was behind the thinking of the early and later Reformation theologians. This analysis is not supported by the case study research of the
present work which suggests consistent streams of both moderate realism and nominalism in the expression of eucharistic theology from the early period of the Reformation through to the latter period and provides ample evidence to show that no one pure view of Anglican eucharistic theology existed in this early Reformation period.

MacCulloch in another work published in 1996 and entitled *Thomas Cranmer: A Life*, gives some clues about why he may not be willing to consider a philosophical analysis of Reformation eucharistic theology. Here he comments that “attempts to produce a comprehensive interpretation of Cranmer’s thinking in nominalist terms have not been especially successful” (MacCulloch, 1996: 491). The work he cites as not being especially successful is that of McGee (1964) previously discussed in Chapter 3 above, who attempted to argue that Cranmer was expressing a nominalist separation of sign and signified in his eucharistic theology. MacCulloch also cites Courtenay (1964) who provided a critique of McGee’s work and who rebuts the arguments put forward by McGee. It seems that on the basis of these two articles, MacCulloch is distancing himself from any attempt to examine eucharistic theology in terms of nominalism at least. This may help to explain why he does not consider the philosophical dimensions of Anglican Reformation theology and concentrates on the outward expressions of liturgy and ceremonial. The problem here though, is that the deficiencies in McGee’s analysis, as pointed out by Courtenay, do not in themselves constitute sufficient reason for completely ignoring the philosophical dimensions of Anglican eucharistic theology in the period of the Reformation and the attempt to conceptualise Anglican eucharistic theology in this way. This thesis, in adapting the work of the contemporary philosopher David Armstrong, has attempted, as Macquarrie (1997: 132) proposes, to use modern philosophical thinking, in an attempt to explain Anglican eucharistic theology, using the categories of realism and nominalism to both moderate and immoderate degrees. MacCulloch may have dismissed such an attempt on the basis of unsuccessful attempts to represent Anglican eucharistic theology in one of these categories without considering further more developed philosophical analysis. This thesis has attempted to discuss Anglican eucharistic theology using the philosophical assumptions of realism and nominalism, to both moderate and immoderate degrees, in a more satisfactory and comprehensive manner than was attempted by earlier writers. This attempt is seen to overcome the criticisms of discussing Anglican eucharistic theology in
this way, as set out by MacCulloch (1996) in relation to Cranmer at least and to expand such a realist and nominalist analysis to the whole Anglican eucharistic tradition.

The implications of the above discussion for the Anglican eucharistic tradition and Anglican theological education centre on a recognition of multiformity regarding not only the outward expression of Anglican eucharistic worship (its liturgy, ceremonial and ritual) but also regarding philosophical assumptions underlying Anglican eucharistic theology. Anglican theological education therefore, if it is to be critical, and if it is to move beyond the narrow confines of particular technical and hermeneutic interests needs to take these implications into account in the design and implementation of programs of theological education concerned with eucharistic theology. Such programs need to recognise the multiformity of the Anglican eucharistic tradition, to expose students to it and to engage in dialogue which is wide ranging, including consideration of philosophical assumptions as well as historical and liturgical assumptions.

It is the very multiformity of the Anglican eucharistic tradition, not only in its expression, but also in its philosophical bases, that contains both the tradition’s power and its greatest challenge. Whilst the Anglican eucharistic tradition presents a breadth of views and so inclusion, it also presents the opportunity for some to put forward arguments for pure and exclusive views of Anglican eucharistic theology based on the particular hermeneutic interests of various church parties. Whilst some advocate the purity of a Reformation theology of the Eucharist for Anglicanism (e.g. Doyle – see Case Study 4.27) others advocate the purity of a Catholic theology of the Eucharist (e.g. Silk, 1995/2002 – see Case Study 4.54). The expression and privileging of exclusive views for the Anglican tradition as a whole seem to stand at odds with the multiformity of the evidence presented in the case study material (see CD) of this thesis and the extracted essences reviewed above in this chapter of the thesis. Those who attempt to argue for a uniformity in Anglican eucharistic tradition seem to do so out of loyalty to particular hermeneutic interests (either Evangelical Anglican or Catholic Anglican) and from a desire to promote the appropriation of these positions among others and by the tradition as a whole. Exclusive views frequently lead to acrimonious debate in the Anglican Communion (e.g. see the Doyle Case Study – 4.27) where strident positions are put as the only possible view and those who adopt different views are seen to be disloyal to certain standards such as Reformation principles or as
simply being quite wrong. This thesis argues that such simplistic positions are lacking in subtlety and in conflict with the evidence of multiformity in the Anglican eucharistic tradition presented in the case studies of this thesis.

4.4 Dialogue – A Way Forward

The next chapter argues on the basis of the evidence presented concerning multiformity as the prevailing essence of the Anglican eucharistic tradition that the way forward for the Anglican eucharistic tradition is the adoption of a dialogue approach to theological education. A dialogue approach has the potential of allowing for what Habermas calls the intersubjectivity of communicative action (Habermas, 1984 and 1989) and thereby suggests that theological education if it is to present a critical interest in regard to the Anglican eucharistic tradition needs to allow for the expression of the varied voices of the tradition without privileging any one voice over others. The evidence of this thesis suggests that the multiformity of the Anglican eucharistic tradition revolves around the distinction between the philosophical assumptions of realism and nominalism to a moderate degree and the expression of particular hermeneutic interests. It is difficult in the face of this evidence to support any one philosophical assumption or hermeneutic interest as having privilege over other assumptions and interests. Accordingly, in view of the multiformity of the Anglican eucharistic tradition, with reference to different hermeneutic interests and philosophical assumptions, this thesis suggests that a dialogue approach to theological education is an appropriate way to proceed since a dialogue approach allows for the equal expression of these different assumptions and interests. A dialogue approach (such as that proposed by Habermas, 1984 and 1989 and based on communicative action) has the advantage of allowing the Anglican tradition to recognise and work with the multiformity of the Anglican eucharistic tradition and different models of theological education. It is proposed in the next chapter that such a dialogue approach is a way forward for the Anglican tradition since it attempts to bring a critical focus and intent to the Anglican eucharistic tradition while at the same time acknowledging the diversity of interests and theology within the tradition without privileging any. Such a critical focus attempts to recognise the sustained existence of multiformity within the Anglican eucharistic tradition and to promote programs of theological education which reflect this multiformity in a critical manner by appreciating the diversity of the tradition as a whole. A process of dialogue, it
will be suggested, can operate as communicative action, where dialogue places emphasis on
the intersubjectivity of shared meaning and understanding rather than seeking ownership of
any one interest for the Anglican tradition as a whole. Such an approach is seen as the way
forward for the Anglican eucharistic tradition and theological education concerned with
eucharistic theology since it engages with the tradition as a whole in a more satisfactory
manner (both theologically and philosophically) than particular technical and hermeneutic
interests alone.
A Dialogue Approach for Theological Education: Ramifications for the Anglican Eucharistic Tradition

5.1 Introduction

A dialogue approach for theological education is suggested as the way forward for the Anglican tradition in general and for the Anglican eucharistic tradition in particular. The Anglican tradition is characterised by a variety of technical and hermeneutic interests as well as various philosophical assumptions (realism and nominalism). These interests and assumptions account for the multiformity of the Anglican eucharistic tradition and often significantly influence the programs of theological education within the tradition. The work of Habermas (1971 and 1973) suggests that technical and hermeneutic interests can sometimes limit critical interest and in turn fetishise and impoverish ways of knowing within a tradition. The work of Armstrong (1989, 1995, 1997 and 2004) suggests that the philosophical assumptions underlying a tradition can be multiform and that critical interest is heightened when these assumptions are more clearly understood. The Case Studies of this thesis (see accompanying CD and the extracted essences of these case studies in Chapter 4) suggest that various interests, technical, hermeneutic and critical are part of the Anglican eucharistic tradition and that the philosophical assumptions of realism and nominalism to the moderate degree are a prevailing aspect of the Anglican eucharistic tradition. In such a situation of multiformity there are competing and conflicting interests which particular groups seek to prosecute and which are both accepted and rejected by other particular interests within the Anglican tradition. A dialogue approach to theological education (such as that suggested by Habermas, 1984 and 1989) is suggested as a way forward for the Anglican eucharistic tradition and its programs of theological education since such dialogue holds the promise of allowing not only the prosecution of particular technical and hermeneutic interests but also the critical interest of intersubjectivity.
This chapter therefore aims to draw out the ramifications for theological education arising from the extensive case study material on Anglican eucharistic theology presented as part of this project (see CD of case studies accompanying this thesis), and also arising from the extracted essences of the case studies presented in the previous chapter (Chapter 4). A dialogue approach is proposed as a way forward for theological education in the Anglican tradition. A dialogue approach provides for intersubjectivity among the participants of the Anglican tradition seeking understanding of differing points of view and is based on the notion of communicative action.

The case studies (see CD) have established that multifor mity in relation to the theology of the Eucharist and the philosophical assumptions of realism and nominalism underlying eucharistic theology in the Anglican tradition, are prevailing and consistent essences of the Anglican eucharistic tradition.

A dialogue approach to theological education is seen to have a critical interest. It involves a moving beyond the purely technical interests of what happens at the Eucharist (e.g. ‘How Christ is present in the Eucharist?’ and ‘How does Christ’s sacrifice relate to the Eucharist?’). It also involves a moving beyond the various hermeneutic interests which characterise the theological parties within Anglicanism (e.g. Evangelical Anglicans and Catholic Anglicans and their particular views of how Christ is present and how Christ’s sacrifice relates to the Eucharist) to allow for the sharing of meaning among participants in the Anglican eucharistic tradition. Theological education in this wider sense, is recognised as involving much more than the mere appropriation of the hermeneutic interest of a church party or the acquisition of technical knowledge, but rather the ability to reflect critically, not only on the knowledge of the tradition as a whole but on interactions where participants engage with others in the sharing of differing and complementary views, ideas, traditions and interests. Such an approach places value on the experiences of the participants who are seeking shared understanding as well as on the specific knowledge of the tradition. It is this critical interest that distinguishes a dialogue approach from the often adversarial and acrimonious debate involved in the defence of a party position typical of the Anglican tradition. Party positions, often closely associated with the ownership of knowledge and the sacred nature of that knowledge, tend to close down the sharing of information, idealise the hermeneutic interest and emphasise the appropriation of an
established tradition. Dialogue approaches, based as they are on communicative action, tend to encourage the stepping outside of a tradition, critical reflection on the hermeneutic interest of the tradition and the sharing of understanding. The work of Jurgen Habermas is important in the establishment of such a dialogue approach based on critical interest, and will be considered, along with the work of other theorists, in regard to its application for theological education in the Anglican tradition.

Habermas in *The Theory of Communicative Action* (1984 and 1989) speaks of the importance of ‘interactions’ among speakers and hearers rather than ‘actions’ by particular groupings or individuals. It is this emphasis on the experience of people and the sharing of that experience with others that moves dialogue and communicative action beyond what McCarthy calls ‘hermeneutic idealism’ (McCarthy, 1984: xxvi) or the conceptualising of society from the perspective of participants whilst at the same time remaining blind to the causes, connections and consequences that lie beyond the horizon of everyday practice. Any criticism of or rejection of hermeneutic idealism is founded on the belief that a person’s hermeneutic interest or the hermeneutic interest of a tradition is not sufficient to understand the complexity of experience and society as a whole. Anglicanism, and in turn, Anglican theological education and the Anglican eucharistic tradition seems to suffer from this hermeneutic idealism, where particular parties want to conceptualise Anglican theology, such as eucharistic theology, solely from the perspective of particular participants and their particular parties or hermeneutic interest (be they Anglican Evangelicals or Anglican Catholics) without sufficient reference to the tradition or system as a whole – both in terms of its Anglican heritage and in terms of eucharistic theology in general. In addition hermeneutic idealism often leads to the assumption that the appropriation of a particular hermeneutic interest is the focus of theological education and this in turn limits adequate consideration of the ways in which theological education should be conceptualised and proceed with critical interest. Appropriation of a particular hermeneutic interest can idealise the knowledge and interests of that hermeneutic and so exclude the knowledge and interests of other hermeneutics by privileging a hermeneutic’s knowledge and interests over the knowledge and interests of other hermeneutics. If this is the case then it may mean that a tradition as a whole remains unconsidered in any adequate fashion and that education within that tradition can become impoverished and fetishised through its concentration on the supposed purity (its sacredness of particular knowledge.
and interests) of particular technical and hermeneutic interests and by seeking the appropriation of any one interest.

This thesis argues that when this occurs, the system (in this case the Anglican tradition of Christianity in all its complexity and forms) which incorporates Anglican eucharistic theology and the educative processes associated with that theology, is impoverished and fetishised. This is particularly the case in relation to the Anglican eucharistic tradition since the evidence of the case studies in this thesis suggests that eucharistic theology in the Anglican tradition is multiform and not uniform, incorporating more than one hermeneutic interest and that there are several philosophical assumptions which underlie this eucharistic theology. Any suggestion that there is a pure form of Anglican eucharistic theology or that Anglican eucharistic theology is uniform according to one hermeneutic interest is counter to the evidence presented in the case studies of this thesis (see CD) and extracted as essences in Chapter 4.

An attempt is therefore made in this chapter to move the debate on Anglican eucharistic theology beyond the technical and hermeneutic interests of church parties (as have been isolated in the case studies and in the various essences of the Anglican eucharistic tradition) and to propose a means whereby theological education concerned with Anglican eucharistic theology can be engaged in a more critical interest. This critical interest is seen in the dialogue approach and the rationality of communicative action.

It is now proposed therefore to examine Habermas’ concept of communicative action more closely and then address some of the ramifications of this concept that apply to the Anglican eucharistic tradition and to Anglican theological education.

### 5.2 Habermas and the theory of communicative action

Habermas acknowledges that since the beginning of the modern Enlightenment era, Western thought has often taken the view that science and technology hold out the promise of limitless advances, with accompanying moral and political improvement (Habermas, 1984 and 1989). Not all commentators, including Habermas, agree with this vision. Stephen White, for example, points out that one of the most distinctive features of
the intellectual activity of the final years of the twentieth century has been the doubts raised about the conceptual foundations of Western modernity, with hard questions being asked about these predominant understandings of reason, subjectivity, nature, progress and gender (White, 1995: 3). Habermas does not however advocate the abandonment of the project of the Enlightenment, but rather argues for its redirection. This he does in his two volume work, *The Theory of Communicative Action* (Habermas, 1984 and 1989). Here he puts the case that reason can be defended only by way of a critique of reason. In so doing his concept of rationality is one that is no longer tied to and limited by subjectivistic and individualistic premises, but rather argues for an integration of what he calls the ‘lifeworld’ and system paradigms. ‘System’ and ‘lifeworld’ Habermas views as the fundamental problem of social theory, that is, how to connect in a satisfactory manner these two conceptual strategies (Habermas, 1989: 151). Systems are understood as open and to maintain themselves even in the face of unstable and hypercomplex environments through interchange processes across their boundaries (Habermas, 1989: 151). Systems are concerned with the maintenance of society and their fundamental nature and identity is the means by which a society stands or falls. The concerns of system paradigms include matters such as culture, social integration and socialisation, and it is these that function as boundary-maintaining systems for the society as a whole. System paradigms steer society in powerful and persistent ways with universal significance, whereas lifeworlds are often characterised by the separation of culture, society and personality (Habermas, 1989: 152). ‘Lifeworld’ for Habermas has a particularity about it and is made up of the “culturally transmitted and linguistically organised stock of interpretative patterns” (Habermas, 1989: 124) often sedimented in texts, traditions and cultural artefacts or in organised institutions, systems and structures, such that ideas are embodied in cultural value spheres, in personality structures and in social institutions with their particular conflicts and interests (Habermas, 1984: 108) based on the organization of authority and political power (McCarthy, 1984: xiv). Lifeworlds often differ from the normal world-concepts or system in that lifeworlds are often associated with particular individuals or groups of people and the traditions they see as sacred. World-concepts or system paradigms are seen as more fundamental, involving critisisable validity claims, based on a frame or categorical scaffolding that serves to order problematic situations (Habermas, 1989: 125), involving “suppositions of commonality” (Habermas, 1984: 102). Communicative action therefore points beyond the particular to the more universal aspects of society. Habermas says that:
“the aspects of the rationality of action we found in communicative action should now permit us to grasp processes of societal rationalization across the whole-breadth, and no longer solely from the selective viewpoint of purposive rational action.” (Habermas, 1984: 335).

World-concepts and system paradigms point beyond the circle of those immediately involved and have claims valid for outside interpreters as well, whereas ‘lifeworlds’ are seen as being already substantially interpreted and as such often prevent those in such a lifeworld from stepping outside of it (Habermas, 1989: 126). Lifeworlds therefore are the unquestioned ground of everything given in a person’s experience and the unquestionable frame in which all the problems I have to deal with are located. Lifeworlds are said to be intuitively present and therefore familiar and transparent as well as being a vast and incalculable web of presuppositions that need to be satisfied if an actual utterance is to be meaningful, that is, valid or invalid. Lifeworlds are very much taken for granted and maintain themselves beyond the threshold of criticisable convictions (Habermas, 1989: 131). Lifeworlds therefore can take the form of sacred truth, and for those who find it impossible to free themselves from the naïve, situation-oriented attitude of being actors caught up in the communicative practice of everyday life within their lifeworld, it is impossible to grasp the limitations of that lifeworld since these actors cannot get behind the context of their lifeworld and examine it with critical intent. Further they see their lifeworld in the sense that it cannot in principle be exhausted and so their critical interest is limited by their hermeneutic idealism (Habermas, 1989: 133).

Habermas’ response to this decline of the paradigm of consciousness, where a person is prevented, by the very constraints of their lifeworld, from stepping out of their lifeworld and engaging with world-concepts, is to propose an explicit shift to the paradigm of language – not to language as a syntactic or semantic system, but to what he calls language-in-use or speech or communicative action (McCarthy, 1984: ix). Habermas says that:

“the concept of communicative action refers to the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action who establish interpersonal relations (whether by verbals or by extra-verbal means). The actors seek to reach an understanding about the action situation and their plans of action in order to coordinate their actions by way of agreement. The central concept of interpretation refers in the first instance to negotiating definitions of the situations which admit of consensus. … Language is given a prominent place in this model.” (Habermas, 1984: 86).
Communicative action involves a shift of focus from the teleological to the communicative dimension where the analysis of language as social action is the basic medium of communication. The teleological aspect refers to the realising of one’s aims or the carrying out of one’s plan of action, whereas the communicative aspect refers to the interpretation of a situation and arriving at some agreement (Habermas, 1989: 126). Rationality therefore, for Habermas, “has less to do with the possession of knowledge than with how speaking and acting subjects acquire and use knowledge” (Habermas, 1984: 8). Earlier in this thesis Habermas’ three ways of knowing (technical, hermeneutic and critical) were discussed (see Chapter 1) and the particular interests of groups were seen as important determinants in the way people come to know things. Habermas’ earlier works (1971 and 1973) were important in this discussion concerning the role interests play in education. This suggests that the means of reaching understanding are important matters to be considered in a process of education and for Habermas this involves intersubjective recognition for the various validity claims of those who may hold differing positions and views, and that the reasons and grounds of these differing positions become important. Habermas argues that:

“In communicative action, the very outcome of interaction is even made to depend on whether the participants can come to an agreement among themselves on an intersubjectively valid appraisal of their relations to the world. On this model of action, an interaction can succeed only if those involved arrive at a consensus among themselves, a consensus that depends on yes/no responses to claims potentially based on grounds.” (Habermas, 1984: 106).

Habermas argues that it is possible to reach agreement about differing and disputed positions by means of argument and shared insights that do not depend on force, but rather on reasons and grounds. It is this process of critique or argumentation that allows communicative action and rationality to proceed (Habermas, 1984: 17-18). Agreement between parties then rests on the sharing of common convictions (Habermas, 1984: 287) and functions as communicatively shared intersubjectivity where reflection on one’s own affective and practical nature means that people act in a self-critical attitude. Habermas says that:

“this concept of communicative rationality carries with it connotations based ultimately on the central experience of the unconstrained, unifying, consensus bringing force of argumentative speech, in which different participants overcome their merely subjective views and, owing to the mutuality of rationally motivated conviction, assure themselves of both the unity of the objective world and the intersubjectivity of their lifeworlds.” (Habermas, 1984: 10).
Chapter 5

Not only does this result in mutual convictions, but also “in coordinating their actions by way of intersubjectively recognizing criticisable validity claims, they are at once relying on membership in social groups and strengthening the integration of those same groups” (Habermas, 1989: 137). There are therefore important benefits deriving from communicative action, not only for mutual understanding but also for group integration and harmony within a tradition as a whole.

This way of acting however, means that people, in order to adopt a critical interest and engage in communicative action, would need to objectify their lifeworld as a boundary-maintaining system rather than assuming that their lifeworld is ‘the’ system and the way things are in a universal sense. Here Habermas distinguishes between ‘instrumental mastery’ and ‘communicative action’, such that instrumental mastery is often employed in the appropriation of a hermeneutic where communicative action maintains a critical focus (Habermas, 1984: 11). This means “an interpreter can go beyond this subjectively purposive-rational orientation and compare the actual course of action with the constructed case of a corresponding objectively purposive-rational course of action” (Habermas, 1984: 102). Communicative action or communicative rationality therefore, Habermas argues, pays attention to the seams between system and lifeworld, since it is the seams that hold the potential for emancipation from the power of particular hermeneutic interests as well as resistance to more self-critical attitudes. These ‘seams’ are the points of intersection, where there can be both harmony and conflict, and it is these seams that form the basis for the dialogue that is the argumentation of communicative action and rationality.

Any process of dialogue is severely constrained by a desire to maintain control and ownership of the system in the sense that the system is seen by some to be equivalent to the lifeworld of an individual, group or tradition. Habermas therefore states that “in the context of communicative action, only those persons count as responsible who, as members of a communicative community, can orient their actions to intersubjectively recognized validity claims” (Habermas, 1984: 14). This greater degree of communicative rationality in turn expands, says Habermas, “the scope for unconstrained coordination of actions and consensual resolution of conflicts” (Habermas, 1984: 15).

Habermas argues that the Enlightenment’s promise of life informed by reason cannot be redeemed so long as the rationality that finds expression in society is deformed by capitalist
modernisation or by the laws of history (McCarthy, 1984: xxxvii). Ownership exerts itself through ‘hermeneutic idealism’, where the view or views of some participants in society are taken, by these participants and others, to be ‘the’ view or ‘the’ system paradigm and where such a perspective only succeeds in blinding the participants to causes, connections and consequences that lie beyond the lifeworld of the everyday practice of an individual, groups or institutions. For Habermas therefore, intersubjective understanding, based on communicative expression, cannot be carried out in a solipsistic manner. Participation with others in a process of reaching understanding is therefore seen as essential. Where understanding is seen to be hermetically sealed in a particular tradition or hermeneutic interest, the lifeworld remains closed and can only be opened when there is a desire and competence to speak and act in a spirit of participation and where there is communication which encourages people to become at least potential members of a lifeworld (Habermas, 1984: 112). This means that the “processes of reaching understanding are aimed at a consensus that depends on the intersubjective recognition of validity claims; and these claims can be reciprocally raised and fundamentally criticized by participants in communication” (Habermas, 1984: 136). This suggests that the purpose of rational communicative action is not egocentric ownership of knowledge or power but the act of reaching understanding. Participants can still be oriented to their own interests but they do this under conditions that harmonise their plans of action on the basis of common situation definitions (Habermas, 1984: 286). This is what Habermas calls “an ideal communicative community” (Habermas, 1989: 2) where critical interest is beyond the understanding of a particular hermeneutic interest and where communicative action performs the task of coordinating and mediating. This suggests that such critical interest brings about “the emergence of a higher-level form of life characterized by a linguistically constituted form of intersubjectivity that makes communicative action possible” (Habermas, 1989: 10-11). In such a form of life, language functions as a medium of not only reaching understanding and transmitting cultural knowledge, but it also functions as a means of socialisation and social integration. These take place through acts of reaching understanding (Habermas, 1989: 24-25) where the authority of the holy (that is, the lifeworld and its particular hermeneutic interest) is gradually replaced by the authority of an achieved consensus (Habermas, 1989: 77). This suggests a moving beyond a particular hermeneutic interest (that is, the holy) and into the area of the binding and bonding force of criticisable validity. When this occurs there is a movement towards social integration that is no longer dependent on institutionalised values but on intersubjective recognition of
validity claims (Habermas, 1989: 89). When a situation is communicatively mediated, the action norms of the participants depend on shared situation definitions that refer simultaneously to the objective, the normative and the subjective facets of the situation in question (Habermas, 1989: 90). Dialogue or communication rationality in action does not therefore mean the abandonment of subjective meaning or particular technical or hermeneutic interests and the focussing on the intersubjective alone, but rather an acknowledgement of the ‘ego’ of the speaker who has expressed his or her experiences (the subjective aspect of a hermeneutic interest) but also the ‘ego’ that refers to someone as a member of a social group who is entering into an interpersonal relation (the intersubjective) with (at least) one other member (Habermas, 1989: 90). Communicative action seeks this type of shared understanding.

5.3 Ramifications for the Anglican eucharistic tradition

Habermas’ theory of communicative action is seen as enabling theology to resolve questions of access, because Habermas bases his work not on ‘action’ but ‘interaction’ (Garrigan, 2004: 72). Habermas’ contribution to philosophy, she argues,

“has been to shift it from the ‘work’ model of activity to one based on communicative action. Prior to Habermas, the essence of philosophy of the subject was that the subject was defined by his or her ‘work’; after Habermas, philosophy is required to explore the ramifications of a theory of the subject wherein it is the subject-subject relation, not the subject-object relation, that gives the point of access to the subject” (Garrigan, 2004: 73).

Garrigan’s analysis of Habermas points the way to an emphasis in any one area of intellectual endeavour, such as Anglican eucharistic theology, where the importance of interactions between speakers and hearers (subject-subject) is emphasised rather than the work of individual thinkers (subject-object). This suggests that the work of Habermas has relevance to any relationship between humanity and God, since it is not about acts, actors and actions, but about interactions between speakers and hearers. In is in this sense that Habermas’ insights have particular relevance for the Anglican eucharistic tradition and for Anglican theological education since they suggest the value of dialogue and interaction (subject-subject) as opposed to the division and acrimony that often occurs when there is too much or exclusive concentration on the object, that is ‘my work’ or particular hermeneutic interest, as subject-object. Habermas’ suggestion that reason be transformed,
rather than abandoned, implies that rationality can no longer be tied to and limited by the subjective and individual hermeneutic interests of church parties and the particular theologians and theological views that inform those interests. As Garrigan points out, there is a distinction here between ‘communication’ and ‘communicative action’. This distinction rests on the idea of “speech acts as bringing about an understanding (through ‘communicative action’) rather than presuming, or even necessarily arriving at the point of understanding (‘communication’)” (Garrigan, 2004: 76).

There is a case then to be made for viewing the Anglican eucharistic tradition as a system paradigm (within a larger system paradigm of the Anglican tradition of Christianity, which itself exists within the larger system paradigm of Christianity and perhaps even the system paradigm of human society) rather than viewing the Anglican eucharistic tradition as separate and particular lifeworlds such as those that exist within the various church parties of Anglicanism (e.g. Anglican Evangelicals and Anglican Catholics). These lifeworlds are often distinct from system paradigms since they are substantially determined and interpreted, perhaps even hermetically sealed, and so lacking in critical interest. In order to become a true ‘communicative community’ theological education in the Anglican tradition needs to recognise that lifeworlds really function as boundary-maintaining devices, which are important and perform the valuable function of defining a hermeneutic, but that they themselves are not the system paradigm of the Anglican eucharistic tradition. The case studies of this thesis (see the CD which accompanies this thesis) supply ample evidence to show that the system paradigm of the Anglican eucharistic tradition is not solely the lifeworld of Anglican Evangelicals or Anglican Catholics. The evidence of the case studies and the extracted essences (Chapter 4) suggest that the basis of the Anglican eucharistic tradition’s system paradigm is a multiformity of Anglican eucharistic theology and that the system paradigm or world-concepts revolve around this multiformity which functions according to the philosophical concepts of moderate realism and moderate nominalism. Further it has been argued that the prevailing essence of moderate realism is itself multiform in its commitments to different philosophical frameworks based on both Platonic and Aristotelian philosophical frameworks. The case studies suggest that this multiformity is pervasive throughout the Anglican eucharistic tradition, not only historically but also across the various theological and philosophical assumptions, and that uniformity is not a characteristic essence of the Anglican eucharistic tradition, despite the efforts of some to argue for one lifeworld for Anglicanism, for example, Doyle’s (4.27) reformed,
evangelical Protestantism, Silk’s (4.54) ‘correct’ Catholic view or Miley’s assumption that Anglicanism is a *via media* (Miley, 2002 and 2003). The evidence of this thesis suggests that the essence of the Anglican eucharistic tradition is not limited to either the Evangelical lifeworld or the Catholic lifeworld or any other single lifeworld. The case studies however, have supplied ample evidence to suggest that the Anglican eucharistic tradition often presents particular lifeworlds and the particular hermeneutic interests they hold as the only lifeworld of the Anglican eucharistic tradition. For example, the eucharistic texts and their particular points of emphasis for various Anglican traditions and provinces throughout the Anglican Communion – see Case Study 4.54 – show how the lifeworld of some parts of the Anglican Communion has become tied to particular texts, traditions and artefacts and their appropriation, which themselves present and perpetuate narrow interests. Such an analysis of the Anglican eucharistic tradition is distinctly different from the characteristic and pervasive multiformity isolated in this thesis as the essence of the Anglican eucharistic tradition.

A consideration of the work of Habermas when applied to the Anglican eucharistic tradition, and as analysed by the case studies of this thesis, leads to the conclusion that there is not just one lifeworld for the tradition. Further the extracted essences of the case studies suggest that the system paradigm for the Anglican eucharistic tradition involves recognition of the distinction between realism and nominalism to the moderate degree. This suggests that unless the Anglican eucharistic tradition is more willing to concede that a plurality or multiformity of view is the essence of the tradition, then the benefits of communicative action will not be accessible to the Anglican tradition as a whole and for the theological education that is part of it. While hermeneutic idealism persists in the Anglican eucharistic tradition, the critical interest of the tradition, its theological education and the Anglican tradition itself, will be impoverished and fetishised. This finding seems to have escaped the attention of some of the more powerful interest groups within the Anglican Communion, including the Communion’s own attempt to access the nature of its theological education (e.g. the work of the Anglican Communion entitled ‘Theological Education for the Anglican Communion’ (TEAC) set up to investigate the nature of theological education in the Anglican Communion, and which has been discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis).
Habermas’ work also implies that if a process of communicative action is to be part of the Anglican eucharistic tradition and associated theological education programs, then the seams between the lifeworld of particular hermeneutic interests and the system need to be explored and acknowledged more fully, both in terms of their intersections and their conflicts. Habermas takes what has been described as a middle path, which focuses on the process of truth-making or rational discourse rather than on the idea of truth as an outcome (Garrigan, 2004: 81). This suggests that truth is a process, not an outcome or presumed ideal or goal but a universal regulatory idea. Following this line of argument, it can be said that sacramental theology is then more a process of interpretation, negotiated between speakers and hearers, than instrumental outcomes adopted by various parties. This is what Williams (2000) seems to mean when he says, “we make signs, and make ourselves through signs” (Williams 2000: 199-200). This suggests a dynamic process of interaction between participants rather than the mere appropriation of a party line. The philosophical work of people such as David Armstrong (reviewed extensively in Chapter 3 of this thesis) has much to offer here as well, since Armstrong’s work also speaks of truth-making (Armstrong, 2004) and provides a model which can be applied to the system paradigm of at least the Anglican eucharistic tradition and perhaps for the Anglican tradition as a whole. Armstrong’s insights for example, have important implications in relation to the analysis of philosophical frameworks that guide the development and sharing of eucharistic theology. The distinction between ‘nature’ and ‘identity’ in its strict and loose senses leads to important reconsiderations of the theology (and writings) of the Anglican eucharistic tradition by allowing a more sophisticated level of analysis. The realisation, taken from Armstrong (1997), that universals are strictly identical in their different instantiations and yet not in their particularity, is crucial for understanding moderate realist eucharistic theology based on an Aristotelian philosophical framework and its application by various Anglican theologians. Without this level of nuanced and sophisticated philosophical reflection, Anglican eucharistic theology is doomed to remain at the level of technical and hermeneutic interest alone.

The model employed in this thesis (Figure 1) as a means of conceptualising the philosophical assumptions underlying Anglican eucharistic theology is based on Armstrong’s work and the idea of instantiation of universals in particulars. This model represents an exploration of the system paradigm of the Anglican eucharistic tradition that is multiform (interpretative as Habermas calls it) rather than uniform (instrumental as
Habermas calls it). The benefits of such an approach for the tradition and for theological education lie in the potential that exists for emancipation from narrow technical and hermeneutic interests as well as for a clearer understanding of the philosophical notions underlying statements of eucharistic theology in the Anglican tradition.

The distinction here is between those whose action is normatively regulated and those whose action is communicative. Normative action expects that people will comply with a norm and that the members of a group will expect certain behaviour, but where action is communicative there is more than one actor and the focus is on interpretation and the subjects trying to reach understanding with one another. The difficulty of course presents itself in any situation where a lifeworld of a particular hermeneutic interests claims to be ‘the’ system paradigm. Such claims, dependent on a sacred or holy view of the lifeworld and the possession of privileged knowledge, limit the chances for communicative action and the benefits of shared understanding. This is particularly apparent in the views of some Anglican theologians. Some Anglican Evangelicals, for example, in their claim to be interpreting ‘the plain words of Scripture’ or the ‘purity’ of Reformation Anglican doctrine (such as is found in particular interpretations of foundational Anglican documents like the Thirty-Nine Articles - see Case Study 1.38 or the 1662 Book of Common Prayer – see Case Study 1.40) believe that their lifeworld (Reformed Anglican Evangelicalism) is the essence of Anglicanism and Anglican eucharistic theology (e.g. Robert Doyle – see Case Study 4.27 The Anglican Diocese of Sydney – see Case Study 4.49). Others, who are Anglican Catholics, in their claim to be interpreting the ‘correct Catholic’ position on the Eucharist, claim that their lifeworld is the essence of Anglicanism and Anglican eucharistic theology (e.g. Silk, 1995/2002 –see Case Study 4.54). The problem here is not the legitimacy or reasonableness of these lifeworlds and their hermeneutic interests, but that they each claim to be the one legitimate essence of the Anglican eucharistic tradition on the basis of being the protectors and possessors of holy and sacred knowledge aimed at providing these particular hermeneutic interests with a privileged status.

The evidence of this thesis suggests however, that the Anglican eucharistic is multiform and therefore more than one particular lifeworld or technical or hermeneutic interest. There is, on the basis of the evidence presented in this thesis in the case studies (see accompanying CD) and in the extracted essences (Chapter 4), no one set of holy or sacred knowledge and no privileged position for any one hermeneutic interest. Habermas argues
when he speaks about knowledge people consider to be holy, that each of these positions is hermetically sealed within its own solipsism without any intersubjective understanding. Where this occurs critical interest is limited in the Anglican eucharistic tradition and the tradition itself becomes impoverished and fetishised by exclusive commitments to particular technical and hermeneutic interests. The case studies of this thesis and their analysis suggest that the essences of the Anglican eucharistic tradition are more fundamental than these particular hermeneutic interests. The multiformity of the Anglican eucharistic tradition, based on the philosophical assumptions of realism and nominalism to the moderate degree, are seen as being fundamental in their multiformity to the system paradigm of the Anglican eucharistic tradition, and it is along the seams of this system and its lifeworlds that the process of communicative action or dialogue is seen to have the most significant ramifications for the Anglican tradition as a whole.

Habermas’ work suggests that if ownership of particular hermeneutic interests is the focus of Anglicanism, its eucharistic tradition and its theological education, then the society that is Anglicanism will be deformed. On the other hand, Habermas’ work also suggests that if communicative action is part of the everyday practice of Anglicanism, its eucharistic tradition and theological education, then agreed understanding and critical interest will be the focus of Anglicanism, such that there is intersubjective recognition of validity claims in speech acts – people talking to one another in dialogue and seeking shared meaning as an ideal communicative community rather than adversarial exchange springing from the ownership of particular knowledge in a particular hermeneutic interest and the presumption of a privileged status. Moving beyond this deformed position requires that a person be prepared to leave the situation of self and subjective opinion and move towards the situation of sharing in another person’s experience, which may or may not be different to their own. This recognition of the need for a communicative aspect rather than a teleological aspect, requires a person be prepared to step outside their own lifeworld, despite the fact that the lifeworld is already substantially interpreted, and reflect critically on their own lifeworld and the lifeworld of others. This does not mean that a person needs to dismiss their lifeworld, indeed they should not, since as Knitter observes, we need to acknowledge and keep hold of who we are and how we have been formed (Knitter, 1991: 153), but at the same time we need to be able to step outside our lifeworld and share intersubjectively with others so that we can appreciate the system paradigm as a whole. Some of the modern case studies of this thesis (see CD Section 4) have provided examples
of those who are prepared to move outside their particular lifeworld and to surrender ownership and seek to pay attention to the seams between system and lifeworld. Cocksworth (Case Study 4.25) is an example of an Anglican Evangelical who has done this in his investigation of eucharistic theology in the Anglican tradition when he affirms sacramentality. Williams (Case Study 4.52) as an Anglican Catholic does this as well when he steps outside his lifeworld to question the very nature of sacramentality. Others, such as Ford (Case Study 4.29) and Pickstock (Case Study 4.41) use philosophical concepts to investigate a model for eucharistic theology – an infrequently used methodology for the lifeworld of the Anglican eucharistic tradition.

Habermas’ work leads to the conclusion that if Anglicanism is to become an ideal communicative community where the coordination of actions leads to the consensual resolution of actions, based not on the possession and appropriation of particular knowledge within a particular hermeneutic interest, but on the way knowledge is acquired and used, then there will be a rationality of shared understanding instead of the acrimony of party spirit. This is a redirection of reason and not its abandonment, as Habermas advocates. The common conviction or shared understanding becomes the idea that the system paradigm of Anglicanism is not one lifeworld or hermeneutic interest. Subjectivistic and individualistic premises need not be the centre of rationality in the Anglican eucharistic tradition and in Anglican theological education if a dialogue approach based on communicative action is adopted. Rather the shared understanding and common conviction is that the Anglican eucharistic tradition is multiform and not uniform – that there is a complexity which extends beyond individual texts, traditions, cultural artefacts and institutional forms, and this can be known when a communicative community takes shape. A supposition of commonality becomes more powerful and more fundamental than particular technical or hermeneutic interests. This also means that participants must be able to step outside their own lifeworld and consider the system as a whole free of hermeneutic idealism to the maximum extent that is possible for them. At no point does this mean that the particular hermeneutic traditions or lifeworlds need to surrender their own presuppositions or propositional content, but it does mean that each of the lifeworlds needs to acknowledge the existence of other lifeworlds and their presuppositions and propositional content. A participant in a lifeworld needs to acknowledge that their lifeworld is a boundary-maintaining system for that particular tradition, but that their lifeworld is not the system paradigm itself. It is this process of communicative action or
dialogue and shared understanding that has the potential of emancipating the system paradigm of the Anglican eucharistic tradition from the deformity of an impoverished and fetishised worldview.

This ramification for theological education has importance for the Anglican eucharistic tradition and forms one of the recommendations for theological education that arise from this study.

5.4 Sacramental theology after Habermas

Some of the ramifications for Anglican eucharistic theology arising from the work of Habermas have been drawn out above. Habermas’ work has wider implications for sacramental theology and in turn for theological education on the basis of his theory of communicative action. This thesis has attempted to draw attention to these implications. Work already cited in Chapter 1 of this thesis has shown that several theological educators have attempted to use the work of Habermas, and indeed communicative action and dialogue, in the broader work of theological education (e.g. Groome, 1981; Wood, 1995; Farley, 1988; Knitter, 1991; Wheeler, 1991; Browning, 1991; Hardy, 2001 and Lovat, 2002a). This is important work but the specific link between sacramental theology and the work of Habermas is in need of greater clarification and explication. What implications are there for sacramental theology on the basis of the work of Habermas? Some of these issues have been addressed above in analysis of the Anglican eucharistic tradition on the basis of the case studies and essences contained in this thesis, however it is informative to investigate what other research has been conducted in this area. The work of Siobhan Garrigan (2004) and some Anglican theologians will be used to investigate this question. Garrigan’s work has additional ramifications for the purposes of this study.

Siobhan Garrigan in her recent book, Beyond Ritual: Sacramental Theology after Habermas, has pointed the way to the implications of Habermas’ work for sacramental theology (Garrigan, 2004). She speaks of Habermas’ work as a “challenge to the very concept of ‘sacrament’ by simple virtue of the explicit anti-metaphysical premises of critical theory” (Garrigan, 2004: vii), but at the same time acknowledges that Habermas has made a valuable contribution to sacramental theology through “a useful conversation between a contemporary
philosopher’s interest and those of theology” (Garrigan, 2004: viii). Habermas in his notion of the ‘linguistification of the sacred’ has led to thinking which has questioned the very nature of a sacrament and whether that nature is intrinsic to ritual or to society as a whole. Rowan Williams (Case Study 4.52) when he speaks of sacraments being irreducibly bound up with language and culture as transformative signs, where “there is action, the making of new things” (Williams, 2000: 197) is engaging in this sort of questioning. Williams pursues this point in his treatment of the sacramental principle, not as the divine presence in all things, but by seeing in all things their difference, their particularity, their ‘not-God-ness’ (Williams, 2000: 218). Garrigan, in much the same way, speaks of sacraments as acts rather than texts, technical problems or articles of faith (Garrigan, 2004: viii) and clearly moves the discussion of sacraments beyond technical and hermeneutic interests. This she argues is essential in any Habermasian analysis dependent as it is on a context a social justice-oriented discourse (Garrigan, 2004: ix). If sacraments are to be interpreted as being about relationship with God and God’s self, then sacraments are about much more than the unique experience of interacting subjects. This type of thinking can lead to a crisis for any institution that insists that it has privileged or holy information, since it challenges the notion of ‘the’ truth existing in a particular hermeneutic interest. This clearly is a type of thinking and the challenge that Garrigan sees as needed.

Garrigan’s questioning leads her to admit that sacramental theology in the late twentieth century has increasingly drawn on the work of scholars from the social sciences in the relocation of any theology of the sacraments. For Garrigan the work of Habermas is clearly important in helping to form this shift, but it has also been shown through the case studies of this thesis that this trend is equally important for many modern Anglican theologians. The work of Ford (4.29), Macquarrie (4.36), Mascall (4.37), Pickstock (4.41) and Williams (4.52) shows evidence of this trend among contemporary Anglican theologians to engage with the social sciences in the relocation of their eucharistic theology. Indeed this thesis itself has attempted to do exactly the same type of relocation in the application of the philosophical work of David Armstrong to the expression and analysis of Anglican eucharistic theology (see Chapter 3 for details of Armstrong’s philosophical work and its links to eucharistic theology). Armstrong’s reference to the powerful truism of universals being strictly identical in their different instantiations (Armstrong, 1997: 27) has been discussed above, however it is important to note that use of this sort of philosophical reflection allows the Anglican eucharistic tradition to apply a more
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sophisticated level of analysis to its eucharistic theology. This is precisely what Garrigan means when she speaks of drawing on the work of the social sciences in the relocation of sacramental theology. Garrigan argues that such a shift indicates “a recognition of the human being, inseparable from his or her context-dependence on the living organism of the earth, as the conduit through which any and all theology is construed” (Garrigan, 2004: 41). Instead of an emphasis on the context-dependence of a particular hermeneutic interest, Garrigan on the basis of Habermasian thinking argues for an emphasis instead on the experience of Christians, thereby suggesting attention towards their interactions in a communicative sense (Garrigan, 2004: 42). Garrigan believes that at the heart of Habermas’ theory of communicative action is the idea of communicative rationality which functions as the goal and criterion of discourse. With this as the standard, Garrigan suggests that Habermas’ work is very useful for contemporary theology if its concern is the negotiation of understanding in a post-metaphysical environment (Garrigan, 2004: 94).

The same conclusion has been reached by this thesis in its consideration of Anglican eucharistic theology on the basis of work by Armstrong and others (see Chapter 3 of the thesis) and the ramifications for those findings for theological education, particularly as they relate to eucharistic theology.

For Habermas (1984 and 1989) the central idea of his theory of communicative action is dominance-free communication. In any speech act there are three validity claims (truth, rightness and truthfulness) and when these are challenged an exchange or argumentation can begin whereby claims are examined. The aim of this exchange is to find a rationally motivated consensus that introduces an ideal speech situation into the context. Speaker and hearer must therefore make their exchanges in a fair way that results in an agreement reached solely by rationally motivated argument without dominance, coercion or manipulation. It would not be appropriate therefore for any one lifeworld or hermeneutic interest to enforce their view on other lifeworlds. Anglican Evangelicals or Anglican Catholics should not therefore impose their views on each other but rather seek an agreement on the basis of their rationally motivated argument. The case studies of this thesis suggest that such a rationally motivated argument would be one based on the multiformity of the Anglican eucharistic tradition and one which recognises the persistent essences of realism and nominalism to the moderate degree throughout the Anglican eucharistic tradition, as well as seeking to realise that moderate realism itself functions within different philosophical frameworks from both the Platonic and Aristotelian
traditions. Such an approach could be part of theological education as well where those making a study of eucharistic theology in the Anglican tradition are exposed to the multiformity of the Anglican eucharistic tradition and to the philosophical concepts of realism and nominalism and the distinction between both moderate and immoderate realism and nominalism, as well as differing philosophical frameworks. The witness of the Anglican eucharistic tradition would be essential in this process in order to expose those learning about Anglican eucharistic theology to this inherent multiformity in the Anglican eucharistic tradition. This means that access to material such as that contained in the case studies of this thesis (on the accompanying CD) is an important resource for Anglican theological education, since it is through exposure to the multiformity of the tradition and the various philosophical assumptions underlying the work of theologians, that participants in the Anglican eucharistic tradition are in a position to appreciate the diversity of the tradition apart from their particular hermeneutic interests. Access to this material is not always easy, due to its age and lack of availability, and so there emerges a need for an organised and representative sample of the Anglican eucharistic such as that which has been assembled in the case studies of this thesis. Without such ready access any awareness of the multiformity of the Anglican eucharistic tradition and the philosophical assumptions underlying tradition will be difficult for students of Anglican eucharistic theology to appreciate. Skilled use of this material by theological educators, intent on making students aware of the multiformity of the tradition is needed. This cannot occur in a situation where one particular hermeneutic interest is given privileged status and where the appropriation of that particular hermeneutic interest becomes the focus of theological education. Sacramental theology in the Anglican tradition after Habermas is in need of some relocation in order to accommodate these recommendations.

Garrigan makes specific recommendations (based on Habermas) about how this process would proceed. She argues that:

“1. Each actor has to have an equal chance to initiate and continue communication;
2. Each actor has to have equal chance to propose, explain and challenge justifications;
3. Each actor has to have an equal chance to express their wishes and feelings;
4. Each actor has to have an equal chance to order and resist order, to promise and to refuse, to be accountable for one’s conduct and to demand accountability from others”. (Garrigan, 2004: 101).
Using such a methodology in theological education on sacramental theology suggests that any fixed idea of what a sacrament is, is rejected by Garrigan, with a preference instead for broader parameters of what a sacrament ‘is’. Rowan Williams has also given a lead here for the Anglican Communion (see Case Study 4.52). What a sacrament ‘is’ could be a product of different lifeworlds within the totality of the system paradigm of Anglican eucharistic theology. This sort of question needs to be asked and made the subject of the intersubjective communicative action forming part of a dialogue approach in the theological education of the Anglican eucharistic tradition and the Anglican tradition generally. The model of the Anglican eucharistic tradition (Figure 1) proposed in this thesis could also be useful in this process, since it acknowledges the multiformity of what a sacrament ‘is’ in the Anglican eucharistic tradition and at the same time recognises the varying philosophical assumptions underlying eucharistic theology in the Anglican tradition. Anglican theological education would however need to allocate more space than it presently does in its syllabuses to philosophical analysis (e.g. the problem of universals, realism and nominalism to both moderate and immoderate degrees) if this model is to be capable of interpretation and dialogue by participants in the Anglican eucharistic tradition. The model of the Anglican eucharistic tradition (Figure 1) provides a system paradigm for the Anglican eucharistic tradition which recognises multiformity as the essence of what the Eucharist ‘is’.

## 5.5 Dialogue – other perspectives

Other theorists have also addressed the issue of dialogue. Some of these other perspectives will now be reviewed and the ramifications of their work linked to theological education in the area of eucharistic theology in the Anglican tradition.

Gadamer speaks of dialogue as ‘conversation’ and argues that it:

> “is a process of two people understanding each other. Thus it is a characteristic of every true conversation that each person opens himself to the other person, truly accepts his point of view as worthy of consideration and gets inside the other to such an extent that he understands not a particular individual, but what he says. The thing that has to be grasped is the objective rightness or otherwise of his opinion, so that they can agree with each other on a subject.” (Gadamer, 1979: 347).

Knowledge in this analysis is not fixed or a commodity to be packaged and grasped, but rather it is a process arising from interaction. Gadamer uses the metaphor of the horizon...
to make his point, arguing that each person brings prejudices and prejugments to an encounter in what he calls their own ‘horizon of understanding’. By this he means “the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point” (Gadamer, 1979: 143). These prejudices and prejugments are involved in what is said in conversation or dialogue, but at the same time a person makes an attempt, if the dialogue is genuine, to understand an horizon that is not his or her own and does this in relation to his or her own horizon. ‘Horizon’ in Gadamer’s terms functions in much the same way as Habermas’ lifeworld. It is in attempting to grasp another person’s horizon or lifeworld that people learn from the other person, intersubjectivity is promoted and understanding is shared. Bernstein argues that this does not necessarily entail agreement but rather, in the to and fro play of dialogue (Bernstein, 1991: 4) there is an attempt to discover the standpoint or horizon of others. Gadamer makes the same point, arguing that in conversation the ideas of others become intelligible without necessarily having to agree with them (Gadamer, 1979: 270).

This model of seeking to understand the horizon or lifeworld of another is useful for the Anglican tradition, not only in interaction between individuals but also between church parties and between particular technical and hermeneutic interests. Dialogue recognises that Anglican Evangelicals and Anglican Catholics may have distinctly different views on the Eucharist on the basis of the philosophical assumptions that undergird their eucharistic theology, but at the same time dialogue has the potential to promote a seeking after mutual understanding and the recognition that there is more than one view on the nature of the Eucharist within the Anglican tradition. Dialogue on philosophical assumptions and frameworks would also be needed to assist participants in understanding the philosophical notions underlying particular expressions of eucharistic theology.

Theological education could benefit from this realisation of the need for dialogue in terms of the interaction between students and theologians of different Anglican traditions as they share views with one another, but also in the interaction of students and theologians with the historical tradition of Anglicanism and its eucharistic theology. This is where the case study material provided on the CD accompanying this thesis has an important role to play. Interaction or conversation with the people of the past, as well as the present, performs the valuable function of broadening horizons and helping to establish that multiformity is a prevailing essence of the Anglican eucharistic tradition. Those in conversation or dialogue
do not aim to win the argument in a defensive manner but rather to promote understanding, tolerance and acceptance. This involves the conversation partner in the testing of their prejudices and pre-judgments in a way that assists in the continual forming and re-forming of horizons. This is why the interaction with both the historical material and the significant voices of the present are so important since it allows people to evaluate their own horizon in terms of what their own lifeworld and the lifeworld of others are saying, with perhaps some acceptance of what another lifeworld is saying. Christopher Cocksworth (Case Study 4.25) as an Anglican Evangelical and Rowan Williams (Case Study 4.52) as an Anglican Catholic are two examples of people acting as participants in the dialogue of the Anglican eucharistic tradition who are considering their own horizons as well as other horizons and reaching new meaning and understanding on the basis of this dialogue. Cocksworth reaches a position where memorial remembrance in the Eucharist, a position rejected by many Evangelicals, is expressed in a dynamic way as anamnesis within his Evangelical lifeworld (Cocksworth, 1993: 206). Williams reaches a position where he can question the sacramental principle, a position generally accepted by Anglican Catholics, through a redefinition of the reasoning behind it (Williams, 2000: 218). It seems possible therefore that participants in communicative action, while still claiming allegiance to one or other of the parties within Anglicanism, can be speakers of their own lifeworld but at the same time hearers of another lifeworld. It also seems possible, following Gadamer, that their can be a fusion of some or all of one lifeworld with another, while at the same realising that no such outcome may be possible. Conversation or dialogue exists, though, when one partner in the dialogue at least hears and recognises what another is saying and in so doing enriches and gains knowledge of themselves as well as others.

More specifically and practically Burbules (1993) specifies some of the conditions that are necessary for dialogue to occur. Burbules suggests that the following are important:

• **Concern** – being with partners in conversation, engaging with them and allowing them to engage with each other in a social bond that involves interest in and commitment to another.

• **Trust** – taking what others say on faith and acknowledging the risk in this.

• **Respect** – acknowledging that there may be differences between conversation partners but allowing the dialogue to continue with mutual regard. This suggests an acknowledgement of equality is essential and that fair-mindedness has a part to play, while degrading and exploiting the partners has no part to play.
• Appreciation – valuing the uniqueness of others and their contribution to the
dialogue.
• Affection – dialogue should involve a feeling with and for the partners.
• Hope – dialogue holds out possibility. It is possible that conversation partners will
learn from each other and that the dialogue process will carry the partners forward
(Burbules, 1993: 19).

It is Bernstein’s view that when these processes are put in place partners in dialogue and in
society as a whole have “a powerful regulative ideal that can orient our practical and
political lives” (Bernstein, 1983: 163). Habermas has called this the ‘ideal speech situation’;
and it is in this situation that dialogue can exist. Freire argues that such dialogue cannot
however exist, between people who want to own and name the world and those who do
not want the meaning that can result from genuine dialogue. Dialogue cannot exist, he
argues, when some people are denied the right to speak and where others deny this right
(Freire, 1972: 61). Dialogue is also difficult to achieve if particular hermeneutic interest
believe that they have a privileged status in the dialogue by virtue of the holy and sacred
knowledge that they and their hermeneutic interests possess and control in an exclusive
and oppressive manner. It is essential therefore in any theological educational process that
basic rules of dialogue are agreed upon, that exclusive ownership of the system by
particular lifeworlds is resisted and that all have the right to express their views. Anglican
theological education, if it operates exclusively within a party hermeneutic, prevents such a
process of dialogue from taking place and in fact when it operates in this way it deforms
theological education and the experience of the Anglican eucharistic tradition such that it
becomes impoverished and fetishised. Dialogue as part of the Anglican eucharistic
tradition and its theological education must seek to avoid this deformation of the tradition
by realising that no one lifeworld (whether it be Anglican Evangelical, Anglican Catholic or
any other Anglican lifeworld) can claim exclusive ownership of the system (the Anglican
eucharistic tradition) through its commitments to particular technical or hermeneutic
interests. In such a situation genuine dialogue cannot proceed and share meaning based on
the intersubjectivity of communicative action will be limited.
5.6 Dialogue and the Anglican Tradition

The Anglican tradition has typically organised itself into party positions and adopted varying theological understandings. The case studies of this thesis (see accompanying CD) have established at length the complexity and the persistence of these party positions in relation to eucharistic theology, firmly based on ownership of particular theological positions, often institutionalised in various texts and traditions of Anglicanism. Case Study 4.54 gives extensive evidence for this situation in relation to the development of eucharistic liturgies in the Anglican Communion in the twentieth century. This perpetuation of a model based on the idea of the ‘holy’ and the ‘sacred’ as Habermas describes it, militates against an ideal speech situation and communicative community. Despite this, it is reasonable to ask what evidence is there to suggest that dialogue has played a role in the Anglican tradition, specifically for the purposes of this thesis in the area of Anglican eucharistic theology? This will be examined in relation to some of the twentieth and twenty-first century case study material. It is in this historical period that some evidence is emerging of a lessening of party position and an engagement with dialogue.

There have been several significant discussions of eucharistic theology conducted by Anglicans in the twentieth century, however not all of these have been strictly in the style of dialogue as outlined above. The Anglo-Catholic Congresses of the early twentieth century (Case Study 4.1) were focussed on the presentation of a specifically Anglican Catholic hermeneutic interest and any discussion of the Eucharist reflected this interest. There was no attempt to enter into dialogue with other hermeneutic interests.

Synodical discussions of various provinces of the Anglican Communion on eucharistic theology, meeting for the production of eucharistic liturgies and the authorisation of their use, have sometimes been conducted in the heat of acrimonious and adversarial debate that reflects little of a dialogue approach. The workings of the General Synod in the Anglican Church of Australia in the years before and up to 1995, which produced and authorised *A Prayer Book for Australia* (1995) (see Case Study 4.54) demonstrate the unwillingness of some to enter into dialogue and the prosecution of particular hermeneutic interests in relation to the eucharistic theology contained in the liturgies of that prayer book (see Case Study 4.54 for detailed comment on these matters). It needs to be recognised however that significant
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negotiation behind the official scenes took place at the 1995 General Synod which allowed
the passage of this prayer through the Synod (see Silk, 2003 who spoke of these discussions
in a telephone interview with the author of this thesis). Some responses to *A Prayer Book
for Australia* (1995) represented a continued prosecution of these hermeneutic interests (e.g.
in the Diocese of Ballarat, Bishop Silk’s publication of the manual *The Holy Eucharist*
(1995/2000) is an example of the response of an Anglican Catholic hermeneutic interest,
while in the Diocese of Sydney, the eucharistic liturgies contained in *Sunday Services* (2001)
contain Anglican Evangelical hermeneutic interests). The effect of these responses seems
to be to entrench hermeneutic interests and to privilege these interests as holy and sacred
knowledge in opposition to or in preference to the nationally accepted standard of
eucharistic liturgies as found in *A Prayer Book for Australia* (1995). Such a situation is hardly
conducive to effective dialogue and the establishment of an ideal communicative
community.

Other gatherings of Anglican theologians have however shared more of a dialogue
approach focussed on the sharing of understanding as a communicative community. The
Conference at Fulham Castle in October, 1900 (Case Study 4.2) adopted a method where
various hermeneutic interests were able to share their views on the Eucharist. The
International Anglican Liturgical Consultations (IALC - V) (Case Study 4.32) also allowed
for the exchange of information between various interests. There is evidence to suggest
fusion of various interest occurring following dialogue. Charles Sherlock, for example, an
Anglican Evangelical expresses a realist theology of the Eucharist where he distinguishes
between ‘eucharistic atonement’ and ‘eucharistic sacrifice’, but at the same time admits his
prejudice for the Evangelical and Reformed views of Thomas Cranmer (Case Study 1.1) in
relation to eucharistic theology (Sherlock, 1998). There is evidence here of a philosophical
distinction between ‘atonement’ and ‘sacrifice’ based on moderate realism while
maintaining a particular Evangelical hermeneutic interest and at the same time being in
dialogue with other Anglican theologians.

The document produced by the Church of England, entitled *Thinking about the Eucharist*
(Ramsey, 1972) (Case Study 4.51), presents a set of occasional papers on eucharistic
theology. The various hermeneutic interests represented here are presented however,
without any apparent dialogue, other than the interests being placed in the same volume.
By far the most significant example of dialogue in the twentieth century, and continuing
into the twenty-first century, is however, the dialogue process undertaken by the Anglican Roman Catholic International Commission (ARCIC) begun by Pope Paul VI and Michael Ramsey, the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1966 (see Case Study 4.22). Both churches entered into a process that was not adversarial but rather respectful and aimed at understanding, rather than proving rightness. Statements of agreement such as those contained in The Final Report (1982) represent a commitment to dialogue where there is clear agreement and clarifications of important aspects of eucharistic theology (e.g. anamnesis, sacrifice and presence of Christ in the Eucharist and the role of the Holy Spirit) although the later Clarifications (1994) has less adequately explored the philosophical distinctions of eucharistic theology. Nonetheless the ARCIC process, reflected in its documents, represents what could be seen as the clearest example of a dialogue approach in the discussion of eucharistic theology in the twentieth century. At the same it is important to note that some within Anglicanism, especially Anglican Evangelicals, have rejected the work of ARCIC on the basis of a lack of fit with their own lifeworld position (e.g. Jensen, 2002a).

Despite the successful examples of dialogue cited above, the typical expression of Anglican eucharistic theology in the modern era has generally not attempted a dialogue approach but more often instead the presentation of particular hermeneutic interests. Anglican Evangelical interests such as those expressed in the written works of Dimock (4.3), Griffith Thomas (4.8), Moule (4.12) are set alongside the Anglican Catholic interests in the written works of Farrer (4.6), Gore (4.7), Hicks (4.9), Newbolt (4.13), Ramsey (4.15) and others at the beginning of the twentieth century. Later in the century and into the twenty-first century it seems that while the particular hermeneutic interests continue to be expressed (e.g. Donovan (4.26), Dix (4.28), Macquarrie (4.36) and Mascall (4.37) as Anglican Catholics and Doyle (4.27), Jensen (4.33), Stott (4.38), Packer (4.39) and Zahl (4.53) as Anglican Evangelicals) there is at the same time an increasing dialogue among theologians, not so much as face to face interaction with other theologians and their interests, but in the expression of written eucharistic theology. Cocksworth (4.25) puts the case for the Anglican eucharistic tradition being multiformal rather than uniform and is prepared to step outside his own Evangelical hermeneutic interest to acknowledge the existence and worth of other lifeworlds, particularly acknowledging aspects of what is normally seen to be Catholic Anglican eucharistic theology and is prepared to integrate these into his own lifeworld in his written works (Cocksworth, 1991 and 1993). Cocksworth’s conclusion of
multiformity as normative for the Anglican eucharistic tradition demonstrates a willingness to dialogue with the tradition as a whole and makes the case for what he calls ‘deep structures’ within the Anglican eucharistic tradition which exist alongside ‘unitive categories’ (Cocksworth, 1991: 50). The admission of multiformity is in itself a moving away from a position of an exclusive lifeworld.

Macquarrie’s conviction that participation in and reflection on religious faith seeks expression through language (Macquarrie, 1977: 1) suggests that dialogue is heavily dependent on what Habermas calls the linguistification of understanding and implies a dialogue among the voices of the tradition. Macquarrie’s preference for a phenomenological approach to the investigation of eucharistic theology implies a “dialectical interplay among the factors” (Macquarrie, 1977: 5) rather than the sole expression of hermeneutic interests. This thesis has attempted to pick up on this dialectical interplay in its analysis of eucharistic theology in the Anglican tradition. The substantial material provided in the case studies (see CD) and the extracted essences in Chapter 4 are evidence of this dialectical interplay occurring which has been isolated in the multiformity of theological and philosophical assumptions underlying the Anglican eucharistic tradition.

Pickstock (4.41) in her writing discusses the meaning of ‘word’ in relation to the Eucharist where she argues that the Eucharist is situated inside language. Christ’s word, she argues, connects sign and signified in a realist manner. She distinguishes this clearly from those who view ‘word’ as merely the text of the Bible. Doyle (4.27) for example uses ‘word’ in this way and Pickstock distances herself from this view, describing it as “a textual calculus of the real” (Pickstock, 1998: 3) that does not reflect the realist analysis she clearly privileges. This privileging at the same time limits any process of dialogue which may be useful in her analysis as a way towards increasing understanding between particular interests.

Phillip Jensen’s privileging of an Evangelical Anglican interest also limits dialogue since he argues there is only one genuine Anglican position regarding the Eucharist and that it is defined as reformed, protestant and evangelical (see Case Study 4.49). Other positions (such as a Catholic Anglican Hermeneutic and realist eucharistic theology) within Anglicanism are described by Phillip Jensen as not genuine since they are not seen to be loyal to the stated privileged characteristics to which he is committed (Jensen, Phillip,
The inability to step outside a particular lifeworld limits the work of both Pickstock and Jensen in relation to the application of any dialogue approach to understanding.

Stephen Sykes (Case Study 7.50) presents a valuable corrective to a dialogue approach when he speaks of the notion of comprehensiveness in Anglicanism. He puts the view that if Anglicanism presents a comprehensive theological position (this thesis describes this as a multiformity in relation to eucharistic theology) then this does not mean that anything goes in terms of the definition of Anglican fundamentals. This suggests that there are some limits on what can genuinely be called Anglican eucharistic theology. At the same time however, Sykes casts doubt on the view that Anglicanism is a via media since the idea is compromised by both practical and political considerations and smacks of “a poverty of thought and of a sheer reluctance to attempt to come to grips with intractably difficult theological material” (Sykes, 1978: 15). Such a via media view of Anglicanism has recently been put by Miley (2002 and 2003) who views Anglicanism as a middle way between extremes. Miley in her consideration of the extremes within Anglicanism (such as the conservative Evangelicals within the Diocese of Sydney) is critical of the privileging of a particular hermeneutic interest (Miley, 2002) but her characterisation of the Anglican tradition as a via media fails to acknowledge in any adequate way, as Sykes suggests, that there is a comprehensiveness within Anglicanism and that there is an inability to tackle the difficult issues of Anglican theology and its various hermeneutic interests. By arguing that that Anglicanism is a via media, Miley is really failing to come to grips with the comprehensiveness or multiformity of the Anglican tradition in any serious way. Miley’s view is distinct from that of a communicative community that attempts to engage with different lifeworlds in the process of dialogue such as Sykes seems to be envisioning in his discussion of coming to grips with difficult theological material. The via media does have the potential nonetheless to recognise that the outcomes of the Anglican Reformation are distinctive in that the Anglican Communion possesses both a consistent catholic and protestant strain within it (Sykes, 1978: 16) and this in turn suggests that for Anglicanism there is “the idea of elements held in tension with each other” (Sykes, 1978: 16) but this seems to be a wider and more multiform definition of Anglicanism as a via media than the one Miley presents. Such a suggestion of complementarity, Sykes argues, has the difficulty of finding a way in which it can be used in a rational manner. There is, says Sykes:

“a great difference between saying that a body like a church has found it practically possible to contain people who hold opposed and contradictory views,
and saying that that church believes that all of the contradictory views are true and in some hitherto undiscovered way reconcilable.” (Sykes, 1978: 19).

Those who adopt the latter of these two positions are seeking for what Sykes describes as a “tame and Anglicanised tertium quid” (Sykes, 1978: 20). Clearly Sykes is opting for the former view in seeking a rational manner in which different ideas can be viewed without seeking a tertium quid. A dialogue approach, based on communicative action could be such a rational methodology based on the intersubjectivity of participants seeking shared understanding. This conclusion has relevance for the present project, since this thesis is arguing in relation to the specific issue of eucharistic theology within Anglicanism, that there is a rational manner in which the distinctly different theologies of the Eucharist can be held in tension. The model developed as part of this project (Figure 1 – see page 146 of this thesis), with dimensions of realism and nominalism, to both moderate and immoderate degrees, suggests that within Anglicanism there are consistent but distinctly different philosophical underpinnings and understandings of the Eucharist and that within philosophy itself there are important distinctions to be drawn in relation to notions and frameworks. The model put forward in this thesis (Figure 1) does not seek to reconcile differences, but seeks instead to recognise the distinctive differences and hermeneutic interests within the same tradition of Christianity and provide a rational means of discussing and conceptualising these differences, not in terms of reconciling them but in terms of recognising that they exist. Such a means is to be found in dialogue and critical reflection based on the intersubjectivity of communicative action as is suggested by Habermas (1984 and 1989). The model of the Anglican eucharistic tradition (Figure 1) recognises the multiformity of the Anglican eucharistic tradition and provides a philosophical framework in which dialogue can proceed in the rational manner which Sykes (1978) sees as being needed in the Anglican tradition.

Sykes seeks to promote this sort of dialogue and critical reflection in his treatment of classical Anglican texts. In discussing Thomas Cranmer’s views on the Eucharist, Sykes reflects on the ambiguities of the theological material which allow for particular interpretations of what Cranmer is saying, where differing hermeneutics within Anglicanism interpret such an important figure in very different ways (see Case Study 1.1 for details of different interpretations of Cranmer’s eucharistic theology). Whilst Cranmer’s theology of the Eucharist is regarded as nominalist by this thesis in that it
separates the signs of the Eucharist from the signified in an empirical manner, it is realist in
that it links the sign of faith in heart and mind with the signified body and blood of Christ.
Attention to historical sources (such as the work of Cranmer and other Anglican theologians) allows dialogue and shared meaning to proceed.

Sykes’ discussion (Sykes, 1995: 40-44) presents the view that contemporary theology, if it is
to make any progress, deserves a level of attention to its historical sources that it rarely
receives. This dialogue focussing on attention to historical sources within the Anglican
eucharistic tradition has been the focus of the case studies in this thesis and adds weight to
the argument that dialogue has a valuable role to play in the Anglican eucharistic tradition
and in theological education, not only because it promotes understanding between differing
lifeworlds in the present, but also between differing lifeworlds from the past which impact
on the present. It is of course realised that such dialogue will of necessity be less
interactive than face to face dialogue with living individuals, but the example of Sykes’
analysis of Cranmer above, suggests that such dialogue can nonetheless be useful. Sykes’
analysis brings into question both the negative view of Cranmer, expressed by those who
accuse him of nominalism, such as Anglican Catholics like Dix (4.28), and the positive view
of Cranmer by those, such as Evangelical Anglicans like Doyle (4.27), who argue that
Cranmer’s eucharistic theology expresses a nominalism and anti-sacramentalism, that is
normative for Anglicanism as a perpetuation of Reformation theology. By combining the
insights of Sykes with the model of realism and nominalism presented in this project
(Figure 1), the “quality of attention” (Sykes, 1995: 42) to both dialogue with participants as
historical sources and face to face interactions can be improved. Those who argue that the
eucharistic theology of Thomas Cranmer and of the Reformation are normative for
Anglicanism, are, in light of this analysis, required to reassess their position, whilst those
who argue that Cranmer’s eucharistic theology was purely Zwinglian are also required to
assess their position. Such dialogue in the present depends heavily on analysis of the
tradition from the past with the addition of rational means (the philosophical concepts of
realism and nominalism to the moderate and immoderate degrees) to assist the dialogue of
communicative action. As has been pointed out above, such a process requires ready
access to the extensive material that forms the phenomena of the Anglican eucharistic
tradition and to material that addresses the philosophical assumptions of realism and
nominalism undergirding the Anglican eucharistic tradition.
Rowan Williams discusses dialogue in a more interactive form, suggesting that by speaking and hearing and by engaging with the material world we come to express truly and respond to the real otherness of God (Williams, 2000: 200). It is in this sense that he questions the traditional understanding of the sacramental principle since he believes symbolic forms are not just lying around waiting to be discovered and recognised. Rather he argues the symbolic forms are what humans live through since humans “are being capable of recalling and re-moulding what is given us, taking it forward and so re-moulding ourselves, the horizons of our understanding and hope” (Williams, 2000: 201). The echo of Gadamer here, in Williams’ talk of horizons, suggests a dialogue approach, where the Eucharist is seen to function in both an educative and emancipatory way, such that a person sharing in the dialogue of a eucharistic community comes to know more about themselves, about others and about God. This suggests therefore, as Williams proposes, that not only do people make signs but also that they make themselves through signs as they reach new understandings about themselves and others. It is Williams’ view that in the knowing of self, people are truly emancipated. This whole idea connects with the notion of the Eucharist functioning as education for emancipation, since Christ as sacrament:

“means in practice an authoritative and creative freedom, whose effects slowly break the mould of the existing Israel, so that the life of God’s people under law can now be read as a sign not only of God but of the new work of God in Jesus and the Church.” (Williams, 2000: 204).

Linear models of education (‘the existing Israel’ which could be seen as a particular lifeworld or hermeneutic interest) are surpassed by the freedom that the eucharistic community brings in “an ultimate intimacy between God and his people, a radicalising and consummation (and therefore revolutionary modification) of the covenant bond” (Williams, 2000: 204-205). In such a scheme Christ “is the sign both of the active pressure and creative grace of God” (Williams, 2000: 205). Christ is therefore not just a ‘thing’ which can be quantified in some technical manner, rather Christ is instantiated in a realist framework by being ‘sign’, the nature of God’s active and creative grace, which means that:

“Christ proclaims the imperatives of the kingdom, realizes them in his life and death, and so begins to make the possible community actual in the post-Easter experience of his followers. He is thus an effective sign, a converting sign.” (Williams, 2000: 205).

This is precisely the argument Pickstock (Case Study 4.41) puts when she argues the case for the realist linking of the sacramental and ecclesial bodies of Christ, as opposed to too
closely associating the sacramental body with the historical body of Christ, such as occurred during the Middle Ages in what is now seen as a corruption of eucharistic theology (Pickstock, 1998: 158-162) focussing on immoderate realism (that is, the carnal or fleshy presence or sacrifice of Christ in the Eucharist).

All this suggests that when this sort of dialogue within the Anglican eucharistic tradition, based on the rationality of a system paradigm, takes place then new meaning and understanding also takes place. Theological education when it practises this methodology is much more than the mere accumulation and appropriation of knowledge, but rather education functioning as emancipation, where the gift of what is known is not some immobilised object (Christ’s body and blood immobilised in bread and wine and locked within an aumbry or tabernacle) and how it can be controlled, accumulated and measured, but rather a process where the learners comes to know self in the context of making signs and as participants join in the life of a eucharistic community as both speakers and hearers. Williams puts this succinctly by stating that:

“The eucharist hints at the paradox that material things carry their fullest meaning for human minds and bodies – the meaning of God’s grace and of the common life thus formed – when they are the medium of gift, not instruments of control or objects of accumulation.” (Williams, 2000: 218).

Such a dialogue requires a stepping apart from any lifeworld that aims to control and manipulate signs or people and a seeking after meaning and freedom for those who enter into the dialogue. For Williams, where the Eucharist becomes a ‘symbol of mutuality’ it incorporates not only the individual’s interests but what is beyond the individual’s interests and it is here that emancipation takes place, for the participant and for the wider Anglican tradition in its functioning as a eucharistic community engaged in communicative action which uses the intersubjectivity of dialogue.

It now remains for this thesis to suggest some practical recommendations about how a dialogue approach to theological education could proceed as communicative action. These general recommendations are set out below.
5.7 Recommendations for a Dialogue Approach to Theological Education

The following recommendations for a dialogue approach in Anglican theological education are made with particular reference to Anglican eucharistic theology.

**Recommendation 1:** That theological education in the Anglican eucharistic tradition recognise that this tradition is multiform and that a number of pervasive essences from the Anglican tradition are present in Anglican eucharistic theology. The most pervasive of these are seen to be multiformity of the tradition and the underlying philosophical assumptions of realism and nominalism to a moderate degree.

**Recommendation 2:** That theological education in the Anglican eucharistic tradition employ critical approaches in the study of the tradition based on the intersubjectivity of communicative action, where interactions move beyond the technical and hermeneutic interests of the various parties within the Anglican tradition. This implies that theological education must be about more than the appropriation of particular technical and hermeneutic interests and must engage in dialogue that is genuinely communicative action.

**Recommendation 3:** That theological education in the Anglican eucharistic tradition be concerned with the sharing of understanding rather than hermeneutic idealism, such that participants are encouraged to step outside their lifeworld and to be engaged with others in their particular lifeworlds, interacting as speakers and hearers as a part of the complexity of the experience of the system paradigm of the Anglican eucharistic tradition and the society of the Anglican Communio. Such rationality of communicative action cannot be tied to subjectivist and individualist premises.

**Recommendation 4:** That theological education in the Anglican eucharistic tradition seeks to distinguish between ‘lifeworld’ and ‘system paradigm’ in the teaching and exploration of eucharistic theology. At the same time efforts need to be made to establish the realisation that this is a fundamental issue of the social world of Anglicanism, and every effort made to connect these two conceptual strategies so as to promote fuller understanding of the nature and identity of the Anglican eucharistic tradition and Anglicanism itself.
Recommendation 5: That theological education in the Anglican eucharistic tradition encourage participants to step outside their lifeworld so as to increase the likelihood of critical reflection through the rationality of communicative action in the context of dialogue situations. Theological education therefore needs to put in place opportunities for people to speak and to hear in an effort to reach understanding through a process of interpretation and argumentation aimed at the reaching of consensus and which encourages participants to look beyond their own horizons and towards the horizons of other participants in the Anglican eucharistic tradition.

Recommendation 6: That theological education in the Anglican eucharistic tradition give language a prominent place, not in terms of syntactic and semantic analysis, but in terms of language-in-use or speech or communicative action, such that participants engage in a process of reaching understanding based on consensus and intersubjective recognition of validity claims.

Recommendation 7: That theological education in the Anglican eucharistic tradition acknowledge that rationality has less to do with the possession of information and more to do with how speaking and acting subjects acquire and use knowledge. This means that participants need to acknowledge the limitations of technical and hermeneutic interests and to commit themselves to more critical interests.

Recommendation 8: That theological education in the Anglican eucharistic tradition recognise that agreement and consensus are reached on the basis of shared insight and does not depend on force and coercion but on reasons and grounds as a process of argumentation.

Recommendation 9: That theological education in the Anglican eucharistic tradition encourages participants to objectify their lifeworld and view it as a boundary making system rather than as ‘the’ system of the Anglican eucharistic tradition. At the same time theological education needs to encourage participants to realise that their lifeworld may not be equivalent to the system paradigm of the Anglican eucharistic tradition and to act in a way that recognises the subjectivist and individualist nature of lifeworlds in general. This recommendation does not however suggest that lifeworlds are lacking in value for the Anglican eucharistic tradition. The recommendation acknowledges that lifeworlds are
important to participants in dialogue since they give participants a sense of where they come from and what they value, but at the same time the recommendation encourages participants not to view their lifeworld as the system paradigm of the Anglican eucharistic tradition, whilst at the same time recognising that other lifeworlds are part of the system paradigm that is the Anglican eucharistic tradition.

**Recommendation 10:** That theological education in the Anglican eucharistic tradition encourage participants to explore the ‘seams’ between their lifeworld and the system paradigm of the Anglican tradition as a process of dialogue based on communicative action.

**Recommendation 11:** That theological education in the Anglican eucharistic tradition encourage the act of reaching understanding rather than the act of egocentric ownership of knowledge. Theological education should encourage the reaching of understanding where learners become an ideal communicative community aiming at socialisation and social integration without the arrogance of the assumption that their particular hermeneutic interests are privileged or holy or sacred knowledge.

**Recommendation 12:** That theological education in the Anglican eucharistic tradition give more priority to the exploration of philosophical assumptions in sacramental theology since this assists in the process of interpretation and argumentation as well as in helping to establish intersubjectivity among participants in dialogue by allowing them to acknowledge the existence of differing philosophical assumptions. The work of secular philosophers (such as David Armstrong) as well as Christian philosophers (such as Catherine Pickstock) are recommended as important sources of philosophical insight.

**Recommendation 13:** That theological education in the Anglican eucharistic tradition encourages the authority of achieved consensus between participants rather than the exclusive authority of particular lifeworlds and hermeneutic interests.

**Recommendation 14:** That theological education in the Anglican eucharistic tradition recognise that dialogue needs to be based on values such as the equality of all participants, fairness, concern for others and their lifeworld, trust, respect, appreciation of another’s premises and hope for shared understanding.
Recommendation 15: That theological education in the Anglican eucharistic tradition promotes dialogue, not only between learners and theologians in a face to face manner, but dialogue with the voices of the Anglican eucharistic tradition in the form of original works and case study material. This suggests that the Anglican Communion needs a more readily accessible method for accessing the phenomena of the Anglican eucharistic tradition and finding ways of using this material creatively and purposefully in Anglican theological education concerned with eucharistic theology.

The Christian faith, of which the Anglican Communion is a part, seeks freedom for its members. John’s Gospel has Jesus proclaiming “and you will know the truth, and the truth will make you free” (John 8: 32). This suggests that truth is aimed at an emancipatory quality and potential in the lives of people and that this was perhaps the aim Jesus had in mind. The recommendations set out above seek to promote the same aim of which Jesus speaks. A dialogue approach to theological education concerned with eucharistic theology seeks to free people from the constraints of technical and hermeneutic interests and promote the freedom of critical interest through the intersubjectivity of communicative action while at the same time recognizing the value and legitimacy of these technical and hermeneutic interests. It is hoped that this thesis and the dialogue approach it recommends for Anglican theological education and the Anglican eucharistic tradition can contribute to this aim of the truth making people free.
Chapter 6

Conclusion and Future Directions for Theological Education in the Anglican Tradition

This thesis has sought through the application of a methodology of phenomenology to access the essences of the Anglican eucharistic tradition and to make recommendations for Anglican theological education. The essences of the Anglican eucharistic tradition (Chapter 4) were extracted from the extensive case study material generated as part of this project (see Case Studies on CD). The major findings of the study have been that the Anglican eucharistic tradition is multiform and not uniform and that this multiformity of the tradition generally centres around the distinction between the philosophical concepts of realism and nominalism to the moderate degree. Although some evidence of immoderate nominalism has been isolated, no real evidence of immoderate realism has been detected in the Anglican eucharistic tradition in terms of the case studies presented in this project. In addition a distinction has been drawn concerning moderate realism and the philosophical frameworks in which it functions. Whereas some moderate realists in the Anglican eucharistic tradition seem to function according to a Platonic framework (e.g. linking the particulars bread and wine with the universal Form of Christ’s body and blood) others seem to function according to an Aristotelian framework where the universal, the nature of Christ as Word or logos, is instantiated in the particularity of both bread and wine on the one hand and Christ’s body and blood on the other. Secular philosophical reflection (principally the work of David Armstrong) has been an important source of interpretation for the experience of the Anglican eucharistic tradition as a whole.

These major findings have also led to recommendations for theological education in the Anglican eucharistic tradition (see Chapter 5) which suggest that the way forward for Anglican theological education is to promote a dialogue approach which engages
participants in the intersubjectivity of communicative action. The advantage of a
dialogue approach, it is argued, is in the establishment of an ideal communicative
community which seeks to move the Anglican eucharistic tradition beyond the
constraints of particular technical and hermeneutic interests in the Anglican tradition and
allow the tradition as a whole to share an understanding of the multiformity of the
Anglican eucharistic tradition. A dialogue approach seeks to have participants involved
in a process of shared understanding rather than limiting discussion to the appropriation
of a particular interest or interests. Such a dialogue approach holds out the hope of
allowing all participants in the Anglican eucharistic tradition (all within the traditional
parties of either Evangelical Anglicans or Catholic Anglicans) to share and value their
particular interests but at the same to step outside the lifeworld of their particular
technical and hermeneutic interests and interact with others in communicative action
rather than party spirit. This has the potential of allowing the participants of the
Anglican eucharistic tradition to be part of a system paradigm that more legitimately
represents the multiformity of the tradition than particular lifeworlds, and sharing this
multiformity in a dialogue approach based on the intersubjectivity of communicative
action. The process of communicative action advocated here owes much to the work of

The recommendations for Anglican theological education concerned with eucharistic
theology (see Chapter 5) made by this study, hold out the potential of creating the sort of
ideal communicative community that allows for the intersubjectivity of a dialogue
approach based on communicative action. Such an approach could be used within
particular theological education institutions as those institutions attempt, not only to
value any particular technical and hermeneutic interests they might hold, but also to
stand back from those interests and interact with others who may have different or
complementary interests. Both this valuing and this standing back is seen to be a
legitimate part of Anglican theological education concerned with eucharistic theology.

Access to the phenomena of the Anglican eucharistic tradition is an area for future
research and action. Printed works of Anglican theologians are not always readily
available and often these, when available, are extensive. A significant need for the
Anglican tradition generally and for theological education therefore is to provide greater
access to this material so that the participants in the dialogue can interact with the
Chapter 6

tradition more easily. The provision of the CD that accompanies this thesis is one way that this access can be increased since the case studies provided there are extensive but do not require participants to have read entire works that are not always readily available or accessible.

One of the most powerful means for the sharing of information in the modern world is the World Wide Web. It is therefore appropriate that discussion of the phenomena of the Anglican eucharistic tradition be encouraged through this means. Accordingly two web sites have been set up where it is intended to place some of the phenomena of the Anglican eucharistic tradition (such as the case studies developed as part of this study) and to encourage dialogue between participants as a communicative community. The extensive case study material on the CD accompanying the thesis is available at the web address: http://web.mac.com/brian.douglas. Discussion of some of the philosophical material presented in the thesis is also available at this site. Abbreviated case study material together with the opportunity for comment and dialogue can be accessed at the following web address: http://anglicaneucharistictheology.blogspot.com. The success of these initiatives is uncertain but represents attempts to allow access to case study material and dialogue to proceed according to the recommendations set out in Chapter 5 of this thesis.

Future research is needed to continue the isolation of case study material, both from the past and the present. As this material becomes available, the analysis and evaluation of this material (e.g. in terms of the philosophical assumptions underlying the eucharistic theology) and the sharing of this material in the system paradigm of Anglicanism is to be encouraged. The use of the web sites discussed above would be an important means of sharing the phenomena of the Anglican eucharistic tradition, which is not always easily available in the printed form, and encouraging dialogue on this material. Face to face discussion among students, theologians and theological educators would also assist this process of dialogue. This is seen to be an important future direction since not only will material be made available to a wider audience, but the discussion that may ensue could lead to greater shared understanding through communicative action and be the impetus for others to engage in research and study of Anglican eucharistic theological and the praxis of theological education.
An additional matter of significance arising from this study is that of philosophical assumptions. This study has suggested, on the basis of the analysis of the phenomena of the Anglican eucharistic tradition that Anglican eucharistic theology varies according to the philosophical assumptions of realism and nominalism to the moderate degree. In order to allow theological education concerned with eucharistic theology to proceed using such a philosophical analysis, there would need to be more attention to philosophy itself within the Anglican tradition of theological education. Courses on sacramental theology would therefore benefit from some discussion of philosophical models, such as that proposed by David Armstrong (see Chapter 3 of this thesis). Not only would this allow for greater understanding of the various philosophical assumptions underlying eucharistic theology but also it would assist in the process of dialogue since it could provide a heuristic device to facilitate the dialogue process. The various philosophical frameworks that underpin eucharistic theology and influence its expression would be a valuable source of study for all students of Anglican eucharistic theology. The web sites on Anglican eucharistic theology referred to above have begun to supply information on such philosophical models in an attempt to facilitate discussion and understanding of the various philosophical assumptions and models. The glossary of terms and background information on Habermas and the theory of communicative actions and its ramifications for theological education are examples of material already added to these web sites.

Theological institutions may be able to encourage those engaged in the study of Anglican eucharistic theology to interact with not only written material (e.g. the writings of various Anglican theologians) but also with other people face to face. Such face to face interaction could be with people from the same institution or tradition or from other Anglican theological institutions and traditions. The hope here is that there would be a genuine sharing of understanding based on argumentation and interpretation emphasising critical interest. It may be possible for theologians and students from institutions with differing theological perspectives to engage in dialogue which is not aimed at prosecuting ‘a’ particular truth or having others appropriate such ‘a’ truth, but instead encouraging all participants to share the truths of the Anglican eucharistic tradition, inherent in its multiformity and differing philosophical assumptions. This would require a willingness to share and to listen in a spirit of openness and mutual respect, rather than acrimonious debate and rivalry. The argumentation and interpretation of dialogue therefore requires trust and acceptance of the fact that other
technical and hermeneutic interests exist and that there is no one ‘truth’ of the Anglican eucharistic tradition expressed as a particular hermeneutic interest.

The advantage of such an approach could work to break down some of the bitterness and misunderstanding that has so often divided the various church party traditions of Anglicanism and in so doing lead, not only to greater shared understanding on the basis of dialogue, but also to a more unified face for Anglicanism. The dialogue approach also has important ramifications for Anglican theological enquiry generally, not just in the area of Anglican eucharistic theology. Theological dialogue for Anglican theology generally, as well as eucharistic theology specifically, could therefore be encouraged on the basis of the approach suggested.

Indications of such a process of dialogue occurring have already begun within the worldwide Anglican Communion following on from the release of the Windsor Report in 2004. The Joint Standing Committee of the Anglican Consultative Council and of the Primates’ Meeting at their meeting in March, 2006, commended the paper *Towards an Anglican Covenant* (2006) developed as a recommendation from the Windsor Report (2004). The paper suggests that “an Anglican Covenant be developed and adopted in the life of the Communion, giving explicit articulation and recognition to the principles of co-operation and interdependence … which hold the Anglican Communion together” (*Towards an Anglican Covenant*, 2006: 1). While the production of such a Covenant has the marks of dialogue stamped on it when it speaks of “collaborative dialogue, equal participation, and transparent objectivity” and when it suggests that there must be “a balance between the promotion of particular interests and shared common interests” (*Towards an Anglican Covenant*, 2006: 6), it also contains the danger of creating merely another narrow hermeneutic for the Anglican Communion. The paper recognises this when it speaks of the dangers of the Covenant (*Towards an Anglican Covenant*, 2006: 2) in that the Covenant could merely create a document which narrows the interests of the Anglican Communion so that there are those who can accept it and so become members of a confessional family, and those who cannot and so are not members of the confessional family. Such a danger has been addressed in this thesis in discussion of the promotion of particular technical and hermeneutic interests in relation to eucharistic theology in the Anglican tradition and the way in which this leads to division and acrimony. At the same time this thesis has suggested that the creation of an ideal
communicative community (as Habermas, 1984 and 1989 calls it), is the way forward for
the Anglican Communion, where dialogue is a process of communicative action based
on the intersubjectivity of argumentation without privileging any one hermeneutic
interest. While the paper Towards an Anglican Covenant holds the potential of creating such
an ideal communicative community which focuses on issues that are relational,
educational and institutional (Towards an Anglican Covenant, 2006: 3), the focus of the
Covenant seems to be on the production of a written document containing theological
content, rather than establishing a dialogue process based on communicative action.
Whilst the writing of Covenant document will undoubtedly involve dialogue, the danger
needs to be avoided of focussing on the written document at the expense of the process
of dialogue. Habermas (1989: 124) warns against this sort of lifeworld where
particularity becomes sedimented in texts and institutions as opposed to vitality of a
communicative community.

The Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, in his June 2006 reflection entitled The
Challenge and Hope of Being an Anglican Today: A Reflection for the Bishops, Clergy and Faithful of
the Anglican Communion (Williams, 2006), argues that “the idea of ‘covenant’ between local
churches … is one method that has been suggested, and it seems to me the best way
forward” (Williams, 2006: 3), however, his reflection seems to focus more on the process
of dialogue, in the face of diversity, than the mere production of a written document.
This is a hopeful sign of dialogue and communicative action being seen as the way
forward for the Anglican Communion as it seeks to become an ideal communicative
community, moving past hermeneutic idealism and encouraging members to step outside
their own lifeworld. Williams himself recognises this as he speaks about the Anglican
Communion’s lack of structures which allow it to cope with the diversity of view that is
arising in not only the Communion but the world (Williams, 2006: 3). There is an
implicit stepping outside of the lifeworld in Williams’ description of what is needed to be
an Anglican today. He argues that this must involve “certain concessions and
unclarities” but that this holds the promise of “ways of sharing responsibility and making
decisions that will hold and that will be mutually intelligible” (Williams, 2006: 3). Clearly
the Archbishop sees both challenge and hope in the process of dialogue and it is
interesting to note that the emphasis of what he says in his reflection is on the process of
dialogue and communicative action, rather than the production of written documents.
For Williams, covenant seems to mean making decisions corporately and looking
together for the mind of Christ as the Scriptures are studied (Williams, 2006: 3). Part of this process may indeed by the production of a Covenant document, but it seems that the Archbishop is clear that process or *praxis* is more important for the Anglican Communion. He specifically links this with sacramental action as a way of creating a “more effective institutional reality” (Williams, 2006: 3) which focuses less on the particular and more on the universal mission of the Church. All this he admits requires learning how to share responsibility. This thesis argues that the dialogue of communicative action is a vital aspect of this type of learning, and that the implication of dialogue and communicative reach far beyond eucharistic theology alone, although of course this thesis has argued that communicative action is the way forward for the Anglican eucharistic tradition. Indeed dialogue and communicative are integral to the life of the Anglican Communion as a whole as it faces the contemporary issues that confront it.

The Anglican Communion exists throughout the world as a diverse body of Christian people seeking knowledge of God and themselves through the sharing of experience. This quest is impoverished by attempts to force the participants in the tradition into particular technical and hermeneutic interests and the particular lifeworlds of the various church parties of Anglicanism without adequate attention to the development of critical interest. This study has made a case for openness and the sharing of understanding in the Anglican eucharistic tradition by accessing the phenomena and extracting the essences of the tradition in an effort to establish that the Anglican eucharistic tradition is multiform. The quest of the Anglican Communion will be better served, it is argued, if the Communion engages in dialogue based on shared meaning and understanding rather than division based on acrimony and suspicion. This thesis therefore attempts to make some contribution to the quest of the Anglican Communion for the emancipation that comes from efforts at shared meaning. More specifically this thesis has sought to provide a model for the understanding of the Anglican eucharistic tradition through a process of dialogue based on the intersubjectivity of communicative action and through analysis of the philosophical concepts underlying Anglican eucharistic theology.
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