Interrupting History

A critical-reconceptualisation of
History curriculum after ‘the end of history’

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DECLARATION

I hereby certify that the work embodied in this thesis is the result of original research and has not been submitted for a higher degree to any other University or Institution.

Signed
When I first went looking for a doctoral supervisor, Professor Jennifer Gore was at the top of my list. As I write these acknowledgements, I still feel the same way. Jenny has offered precisely the direction and support I needed throughout this project, and was simply amazing in the last few weeks. I hope this project is only the beginning of our professional relationship.

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I would like to especially thank my wife, Vicki, my son, Nicholas and my daughter, Rebekah, who have lived with dad’s “PhD head” for six years while I was completing this project. We were a ‘young family’ when this project started, and as it comes to a close both Nick and Beck are in high school. How time flies, even when facing ‘the end of history’.

Finally, it would be remiss of me not to note that this research was completed with funding support from the University of Newcastle in the form of an Australian Postgraduate Award scholarship for the first two years of the project, and a University of Newcastle Postgraduate research special completion scholarship in 2005.
This dissertation is dedicated to my family, as it must be, for allowing me the time I needed to complete this project, and for being as excited as I was, as I finished it.
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Contemporary Italian philosopher, Gianni Vattimo (1991), has described 'the end of history' as a motif of our times. While neo-liberal conservatives such as Francis Fukuyama (1992) celebrated triumphantly, and perhaps rather prematurely after the fall of the Berlin Wall, 'the end of history' in the 'inevitable' global acceptance of the ideologies of free market capitalism and liberal democracy, methodological postmodernists (including Barthes, Derrida, Baudrillard, Lyotard, and Foucault), mobilised 'the end of history' throughout the later half of the twentieth century as a symbol of a crisis of confidence in the discourse of modernity, and its realist epistemologies. This loss of faith in the adequacy of representation has been seen by many positivist and empiricist historians as a threat to the discipline of history, with its desire to recover and reconstruct 'the truth' of the past. It is argued by defenders of 'traditional' history (from Appleby, Hunt, & Jacob, 1994; R. J. Evans, 1997; Marwick, 2001; and Windschuttle, 1996; to Zagorin, 1999), and some postmodernists (most notably, Jenkins, 1999), that if we accept postmodern social theory, historical research and writing will become untenable. This study re-examines the nature of the alleged 'threat' to history posed by postmodernism, and explores the implications of postmodern social theory for History as curriculum.
IMPORTANT NOTE

To hopefully eliminate some confusion that comes when attempting to determine the referent of the term ‘history’, I follow the convention of recent History curriculum studies (see A. Clark, 2004), rather than the work of Jenkins (1999; 1997), as far as the use of capitalisation is concerned. Jenkins describes ‘upper case History’ as metanarrative, and ‘lower case history’ as the practice of historians. This convention, while useful, does not allow distinction between the practise of the discipline, and the learning and teaching of the discipline, of importance within this study. Therefore, at all times throughout this dissertation, History (with a capital ‘H’) is used as the title of the subject taught in schools and universities (as with Economics, Mathematics, or Geography), while history (with a lower case ‘h’) is used to describe the academic discipline or ‘the past’ itself. Where I wish to make clear that ‘history’ is being mobilised with metanarrative associations, it is placed ‘under erasure’ through the use of single inverted commas. The only exception to these rules is (1) where the referent is left deliberately ambiguous (and therefore potentially multiple), as is the case on most occasions where discussion is focused upon ‘the end of history’; or (2) where normal punctuation conventions dictate the necessity of capitalisation.
PREFACE

Millennial concerns

As a way of prefacing my dissertation, and performing a little currere, I would like to share with you, my reader, a number of ‘millennial’ concerns, framed in terms of an aspect of my own ‘curriculum’ or life ‘course’. Let me begin with a concern that was not my own, but encouraged me to write this preface. Recently, a retiring president of the Australian Association for Research in Education, the Dean of the faculty in which I work, asked why we couldn’t just return to “good old fashioned forms of Marxist analysis”. There was humour in his tone, as always. However, what was striking to me in his rhetorical question was the idea of a ‘return’ to a particular pre-postmodernist form of analysis. The notion of ‘return’ struck me as strange, given that I had never really been where he was suggesting we should return to. Of course, even a cursory glance at research texts produced in different times, and places for that matter, shows that they are marked by quite different peculiarities and regularities of style and concern. So here was my problem.

I was born the year that Foucault’s The order of things was published; the same year that the first English translation of Derrida appeared in the United States, and Barthes was composing The discourse of history. Barthes’ postmodern turn, marked by the production of S/Z, was complete before I started school in 1971. When Derrida’s Of grammatology was

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1 Pinar (1975a) uses the infinitive form of curriculum in order to privilege the autobiographical aspect of educational experience. Thus, curriculum becomes the course of one’s life, rather than just a school syllabus document, or the experience of school based education.

2 Although there is probably an argument to be made here about different conceptions of time, I am not rejecting the concept of ‘return’ because of a commitment to the linearity of history. Without elaborating further, I would propose that Deleuze’s notion of the rhizome constitutes an alternative (like Foucault’s notion of ‘discontinuity’) that moves us beyond the binary of linear and cyclic conceptions of time and history. But that is an argument for another time.
translated into English by the postcolonial theorist Spivak in 1976, I was ten years old, and facing the death of my grandfather, who in name and in spirit had been my ‘Da’. When Foucault passed away in 1984, the same year Lyotard’s report on the postmodern condition was translated into English, I was completing my final year of high school. Although I would flirt briefly with an Arts degree in 1985, it would be another decade before I started my education degree. When I finally enrolled at the University of Sydney in 1996 the academy had been responding to postmodern and poststructuralist concerns for over twenty-five years, and we had finally, convincingly, entered into the post-industrial world of the internet, in which Foucault’s shift of concern from the ‘mode of production’ to the ‘mode of information’ (Poster, 1984, p. 127), seemed somehow prophetic. Despite the existence of ‘old Marxists’ in the faculty, poststructuralism had emerged as a distinct form of analysis that was not only agreeable to the postmodern sensibilities of those of us marked by the sign of erasure (Generation X), but formed part of the intellectual space in which our post-punk academic subjectivities were being fashioned. Thus, while we might be haunted by Marx (as Derrida suggests, and my own Vygotskian and ‘Critical Pedagogy’ leanings betray), we can never return to Marx.

If the decline of Marxism – that had lead to my Dean’s lament – can really be traced back to the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the collapse of Soviet communism, then there was little hope for me. It wasn’t until 1996, well after Fukuyama (1989) had first announced *The end of history*, that I returned to study in the academy, already on its way to becoming a post-historical institution (Peters, 1998), with the ghost of Marx lingering in those offices of a recalcitrant old-guard who were yet to give up on the Revolution. However, even if we Gen-Xers and the ‘old-guard’ were both oblivious to Marx’ passing, we shared the knowledge that the end of the Millennium was fast approaching. As primary school
students, we Gen-Xers had calculated ourselves into that future so many times, with disbelief that we would be adults, perhaps with children of our own, when the calendar finally caught up with our imaginations. So ‘millennial concerns’ had been part of our life for a considerable period when Gorbachev and the Soviet Union finally went the way of Marx, and I do remember thinking in 1991 as I sat watching the (first) Gulf War unfold on CNN, oblivious to Fukuyama, that I might finally be experiencing the end of history. I didn’t have Baudrillard’s (1995) reassurance then, that this was just a simulation, but I did have a baby son, which made the simulacra that much harder to resist.

Of course, we Gen-Xers were not the first generation to anticipate our coming-of-age at Armageddon, though for us ‘the end of history’ has always been shrouded in a radiation cloud. Which is probably why, when asked at a dinner party what my thesis was about, I was met with disbelief when I suggested that it considers the implications of ‘the end of history’ for History curriculum. It was to my companion self-evident that history had not ended, as events were still transpiring as we spoke. Of course, her objection betrayed a great deal about her particular conception of history, and lack of familiarity with ‘post-historical discourse’ in contemporary philosophy, politics, and history theory. However, it also alerted me to the fact that what I took to be a topic of great importance from my location in the academy was regarded with incredulity at the dinner table. I make this point because despite being regarded by some commentators as ‘a sign of the times’ (Vattimo, 2001),

3 Throughout this entire dissertation, I use quotation marks “to serve as a precaution” (Derrida, 1978/1993) and to mark out what I am using ‘under erasure’. According to Derrida (quoted in R. J. C. Young, 2001), to hold a term ‘under erasure’, is “to preserve as an instrument something whose truth value he [the author] criticizes” (p. 420). As a rhetorical device, ‘the end of history’ constructs a space within which ‘history’ can be discussed while holding it ‘under erasure’.

4 See the insightful paper by Anijar (2004) for an analysis of how Baby Boomers, Gen Xers and Post-Millennials have handled living in a world constantly threatened by ‘the bomb’.
‘the end of history’ remains somewhat esoteric as a concept, and has a number of diverse and conflicting associations.

Versions of the idea that history is facing an inevitable end have been around for some time (Niethammer, 1992). We know, for example, that at the turn of the first Millennium, Christians expected the Messiah to return and to engage in a “complete winding up of the created order and the imposition of a post-historical age of divine rule” (Rayment-Pickard, 2000, p. 301). Such a view was largely rejected among the European intelligentsia by the time of the Renaissance, and was replaced with a secularised Enlightenment view of ‘the end of history’ as “the self-perfection of humanity” (Rayment-Pickard, 2000, p. 301). However, the “prolonged fear of imminent annihilation” (Giroux, 2001, p. 197) that followed us through the Cold War, and that may have been reignited by the ‘War on Terror’, has constituted a social sphere in which an “ever-present Western religious subtext of the apocalypse” (Anijar, 2004, p. 127) persists as a cultural undercurrent. Perhaps ironically, it is ‘technocratic rationality’, as a particular legacy of the Enlightenment, functioning as the *modus operandi* of militarily-invested governments around the globe, which has painted the apocalypse as more possibility than prophecy.

Over the past couple of decades, ‘end of history’ rhetoric has emerged as a marker of intellectual debate over the status of history in the academy, from within neo-liberal, poststructuralist, and neo-positivist traditions. Although we can really only speculate why ‘end of history’ rhetoric has erupted in a multiplicity of forms at this particular historical moment, the timing of its emergence makes it seem likely that it is both part of, and a reaction to, a much broader secular millennialism, contingent upon the great social, cultural and intellectual changes wrought during the late twentieth century. What is worth noting is
that manifestations of a secular millennialism, or at least a “millennial sensationalism” (Feldstein, 2001, p. 312), appeared across a range of ‘Western’ intellectual and media-driven discourses in the last two decades of the Twentieth Century. Who is likely to forget: we were about to see the manifestation of a New World Order as a result of the implosion of the Soviet Union (Brandon, 1992; Fukuyama, 1989; Galtung & Vincent, 1992; D. A. Smith & Böröcz, 1994); the collapse of computer systems as a result of the Y2K bug (P. Stanley, 1998), itself intimately connected with the idea of time, and perhaps a manifestation of deep anxieties about the information society (Fosket & Fishman, 1999); the ‘urgency’ of Australia’s push to become a republic, strangely ominous as we approached the centenary of Federation, and invested with a millenarian romanticism (Wark, 1997); speculation the Earth would experience a cataclysmic collision with asteroid 1997XF11 in 2028, which later was proven to be inaccurate (Polsani, 1998); we would be wiped out by HIV AIDS, a new indestructible plague (see Carter, 1987; Haver, 1996; Kinsella, 1989, for a sceptical view about the HIV AIDS epidemic). The list could go on. Importantly, highlighting these various millennial concerns is not meant to suggest that they are somehow ‘false’ by being tied up in an apocalyptic fixation. HIV AIDS still demands our attention, and has proven devastating for communities across the globe, particularly in Africa; with September 11, we may well have moved closer to realising a particular kind of New World Order; and the inevitability of an Australian republic still seems a cautious bet, though its timing may no longer be suggestive of an arcane destiny. The important point about this list of millennial declarations is that obsession with the ‘end of history’ is not simply an academic phenomenon confined to the philosophical works that emerged on the French intellectual scene in the later half of the twentieth century, but has manifested in a variety of popular forms.
The focus of a growing number of films and television series (Broderick, 1993; Combs, 1993; Rowlands, 2003), and an important theme in an increasing number of books (Bongie, 1991; S. Brown, Bell, & Carson, 1996; Castells, 1998; Giroux & Myrsiades, 2001; Gould, 1997; Laurance, 1999; Tiffin & Terashima, 2001), ‘the Millennium’ has obviously been on ‘our mind’. It is also likely that a retrospective glance may figure ‘the Millennium’ a twentieth century obsession, motivated by an insatiable desire to create meaning where perhaps there was none, like the protagonist in a book by Umberto Eco (see Foucault’s pendulum, Eco, 1988), or the reader of a Haruki Murakami novel (try reading for example, Hard-boiled wonderland and the end of the world, Murakami, 2001). Resultantly, what Gould (1997) has called ‘Millennium madness’ may well have given “to the more academic theories a greater resonance with the temper of their times than is customary” (Kumar, 1995, p151). Kumar (1995) is right to suggest that there is “at least an ‘elective affinity’” between the fall of communism, the end of modernity, and the end of the Millennium, “even if we would be hard put to specify casual links” (p. 152). Likewise, Jameson’s assertion (from a text originally published in the early 1980s), that “these last few years have been marked by an inverted millenarianism, in which premonitions of the future, catastrophic or redemptive, have been replaced by a sense of the end of this or that” (Jameson, 1991, p. 1), is also pertinent. Besides being reflective of what Derrida (1994) has referred to as the apocalyptic turn in philosophy – which he argues stretches back to the post-WWII 1950s – and what Berkhoffer (1995) describes as “the apocalypticism expressed in popular culture” prior to the Millennium (p. 1), talk about ‘the end of history’ may well be part of the millennial spirit of the times, a key discourse in the context of our fin de siècle.5

5 Literally translated “end of cycle”, here fin de siecle is used as a signifier of the end of the second Millennium.
While the idea of ‘the end of history’ may have proliferated toward the turn of the Millennium because of some deep-seated anxiety, or motivated search for meaning, it has been reworked within poststructuralism into a decidedly anti-millennial form. Take for example Foucault’s (1971/1994) resistance to ideas of continual development towards a shared finality; Derrida’s (1994) rejection of teleological narrative as little more than a confidence trick; Lyotard’s (1991) scepticism of the future offered by science that he argues is motivated by an obsession with human survival beyond the super nova of our own sun; and Baudrillard’s (1992) loss of faith in both history and its end/ings as reality and its representation implode. Regardless of the reasons for the wide-spread emergence of ‘end of history’ rhetoric, it remains like its conceptual cousins, ‘the demise of the Author’, and ‘the end of Man’, intuitively problematic (Burke, 1998). As Kumar (1995) notes, “the onset of the end, not just of another century but of another Millennium, is bound to have an effect on the theories under consideration” (p. 151). There can be little doubt that this was the case concerning the academic curriculum of the late twentieth century; and my course through the humanities as an undergraduate in Education, History, and Linguistics, during the last days of the second Millennium.

Although it has been an interesting, and perhaps necessary intellectual exercise, to place the proliferation of ‘end of history’ rhetoric within its contemporary ‘historical’ context, this dissertation is not actually concerned with ‘the end of history’ as a millennial discourse. Instead, it represents an attempt to address the dearth of discussion in educational literature about the significance for school History of recent debates over the status of historical knowledge, by exploring what are representative positions on ‘the end of history’ that have emerged in contemporary political and philosophical debate. In particular, my concern is with contributions to ‘end of history’ discourse that emerged in the second half
of the twentieth century, after World War II, in the countdown towards the year 2000. Had I adopted a different periodisation then figures such as Hegel, Nietzsche, and Marx may well have figured more prominently in my analyses, since at least one current stream of thought is indebted to their much earlier theorising (see Fukuyama, 1992). I am aware that the periodisation adopted for this study does make the appearance of ‘end of history’ discourse as a manifestation of, or reaction to, a form of secular millennialism, stronger than it might have otherwise. However, it is the meaning of, and problems posed by, ‘the end of history’ for History as a school subject (an object of study), and not any status it may hold as both millennial and/or anti-millennial discourse, that is explored in this dissertation.

I defend my decision to confine this study to discourses that became popular in the late twentieth century, on the basis that post-war ‘end of history’ discourse emerges from a context increasingly dominated by globalised capitalism, postmodern philosophies, and fast-paced information technologies – a world quite different from that experienced by Hegel, Nietzsche, and Marx. Following Malinowski (1923), we might say that the ‘context of culture’ in which ‘the end of history’ was discussed by Hegel, Nietzsche, and Marx, is quite different from the context in which Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, Baudrillard and Fukuyama have produced (and sometimes exchanged) their views. I would suggest then, that post-war ‘end of history’ discourse is indeed of a different genus than the nineteenth century variety, and deserves to be considered in its own right. Legacies of earlier thinkers are discussed only where this assists with understanding ‘the end of history’ as it operates in contemporary discourse (thus, references to Hegel, Nietzsche, and Marx are not completely absent). However, my aim is not to develop a history of ‘end of history’ rhetoric, so common to work in the area of philosophy, in which an idea is tracked to and from its
apparent origin, or in which a series of analyses “move towards the present, demonstrating
the gradual production of an adequate theory” (R. J. C. Young, 1990, p. vi), an approach
troubled by postmodern theory. Instead, I have elected to confine my study to the
development of a curricular response to that ‘end of history’ rhetoric, which is closely
associated with our times: the end of the cold war after the collapse of soviet communism;
the turn of a new Millennium; the spread and obsession with information communication
technologies; the rise of mass media; and most importantly, the epistemological crisis
associated with the widespread ascendancy of postmodern scepticism within the
humanities.

In confining my exploration to contemporary ways of thinking about ‘the end of history’, I
share Green’s (1995) ironically framed “idealist ambition” to rethink curriculum after
postmodernism (p. 405); to explore the challenges and possibilities arising from a
postmodern conception of the school curriculum and the practice of a ‘posthumous’
history pedagogy. This preface then has been a way for me to explore concerns that ‘end of
history’ discourse is nothing but a passing fad, thematised by, perhaps even contingent
upon, a conjunction of calendar, theory, and autobiography. However, this is not to
trivialize its usefulness as a problematic. As you read this thesis, we are already past the
limiting horizon of the Millennium, and ‘the end of history’ continues to signify important
debates in the academy, some of which problematise the possibility of history itself.
Regardless of its own ‘historical ground’, I would assert the productivity of ‘the end of
history’ as a ‘diffractive lens’ (Gough, 1998) through which to rethink History curriculum,
particularly at this time when neo-liberals and conservatives would have us ‘give up the
ghost’ in our struggles for critical and effective histories.
In the wake of history

History is today haunted by predictions of its immanent end. Present within the contemporaneous discourses of a triumphant liberalism, a sceptical postmodernism, and a defensive positivism – traditions that usually have little reason for consensus – claims abound that we are facing ‘the end of history’. Signifying both a widespread crisis in historical ways of knowing, and our dwelling on the threshold of a new social order, ‘the end of history’ appears as a motif of our times (Vattimo, 1991), and is perhaps the single description of ‘the postmodern condition’ upon which a number of influential commentators agree (Jameson, 1998; Lyotard, 1979; Vattimo, 1991). While postmodernism, as the sceptical intellectual culture of contemporary Western society has challenged history as epistemology, postmodernity, as an emergent set of social, political, and cultural conditions, has rendered naïve any commitment to history as ontology (Breisach, 2003; Jenkins, 2003).

Although there is a growing body of work that has considered the implications of postmodernism for education (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1991; de Alba, Gonzalez-Gaudiano, Lankshear, & Peters, 2000; Doll, 1989; 1993; Giroux, 1990; Giroux, 1996b; Green, 1995; Holzman, 1995; Kohli, 1995; Lather, 1991; McLaren, 1995a; 1995b; P. Slattery, 2000; W. B. Stanley, 1992; Symes, 1997; Usher & Edwards, 1994), the significance of postmodernism’s challenge to history has been virtually ignored in discussions of History curriculum, with
only a few exceptions (Brickley, 1994; 2001; Dos Santos-Lee, 2001; Seixas, 2000; Wilton, 1999). While the odd ‘teaching text’ in Australia (Taylor & Young, 2003) and the United Kingdom (Husbands, 1996) has recognised the need to engage constructively with postmodernism’s challenge to history, there is a dearth of curriculum-based studies that focus sustained attention upon the problem. An unpublished Master’s thesis by Lonsdale (1991) may be the exception. However, Lonsdale’s (1991) conclusion that:

Despite the critical possibilities inherent in postmodernism it is arguably a conservative phenomenon which lends itself more easily to a discursive and playful intellectuality than to any meaningful praxis (thesis summary)

is a widely-held position that is at odds with my own assessment, and reflects a particular conservatism of its own.

This loss of faith in the adequacy of representation has been seen by many positivist and empiricist historians as a threat to the discipline of history, with its desire to recover and reconstruct ‘the truth’ of the past. Postmodernism has been described by a number of historians and social critics as an attack on historical reason (Appleby, Hunt, & Jacob, 1994; McCullagh, 1987; Windschuttle, 1996; Zagorin, 1999), and the epistemological foundations of history as a discipline (Black & MacRaild, 2000), that is politically paralysing (Roth, 1995c), and has little to do with the practice of actual historians (R. J. Evans, 1997; McCullagh, 2004), or to offer serious historiography (Zagorin, 2000). It is argued by defenders of ‘traditional’ empiricist history (from Appleby, Hunt, & Jacob, 1994; R. J. Evans, 1997; Marwick, 2001; and Windschuttle, 1996; to Zagorin, 1999), and some postmodernists (most notably, Jenkins, 1999), that if we accept postmodern social theory, historical research and writing will become untenable, resulting in the death of history as a discipline. This concern with the status of historical truth parallels widespread anxieties
about the postmodern social condition of contemporary life in which we appear to have lost our connection to history (Baudrillard, 1992; 1995; Chakrabarty, 1992/2004; Jameson, 1998), and are having to rethink our ‘stories’ amidst much more complex social conditions that put into question any ‘grand narratives’ that attempt to transport us “by a voiceless obstinacy towards a millennial ending” (Foucault, 1971/1994, p. 380), or cocoon us within a singular catholic metanarrative (Lyotard, 1979).

The central problematic of this study is the (im)possibility of History curriculum after ‘the end of history’. In this study, I re-examine the nature of the alleged ‘threat’ to history posed by postmodernism, beginning my analysis with an investigation of ‘end of history’ discourse in contemporary theory. I then explore the implications of postmodern social theory for History as curriculum. Situated within a broadly-conceived critical-reconceptualist trend in curriculum inquiry, my intention is not to propose the adoption of postmodern theory as the best approach to teaching History, but simply to consider what taking seriously ‘the end of history’ in contemporary theory might mean for History as curriculum. In exploring the social meliorist changes to, and cultural politics surrounding, the History curriculum in New South Wales (NSW), Australia, from the Bicentennial in 1988 to the Millennium – a period that marked curriculum as a site of contestation in a series of highly public ‘history wars’ (S. Macintyre & A. Clark, 2003) – this study explores past attempts to mount, and future possibilities for, a curricular response to the problem of historical representation.

**History as unreliable signifier**

An untutored reader could be excused for thinking that assertions of ‘the end of history’ are the equivalent of proclamations of the end of the world. Occasionally of course, they
have been (see preface). However, such confusion arises in part from a linguistic condition in English, in which the sign ‘history’ has a number of competing referents. Those who have investigated the etymology of the word ‘history’ have argued that it is either related to the Greek word ἴστορ, meaning ‘witness’ (Le Goff, 1900, p. 100), or finds its derivation in historia, another Greek word meaning “to investigate” (Ashcroft, 2001, p. 82). Legitimately, when we speak of ‘history’, we can be referring to knowledge about ‘the past’ in the form of: (i) the academic discipline taught in universities and practised by professional scholars; (ii) the school subject that typically has an ambivalent relationship to its parent in the academy; or (iii) the record of past events in particular human societies, the oeuvre of a particular author or the archives of a ‘civilization’ that purport to retell the past as it was. In contrast, we might also be referring to the past itself: (iv) the aggregate of everything that has ever happened; or (v) just our own set of life experiences. The distinction between what actually happened in the past, and our knowledge of what happened – or what Stanford calls (1994) history-as-event and history-as-account respectively – is generally accepted in the discipline. This distinction is evident in the work of positivists and postmodernists alike. The difference in their views usually comes down to what this distinction is taken to mean. For the positivist historian it means there is a past that can be recovered through careful research and analysis, and subsequently re-presented, or retold, as histories (R. J. Evans, 1997); even if the history that is reconstructed is influenced by the concerns of the present (Collingwood, 1946/1994) or modified by the historian’s interpretive choices (E. H. Carr, 1990). However, in much postmodern and poststructuralist critique, it is taken to mean that there is a profound distinction between the sign (history text) and its referent (past event), such that one cannot say with any firm reliability that one is commensurate with the other (see the various positions of Barthes, 1967/1997; Baudrillard, 1992; Derrida, 1994; H. White, 1978a, on this problem). Postmodern and poststructuralist theory even
points to the complete unrecoverability of the referent (Jenkins, 1999). History then becomes a narrative that attempts to fix, through a denial of its own historicity (LaCapra, 2004) and the removal of all trace of its perspectivalism (Ermarth, 1992), a radically uncertain past.

Attempting to make the complicated concept of ‘the end of history’ more comprehensible, postmodern history theorist, Keith Jenkins (1995), distinguishes between Upper Case History – the belief that the procession of events we refer to as history has some inherent meaning or significance, or that human societies are evolving towards some optimal endpoint (the proposition shared by Hegel, Marx and Fukuyama); and Lower Case history – the actual practices of studying and writing historical narratives, the work of the professional historian (the approach attributed to von Ranke, but posthumously claiming authors as far back as Herodotus and Thucydides). Jenkins’ framework allows him to articulate plainly which history he is arguing is coming to what end, and is present as a framing tool when I examine ‘the end of history’ in contemporary theory, and its implications for History curriculum (though my use of upper and lower case conventions follows Anna Clark, 2004, rather than Keith Jenkins). However, even using Jenkins’ distinction, the multiple meanings of ‘history’ present a particular problem for any thesis that seeks to discuss the subject. The multiple referents of history have probably proven one of the stumbling blocks in the defence of the discipline, where all too often debate has deteriorated into polemics, as authors slip between referents and at times stop making sense of what is really at stake (Brickley, 2001).

This unreliability of the signifier history manifests itself in debates over the status of History/history, by making ‘the end of history’ itself a floating signifier whose meaning
shifts depending on the discursive tradition in which the phrase is used. The singularity of focus suggested by the idea of ‘rethinking History curriculum after the end of history’, obscures the complexity and multiplicity at the heart of such a project, since there is not one ‘end of history’ but many (Jenkins & Munslow, 2004a). Navigating through the celebrations, lamentations, invocations, and proclamations that arise in and around ‘end of history’ discourse, I argue that the empiricists’ claims that History/history is being ‘murdered’ by postmodern and poststructuralist approaches to studying the past (R. J. Evans, 1997; Marwick, 1970; Windschuttle, 1996), are at best inaccurate. Claims that postmodernism is ‘killing history’ arise out of a particular conception of ‘history’ as a discipline, and are very likely the result of what Bernstein (1999) describes as ‘strong framing’ or a ‘strong grammar’ within the historiographic field, that works to protect the borders of the discipline against the kind of ‘invasion’ – from literary and cultural studies – lamented by Windschuttle (1996).

According to Brickley (2001) and Garton (2003), such claims also emerge from what seems to be a misunderstanding of the poststructural and postmodern position in contemporary theory, a position in which, far from being left without history, we are left with (almost) ‘nothing but history’, albeit in a ‘weak’ form, stripped of its “metaphysical buttressing” (D. D. Roberts, 1995, p. 9). What this suggests, I think it can be argued, is that postmodernism – at least in some of its poststructuralist forms – is a movement that extends the gaze of historians, so that nothing escapes it, not even themselves. History as such, is hardly at an end under this kind of regime, but it is transformed; forced into self-reflexivity or as Berkhoff (1995) describes it, ‘reflective (con)textualisation’, because of being pushed to its logical conclusions (where everything and everyone is historicised). As a result of appropriating the gaze of the historiographer, histories – as interpretations of the past –
come to be viewed as somewhat unreliable representations. Resultantly, a position redolent of Gadamer (1999) emerges, in which ‘histories’ are understood as historical products themselves, to some degree ‘prejudiced’ or conditioned by the period in which they were written, and constituted within the ‘horizon’ or limits of the cultural paradigms of their authors. Understanding ‘History/history’ as an ‘unreliable signifier’ thus foregrounds, in a particular form, what Lyotard (1979) has described as the crisis of representation and legitimation that he associates with ‘the postmodern condition’ of incredulity towards metanarratives (those ‘master narratives’ that might be described as ahistorical representations masquerading as histories, that claim the status of universal truth, while failing to acknowledge their own historical origins). It is to an introductory exploration of this crisis that I now turn.

**Theorising the postmodern**

A large part of this dissertation is devoted to exploring the various meanings of ‘the end of history’ that are mobilised in contemporary society. Frequently the analysis of these meanings involves an extended engagement with postmodern thought. However, by way of some introduction, I will attempt to provide a brief summary of the understanding of postmodernism and its central concerns that I take into this study, particularly those that have a significance for ‘history’ as discipline and discourse. Of course, this definitional discussion is neither neutral nor unmotivated, and inevitably moves in a reductive direction that is at odds with postmodern thought itself. Nonetheless, presenting some of the main

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6 I must thank Professor Anthony Welch for this turn of phrase, which he offered as a description of aspects of my honours work at the University of Sydney, conducted during the Autumn and Spring semesters of 1999.
claims made about postmodernism is a necessary step before moving on to the details of
the project that is the focus of this study.

Postmodernism is notoriously difficult to define. Svi Shapiro (1995) has argued, not
uncommonly, that the meaning of postmodernism “is at best elusive and, at worst, utterly
incoherent” (p. 187). Postmodernist thought emerged in the academy during the late
twentieth century as an ‘apocalyptic discourse’, intent on demolishing once carefully
elaborated certainties via an extended and multi-faceted polemic against foundationalism,
esentialism, and universalism. Inheriting the terminal impulses of Nietzsche and Heidegger
that claimed ‘God’ and ‘Philosophy’ in turn (Falzon, 1998), postmodernism appears to have
had a range of influences and antecedents (Best & Kellner, 1997). In some ways it seems to
reincarnate aspects of the philosophy of the ancient Greek school of Sceptics (Southgate,
2003); and from a different perspective, to push to their radical conclusions the
philosophical arguments of the American Pragmatists (see the discussion of Rorty in
Jenkins, 1995). Of course, it would be neither very postmodern, nor ‘historically accurate’
to suggest that the Sceptics and the Pragmatists are direct progenitors of postmodernism,
despite Eco’s prophetic assertion (cited in Southgate, 2003) that soon even Homer will be
claimed as a postmodernist. However, there are parallels in some of their philosophies
(Sturrock, 1979), and at least in the work of the contemporary American philosopher,
Richard Rorty, these ideas find a common home (see for example, Rorty, 1979, Philosophy
and the Mirror of Nature).

Used as an epithet for the ‘cultural condition’ of late capitalism (Jameson, 1998), and the
present ‘status of knowledge’ in post-industrial societies (Lyotard, 1979), postmodernism

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7 See Curthoys and Docker’s (2006) brilliant reclaiming of Herodotus as the first ‘philosophical historian’,
and his elevation as a useful role model for postmodern historiography.
appears as a cipher, whose meaning must be indefinitely suspended. Within the early period of its more self-conscious impact on the humanities, an attempt was made by Denzin (1986) to define postmodernism “as both a form of theorizing about societies and a period in social thought” (p. 194); a distinction Cahoone (1996) re-articulated a decade later when he suggested that there are two main forms of postmodernism, the methodological and the historical. Some scholars have argued that postmodernism, as methodological theory, is constituted by “neo-liberal forms of governmentality . . . the emerging postindustrial society in the West structured by the so-called new information economy . . . [and a] crisis of cultural authority” (de Alba, Gonzalez-Gaudiano, Lankshear, & Peters, 2000, p.128). It has also been described as the ‘cultural logic’ of postmodernity (Jameson, 1998). For these reasons, I will explore postmodernism as an historical epoch first.

**Historical postmodernism**

As an historical claim, postmodernism is typically mobilised to signify that the “cultural organization of modernity has fundamentally changed” (Cahoone, 1996, p. 17), and that a “radical break with past societal trends” (Dear & Wassmansdorf, 1993, p. 322) has taken place; though some scholars use the term to mark significant social and cultural transformations while still articulating a closer continuity with the modern (Best & Kellner, 1997), and even go so far as to suggest that “the postmodernization of culture does not transcend historical modernity” but as Lyon (1999) argues, constitutes “a powerful challenge to intellectual modernity” (p. 123). Understanding postmodernism as an historical claim involves exploring ‘the postmodern’ (or ‘postmodernity’) as both a particular cultural style and a unique social condition. Recognised as an historical style in art and architecture, dominated by anachronism, collage, allegory and pastiche (Lash & Urry, 1987),
postmodernism has been associated with what Danto (1986; 1997) calls ‘the end of art’. According to Connor (1997), Danto’s ‘end of art’ thesis proposes that we have reached a condition in which the metanarrative of art history is over, so art can no longer be defined by its place in an historical or developmental progression. This leaves postmodern (or more accurately, post-historical) artists free to produce art in any form that they please. According to Danto (1986) post-historical art is therefore characterised “by the lack of a stylistic unity” (p. 83). In its postmodern manifestation, this often takes the shape of the artist rehearsing and remixing older forms (indicating that the telos of art’s history has been reached), or rendering the everyday as art (problematising any axiological foundations from which to view art).

Similarly, recognised as an historical movement in literature, postmodernism has been associated with tendencies towards self-conscious irony and disruption, in the form of fabulism, metafiction, and surfiction (Chabot, 1988), forms of fiction that draw attention to themselves as fiction. Postmodernism in literary studies has also been associated with the idea of ‘the death of the author’ (Barthes, 1968/1977), marking the impossibility of restricting meaning to the author’s intentions, and the denial of univocal authorship as a result of the inevitability of textual repetition (intertextuality), which it shares with earlier formalist theories (see most importantly, Bakhtin, 1981). ‘The death of the author’ has also been associated with the poststructural recognition that ‘author-ity’ is always an artifact of a discursive regime, not a simple fact of writing (Foucault, 1969/1994). Whether these trends in art and literature actually represent a ‘new style’ that breaks with the modern, and whether they are in their current manifestation dependent upon, or independent of postmodernism as a social condition, remains the subject of debate. Taken as expressions
of ‘the postmodern’ however, these artistic and literary movements suggest overlaps between postmodernism as style and social condition.

As an historical social condition, postmodernism is sometimes argued to be the result of a transformation from nineteenth century industrial society to late twentieth century information society (Poster, 1990; 1995), “characterized by time and space distortions which are the result of recent technologies of travel, telecommunications and information transfer” (Potter, 1996b, p. 89). Commentators have also described this particular reorganization of the social as a shift from the politics of production to an obsession with consumption. Not discussing postmodernity per se, but describing ‘millennial capitalism’, Comaroff and Comaroff (2000) have asserted of ‘consumption’ in late twentieth century society, that:

increasingly, it is the factor, the principle, held to determine definitions of value, the construction of identities, and even shape the global ecumene. As such, tellingly, it is the invisible hand, or the Gucci-gloved fist, that animates the political impulses, the material imperatives, and the social forms of the Second Coming of Capitalism – of capitalism in its neoliberal, global manifestation. (p. 294, emphasis in the original)

Porter (1993) notes that at the present moment, “previously stable socioeconomic categories, notions like value and need, have lost their inherent meaning and objective anchorage”, determined now by the vagaries of the market, in which “consumption is all-important” (p. 1). Resultantly, postmodernism is depicted by Jameson (1991) as the historically specific logic of late (consumer-focused multinational) capitalism. This ‘multinational capitalism’ has reworked “the constitutive relationship of production to consumption, and hence of labor to capital” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2000, p. 293), in such a way as to make consumption “the moving spirit of the late twentieth century” (Comaroff

As a logic of consumption, the cultural style and social condition of postmodernism are brought together. This is perhaps clearest in the writings of the French social theorist, Jean Baudrillard. Described by Douglas Kellner (1989a) as “a ‘new McLuhan’ who has repackaged McLuhan into new postmodern cultural capital” (p. 73), aspects of Baudrillard’s work can be read as ‘updating’ Debord’s (1977) theorisation of contemporary society as spectacle (Callinicos, 1989). Although marked by an “eclectic approach to cultural analysis [that] makes a sweep of all the major theoretical frameworks” (McLaren & Leonardo, 1998, pp. 216-217), Gane (2000) asserts that Baudrillard’s analyses of contemporary culture are based most strongly on “classical exchange theory as a theory of social determination” (p. 35). Jean Baudrillard (1988) has argued that within postmodern society – which he sees operating as a ‘hermetically sealed pleasure dome’ from which there is no obvious escape (Porter, 1993, pp. 1-2) – the social value of ‘objects’ is created by differentiating consumer items from each other. This differentiation results in part from contemporary society’s capacity to both reproduce ‘the code’ (create copies of an unrecoverable original), and ‘brand’ the replicas (as ‘identifiable’ and ‘identical’). Subsequently, consumer goods come to have not only a value determined by the market (made up of their ‘use value’ and ‘exchange value’), but also a ‘sign value’ determined by the ‘social status’ they confer upon, or ‘identity’ they make possible for, the consumer (McLaren & Leonardo, 1998). Like the ‘postmodern’ art of Warhol, new technologies make possible the endless replication of the object/sign/style, and therefore the construction of ‘indiscernible counterparts’ for
everyone (who can afford to pay the right price). Thus, theorists who argue for *historical postmodernism* as a description of the present moment in Western societies, depict ‘the contemporary’ as a society dominated by a capitalist logic of style and consumption, in which “sentimentality and history become less pertinent because an almost perfect replica of the object can be (re)produced… [and] people become functions of consumer society as they are motivated to purchase more and more objects in order to feel part of the social milieu” (McLaren & Leonardo, 1998, p. 218), since these objects carry, according to Baudrillard (1988), a ‘sign value’ that is ‘consumed’ in the act of exchange, conferring status on the consumer. This conflation of object/style/status reinforces the logic of capitalism via a marking of the individual by the list of what they consume, and therefore lends weight to the suggestion from some quarters that “Postmodernist rhetoric has been profitably capitalized on by neoliberalism in order to update its longed-for project of cultural hegemony” (Hopenhayn, 1993, p. 98). Trapped within a matrix of market ideology, the argument advanced here is that the individual plays the consumption status game whether they want to or not, typically without any conscious awareness of their complicity with ‘the game’.

Baudrillard (1983) couples his analysis of the dominance of the object with a vision of society in which the television and communication media have come to rule our lives, and reality appears to have ‘imploded’, with the result that it has become impossible for us to determine the difference between the real world and its ‘hyperreal’ televisual simulation. Douglas Kellner (1989a) describes Baudrillard’s depiction of this situation as one in which

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8 The expression ‘indiscernible counterparts’ actually comes from Art theory. It suggests the impossibility of determining the difference between say a shovel used to dig dirt, and a shovel created as a work of art. Here I ‘play’ with that meaning, but in the context of consumer objects and social signs being created to replicate an unrecoverable original that has been lost amongst exact clones. As a consequence of the mass production of ‘the real’ an implosion of “the demarcation [results] between the copy and its original” (McLaren & Leonardo, 1998, p. 230).
“the boundary between representation and reality implodes, and as a result, the very experience and ground of ‘the real’ disappears” (p. 63). This is perhaps best exemplified by the first Gulf War, that Baudrillard (1995) argued ‘would not’ and ‘did not’ take place. According to Paul Patton (1995) in his introduction to Baudrillard’s *The Gulf War did not take place*:

> The Gulf War was instant history in the sense that the selected images which were broadcast worldwide provoked immediate responses and then became frozen into the accepted story of the war: high-tech weapons, ecological disaster, the liberation of Kuwait. (p. 3)

According to Baudrillard (1995), there was no ‘war’ in the Persian Gulf in 1991, but both a media driven “virtual war” (p. 30), and “an ultra-modern process of electrocution” (p. 61), since no Iraqi who took part had “a chance of fighting”, and no American who took part “a chance of being beaten” (p. 61). Thus, despite any validity held by the claim that during this campaign “the amount of high explosives unleashed during the first month of the conflict exceeded that of the entire allied air offensive during WW II” (Patton, 1995, pp. 1-2), Baudrillard denies that a real ‘war’ took place. For Baudrillard (1995), what did happen was the analogue of the film *Capricorn One*, “in which the flight of a manned rocket to Mars, which only took place in a desert studio, was relayed to all the television stations in the world” (p. 61).

It is not that Baudrillard is denying history when he asserts that the Gulf War did not happen, as the authors of Australia’s most recent history pedagogy and curriculum text, *Making History*, seem to assert (Taylor & Young, 2003). The theory of hyperreality is no dupe for alleged ‘Holocaust deniers’ like David Irving, who are said to engage in “massive falsification of historical evidence, manipulation of facts, and denial of truth” (R. J. Evans, 2002, p. 10), and deliberate “misrepresentation, mistranslation, misleading phrasing, and
imperfectly varnished deceit” (Guttenplan, 2001, p. 223), nor revisionists like Keith Windschuttle, whose account of Australia’s colonial past rests according to Attwood (2005) “upon poor and faulty methods of historical scholarship” (p. 152). Baudrillard acknowledges that the United States military dropped bombs on Iraq, and killed thousands of people, but he is not writing ‘history’. Baudrillard’s “high risk writing strategy, courting equally the dangers of contradiction by the facts and self-refutation”, is designed to be “less a representation of reality than its transfiguration” (Patton, 1995, p. 6), less history than a challenge to the ‘instant history’ of the media report. Patton (1995) argues that Baudrillard’s essays can be understood as “immediate responses to instant history TV and its first draft versions in the print media” (p. 6), “a symbolic challenge to the manner is which these [events] were portrayed” (p. 7) and, an interrogation of “the nature of the Gulf War as a media event . . . a simulacrum of war” (p. 10). As Steven Best and Douglas Kellner (2001) suggest, during the Gulf War “images and representations of the war, disseminated by government and media outlets, replaced the events of the war itself, providing a hyperreal experience of the war as a media spectacle” (p. 74). In the postmodern world of hyperreal simulation, Baudrillard (1992) argues that events have gone on strike, and all we are left with is their indiscernible media simulacra. It is this, a criticism of the process by which representation comes to be indiscernible from reality in ‘media society’, rather than refutation that something actually took place, that would seem to be the intended meaning of Baudrillard’s ‘Gulf War denial’.

Perhaps because so much of what is argued to constitute ‘the postmodern’ is either ‘recycled modernity’, or the “renovation within ruination” of ‘the old’ (Baudrillard, 1990, p. 171), the talk of both a postmodern style and a postmodern era is explicitly rejected by Callinicos (1989). He argues that the claims for a distinctive postmodern artistic aesthetic
are contradictory, and remain unconvincing. He also argues that much of the scholarship supporting ‘the postmodern’ as a break with *industrial* capitalism “grossly exaggerate[s] the extent of the changes involved, and fail[s] to theorize them properly” (Callinicos, 1989, p. 135). Smart (1993) is also cautious about the ‘radical break with modernity’ thesis, arguing that “contributions to the debate over the notions of modernity and postmodernity are frequently overblown” (p. 60). However, even as a scholarly critic of postmodernism, who has gone to great pains to argue *against any* suggestion that the later half of the twentieth century saw a radical break with the past, Callinicos (1989) concedes that the term ‘postmodern’ is usefully understood as a floating signifier, utilised by:

> a socially mobile intelligentsia in a climate dominated by the retreat of the Western labour movement and the ‘overconsumptionist’ dynamic of capitalism in the Reagan-Thatcher era . . . to articulate its political disillusionment and its aspiration to a consumption-oriented lifestyle. (pp. 170-171)

Callinicos’ criticism, of postmodernism as an historical social condition, and those he believes to be advocating this thesis (such as Baudrillard and Lyotard), hinges on a specific rejection of the idea that capitalism has mutated into a form that has left industrialization behind. He is evidently prepared to concede that ‘postmodernism’ may be used as a sign to demarcate a particular socio-historically located intellectual trend, but this trend must still be understood to be underpinned by industrial capital. Simply, he argues that postmodernism is more likely an intellectual orientation rather than a definable aesthetic. It should be acknowledged that Callinicos was writing a number of years before the advent of the global internet and, almost two decades after his critique, ‘postmodernism’ as signifier is still afloat, and is being utilised by a generation of scholars who were still at school during the Reagan-Thatcher era. It may well be that only time will tell whose stance on postmodernism as an historical phenomenon (or otherwise), proves the most plausible. At
this moment, postmodernism no longer appears simply a passing fad, as some of its early critics expected.

It is important to consider that despite the fact that the emergence of postmodernism as an intellectual orientation appears to have coincided with the arrival of so-called ‘postmodernity’, “it is a mistake to [simply] equate postmodernism with postmodernity” (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2003). Arguably, it is not any synchronicities, dependencies, or overlaps in their development that connects postmodernity and postmodernism, more a set of resemblances. As Best and Kellner (1997) argue, the pathways to postmodernism and postmodernity have been many and varied, and any genealogy of postmodern thought inevitably partial. Thus, it is probably unproductive, only partially accurate, and the product of a self-defeating irony, to define methodological postmodernism as the intellectual orientation of those academics fashioned by postmodernity. Of course, nothing is simple when it comes to defining any aspect of postmodernism.

Methodological postmodernism

As a methodological position, postmodernism is no “systematic theory” (Kvale, 1992), nor a unified discourse. Sometimes it may seem to the observer that postmodernism is used as a label for such a wide range of ideas, that it is empty of any meaning (Rosenau, 1992). Perhaps best described as a continuum of critique that shares cynicism about claims to truth in the human and social sciences, postmodernism has been described as “a mine-field of conflicting notions” (Harvey, 1990, pp.viii), marked by a pervasive nihilism (Hoepper, 1998), that resists “any tendency to totalize” (Kenway, 1992). Curriculum theorist, Patrick
Slattery (1997), has documented a range of concepts he identifies as postmodern philosophies, including:

- the death of the subject, the repudiation of depth models of reality, the rejection of grand narratives or universal explanations of history, the illusion of the transparency of language, the impossibility of any final meaning, the effects of power on the objects it represents, the failure of pure reason to understand the world, the de-centering of the Western logos and with it the de-throning of the "first world," the end of a belief in progress as a natural and neutral panacea, and a celebration of difference and multiplicity. (p. 3)

This is some list. Hutcheon (1989) argues that postmodernism typically “takes the form of self-conscious, self-contradictory, self-undermining statement” (p. 1). Invested in the trope of ‘irony’, postmodern theory “manages to install and reinforce as much as undermine and subvert the conventions and presuppositions it appears to challenge” (Hutcheon, 1989 pp. 1-2). Defined, according to Lyotard (1979), by an ‘incredulity towards metanarratives’, postmodernism “manifests itself in the multiplication of centres of power and activity and the dissolution of every kind of totalizing narrative which claims to govern the whole complex field of social activity and representation” (Connor, 1997, p. 8). Postmodernism is clearly a complex philosophical phenomenon.

Connor (1997) asserts that “Post-modernism as method is basically a revolt against the rationality of modernism, a deliberate attack on the foundation character of much modernist thought” (p. 322). However, following Foucault (1983/1994), we might want to argue that postmodernism is simply a different form of rationality to ‘modernist reason’, rather than the jettisoning or rejection of reason and rationality altogether. To think otherwise is to accept that methodological postmodernism is simply a particular form of irrationality, either devoid of its own ‘logic’ or constituted by the supplanting of logic by a valorisation of ‘aesthetics’ and ‘experience’, a claim argued by Habermas (1987). However,
it is only subscription to the modernist binary of ‘logic’ versus ‘rhetoric’ that sustains the claim that postmodernism is a form of irrationality. In contrast, considering postmodernism as a form of reasoning, reveals that methodologically its ‘rhetorical logic’ challenges realism (arguing that there is no unmediated access to the world, and that what counts as ‘reality’ is constructed in the process of attempting to know the world); rejects essentialism (claiming there is no universal human nature that is consistent across cultural landscapes and historical epochs); and disrupts foundationalism (asserting that there can be no statements of value, or claims to truth made, that will be universally acceptable, since they are typically intelligible only within the socio-historically specific disciplinary rules that have made them possible). These three signature postmodern philosophies are often defined by the motifs of ‘the end of history’, ‘the death of the subject’, and ‘the death of the author’ respectively; concepts I return to at different points in this dissertation (where I engage with the nuances of each in the context of my argument).9

9 Interestingly, all three of these motifs appear in the work of the French historian of ideas, Michel Foucault. For example, ‘the end of history’ may be found as a recurring motif in his paper Nietzsche, genealogy, history (Foucault, 1971/1994); ‘the death of the subject’ is announced at the conclusion to his book The order of things: An archaeology of the human sciences (Foucault, 1970/1994); and ‘the death of the author’ is inscribed in his paper What is an author? (Foucault, 1969/1994). Yet, despite being associated with postmodernism as a methodological position, Foucault was ambivalent about the idea of postmodernity (Foucault, 1994). When discussing structuralism and poststructuralism with Gerard Raulet, and in reply to a comment Raulet makes about ‘postmodernity’ as a “hold-all concept”, he states with what appears to be a mischievous irony that is somewhat lost on his interviewer: “What are we calling postmodernity? I’m not up to date” (Foucault, 1983/1994, p. 447). Raulet’s response is to cast postmodernism as “a breaking apart of reason; Deleuzian schizophrenia”. Foucault’s response to Raulet’s attempt at definition indicates that he finds it difficult to locate “what kind of problem is common to the people we call ‘postmodern’ or ‘poststructuralist’”. Thus, the label is not one he would use of himself. For Foucault, the main problem is that, in France, “modernity” as a concept has never been properly defined, which makes notions of postmodernity almost impossible. If postmodernity is perceived as the collapse of reason, or a break with reason, then Foucault finds it an unsatisfactory concept, since what he sees are transformations of reason as it manifests in different forms of rationality at different times. Thus, Foucault positions himself against the Habermasian view that postmodern thought is marked by irrationality, rather than a different form of rationality.
In practice, methodological postmodernists – whom Breisach (2003) refers to somewhat controversially as *poststructuralist postmodernists*\(^\text{10}\) – typically refuse to accept that there are any trans-cultural, trans-historical, or transcendent grounds for interpretation.\(^\text{11}\)

Poststructuralism, which has perhaps come to be associated more closely with postmodern social theory than any other single philosophy, became a widely-used label for those critiques of modernity and Enlightenment philosophy that became the signature of Continental European philosophy during the late sixties. Originally a French form of methodological postmodernism, those philosophies typically associated with poststructuralism emerged partially as a result of the political disillusionment that followed the student and worker strikes of 1968 and as a reaction to the “scientific pretensions of structuralism” (Best & Kellner, 1991, p. 20). Structuralism had been the dominant social theory of the time, casting “human behaviour as rule-governed transformations of meaningless elements” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. xix). Among the poststructuralists, Barthes’ work marked the shift away from the search for deep structures that were believed to pre-configure meaning, to the concentration on the problem of representation. Foucault’s work also demonstrates something of this shift, *The order of things* (1970/1994) and *The archaeology of knowledge* (1969/1972) being structuralist in flavour if not in intent

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\(^{10}\) Breisach (2003), exploring the postmodern challenge to history, and the genealogy of various forms of postmodernism, actually differentiates between two types of postmodernism: *structural postmodernism* (that he associates with the period from 1945-1965), and *poststructuralist postmodernism* (that comes to prominence in the late 1960s). The defining feature of structural postmodernism – which is not to be confused with Structuralism – was the “retention of a knowable world of objectively given structures and forces” (p. 22). Common to both forms of postmodernism, according to Breisach’s analysis, is a belief that humanity will enter a period of history that is beyond modernity, sometimes called the *posthistoire*. According to Breisach’s schema, *poststructuralist postmodernists* (such as Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida, Baudrillard, and Deleuze) are identified by their rejection of the privileged status of modernist theory, and thus enter into forms of post-modernism. On the other hand, *structural postmodernists* (such as Cournot, Kojève, and Fukuyama), can be identified by their belief that we are about to enter a period of quietude, the final stage of history, having realised a world based on a balance of ‘recognition’ and ‘equality’, and thus profess visions of post-modernity (or more correctly, post-history) as the stage beyond modernisation.

\(^{11}\) Consequently, poststructuralist postmodernism resists, among other philosophies, conservative hermeneutics, which maintains a Romantic faith in the capacity of the interpreter to discover or recover an absolute truth.
(Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982), while subsequent works were far more sceptical about the project of locating or building ‘grand schemes’. As a thorough-going critique of “modern theories rooted in humanist assumptions and Enlightenment rationalist discourses” (Best & Kellner, 1991, p. 27), poststructuralism is often characterised by a respect of that which might be described as specific, local, different, and peculiar, and a rejection of theories that propose universal, foundational, or essential norms of human social and cultural life. Where explanations are provided they are at best given tentatively, cautiously, and reluctantly, as descriptions from the author’s own praxis or position, or as a set of self-proclaimed fictions, rather than as totalizing discourses that claim universal applicability, or truth-claims that articulate the discovery of some deep meaning concealed from consciousness. What is rejected by many ‘poststructuralist postmodernists’ is the transcendental self, the disembodied rational hero-norm of the enlightenment, who masquerades as ahistorical, asexual, acultural, and classless, while simultaneously masking a (socially constructed) white masculine subjectivity. In place of the metaphysical or transcendental subject, methodological or poststructuralist postmodernists propose decentred, fragmented, material subjects, producers and products of the discursive practices of their unique historical circumstances. Not only are these postmodern subjects argued to lack an underlying ahistorical unity, they are also considered to be split or fragmented within themselves, as a consequence of their participation in contradictory discourses and practices. 

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12 It should be noted that not all poststructuralists were reformed structuralists. Derrida, for example, reworks the insights of structuralist linguistics, rather than ever adopting them himself.

In attempting to encapsulate methodological postmodernism, it is probably important to make mention of Ebert’s (1996) often quoted distinction between ludic postmodernism and resistance postmodernism; akin to Roseneau’s (1992) distinction between sceptical and affirmative postmodernists and, perhaps, some writers concern to differentiate Lyotard and Baudrillard (as postmodernists) from Foucault, Deleuze and Derrida (as poststructuralists). According to Ebert’s schema, ludic postmodernism (also described as "spectral postmodernism" in Kincheloe & McLaren, 2003, p. 457), is focused upon poststructuralist (or deconstructionist) textual analysis that “indulges in aesthetic play for its own sake while distancing itself from a politically troubled world, or even lending tacit or explicit support of the status quo” (Best & Kellner, 1997, p. 137). In contrast, resistance postmodernism, sometimes referred to by epithets such as oppositional and critical, “brings to ludic critique a form of materialist intervention because it is not based solely on a textual theory of difference but rather one that is also social and historical” (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2003, p. 458).

Postmodernism in its poststructural form is concerned with “troubling textual authority” and hence “became significantly associated with a critical mode of analysing texts” (Nicholson & Seidman, 1995, p. 8). However, if ‘resistance postmodernism’ argues that “textualities (significations) are material practices” and therefore the embodiment of “conflicting social relations” (Ebert cited in Kincheloe & McLaren, 2003, p. 458) – which could very well be an axiom of some poststructuralist work such as Foucault’s – then I’m not sure that ludic and resistance postmodernism aren’t actually just two different ways of reading postmodernism, or two different uses of postmodern theory, rather than different forms of postmodernism. Following de Alba, Gonzalez-Gaudiano, Lankshear, and Peters (2000), I reject the distinction between sceptical and affirmative postmodernism that has
been advocated by scholars such as Doll, Griffin, McLaren, and Rosenau as “conceptually misleading and historically false” (p. 129). Arguing that discourse is constitutive of social relations (after Foucault), or that there is no-outside text (after Derrida), does not mean there is no world outside of language (and therefore no real political struggles). Rather, it means there is no unmediated access to reality, and that discourse is constitutive – as far as our perspective on things is concerned – rather than unproblematically descriptive, of ‘what is’ (restating the ‘meta-realist’ principle highlighted earlier). Postmodernism is thus not an extreme form of idealism or anti-realism that denies the world (Jenkins & Munslow, 2004a), though it does reflect a degree of Kantian subjectivism. Nor, as Flynn (1997) argues, is postmodernism the opposite of modernism, though it remains sceptical about the particular form of reasoning that underpins a great deal of modernist thought. Postmodernism doesn’t have to mean denying a critical project, but it does mean remaining cautious of any claims to truth, and wary of according any privileged status to one’s own motivations or perspective.

The end of history? Postmodernism and the problem of historical representation

Postmodernism’s challenge to the epistemological foundations of history as a discipline has been considerable, and taken the form of discussions within the academic press that might be described as favourable (Ankersmit, 2001a; Berkhoffer, 1995; Jenkins, 1999; 2003; 1997; Jenkins & Munslow, 2004b; LaCapra, 2000; 2004; Munslow, 1997; 2003; Southgate, 2000; 14 Note that in Rosenau (1992) for example, Foucault is at times placed with the sceptical postmodernists, at other times with the affirmatives. The logic of categorization at work is based on Rosenau’s pre-interpretive prejudice that two forms of postmodernism actually exist in reality, rather than only in his interpretive schema. This problem is consistent across the literature that adopts some form of the ludic/resistant distinction, and seems frequently to support a partial or qualified acceptance of postmodern social theory, in opposition to its ‘dangerous’ wholesale embrace. This is not in itself problematic, if one takes an eclectic stance that ignores epistemological contradictions between philosophies, an approach sometimes associated with postmodernism itself.
2003), fair (Breisach, 2003; C. G. Brown, 2005; Chartier, 1997; Curthoys & Docker, 2006; Iggers, 1997; Willie Thompson, 2004), and for want of a better word, ‘fearful’ (Appleby, Hunt, & Jacob, 1994; R. J. Evans, 1997; McCullagh, 2004; Roth, 1995c; Windschuttle, 1996; Zagorin, 1999; 2000). For the historian, one of the central problems that postmodern social theory presents has been described as the crisis of representation. In principle, this means that poststructuralists as methodological postmodernists typically reject the idea that our representations unproblematically correspond with reality. Rather, they take the position that reality is never known outside of our systems of representation, so our representations can be said to shape, write, constitute, or inscribe our ‘reality’ rather than mirror it (Rorty, 1979).

From the perspective of postmodernism, our representations of the world constitute reality as we know it. That is not to say that representations actually form the world itself, as some critics of methodological postmodernism sometimes suggest, but they do predispose us to view and engage with the world in certain ways. Like the great German philosopher Kant, this leaves us not in the position of denying that a world exists outside of our own mind, but in a state where “we can believe in reality but not know the true nature of things-in-themselves” (Munslow, 2003, p. 59). The postmodern position is marked by a rejection of “naïve realism [which] holds that objects in the real world conform or correspond precisely to our representation and our understanding of them” (Munslow, 2003, p. 56), manifesting a “profound distrust of the idea that referential language works through mirroring or mapping reality” (Potter, 1996b, p. 68). Like modernists, postmodernists also reject the philosophy of Renaissance romanticism that held “the sign was an essence of the thing [it signified]… [and that] signs were likenesses… of the things they represented” (C. G. Brown, 2005, p. 44), functioning ‘in sympathy’ with them. Instead, postmodern social
theory accepts the arbitrariness of the sign, but inverts our common sense perspective that signs reflect things in the world, and replaces it with the view that our understanding of things in the world is constituted by the socio-historical sign systems we have inherited, appropriated, and evolved in the course of our socio-linguistic ‘development’. In this view, the world – as we know it – is constituted by the sign, rather than the (existence of the) sign being dependent on the world.

It is highly unlikely that any historian other than a hagiographer would be inclined towards the sympathetic logic of romanticism; and it would be setting up the discipline of history as a straw man to suggest that most historians endorse anything like naïve realism. However, many historians do subscribe to other forms of realism. For example, there are historians who subscribe to an empirical-analytic philosophy that suggests “we could discover explanations that reflect the rational structure of nature through empirical research, the inference of its meaning and the representation of its findings as the truthful descriptive statement” (Munslow, 2003, pp. 40-41). There are also other historians who might be described as positivists, who “presupposed that human existence (and its manifest horrors) could be explained through the discovery of general laws of human social behaviour” (Munslow, 2003, p. 42). In both cases, it is the will to know, expressed as a conceit that we can come to understand and accurately represent what happened in the past, which brings positivist and empiricist historians into conflict with poststructuralists. For methodological postmodernists of all persuasions typically deny the capacity of language to act as a transparent mode of representation; argue there is no unmediated access to the past; and that when attempting to write histories, all we are left with is partial traces of the ‘once was’ that are open to multiple, conflicting, situated interpretations and explanations (Jenkins, 1999).
As this brief overview indicates, while the impact of methodological postmodernism upon history as an academic discipline has been the subject of significant debate, and challenged the foundations of much historical work, the implications of ‘the problem of historical representation’ have been – as has already been noted – virtually ignored in studies of History education. Although the significance of postmodern social theory for ‘historical studies in education’ has been explored in a relatively recent text by Popkewitz, Franklin and Pereyra (2001b), postmodernism’s implications for History as curriculum have been largely neglected within the curriculum field, with only a few exceptions (Brickley, 1994; 2001; Lonsdale, 1991; Seixas, 2000). Thus, exploring postmodern theory’s significance for history, and its implications for History as a curriculum, forms the central project of this study.

Situating the study: NSW History curriculum from the Bicentennial to the Millennium

Taking seriously Goodson’s (1992) argument that “social histories of school subject[s] need to be undertaken in national and local milieux” (p. 25), this study reserves as a context for its deliberations and ruminations, the secondary school History curriculum in New South Wales (NSW), Australia. Specifically, it explores the central problematic of this dissertation – *History curriculum after ‘the end of history’* – in relation to changes that have occurred within the compulsory junior secondary History curriculum in NSW, during the period defined by two important temporal markers, the Bicentennial of the nation (whose significance I will discuss shortly) and the Millennium (whose significance for postmodern theory, and my own ‘curriculum’, if not curriculum as it is more usually understood, I

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15 Henceforth, the reader should assume that all discussion of the NSW History curriculum refers to the compulsory junior secondary school History curriculum in NSW, unless otherwise specified.
discussed in the preface). Although in some senses, it might be possible to discuss the central problematic in purely philosophic and theoretic terms, Goodson’s (1992) work makes clear that attempts to study school subjects as abstract categories, or universal structures, divorces them from the wider social, political, and cultural assemblages and relations that provide them with form and meaning. Thus, while conceptual issues are given primacy in this study, the NSW context does more than simply anchor the discussion; it works as a case through which deliberations, in terms of the problematic, are situated to render them meaningful, purposeful, and intelligible.

The NSW History curriculum in the period defined by the Bicentennial to the Millennium is significant to this study for a number of reasons. Although school History was influenced by a range of critical theories between 1968-1974 (Barcan, 1997) – years of intense social change in Australia (and the world) – I theorise the publication of the 1992 Syllabus as an important moment. Unique in mandating the study of Australian history, the 1992 Syllabus responded to the social conscience of its times, implicitly sanctioning the retelling of ‘history from below’ (Sharpe, 1991). Appearing in the wake of significant shifts and growing scholarship in Aboriginal historiography that gained increasing attention in the lead up to the Bicentennial, and Feminist histories that had been circulating since the sixties,¹⁶ the 1992 Syllabus was the first History syllabus in NSW to incorporate social histories about, and from the perspective of women and Australia’s Indigenous peoples, framed as legitimate alternatives to the master narratives of ‘famous men’ and ‘pioneering settlement’. While an appreciation of the feminist perspective on the past had been part of the national consciousness for some time prior to its incorporation in the curriculum, for many Australians, the Bicentennial provided an important catalyst for reflection on the

¹⁶ These shifts in Aboriginal history had been canvassed somewhat earlier in Teaching History, the History Teachers’ Association’s quarterly journal, by Frank Farrell (1980).
nation’s past, bringing into sharp relief the disjuncture between the official story of two-
hundred years of successful European settlement, and Indigenous stories that described
two centuries of displacement, occupation and oppression (Russell, 2001). According to
Carmel Young (1987), placing an increasing emphasis on Aboriginal experience and
perspective, the new historiography moved towards detailed local and regional studies of
Indigenous life that broke the “Great Australian Silence” around Indigenous history
(Biskup, 1982, p. 12), which had been sustained by an Anglo-Australian myth that “the
destruction of Aboriginal society in the face of colonising forces [was] inevitable . . . [and] also complete” (G. Macdonald, 2001, p. 176), a belief in a non-eventful “quiet frontier”
free of the “founding violence” of other nations (Veracini, 2003a, p. 328), not to mention
both ignorance of, and disbelief when confronted with, the forced assimilation of
Aboriginal youth through implementation of state-sanctioned Indigenous child removal
policies throughout most of the post-Federation/pre-Bicentennial period (Goodall, 2002).

Undeniably a ‘radical’ text (K. Thompson, 1999), the 1992 Syllabus by incorporating the
‘new histories’ of the post-WWII period, effectively ‘changed the subject’ of school
History, both in terms of its orientation as an area of study, and in terms of ‘the subject’
that was studied. It should not be surprising to learn, that as part of a broader socially
critical turn in the curriculum, this new radical History was set on a collision course with
politically conservative historians, such as Geoffrey Blainey; and socially conservative
politicians, such as John Howard (the current Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of
Australia). Igniting a series of heated and highly public ‘history wars’ (S. Macintyre & A.
Clark, 2003), Blainey (1993b) has articulated concern over what he calls the ‘black armband’
or mournful view of Australia’s past, and has lamented the subsequent loss of what he
nostalgically labels the ‘three cheers’ view of Australian history. Such sentiments have been
frequently echoed in the speeches of the Prime Minister. They are undoubtedly tied to his resistance to ‘reconciliation’, and refusal “to apologise on behalf of the nation for the forced removal of Aboriginal children from their families” (Curran, 2004, p. 250), as to do so would, in his mind, fail to present a ‘balanced’ view of the past.

It is in the context of these contemporary debates over the representation of the nation’s past, particularly the re-visioning of frontier life, that History curriculum in NSW has become increasingly a site of contestation (A. Clark, 2003; Davison, 2000). This contestation over the curriculum mirrors similar ‘history’ and ‘culture wars’ in the United States (Nash, Crabtree, & Dunn, 1998); the United Kingdom (Aldrich, 1991; Phillips, 1998), and Canada (G. H. Richardson, 2002; Seixas, 2000). What is at stake in each of these ‘history wars’ is not only ‘national identity’ (C. Halse & C. Harris, 2004), but also our conceivable future, because as Bennett (1995) has argued:

more than history is at stake in how the past is represented. The shape of the thinkable future depends on how the past is portrayed and on how its relations to the present are depicted. (p. 162)

History curriculum, as “a disciplining technology that directs how the individual is to act, feel, talk, and ‘see’ the world and ‘self’” (Popkewitz, 2001, p. 153), serves a function in the ‘history wars’ by operating as an apparatus for the social re/production of national identities, through linking “the development of the individual to the images and narratives of nationhood” (Popkewitz, Pereyra, & Franklin, 2001). Thus, the importance of school History as a battlefield in these ‘history wars’ should not be underestimated (A. Clark, 2003). If this dissertation may be understood as foregrounding the exploration of History curriculum after ‘the end of history’, then it may be useful to understand its background as a concern with theorising a postmodern curricular response to what has become known in
Australia as the ‘history wars’ (S. Macintyre & A. Clark, 2003). If, as Lundgren (1991) argues – from the standpoint of reproduction theory – that the problem of representation is ‘the central problem of curriculum theory’, then the practical question arising for the NSW History curriculum amidst the ‘history wars’ must be How should History curriculum (re)present history after ‘the end of history’? There is no easy answer to this question. However, by exploring History curriculum in NSW over the period specified, we may gain some insight into how curriculum developments during the nineties may be read as already providing some answer to just such a question. Further, by exploring the implications of recent scholarship in the area of postmodern, poststructuralist, and postcolonial theory, this study attempts to assess possibilities for History as curriculum that have been overlooked in the struggle for critical and effective histories.

Composition of the study

Having outlined both the social and theoretical context for this study, defined the study’s central problematic, and situated my project amidst recent changes to, and internationally-resonant debates over, the NSW junior high school History curriculum, I would now like to say a few words about the remaining chapters of the dissertation. Rather than address the arrangement of chapters and their contents in terms of the metaphor of ‘structure’, I have decided to discuss the dissertation as a ‘composition’. Like ‘history’, composition is a word with many connotations. Used as a noun, a composition may be an artistic creation, a piece of writing (usually fictional or figurative), or a product composed of multiple parts. Used as a verb, to compose suggests an act of putting things together, combining items into a new whole, or the active arrangement of parts. Unlike the notion of structure, which can seem somewhat static and suggest the adoption of pre-determined sections or parts,
the idea of composition immediately conjures a sense of deliberation and creative construction. While describing the structure of a document allows the author to fade into the background, discussing the composition of a document renders visible the presence of the author, and as a result, the non-arbitrary arrangement of the work that is about to be read. Therefore, I would ask my reader to engage with this dissertation as a composition, a deliberate assemblage of ideas that seeks to make scholarly contribution to debate, while never losing sight of itself as an act of writing.

Understanding this dissertation as a composition, Chapter II is designed as an orientation for the reader to the methodology underpinning the study. In Chapter II, I define the terms of the study’s deliberation, analysis, and critique, by situating my methodological approach within an emergent postmodern critical-reconceptualist trajectory in curriculum theory that concerns itself with a deconstructive (radical hermeneutic) approach to curriculum study.

In Chapter III, I analyse conceptions of ‘the end of history’ in contemporary theory by (re)reading the work of the historicist Fukuyama in relation to the critiques of metanarrative history proposed by a number of methodological postmodernists. Composed as a literary-philosophical investigation, Chapter III explores the postmodern challenge to history as a ‘grand story’.

Chapter IV is constructed as a historically-oriented study that examines relatively recent curricular responses to the rejection of history as a singular, universally-shared and all-encompassing ‘grand story’. It uses the notion of ‘history as collective memory’ as a frame to critically examine what Green (1991) would describe as “the historical choices actually made” (p. xii), by one particular institutional form of school History education (the NSW
History curriculum) in its response to ‘the end of the grand story’. It proceeds through a critical exploration of the social meliorist changes to, and cultural politics surrounding, the History curriculum in NSW, from the Bicentennial of the nation in 1988 to the Millennium, a period – as already noted – that marked curriculum as a site of contestation in a series of highly public ‘history wars’ (S. Macintyre & A. Clark, 2003). Exploring the approach to history found in what has come to be known as ‘critical pedagogy’ in the United States as an analogue of the changes to the NSW History curriculum, the chapter concludes by addressing some of the limitations of ‘counter-memory’ as ‘critical pedagogy’.

Chapter V explores the missed opportunities for ‘critical practice’ within the NSW History curriculum. Synthesising insights into the ‘nature of history’ derived from the writings of Roland Barthes, Hayden White, David Carr, and Frank Ankersmit, I argue in Chapter V that what has remained uncontested in the struggle for ‘critical histories’ during the period under study, are the representational practices of history itself. Engaging Peter Seixas’ (2000) tripartite model of approaches to history education, Jenkins and Munslow’s (2004a) mapping of contemporary historiographic orientations, and Bill Ashcroft’s (2001) analysis of the modes of action by which postcolonial subjects resist *interpellation* and *inscription* within dominant representations of the historic past, I propose a way beyond ‘counter memory’ as critical history.

Chapter VI concludes the study by considering the (im)possibility of History curriculum after ‘the end of history’. Drawing upon the metaphor of ghosts in the curriculum (Doll, 2002), I argue that if History curriculum is to be a critical/transformation enterprise, then it must attend to the problem of historical representation. In the process of making this claim, I consider an important direction for future research.
Given the ‘postmodern’ critical-reconceptualist orientation of this study, there is one final meaning of ‘composition’, which I would like to invoke in thinking about this dissertation. It is a less well known meaning derived from the field of Legal studies. In Law, composition has the specific meaning of a settlement where creditors agree to accept a lesser payment of a debt in exchange for immediate payment. Perhaps this is a useful note on which to end this introduction. In typical postmodern fashion, this dissertation might be thought of as the partial payment of a debt. It is certainly not the final word that can be said about the ramifications of ‘end of history’ discourse for History curriculum, but it is an attempt none-the-less, to make an immediate (perhaps even overdue) contribution to the debate. This contribution is inevitably partial. In the last two years of writing, it seemed that the number of texts published that focused on postmodern historiography doubled. Many, of course, are repetitive in one way or another, which is predicted by methodological postmodernism’s focus on intertextuality. However, the last word is a long way off, and it would appear that in the curriculum response to ‘the end of history’ in Australia and beyond, we are only at the beginning of the conversation. Thus, it is to expand conversation about the implications of postmodernism for History curriculum, and not to have the final word, that this dissertation is presented as the inevitably partial payment of a scholarly debt.
In the previous chapter, I characterised my study as having two related foci. First, a re-examination of the nature of the alleged ‘threat’ to history posed by postmodernism, and second, as a consideration of the implications of postmodern social theory for History as curriculum. I began by necessarily clarifying some technical difficulties associated with the use of the term ‘history’, that have frequently meant that the interlocutors involved in contemporary debates over the status of history have often been arguing at cross purposes. Understanding ‘the end of history’ as a coded reference to the contemporary crisis of historical representation induced by postmodern social theory, and acknowledging the significance of this crisis for History education, I introduced the central ironic problematic of this study as a concern with the (im)possibility of History curriculum after ‘the end of history’. I then indicated that the problematic would be explored in relation to changes to the NSW History curriculum, within a period defined by the Bicentennial of the nation in 1988 to the Millennium. I signalled that discussion would proceed by way of philosophical and historical inquiry into past attempts to mount, and future possibilities for, a curricular response to the problem of historical representation. Finally, I drew attention to salient features of the composition of this study, and indicated how the various dimensions of the problematic would be addressed throughout this dissertation.
In this chapter, I define the terms of the study’s deliberation, analysis, and critique. After briefly mapping the curriculum field, I explore the critical-reconceptualist trajectory in curriculum theory, and the significance of its recasting of curriculum as text and discourse for the current study. Combining approaches typically identified with history, philosophy, and literary studies on the one hand, empirical analysis, and experimental science on the other, the field of curriculum theory has no single methodological foundation. There are no commonly agreed upon ‘canons’ to guide the process of curriculum theorising, nor any widely accepted techniques of analysis that could be used as a standard that would assure the reader of the fidelity of the approach taken to curriculum inquiry in the current study. However, it is possible to situate the work undertaken in this dissertation within an emergent postmodern trend within critical-reconceptualist curriculum theorising.

Representative of what has been described as a ‘textual turn’ in the field of curriculum studies (Green, 1994), recent critical-reconceptualist curriculum theory draws upon poststructuralist (deconstructive) approaches, in addition to hermeneutic (interpretive) approaches, to curriculum conceptualization and critique (see the representative volume edited by Pinar & Reynolds, 1992). Such approaches have been responsible for the reconceptualization of curriculum theory as a form of textual interpretation and pedagogic discourse analysis, and demand a clear understanding of what is meant by text and discourse. As a form of textual interpretation and pedagogic discourse analysis, postmodern critical-reconceptualist curriculum theory typically adopts ‘reading and writing strategies’ such as *diffraction* (Gough, 1994; 1995; 1998; 2002a), and *deconstruction* (Gough & Sellers, 2004; Green, 1995), as ways of opening ‘lines of flight’ for thinking curriculum anew (Reynolds & Webber, 2004a). Often working as a practice of *fabulation*, using text and
ideas to assist the reader to confront the world in a new way (Scholes, 1976), and *fabrication*, weaving together texts and ideas into some new ‘fabric’ or form (MacLure, 2003), the postmodern form of critical-reconceptualist curriculum inquiry is not restricted to specific ‘methods’, nor to a truth-seeking hermeneutic. Instead, it draws upon any strategies that may assist in the deliberations of the curricularist, opening up as a major goal, “the possibility of moving people to see other possible worlds” (Reynolds, 1989, p. 51). Addressing the challenge of defining poststructural methods of curriculum inquiry forms the final part of this chapter. Let me begin, however, by defining the interests and modes of operation of curriculum theory itself.

**Theorising curriculum**

According to Pinar (2004), “curriculum theory is a distinctive field of study, with a unique history, a complex present, an uncertain future” (p. 2). He argues that in comparing curriculum theory with educational psychology, sociology, and philosophy, we should note that, “Only curriculum theory has its origin in and owes its loyalty to the discipline and experience of education” (Pinar, 2004, p. 2). Popkewitz (2001) has argued that curriculum theory is often a systematic attempt “to re-vision the identities of children through the mediations of abstract, generalized systems of ideas” (p. 135). According to Popkewitz (2001), “Curricula are historically formed within systems of ideas that inscribe styles of reasoning, standards, and conceptual distinctions in school practices and its

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17 Although Scholes (1976) describes *fabulation* as ‘fiction that offers us a world clearly and radically discontinuous from the one we know, yet returns to confront that known world in some cognitive way’ (p. 47), I am using it here in a much broader way, more closely aligned with what Gough calls, after Haraway, ‘diffraction’. Thus, my use is not limited to fictional texts, though it does not exclusively employ non-fictional texts either.

18 In this dissertation, as in the field generally, the terms ‘curriculum theory’, ‘curriculum studies’ and ‘curriculum inquiry’ are used as relative synonyms.
subjects” (p. 151). Curriculum must therefore be understood as “a practice of governing and an effect of power” (Popkewitz, 1997, p. 151), that is implicated in the constitution of particular kinds of rationalities and subjectivities. In investigating curriculum as a site of subjectivity formation, it is important to note that curriculum theory is no unified practice, nor “has it ever existed as a monolithic discourse” (Giroux, 1990, p. 3). The practice of “curriculum theorizing is not singular but . . . multiple, fractured and contested” (Wright, 2000), conceptions and cultures of curriculum varying, sometimes dramatically (Joseph, Bravmann, Windschitl, Mikel, & Green, 2000). Kemmis and Fitzclarence (1986) have argued that:

The central problem of curriculum theory is to be understood as a double problem of the relationship between theory and practice, on the one hand, and of the relationship between education and society, on the other. (Kemmis & Fitzclarence, 1986, p. 22)

Attempts to understand and navigate trajectories in curriculum theory are frequently derived from studies of the literature that focus upon how scholars deal with either one or the other of these two ‘central problems’.

Orientations towards the central problems of curriculum theory

When the first problem – the relationship between educational theory and practice – is the focus of curriculum theory, heuristics tend to define the variety of roles adopted by the curricularist. For example, James B. Macdonald’s (1975) somewhat dated, but still efficacious map of the field identifies three distinct approaches to curriculum theory: (1) a form of evaluative curriculum philosophizing that uses theory “as a guiding framework for applied curriculum development and research” (p. 5); (2) a form of curriculum conceptualizing that uses theory to build curriculum constructs that can be tested empirically for the purpose of determining
“the efficiency and effectiveness of a curriculum prescription” (p. 6); and (3) a form of intellectual ‘free play’ that uses theory “to develop and criticize conceptual schema in the hope that new ways of talking about curriculum, which may in the future be far more fruitful than present orientations, will be forthcoming” (p. 6). In practical terms, following Pinar’s (1998) analysis of more recent trends in curriculum scholarship, this tripartite scheme can be re-articulated as a distinction between the *curricularist-as-consultant*, working in ‘the field’ or ‘the lab’ to design effective courses, pedagogical practices, and/or units of study, and the *curricularist-as-generalist*, working in ‘the library’ to question taken-for-granted assumptions about education.\(^{19}\) Cherryholmes’ (1987) distinction between *constructionist* and *deconstructionist* inquiry, or what might be described as ‘educational design’ and ‘curriculum critique’ respectively, is also a useful way of defining these bipolar tendencies in curriculum scholarship.

It is possible, as Gough (2003) following and extending the work of Schwab (1970) suggests, to depict the ways different curriculum scholars have engaged with the theory-practice problem as the result of a commitment to one of three orientations, that produce different forms of knowledge. According to Gough (2003), educational research may be “conceived and conducted” as a concern with: (1) The theoretic – Propositional knowledge in the form of *warranted conclusions* or “*Knowing that…*”; (2) The practical – Judgements in the form of *defensible decisions* or “*Knowing I/we should…*”; and (3) The technical – Skills in the form of *productive procedures* or “*Knowing how…*” (pp. 4-6). While deliberative curriculum inquiry is essentially concerned with ‘the practical’ (Schwab, 1969), much of radical curriculum theory has been concerned with ‘the theoretic’ and positioned itself

\(^{19}\) The distinction here between working in the field, lab, and library as different sites of educational research, is one I owe to prominent Australian curriculum scholar, Bill Green, who shared his scheme with me in personal conversations.
against ‘the technical’ (Giroux, 1988; 2003; McLaren, 1989; Pinar, 2004). Despite the importance of these various forms of knowledge, there is always an in-built danger that “a curriculum perspective that ‘chooses’ not to answer the commonsense questions appears to be naïve, obfuscating, needlessly difficult, or simply wrong, confused, or fuzzy” (Reynolds & Webber, 2004a, p. 8).

If the second problem articulated by Kemmis and Fitzclarence (1986) – the relationship between education and society – becomes the focus of curriculum theory, then we can identify a different set of orientations in the field of curriculum scholarship. Marsh and Willis (2003), reciting the earlier work of William Reid (1981), argue that because of how scholars deal with the problem of education and society, they can be identified as being either system-oriented, system-supporting, system-indifferent, or system-opposing. According to their study of the field, DeMarrais and LeCompte (1995) have suggested that curriculum scholars are inevitably: (1) social transmissionists concerned with the efficacy of curriculum as ‘knowledge transfer’ from one generation to the next; (2) interpretativists concerned with ‘understanding’ curriculum, its generation, evolution, operation and effects; or (3) social reconstructionists concerned to use curriculum as a vehicle of liberation and emancipation, societal transformation, individual empowerment, and/or cultural critique. These three approaches manifest in Aoki’s (2005b) scheme as an empirical-analytic orientation, associated with the traditional model of curriculum theory defined by the Tyler Rationale, that encourages attempts to gain knowledge about effective pedagogy “through guided observation and carefully designed and controlled manipulation” (p. 102); a situational-interpretive orientation, typically associated with reconceptualist curriculum theory, that encourages attempts to understand curriculum as lived experience and/or human meaning-making activity, “the way in which man [sic] meaningfully experiences and cognitively appropriates the social
world” (p. 104); and a critical-theoretical orientation, associated with various forms of radical curriculum theory, that encourages exploration that “makes explicit the tacit and hidden assumptions and intentions held” and instantiated through curriculum as social practice (p. 105). As Aoki (2005a) argues elsewhere, such distinctions can be closely related to the technical, hermeneutic, and praxis oriented knowledge interests articulated by Frankfurt School critical theorist, Jurgen Habermas (1972). When constructed in this way, praxis oriented curriculum inquiry is often positioned by its practitioners in opposition to what they perceive as the ‘instrumentality’ or ‘technocratic rationality’ of technical or empirical-analytic oriented curriculum theory (see for example, Kincheloe & McLaren, 2003). However, Ladwig (1996) has argued, both philosophically and rather pragmatically, that we should have serious reservations about social theories that oppose ‘scientific’ research simply on ideological grounds, as they limit their own potential arsenals in the struggle for a more just education system.

Sometimes heuristics have been developed by scholars who either prefer not to distinguish between the two central problems of curriculum theory, or realise the importance of considering the theory-practice and education-society problematics together, resulting in hybrid schema. For example, Huebner (1966/1999) has identified the deployment of five ‘value systems’ in the practice of curriculum theory, that result in discussions of curriculum from viewpoints that he describes as technical, political, scientific, aesthetic and ethical; each of which results in different curriculum conceptions and prescriptions. Alternatively, Kliebard (1987) identifies curricularists as either mental disciplinarians, social efficiency experts, developmentalists, or social meliorists, depending on whether they were concerned with acculturating youth, testing a curriculum prescription, instantiating a psychologically-informed course design, or correcting the ‘ills of society’ through educational intervention.
In another schema, Eisner and Vallance (1974) map constructions of ‘curriculum’ as the development of cognitive processes concerned with “the refinement of intellectual operations” (p. 5); technology concerned with “finding efficient means to a set of predefined, unproblematic ends” (p. 7); self-actualization concerned with education “as an enabling process” (p. 9); social reconstruction concerned with “social reform and responsibility to the future of society” (p. 10); and academic rationalism concerned with “enabling the young to acquire the tools to participate in the Western cultural tradition” (p. 12). Despite the limitations of the various heuristics deployed by those attempting to map the curriculum field, it is typical practice to identify curriculum scholars with specific movements because of their utilisation of common orientations to solving educational problems, and their particular conceptions of curriculum. Of the various contemporary approaches to curriculum inquiry that exist, it is radical curriculum theory in its critical-reconceptualist form that has had the most influence on this study.

Critical-Reconceptualist curriculum theory

Although by no means a unified approach to the study of education, radical curriculum theory has two prominent and identifiable strands, reproductionist and reconceptualist curriculum theory, that in many ways overlap and borrow from each other (Reynolds, 1989). Marsh and Willis (2003) even go so far as to regard both these forms of curriculum theory as divergent trends within the reconceptualist movement itself. For similar reasons, Cormack and Green (2000) use the synthetic epithet ‘critical-reconceptualist’ to refer to scholars working within this tradition. What W.M. Reynolds (1989) has called ‘reproductionist’ curriculum theory is usually identified with the emergence of the ‘new sociology of education’ movement, that included the work of M. Young (1971) and a little
later Bernstein (1990) in the UK; Bowles and Gintis (1976) in the United States; Connell, Ashenden, Kessler, and Dowsett (1982) in Australia; Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) in Europe. Radical curriculum theory also has roots in both the American Pragmatist and Socialist movements of the early 1930s (W. B. Stanley, 1992). This genealogy still shows traces in the work of some contemporary radical curriculum theorists such as Giroux. However, the writings of Giroux and other radical pedagogues, attest to a very particular reading of the pragmatists (Hlebowitsh, 1992), and have tended towards the adoption of a Gramscian and Althusserian form of neo-Marxist ideology critique, and Marcusian emancipatory philosophy, only recently turning to the work of the Marxist-inspired pedagogical theory of the Vygotskian Cultural-Historical School (see for example, Kincheloe, 2004; Miedema & Wardekker, 1999).

In the eighties, radical curriculum theory was most readily associated with the work of Apple (2001; 2004a),20 Giroux (1981; 1983; 1988), and McLaren (1989), who were in many ways foundational in the critical pedagogy movement (Kincheloe, 2004). In Australia, ‘radical curriculum theorising’ appeared most successfully in the form of the socially critical curriculum movement, which had particular impact in the area of English (see for example the collection by B. Baker & A. Luke, 1991), and more broadly in educational action research (see particularly, Kemmis & McTaggart, 1998a; 1998b). Much of the literature on feminist approaches to education may also be understood as a strand of radical theorising, often favouring – like Giroux and McLaren – ‘pedagogy’ as a category over ‘curriculum’ (Ellsworth, 1989; Gore, 1993; Lather, 1991; A. Luke, 1989; Walkerdine, 1992), to place emphasis upon education as a set of practices, even whilst remaining in many cases a ‘theoretical’ discourse (Gore, 1991). While these radical ‘reproductionist’ approaches have

20 These works are recently republished versions of eighties’ classics.
not always been allies, nor necessarily adversaries (Gore, 1993), what they have in common is a shared vocabulary drawn from neo-Marxist writers such as Gramsci, Marcuse and Althusser. Concerned with issues of ideology, hegemony, cultural capital, and social reproduction (Marsh & Willis, 2003), ‘reproductionist’ curriculum theories both contrast with and complement the more ‘hermeneutically-oriented’ approaches within the ‘reconceptualist strand’ of radical curriculum theorising. Although neither approach has had much impact in Australian curriculum theorising per se (Green, 2003), both these orientations to curriculum theorising have significance for this dissertation, as it is in reflecting upon History curriculum as ‘critical pedagogy’ that this study attempts to address the problem of representing ‘history’ within History curriculum after ‘the end of history’. Thus, it is as a work of critical-reconceptualization that this study attempts to engage with its central problematic. Understanding the commitments, methods, and methodological issues of critical-reconceptualist curriculum theory forms the focus of the remainder of this chapter.

The ‘textual turn’: Hermeneutic trajectories in curriculum inquiry

When Pinar (1975c) published his renowned collection, Curriculum theorizing: The Reconceptualists in the mid-seventies, he described it as “a report of a movement just under way” (p. xi). Only a few years later, when discussing the emerging body of reconceptualist curriculum theory, Pinar (1979) remarked that “while the writing published to date may be somewhat varied thematically, it is unitary in its significance for the field” (p. 13). According to a recent study of synoptic curriculum texts conducted by Kim and Marshall (2005) – the hostility towards the ‘reconceptualists’ within some recent curriculum scholarship notwithstanding (Hlebowitz, 1997; 1999; Wraga, 1998; 1999a; 1999b; Wraga
& Hlebowitsh, 2003) – there has been a growing trend for new curriculum texts to reflect the influence of reconceptualization.\textsuperscript{21} Despite its initial adoption and continuing use of ‘conceptual tools’ from existentialism and phenomenology in order to “understand the nature of educational experience” (Pinar, 1975b, p. xiii), and somewhat later appropriation of poststructuralist methods (Pinar & Reynolds, 1992), what links the reconceptualists is not a consistent methodology, but the theme and function of their work (Pinar, 1975c).

According to Jackson (1992), a concern to go beyond the limits of the technicist Tyler rationale, the deployment of various forms of theory (usually with a continental European genealogy), and an underlying neo-Marxist orientation or emancipatory intent, are the three markers of critical-reconceptualist curriculum work. Such a set of markers helps to blur the distinction that some scholars may wish to make between reproductionist and reconceptualist curriculum theories (Reynolds, 1989), however, while downplaying differences in approach, it does define the space of radical curriculum theory broadly conceived. Sharing a view of ‘curriculum as a complicated conversation’ (Pinar, 2004; Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery, & Taubman, 1995), the dominant modes of inquiry for scholars working within the critical-reconceptualist movement, are not ‘scientific’ or ‘techno-rationalistic’ but historical, philosophical and literary (Pinar, 1975c).

According to Short (1991), in his thorough overview of inquiry methods in curriculum studies, historical inquiry has “the distinctive purpose of ascertaining and explaining human actions and events that have occurred in the past” (p. 16). The most striking features of

\textsuperscript{21} On the whole, this critique of the Reconceptualists rests on the idea that in this form of curriculum scholarship there has been a ‘retreat from practice’ (Wraga, 1999), and therefore a failure to reconcile the reconceptualization with earlier work in the field of curriculum studies which was more ‘practically’ oriented. This critique has been challenged by Pinar (1999), Westbury (1999), and Morrison (2004) in the same journals, arguing that “Curriculum discourse should be marked by richness, diversity, discordant voices, fecundity, multiple rationalities, and theories, and should be touched by humanity and practicality in a hundred thousand contexts” not just the site of the school (Morrison, 2004, p. 487).
historical inquiry are its application of “relatively standard” methodologies, and deployment of “the techniques involved in telling a compelling story” (Short, 1991, p. 17). On the other hand, philosophical inquiry has “the distinctive purpose of examining the fundamental significance of all questions and answers that may arise in the course of human affairs” (Short, 1991, p. 15). Its scope is broad and covers issues related to epistemological, metaphysic, aesthetic, ethical, logical, axiological, ontological and cosmological problems. Its form of inquiry follows “a process of conceptual examination in which questions are raised, answers are posed, implications of the answers are recognised, the reasonableness of the answers are questioned and/or accepted and perhaps new questions are tried out again and again” (Short, 1991, p. 16). It is often identified by a form of dialectic inquiry that relies on “analysis, synthesis and criticism” (Short, 1991, p. 16). Finally, literary inquiry embraces forms of both artistic and hermeneutic inquiry in Short’s scheme. While artistic inquiry attempts to make “intelligible subjective human feeling articulated in the perceptual, aesthetic, and formal qualities of a particular phenomenon or created work” (Short, 1991, p. 17), hermeneutic or ‘interpretive’ inquiry seeks to “attain understanding of the structure of meaning” people give to their experiences and actions (Short, 1991, p. 20). Typically, this involves a procedure of identifying the meanings in a text “in relation to the focus of interest”, and examining these meanings “in relation to one another” (Short, 1991, p. 21). Depending upon whether this act occurs inside a conservative, critical, or radical (postmodern) frame of reference, there will be different expectations in terms of the ‘truth’ that is realised through this process (Gallagher, 1993).

The adoption of historical, philosophical and literary modes of inquiry within critical-reconceptualist curriculum studies manifests as the recasting of curriculum theory as “the interdisciplinary study of educational experience” (Pinar, 2004, p. 2). This stands in
contradistinction to narrow views of curriculum theory as limited to the study or design of a school district’s planned “scope and sequence guides” or official published syllabi (Pinar, 2004, p. 185) – what Eisner (1979) has described as the explicit curriculum. The influence of Pinar’s (1979; 2004) use of the infinitive form of curriculum, currere, to redefine curriculum as the ‘course’ of our individual and collective educational experience, can clearly be seen on the field. However, the reconceptualization did not stop with the appropriation of a phenomenological hermeneutic. Implicated in the movement from modernism to postmodernism in the field of curriculum inquiry, the reconceptualization has its roots in the critical hermeneutic tradition (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2003; Slattery, 2002), the impact of which has been “a shift from ‘reproduction’ to ‘representation’ as an organising principle for curriculum research and critical pedagogy” (Green, 1993, p. 202). What the reconceptualization has meant for the field is a broadly realised ‘textual turn’ (Green, 1993; 1994), the application of a wide range of insights, interpretive tools, methods, and heuristics from continental European philosophy, literary theory, social history, and cultural studies, to an understanding of curriculum as text.

**Reading curriculum as text**

Understanding curriculum as text requires an appreciation of contemporary literary, social, and hermeneutic theory. Despite the fact that critical-reconceptualist curriculum theory has increasing drawn on an impressive array of theoretical traditions and, as a result, has no single conception of ‘text’ that it consistently mobilises, there does appear to be a number of intuitions about the nature of ‘text’ that are widely shared by contemporary literary, social, and curriculum theorists. In the last half of the twentieth century, ‘text’ was used within a range of disciplinary fields as a word to describe “any cultural object, from writing
to dress, food, and even the human body” (Fuery & Mansfield, 2000, p. 56), not just that which “is written on the printed page” (Cherryholmes, 1987, p. 303). Using “the text as a paradigm”, contemporary hermeneutics, or the “theory of interpretation” (Gallagher, 1993, p. 4), underpinning much of the ‘critical work’ conducted in the social sciences (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2003), has come to read the world, lived experience, and all human activity as a text (Gallagher, 1993, p. 7). Adopted by hermeneutists, poststructuralists, postcolonial theorists, postmodernists, critical theorists, and curriculum reconceptualists alike, as “a broad term for all human activities, products, and representations” (Fuery & Mansfield, 2000, p. 215) – including curriculum – ‘text’ becomes a synonym for ‘material culture’ (Silverman, 1990). Accepting ‘material culture’ as “analogous to text” (Olsen, 1990, p. 164), or “thinking social structure as a whole through the metaphor of textuality” (Frow, 1990, p. 47), curriculum (as cultural practice and educational experience) is rendered capable of being ‘read’.

Conceptualizing curriculum as a text that is ‘read’ by teachers, students, and educational administrators, problematises research that assumes a stable relationship between planned and enacted curricula; between educational experience and its documentation and interpretation. Rendered as text, curriculum becomes subject to negotiation, as the agency of its ‘readers’ is exercised through individual interpretation. Constituted independent of its readers, the text is never “a fully imagined and fully controlled product of its author’s mind” (Fuery & Mansfield, 2000, p.145), as it inevitably carries a surplus of meaning (Derrida, 1976; 1978/1993), or at least can be read in a variety of ways that go beyond the author’s intended meanings. Nor, as Kemmis (1993) argues, can the curriculum as text “represent the world in an unproblematic way” (p. 36). He suggests, instead, that ‘the
world it ‘represents’ is manifold and diverse, always subject to interpretation, construction and reconstruction” (Kemmis, 1993, p. 52). Cherryholmes (1987) adds that:

> text refers not just to what is written and on the printed page. It also includes other words and definitions, other traces in the language that make it possible to assign value and meaning to what is written. To understand a text one must go back and forth between what is present and what is absent, what is written and what is not written. One must read the silences of a text as well as what is written. (p. 303)

This particular kind of understanding of ‘text’ has lead Eagleton (1983) to argue that “texts do not exist on bookshelves: they are processes of signification materialized only in the practice of reading . . . [ensuring that] the reader is quite as vital as the author” (p. 74). Because “a text exists only as a specific sociocultural creation, tied to events occurring at the time of reading” (Silverman, 1990, p. 152), ‘text’ has according to Eagleton (1983) – re-articulating notions derived from Barthes (1975) – “no determinate meaning, no settled signifieds, but is plural and diffuse, an inexhaustible tissue or galaxy of signifiers, a seamless weave of codes and fragments of codes” (p. 138). Stated another way, “the logic of texts do not match their rhetoric, they are not what they daim” (Cherryholmes, 1987, p. 303). Rather than being self-contained entities, texts constitute their boundaries via rhetorical means, and are constituted according to Frow (1990) by *intertextuality*, the transformation and repetition of structures across texts. In other words, texts are never isolated products of an author’s mind, but reproduce and rework structures and ideas that can be located in other texts. The intertextual relationships that are activated, including not only references to ideas drawn from other texts, but also repetition of textual structures in composition, make texts less stable entities than they appear. Resultantly, text must be understood as “a totality of composition that bears within itself possibilities of meaning that overflow grammatical and syntactic arrangement” (Gallagher, 1993, p. 6).
The suggestion that meaning is not solely an artefact of ‘grammatical and syntactic arrangement’ does not mean that ‘anything goes’ in textual interpretation. Rather, it should support recognition that “meaning is created or interpreted with the text” as a result of the reader’s socio-historically constituted subjectivity and culturally contingent register and genre-based reading expectations, “rather than extracted from something inherent in it” (Silverman, 1990, p. 152, emphasis in the original). Meaning in this sense is always multiple and, more importantly, relational, never solely or inherently a property of text. Laurel Richardson (2001) has argued that we should work on the assumption that “all readers are writers, that the text is constantly being reinvented by readers” (p. 36). Understanding the process of reading as an act of (re)writing, R. J. C. Young (1981) argues that “text functions as a transgressive activity which disperses the author as centre, limit, and guarantor of truth, voice and pre-given meaning” (p. 31). The text, by inviting the birth of the reader, is the death of the author (Barthes, 1968/1977).

We must be mindful, however, of Gallagher’s (1993) assertion that, “built into the very act of reading, and conditions implicated in the situation of the reader and in the structure of the text . . . [are the] conditioning factors [that] constitute the limits within which the reader constructs an interpretation of the text” (p.5). Likewise, Wolfreys (1998) argues that, “we cannot bring an idea of reading to a text ahead of its being read. The particularity of the text precludes the possibility of a theory or method of reading” (pp. 50-51). Consequently, we might assert that the posthumous author, having deployed a finite set of linguistic resources in a particular pattern (register and genre among the definable features of that pattern), haunts the text (Burke, 1998). Tilley (1990), mindful of this tension, adds another when he states:
the text mediates: it is neither a direct expression of reality, nor is it
totally divorced from it. So meaning in the text is dual. It is both to be
found in the text’s organization and syntax and in the relation of the text
to the world. (Tilley, 1990, p. 332)

We might add that meaning, in addition to emerging from the relationship of text to world,
and reader to (authored) text, is determined by the ‘cultural tools’ that mediate these
relationships, whether in the guise of text-forms or reading strategies. Conceptualizing
*curriculum as text* draws attention to the ‘semiotically mediated’ nature of education (John-
Steiner & Mahn, 1996; Wells, 1999; Wertsch, 1991b). Practically, this means that as
individuals engage with and appropriate what Vygotsky (1930/1994) described as the
‘physical and symbolic tools’ offered in the curriculum, they both reproduce culture, and
simultaneously transform it via mutations they introduce into the social through novel tool-
use (Engestrom, 1999), a consequence of the demands of “unique, situated performance”
(Wertsch, 1991a, p. 94). In sociocultural terms, curriculum functions as a culturally framed
and socially mediated educational experience that both constrains possible outcomes and
experiences through its representational strategies and structures, and simultaneously
provides possibilities for the agency of individual learners as they navigate and negotiate
unique situations, in the process redefining the educational experience.

What rendering *curriculum as text* means for curriculum theory can also be understood in
part from a useful comparison with educational policy research. Ozga (2000), exploring
*educational policy as text*, has argued that “we should not restrict our understanding of texts to
those that come with ‘policy text’ stamped all over them” (p. 95). Rather, she makes the
case that beyond:

White and Green papers, Bills and Acts of Parliament, regulations
governing decision-making at all levels of provision . . . [we should]
extend the category of policy text to include documentary or other
I think it is clear from the critical-reconceptualists that the same case can be made for the category of ‘curriculum text’ in the kinds of inquiry undertaken by the contemporary curricularist. In practice, this means broadening the base of the curriculum text from syllabus documents to textbooks, teaching resources, academic articles (that profess educational ideals or analyse the pedagogic effects of discourse), educational policy documents (where they describe the intended experience of students and educators), newspaper articles and editorials (that critique existing school practices and outcomes, or express opinions about ideal educational realities), statements made by education ministers during radio interviews, diagrammatic representations of a course or program in a university handbook, and so on. Even pedagogic ‘ideas’ that can be located within and across texts and domains become potential objects of study. Sometimes it has involved the production and interpretation of literally new texts for analysis, such as those that emerge as narratives of educational experience, resulting from autobiographical inquiry. We see the production of such curriculum texts in the work of two early ‘reconceptualists’, Grumet (1980/1999) and Pinar (Pinar & Grumet, 1981), for example. However, it also means, after the hermeneutic turn, using ‘text’ as metaphor, reading ‘educational experience’ as if it were a text, whether or not a textual object that records such experience (in written or oral form) was ever produced.

According to Mann (1975), “to regard a curriculum as a literary object . . . means first of all to think of it as a set of selections from a universe of possibilities” (p. 135). Because of the curriculum’s inevitable selections and elisions, possibilities are opened for ‘reading’ curriculum as an autobiographical (Grumet, 1980/1999), political (Koutsellini-Ioannidou,
1997), racial (Castenell & Pinar, 1993; Pinar, 1991), gendered (Poynton & A. Lee, 2000), aesthetic (Eisner & Vallance, 1974), moral, queer, institutional, or emancipatory text (Janesick, 2003, p. 9). The possibilities are almost limitless, but always involve some form of what Alan Luke (1995, p. 20) has called a ‘disarticulation’ of the text – the disruption of that which the author presents as “common-sensical, obvious, natural, given or unquestionable… to open it up to further questioning” (MacLure, 2003, p. 9, emphasis in the original). Alan Luke’s process of ‘disarticulation’ shares Threadgold’s (2000) commitment to “writing as intervention, as research, as analysis . . . [and] envisages a different kind of ‘making visible’ which writing might accomplish for and through the speaking subject” (p. 51). Accepting the ‘crisis of representation’ that is implicated in curriculum theory’s textual turn (MacLure, 2003, p. 134), the act of writing a text that interrogates and ‘re/de/signs’ curriculum, becomes “a method of inquiry” (Gough & Sellers, 2004, p. 14). Contemporary curriculum inquiry, as the ‘re/de/Signing’ of educational experience (Gough & Sellers, 2004), takes seriously Alison Lee’s (2000) description of research as ‘(re)writing’, in which the production of a new ‘inter textual text’ is the method. Given curricularists must themselves be selective either in what they interrogate, or what they re/de/sign, “no single critique is [or will ever be] exhaustive” (Mann, 1975, p. 137). However, its success is perhaps best judged by the extent to which it encourages the reader to think differently about the curriculum being re/de/signed.

The ‘discursive turn’: Poststructural approaches to curriculum inquiry

The reconceptualization of curriculum theory did not stop with the re-casting of curriculum as text. After its initial hermeneutic turn, the field of curriculum studies
continued to show signs that its practitioners were experimenting with new ways of engaging in reconceptualization. From the early nineties, a ‘second wave’ of reconceptualist theorising – or if one prefers, a ‘third wave’ of curriculum theorising itself (Wright, 2000) – began to appear. Some of those theorists involved in the first forms of reconceptualist inquiry began to adopt approaches to curriculum theory noticeably influenced by phenomenology and/or deconstruction (Pinar & Reynolds, 1992), and various forms of postmodern social theory (see for example, Giroux, 1990; 1995; 2000b; McLaren, 1995b; McLaren & Hammer, 1996). The nineties also marked an increasing attention in curriculum scholarship to issues of language, representation, and knowledge (see for example, Green, 1993; Popkewitz, 1997), drawing particularly upon poststructuralist theory as an important intellectual resource (Cormack & Green, 2000). In a recent book, Reynolds and Webber (2004b) proclaimed the emergence of what they now see as a new generation of postmodern curricularists, who work as “Deleuzian nomads… preferring to ‘do curriculum’ on an alternate playing field” (p. 11). Appropriating methods from various forms of poststructural theory, the intellectual ‘nomad’ typically challenges “an idea, concept, trend, movement, or act, and then immediately puts it under erasure, challenging his or her own presumptions to knowledge, power, and will in curriculum theorizing” (Webber & Reynolds, 2004, p.203). Wright (2000) documents the same trend, suggesting there has been a:

...turn to cultural studies and the virtually ubiquitous post discourses . . . which draws on the work of the original reconceptualists . . . but which takes erstwhile supposedly radically untraditional characteristics (such as theorizing about non-school pedagogical spaces, theorizing social justice) for granted and concentrates on pushing the theoretical limits of curriculum theorizing. (pp. 9-10)

This particular kind of approach to curriculum theorising is enabled by the possibilities that arise through a conceptualization of curriculum as ‘pedagogic discourse’ – discourses about
pedagogy, and discourses that have a pedagogical effect (by inscribing a particular set of meanings and possibilities). It relies on a critical insight of poststructural discourse theory: the impossibility of making statements outside of discourse. Thus, the statements made by the researcher or scholar are subject to the same ‘suspicion’ as the statements analysed by the discourse theorist. To place a Foucauldian spin on Derrida’s (1976) infamous statement, il n’y a pas de hors-texte, there is no “truth” outside of discourse/text, since it is discourse that provides the truth-value of any claim made.

Let me begin my exploration of ‘discourse’ in curriculum theory by repeating Ball’s (1993) claim, made inside a somewhat different frame, that text and discourse are related but distinct cultural artefacts. The exact nature of this relationship depends upon the definitions of text and discourse to which one subscribes. The phenomenologist Ricoeur (1991), for example, has asserted that “text is any discourse fixed by writing” (p. 106). However, despite what may have been his intention, this limits the definition of text to a written artefact, and for the reader of Ricoeur renders discourse simply speech. Foucault (1978/1994) cautioned against the tendency to reduce discourse to text, but was speaking of text as a ‘material object’, rather than a ‘material practice’. As a way of re-working or re- wording Ricoeur’s proposition, we might say that text – as both material object and material practice – is constituted ‘by’ discourse; and that discourse bleeds beyond the boundaries of a single text, working within and across texts, forming a network of intertextual relations. Before we can fully appreciate these statements, and their significance for contemporary curriculum inquiry, we need to understand what is meant by the term ‘discourse’.

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22 This phrase from Derrida’s (1976) On grammatology, appears thus: “There is nothing outside the text [there is no outside-text; il n’y a pas de hors-texte]” (p. 158).

23 According to Gallagher (1993), this is not true of Ricoeur’s entire oeuvre. However Gallagher argues that Ricoeur does over-rely on metaphors of reading and writing in his particular theory of interpretation.
Conceptions of discourse in educational research

There are multiple conceptions and definitions of ‘discourse’ circulating in contemporary theory (Mills, 1997), and a wide variety of ways in which ‘discourse analysis’ is taken up as a practice in educational theory specifically (MacLure, 2003; Poynton & A. Lee, 2000). It would seem that almost the full range of possible conceptions has been mobilised within the field of curriculum studies. Any historically-oriented study of the concept of ‘discourse’ reveals a complex genealogy, emerging from the interaction of ideas across the domains of structuralism, poststructuralism, linguistics, post-Freudian psychoanalysis, neo-Marxism, and the field of cultural studies (Sawyer, 2002). It is important to note that although a great deal of contemporary research credits Foucault with the origination of the widespread adoption of the term ‘discourse’, it has been argued rather convincingly by Sawyer (2002), that it is not the strict Foucauldian definition that is typically mobilised in contemporary scholarship. Sawyer (2002) claims that the more probabilistic origin of the ‘broad usage’ of the term, particularly if we look at how it is being used, is with two other French theorists, the Marxist Michel Pêcheux and psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, and many of the theorists who worked in the emerging field of British cultural studies during the 1960s and 1970s. Foucault (1969/1972) has added to the confusion himself, stating in *The archaeology of knowledge* that, despite his own formal definition, he has used ‘discourse’ in a range of ways:

> treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements. (p. 80)

While the common or broad usage of the term often fluctuates between these various senses, with different disciplines placing more or less emphasis on one definition or another, two particular conceptions seem to dominate educational literature, which we might describe as the literary (or cultural) and linguistic definitions, respectively.
Within Literary and Cultural Studies, ‘discourse’ operates as a synonym for sets of ‘authoritative statements’, that are said to stand in ‘intertextual relationship’ with one another. Texts thus instantiate and are constituted by and as ‘discourse’, or sets of ‘authoritative statements’. These ‘authoritative statements’ or ‘master narratives’ not only inscribe particular relations of power, but are so seductive that it is often impossible, difficult, or dangerous to think otherwise (for a superb discussion of how this plays out in teaching, see McWilliam, 1999). Understood in this way, we might suggest that ‘discourse’ functions as a kind of ‘scaffolding’ within which particular forms of reasoning are constructed (Popkewitz, 2001). Such ‘authoritative statements’ not only constitute the ‘flesh’ of the text, but also discursively construct its boundaries (Cherryholmes, 1987), and its ‘intelligibility’ to different audiences as fact or fiction. Mobilised as a term for ‘authoritative statements’, ‘discourse’ has been heavily influenced by Foucault, whether or not he can be claimed as its origin. Foucault’s (1980a) insight that “it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together” (p. 100), pervades the mobilization of discourse theory in education.

For Foucault, ‘discourse’ was understood as a series of statements that form the objects of which they speak (Sawyer, 2002), consisting “of words spoken or written that group themselves according to certain rules . . . that make their existence possible” (Reynolds, 2003, p. 76). The ‘rules’ that form the ‘conditions of existence’ of a discourse, are not conceptualised by Foucault as the constraints and affordances of a linguistic grammar: they are instead rules of formation for objects, operations, concepts and theoretical options; or the conditions that broker the limits and forms of expressibility, conservation, memory, reactivation, and appropriation (Foucault, 1968/1996). These rules determine not only what can and cannot be said, but also what may be considered true or false, within a given discipline, community, or
institution, at a specific historical moment; or as Foucault (1980a) expresses it, “discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power” (p. 101). Importantly, Foucault’s concern with discourse centres on what he describes as ‘the archive’, the sum total of authoritative statements that have actually been made in a given field, discipline, or institution. Foucault’s conceptualization of discourse presents an additional possibility to those discussed already, the possibility of understanding curriculum as archive, or a series of statements that (a) instantiate a pedagogical intent or (b) that have engendered, or are likely to result in, an educative effect. ‘Discourse analysis’ in a Foucauldian sense is, therefore, the study of ‘knowledge systems’ (Popkewitz, Franklin, & Pereyra, 2001a), constituted by “serious speech acts: what experts say when they are speaking as experts” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. xx, emphasis in the original), or what is articulated and accepted within a given discipline, community, or society.

Practically, Foucault’s discourse analytics attempts to “define the play” between intradiscursive, interdiscursive, and extradiscursive dependencies (Foucault, 1991, p. 58); “between the objects, operations and concepts of a single formation” (p. 58), “between different discursive formations” or disciplines (p. 58), and “between discursive transformations and transformations outside of discourse . . . discourse and a whole play of economic, political and social changes” (p. 58), respectively. According to Baker and Heyning (2004), within educational research, the adoption of Foucauldian inspired approaches to ‘discourse analysis’ has resulted in a tendency towards historicization and philosophizing projects that “offer insights into the ‘conditions of possibility’ for certain discourses” (p. 29); denaturalization projects that challenge the universality and normativity of particular educational practices (p. 31); and critical reconstruction projects that marshal “inquiry toward delineating and reconstructing a stated new vision or practice” (p. 32). While the current study is readily
identified as a critical reconstruction project, it is clear that such a project overlaps in significant ways with historicization/philosophizing and denaturalization approaches, and may not be possible without them.

Although versions of Foucault's definition of discourse, and approaches to discourse analysis purportedly influenced by Foucault, are widely mobilised in educational research (Baker & Heyning, 2004), and have had some play in the field of curriculum studies (Cormack & Green, 2000; Popkewitz, 2001; Popkewitz, Franklin, & Pereyra, 2001a), an alternative definition that has arisen within the discipline of Linguistics probably enjoys equal currency in Education studies more broadly. In linguistics, ‘discourse’ is typically defined as “language in use” (MacLure, 2003, p. 182). This conception of discourse has lead some linguists to focus almost exclusively on the grammatical (syntactic, grapho-phonemic, phonological, semantic, pragmatic, and morphological) rules used by a speaker to construct meaning in different communicative situations and cultural contexts, resulting in emergent sub-disciplines such as ‘conversation analysis’ (Potter, 1996a). In other words, linguists studying 'discourse' are concerned with how the mobilisation of linguistic resources to construct meaning, varies as a function of communicative purpose, cultural and situational context, and relationship between interlocutors (Hasan, 1989). They typically study “language as a social semiotic, a resource to be deployed for social purposes” (Lemke, 1995, p. 27). Within such a sociolinguistic perspective, ‘discourse’ or more correctly a ‘discursive formation’ (Lemke, 1995) appears as the regularly repeated written or spoken text-forms (registers and genres) that are the conventions for making-meaning under specific sets of conditions constituted by purpose, context, and audience (Halliday, 1977). Discourse therefore operates both as a culturally constituted limit condition, and manifests via a set of
socially shared presentational, orientational, and organizational resources that shapes linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour (Lemke, 1995).

Given the context-bound regularities that are apparent in the reproduction of specific forms of discourse, socio-linguist Gee (1990) has proposed that human beings navigate between a number of alternate ‘discourse communities’. Gee’s (1990) suggestion is that we each acquire a ‘primary discourse’ from our home/family environment, and learn a number of ‘secondary discourses’ within scholastic and ultimately work-related institutions. Here, understanding and controlling one’s own language use in different situations becomes the key to successfully negotiating social life, and the capacity to do so is frequently depicted as a kind of social capital (Gee, 1990) that curriculum plays an important part in distributing (Lemke, 1995). Resultantly, a key feature of the analytical approach adopted by linguists studying ‘discourse’ as ‘language in use’ is the close, systematic attention to linguistic and semiotic variation across differing situations and contexts. This approach to discourse analysis differs from literary and cultural studies approaches by its attention to the grammatical choices that are utilised to construct meaning; by a text-centred functional ‘linguistic’ method, rather than an intertextual ‘literary’ methodology.

Oftentimes, linguistic and cultural definitions of discourse are married (MacLure, 2003, p. 186), as is the case in the various forms of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Practitioners of CDA can be identified by their attempts to understand how textual and discursive practices manifest “wider socio-political structures of power and domination” (Kress, 1990, p. 25).

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24 Gee’s depiction of primary and secondary discourses is redolent of Vygotsky’s (1931/1994a; 1931/1994b) distinction between everyday and scientific thinking.

25 Such work is frequently based upon the foundational studies of Halliday (1985) and, particularly in the Australian school context, the work of Jim R. Martin and J. Rotherty (1993).
p. 85), constructing their ‘practice’ as a form of ‘ideological critique’ that relocates discourse and text within the context of their production and consumption (Lemke, 1995). Drawing upon “close systematic analysis of the language of texts”, the Critical Discourse Analyst attempts to provide “concrete examples of how texts work to create inequalities” (Mills, 1997, p. 134). The various forms of CDA operate within a self-consciously political framework influenced, according to Alan Luke (1999), by (1) poststructuralist conceptions of text and discourse as having “a constructive function in forming up and shaping human identities and actions” (p. 167); (2) Bourdieu’s understanding of textual and discursive practices as embodied forms of “cultural capital with exchange value in particular social fields” (p. 167); and (3) neo-Marxist cultural theory’s assumption that texts and discourses “articulate broader ideological interests, social formations, and movements” within political economies (p. 167). Critical Discourse Analysts remain on the whole committed to the proposition that “observable realities, truths, and social facts” have no “essential existence prior to discourse” (A. Luke, 1999, p. 171). Subsequently, CDA casts “all data and research artefacts as discourse . . . [and] pedagogical practices and outcomes as discourse” (A. Luke, 1999, p. 171).

An important contribution to CDA has been Gee’s (1990; 1992; 1999) conceptualization of discourse with a lower case ‘d’ as ‘language-in-use’, and Discourse with a capital ‘D’ as “sayings-doings-thinkings-feelings-valuings” (Gee, 1990, p. xv); “words, acts, values, beliefs, attitudes, social identities, as well as gestures, glances, body positions, and clothes” (Gee, 1992, p. 107); “a particular social group’s way of being in the world, their ‘form of life’, their very identity” (Gee, 1990, p. xvii). Despite the focus on ‘discourse’, approaches claiming to be forms of CDA vary, but they typically adopt a strategy that involves exposing through the use of linguistic and semiotic tools, the ways in which text (including
social practice as text) operates as an ideological instrument, a tool of an often invisible
cultural politics (see Fairclough, 1995; Kress, 1990; Lemke, 1995; A. Luke, 1995; Van Dijk,
2001). CDA not only works across, and often blurs, the distinction between the various
definitions of discourse articulated in the preceding pages, it also adopts an approach to
discourse more informed by critical theory than poststructuralism, despite its claims, since
discourse (as ideology) is seen to conceal realities rather than simply construct them.

While the space created by the blurring of definitions is also the operative domain of
curriculum studies, the approach to discourse analysis adopted by the critical-reconceptualist is
typically ‘literary’ rather than strictly ‘linguistic’. This has particular consequences for
curriculum theorising. One realisation it has produced is that there is no escaping discourse
(given ‘discourse’ is considered to be embodied in, and shapes, both statement and social
practice). Subjectivity is understood an artefact of discourse, socially and historically
contingent. Unsurprisingly then, poststructuralist curriculum theory promises no trans-
subjective truths from research, as a conservative hermeneutics might anticipate and desire.
According to Patrick Slattery (2002), the phenomenological quest for the truth of being is
replaced within poststructural curriculum inquiry’s ‘deconstructive hermeneutics’ by an
emphasis “on possibility and becoming as a goal of education because human consciousness
can never be static” (p. 661, emphasis in the original). Thus, there is no ‘essence’ to be
recovered by the act of interpretation, nor any ultimate ‘foundation’ that can authorize the
method of inquiry.

The recognition that the researcher is as much subject to the effects of discourse as that
which is studied, and that this phenomenon affects interpretation, marks a moment of self-
reflexivity in curriculum studies. Reynolds and Webber (2004a) in a recent book on curriculum theory, argue that:

the purpose of discourse analysis [in curriculum theory] is not to determine what the discourse means, but to investigate how it works, what conditions make it possible (its exteriority), how it interacts with nondiscursive practices, and how it is connected to power and knowledge. (p. 7)

Further, within a poststructuralist approach to curriculum inquiry, attention is likely to be given to the effects of statements, such as the ‘subject positions’ they permit and create, rather than to their grammatical forms. Pedagogic or curriculum discourse analysis for the poststructural curricularist is, therefore, not a way of constituting the object of analysis as an everyday classroom speech act or vocal exchange. Rather ‘discourse’ is deployed as a way of highlighting how ‘serious statements’ made within or about education, constitute and coordinate particular forms of knowledge, that form our ways of reasoning about the self and the world (Popkewitz, 2001). This insight has implications for the objects of curriculum research.

Reading curriculum as discourse

James B. Macdonald (1975) has asserted that the objects of analysis for curriculum theorising are inevitably statements about (a) forms of knowledge and ways of knowing – the ‘nature’ of what is to be taught and how it is learnt (epistemology); (b) pedagogical decision-making processes and educational realities – what can be taught and learnt within the limits of the educational situation (ontology); and (c) valued skills, concepts, and experiences – what is currently being, or should be taught (axiology). Statements arising about curriculum from within the field defy any single mode, ranging across the

26 Although not ‘curriculum theory’ as such, the work of Davies (1993) demonstrates this potential.
“descriptive, explanatory, controlling, legitimating, prescriptive, and affiliative” (Huebner, 1975, p. 256). David Smith and Lovat (1995) perhaps summarise the field effectively when they argue that pronouncements inescapably tend towards normative statements about what curriculum should be (the ideal), or descriptive statements about what curriculum actually is (the reality). A discursive formation – ‘curriculum’ from the poststructuralist perspective – is both educational experience, and an ‘archive’ of statements that govern our way of thinking about education (and the particular disciplinary knowledges it has generated or appropriated). Understood in this way, curriculum is realised as “an ensemble of methods and strategies that inscribe principles for action” (Popkewitz, 1997, p. 163) and particular “styles of reasoning” (Popkewitz, 2001, p. 151).

In order to understand how curriculum constructs particular ‘styles of reasoning’ or constitutes socio-historically specific ‘rationalities’, it is useful to draw on Eisner’s tripartite model of curriculum. In The educational imagination, Eisner (1979) argues that the explicit curriculum – that knowledge (and ‘system of reasoning’) which is advocated in the official documents of a state or district education authority – is only a small component of what schools teach and students learn. He argues that in understanding the total curriculum of a school (and for our purposes, the ‘rationalities’ it constructs), it is just as important to consider what he terms the implicit curriculum, what a school teaches because of the ideas and values it instantiates through its physical organization, timetabling methods, organizational structure, etc. The implicit curriculum is defined by the messages that students actually receive or the meanings they construct, despite not being formally stated or necessarily even ‘consciously’ intended. In many ways, it is similar to descriptions of the hidden curriculum, with perhaps some important differences in how it is operationalised as a concept in curriculum theory.
A central concept in radical curriculum theory, the hidden curriculum was described by Seddon (1983) as “those outcomes [from schooling], which are not explicitly intended by educators” (p. 1). Apple (2004a) defines the hidden curriculum as:

the tacit teaching to students of norms, values, and dispositions that goes on simply by their living in and coping with the institutional expectations and routines of schools. (p. 13)

Longstreet and Shane (1993) describe it as:

the kinds of learnings children derive from the very nature and organizational design of the public school, as well as from the behaviors and attitudes of teachers and administrators. (p. 46)

In each case, what is being described is a ‘covert curriculum’ (Print, 1989), that is deeply implicated in social reproduction. However, while the hidden curriculum is almost always cast negatively, as a mechanism for the maintenance of “the ideological hegemony of the most powerful classes” in a society (Apple, 2004a, p. 41), the implicit curriculum seems to be constructed as a more generous notion. Closer to Dewey’s idea of “collateral learning” that understands the “latent outcomes” of this covert curriculum as potentially positive as well as negative (Hlebowitsh, 1993, p. 9), the implicit curriculum does not immediately imply as “hidden curriculum” so frequently does, a pedagogical device responsible for the production of an ideologically laden ‘false consciousness’. In conception, the implicit curriculum ‘fits’ more readily with a Vygotskian notion of education, in which the social and tool-mediated activity of schooling simultaneously reproduces and transforms culture (Bruner, 1984; Engestrom, 1999; Minick, 1997; Scribner, 1985). For neo-Vygotskians such as Newman, Griffin, and Cole (1989), education operates as a ‘construction zone’ in which knowledge is co-constructed by participants; and the pedagogical encounter – ‘curriculum’ rendered as educational experience – becomes the crucible in which “culture and cognition
create each other” (Cole, 1985). From this perspective, it becomes absurdly reductionist to limit understanding of the covert curriculum to being an instrument solely of social control (see Hlebowitsh, 1993, for a similar argument from a Deweyian perspective). Inevitably, like all aspects of the curriculum, it will be both constraining and enabling of particular ways of thinking, acting, being. Such effects are, as Bernstein (1990) notes, independent of whether a given pedagogy is visible or invisible.

For Eisner, the curriculum is not solely constituted by what is taught explicitly or visibly according to official syllabi, and implicitly or invisibly through its social practices. It is also constituted by that which is not taught, or what he terms the null curriculum. It is this aspect of ‘curriculum’ that is of particular interest in the current study. The null curriculum makes clear how the curriculum functions to construct a system of reasoning. Eisner (1979) argues that the null curriculum is formed as a result of “the intellectual processes that schools emphasize and neglect . . . [and] the content or subject areas that are present and absent in school curricula” (p. 83). It is worth quoting at length Eisner’s conception of the null curriculum. According to Eisner (1979):

there is something of a paradox involved in writing about a curriculum that does not exist. Yet, if we are concerned with the consequences of school programs and the role of curriculum in shaping those consequences, then it seems to me that we are well advised to consider not only the explicit and implicit curricula of schools but also what schools do not teach. It is my thesis that what schools do not teach may be as important as what they do teach. I argue this position because ignorance is not simply a neutral void; it has important effects on the kinds of options one is able to consider, the alternatives that one can examine, and the perspectives from which one can view a situation or problem. The absence of a set of considerations or perspectives or the inability to use certain processes for appraising a context biases the

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27 These descriptions of the educational experience, are in fact definitions provided for Vygotsky’s notion of the ‘Zone of Proximal Development’ (ZPD). I have argued elsewhere that the ZPD defines the pedagogical moment itself (Parkes, 2000), hence my use here of definitions of the ZPD as descriptions of ‘curriculum’ rendered as ‘educational experience’.

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evidence one is able to take into account. A parochial perspective or simplistic analysis is the inevitable progeny of ignorance. (p. 83)

What this means for curriculum theorising is the importance of attending not only to the curriculum that is advocated, and the curriculum that is enacted or experienced, but also the knowledge that is neglected. The curriculum therefore embodies a particular system of reasoning validated, in part, by its neglect of alternate forms. Eisner (1979) argues that real consequences emerge from a null curriculum, since “voids in educational programs . . . withhold from students ideas and skills that they might otherwise use” (p. 258). However, Eisner (1979) is not arguing for the impossible, a curriculum that teaches everything. In his own words, he provides the following caveat:

I am not suggesting that any of us can be without bias or that we can eventually gain a comprehensive view of all problems or issues. I do not believe that is possible . . . Such a perspective requires omnipotence. Yet if one mission of the school is to foster wisdom, weaken prejudice, and develop the ability to use a wide range of modes of thought, then it seems to me we ought to examine school programs to locate those areas of thought and those perspectives that are now absent. (p. 83)

Therefore, Eisner’s notion of the null curriculum opens possibilities for curriculum critique, not simply on what is planned or enacted, but on the basis of what is missing or absent. The null curriculum is, thus, singularly important as a methodological tool, since as Eisner (1979) notes, it:

allows one to raise questions about what children are learning that would never be identified if one were to focus only on the intended goals of the explicit curriculum . . . [and places us] in a position to evaluate the consequences of each. (p. 285)

In naming the null curriculum, Eisner, although not a poststructuralist himself, provides a useful resource for conducting poststructuralist curriculum inquiry.
Poststructural curriculum inquiry as ‘deconstructive hermeneutics’

According to Cherryholmes (1987), one of the important tasks of a post-structural study of curriculum:

is to figure out why and how opportunities are provided and why other opportunities are bypassed. Curriculum, in part, is a study of what is valued and given priority and what is devalued and excluded. (p. 297)

When used as part of a poststructural or deconstructive curriculum inquiry, the *null curriculum* moves from being simply a description of what is not taught as part of the official and unofficial curriculum, and becomes instead an important methodological tool. By identifying the specific forms of reasoning that are valued in a curriculum, and examining those forms in relation to the styles of reasoning that are neglected, a picture develops of the curriculum as a system of governance that is constitutive of subjectivity via its selection of particular “ways for individuals to organize their views of ‘self’” (Popkewitz, 2001, p. 163). Stated another way, from a poststructuralist point of view, pedagogy is a social practice of self-formation (Palermo, 2002; Parkes, 2000).

As a methodological construct, the *null curriculum* enables the researcher, *given the application of different frames or lenses*, to determine how curriculum is implicated in the production of specific rationalities. For example, if I wanted to understand what forms of hermeneutic theory had been taken up in curriculum work, and what forms neglected or ignored, then Patrick Slattery’s (2002) Hermeneutics, subjectivity, and aesthetics: Internationalizing the interpretive process in curriculum research, in *The handbook of international curriculum research*, Gallagher’s (1993) *Hermeneutics and education*, or Nicholas H. Smith’s (1997) *Strong Hermeneutics: Contingency and moral identity*, would all be useful texts since each provides a typology of various forms of hermeneutic inquiry. In his own inquiries, Eisner (1979) uses
an aesthetic lens to demonstrate that the creative arts remain in many ways a *null curriculum* in American schools. Gough (1998), following Haraway (1985), uses fiction within his curriculum projects, as a diffractive lens “that may be particularly useful to us when we are attempting to reconceptualize or reconstruct some aspect of our work” (p.107). Gough’s diffractive approach to curriculum inquiry highlights how fiction – speculative or science fiction particularly – may be effective “as a means of posing options and alternatives” (Gough, 1998, p. 93), through ‘narrative experiments’ with figures such as ‘the cyborg’ that expose the limits inscribed within curriculum constructions of our collective past, present and future (Gough, 1995). Such ‘diffractive lenses’ open possibilities for the poststructural reclamation of earlier hermeneutic work in the curriculum field, by functioning as tools in deconstructive inquiry that invite interpretation and the seeking of ‘understanding’ as a goal, but resist the attraction of naming any particular ‘reading’ truth.28

The notion of the *null curriculum* complements deconstructive curriculum inquiry. The *null curriculum* functions in many ways like the ‘absent presence’ in deconstruction, defining a curriculum’s ‘system of reasoning’ by what it neglects or deliberately rejects. As John R. Hall (1999) notes, deconstruction “seek[s] out the unspoken and unwrittens - silenced truths that haunt the texts marked by their absence” (p. 9). Royle (2000) explains that in its initial appropriation by academics in American universities, deconstruction was associated with “a strategy concerned with conceptual oppositions”, which involved “an overturning” of hierarchies “and a reinscription or transformation of the basis on which this opposition functioned in the first place” (p. 5). However, concerned over the problems generated by such reductive definitions, Derrida (1990) has declared deconstruction to be “neither a theory nor a philosophy . . . neither a school nor a method . . . not even a discourse, nor an

28 I would argue that one of the only certainties in deconstructive curriculum inquiry is that a different reading, as a result of using a different diffractive lens, is always possible.
act, nor a practice” (p. 85). Resisting definition, Derrida (1989) has asserted that “deconstruction is inventive or it is nothing at all” (p. 42). Of course, the precise meaning of Derrida’s refusal that deconstruction is a method, hinges on what we mean by the term ‘method’. If it “suggests something systematic and closed”, then deconstruction is definitely not a ‘method’ (Royle, 2000, p. 5). However, deconstruction is not devoid of all definition, as Derrida (1984) suggests:

> Deconstruction not only teaches us to read literature more thoroughly by attending to it as language . . . it also enables us to interrogate the covert philosophical and political presuppositions of institutionalized critical methods which generally govern our reading of a text . . . It is not a question of calling for the destruction of such institutions, but rather of making us aware of what we are in fact doing when we are subscribing to this or that institutional way of reading. (p. 125)

Joanne Martin (1990) may therefore be close to the mark when she states that deconstruction is “an analytical strategy that exposes in a systematic way multiple ways a text can be interpreted” (p. 340), problematising any attempt to close on a singular meaning (of text or method). In this sense, deconstruction may be understood as a kind of ‘radical hermeneutics’, that “describe[s] meaning as a product of grammatological form, the play of signs” (Gallagher, 1993, p. 278); and that aims “to keep the trembling and endless mirror-play of signs and texts in play” (Caputo, 1987, p. 118), by engagement in acts of reading and interpretation that resist the desire for closure on a final meaning.

Despite the problems of defining actual ‘deconstructionist’ methods, Boje (2001) has attempted with “apologies to Derrida” to outline moves that he believes can be identified as signature deconstructionist strategies (p. 22). Boje’s (2001) list includes practices of: making visible unstable binaries; recovering absent voices; subverting definitions by listing variations; reversing dualities; articulating dissensus; finding exceptions to stated rules;
tracing the unsaid; re-narrating, and resituating text. The above list of strategies provides a
good description of the methodological scope of ‘poststructural curriculum theory’ in
general, and a ‘deconstructive hermeneutics’ in particular. However, any attempt at defining
the methods of the deconstructive curricularist should be tempered by Cormack and
Green’s (2000) suggestion that curriculum discourse analysis “is at once symptom and
technology, and hence as much a mode of transgression as it is a matter of discipline and
method” (p. 2).

Conclusion: Opening lines of flight through
deconstructive curriculum inquiry

In this chapter, I defined the terms of the deliberation and critique undertaken in this
dissertation, by locating my study within a poststructural trend in critical-reconceptualist
curriculum theory. I argued that a defining feature of poststructural critical-reconceptualist
curriculum scholarship was its use of historical, philosophical and literary forms of inquiry
into pedagogic discourse for assisting educators to see alternatives to current practice. In
this schema, pedagogic discourse was rendered large, embracing both discourses that have
a pedagogical intent, and discourses that have a pedagogic effect. Thus, syllabus documents
and the speeches of politicians that discuss education are among the many texts that are
open to scrutiny. Following Gough (1995), I posed *diffraction* and *deconstruction* as useful
tools alongside Eisner’s (1979) notion of the *null curriculum*, to render visible the particular
systems of reasoning privileged by a specific curriculum design, and to ‘open lines of flight’
for thinking curriculum anew (Reynolds & Webber, 2004b).
It is important to note, that while the overall structure of the study is consistent with the structure of philosophical curriculum inquiry described by Short (1991), there is no single diffractive lens or deconstructive technique that is deployed throughout. For example, in Chapter III, science fiction film is deployed diffractively, in an approach influenced by Gough (1995), to deconstruct part of Fukuyama’s (1989; 1990; 1992; 2002a) ‘end of history’ thesis, given his own use of stories by H. G. Wells and Aldous Huxley (Fukuyama, 2002b). Likewise, reading Fukuyama alongside the work of a number of methodological postmodernists (Baudrillard, 1992; 1995; Derrida, 1994; Haraway, 1985; Lyotard, 1979; 1991), and postcolonial theorists (Chakrabarty, 1997; Prakash, 1995; Spivak, 1997; R. J. C. Young, 1990), forms another important deconstructive tactic. This conforms to the question-raising or problem-posing phase of philosophical curriculum inquiry. In Chapter IV the idea of history as ‘collective memory’ (see for example, Halbwachs, 1980; Healy, 1997; Le Goff, 1900; Sassoon, 2003) becomes a diffractive lens to understand what is at stake in the debates over school History. Examining the actual route taken within History curriculum in NSW as a solution to the problem of ‘the end of history as a grand story’, this corresponds to the second phase of philosophical curriculum inquiry. Finally, in Chapter V, theories of history teaching (Seixas, 2000), historical writing (Ankersmit, 2001a; Barthes, 1967/1997; D. Carr, 1986; 2004; H. White, 1973; 1978b), and approaches to resisting the interpellating effects of historical discourse (Ashcroft, 2001), are mobilised as diffractive heuristics for responding to the central problematic of this dissertation, the (im)possibility of History curriculum after ‘the end of history’. This corresponds with the concluding phases of philosophical curriculum inquiry, in which the implications of answers are recognised, assessed, and either accepted or rejected with at least a partial obligation to raise better alternatives.
Working inside the structure of a philosophically oriented curriculum inquiry, the ‘deconstructive hermeneutic’ that underpins my approach to ‘re/de/signing curriculum’ as Gough and Sellers (2004) might describe it, resists the adoption of a singular method, deploying many of the strategies articulated by Boje (2001) and Gough (1998), among others, in a strategic rather than comprehensive way. To aid the reader, each diffractive lens is explored in the context of its deployment. On the other hand, I rarely if ever, announce the use of a particular deconstructive tactic, letting my argument rest on its own merits. While there might be great variation in the diffractive lenses and deconstructive tactics mobilised throughout this dissertation, the epistemological stance underpinning my approach as a whole, aims to be consistent in its projection of ‘curriculum’ as text and discourse; in its use of the structure of philosophical inquiry; and in its deployment of ‘theory’ (and occasionally science fiction) as a deconstructive tool.

In the next chapter, I begin my exploration of ‘end of history’ discourse, by exploring the work of the American political theorist, Francis Fukuyama, and his suggestion that we have arrived at the terminus of history. Deploying ideas drawn from a number of Science Fiction films, and exploring relevant writings of a number of methodological postmodernists, and a number of postcolonial theorists, I read with and against Fukuyama, in the process attempting to understand the many ways in which ‘the end of history’ gets mobilised on the contemporary scene as ‘the end of the grand story’.
III

(DE)TERMINATION
The end of the grand story

In Chapter II, I developed the theoretical lens through which my curriculum inquiry will proceed. I suggested that rather than be conceptualised as a formal method or procedure, the particular form of curriculum theorising that I adopt may better be understood as a kind of 'deconstructive hermeneutics', not designed to illuminate some ultimate truth, but to open possibilities in the pedagogical, philosophical and curriculum texts encountered. Further, I asserted that by using diffraction, defamiliarization, and deconstruction as 'methods', the approach adopted is 'postmodernist' (after Doll & Gough, 2002; Pinar, 1979; Reynolds & Webber, 2004b) and exploratory, with intellectual roots in literary theory, history, and philosophy. Accordingly, I situated my dissertation within the critical-reconceptualist approach to curriculum studies, and positioned my work as a form of poststructural philosophical curriculum inquiry, that takes as the objects of its analysis not only discourses about curriculum and pedagogy, but also discourses that have a pedagogical effect. I completed the chapter by addressing the methodological problem of defining poststructural curriculum inquiry.

In this chapter, I move to an exploration of the discourse of 'the end of history' in contemporary theory, as an important prelude to my inquiry into the orientations of the History curriculum in NSW, and the implications of 'the end of history' for History as curriculum. My explorations begin with the works of Francis Fukuyama. As an economist
who once worked for the Political Science Department of the RAND Corporation, and as a one time member of the Policy Planning Staff of the US Department of State, Fukuyama has, unsurprisingly, a rather conservative outlook. It is probably impossible to discuss the idea of ‘the end of history’ today, without referring to his controversial and conservative thesis, built upon themes he draws from Kojeve, Hegel, Nietzsche and Marx. Fukuyama’s thesis is the most widely known contemporary academic manifestation of the resurrected utopian dream, assuring us of arrival at History’s terminus. Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ spin does not involve the rejection of modernity’s master narratives as Vattimo (1988) argues ‘end of history’ discourse does in the works of those associated with methodological postmodernism (Barthes, Baudrillard, Derrida, Foucault, Haraway, Lyotard). Rather, Fukuyama is concerned to announce triumphantly, that modernity’s goal of ‘the recognition of human freedom’ is not a fantasy, but has actually been realised in the history of the present. The most recent manifestation of a Hegelian ‘end of history’ metanarrative, Fukuyama’s work, announcing the arrival of the West at the telos of history (‘the end’ of the grand story), stands in opposition to the writings of the French postmodern social theorists, who assert that both history (Barthes, 1967/1997; Foucault, 1971/1994; Lyotard, 1979), and its end (Baudrillard, 1992; Derrida, 1994), are linguistically-generated illusions. Reading Fukuyama with and against the methodological postmodernists is used as a strategy to illuminate the multiple meanings of ‘the end of history’ in contemporary theory.

In turning to the work of Fukuyama – probably the contemporary theorist most responsible for popularising the idea of ‘the end of history’ – I begin by attempting to articulate the main aspects of his utopian ‘end of history’ thesis. I follow this by exploring some of his more recent work, which actually seems to indicate concerns that, without careful intervention, we may find ourselves ‘back in history’ as society falls into various
states of dystopia. Fukuyama’s dystopic concerns demonstrate the conservative line that underscores all his writings, and makes for a useful comparison with similar concerns in the work of postmodern philosopher, Jean Francois Lyotard. I then problematise both their readings of the posthistorical subject, by discussing them in relation to the image of the posthuman/posthumanist ‘cyborg’, as it emerges in the work of Haraway (1985), Gray (2001), and others. Following lines of criticism developed in Specters of Marx, I document Derrida’s (1994) deconstruction of Fukuyama’s thesis, which reveals its idealistic closures. I then proceed to examine an alternative conceptualization of ‘the end of history’ mobilised in contemporary theory by Jean Baudrillard. His conception of ‘the end of history’ reads the present as marked by a ‘loss of history’, the result of history’s displacement by media spectacle. Baudrillard’s rejection of ‘the grand story’ of history as a seductive illusion is then contrasted with recent developments in the area of postcolonial theory, in which (the grand story of) history is argued to be a ‘white mythology’ that serves to constrain humanity within the metanarrative of Western (neo)colonialism, in part by constructing whiteness as the invisible norm against which all others are compared. This analysis of ‘end of history’ discourse in contemporary theory invites speculation about the political uses and abuses of history, and the impossibility of history as a ‘grand story’ after historical and methodological postmodernism.

The political liberal as last man of history

Fukuyama’s original essay on the subject of ‘the end of history’ was published in The National Interest in 1989, shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The coincidence in the timing was more than serendipitous. For Fukuyama (1989), the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the resultant end of the Cold War, were all events that
marked the triumph of liberal democracy over its rival socialist modes of political and economic organization. Taken together, and read through his enthusiastic commitment to political and economic liberalism, these events appeared to signal, for Fukuyama, arrival at ‘the end of history’; that is, arrival at the terminus of history, where ‘History’ is “understood as a single, coherent, evolutionary process” (Fukuyama, 1992, p. xii); or “a coherent, directional evolution of human societies taken as a whole” (Fukuyama, 1995). Fukuyama’s thesis not only celebrates the triumph of free market capitalism over the soviet socialist system, but reinstates a metanarrative of progress. Interestingly, Fukuyama appears to be unconcerned by the epistemological crisis that has occurred across the humanities, casting doubt on notions of universal progress. He remains optimistic, despite recent international events, that his original ‘end of history’ thesis was correct, that “the process of modernization was . . . a universal one that would sooner or later drag all societies in its train” (Fukuyama, 2002a, p. 8). His vision is a legacy of the Enlightenment. It is, as Jenkins (1999) would be quick to note, a vision of ‘history’ in the Upper Case, in which making history is synonymous with making progress (in Fukuyama’s sense, movement towards the realisation of a liberal capitalist utopia). It is a view as Elton (1997) has suggested, that we have moved into a ‘post-historical’ era that is effectively beyond ‘ideological conflict’. It is built around a belief that we have arrived at ‘the end’ of ‘the grand story’ of humanity.

Fukuyama’s widely-read essay engendered a range of reactions, some positive, many highly critical. His essay, supported by a storm of publicity, caused such a stir among academics and political commentators, that he expanded it into what became a best-selling book, *The end of history and the last man*, which in its post Cold War triumphalism, was very much a product of its times (Furedi, 1994). The book was followed by a number of essays over the last decade of the twentieth century, many of which manifested his attempts to clarify and
restate in ways more acceptable to a sometimes hostile audience, his speculative ‘end of history’ thesis (see for example, Fukuyama, 1995). As recently as 2002 he returned to the topic of ‘the end of history’ in an attempt to respond to the events of September 11 2001, which appeared to those more critical of Fukuyama’s work to suggest a serious problem for his thesis. For many, the events of September 11 demonstrated that international ideological conflict was not dead, and that while liberal democracy’s old adversary, socialism, might now be relegated to the pages of history, liberalism had a new foe in reactionary Islamic fundamentalism (Zakaria, 2001). Could this mean that Fukuyama’s proclamation of ‘the end of history’ may have been premature?

Fukuyama’s recent response to this question was that September 11 simply “represents a serious detour”, on the way to the global acceptance of political and economic liberalism (Fukuyama, 2002a, p. 8). In his view, there is no escaping ‘history’, no escaping the current of “modernization and globalization” which he sees as “the central structuring principles of world politics” (Fukuyama, 2002a, p. 8). In fact, it is clear that Fukuyama (2002b) sees September 11 as “a desperate rearguard action” that seeks to challenge globalization and modernization, but which will ultimately be “overwhelmed by the broader tide of modernization” (p. 11). The events of September 11 therefore do little more than assure Fukuyama of the steady advance of modernization throughout the world, which he associates with the acceptance of the ideology of ‘political and economic liberalism’. Despite his confidence about the global march towards liberal states, however, Fukuyama is often ambivalent about which countries are currently living at, inside, or after ‘the end of history’. While some would argue that in The end of history and the last man, Fukuyama’s end-state of history was implied to exist in contemporary America (Roth, 1995b), Fukuyama’s own more recent comments appear a little more cautious. Take for example his post
September 11 declaration that “the Europeans are certainly right that they are living at the end of history; the question is, where is the rest of the world?” (Fukuyama, 2002a, p. 24). For those who accept Fukuyama’s thesis, this is an important question. However, supporters need not despair, since Fukuyama provides at least a partial answer to this problem.

Although we might be yet to arrive at the full realisation of a global liberal utopia, according to Fukuyama’s reading of the political events of the last two decades of the twentieth century, the world has entered a time where all alternatives to liberal democratic capitalism have been revealed as inadequate (Fukuyama, 1992). His thesis, in his own words part empirical, part normative, is speculative, based on a quasi-Hegelian view of history (Williams, Sullivan, & Mathews, 1997), a view that follows Hegel in conceptualizing “the [h]istory of the World” as nothing other than “the progress of the consciousness of freedom” (Elliot, 1994, p. 50). Such a view is ‘historicist’ in the sense that it looks for “trends that underlie the evolution of history” (Popper, 1957/1986). From a postmodern perspective, the fundamental flaw in Fukuyama’s thesis would seem to be his equating of ‘human freedom’ exclusively with a particular historic form of politico-economic liberalism. By mistaking historical events for universals, Fukuyama re-instates a metanarrative of progress while presenting his thesis as a simple (even self-evident) historical description. Since metanarratives gloss the situated, historically and culturally embedded nature of events, usually presupposing some grand underlying theme or principle, they are really historicist, or ahistorical narratives that masquerade as histories.

Fukuyama attempts to thwart attempts to dismiss his thesis as simple historicist speculation by asserting that it is possible to argue on empirical grounds that human societies will
increasingly adopt free market capitalism, or as he prefers to call it “economic liberalism” (Fukuyama, 1990), as their mode of economic production (socialist modes, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, having been demonstrated to be inadequate). This argument forms what he considers to be the strong aspect of his thesis. He also argues that societies will increasingly be inclined to adopt liberal democracy, or “political liberalism” (Fukuyama, 1990) as the preferred mode of government as a consequence of an innate need for humans to receive recognition – to be seen and valued – that only democracy has been shown by history to meet. His evidence for such a statement is that:

the fall of the regimes in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia was the direct result of the death of Marxism-Leninism in the original homeland of the world proletariat, the Soviet Union [which has consequently resulted in a] remarkable consensus . . . over the viability and desirability of economic and political liberalism. (Fukuyama, 1990 p. 75)

This, he would suggest five years on, is the weak aspect of his argument (Fukuyama, 1995). For Fukuyama, the global movement toward economic and political liberalism indicates that we are living at ‘the end of history’, that is, at a time when history has moved beyond ideological conflict to leave liberalism as the ‘last man standing’.

In a recent attempt to clarify his original thesis, Fukuyama (2002a) argued that:

the ‘end of history’ hypothesis was about the process of modernization. Progressive intellectuals around the world spent much of the last century and a half believing that historical progress would result in an evolution of modern societies toward socialism. In more recent years, they have held that societies could modernize and yet remain fundamentally different culturally. My hypothesis was that there was such a thing as a single, coherent modernization process, but that it led not to socialism or to a variety of culturally-determined locations, but rather to liberal democracy and market-oriented economics as the only viable choices. The process of modernization was, moreover, a universal one that would sooner or later drag all societies in its train. (p. 8)
Whether Fukuyama is correct about both the direction and universality of history is arguable. However, for our purposes, it makes visible a particular modernist metanarrative of the ultimate movement of history towards a specific telos, or optimal endpoint. However, what remains evident in Fukuyama is that his ‘end of history’ utopia is not the vision shared by all of his fellow historicists/teleologists, Marx, Hegel and Kojeve. In the preceding passage, Fukuyama differentiates his ‘end of history’ thesis from that of Marx, who depicted ‘the end of history’ as the arrival at a socialist utopia. Likewise, Fukuyama (1992) differentiates his view from Kojeve (1969), who despite providing support for Fukuyama’s Hegelian doctrine of ‘Universal Recognition’, claims with Marx that ‘the end of history’ is to be realised in a universal socialist state. In the process of distancing his ideal utopia from the Marxist/Kojevean desire for the materialization of a socialist state, Fukuyama constructs a utopia that is in some sense closer to Hegel and his idealist proposition of the universal acceptance of ‘freedom’ as the goal of history. For Fukuyama this manifests itself as the realisation that economic and political liberalism are “the only viable choices” for human beings in modern societies (Fukuyama, 2002a, p. 8). He is able to argue this, because in his view, it is only liberalism that satisfies the human desire for ‘recognition’ (McCarney, 1994). Kojeve was visibly wrong about the telos of history according to Fukuyama, as the collapse of European communism has demonstrated, particularly because he ignored the role of mediators such as ‘corporations’ that increase the possibilities of ‘recognition’ in a civil society; mediators that Fukuyama obviously believes are absent in a communist state (McCarney, 1994, pp. 18-19). Thus, while drawing on the insights of Marx and Kojeve, Fukuyama anticipates a very different telos, one that rejects the ideology of socialism in favour of the promise of a free market liberal utopia, which Fukuyama believes is the politico-economic embodiment of Hegel’s goal of a society built on ‘universal recognition’ of freedom. Fukuyama does not conceptualize his utopia as
absolutely or ‘radically egalitarian’, but as a society in which “freedom and equality [are offered] to the maximum extent to which they are possible” (Bertram, 1994, p. 176).

According to Fukuyama’s (1999) speculations, based on his observation of the development of modern societies:

the logic of a liberal and democratic political order becomes more pressing as societies develop economically, since reconciliation of all diverse interests that make them up requires both participation and equality. The unfolding of modern natural science drives economic development, and economic development drives – with lags, setbacks, and wrong turns – a process of political development in the direction of liberal democracy. We can therefore expect a long-term progressive evolution of human political institutions in the direction of liberal democracy. (p. 280)

Fukuyama’s assertion is plain. If a society has not yet ‘modernised’ it will be forced to sometime in the future as a result of the increased pressure of the global market place for absolute participation. Because modernization involves the appropriation and development of sophisticated technologies, it requires the mobilization of labour and vast resources in a particular direction. Societies undergoing modernization are therefore forced to move towards various forms of consensual politics. For Fukuyama, the result of moving in this direction is that liberalism will, sometimes after experiments with alternative philosophies such as socialism (or even religious fundamentalism), be recognised as the only viable political and economic theory; the only political and economic philosophy that works in harmony with a unified, globalised market economy. It is also, as he argued in his first major book (Fukuyama, 1992), the only political philosophy that (at least in principle) allows all voices to be heard, and thus provides the recognition of individuals that Fukuyama, following Kojeve’s (1969) reading of Hegel, believes our ‘human nature’ demands.
The vision of history offered to us by Fukuyama is a relatively linear, teleological one. Deviations from the *telos* are to be interpreted not as a failure of the thesis, but as temporary deviations and setbacks, that will ultimately be supplanted by the adoption of political and economic liberalism (the arrival at Fukuyama’s utopia). In *The Great Disruption*, Fukuyama provides his account of the massive social change that occurred in the decades from the 1960s to the 1990s, as industrial nations began the transformation into information societies. In this work, Fukuyama again restates his conservative vision of history as a linear, progressive, directional development, albeit with a minor modification to account for the unpredictable rise and fall of ‘social and moral values’. Beginning by restating his ‘end of history’ thesis, Fukuyama (1999) asserts that:

> in the political and economic sphere, history appears to be progressive and directional, and at the end of the twentieth century has culminated in liberal democracy as the only viable alternative for technologically advanced societies. In the social and moral sphere, however, history appears to be cyclical, with social order ebbing and flowing over the space of multiple generations. (p. 282)

While Fukuyama remains satisfied that his global, liberal, democratic, free-market utopia will ultimately be achieved, his immediately pre-millennial tome appears to show signs of concern that his ‘end of history’ utopia could move further from our reach than originally conceived, or at least be put under threat from a variety of sources. This concern has become thematised over Fukuyama’s most recent works, demonstrating that despite his confidence in the ultimate manifestation of his ‘end of history’ utopia, he remains uneasy about the potential of ‘technologically advanced societies’ to slip into states of social, economic, moral and political dystopia. Such a concern was subtly present as early as Fukuyama’s (1992) *The end of history and the last man*, the title of which contained an implicit warning that we had better not be like the ‘last man’ [sic] of Nietzsche’s work, where our complacency, and experience of ‘physical security and material plenty’ – the effect of living
after the end of history, after all ideological battles were over – might lead to the reigniting of history, with all the conflict that this suggests (Sim, 1999). There is, therefore, an important justification for the examination of Fukuyama’s dystopic concerns, as they remain the flip side of his ‘end of history’ thesis, and reveal a particular dimension of his ‘millennialism’. It is to an examination of Fukuyama’s dystopias, in order to begin the deconstruction of his ‘end of history’ thesis that I now turn.

Fukuyama’s dystopia: The return to history

If we were to charge Fukuyama with naivety, because his teleological, liberalist ‘end of history’ thesis leaves no space for radically new forms of political and economic life to emerge as a consequence of the impact of unforeseen technologies in the future, then we should not be surprised that his latest work appears to, at least partially, recant ‘the end of history’ in response to exactly this notion. In response to critics, Fukuyama’s (2002b, p. 10) subtly revised argument is that because technology shapes the forms social life often takes, we will not experience the absolute ‘end of history’ until we reach the end of science. That is, we will not be living at ‘the end of history’ until we reach the end of ‘techno-scientific progress’. Thus, Fukuyama’s latest work simply adds a second problematic trajectory to its already contested teleology.

The problem for Fukuyama, of suggesting that there might be an ‘end of science’ that ‘the end of history’ hinges on, is that we have no way of determining if and when we have reached the final form of techno-scientific development. If, as Popper (1957/1986) has argued, “the course of human history is strongly influenced by the growth of human knowledge”, and “we cannot predict, by rational or scientific methods, the future of our
scientific knowledge. . . [Then] we cannot, therefore, predict the future course of history” (pp. vi-vii). Fukuyama’s suggestion that ‘the end of history’ will be reached after ‘the end of science’ is self-defeating, since science cannot logically have an end, at least not one that we know is the end (despite the ‘popular idea’ that we are coming close to knowing all that we can know, as argued in Horgan, 1996). Unmistakably, Fukuyama’s thesis relies on a commitment to a historicist vision of history (and science), a commitment “to formulate hypotheses about general trends underlying social development” (Popper, 1957/1986, p. 16), and therefore, predictions about the direction of history. I must make clear here, however, that I am not advocating, in challenge to Fukuyama, that techno-science has the potential for unlimited ‘progress’. Rather, I simply want to suggest that the future forms techno-science takes are never perfectly predictable, and may well be radically different from that experienced in the present. This has been forcefully argued in the work of Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn (1970) sought to demonstrate that scientific progress is frequently the jettisoning of a previously held paradigm in favour of a new one, not necessarily contingent on its predecessor. Likewise, much of Foucault’s oeuvre could be interpreted as a challenge to the idea of progress in the human sciences (see for example, the discussion of the problem of ‘progress’ and ’continuity’ in Foucault, 1971/1994). Interestingly, these critiques do not concern Fukuyama, who once again demonstrates a capacity for ignoring the epistemological challenges to his thesis, asserting instead a commitment to his own brand of historicist empiricism, and allegiance to ‘the grand story’ of modernisation, the myth of human progress.

As noted earlier, in his final pre-millennial work, The Great Disruption, Fukuyama (1999) examines the shift that has been occurring in the ‘developed’ world, from an industrial to an information society. He asserts that during this period of transition, or as he prefers to
call it the period of ‘Great Disruption’, the countries involved experienced an epoch characterised by ‘moral decay’. His evidence for the ‘moral decay’ associated with the Great Disruption of the 1960s to the 1990s, includes citation of high crime rates, illegitimacy statistics, and indices of low levels of trust in major institutions (Fukuyama, 1999). He ignores issues relating to improvements in the working conditions of the socially disadvantaged, or the increasing status of women in western societies. These would disturb the dark picture he wishes to paint. Further, many scholars may want to challenge Fukuyama’s assumption that the measures he has selected indicate anything about levels of morality in the general population. They tell us rather, a great deal about Fukuyama’s values. I document Fukuyama’s ideas here to again highlight the conservative and often unproblematic nature, not only of his arguments, but of his evidence, and assumptions.

Exploring the moral dimensions of ‘the end of history’ further, Fukuyama (1999) suggests in this later work that:

there is a strong logic behind the evolution of political institutions in the direction of modern liberal democracy, one that is based on the correlation between economic development and stable democracy . . . This same progressive tendency is not necessarily evident in moral and social development. (p. 10)

Fukuyama’s first dystopia is therefore, a descent from ‘the end of history’ into social disorder and chaos. According to his logic, if we leave unchecked the ‘excessive individualism’ that the Great Disruption encouraged, then we may be unable to enjoy the fruits of ‘the end of history’. We will be like Nietzsche’s lazy, hedonistic ‘Last Men’ – as discussed earlier – who forget what it is like to live in history, with its conflicts and dangers. Fukuyama’s problem, as Roth (1995b, p. 171) argues, is “how will we keep ourselves hard after getting what we wanted”? He notes that “the ambivalent liberal in The end of history
looks around and sees satisfaction, then worries, American-style, about the dangers of too much satisfaction” (Roth, 1995b, p. 171). Of course the comparison between the ‘Last Men’ of history, and the political apathy and distrust that some argue characterised the teen youth of the 1990s is striking, and cannot go unnoticed by Fukuyama, who is eager to place developed nations at ‘the end of history’, and intensely worried by the prospect of, what we might term, a ‘return to history’.

Fukuyama’s historicism comes to his aid in providing hope that this dystopia will not circumvent ‘the end of history’. He argues that “there is a bright side . . . social order, once disrupted, tends to get remade once again, and there are many indications that this is happening today” (Fukuyama, 1999, p. 6). According to Fukuyama (1999):

we can expect this to happen for a simple reason: human beings are by nature social creatures, whose most basic drives and instincts lead them to create moral rules that bind themselves together into communities. They are also by nature rational, and their rationality allows them to create ways of cooperating with one another spontaneously. (p. 6)

Thus, while Fukuyama is unsure of a way to maintain moral order over time, he is again sustained by a vision that the social disorder of the Great Disruption “is beginning to recede” (Fukuyama, 1999, p. 7), and will recede due to certain ‘essential features’ of human behaviour, evident in cyclic trends observable over ‘the course of human history’. Such a view relies on a view of humanity that has been shared by more mainstream historians such as Pirenne (1970), who once asserted that a relatively stable human nature is a core assumption of all attempts at historical construction, since “one cannot comprehend men’s actions at all unless one assumes in the beginning that their physical and moral beings have been at all periods what they are today” (p. 30). Interestingly, at its extreme, such a position suggests the impossibility of writing a history of ‘the Other’, and locates moral
behaviour as a universal trait, rather than an emergent sociocultural phenomenon, subject to variation from place to place, and over time. It would appear that the commitment to a relatively stable and universal human nature, or at least assumptions about relative consistencies in human behaviour, invites meta-historical speculation (Bullock, 1970) about meanings concealed in the grand sweep of a cyclical or teleological history. According to Bhabha (1996):

> the idea that history repeats itself, commonly taken as a statement about historical determinism, emerges frequently within liberal discourses when consensus fails, and when the consequences of cultural incommensurability make the world a difficult place. At such moments, the past is seen returning, with uncanny punctuality, to render the ‘event’ timeless, and the narrative of its emergence transparent. (p. 59)

Although Bhabha was not talking about Fukuyama in the passage quoted above, he might as well have been, so close does his description of a general liberal strategy accord with Fukuyama’s rhetoric. Once again, Fukuyama’s thesis emerges in striking opposition to postmodern conceptions of ‘the end of history’, which are built on an opposing assumption, that humanity has no universal, essential, enduring subjectivity; no inevitable trajectory; nothing like a universal ‘human nature’; nothing to hang a universal morality on.

The concern about a moral dystopia stopping us at the gates to ‘the end of history’ is only one of Fukuyama’s apprehensions. He is also concerned that recent developments in science will lead to a nightmare world where ‘the end of history’ may be permanently eluded as humanity is altered beyond recognition. Fukuyama’s second dystopia is unambiguously the emergence of a posthuman world, driven by an unrestrained techno-scientific establishment. In his most recent book, *Our posthuman future: Consequences of the biotechnology revolution*, Fukuyama (2002b) proposes three scenarios – two of which are borrowed from Aldous Huxley’s (1931/1989) *Brave New World*, a text he addresses in his
introduction – that are likely to occur if scientific progress remains unaccountable to ‘moral’ values. In the first dystopic scenario, human beings use designer drugs to alter moods and personalities to the point that there is no longer any excuse for not being in a state of perpetual happiness. The result of such a scenario, Fukuyama wants us to recognize, is the social stigma, and potential ostracism, that might occur as a result of ‘having a bad day’, which will no longer be acceptable. The recent film *Equilibrium* (2002, dir:Wimmer), exaggerates just such a scenario, where people who fail to take their ‘mood’ drugs – in this case to keep them in ‘equilibrium’ – are executed as traitors to the state. In Fukuyama’s second scenario, advances in medicine result in lifespans of well over 100 years, resulting in a range of unforeseen problems such as increased mental rigidity as people age, and a decreasing interest in sexual reproduction resulting from an inability to make oneself attractive to the opposite sex – welcome to universal test-tube reproduction.

In his final dystopic scenario, Fukuyama worries about the likelihood of science transforming our world into the kind of place depicted by H. G. Wells’ (1896/1996) in *The island of Dr Moreau*, in which genetic manipulation results in chimeras and interspecies hybrids, humans whose capabilities have been ‘enhanced’ by animal DNA, with unforeseen terrifying effects. Likewise, Fukuyama shows concerns about the possibility of ‘designer babies’, whose genes are manipulated to produce specific characteristics in future generations, a scenario prophesised by Frank Herbert, in his Hugo and Nebula award winning book *Dune* (1965/1981), where the religious order of the ‘Bene Gesserit’, attempts to manipulate bloodlines in order to produce the ‘Kwisatz Haderach’, an all powerful Messiah. A similar theme is evident in Herbert’s lesser known *The eyes of Heisenberg* (1966/1976) in which genetic science has become bureaucratised to the point where all embryos have their genes ‘cut’ in order to produce a race of near-immortal ‘optimen’.
Fukuyama warns of potential social effects of the ‘gene manipulation’ scenario, such as children blaming their genes, or their parents who ‘selected’ their genes, for all their failures, rather than themselves. He also suggests the possibility that a new under-class of people may develop, whose failures are blamed on the contamination of their human genes with animal material. We might also ask the question, what happens to those who can’t afford modification? Will they produce a new under-class of the less than biologically perfect, who are excluded from particular kinds of jobs due to identified defects in their DNA. One can see such a dystopia in Andrew Niccol’s (1997) film Gattaca, in which an ordinary guy with a heart defect must assume someone else’s identity in order to take on the kind of career he’s dreamed of. In a moment that reveals the liberal-humanist emancipatory undertones of his thesis, Fukuyama (2002b) asks “What will happen to political rights once we can breed some people with saddles on their backs, and others with boots and spurs?” (p. 23).

Fukuyama’s real concerns for the advent of a techno-scientific dystopia are based on his enduring commitment to notions of an essential human nature. In Fukuyama’s (2002b) most recent (post-Millennium) book, he argues that:

> whatever the academic philosophers and social scientists may think of the concept of human nature, the fact that there has been a stable human nature throughout history has had very great political consequences. (p. 28)

For Fukuyama (2002b), the growing scientific interest in biotechnologies may “reopen possibilities for social engineering” (p. 31), such that in a generation or two, we may find ourselves in “a posthuman future, in which technology will give us the capacity gradually to alter that essence [human nature] over time” (p. 301). Such comments make Fukuyama seem completely oblivious to the telling critiques of essentialism and humanism that have
emerged from within the academy since the late sixties/early seventies (see for example, Deleuze & Guattari, 1972/1983; Foucault, 1970/1994; Henriques, Holloway, Urwin, Venn, & Walkerdine, 1984). However, I think he is right to recognize the potential of science to alter the human subject, or to produce new types of subjects, but wrong about the idea of a ‘human essence’ that is being re-shaped by bioscience. What we may recognize in retrospect is that what is being reshaped is the ahistorical, universal subject of history. Not ‘an essence’ but the concept of a unified, trans-historical self.

Given his commitment to essentialism and humanism, Fukuyama (2002b) shows concerns that:

the posthuman world could be one that is far more hierarchical and competitive than the one that currently exists, and full of social conflict as a result. It could be one in which any notion of ‘shared humanity’ is lost, because we have mixed human genes with those of so many other species that we no longer have a clear idea of what a human being is. It could be one in which the median person is living well into his or her second century, sitting in a nursing home hoping for an unattainable death. (p. 302)

However, his concerns are not only for the social costs of a posthuman future, but also for what such a future might mean for liberal democracy. If we suspend the arguments concerning essentialism and humanism for a moment, and accept Fukuyama’s belief in a stable human nature, then we would have to agree that if “Human nature shapes and constrains the possible kinds of political regimes”, then “a technology powerful enough to reshape what we are will have possibly malignant consequences for liberal democracy and the nature of politics itself” (Fukuyama, 2002b, p. 20). Fukuyama’s answer to the problem of a ‘return to history’, ushered in by the radical alteration of ‘human nature’, is to encourage the development of legal and institutional restraints on scientific innovation and experimentation. Interestingly, Popper (1957/1986, p. 21) in his critique of historicism,
predicted that such a strategy was the likely one to be adopted by the historicist/utopianist, arguing that “the uncertainty of the human factor must force the Utopianist, whether he [sic] likes it or not, to try to control the human factor by institutional means”. Although Fukuyama’s *Our posthuman future*, wouldn’t be written for twenty years after Popper’s polemic against historicism, the main thrust of its argument, indeed its purpose for being written, are predicted in Popper’s critique. Ironically, however, the goal of Fukuyama’s historicism, ‘liberal democracy’, shares a remarkable affinity with the “open society” of anti-historicist, Karl Popper (Roth, 1995b, p. 164). Popper, however, never suggested that his utopia was inevitable.

‘Fukuyama unborn’ or Lyotard, Haraway, and the posthistorical cyborg^29

It may be interesting to note at this point, that Fukuyama’s posthuman dystopia shares a remarkable affinity with aspects of the apparently anti-technoscience ‘end of history’ discourse that emerges in Lyotard. Famous for his assertion that the postmodern condition can be characterised by an incredulity towards metanarratives – a consequence of the agonistic struggle between incommensurable language games or phrase regimes (Breisach, 2003) – Lyotard (1979) is no supporter of historicism. Plainly, when he poses the question, “Can we continue to organize events on the basis of the Idea of a universal history of humanity?” (Lyotard, 1989, p. 317), he is positioning himself in opposition to totalizing narratives that purport to affirm a universal history. Likewise, his mantra against the credibility of metanarratives, places him in direct opposition to the kind of ‘end of history’

^29 Inspired by Gough’s (1994; 1995) call for the manifestation of cyborgs in curriculum inquiry, I deploy elements of speculative fiction when exploring the thesis of Fukuyama, since it reveals among other things, what has had to be ignored in order to maintain his argument that free market capitalism and political liberalism mark our arrival at the terminus of history.
thesis argued for by Fukuyama. It is not surprising then, to find Lyotard (1989) failing to share Fukuyama’s faith in political and economic liberalism, evident when he argues that:

‘May 1968’ refutes the doctrine of parliamentary liberalism . . . the ‘crises of 1911 and 1929’ refute the doctrine of economic liberalism. And the ‘1974-9 crisis’ refutes the post-Keynesian adjustments that have been made to that doctrine. (p. 318)

However, despite his rejection of meta-narrativist history, and his refutation of liberalism’s credibility, Lyotard’s vision of a posthuman apocalypse brings him closer to Fukuyama than one might expect. As Sim (1999) argues, Lyotard’s depiction of ‘the end of history’ is “a singularly bleak one at that, of both the end of history and the end of the world” (p. 25).

It is a vision of a posthuman nightmare world, produced by an unrestrained technoscientific establishment, intent on replacing flesh with some form of hardware, that will act as a platform for ‘thought’ so that consciousness can continue without a body (Lyotard, 1991). Lyotard, in ironic mode, argues the logic of such a commitment, since “while we talk, the sun is getting older” (Lyotard, 1991, p. 8), and eventually, he assures us, the sun is going to explode and life on planet Earth will be over. In typically provocative fashion, Lyotard catalogues the argument that humanity must escape the impending solar apocalypse, 4.5 billion years from now, or be faced with extinction; what he calls “the death of death” (Lyotard, 1991, p. 10). According to Lyotard (1991), this is “the sole serious question to face humanity today” (p. 9).

Whether we are as concerned as Lyotard about ‘the death of death’ or not, there is a great deal of evidence to suggest, as Best and Kellner (2001) do, that:

With the ever deeper incursion of science and technology into the natural world, society, everyday life, and our very bodies (e.g. with wearable computers, bionic implants, and modified genes), human beings and technology are imploding. (p. 151)
This implosion is likely to result in a situation where “the next milestone will be technology creating its own generation without human intervention” (Kurzweil quoted in Best & Kellner, 2001, p. 149). While some are generally favourable to such a blurring of the boundaries between technology and biology (Best & Kellner, 2001; Hayles, 1999; Kurzweil, 1999; Moravec, 1988), others remain cautious (Paul & Cox, 1996). Arguably, “the postmodern adventure is an era of intense technological development in which the human species and its environments are coevolving into dramatic new configurations” (Best & Kellner, 2001, p. 154). It is as a warning against this ‘coevolution’ that Lyotard appears to have written his essay, though the matter-of-fact tone in which the essay is written would seem to disguise its sardonic intent.

Concerns about technology and its potential to interrupt ‘the human’ first emerged as a theme in Mary Shelley’s (1818/1993) *Frankenstein*. According to Best and Kellner (2001):

Shelley’s tale synthesizes the vision of scientific materialism – that modern science can produce wonders, including new life forms – with the stance of Gothic romanticism, which fears the ugly, the monstrous, the irrational, and the violent erupting and destroying of human hopes and life. (p. 159)

It seems certain that Fukuyama and Lyotard share Shelley’s concerns, particularly evidenced by Lyotard’s (1991) use of the term ‘inhuman’ rather than ‘posthuman’ to describe the trajectory of ‘human development’ in a world dominated by techno and bioscience. Yet the problem shared by both Fukuyama and Lyotard is a commitment to a ‘natural-technological’ binary that fears technology will effectively terminate humanity. This particular fear is not unique to the theorists under discussion here, but can be identified as a genre in contemporary film and speculative literature. Ankin Skywalker’s transformation into the evil cyborg Darth Vader, and the rise of the ‘clone army’ in *Star Wars: Attack of the*
clones (2002, dir: Lucas); the domination of humanity by machines in The matrix (1999, dir: Wachowski & Wachowski), and Terminator; the dismembering of robots at a carnival in A. I. Artificial Intelligence (2003, dir: Spielberg); are all movements and moments in contemporary cinema that highlight the enduring fear of man being replaced by machines.

Not all theorists proposing an impending shift towards the posthuman are as disturbed by the prospects of an ‘enhanced’ or ‘modified’ humanity as are Fukuyama and Lyotard. Donna Haraway’s (1985) ‘The cyborg manifesto: Science, technology, and socialist-feminism in the late twentieth century’, an important chapter in the area of ‘cyborg politics’, works against the natural/biological - artificial/technological binary that prefigures and fuels much of Fukuyama and Lyotard’s pessimism. Invoking the ‘mythological’ figure of the ‘Cyborg’ to collapse distinctions between the natural and artificial, Haraway’s manifesto has been described as “a complex interpretation of the cultural, social, and economic milieu at the end of the millennium” (Cutler, 2001, p. 190). On a mission to tear down “the Berlin Wall between the world of objects and the world of subjects, and the world of the political and the technical” (Haraway, 1997, p. 270), Haraway is at the forefront of a queering of techno-science. For Haraway (1997), “the pedagogic task is to learn the rules of the game” (p. 131), so that we might avoid “the end of the millennium . . . brands that mark us all in the too persuasive stories of the New World Order” (p. 271).

Haraway (1997), who identifies as an “historian of science” (p. 49), argues that far from “destroying ‘man’ by the ‘machine’ or ‘meaningful political action’ by the ‘text’” (Haraway, 1985, p. 70), postmodern criticism – with the figure of the cyborg as its subject – opens possibilities for moving beyond our dualist ontologies and oppositional politics. Further, the idea of the hybrid creature of the cyborg allows us to elude “seductions to organic
“wholeness” that prevent us from seeing the liberating possibilities of a politics that emerges from the merger of flesh and machine (Haraway, 1985, p. 67). It is a vision that agrees with Fukuyama’s insight that the alteration of the human could lead to new political forms, but rather than see this as a catastrophe, Haraway proposes this as a rare opportunity to rethink our politics. Celebrating – in a way that must be offensive to Fukuyama’s liberalist idealism – the potential of the posthuman condition to provide us with new forms of political radicalism, Haraway (1985) affirms, “the cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics” (p. 66). Such a politics, by virtue of its emergence from the hybrid cyborg form, is likely to invite “progressive people” to engage in the “transgression of boundaries”, “potent fusions” and “dangerous possibilities” (Haraway, 1985, p. 71). Unlike Fukuyama’s utopia, in which everyone is a political liberal, Haraway’s (1985) vision projects “heteroglossia” as the likely form of a cyborg’s “radical cultural politics” (p. 70).

Haraway’s vision is generally conceived as a positive one that has spawned its own field of scholarship into the political possibilities of the posthuman condition (see for example the papers in Bell & Kennedy, 2000; and Gray, 1995), and stands in contrast to Fukuyama’s historicist, essentializing, humanist commitments. While it is sensible to remain mindful of the potential dominating effects that new technologies, and fusions of flesh and machine might have – powerfully depicted in Star Trek’s vision of ‘the borg’, a species of imperialist cyborgs who wish to integrate whole species and cultures into their mind-numbing collective – being ‘cyborged’ doesn’t have to mean making “the Holocaust and the Gulag look like rehearsals” (Gray, 2001, p. 201). In Cyborg citizen: Politics in the posthuman age, Gray (2001) creates something of an inventory of the many ways in which we have already been ‘cyborged’, and will increasingly be ‘cyborged’ in the future, from the colonisation of our bodies by nanotechnologies, increasingly powerful biomedical agents, cosmetic simulacra,
and interspecies organ transplants, to our use of information communication technologies that form humanity into a single “cyborg system” (p. 194). His work stands in contrast to Fukuyama’s pessimism, and while he concedes that “horror is possible, perhaps inevitable” he also reminds us that “resistance, even joy, should be just as possible” (Gray, 2001, p. 195). According to Gray (2001):

cyborg epistemology shows that there is no inevitable dialectical lockstep; prosthetic additions are always possible – on the body and on culture, and therefore the future. (p. 195)

Gray renders history plastic. There can be no terminal interface that cannot be modified, enhanced, hacked or supplemented in some way. Therefore, there can be no end to history, no final destination.

Avoiding the binary of the real and the virtual by drawing on Virilio’s (1989) distinction that divides reality into virtual and actual events, we might underscore that the merger of flesh and machine while ‘real’, does not have to be ‘actual’. The posthuman condition appears to be manifesting as much as a ‘virtuality’, as an ‘actuality’. According to Kroker and Weinstein (2001) we are living “at the edge of a fantastic intensification of a history that is yet to be written: the telematic history of the virtual body” (p. 132). Rejecting Fukuyama’s thesis “as an explanation of the fading role of ideology in the twilight days of the Cold War” (p. 132), Kroker and Weinstein (2001) affirm that only “when history means the archiving of the human function and its recombination in the form of monstrous hybrids . . . can we finally speak of non-history” (p. 132). In concert with Fukuyama, Kroker and Weinstein (2001) resurrect Nietzsche’s “last man”, reinscribing him [sic] as “the recliner”, whose “flesh has crashed” right at the moment of the media-net’s emergence, fusing commodity and desire (pp. 143-144). In their vision of a telematic
history on a “transition to nowhere”, the authors of *Data crash* see ‘history’ as an irrelevancy, “because its subject ‘man’ is no longer the protagonist of anything but cynical dramas on the media-net” (Kroker & Weinstein, 2001, p. 143). Telematic history is for Kroker and Weinstein the real (virtual if not actual) ‘end of history’. Fukuyama’s fear of a return to history, triggered by the boredom of the ‘last man’ is challenged by Kroker and Weinstein’s thesis. For them, the ‘last man’, the recliner, is sitting back with the remote control or playstation controller, re-entering history of an unexpected kind, one in which a different kind of freedom is sought; a virtual freedom to archive, delete, copy, and recombine identities in forms that might outrage the sensibilities of more conservative liberals.

It would seem that what Fukuyama is most scared of by a return to history was announced by Foucault (1970/1994) at the end of *The order of things*, and is celebrated and given form by Haraway. It is a fear that an unrestrained science will bring an end to the uncontaminated, pure human subject of history. If the historical positions itself against the natural, or in Fukuyama’s case is naturalised by the historian, then Haraway’s cyborg is a disruptive figure, a terminator who ends Fukuyama’s naturalistic history, in favour of a being in which culture is not just context, nor simply inscribed on the surface of the body, but penetrates, indeed constitutes the ‘flesh’, wet and virtual. While the prophets of the virtual may want to signal the post-historical nature of the telematic, there is also a different kind of history in the prosthesis, one in which the tool itself is an artifact of the cultural-historical milieu, that marks the body as historical from the inside out. Therefore, Fukuyama’s dystopia does not necessarily signal a return to history, but alternative posthistorical possibilities. If indeed we continue down the path of self-modification, it will be interesting to observe whether the ‘last man’ of history will remain Fukuyama’s
complacent Nietzschean clone, or emerge as Haraway’s radical cyborg, experiencing history as part of the integrated circuit.

If indeed the virtual will be the ground of a new history, then one wonders what Fukuyama would make of Stelarc’s (1997) claim that:

> in this age of information overload, what is significant is no longer freedom of ideas but rather freedom of form - freedom to modify and mutate the body. The question is not whether society will allow people freedom of expression but whether the human species will allow the individuals to construct alternate genetic coding. (p. 1)

Certainly the Fukuyama of *Our posthuman future* would have great difficulty in coming to terms with Stelarc’s radical view of human freedom. But then, what is the ideal of freedom that Fukuyama’s liberalism seeks? At least one critic, the deconstructionist Jacques Derrida, is highly sceptical of a form of freedom that seeks in its arrival at the *telos*, to silence all other voices. It is to Derrida’s deconstruction of Fukuyama’s thesis, and to a clearer picture of postmodernism’s rejection of ‘the grand story’ and its teleological ending, that we now turn.

**Haunting Fukuyama: Spectres of Derrida**

Derrida’s critique of Fukuyama goes beyond concerns that he is engaged in an attempt to silence ideological opposition to liberalism in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union (symbolic for Fukuyama of not only ‘the end of history’, but also ‘the end of Marxism’). It also goes beyond Derrida’s (1994) assertion that Fukuyama is only ever really dealing with an idealised version of liberalist ideology, and not its instantiated forms, which he argues have “never been so much in the minority and isolated in the world”, and which today operate in “a state of dysfunction”, as they are always “distorted, as was always the case, by
a great number of socio-economic mechanisms” (p.79). Derrida (1994) also wants to point out the irony of Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ claim, since it relies on references to actual historical events to pronounce its ‘end’ (such as the fall of the Berlin Wall); and yet disavows the use of this strategy when critics identify events (such as September 11) that seem to discredit Fukuyama’s hypothesis. In the later case, Fukuyama quickly shifts to “trans-historic and natural” claims for his ideology, which Derrida (1994) refers to as:

> the sleight-of-hand trick between history and nature, between historical empiricity and teleological transcendentality, between the supposed empirical reality of the event and the absolute ideality of the liberal telos.

(emphasis in the original, p. 69)

Thus, Derrida identifies for us the technique of metanarrative historians: to emphasize the events of their time, where they support the vision of the telos; but to emphasize the telos itself, where the events seem to discredit the metanarrative being proclaimed.

Perhaps Derrida’s most enduring contribution to ‘end of history’ debate, however, will be his insistent claim that to write Marx or socialist ideology out of history will not be as easy as proclaiming the arrival of the liberalist utopia. According to Derrida, Marx will remain a spectre, a ghost that haunts our thinking and philosophizing (see my comments in the preface for a discussion of my relation to Marxist thinking). Derrida’s view is that we are all heirs of Marx in some sense, whether we construct our ideas around his theses, or against them. In a sense, this is the explicit theme of Specters of Marx, the work in which Derrida seeks to demolish Fukuyama’s thesis. According to Sim’s (1999) reading of Derrida, “Marx is too deeply ingrained in our cultural heritage to be dismissed, as some of the more radical post-Marxist thinkers would have us believe” (p. 45). Further, Sim (1999) argues that “there can be no sudden break of the ‘Marxism is dead’ variety: to believe otherwise is to be philosophically naïve” (p. 47). It appears as if, then, despite his own references to Marx,
Fukuyama remains naïve, engulfed in the “good news” of his own triumphalism (Derrida, 1994, p. 64).

September 11: History’s return, or the final nail?

There have been many criticisms of Fukuyama’s thesis, not the least that the spectre of communism that liberalism has apparently defeated was no more than a rival brand of capitalism, and Fukuyama’s triumphalism an instantiated form of ‘idealized liberalism’ (Derrida, 1994). Besides drawing attention to this category mistake, Derrida (1994) also accuses Fukuyama of problematically assuming that liberalism is the only real path to human freedom, itself a manifest form of liberalist idealism. Fukuyama (1992) has defended his liberalist idealism by arguing that his thesis speculates based on empirical observations of the changes occurring throughout the world at the current time. It would appear that Fukuyama knows what these changes mean, because ‘he knows where we’re going’ (Roth, 1995b, p. 164). Enlisting the support of real events, Fukuyama attempts to give credibility to an otherwise sensational suggestion. The seductive power of a selective empiricism is evident in Fukuyama’s (2002a) post-September 11 comments, when he argues that:

> it is hard to see that Islamism offers much of a realistic alternative as a governing ideology for real world societies. Not only does it have limited appeal to non-Muslims; it does not meet the aspirations of the vast majority of Muslims themselves. (p. 8)

To support this observation, Fukuyama uses the same strategy that he uses to support his ‘end of history’ thesis; he selects specific favourable empirical examples. Citing only the Islamic regimes in Iran and Afghanistan, and highlighting the apparent dissatisfaction of the Muslim populations living under these extremist theocracies, while typically ignoring
the stable, successful and relatively prosperous Islamic democracies that exist in Malaysia and Indonesia, assists Fukuyama to further his thesis regarding the inevitable connections between liberalism, democracy and free market capitalism.

Considering Fukuyama’s implicit dismissal of Islam as an ideological alternative to liberal democracy, Zakaria (2001) states that while Fukuyama may be correct that:

> radical Islam as an ideology . . . posed no threat to the West . . . we pose a threat to it, one its followers feel with blinding intensity. It turns out it takes only one side to restart history. (p. 70)

The consequence of the recent internationalisation of terrorist attacks, Zakaria (2001) believes, will be governments becoming “more powerful, more intrusive and more important . . . for the oldest Hobbesian reason in the book – the provision of security” (p. 70). Zakaria’s critique is a rejection that we are anywhere near seeing the widespread permanent adoption of political and economic liberalism. Instead, what we may see are more authoritarian governments, despite their professed allegiances to particular democratic philosophies. Using Fukuyama’s own strategy to support Zakaria, one only has to observe the swing towards right-wing political parties in developed nations around the globe; and the increasing border protection and anti-civil liberty laws passed by governments concerned by the threat of terrorism (recent ‘sedition’ and ‘detainment without charge’ laws in Australia being a case in point).

Despite the fact that Fukuyama’s work is often located within a broad Hegelian-Marxist tradition (Williams, Sullivan, & Mathews, 1997), Fukuyama’s is a weak version of the Hegelian view of history. While Hegel was perhaps the first ‘modern’ scholar to herald an end to history, he saw this end as arising out of a dialectical process, in which thesis (an
idea) and antithesis (an opposing, contradictory idea) would see a final resolution in synthesis (some new form that reworks the original idea after taking into consideration its contradictions and oppositions). Hegel conceptualised the resolution of his dialectic as the “universal and reciprocal recognition of one’s humanity”, which amounted, following the French and American revolutions, to the universal acceptance of ‘freedom’ as the ideal of humanity (Horrocks, 1999, p. 15). Horrocks (1999) has argued that “Hegel never imagined the struggle to preserve this freedom would end. Wars would continue after the end of history” (p. 15), but the ideal of freedom would not be supplanted as the goal of human society. There is good reason to believe that Hegel thought the Prussian state in which he spent his final days, existed at ‘the end of history’, and that the Napoleonic wars had already moved Europe to acceptance of history’s telos (Sim, 1999). Marx, revising Hegel’s view of history with his own formulation of the historical materialist dialectic, disagreed.

According to Marx, the fulfilment of history was to be achieved when the under-classes, alienated by the machinery of capitalism, inevitably rose up against the owners of capital, displacing them in the establishment of a communist state. Here Marx’s materialism is at odds with Hegel’s idealism. The ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ was not just an idea that had to be recognised or accepted, but a reality that must be actualised. Fukuyama is accused of collapsing distinctions between philosophers in order to enlist their support (Sim, 1999). Considered by some to be an heir to Hegel and Marx (Williams, Sullivan, & Mathews, 1997), Fukuyama reads their philosophies of history through Kojeve – from whom he borrows the Platonic idea of ‘universal recognition’; and through Nietzsche – from whom he appropriates the idea of the ‘last man’ (Roth, 1995b). While the empirical existence of opposing politico-economic systems is acknowledged in Fukuyama’s thesis, there is no real dialectic through which the opposites are synthesised into a greater whole. For Fukuyama,
one competitor is simply superior to the other, and the lesser must inevitably give way to
the greater. Fukuyama’s is not simply the Hegelian-Marxist reading of historical
development as progress in a particular political direction (although he seems to hold this
view), it is also predicated on a kind of intellectual Darwinism, in which only the strongest
or fittest ideology can ultimately survive the struggle of social, economic and political life.
The criticism here is not the lack of a ‘true’ dialectic in Fukuyama’s view of history, but his
unproblematised assertion that we have apprehended the ultimate form of human social
life in economic and political liberalism. Despite differences in the work of Hegel, Marx,
Kojeve, and Fukuyama, what they share is a teleological view of history, a view of history
as a ‘grand story’ in which events are inexorably moving our human societies towards a
final utopian ideal or form. It is only on the nature of the utopia, and perhaps, the process
of arriving at this final form of human society, upon which they differ.

The Marxist scholar and theorist of the postmodern, Fredrick Jameson (1998), seems to
support Fukuyama’s thesis when he argues that Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ doesn’t really
mean ‘the end of time’ but ‘the end of space’, as a consequence of the cultural fallout of a
homogenizing globalism. However, Jameson’s observation about the effects of globalism
also support a concern of Sim’s (1999), that Fukuyama’s thesis amounts to little more than
an attack on cultural pluralism, via its suggestion that in the long haul, we shall see “a
continuing convergence in types of institutions governing the most advanced societies”
(Fukuyama, 1992, p. 338). One may want to ask Fukuyama, can we have liberalism without
McDonald’s? Although he is never explicit on this point, it would appear not, since it is
impossible for Fukuyama to envisage a direction for history that does not result in the
adoption of both economic and political liberalism (at some ultimate point). Further,
Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis may actually be, as LaCapra (2004) argues, “an
ideological attempt to remain fixated at an existing historical condition, such as a market economy and limited political democracy” (p. 1). Consequently, we might say that Fukuyama’s thesis equates history with ideology, and conflates economic and political liberalism, and while evangelical in character, does little to promote hope for the critics of late capitalism, as his representation of the future is one in which all opposition to liberal capitalist ideology is silenced (Derrida, 1994; Sim, 1999).

The illusion of history

Depictions of ‘the end of history’ in contemporary theory do not stop with Fukuyama and his dystopias. While Fukuyama’s thesis may be read as, perhaps, an argument for the metanarrative of modernity, a great deal of contemporary postmodern and poststructuralist theory opposes metanarrative history generally, and the discourse of modernity specifically. In fact, when ‘the end of history’ is discussed in postmodern social theory, it is the rejection of ‘the grand story’ of modernisation that is intended (Vattimo, 1988), not the celebration of modernity’s final realisation in the triumph of liberal democracy. One writer who has been at the forefront of discussions of ‘the end of history’ as the rejection of the ‘grand story’ has been the French social theorist, Jean Baudrillard. Often considered to be at the outer extreme of postmodern scholarship, Baudrillard is usually either loved or detested. His work as cultural critic and ironic philosopher, have seen him subject to a range of criticisms, usually accusing him of some sort of intellectual shenanigans, and resulting in a range of epithets from “the Walt Disney of contemporary Metaphysics” (Norris, 1990), to the ‘New Manichean’ (Bayard & Knight, 1995). However, there is much to take seriously in Baudrillard, even if his ironic and flamboyant style gives some readers the illusion that he
doesn’t take his subject matter seriously himself. While his work spans a range of topics, his themes are drawn from his own ‘pataphysical’ reading of contemporary life.\textsuperscript{30}

Baudrillard’s unique contribution to ‘end of history’ discourse spans a range of works, and is arguably one of the enduring themes in his œuvre, at least as far as the decade of the 1990s – in the lead up to the Millennium – is concerned. Addressed directly in \textit{The illusion of the end} (cryptically subtitled in its French publication “the Event Strike”), ‘the end of history’ appears as a sub-plot in his pivotal \textit{Symbolic exchange and death}; returns with a vengeance in \textit{The vital illusion}; and informs the argument of perhaps his most controversial work, \textit{The Gulf War did not take place}. Far from providing a single thesis on ‘the end of history’, Baudrillard develops throughout his writings a range of arguments, from the idea that history no longer moves forward, but in reverse (Baudrillard, 1998);\textsuperscript{31} to the notion that ‘news’ has displaced history (Baudrillard, 1995). Proposed in the countdown to the Millennium, Baudrillard’s views challenge both the teleological metanarrative history of Fukuyama, and the un-reflexive history of blind empiricists (Jenkins, 1999). Drawing on a rich intellectual tradition that embraces scholars from Marx to McLuhan (D. Kellner, 1989a), Baudrillard’s work on ‘the end of history’ offers surprising insight into the history of our times; and the nature of historical consciousness in postmodernity. Given that I have already addressed a number of aspects of Baudrillard’s critique in the introduction, I will confine my comments here to those most relevant to the problem of history.

\textsuperscript{30} Pataphysics is the methodology that Baudrillard uses “to invert prevailing models of culture, technology and society” (Horrocks, 1999). It is best described as “a science that makes up imaginary solutions, usually in opposition to the regular laws of physics or logic” (Horrocks, 1999).

\textsuperscript{31} For Baudrillard, one of the striking symbols of the late 1990s was the digital clock displayed on the Beaubourg Centre in Paris. Unlike most clocks that keep track of the forward march of time, the Beaubourg clock was set to countdown the seconds to the year 2000 (Baudrillard, 1998). Baudrillard theorises this as history going in reverse.
In contrast to Fukuyama’s assertion that we have arrived at the terminus of history, Baudrillard (1992) argues that the whole concept of an ‘end to history’ is an illusion, because for history to be at an end would imply that ‘history’ (the procession of events) had a teleology in the first place; and as LaCapra (2004) argues, “from a historical perspective, the very idea of the end of history might seem to be a nonhistorical absurdity” (p. 1). Baudrillard (1992) rejects any pretensions to what Jenkins (1999) describes as “upper case History,” a history with some deep underlying significance. However, although his argument is that any ‘end to history’ is simply an illusion, it can only be sustained if we accept that there is no grand story of human society, no ‘history’, in the first place, since grand stories typically imply grand endings. So providing an argument that demonstrates any end to history is an illusion simultaneously terminates history as well. There is, according to Baudrillard (1992), no coherent unfolding of a grand plan, inescapable destiny, order in events, or concealed set of meanings to be revealed through life’s twists and turns. According to Lainsbury (1996), Baudrillard makes clear that when events continue but have no significance, we are living beyond history. In one stroke Baudrillard’s anti-Hegelian, anti-teleological, and anti-utopian thesis attempts to establish that both history and its end are illusions, and must be considered to be already over.

While Baudrillard’s arguments may be aimed at bringing an end to metanarrative history, they are not the end to his thesis. Baudrillard’s attack goes much further than suggesting that history as a ‘grand story’ and its end are illusions. He also argues that it has become impossible to practice history in any conventional sense, to even write or tell histories in what Jenkins (1999) describes as their ‘lower case’ form. Baudrillard’s argument is that late capitalist society has become increasingly fragmented, accelerated, and saturated with information, a consequence of its absolute dependence on technological innovations. He
lucidly argues, on his own empirical grounds, that the pace of society, and particularly the central role of the high-tech media, have made history impossible, and so its reporting and recording functions have come to be replaced by “news”.

According to Baudrillard (1995), there is no longer any time to reflect upon the past. Instead, we are left simply to consume the on-going stream of news that floods into our lounge rooms and workplaces. Rather than living in history, or with history, it is Baudrillard’s thesis that we are seduced by media-driven simulae and simulations, in which nothing ‘really’ happens, because it is only really happening for us on the television set or in the newspapers. For Baudrillard (1992 p 21), “the event which is measured [neither] by its causes nor its consequences but creates its own stage and its own dramatic effect, no longer exists.” Events only exist now, according to Baudrillard (1995), because of their ‘newsworthiness’. That is to say, ‘events’ are brought into and exist in the social, only when believed by journalists to have newsworthiness, not simply because they ‘happened’. As discussed in the introduction, his argument is captured by the idea that events are ‘on strike’, and allows him to assert controversially, that The Gulf War did not take place (Baudrillard, 1995). He can assert this because the Gulf War we know about is not the events that occurred in some Iraqi desert, but is the “news story” we experienced watching the television news broadcasts, and reading the daily newspapers. The history of the Gulf War we experienced in our lounge rooms is one in which the only causalities were from surgical strikes to strategic targets, history as an inherently meaningful event among them. The Gulf War is used by Baudrillard (1995) as an example to support his assertion that meaning can never be an essential characteristic of an event, but is something constituted in its production as a news story or public narrative (Horrocks, 1999). For Baudrillard (1995), reality and its representation have imploded in the news story, because televisual
simulation has come to be indistinguishable from the event. Coupled with the filtering effects of the media that determine what is significant (newsworthy) and what is not – a function of taste and fashion as much as anything else – the result is not only the loss of history as a grand story, but also the loss of history as a quiet reflection on the past.

**History as a white mythology**

Baudrillard is not the only scholar to suggest that history as a ‘grand story’ is simply an illusion. Internationally, a number of scholars have made the case that history functions as a set of ‘white mythologies’, which provide narrative support for various forms of cultural and economic imperialism. Among these scholars we can number as the most significant, Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, and the academics who make up the *Subaltern Studies* group, such as Dipesh Chakrabarty and Ranajit Guha (R. J. C. Young, 1990). Considered together, we can assign this group to the field of critique known as postcolonial studies. According to R. J. C. Young (2001), Professor of English and Critical Theory at Oxford University, and author of a number of exegetic works on postcolonial theory, “Post-colonial critique focuses on forces of oppression and coercive domination that operate in the contemporary world” and defines its terrain by “the politics of anti-colonialism and neocolonialism, race, gender, nationalisms, class and ethnicities” (p. 11). In alignment with R. J. C. Young’s (1990) articulation of European history as a set of White mythologies, Gyan Prakash (1994) has argued that one of the aims of postcolonial criticism is to critique the “historicism that projected the West as [h]istory” (p. 175).

For Prakash (1994), the conflation of history with the triumphant narratives of the West was a master-stroke of imperialism. In practice, it meant that history, as a discourse that
emerges from Europe, has tended to have a culturally specific teleology, and to write about the peoples outside of Europe in ways that assume – surprisingly reminiscent of Fukuyama – they will ‘come on board’ in the journey towards the ultimate end’, or be left behind as ‘people without history’. This embedded, often invisible historicist agenda has tended to result in histories that construct those ethnically different from the historian’s culture as inferior. The power of this kind of history, according to Stuart Hall (1997), was not just its strategy of constructing the colonised subject as “different and other within the categories of knowledge of the West” (p. 112), but manifested more profoundly in its ability to make the colonised see themselves as ‘the Other’. According to R. J. C. Young (1990), postcolonial theorists such as Spivak, argue that “the Third World was itself created as a representation, or as a set of representations, not only for the West but also for the culture whose representation was constructed” (p. 159). R. J. C. Young (1990) argues that this was absolutely essential for the ‘success’ of the European colonisation of Asia, Africa, the Americas and the islands of the Pacific (including Australia), since nineteenth and early twentieth century “imperialism was not only a territorial and economic but inevitably also a subject-constituting project” (p. 159). According to R. J. C. Young’s (1990) reading of Spivak, this means that “history is not simply the disinterested production of facts, but is rather a process of ‘epistemic violence’” (p. 158). Lands may be colonised by subduing the population through force or oppressive trade relations; but minds are colonised by inscribing the subdued population in the ‘historical record’ as inferior, sometimes even sub-human. We see this in the construction of ‘exotic Orientals’ in the case of Asia and the Middle East (Said, 1978); a single unified ‘dying race’ of Aborigines, in the case of Australia’s Indigenous peoples (Biskup, 1982; Russell, 2001).
In practice, the construction of ‘the Other’ in the discourse of the colonizer meant that the only saving grace for subaltern (colonized) Others was to attempt to clone themselves in the cultural image of the colonizer (Ashcroft, 2001). However, paradoxically, as Memmi (1967) notes, “If the colonizer does not always openly discourage these candidates to develop that resemblance, he never permits them to attain it either. Thus, they [the subalterns] live in constant and painful ambiguity” (p. 15). This is particularly true of those who succumb, either by force or choice, to ‘assimilation’. Assimilation was a state sponsored policy within pre-Bicentennial Australia, and has been making something of a comeback in public discourse since the emergence of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party and the events of September 11. When forced to assimilate, ‘subalterns’ often find themselves liminal beings, removed from their own primary culture, yet not completely accepted in the new; hybrid nomadic subjects, without place or path.  

Derrida’s analysis of the way in which binary logic is used to privilege one particular element of the coloniser-colonised dyad is useful here. Derrida’s deconstructionist strategy, born according to R. J. C. Young (2001) out of Derrida’s own experience as a French Algerian, which cast him as alien in both France (the location of his tertiary education and emergence as a philosopher of international acclaim) and Algeria (the place of his birth and schooling), predicts the paradoxical effects of colonial discourse. Given the seduction to become part of the ‘institution’, yet simultaneously experiencing the rejection of one’s claim of status, one can aspire only to being a ‘well-behaving black’, typically at the cost of one’s Indigenous heritage; an experience Australia’s ‘stolen generation’ know only too well (Read, 2002). The binary logic of coloniser-colonised, privileging the culture of the

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32 The colonial notion of Aborigines’ tendency to go on ‘walkabout’ seems strangely resonant here. Rather than marking an apparently essential feature of Indigenous behaviour, as it does in colonial and neo-colonial discourse, ‘walkabout’ could describe the state of the liminal being, caught between worlds, and not completely comfortable in either, forced to ever be berwixt and between.
coloniser as the norm against which all others will be judged, ignores the complexity and multiplicity that is the ‘inside reality’ of ‘the Other’. Take, for example, the tendency within the historical discourse of Europe, to project Asia or the Middle East as “unified racial, geographical, political and cultural zone[s] of the world” (Bhabha, 1983/1997, p. 41), and to represent Australia’s Indigenous peoples as a single racial group described by the epithet ‘Aborigines’, obscuring the fact that “there were perhaps as many as 500 Australian Aboriginal tribal groups speaking up to 250 languages” prior to European contact (Russell, 2001, p. 2). This construction of ‘the Other’ as a unified group has particular effects. As Stuart Hall (1997) notes:

far from being grounded in a mere ‘recovery’ of the past, which is waiting to be found, and which, when found, will secure our sense of ourselves into eternity, identities are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past. (p. 112)

Recent events, such as September 11 – which have resulted in the homogenization of ethically and religiously diverse Moslems within the consciousness of the west – simply repeat the same tired pattern in which power is sought by rendering ‘the Other’ as a single manageable group. Despite the age of European imperialism being ‘officially’ over, ‘history’ (as both metanarrative and the narrative technology that positions us as peoples in relation to one another) lingers. As Spivak (1997) asserts, “the declared rupture of ‘decolonization’” has not resulted in the freedom one may have expected, the historical discourse often “boringly repeats the rhythms of colonization with the consolidation of recognizable styles” (p. 202). From Spivak’s viewpoint, ‘independence’ from the colonial power might free us of our foreign oppressors’ armies, but it does not automatically free us of the discourses in which our subjectivities and identities have been inscribed. This is, quite obviously, a serious problem for the postcolonial historian.
It is of course difficult – if not impossible – to free ourselves from the inscriptive effects of the cultural discourse of history. Spivak (1997), reflecting upon a lecture delivered in London, problematises the naming of the subject in everyday discourse (with its historical legacies). Spivak at home in America is ‘Indian’ (as she would be in Australia), but in Britain she is definitely ‘Asian’. In India, she would be ‘Bengali’. She might even be thought of by some as representative of ‘woman’, ‘feminist’, ‘postcolonial theorist’ or ‘poststructuralist’.

Therefore, she wonders, in delivering her lecture, who it is that speaks? Recognising history as a cultural discourse is part of the answer to her question. According to Chakrabarty (1997), we may well “attempt the impossible . . . by tracing that which resists and escapes the best human effort at translation across cultural and other semiotic systems, so that the world may once again be imagined as radically heterogeneous” (p. 244), but it must be attempted. R. J. C. Young (1990) sees the potential of imperialist and Indigenous systems to be ‘interruptive’ of each other. On the other hand, with due caution, Chakrabarty (1997) points to an interesting dilemma he experiences as a postcolonial historian, when he asserts that:

in so far as the academic discourse of history – that is, ‘history’ as a discourse produced at the institutional site of the university – is concerned, ‘Europe’ remains the sovereign, theoretical subject of all histories, including the ones we call ‘Indian’, ‘Chinese’, ‘Kenyan’, and so on. There is also a peculiar way in which all these histories tend to become variations on a master narrative that could be called ‘the history of Europe’. In this sense, ‘Indian’ history itself is in a position of subalternity; one can only articulate subaltern subject positions in the name of this history. (p. 233)

Chakrabarty has captured the perpetual dilemma for the insurgent historian – the impossibility of writing an alternative view of the past in a way that does not automatically, either through the structure of its form, or by virtue of its being ‘alternative’ to the dominant discourse, position itself inside the on-going subjugating narrative of a European
historicism. As Ashcroft (2001) explains, “the most profound hindrance to colonial history is not the absorption of colonial reality into Europe in this way. It is the dominance of the assumptions and methodologies of the master narrative of History itself, as a way of conceiving colonial reality” (p. 98). It is not surprising, given this dilemma, that R. J. C. Young (1990) draws attention to the fact that “Opportional historians can often unknowingly, or even knowingly, perpetuate the structures and presuppositions of the very systems they oppose” (pp. 161-162). There are no easy answers, and no easy freedom from ‘history’.

What is clear from the perspective of postcolonial theory, is that Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis that inscribes humanity’s trajectory within a neo-liberal discourse of modernity, deploys the same kind of metanarrative strategy as colonial history, albeit as a neo-colonial narrative (rather than ‘official’ history). Subscribing to a relatively stable ‘human nature’ throughout ‘history’, Fukuyama recapitulates the colonial strategy of universalising the experience of Europe (and in his case the United States), projecting the West as ‘history’. Fukuyama’s dismissal of the threat of politicised Islamic fundamentalism, and his wilful neglect of Islamic democracies in South East Asia in his ‘end of history’ discourse, would seem to confirm a tendency towards a Eurocentric historicism; as does his attempt to reassert the discourse of history at a time when “we are witnessing the dissolution of ‘the West’” as the master-category of history (R. J. C. Young, 1990, p. 20). If R. J. C. Young (1990) is correct that “postmodernism can best be defined as European culture’s awareness that it is no longer the unquestioned and dominant centre of the world” (p. 19) – a realisation that is itself an artefact of the cultural contact resulting from the colonial period – then history is indeed under siege by postmodernism, and Fukuyama’s teleological thesis no more than the death throes of the modernist metanarrative. Perhaps
then, the rise of the New Right may be part of a reactionary politics, troubled by the loss of (metanarrative) history, seeking unity under the invisible sign of ‘whiteness’ at all costs. Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ pronouncements can thus be understood as a call for history to stop where it is, at the triumph of ‘the West’. But it is likely that all that has come to an end is the project of modernity (Vattimo, 1988).

**Conclusion: After history?**

In this chapter, I conducted an exploratory study of ‘end of history’ discourse in contemporary theory. Reading with and against the work of Francis Fukuyama, I argued that two rival conceptions of ‘the end of history’ dominate contemporary western philosophical discussion. The first, Fukuyama’s thesis, asserts humanity’s arrival at ‘the end’ of the ‘grand story’, the telos of modernisation, the universal acceptance of political and economic liberalism as the only viable ideologies to survive the Cold War. The second, the postmodern position, proclaims the demise of metanarrative history or history as a ‘grand story’, and rejects any notion of a universal human subject or essential ‘human nature’. Recent notions of the post-historical subject as a politically unpredictable telematic or cyborg figure unconstrained by a natural/technological binary (Gray, 2001; Haraway, 1985) were posed as an alternative to Fukuyama’s (1992) Nietzschean notion of a lazy, hedonistic ‘last man’ for whom political struggle is over. Fukuyama’s thoroughly historicist metanarrative of the universal acceptance of political and economic liberalism was argued to express a triumphant commitment to an idealised liberalism (Derrida, 1994), at odds with a more generalised postmodern scepticism towards history and politics (Baudrillard, 1992; 1995; Lyotard, 1979; 1987). Further, Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ modernisation metanarrative was argued to project onto the events of the past an underlying meaning that
universalises the cultural experience of the West. Drawing upon postcolonial theory it was argued that metanarrative history has typically functioned as a ‘white mythology’ that seeks to construct Europe as the master-category against which all others are subordinated and rendered inferior (R. J. C. Young, 1990). Following Chakrabarty (1997), it was suggested that history as a disciplined form of writing made it extremely difficult for the historian to escape the Eurocentrism of historical discourse.

In the next chapter, I explore the NSW History curriculum’s response to ‘the end of the grand story’. Documenting a ‘struggle for histories’ at the site of the curriculum, Chapter IV explores the emergence of, and reaction to, socially critical approaches to ‘history’ within the NSW History curriculum during the period marked by the Bicentennial to the Millennium, a time of intense debate over representations of Australia’s colonial past. In many ways emblematic of the struggles over representations of history that have occurred in education systems across the English-speaking world, the struggles within and around the NSW curriculum are presented as a case through which to explore curricular responses to ‘the end of history’. Deploying the concept of ‘history as intersubjective memory’ as a lens, Chapter IV documents the cultural politics of History curriculum change in the 1990s, in the process highlighting the ways in which the NSW History curriculum has changed as a subject in relation to debates over representations of the national past.
In Chapter III, I explored the way in which ‘end of history’ discourse is mobilised in contemporary theory both as a celebration of the apparent climax of modernity, and as a challenge to modernity’s credibility. Fukuyama may proclaim our immanent arrival at ‘the end of history’, the telos of modernisation, marked by the near global acceptance of political and economic liberalism as the only viable ideologies after the fall of Soviet communism, but methodological postmodernists and postcolonial theorists remain sceptical of a Eurocentric historicism that projects history as a grand story of human progress and universalises the cultural mythologies of the West. By reading with and against Fukuyama, I demonstrated that metanarrative history, or history as a ‘grand story’, was predicated on a historicism that could only be sustained by projecting the West’s cultural ideals as a universal reality, in the process ignoring postmodern and postcolonial critique.

In this chapter, I explore how ‘the end of history’ as ‘the end of the grand story’, or the rejection of metanarrative history, has manifested at the site of the NSW History curriculum. The focal point for my discussions is the History Years 7-10 Syllabus (Board of Studies NSW, 1992), published and implemented in the early 1990s. Not only mandating the study of Australian history, but responding to the social conscience of its times, the 1992 Syllabus was a watershed curriculum document. According to Glissant (cited in Ashcroft, 2001), ‘history ends where the histories of those people once reputed to be
without history come together” (p. 98). Incorporating ‘social histories’ about, and from the perspective of women and Australia’s Indigenous peoples, and framing them as legitimate alternatives to the hegemonic Eurocentric patriarchal master narratives of the nation, the 1992 Syllabus challenged conceptions of history as a grand story. Published in the wake of growing scholarship in Aboriginal historiography that had gained increasing media and political attention in the lead up to the Bicentennial of the nation, and undoubtedly influenced by the civil rights movements of the sixties (particularly feminism), and the equity policy context of the late seventies and early eighties, the 1992 Syllabus is examined as a specific case through which to explore curricular responses to ‘the end of history’.

Described as ‘radical’ (K. Thompson, 1999), the social meliorist changes to the NSW History curriculum set it on a collision course with politically conservative historians and socially conservative politicians, becoming an important site of struggle in a series of heated and highly public ‘history wars’ (S. Macintyre & A. Clark, 2003). At the core of these skirmishes over history was a concern that the historical consciousness of the nation’s youth was being hijacked by left-wing radicals intent on installing a ‘black armband’ or mournful view of the nation’s past (Blainey, 1993a; 1993b), undesirably influenced by ‘political correctness’ (Donnelly, 1997), cultural studies, literary theory, and postmodernism (Windschuttle, 1996). Their lament was shared by Prime Minister John Howard, who was keen to see schools dispense with the ‘black armband’ history promoted during the term of his predecessor (Davison, 2000; S. Macintyre & A. Clark, 2003). Of particular concern was the representation of frontier life during the pre-Federation period (McGuinness, 1994). A shift in the language that had traditionally described British colonisation as ‘settlement’ to an unprecedented acknowledgment of the Aboriginal perspective on colonisation as ‘invasion’, generated a great deal of angst among the conservative intelligentsia in NSW (S.
Macintyre, 2004), Queensland (Land, 1994), and Victoria (Grimshaw, 1996), where similar curricular changes occurred.

In many ways emblematic of the struggles over history that have occurred in History education across the English-speaking world (Aldrich, 1991; Nash, Crabtree, & Dunn, 1998; Phillips, 1998; G. H. Richardson, 2002), what is at stake in these ‘history wars’ is in part the future of the nation (C. Halse & C. Harris, 2004), because as Bennett (1995) has argued “the shape of the thinkable future depends on how the past is portrayed and on how its relations to the present are depicted” (p. 162). In other words, history constrains and enables particular ways of thinking about where we have been and where we are going.

According to Seixas (2000), what is sought by each side of the conflict:

is the power of the story of the past to define who we are in the present, our relations with others, relations in civil society – nation and state, right and wrong, good and bad – and broad parameters for action in the future. (p. 21)

Accordingly, I follow Healy (1997) in interpreting the curriculum as a political device that over the years has “installed particular visions of history and trained people in ways of acquiring and interpreting social memory” (p. 73). Thus, as a way of understanding the changes wrought by the 1992 Syllabus, their relationship with a parallel ‘critical’ project in the United States, and the political backlash against the introduction of Indigenous perspectives into the curriculum, I conclude with an examination of the problematic relationship between history and memory, and its significance in terms of the struggles over representations of the national past.
History’s last stand: The state of the subject

There are a number of factors that make the NSW History curriculum an interesting context within which to explore the central problematic of this study. An important site of scrutiny in recent NSW state-based (Halse, Khamis, Dinham, Harris, Buchanan, & Soeters, 1997) and Federal (Taylor, 2000) inquiries into History education, NSW has become significant in Australian education as the place of History’s ‘last stand’ as a school subject.

Within the federated states of Australia, NSW is unique in maintaining a discrete junior high school History subject despite decades of political pressure for a shared national Social Studies curriculum. Since the mid 1990s, History as a discrete subject (along with Geography and Commerce and a newly developed ‘environmental studies’ strand), was subsumed within an integrated ‘social studies’ curriculum titled *Studies of Society and the Environment* (SOSE), in all states but NSW. The trend to integrate History with the social science subjects was one of the consequences of the *Declaration of national educational goals* (MCEETYA, 1989), otherwise known as the ‘Hobart Declaration’, which was rapidly translated into a series of ‘national statements and profiles’ for the various ‘key learning areas’ (KLAs) that had been formed as a way of standardising curriculum across Australia (C. Harris, 1996). Arguably, the main thrust of the Hobart Declaration was the endorsement of “the introduction of an outcome-based national curriculum” (Simpson, 2004, p. 3), the wholesale adoption of which would see History lose its place as a discrete subject. While moves towards an integrated Social Studies curriculum, and a unified ‘core’ national curriculum had been gaining momentum for some time before the Hobart Declaration (see Fitzgerald, 1981 for a discussion of the issues as they stood in the early

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33 These inquiries were initiated by the NSW History Teachers’ Association and the Federal government respectively. Their main task was to diagnose the state of History education, particularly given its incorporation within a broad social studies key learning area in most states and territories.
eighties), all attempts at developing a core ‘integrated’ social studies curriculum for Australian secondary schools had been previously unsuccessful. In contrast, ‘Hobart’ was largely successful because of the unique consensus it achieved (and represented) between Federal, State, and Territory Ministers for Education, all of whom had been signatories to the declaration (C. Harris, 1996; Simpson, 2004).

However, while the Hobart Declaration did result in ‘the end of History’ as a discrete subject in most states and territories as a result of its integration within the SOSE KLA, NSW ultimately dissented. Its dissent took the form of establishing a Human Society and Its Environment (HSIE) KLA for primary schools that included a history-inspired ‘change and continuity’ strand consistent with the other states and territories, but the maintenance of a discrete History subject in the junior years of secondary school. As Simpson (2004) notes, this was largely due to “the effective intervention of key stakeholder groups, particularly the New South Wales History Teachers’ Association (HTA)” (p. 5), and “the local tradition in which [H]istory has always been taught as a discrete subject” (pp. 4-5), at least in the living memory of many teachers. Likewise, the success of History in attracting elective enrolments during the seventies and eighties, particularly over rivals such as Geography, helped to secure the place of a discrete History subject amidst anxieties over the role and function of History as curriculum within the new KLA structure (Duncan, 1992). Continued support for History as a defined area of study also came from the ‘History

34 The ‘Hobart Declaration’ has more recently been superseded by a new national statement, the Adelaide declaration on national goals for schooling in the twenty-first century (MCEETYA, 1999), that remains committed to visions of a national curriculum.

35 An introductory ‘Social Studies’ curriculum in Form I (Year 7), followed by the possibility of an elective study of History in Forms II, III, and IV (Years 8-10) had been the pattern in NSW schools since the adoption of the “Wyndham Scheme” in 1962 (Johnston, 1982). Throughout this period, instruction was guided by a “prescriptive, chronological syllabus . . . programmed in fortnightly slabs of content” (Johnston, 1982, p. 65) that remained relatively unchanged from 1957 until 1972 (Clark, 2003). Within this structure, Australian history was relegated to the elective streams.
Premier’ Bob Carr, whose undergraduate degree in American history had instilled a passion for, and commitment to the subject (S. Macintyre, 2004). While this disputation over the continued status of History as a discrete subject in NSW has some relevance to the concerns of this study, according to Catherine Harris (2004), it is also significant as part of a global conversation about the nature of History education. However, this is not the only, nor main reason the NSW mandatory History curriculum provides an interesting context for the exploration of the central problematic of my thesis.

The most important reason for exploring the problematic in relation to the selected context is that during the fight to maintain its borders, History curriculum in NSW was re-written in the early 1990s as a ‘radical text’ that made many subsequent pre-Millennium curriculum developments appear ‘reactionary’ (K. Thompson, 1999). The ‘radicality’ of the 1992 curriculum changes took a number of forms. The first involved the adoption of a firm position on what content knowledge should be ‘fundamental’ to the History education of young Australians. The answer attempted to address the perennial problem of the lack of national content in the curriculum, which had been exacerbated by the structure of the History curriculum in the sixties, seventies and eighties that relegated Australian history to the elective years. Mandating 100 hours of Australian history content, the 1992 Syllabus was described at the time by Carmel Young (1993) as “a radical departure” from the syllabus it supplanted (p. 3). However, the 1992 Syllabus went even further than establishing a set of new basics and moving significantly away from previous curriculum

36 This support went beyond advocacy for a discrete History subject, to the institution of a state-based history project award scheme, and scholarships for the study of American history (Bob Carr’s personal passion).

37 Merold Westphal (1997) in her discussion of a ‘radical hermeneutics’ reminds us that the concept of “radicality” is a “mixed metaphor”, given that “etymologically it means getting to the root of things” (p. 50), in addition to a sense of a major break or rupture.
constructions. It was surprisingly ‘radical’ in yet another more political way, for the 1992 Syllabus “guard[ed] against the sway of a master narrative in history” (C. Young, 1993, p. 4) by underscoring “the importance of selecting and promoting a full range of voices in the telling of Australian history” (C. Young, 1993, p. 6), “voices frequently absent from the national narrative” (A. Clark, 2003, p. 173).

Endorsing a trend that had begun in the 1970s away from the rote recall of facts and dates, the 1992 Syllabus was a watershed document in its ‘social meliorist’ orientation (as Kliebard, 1987 defined it). Strongly influenced by that “study of the social dimensions of past societies” that has come to be called ‘social history’ (MacRaild & Taylor, 2004, p. 6), which at the time had been struggling for over a decade to gain ground in American schools (Stearns, 1982), the syllabus encouraged “real questioning from a multitude of viewpoints” (p. 4). Organised around five focus questions that attended to issues of Australian identity, heritage, Australia’s international relationships, women’s experience, and Indigenous perspectives, the 1992 Syllabus effectively ‘changed the subject’ of school History, both in terms of its orientation as an area of study, and in terms of ‘the subject’ that was studied. The incorporation of social histories of, and more importantly from, the perspective of women and Australia’s Indigenous peoples – perspectives that had been historically sidelined or for a long-time academically non-existent – and the framing of these histories as legitimate alternatives to the master-narratives of ‘famous men’ and

38 Despite the clear resonance between the 1992 Syllabus and the social conscience of its time, it is important to note that I make no claims about how this curriculum document was ultimately enacted, or what its educational effects were. What is actually taught by history teachers in the implementation of new syllabi is an object of analysis less amenable to retrospective data collection than an analysis of policy and curriculum documents. The only reliable data on students’ historical knowledge, for example, that would reflect the 1992 Syllabus and all previous curriculum documents as well, were documented in a study conducted at the University of Technology Sydney (Ashton, Connors, Goodall, Hamilton, & McCarthy, 2000). The report from the researchers was not particularly flattering for the general population’s knowledge of history, the implication being that school History has little effect on the citizenry’s knowledge of their nation’s history.
‘pioneering settlement’, would prove to be the most controversial aspect of the changes to History curriculum in the early 1990s.

The climate of reform: History as a gendered text

According to Anna Clark (2003), the “critical approaches to Australian history” (p. 173) that were emerging from the academy during the 1960s and 1970s, which were beginning to question “established interpretations of settlement and progress” (p. 173), inevitably had an impact on the history that was taught in schools. This impact had initially taken the form of an increasing focus on the construction of a “non-prescriptive” student-enquiry focused syllabus in 1972 “which maximised the freedom of teachers and pupils to choose content and methodology to suit their interests, ability levels and school circumstances” (Johnston, 1982, p. 66). While the syllabus released in 1980 intensified the focus on the development of students’ historical understanding (Johnston, 1982), it was in the early 1990s that the impact of the new History on the school curriculum took a decidedly more political turn. This political turn, as already noted, involved the incorporation of the perspectives of women and Australia’s Indigenous peoples into the teaching of Australian history.

The publication of the 1992 History Years 7-10 Syllabus in NSW was made possible in the wake of the civil rights and social reform movements of the sixties, and the equity policy context of the late seventies and early eighties, that included the publication of documents such as: Girls, school and society in 1975; Towards non-sexist education in 1979; the Multi-cultural
These policies were influenced by a growing social conscience constituted in part by the discourses of feminism, neo-Marxism, and multiculturalism. It is also likely the ‘new histories’ that came to the fore in the late seventies and early eighties (documented in Osborne & Mandle, 1982), as ‘social histories’ that “emphasized the lives of ordinary people” over the study of elites (MacRaild & Taylor, 2004, p. 120), legitimised the place in the NSW History curriculum of feminist and Indigenous perspectives on Australia’s past.

The growing influence of postmodern social theory that had rendered ‘history from below’ an increasingly appealing option over more totalizing approaches to history in the academy (Perry, 2002), probably also contributed to the climate of reform that encouraged curriculum developers to design a syllabus that was socially meliorist in orientation.

Without doubt, one of the most important movements and philosophies to foster this climate of curriculum reform was feminism.

It is beyond the scope of this project to examine the impact of feminism upon education in any general sense. Instead, I will confine my analysis to gaining an understanding of ‘history’ from a feminist perspective, as a way of understanding the climate of History curriculum reform. From the standpoint of feminist theory, history is a gendered text. For

39 For a detailed discussion of the social and policy context of this era and its effect on education in NSW more broadly, see Barcan (1988).

40 Interestingly, however, there still appeared to be a need to argue for a curriculum that attended to Women’s history and Aboriginal history in the years leading up to the release of the new syllabus (Allport, 1987; Carmel Young, 1987).

41 I should like to make clear that while I describe the 1992 Syllabus as ‘social meliorist’ in orientation, this description is an application of Kliebard’s work, and is not meant to be a claim about any shared social reconstructionist or meliorist intentions on the part of the stakeholders involved in the 1992 curriculum’s production, despite how ‘clearly’ we might think we can read the situation today. What I would say is that the 1992 Syllabus arguably demonstrates sensitivity among at least some of those involved in its production, to the voices and narratives of those ‘in the margins’. Likewise, it is known that many of the key players in the construction of the 1992 Syllabus were members of HTA executive, whose activist orientations encouraged them to advocate successfully for the voice of teachers in the production of the new History curriculum (C. Harris, 2004). It is likely that in this case their activism extended beyond the interests of History teachers.
example, in *Feminism and deconstruction*, Elam (1997) suggests that Western history has been dominated for centuries by narratives of ‘great men’. Elam (1997) acknowledges recent feminist attempts to re-evaluate what counts as historical knowledge, and to make women appear in the historical record where they had previously been invisible. The work of Davis (1987) that attempts to recover the voices of ordinary men and women in sixteenth-century France can be seen as a case in point, as can that of Sochen (1982), who actually uses the neologism ‘herstory’ to highlight a focus on women as the subject of the narrative that is told. Sochen (1982), writing about women in the early day’s of American history, argues that “as any reader of history books knows, the overwhelming majority of evidence, of persons, and of events described in history narratives is about male exploits, male accomplishments, and male failures” (p. 1). Armed with a commitment to write women’s history, or *herstory*, Sochen represents one of an ever increasing number of feminist historians who have taken up the challenge to write histories from a woman’s perspective, focusing on the private life of women, rather than the public life of men, as the object of the historian’s gaze (Sochen, 1982). Circulating within and beyond the academic history community, such feminist perspectives on the past had become commonplace prior to the production of the 1992 Syllabus.

While Elam believes in the importance of *her-story* being told, rather than just *his-story*, she underscores that “*her-story is not one story*” (Elam, 1997, p. 69, emphasis in the original), that there is no single story shared by every woman. In fact, she argues that “an injustice is committed when any one history purports to speak for all women everywhere, when it does not underline the incompleteness of its own narrative” (Elam, 1997, p. 69). Elam’s comments grapple with a central problem of historical scholarship and curriculum development. Whenever events are historicised, they are also ‘hypostatised’. I use the word
‘hypostatised’ to convey not only the idea of giving the past a reality by making it concrete as a history, but also to emphasize the sense in which historical narratives fix our conceptions of ‘the past’. The effect of this ‘fixation’ is to leave history standing motionless, a snapshot of a much richer and varied context than the form of narrative can capture, despite how pluralist or dialogic the style of the historian. When a story becomes history it renders static a conception of ‘the past’, and by virtue of its attempt to ‘get the story straight’ (D. Carr, 2001a) allows some voices to be heard while silencing others. This fixing of history often produces according to Ann-Louise Shapiro (1997), “an account of the past that is fundamentally ahistorical” (p. 12). That is to say, where the historian writes in such a way as to universalize the viewpoint of his or her narrative, the “alternative trends and possibilities” (A-L. Shapiro, 1997, p. 12) that would normally remain in any rendering of ‘the past’ become ‘flattened’, and discontinuities are suppressed, implying that the present is the predestined result of some remote past, rather than “the result of deliberate action, contestation, and contingency” (A-L. Shapiro, 1997, p. 12). Thus, even feminist histories may suffer from the problem of presenting the voice of their narrator as recording the universal viewpoint of all women. This is problematic, and may well be one of the factors that have given rise to the range of feminisms we see today, given that no one feminism speaks for all women (A. Luke, 1989; St.Pierre & Pillow, 2000).

Thinking in terms of school life, what the feminist critique of history reveals so sharply is the fact that “the traditional curriculum teaches all of us to see the world through the eyes of privileged, white, European males and to adopt their interests and perspectives as our own” (Rothenberg quoted in Berkhoffer, 1995, p. 170). This kind of criticism seeks to demonstrate, in-line with poststructural and postcolonial theory, how ‘history’ typically positions the white, European male as the uncontested norm, or standard against which all
others should be measured. Since it is unlikely that the viewpoints emerging from other
groups (such as gender, ethnic, Indigenous, and class minorities) will be the same as the
dominant ‘phallicentric’ view (Derrida, 1976), difference is registered as deficit
(Rothenberg, 1991). Obviously histories that revise or question ‘the great story’ of men are
often declared to be ideologically motivated, while ‘the great story’ is positioned as an
objective reality.42

Any historian who takes seriously the feminist critique is forced to re-read history as a
gendered text. Historians of the 1960s and 1970s were alert to this issue, and engineered
“critical approaches to Australian history [that] questioned established interpretations” and
demonstrated a commitment to “social histories of feminist, migrant and Aboriginal
perspectives” (A. Clark, 2003, p. 173). This shift is often described, as noted earlier, as an
increasing interest in “history from below” (S. Macintyre, 1997); history from the viewpoint
of those in the margins. While feminism was an important influence on the climate of
reform that worked as a crucible within which the 1992 Syllabus was produced, the context
was the Bicentennial of the nation and the attention it brought to Aboriginal history.

The context of reform: Bicentennial Australia and
history as cultural memory

While the interjection of the perspectives of women had followed the gender equity and
women’s liberation movements of the seventies, it is probably no coincidence that
Indigenous perspectives finally found a place in the NSW History curriculum when they
did. Awareness that Australia’s Indigenous peoples held a legitimate alternative perspective

42 We see this particular strategy in Windschuttle (2002), who denies historical accounts of the massacres of
Indigenous people in Tasmania as ideologically motivated, while portraying his own counter-revisionist
argument that there never was a frontier war in Australia as ‘objective’ history.
on the nation’s history was thrust into public consciousness during the late 1980s through a
growing body of works dedicated to the revelation of an Aboriginal history (Biskup,
1982). Reynold’s (1982) ground-breaking *The other side of the frontier: Aboriginal resistance to the
European invasion of Australia*, provided one of the first accounts of early European-
Indigenous contact from the Aboriginal viewpoint that had influenced educators (Prentis,
1993). Advocated as a useful resource for gaining “an Aboriginal perspective” that could be
incorporated into the curriculum (Carmel Young, 1987, p. 11), Reynold’s work challenged
the traditional narrative of a non-violent frontier.

Public awareness of a distinctive Aboriginal perspective on Australian history, documented
in the new scholarship, came partly as a result of a series of grass roots protests that
culminated in the form of a ‘day of mourning’ during the Bicentennial celebrations of 1988
(Reed, 2004). For many Australians, the call for a ‘day of mourning’ by Indigenous elders at
the time of the Bicentennial provided an important catalyst for reflection on the nation’s
past, bringing into sharp relief the disjuncture between the official story of two-hundred
years of successful European settlement with Indigenous stories that described two

43 Some of these shifts in Aboriginal history had been canvassed somewhat earlier by Frank Farrell (1980), in
*Teaching History*, the journal of the History Teachers’ Association. More recent work by Veracini (2003b)
documents ‘four waves’ in Aboriginal historiography. According to Veracini (2003b), the first wave took
place during the 1960s and 1970s, establishing “a dialectical opposition between Aboriginal absence and
Aboriginal presence” in ‘Australian history’ (p. 225). The second wave occurred during the late 1970s and
early 1980s exploring issues relating to Aboriginal passivity and resistance in relation to colonisation. The
third wave emerged in the late 1980s and continued through the early 1990s, examining “the tension between
Aboriginal strategies of confrontation and collaboration with invaders” (Veracini, 2003b, p. 225), and
ultimately affirmed Aboriginal agency. The fourth phase commenced in the late 1990s, and continues into the
present. It involves debates over “the tension between unsurrendered sovereignty and unilateral
extinguishment of native rights to land” (Veracini, 2003b, p. 225). Thus, while the ‘new Aboriginal
historiography’ in general refers to the tendency of historians in the later half of the twentieth century to pay
attention to Indigenous perspectives on the past, the central debates in the field have undergone a number of
transformations. By the time of the 1992 Syllabus history educators who were keeping up with the academic
debates would have been aware of literature that fitted into the first three phases of the debate. The
development of a new syllabus in 1998 could be seen to coincide with the beginning of the fourth phase of
Aboriginal historiography, although Windschuttle’s (2002) polemic work for example, continues the battle of
the third phase.
centuries of displacement, occupation and oppression (Russell, 2001). Placing an increasing emphasis on Aboriginal experience and perspective (Carmel Young, 1987), the new historiography of the eighties had moved towards detailed local and regional studies of Indigenous life that broke the “Great Australian Silence” around Indigenous history (Biskup, 1982, p. 12). As noted in my introduction, this ‘great silence’ had been sustained by an Anglo-Australian myth that “the destruction of Aboriginal society in the face of colonising forces [was] inevitable . . . [and] also complete” (G. Macdonald, 2001, p. 176); a belief in a non-eventful “quiet frontier” free of the “founding violence” of other nations (Veracini, 2003a, p. 328); both ignorance of, and disbelief when confronted with, the revelation of state-sanctioned Indigenous child removal policies throughout most of the post-Federation/pre-Bicentennial period, designed to foster ‘assimilation’ (Goodall, 2002); and sometimes according to historian, John Harris (2003), the wilful ‘drawing of a veil’ over events by historians in the 1800s already concerned about what it could mean for the national spirit and reputation if stories of frontier atrocities should have wide national and international circulation.

It must be stated that the sentiment of the 1992 Syllabus, embodied in its interjection of an Indigenous historical perspective on the nation’s past into the curriculum, stood in striking contrast to the 1957 Syllabus which still looked at “Aboriginal people as an appropriate study of ‘stone age man’ at the ‘threshold of history’” (A. Clark, 2003, pp. 173-174). This shift in perceptions of Aboriginal people, their culture, and ownership of a legitimate history, had taken generations to emerge. Once public, however, the new perceptions rather rapidly impacted upon what was taught about Indigenous Australians in the curriculum. Interestingly, the History curriculum in NSW also seemed to be in tune with

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44 Used here in the sense of ‘historical writing’.
the legal climate of its day. In the same year the 1992 Syllabus was published, the struggle for Indigenous land rights had moved forward with the High Court’s announcement of the Mabo decision, which, translated into practical terms, meant that Indigenous people had a right to dominion over their traditional lands, and that this situation demanded recognition within Australia’s political and legal institutions (Ritter & Flanagan, 2003). The Mabo decision (and the Wik decision that followed in 1996) had important consequences for Australian history in particular, and Australian society more generally. For, as Attwood (1996) has argued:

Mabo and the new Australian history ends the historical silence about the Aboriginal pre-colonial and colonial past upon which the conservative invention of Australia and Australianness was founded, and since their Australia was realised through and rests upon that conventional historical narrative, the end of this history constitutes for them the end of Australia. (p. 116)

It was this ‘end of history’ that so unmistakably emerges in the 1992 Syllabus. It would seem that in a certain sense, the 1992 Syllabus anticipated the Mabo declaration, and was already affecting possibilities for this kind of recognition within the school History curriculum. However, while seemingly popular with teachers, the apparent radicalism of the 1992 Syllabus eventually made it unpopular with conservative politicians, and some ‘traditional’ historians (K. Thompson, 1999).

**White-washing public memory: Cultural politics and the ‘hijacking’ of history**

In a recent work on what has become known as *The history wars*, Stuart Macintyre and Anna Clark (2003), documented and, in many ways challenged, the growing concerns of a powerful New Right that seeks to return Australia to a naïve, idealistic, ‘1950s’ view of the
nation’s past. In Stuart Macintyre and Anna Clark’s (2003) analysis of the growing conflicts over Australia’s history, he reports how the nation’s past has become the focus of a political battle, tethered to issues of national identity, immigration, and the treatment of Australia’s Indigenous population (past and present). That the incorporation of a revisionist Aboriginal perspective on Australian history triggered a series of political conflicts over the curriculum should not be surprising, since, as Ashcroft (2001) has argued:

*narratives are not neutral alternatives, but are themselves a feature of the power struggle continually waged in post-colonial societies. Contesting narratives struggle for authority over the explanation of the past.* (p. 89)

Anna Clark (2003) agrees with Ashcroft’s assertion, arguing that the disputes over the content of the curriculum that followed the incorporation of Indigenous histories of Australia’s colonial past were “simply the latest manifestation of a perennial concern about historical knowledge and national identity” (p. 172).

Only a couple of years before Stuart Macintyre and Anna Clark’s analysis of the ‘history wars’, Davison (2000) published his own work in the popular press, *The uses and abuses of Australian history.* Davison’s exploration of the contemporary uses and abuses of history in Australian society included a discussion of what he defined as the Howard-Keating conflict. According to Davison (2000) it was a conflict in which John Howard, as a newly elected Prime Minister accused the out-going government lead by Paul Keating of ‘hijacking’ history; of officially sanctioning a “politically filtered . . . and distorted” view of our national past. Howard of course wanted to return to Australia’s ‘real’ history. For Howard, leader of the main Federal conservative party, the real history was one that

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Australians could be proud of; a history that documented what Australia had achieved over the past two hundred years, rather than any perceived failings of the nation and its citizenry. Importantly, without ever stating it explicitly, the Prime Minister wanted a history that played down any injustices committed to Indigenous populations during our colonial past. Howard’s resistance to the new Aboriginal history would seem to be motivated by a concern that acknowledging past injustices could require present or future governments to treat Indigenous peoples as a ‘special case’ requiring compensation, at odds with his radical ambition to dismantle the ‘welfare state’. More importantly, however, Howard’s resistance appears to arise from an extreme neo-liberal individualism that is intuitively appealing to many Australians, and that suggests those of us living in Australia today should not be held accountable for what our forbearers did during our collective past (Davison, 2000).

Keating, on the other hand, was concerned that before Australia could go forward as a nation, ‘White Australia’ must ‘reconcile’ with its unwritten past; a past that lingers and has consequences for Indigenous communities today; a past in which Aboriginal communities were treated with a kind of disrespect that is out of step with contemporary social values (Davison, 2000).

The entry of Howard and Keating into the ‘history wars’ was supported by their particular readings of the past (Nile, 2002). Keating’s speech writer, the historian Don Watson, drew on the work of Manning Clark (1995) and Henry Reynolds (1982), both of whom had written ‘revisionist’ histories of Australia that put into question what had, until the late sixties, been the dominant ‘White colonial’ narrative. On the other hand, Howard’s history – which appears to be bound up in a desire to turn back the historical clock to the Australia of his youth – was forged through readings of the conservative historian Geoffrey Blainey. According to Blainey (1993a), our nation’s collective memory is under siege from the ‘black
armband’ view of history. The notion of a ‘black armband’ view of the past was first raised by Blainey (1993b) in his John Latham Memorial Lecture in the April of 1993. It was followed by an article with the same theme in the conservative journal *Quadrant* (see Blainey, 1993a). However, it wasn’t until the new Prime Minister, John Howard, ‘borrowed’ the phrase three years later, as a political mantra against left-wing ‘revisionist’ historians, and those sympathetic to revisionist histories among his political opponents, that the idea of a ‘black armband view of history’ entered into the national lexicon (Warhaft, 1993).

In short, Blainey (1993b) coined the phrase to describe the ‘mournful view’ of the nation’s past being promoted by the Hawke-Keating Labor government, who were drawing on the constructions of revisionist historians to challenge what they perceived to be a ‘public amnesia’ in relation to the displacement of Indigenous peoples, and the destruction of their societies by European colonisation. Blainey contrasted the ‘black armband’ view with what he described as the traditional ‘three cheers’ view of Australian history. It was Blainey’s (1993a) view that the ‘balance sheet’ of the past was firmly in favour of the achievements of ‘White society’ since ‘settlement’, and that any history that has an excessive focus on past wrongs promotes a ‘mournful’ relationship with the nation’s past that harms the nation, and is ultimately inaccurate. Blainey’s (1993b) main concern seemed to be that Australia’s history was being rewritten by ‘radicals’ intent on claiming the historical consciousness of ‘ordinary’ Australians, in the service of partisan politics.

Following Blainey’s lead, the educationalist, Kevin Donnelly (1997) has argued that there is a political bias present in what is current taught in schools about our nation’s ‘history’. Donnelly has expressed particular concern about the teaching of ‘revisionist’ or ‘black

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46 The Labor party is Australia’s major left-wing political party at both state and Federal levels of politics.
armband’ accounts of the colonisation of Australia that depict White ‘settlement’ as an ‘invasion’, a position that had been argued some years earlier by McGuinness (1994), a columnist in *The Australian* newspaper, and by a host of other journalists and commentators (see for example, Koch, 1994; Partington, 1987; Wilkins, 1994). According to McGuinness (1991) the draft version of the 1992 Syllabus represented the work of a “new establishment” (p. 15) that was hijacking our national past and infecting students’ minds through the use of “politically correct buzzwords” that included terms like “invasion”, “genocide”, “dispossession”, “Aboriginality” and “terra nullius” (A. Clark, 2002, p. 20). Although critique during the early 1990s remained at the level of rhetoric and hyperbole, it was not long before a series of counter-revisionist texts on Australian history emerged. At the forefront of the new counter-revisionist history was Keith Windschuttle and his tome *The fabrication of Aboriginal history* (Windschuttle, 2002).

Gaining wide attention, Windschuttle’s work set out to attack the new Aboriginal historiography, particularly its representation of frontier conflict. Windschuttle has a number of criticisms that he levels at the new Aboriginal historiography. For example, he disputes the application of the term ‘genocide’ to the treatment of Aboriginal populations in Tasmania (Poad, 2003). In that respect he is not alone, as many left-wing historians also suggest that the contemporary use of the term ‘genocide’ is inappropriate for the Australian context (Curthoys & Docker, 2001; Markus, 2001). However, his more controversial claim is that there was no organised resistance to European encroachment in Tasmania, and that accounts of a guerrilla war are fabrications, based on exaggerations of the evidence for the numbers involved (Poad, 2003). Windschuttle’s views have themselves stimulated a series

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47 This work follows Windschuttle’s (1996) *The killing of history*, a polemic against postmodern history. It also comes in the wake of Evans’ (1997) *In defence of history*, another response to the ‘threat’ of postmodernism, and Granatstein’s (1998) *Who killed Canadian history?* The later is comparable to Windschuttle’s ‘fabrications’ text, arguing that Canadian history has been distorted by revisionists.
of rebuttals from scholars working in the field (Attwood, 2005; Manne, 2003), and provoked a critical response within the professional history teaching journals (Clement, 2003; S. Macintyre, 2004; Poad, 2003). However, not all attention has been negative. *Washout: On the academic response to the fabrication of Aboriginal history* (Dawson, 2004), documents the reaction to Windschuttle’s (2002) criticisms of Aboriginal historiography among those historians whose work was attacked, and those Left-wing academics generally in support of what has been called the ‘new Aboriginal historiography’ (Biskup, 1982). Windschuttle’s published polemics have plainly ushered in the latest phase of the debate, a debate that is essentially a struggle over representation of the nation’s past.

The comments of Blainey, Donnelly, Howard, McGuinness, and Windschuttle, reflect what might be described as a ‘White backlash’ against the ‘radical histories’ of the new History curriculum that emerged in the early 1990s, and a politically motivated attempt to discredit the reformist agenda of the Left by constructing ‘political correctness’ as an attack on Australian culture (A. Clark, 2004). What is common in each of the criticisms documented above is the accusation that the new historiography is politically motivated and ideologically laden, while the critic’s own version of history is ‘just the facts’. Although never stated in this fashion, the New Right from which such criticisms emerge, yearns nostalgically for an unproblematic ‘White history’ that has been ‘naturalised’ to the point of its conflation with ‘reality’ and the ‘real past’. Such strategies are obviously ignorant of, or perhaps more accurately complicit with, the process by which ‘White privilege’ and ‘White history’ is rendered invisible and universal, by presenting the ‘White story’ as ‘commonsense’ (Apple, 2004b). However, the strategies of these neo-conservatives indicate

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48 Interestingly, in his most recent attack on schools, the Prime Minister shifted the battle to the issue of political correctness itself, decrying public schools as ‘value free’ education.
a desire to return to a ‘White-washed history’ which, in their colour-blind ways, they see as ‘history as it was’ – although by this they mean as it ‘really’ was and, as it used to be taught. On the contemporary scene, the conservative position is committed to “the myth of realism” that conflates ‘White history’ with ‘history’ itself (Tonkin, 1990, p. 25), as if ‘Whiteness’ meant translucent, without filters or ‘coloured’ lenses.  

If John Howard links the narrative of the West with history, effectively ‘selling’ our ‘White mythologies’ as ‘commonsense’, he does so for a set of reasons both personal and political. Ferro (1981), reporting on the work of Preiswerk and Perrot (1978), identifies the values that underpins ‘White history’ as a genre, including: a commitment to monotheism; liberal democracy; progress; industrialisation; national unity; law and order. Such values would seem to be implicit in the histories of countries across Europe and the English-speaking world, and are what contrasts ‘White history’ with histories from other parts of the world. It is this set of ‘liberal’ values – and not just a particular narrative – that Howard and his supporters see as under threat by ‘black armband’ histories. It is a position Howard appears to share, whether he admits it or not, with the one time leader of the populist ultra-conservative ‘One Nation’ party, Pauline Hanson. It is a position he continues to capitalize on, seeking a power-base among the White disenfranchised, perceived to have suffered at the hands of Keating’s ‘depression we had to have’ in the 1980s, and feeling nauseated by an apparently ‘value-free’ diet of ‘political correctness’.

It is possible to read the ‘White backlash’ to the struggle for histories as a reaction to what Weis, Proweller, and Centrie (2004) describe as White working class masculinity under siege. Although their analysis centres on the United States, it would seem to be equally

49 “Whiteness” according to McLaren (2000), “is a kind of articulatory practice that can be located in the convergence of colonialism, capitalism, and subject formation” (p. 150).
applicable to the Australian context. Large losses of male-dominated jobs in a range of labour-intensive industries due to the economic restructuring of the 1980s; an increasing number of non-white immigrants moving into the suburbs resulting in a sense of territorial encroachment; and challenges for dominance in the home as the result of gender role contestation, have all resulted in men no longer having “a clear-cut material sphere in which they can assert lived power” (Weis, Proweller, & Centrie, 2004, p. 139). It is this ‘sense of loss’ or ‘disenfranchisement’ that has been capitalised on by New Right governments in both the United States and Australia, and has resulted in the disturbing success of movements such as Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party (Apple, 2004b). Feeling a sense of loss and disadvantage, however factual or illusory this may have been, ‘White working class males’ in the 1990s, were eager to accept the political rhetoric of a conservative elite that implicated ‘political correctness’ and ‘black armband’ histories as responsible for the de-throning of patriarchy, and subsequently, the sense of cultural despair. The New Right’s strategy provided permission for recommitting oneself to the ‘White mythology’, a ‘three cheers’ version of the national past that offered comfort for ‘Whites’ eager to reclaim their ‘rightful status’ in Australian society.  

Like conservatives in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, Howard in his criticism of ‘black armband’ history, and his call for a return to a triumphant national narrative (Maiden, 2006), fails to understand that judgments made by historians “are always tentative, subject to further investigation and evaluation” (Nash, Crabtree, & Dunn, 1998, p. 50). Howard’s government continues to extol the view that ‘political correctness’ and a ‘black armband’ history had hurt the nation in the eighties and early nineties. His Australia Day speech on 26th January 2006, once again repeated his Blainey-inspired rhetoric of getting the balance of history right, and argued that a sense of national unity, to be provided by a History curriculum that focused on a coherent (all-embracing) narrative, was essential in the fight against ‘terror’, his new Orwellian opponent (Howard, 2006).
When critici sing the fact that particular perspectives on the past are taught in schools, Howard and his supporters would do well to remember that:

historical knowledge is contingent; multiple perspectives on the past must be explored because people under study are seldom of one mind; historical objectivity should be pursued, but it can never be completely achieved; and . . . the historian’s writings can never be detached from the persona of the writer. (Nash, Crabtree, & Dunn, 1998, p. 40)

Dening (1996) is even more exacting about the dilemmas of history, when he asserts that histories are “transformations of the past into expressions . . . they refer to a past in making a present . . . Histories are metaphors of the past . . . but histories are also metonymies of the present” (p. 37). In other words, the meaning of ‘the past’ is given to it from the present. Whatever meaning it once had in itself, as a living present, is now more or less unrecoverable.

Manufacturing the ‘good citizen’ through studying the nation

Although the 1992 Syllabus was a landmark document in the evolution of History curriculum in NSW, the public backlash against ‘political correctness’ and the growing strength of the New Right by the end of the 1990s, saw pressure placed upon the education authorities to revise the curriculum once again (A. Clark, 2003; Donnelly, 1997). This pressure also came from the Carr Labor government, elected in 1994, which was keen to see history taught as a compulsory subject across Years 7-10, with emphasis on history as a body of knowledge, coupled with a public examination for the school certificate, as ways of increasing academic rigor and teacher accountability (C. Harris, 2004). However, according to the research of Kylie Thompson (1999) the original impetus for a new syllabus did not come from within NSW itself, but was encouraged by a directive from the federal Liberal government that required state education authorities to find ways of incorporating national
‘civics and citizenship’ initiatives into the humanities curriculum. Following an inquiry conducted by the Civics Expert Group into the best way for civics and citizenship to be delivered, it was decided that civics and citizenship education should become part of the History curriculum. Interestingly, some academics saw the whole notion of using History curriculum to deliver civics and citizenship education as an innovation (S. Macintyre, 1997). However, it is important to note that when History originally appeared as a subject in NSW schools around 1830 it emphasised “loyalty to the empire and civic duty” (A. Clark, 2003, p. 173), and the topic of History curriculum and citizenship education was visited frequently in the professional journals and academic press throughout the twentieth century. Thus, far from being innovative, the idea to utilise History to produce the ‘good citizen’ of the nation simply returns History to one of its ‘original’ purposes.51

The significance of the release of a new syllabus, after public debates over what is taught about the past in schools, is difficult to determine, as the reasons for its publication are always many and varied, including the fact that the development of the 1998 syllabus reflected a general trend in curriculum renewal, if somewhat before schedule (C. Harris, 2004). However, the production of the 1998 Syllabus was accompanied by rhetoric of falling standards within History education (S. Macintyre, 1997), concerns over the politicisation of curriculum content (Nile, 2002), and alarmist calls for a return to a more ‘traditional’ History curriculum, which would simply ‘tell the past as it was’ (Windschuttle, 1996). The importance of school History as a battlefield in the ‘history wars’ should not be

51 The relationship between History and Civics education is actually a long-standing one. Note for example, Long’s (1909) claim that the value of History as a school subject was “the bearing it has on the proper discharge of the duties of citizenship” (p. 11), and T. S. Hall’s (1914) argument “that civics is not an independent school-subject, but is necessarily dependent upon the teaching of history. All history teaching should aim at creating an atmosphere of civic responsibility” (p. 630). Also note the discussion of History as self-evidently related to Civics education in Currey (1930), and “the incorporation of civics into comprehensive courses on Australian history or into Social Studies courses” depending on which state one was looking at, in the early 1950s (Collins, 1953, p. 92).
underestimated (A. Clark, 2003). Curriculum, as noted earlier, functions as “a disciplining technology that directs how the individual is to act, feel, talk, and ‘see’ the world and ‘self’” (Popkewitz, 2001, p. 153), performing an important role in the social reproduction of national identities (C. Halse & C. Harris, 2004). As Popkewitz, Pereya and Franklin (2001a) have argued, it typically does this by operating as a vehicle for national histories that connect the development of individuals to narratives and images of nationhood.

Interestingly, when the new syllabus was released in 1998 (Board of Studies NSW, 1998), some commentators suggested that the directive to incorporate civics and citizenship education into History curriculum was used as a lever to produce a “totally reactionary document” that signalled “a return to the 1950s and 1960s style curriculum” (K. Thompson, 1999, p. 53). According to Christine Halse and Catherine Harris (2004) the 1998 Syllabus was significant: in its return to ‘chronological history’; its movement away from an ‘issues-based’ model due to ‘content overload’; its movement towards a preference for content over skills; and its incorporation of a focus on civics and citizenship that could “be seen as an effort to extol a particular vision of nationalism” (p. 20). In light of the ‘radical’ sensibilities manifest in the 1992 Syllabus, the changes to History curriculum in NSW that resulted in the 1998 Syllabus have been argued to represent a conservative, ‘reactionary’ backlash (C. Halse & C. Harris, 2004; K. Thompson, 1999). One alarming consequence of the incorporation of civics and citizenship education with History curriculum is the increasing emphasis on the teaching of a triumphal national narrative; precisely the goal of the New Right in their attack on the 1992 Syllabus as ‘black armband’ history.

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52 It should be noted that in 2003 another new syllabus was released (Board of Studies NSW, 2003), replacing the unpopular 1998 document. Descriptions of new across-the-board assessment practices, life skills outcomes for students with special needs, and descriptions of historical skills appropriate for each topic, are the main differences to the previous syllabus, rather than any significant changes in structure or content.
Looking back over the politics of the twentieth century, Schlesinger (1992) sees the conflation of history and nationalism as a “corruption of history . . . [that] continues to thrive because it taps into potent emotions of history and locality to give individual lives meaning in an increasingly baffling universe” (p. 47). On both sides of politics, the central category for the analysis of ‘history’ is the construct of ‘nation’, which remains unproblematised in most debates, and is often at the root of attempts to determine a shared public memory of the past (Curthoys, 2003). Typically, the type of nationalism that fuels the ‘history wars’ is a racialised nationalism. The situation in Australia is little different. The political interest in school History comes out of the recognition that controlling what is taught as history is a way of influencing the course of the future. As Nugent (2003) argues, “the stories we tell ourselves about the past have serious consequences both for how we understand the present and for how we can imagine alternative futures” (p. 33). Given the politician’s skill for “manufacturing consent” (Nile, 2002, p. 202), the desire to produce a hegemonic narrative of the nation that speaks to and from one’s own political position, is probably irresistible. However, politicians with ambitions to prescribe a diet of national history would do well to explore George H. Richardson’s (2002) research conducted with a number of Canadian teachers, working amidst similar politicization of school History in Canada.

According to G. H. Richardson (2002) the articulation of national identity in the Canadian curriculum emerges from his research as “a series of frozen tropes” that are “increasingly irrelevant to both teachers and students” (p. 138). G. H. Richardson (2002) argues that:

required to teach a curriculum whose assumptions and legitimacy they no longer uncritically assume, teachers find themselves trapped between the mythic structure of modernism and the postmodern realities the classroom presents to them. (p. 135)
This has led G. H. Richardson (2002) to the conclusion that living with ‘ambiguous conceptions of difference and national identity’ (p. 143) is of critical importance for educators and their students living in postmodern pluralist societies. His research documents how working with this ‘ambiguity of identity’ rather than a fixed national self, allows teachers “to seize the imagination and passion of . . . students” (G. H. Richardson, 2002, p. 143), for whom these issues have an immediate relevance. Spivak and Rooney (1989) make the claim that no discourse is ever innocent of a will to power, whether counter-revisionist or ‘black armband’. However, it would be unfortunate if we took away from this the idea that we should avoid the teaching of national narratives altogether, since this provides little solution, as “historical knowledge and perspective, while helping people to think intelligently about contemporary issues, have the potential to provide personal moorings” (Nash, Crabtree, & Dunn, 1998, p. 9).

One solution, as Nehamas (1985) remarks, is to demonstrate “the contingent character of the institutions that traditional history exhibits as unchanging, [as this] . . . creates the possibility of altering them” (p. 112). This is, frankly, an activity frequently articulated as a desired practice in the texts of critical pedagogues (whose work will be addressed below). What governments in post-industrial, and/or postcolonial democracies like Australia, Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom, need to realise is that:

lively debate over the meaning of the past and its relation to today’s affairs does not signal national disunity and deterioration; rather it is a sign of a vibrant democracy. On the other hand, when these debates become rancorous and politicized, they threaten to impede the national mission to cure ourselves of historical amnesia. (Nash, Crabtree, & Dunn, 1998, p. 272)

I would agree with Popkewitz, Pereya and Franklin (2001a), that the discipline of History must remain committed to a “critical engagement . . . [with] the present, by making its
production of collective memories available for scrutiny and revision” (p. 4). However, we should be wary of any History that simply attempts to install a set of collective memories. As Ann-Louise Shapiro (1997) argues, the good historian produces a history that “organizes and exceeds memory, refusing to conflate the two” (p. 130). While history and memory may have in common a viewing of the past from the perspective of the present, they both must be used to resist “the desire to fix history” (A-L. Shapiro, 1997, p. 130). This resistance is unlikely to be achieved if stakeholders are forced to let governments dictate the national narrative taught in schools. As Peter Lee (1991) asserts, “History in schools is too important to be left to the politicians” (p. 63).

Understanding history as collective memory

One way of understanding what is at stake in the battle over the content of school History, is to explore history as a form of collective memory. One of the most important developments in the historiographic field in recent years has been the emergence of history and memory studies, perhaps because they present a way to understand history after the collapse of history as a grand story. The work in this area is useful for assisting us to understand what happened to History curriculum after ‘the end of (metanarrative) history’, particularly in terms of the development of the 1992 Syllabus and its replacement in 1998 by a more conservative document, since, the territory that is contested in these curriculum documents is the territory of collective or public memory.

History has a complex and problematic relationship with memory. LaCapra (1998) has asserted that “ideally, history critically tests memory and prepares for a more extensive attempt to work through a past that has not passed away” (p. 8). Roth (1995b) has
described memory as “the key to personal and collective identity” (p. 8); and Dening (1996) has asserted that if ‘memory’ may be considered the everyday word for a personal or intimate knowledge of the past, then history may be conceptualised as “public knowledge of the past . . . in the sense of being culturally shared” (p. 36). Halbwachs (1980), whose work is foundational in the area of ‘collective memory’, has argued in a way redolent of Vygotsky’s research into the genesis of higher order human cognition (see Vygotsky, 1981; Wertsch, 1985; Wertsch & Stone, 1985), that even individual memory has a social source. He makes his case by arguing that “individual memory could not function without words and ideas, instruments the individual has not himself invented but appropriated from his [sic] milieu” (Halbwachs, 1980, p.51). This is also supported by Foucault’s (1982/1994b) work on ‘technologies of the self’, which attempts to demonstrate how social practices of self-regulation are appropriated by the individual as a form of self-governance. Thus, Collingwood (1946/1994) is able to argue that history “does not depend upon memory” (p. 238), for it is memory that depends on history.

Foucault (1969/1972) has noted that traditionally the function of History has been conceived as the memorisation of the monuments of the past, which it achieved by transforming them into documents, producing one might be inclined to say, a set of culturally shared memories. However, the reverse of this could also be said to be true, as history has often turned documents into ‘monuments’, effectively ‘colonising’ public memory. Likewise, reporting on the thesis of Halbwachs, Sassoon (2003) has argued that:

collective memory is shaped by and responds to the present. The act of remembering rather than being a mechanistic resurrection of the past is hermeneutic and in order to negotiate a consensus of what is collectively remembered, memory itself must be malleable. (p. 43)
In practice, it has been the function of the historian to construct, preserve, recover or restore ‘collective memory’ by producing texts – or collecting and displaying artifacts within a museum exhibit – that ‘record’ and ‘fix’ particular narratives, despite what may actually be their intentions, against what might otherwise be perceived to be a ‘malleable’ past. However, as Huyssen (1995) suggests, “the past is not simply there in memory . . . it must be articulated to become memory” (p. 3). For Huyssen, there is no memory of the past that is not also an articulation of a particular conception of the past. This articulation is not simply a mimetic act in Huyssen’s view. Rather, it is the consequence of an active process, where “Memory is recherché rather than recuperation” (Huyssen, 1995, p. 3).

Underscoring the ‘active process’ that is behind the act of memorisation and remembrance, Todorov (2001) has argued that “memory itself is necessarily a selection” (p. 12). Work in the field of neuro-psychology suggests that memory is not simply a record of events that one has experienced, stored on a special film in the dark room of the mind or brain, waiting to be brought out for a special screening, as was suggested by seductive mappings of the processes of memory onto the information processing model. Recent studies indicate that memory “is not one process nor one experience, but many” (Kavanagh, 2000, p. 23); and that the process of ‘remembering’ is a much more active and complex process than we might at first think, in which what is ‘re-membered’ is often as much constructed as recalled. This is particularly true in the case of what neuro-psychologists refer to as ‘episodic memory’ – “our ability to remember events, places, connections, information and people within the terms of our lives” (Kavanagh, 2000, p. 13) – which gains its narrative qualities only by being regularly ‘rehearsed’. As Engel (1999) has argued, “the more one has communicated a given memory, the more it becomes a story” (p. 147). The work that has been conducted in the area of ‘false memory syndrome’ also supports this view of memory...
(Loftus & Ketcham, 1996). There is documented evidence that situations in which expectations on the part of the therapist (and the client), combined with ‘leading questions’ that invite movement towards particular kinds of narrative conclusions, can produce effects in the consciousness of the client that imitate the subjective form of memories, even though the events being remembered may never have taken place (Loftus & Ketcham, 1996). Engel’s (1999) warning that “the accuracy of a memory does not correspond to the vividness of a memory” is therefore quite instructive (p. 15).

This production or colonisation of memory is not restricted to individual memory, but also happens on the collective level. Thus, it should not be surprising to find Todorov (2001) arguing that “memory is in no way the opposite of forgetting” (p. 12). Given what we now know about memory, it cannot simply be a process of ‘storing’ recordings of events for retrieval when requested. Nor can it be a passive process like ‘forgetting’ appears to be.\footnote{See Forty & Küchler’s (1999) discussion of Alexander Luria’s work with a mnemonist for an argument that suggests forgetting is a more active process than we might at first be inclined to think.}

The act of remembering is an activity akin to writing a history. In both cases, threads and traces are drawn together to make a coherent narrative. Following this line of argument, memorisation is the process of generating simulacra (Wyschogrod, 1998), that attempt to simulate the once was, while being doomed to partiality, distortion and generalisation.

Nora (1995) has asserted that history must remain suspicious of memory, its mission being to suppress or destroy it. What Nora seems to be implying by making such an assertion, is that the rigor of producing a history makes it an altogether different process than simply memorising or remembering something that has occurred. The suggestion also appears to be in alignment with Thomson’s (1990) assertion that “memory is a battlefield” (p. 73) upon which we fight within ourselves and with others “to make a particular memory of our
experiences, and to repress alternative memories”, and likewise, “engage in a public struggle between different versions of the past” (p. 73). Taken in this way, history becomes a process of sorting, filtering, copying, rejecting, selecting, constructing, reworking, and ultimately sanctioning memories, whether our own or those of our broader communities and nations. However, history is surely not simply the production and consumption of memories, nor a set of “simple representations of what once was, but . . . [a] practically oriented attempt to reshape our effective collective understanding of the past” (Norman, 2001, p. 128). Historical narratives, according to McLaren (1995c), “help us remember but also help us forget. They help shape our social reality as much by what they exclude as what they include” (p. 236). ‘History’ in this sense becomes at once an important act of remembrance, while it simultaneously works to erase conflicting alternative perceptions of ‘the past’ from public memory. Thus, inclusion and exclusion are part of the same process of memorisation, and are not only evident in the cognitive functioning of an individual, but in the production of historical narratives, and in the construction of historical exhibits.

The attempt to engage in ‘remembrance’ of the past at a public level – to ‘escape from amnesia’ (Urry, 1994) – is nowhere as obvious as it is in the ‘subjectifying technology’ of the museum (Hooper-Greenhill, 1992). When a museum exhibit is constructed, artifacts are collected and arranged according to the concerns of the curator, and one might add, a range of cultural assumptions (Karp & Lavine, 1991), and a cultural perception of time and history (Diane Drake Wilson, 2000). The illusion conjured by the nineteenth-century museum curator that objects could speak for themselves has given way to a new regime in which objects are ‘given meaning’ by being arranged according to “historical associations” (Davison, 2003). After Foucault, we can no longer see as innocent any practice of arranging objects in the museum (Hooper-Greenhill, 1992). The displays of objects in ‘historical
associations’ in a modern exhibit is no less a product of a ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault, 1980b) than the display of artefacts in isolated display cases, organised according to the authority of ‘scientific’ taxonomies, in the nineteenth century museum (Davison, 2003). As studies of the changing form of museums over the past two centuries demonstrate (Bennett, 1995; Hooper-Greenhill, 1992; Walsh, 1992), there is nothing ‘natural’ about either of these arrangements. Those objects that make it into an exhibit, and those that are left out, as well as their placement in relation to one another, and in what sequence, constitute an attempt to tell a particular story, and thus to shape or ‘colonise’ collective memory. This charge could also be laid at ‘the archive’ or library, which has effects on collective memory by tightly controlling ‘archival memory’ – what documents are included and excluded from the available collections (Sassoon, 2003).

Identifying the strategic processes at work in the formation of museum exhibits and library collections is not to suggest that they can be avoided. As Bennett (1995) remarks, “the artefact, once placed in a museum” (p. 146), or we might add, added to the collection of a library, “itself becomes, inherently and irretrievably, a rhetorical object” (p. 146); and the goal of the ‘rhetoric object’ is to mediate the viewer’s relationship with ‘the past’; to legitimise through its cultural authority – and the force of the presence of its selected artefacts – a particular view of history (S. Macdonald, 1996). The museum is thus engaged, as much as the written historical narrative, and the archive from which documents are drawn, in the production of a specific knowledge of the past, that attempts to discipline and constitute the ‘public memory’ of its interlocutors (Hooper-Greenhill, 1992). Just as the historical narrative has been recognised as an ideological text (Barthes, 1967/1997), the
That history in its various forms is used to reshape our collective understanding of ‘the past’ is evident in the way that school History was conceptualised in France for example, as “the means by which children were constituted as heirs and carriers of a common collective memory that made them not only citizens, but family” (A-L. Shapiro, 1997, p. 111). This process of producing a collective consciousness of ‘the past’ is often achieved at the expense of heterogeneity. It typically sanctions particular accounts while de-legitimating others. It ‘invents’ nations through its construction of a shared national narrative (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1994). The danger of this process of legitimation and de-legitimation, of producing a single uniform historical narrative, has been demonstrated numerous times during the twentieth century when totalitarian governments acted to deliberately blot out certain memories from the national consciousness (Todorov, 2001), effectively denying to specific people or particular groups a place in history. In such cases, school History becomes a vehicle for “the official story a nation or culture tells itself” (Pinar, 2004, p. 38). The result is often a pedagogy of indoctrination, whose only antidote, according to Nash, Crabtree and Dunn (1998), is to encourage the “analysis and interpretation of the past based on rigorous weighing and judging of evidence from a variety of original sources” (pp. 33-34). This is of course a useful strategy against universal history, assuming that a variety of sources are available to historians, and their alternative accounts accessible to the wider society. In the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century

54 For a local example of a debate over the ‘story’ a museum exhibit tells, see Stuart Macintyre and Anna Clark (2003). The chapter on “Working through the museum’s labels” documents current debates over the representation of Australian history in exhibits at the National Museum of Australia. Likewise, the more theoretical work of Tony Bennett (1995) details some of the politics of national museums with some reference to the local (Australian) scene.
in which history was tightly controlled, however, this assumes a luxury that was simply not available.

On the pedagogy of interjection: Counter-memory as critical history

Given the potentially political nature of the History curriculum, particularly when viewed as a venue for the production and circulation of public memory, radical educators have frequently advocated ‘history’ as a site for ‘critical’ approaches to pedagogy. Interestingly, the curriculum shift represented by the 1992 Syllabus, involving what might be called a ‘pedagogy of interjection’, or the incorporation into the curriculum of marginal standpoints from which to view the past, also coincided with an attempt among curriculum theorists in the United States (most significantly, Henry Giroux and Peter McLaren), and in Canada (most notably, Roger Simon), to develop a ‘critical pedagogy’. Although I make no claim for a connection between these movements, the History curriculum that emerged during the early 1990s paralleled the emergence of critical pedagogy in the United States, and was reflective of the wider social and intellectual trends that resulted in the simultaneous emergence in Australia of a ‘New English’ (Green, 1995). Thus, a way of understanding the changes wrought by the 1992 Syllabus is to conceptualise it as opening the space for a ‘critical’ approach to History education.

‘Critical pedagogy’ is often described as a reaction against the techno-rational form of curriculum theorising that aims at cultural transmission and reproduction (Martusewicz, 2001, pp. 4-6). Although there is no single form of ‘critical pedagogy’, its multiple versions have been argued to grow out of “a common set of issues and conditions” (Leistyna & Woodrum, 1996, p. 3), centring on “the political nature of public schooling” (Giroux, 1988,
According to Sullivan (1987), “a fundamental assumption of a critical pedagogy is that it is a broad educational venture which self-consciously challenges and seeks to transform the dominant values of our culture” (p. 63). In one of his earliest works on ‘critical pedagogy’, Giroux (1983) challenged teachers and teacher educators “to reach into our own histories and attempt to understand how issues of class, culture, gender, and race have left their imprint upon how we think and act” (p. 241). In the same work, Giroux (1983) projected as “an essential aspect of radical pedagogy . . . the need for students to critically interrogate their inner histories and experiences” (p. 150). McLaren (1998), a close collaborator of Giroux, has argued that an enduring feature of ‘critical pedagogy’ is the move to situate ‘human life’ in its “historicality-sociality” (p. 172). This position is supported by Darder, Baltodano, and Torres (2003), who assert that ‘critical pedagogy’ recognises “that all knowledge is created within a historical context” (p. 12), and that viewing knowledge as the product of a particular historical moment places emphasis on the “discontinuities, conflicts, differences, and tensions in history” (p. 12). Thus, it should not surprise the reader to find Giroux (2000a) advocating a ‘pedagogy of public memory’ that “rejects the notion of knowledge as merely an inheritance with transmission as its only form of practice” (p. 36).

The proposal to use ‘history’ as a tool of ‘public’ or ‘counter-memory’ forms something of a recurring theme in ‘critical pedagogy’. “Skilled in the language of public memory” (p. 36), the radical educator is admonished by Giroux (2000a) “to develop a critical watch over

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55 Given the scope and focus of this study, I focus on that form of critical pedagogy that has consistently advocated a ‘pedagogy of counter-memory’. I do so knowing that as a historical phenomenon, it has mutated and changed over the years, such that one can now find references in the literature to ‘psychoanalytic’ (Martusewicz, 1997; Todd, 1997), ‘performative’ (Gallop, 1995; Simon, 1995), and ‘border’ (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1991; Giroux, 1995) pedagogies, which may on some accounts, address issues raised in the criticisms of ‘critical’ approaches to education that I address towards the end of this section.

56 Other themes have included the need for critical literacies, cultural politics, and democratic dialogue (Hoepper, 1998).
the relationship between historical events and the ways in which those events are produced and recalled through the narratives in which they unfold” (p. 36). He argues that:

public memory suggests that history be read not merely as an act of recovery but as a dilemma of uncertainty, a form of address and remembering that links the narratives of the past with the circumstances of its unfolding and how such an unfolding or retelling is connected to “the present relations of power”. (Giroux, 2000a, pp. 36-37)

In other words, a critical history pedagogy works against the hijacking of ‘collective memory’ by recognising that historical knowledge “is always the object of struggle” (Giroux, 2000a, p. 37). A pedagogy emerging from such a position sees history as the practice of ‘counter-memory’, where “counter-memory represents a critical reading of how the past informs the present and the present reads the past” (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1991, p. 124).

The practice of ‘counter memory’ is said to be derived from the work of Foucault (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1991). This is perhaps because Foucault (1971/1994) has affirmed that effective history “must record the singularity of events outside any monotonous finality” (p. 367), and as LaCapra (2000) argues, wanted “to write the history or trace the archaeology of what they [the medical, penal, psychiatric or pedagogical establishment] silenced, repressed, or excluded in constituting themselves and the institutions that house them” (p. 130). As a pedagogical practice in History classes, it may be best aligned with ‘history from below’ – “the rewriting of history through the power of [once silenced] student voice” (Giroux, 1995, p. 51) – as opposed to ‘counterfactual history’ that recounts what might have been rather than what was (see Ferguson, 1997). However, it has been suggested by Giroux (1995) that “remembrance as counter-memory opens up the past, not as nostalgia, but as the invention of stories” (pp. 53-54, my emphasis). According to Giroux
the practice of counter-memory invites students “to reclaim their identities through the production of different historical narratives” (p. 51, my emphasis). As Stuart Hall (1997) notes:

perhaps instead of thinking of identity as an already accomplished fact, which the new cultural practices then represent, we should think, instead, of identity as a ‘production’, which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation. This view problematises the very authority and authenticity to which the term, ‘cultural identity’, lays claim. (p. 110)

If we take seriously the idea that as ‘posthistorical subjects’ we are all cyborgs, hybrids, or chimeras, then ‘reclamation of identity’ would of necessity involve the recognition of ourselves as the site of intersection of a range of, oftentimes conflicting, inscriptive forces, perhaps subject to multiple interpellations in the same moment. This provides us with the possibility of writing new scripts for ourselves that open the possibility of greater freedom, given appropriate tools to do so, rather than being limited by a non-negotiable past.

‘Counter-memory’ as a practice would seem to be particularly important in school, since sociologists of school knowledge interested in curriculum reform have often argued that public schooling has a history “of regulation, imposition, and repression” (Popkewitz, Pereyra, & Franklin, 2001, p. 11). However, documenting the attitudes of more recent critics of radical revisionists, Popkewitz et al (2001a) have argued that it is naïve to believe that “minorities and the poor simply accept the efforts of the educational professions to mold them in the image dictated by the nation’s political and social elite” (p. 11). Following a similar line, Simon (2000) argues that school is better conceptualised as a sphere of ‘transactive memory’. It is Simon’s (2000) view that:

memory is not just that which contributes to knowledge of the past and/or underwrites a claim to group or communal membership . . . memory may become transactional, enacting a claim on us, providing
accounts of the past that may wound or haunt – that may interrupt one’s self-sufficiency by claiming an attentiveness to an otherness that cannot be reduced to a version of our own stories. (p. 63)

In his detailed treatment of ‘transactional memory’, Simon (2000) argues that:

if the limits of historical memory are fully constrained by notions of identity and identification, the possibilities for transactive public memory are clearly limited. For in such identity-based affiliations begins the refusal to take other people’s memories seriously, as of no concern, as having nothing to do with you, as not your responsibility, unless, perhaps, one can forge an identification between one’s own troubles and traumas and those of others. (p. 64)

In many ways the above is a description of the problems involved in the reception of, and political resistance to, the 1992 History syllabus in NSW. There are few conservative politicians and historians who would support a ‘pedagogy of transactive memory’, as Simon (2000) conceives it, that facilitates a situation in which one’s memories of the past are placed alongside potentially opposing narratives, allowing for the possibility that “one’s stories might be shifted by the stories of others” (p. 62).

Unconcerned by the inevitable resistance to his form of critical pedagogy, Simon (2000) asserts that “a transactive memory has the potential to expand that ensemble of people who count for us” (p. 63). That is, we may come to empathise with the situation of others by hearing the recounting of ‘public memories’ from their perspective. In this case, school becomes “a transactional space, not for the consolidation of national memory but for mobilizing practices of remembrance-learning” (Simon, 2000, p. 63), simultaneously connecting us with marginal narratives and problematising the mono-myths of our culture. Simon’s (2000) ‘pedagogy of transactive memory’ thus resists “the reiteration of valued stories which attempt to secure the permanence of collective affiliations and identifications in stable notions of a meaningful past” (p. 76). Instead, he argues that it “evokes a
persistent sense – not of belonging but of being in relation to, of being claimed in relation to the experience of others” (Simon, 2000, p. 63). In Simon’s ‘pedagogy of transactive memory’ is the possibility of a critical History pedagogy that is the analogue of the changes made to the NSW History curriculum in the early 1990s, that makes strange our ‘collective memories’ by making us live ‘the struggle for histories’ in our classrooms.

On the limitations of counter memory as critical history

Despite its ‘good intentions’, since the late 1980s, ‘critical pedagogy’ has sustained considerable criticism (Bowers, 1991; Hoepper, 1998; W. B. Stanley, 1992). Unlike the situation of the ‘new histories’ of the 1992 Syllabus, the most insistent critique has not come from a powerful New Right, but from fellow radicals working out of a growing field of postmodern and poststructuralist feminist scholarship (Ellsworth, 1989; Gore, 1993; Lather, 1991; C. Luke & Gore, 1992; McWilliam, 1997; Yates, 1992). Critical pedagogues, such as Giroux and McLaren, have been accused by a succession of poststructuralist feminists of using rhetoric that “give[s] the illusion of equality while leaving the authoritarian nature of the teacher/student relationship intact” (Ellsworth, 1989, p. 306). They have been accused of overstating the power of ‘rationality’ to free the subject from constraining metanarratives (Lather, 1992; Yates, 1992); of narrowly identifying power with forces of exploitation and repression (S. Shapiro, 1995); of not getting beyond the ‘missionary position’ (McWilliam, 1997). Further, it has been argued that failing to develop “a coherent and systematic engagement with theorisation of ‘gender’” has lead critical pedagogy to “an acritical reinstatement and revalorisation of history’s ‘great’ patriarchal

*57 There have of course been other critiques of ‘critical pedagogy’, coming out of the mainstream, and the old Left (W. B. Stanley, 1992). However, it is the feminist poststructuralist critique that has had the greatest effect on the field.*
metanarratives” (C. Luke & Gore, 1992, p. 25; see also Yates, 1992). Added to this, Ellsworth (1989) argues that the technical lexicon of ‘critical pedagogy’ such as “empowerment’, ‘student voice’, ‘dialogue’, and even the term ‘critical’ – are repressive myths that perpetuate relations of domination” (p. 298), since “the intrinsically asymmetrical conditions of classrooms precluded the sort of dialogue envisioned by critical pedagogy” (W. B. Stanley, 1992, p. 142), since often it is an idealised form of dialogue that is prescribed, one that often ignores the material circumstances of speakers, and unwittingly imposes its own set of particular communicative norms (Burbules, 2000). Gore (1992) has likewise questioned the notion of a pedagogy of ‘empowerment’ as it appears to privilege those doing the ‘empowering’, and thus fails to avoid the very relations of power it proposes to subvert. Further, Gore (1991) argues that “radical pedagogy discourses have tended to hold traditional [zero-sum] conceptions of power and knowledge” that overly simplify power relations and lead “to a kind of self righteousness that claims innocence, and risks the replacement of one orthodoxy with another” (p. xx), particularly through “tendencies to create grand narratives” of its own (Gore, 1993, p. 122). While these critiques of critical pedagogy are undeniably important, and shape my own approach to education, there are other reasons for being cautious about a ‘critical pedagogy of counter-memory’ as a way of teaching History.

The scholarship and climate of reform that influenced the production of the 1992 Syllabus points to the impossibility of producing a standpoint-free History/history. At the level of curriculum documentation, this realisation manifested in the 1992 Syllabus as a call to teach history from ‘various perspectives’. However, my concern from the viewpoint of history theory is that such a strategy is only ever a partial solution to the problem of ‘history’, operating exclusively at the level of ‘content’. Paralleling similar changes to the curriculum
in British Columbia, Canada, the interjection of ‘counter-narratives’ “complicate the nation-building story. . . [but] do not necessarily upset it” (Seixas, 2000, p. 22). Based on an oppositional politics, the ‘critical pedagogy of counter-memory’ or ‘border pedagogy’ as Giroux prefers to call it in his more recent writings (Giroux, 1992; 1995; 1996b), often works to valorise narratives of the past emerging from the margins, while challenging blind acceptance of “master narratives based on white, patriarchal, and class-specific versions of the world” (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1991, p. 120).

This kind of ‘pedagogy of polemics’, involves pitting one version of the past against another in the hope of the kind of personal transformation sought by Simon (1994; 2000). However, while it is likely that a ‘pedagogy of counter memory’ will support students in uncovering in whose interests various claims on the past are produced, it is equally possible that it will achieve little more than the creation of conflict between those holding opposing views. In fact, according to Ashcroft (2001) in his analysis of cultural transformation in postcolonial societies, those deploying strategies of interjection typically accept (or at least appear to accept) “the basic premises of historical narrative” but supply “a contrary narrative, which claims to offer a more immediate or ‘truer’ picture… a record of those experiences omitted from imperial history” (p. 101). The resultant ‘game of truth’ between competing narratives, particularly where perspectives may differ but there is general agreement on ‘the facts’, arguably places students in a situation in which celebration of “a democratic, multi-cultural, multi-perspectival, pluralism of historical approaches” leaves them able to adjudicate between alternative histories only on the basis of their own “political sympathies” (Fulbrook, 2002, p. 9). It is even likely that what this approach to history pedagogy does is to enshrine a cultural relativism that blunts critique rather than enhances it, making it politically incorrect to make value judgements about opposing
historical narratives, a widely held fear within the historical establishment (R. J. Evans, 1997; McCullagh, 2004; Zagorin, 1999). Further, while the idea of a ‘pedagogy of transactive public memory’ is appealing, it may be idealistic in its projected effects, for there is little in Simon’s (2000) description of the ‘pedagogy of transactive public memory’ that guarantees students will come to value the standpoints of others, or see this as a desirable aim. In both forms of critical pedagogy, there is perhaps an over confidence in the rationality of the student (W. B. Stanley, 1992; Yates, 1992). What these approaches to ‘critical history’ elide is direct attention to historical representation (as social practice and cultural artefact).

It should be noted, that the call for a critical pedagogy that attends to representational practices is not absent from the literature. Giroux has frequently called for a pedagogy that interrogates representation (Giroux, 1992; 1993; 1995; 1996a). Recognising that “pedagogy and the issue of cultural representation have become strategic forces used by the New Right and other conservative groups in mobilizing an authoritarian populist movement” (Giroux, 1994, p. 35), Giroux argues for “the pedagogical as a form of cultural politics” (p. 35), in which “the act of representing can be addressed historically and semiotically” (p. 39). Kaufmann (2000) has argued that critical pedagogy may be advanced “through a strategic postmodern interpretation of discursive formations as shifting constructions” (p. 444). Thus, the neglect of attention to historical representation (as practice and artefact), in attempts to manifest a critical History curriculum, should not be understood as a failure of critical pedagogy itself. Rather, the problem appears to be in the uptake or translation of only certain aspects of critical history pedagogy. Regardless, it would seem that additional pedagogic attention is needed to the way in which histories are produced and reproduced through the mediating effects of particular disciplinary practices, narrative forms, and
cultural tools, if ‘critical pedagogies’ are to be useful for students in navigating the ‘struggle for histories’.

**Conclusion: Beyond the struggle for histories?**

In this chapter, I explored how the NSW History curriculum responded to ‘the end of history’ as a grand story. The focal point for my discussions was the 1992 *History Years 7-10 Syllabus*, in many ways a watershed curriculum document. Radical in mandating 100 hours of Australian history, and incorporating social histories about and from the perspective of women and Australia’s Indigenous peoples, the 1992 Syllabus challenged the notion of a singular ‘history’. The civil rights and social reform context of the sixties and the equity policy context of the seventies and eighties, were both argued to have created a climate for reform. However, it was the Bicentennial of the nation that brought the ‘new Aboriginal historiography’ to public attention, serving as a catalyst for rethinking national mythologies that was argued to have encouraged the incorporation of Indigenous perspectives on the national past into the curriculum. The incorporation of a ‘revisionist’ Aboriginal history of the nation into the 1992 Syllabus, was argued to have set History curriculum on a collision course with politically conservative historians and socially conservative politicians, who were concerned about what they believed was a ‘black armband’ history being taught in schools. It was proposed that the conflict over the social meliorist changes to school History was an important factor in the publication of a more conservative syllabus in 1998.

As a way of understanding what is at stake in these struggles over History education, I documented recent scholarship that conceptualises history as a form of ‘public’ or ‘collective memory’. Navigating the problematic relationship between history and memory,
the recent scholarship underscores how national narratives are produced through processes akin to both remembering and forgetting. Understood in this way, ‘history’ was argued to be at once an important act of remembrance, while simultaneously functioning to erase conflicting alternative perceptions of ‘the past’ from ‘public memory’. Among some educators, the reconstruction of History education in 1998 as a form of ‘civics and citizenship education’ was argued to be underpinned by a political desire to control the ‘public memory’ of the nation. Thus, the changes to the NSW History curriculum in 1998 appeared to some scholars ‘reactionary’ in contrast to the pluralist approach of the 1992 Syllabus.

Exploring Giroux’s ‘critical pedagogy of counter-memory’ and Simon’s ‘pedagogy of transactive public memory’ in the United States, as analogues of the changes made to the NSW History curriculum in the early 1990s, I articulated some of the limitations of ‘counter-memory’ as ‘critical history’. Both ‘critical pedagogy’ and the 1992 Syllabus were argued to be limited by ‘a pedagogy of polemics’ that is idealistic in its assumption that pitting one version of the past against another will result in a kind of personal transformation; and in its orientation towards the rejection of dominant narratives is likely to install new hegemonies of its own. Finally, I presented a concern from the viewpoint of history theory, that a ‘critical pedagogy of counter-memory’ operates almost exclusively at the level of ‘content’, and therefore is only ever a partial solution to the problem of ‘history’. I suggested that what was ignored in this approach to ‘critical history’ was attention to historical representation as both social practice and cultural artefact; and that one way forward may be increased pedagogic attention to the way in which histories are produced and reproduced through the mediating effects of particular practices, narrative artefacts, and cultural tools.
In Chapter V, I explore the missed opportunities for ‘critical practice’ within the NSW History curriculum. Synthesising insights into the ‘nature of history’ derived from contemporary academic debate, I extend my argument that what has remained uncontested in the struggle for ‘critical histories’ during the period under study are the representational practices and forms of history. Understanding history as a representational practice and cultural artefact is argued to be central to a postmodern reconceptualisation of school History; and of great importance in any attempt to rethink History curriculum after ‘the end of history’.
In Chapter III, I explored the way in which ‘end of history’ discourse is used in contemporary theory to signify: our alleged triumphant arrival at the terminus of the grand story of modernisation (Fukuyama, 1989; 1990; 1992; 1995; 2002a); a cultural condition in which reality and its representation have apparently imploded (Baudrillard, 1992; 1995); and; a scepticism towards a historicism that projects history as a metanarrative of human progress (Derrida, 1994; Foucault, 1967/1994; 1971/1994; Lyotard, 1979; 1991), universalising the cultural mythologies of the West (Chakrabarty, 1997; R. J. C. Young, 1990). In Chapter IV, I then critically examined social meliorist changes to the NSW History curriculum, focusing upon the emergence and reception of a new syllabus in 1992 that incorporated social histories about and from the perspective of women and Australia’s Indigenous peoples, disrupting notions of a singular ‘national narrative’. This curricular response to ‘the end of history as a grand story’ was argued to have followed a climate of social reform, and been stimulated in part by the Bicentennial of the nation in 1988 that brought into sharp relief the opposing histories of a ‘Eurocentric establishment’ and a new ‘revisionist’ Aboriginal historiography. It was noted that the ‘radicalism’ of the 1992 Syllabus saw it become an important site of conflict in a series of heated and highly-public ‘history wars’ (A. Clark, 2004; S. Macintyre & A. Clark, 2003). These history wars resulted in the supplanting of the 1992 Syllabus, only six years later, by what a number of commentators referred to as a ‘reactionary’ syllabus (C. Halse & C. Harris, 2004; K.
Thompson, 1999), in part the outcome of a ‘white backlash’ against the institutionalisation of an apparent ‘black armband’ history. As a way of understanding what was at stake in these History curriculum wars, I engaged with recent scholarship that conceptualises history as a form of ‘public’ or ‘collective memory’. I then determined that the ‘critical pedagogy of counter-memory’ (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1991; Giroux, 1995; 2000a) and ‘pedagogy of transactive public memory’ (Simon, 1994; 2000) advocated by radical theorists in the United States and Canada respectively, were analogues of the critical approach to history adopted in the 1992 Syllabus. Documenting some of the limitations of ‘counter-memory’ as ‘critical history’, I concluded by expressing a concern that a ‘pedagogy of counter-memory’ is only ever a partial solution to the problem of ‘history’, operating almost exclusively at the level of competing ‘content’, leaving unchallenged the practice and forms of historical representation.

In this chapter, I explore the nature and impact of school History’s ‘null curriculum’, rethinking critical History education in relation to postmodern theory and its theorisation of history as historiography. I begin by revisiting some important concepts I developed in the chapter on critical-reconceptualist curriculum theory, and draw upon both a pedagogical (Seixas, 2000) and historiographic (Jenkins & Munslow, 2004a) heuristic for understanding approaches to History teaching, insisting that the null curriculum may be what curriculum as a ‘knowledge system’ must reject in order to maintain its claims to truth. The neglect of historiography in the NSW mandatory History curriculum is argued to not only limit the tools students have available in a critical engagement with history, but also creates the very conditions of possibility for History curriculum itself. Registering the contributions of Roland Barthes, Hayden White, David Carr, and Frank Ankersmit, to debate over the narrative nature of history, I argue that historiography is vital for any
critical approach to the study of histories, but lethal for a History curriculum that desires to maintain its claim to truth. Attempts, such as the NSW Senior History Extension Course (Board of Studies NSW, 2000), to introduce historiography as a discrete course of study in the senior school, are argued to quarantine historiography, effectively inoculating the mandatory History curriculum against ‘the problem of historical representation’. Finally, drawing upon Nietzsche’s (1874/1983) anti-historicist historiography, together with Ashcroft’s (2001) analysis of the modes of action by which postcolonial subjects resist interpellation and inscription within dominant representations of the historic past, I examine the implications of reclaiming historiography as the ‘unsayable’ in History education. Arguing that a critical approach to history demands the possibility of disengaging from historical discourse, I propose a pedagogy of interpolation as an appropriate ‘critical’ curricular response to ‘the end of history’.

**On the ‘missing paradigm’ of History education**

Earlier in this dissertation, I mapped the field of curriculum studies, and located my own work within a critical-reconceptualist trend in curriculum inquiry. While reconceptualist inquiry was argued to have begun by adopting a phenomenological/hermeneutic orientation to the study of educational experience (making sense of curriculum as ‘autobiographical text’), critical or radical curriculum theory was marked by its concern with education’s role in the reproduction of social inequality (challenging curriculum as ‘political text’). Thus, critical-reconceptualist curriculum inquiry could be understood as an approach to curriculum theorising that attempts to both understand and transform the practice of education.
A second wave of critical-reconceptualist theory, marked by a poststructural turn, shifted the emphasis in more recent years towards greater diversity in forms of curriculum inquiry (Pinar & Reynolds, 1992; Reynolds & Webber, 2004b), including the study of curriculum as knowledge systems that constitute particular rationalities via their inclusions and exclusions (Cherryholmes, 1987; Popkewitz, 1997). I argued that in order to understand how curricula construct specific ‘rationalities’, it is useful to drawn on Eisner’s (1979) much earlier tripartite model of curriculum. Eisner’s model proposed that students learn an explicit curriculum (documented in state or district policy and syllabus documents), an implicit curriculum (embodied in the school’s daily routines and practices), and a null curriculum (constituted by the knowledge and practices that are neglected or ignored). According to Cherryholmes (2002) “the explicit, implicit, and null curricular, together, express what is valued and dis-valued and determine the course of study. Theirs is an integrated dynamics” (p. 118). Poststructurally, these three curricula may be interpreted as equivalents of the said (explicit curriculum), the unsaid (implicit curriculum), and the unsayable (null curriculum).

One way of approaching postmodern critical-reconceptualist curriculum inquiry is, therefore, to study curriculum as a knowledge system that makes available, either explicitly or implicitly, particular forms of reasoning, defined and constituted in part by the neglect or denial of alternate forms of reasoning. It is my argument that historiography – as the study of historical representation – functioned as a null curriculum within ‘critical’ History education in NSW during the period under study.

According to Stimpson (1991), “null curricula arise for varying reasons” including:

- neglect because important questions of purpose and intent are not thought about and not asked.
- . . because of conservatism and a desire to

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58 This construction owes a great deal to conversations with Bill Green.
maintain the status quo . . . [or] the decision to take one direction in a
curriculum rather than another. (pp. 11-12)

The least likely aetiology of the 1992 NSW History syllabus' neglect of historiography was a
desire to maintain the status quo, given its unique mandating of Australian history, and its
subversive valorisation of counter-narratives of the nation. It is far more likely that as it had
never been a part of the NSW History curriculum before, historiography was simply not
considered a necessary part of the explicit curriculum. While there is no real evidence for
this, it may have been considered likely to arise in an ad hoc way, as part of the implicit
curriculum, emerging through the teaching of rival national narratives. However, from a
poststructuralist standpoint, there is perhaps a more significant reason why historiography
has remained absent from school curricula.

According to poststructuralist theory, ‘rationalities’ are the product of cultural-historical
knowledge systems that define themselves as much by their inclusions as by what they
exclude. For example, according to Foucault (1965/1988), ‘reason’ itself, as a construct of
the European Enlightenment, was defined by its rejection of certain forms of behaviour
that now constitute what we know as ‘madness’. For Foucault (1965/1988), ‘madness’ does
not describe some essential quality or condition of a human being. Rather, madness was
historically constituted by “the caesura that establishes the distance between reason and
non-reason; reason’s subjugation of non-reason” (p. ix).59 Whether one agrees with the
conclusions of Foucault’s Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique or not (published in an abridged
version in English titled Madness and civilization: A history of insanity in the age of reason,
Foucault, 1965/1988), Foucault (1972/1994) asserts that his understanding of how systems

59 This is reminiscent of Derrida’s (1978/1993) description of the way reason is haunted by madness, just as
madness cannot be talked about except in the language of reason. A point he makes, rather ironically, in an
attack on Foucault.
of reasoning define themselves through the dynamic of what they include and exclude, came as a result of his attempt:


to see how these problems of constitution could be resolved within a historical framework, instead of referring them back to a constituent object (madness, criminality, or whatever). (p. 118)

We can take from this argument, that concepts such as ‘madness’, ‘criminality’, ‘sexuality’, and even ‘history’ do not refer to ‘essences’, but remain floating signifiers, whose meaning changes in different socio-cultural and temporal contexts, constituted by a system of justified, institutionalised, and operationalised differentiations, that permit and enable one to act upon the actions of others (Foucault, 1982/1994a). Thus, applying Foucault’s (1982/1994a) insight to education, we could say that curriculum operates as a set of ‘justified, institutionalised, and operationalised differentiations’ of particular forms of knowledge and reasoning, and is the exercise and embodiment of a ‘relation of power’ that “puts into operation differences that are, at the same time, its conditions and its results” (p. 344).

These conditions and effects of curriculum as a ‘relation of power’ should not be understood simply as repressive, but are actually productive of particular rationalities. As Foucault (1972/1994) asserts, “the notion of repression is quite inadequate for capturing what is precisely the productive aspect of power” (p. 120). According to his analyses:


what makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no; it also traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network that runs through the whole social body, much more than a negative instance whose function is repression. (Foucault, 1972/1994, p. 120)

Thus, the function of a curriculum that justifies its differentiations of knowledge on the basis of precedent or purpose, institutionalises these differentiations via apparatuses such
as policy and syllabus documents, and operationalises these differentiations through particular forms of pedagogy or state-wide examinations, is the production of particular ‘rationalities’ rather than others. When curriculum is understood in this way, the null curriculum becomes that which cannot be said, without challenging the ‘rationality’ of the system.

As a result of differentiating history from historiography – an enduring legacy of the Nineteenth Century – History curriculum treats the representational practices and forms of history as objective, rational, natural, universal, unchanging, and unproblematic, since historiography as a meta-theoretical discourse, is that ‘system of reasoning’ that extends the gaze of the historian to everything, even themselves, revealing the historical specificity of all forms of historical knowledge and practice. To maintain history’s claim to truth, historiography (as meta-theory) must remain the ‘unsayable’. For if historiography as meta-theory is made explicit, if it enters into historical discourse, then history is profoundly ‘interrupted’. The result of this interruption is to render history’s truths ‘relative’, to time, place, culture, method, methodology, autobiography of the historian, etc. Of course, this often scares historians who are reluctant to surrender realist epistemologies (R. J. Evans, 1997; Windschuttle, 1996). Without a meta-disciplinary historiography, realism becomes a default logic, that encourages focus on the success or otherwise of historical interpretations according to the methodological standards of the discipline. Any critique of a particular ‘history’ thus remains ‘interior’ to the disciplinary discourse. However, frequently it is challenges from ‘exterior’ discourses that open the possibility for a more profound form of criticism. For these reasons, it is my argument that the lack of historiography in the

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60 The impact of literary theory on the humanities is a case in point.
curriculum limits the possibilities for a critical History. This can be demonstrated by examining Seixas’ (2000) conceptualisation of three approaches to History teaching.

According to Seixas’ (2000) model, teachers may decide to present a single story as the best history we have available, perhaps because, as he notes elsewhere, this is the way they encounter history from historians (Seixas, 1999). He describes the approach of teaching ‘the best story’ as “enhancing collective memory” (Seixas, 2000, p. 20). In the historiographic work of Jenkins and Munslow (2004a), this approach to teaching history would seem to correspond with a “reconstructionist” epistemology (p. 7), held by those few historians who still claim “to fair-mindedly discover the ‘truthful interpretation’ in the documents and write it up in an essentially unproblematic representation” (Munslow, 2003, p. 5, my emphasis). We can see from Chapter IV, that many conservative politicians would have all schools adopt this approach to teaching history, given it provides them with a sense of control over ‘public memory’. The 2006 Australia Day speech of Australia’s conservative Prime Minister John Howard, in which he called for a return to teaching history as a “structured narrative” informed by “the central currents of our nation’s development” (Howard, 2006, p. 4), is unreserved in its support for a ‘reconstructionist pedagogy’ of ‘collective memory’. At its best, as Seixas (2000) suggests, it promises the possibility of group “identity, cohesion and social purpose” (p. 22), or in the themes of Howard’s (2006) Australia Day tome, “social cohesion” and “national unity” (p. 4). At its worst, this approach is likely to manifest in a doctrinaire, nostalgic, nation-centric ‘names and dates’ pedagogy that has the potential to limit the development of more differentiated and sophisticated forms of ‘historical consciousness’ (see the discussion of Rusen’s account of the ontogenesis of historical consciousness in Peter Lee, 2004).
An alternative approach identified by Seixas (2000), and one that parallels in some ways the advice of the 1992 Syllabus, involves presenting conflicting interpretations of the past to students, with a view to “reach[ing] conclusions about which is the better interpretation on the basis of [studying] a series of documents, historians’ assessments, and other materials” (p. 20). In Jenkins and Munslow’s (2004a) heuristic, this approach would seem to be underpinned by a “constructionist” epistemology, held by historians who engage in “the study of the actions of people in groups” (p. 10), using “varying levels of social theory . . . to [form] more or less complex forms of explanatory conceptualisation” (p. 11). Constructionist historians use “concepts and theories such as race, class, gender, imperialism, nationalism” to make sense of ‘the past’ (Jenkins & Munslow, 2004a, p. 11).

According to Jenkins and Munslow (2004a):

> unlike reconstructionists, constructionists accept that getting at the story is not simply assured by a detailed knowledge of the sources. However, for constructionists, knowing the truth of the past is still feasible in principle precisely because history is constructed through using the tools of sophisticated conceptualisation and social theory. (p. 11, original emphasis).

Given the constructionist’s confidence in developing relatively reliable histories from the evidence, this approach is likely to engage students in learning “disciplinary criteria for what makes good history” (Seixas, 2000, p. 20), assuming that one is seeking to determine which interpretation among alternatives is the ‘best interpretation’. Although the 1992 Syllabus encouraged teachers to engage students in ‘historical inquiry’, and to look at the past from ‘multiple perspectives’ (underpinned by at least some understanding of social theory), the use of loaded words such as ‘invasion’ in place of the traditional, and perhaps equally loaded, ‘settlement’, to describe British colonisation of Australia, showed a commitment to a ‘constructionist pedagogy’. Arguably, it also demonstrated the intrusion of a pedagogy of ‘collective memory’; albeit, one that operates as a pedagogy of ‘counter-
memory’ that has the potential to replace one master-narrative with another, even if that new master-narrative originated ‘from the margins’. Of course, the 1992 Syllabus does not preclude using ‘different perspectives’ to push ‘disciplined inquiry’, but nor does it mandate such an approach. 61

Importantly, engaging in ‘disciplinary inquiry’ is not the equivalent of learning a metadisciplinary historiography, a point that Seixas (2000) acknowledges implicitly by his description of a third pedagogical strategy for teaching history that he depicts as a ‘postmodern’ approach. According to Seixas (2000), this third approach is identified by its resistance towards any attempt to adjudicate between histories in terms of which story is the ‘best interpretation’, and aims instead to assist students “to understand how different groups organize the past into histories” (pp. 20-21), an approach that is distinctly historiographic in orientation. This approach would seem to be based on what Jenkins and Munslow (2004a) describe as a “deconstructionist” epistemology (p. 12). According to Jenkins and Munslow (2004a), deconstructionist historians:

- critique correspondence and coherence theories of knowledge (referentiality); the notion of inference and the truthful statement (explanation to the best fit); the clear distinction between fact and fiction; the subject-object division (objectivity); representationalism (accurate representation), and the idea that the appropriate use of social theory (concept and argument) can generate truthful statements. (p. 12)

Committed to an anti-representationalist (not anti-realist) position, deconstructionist historians often “explore the consequences of reversing the priority of content over form . . . experimenting with [new forms of] representation” (Jenkins & Munslow, 2004a, p. 13).

61 Note, I must reiterate that my interest is in History curriculum’s official response to the idea of ‘the end of history’. I make no claim about how individual teachers might have interpreted the instructions of a particular syllabus, or how they might have subsequently implemented any syllabus. We know from important research conducted in North America, that a number of things can impact on how a teacher teaches History, including their subject-matter knowledge (Wineburg & Wilson, 1991), conceptions of history (Evans, 1994; Wineburg & Wilson, 2000), epistemological stance (Wineburg, 1991), and even their willingness or otherwise to “challenge both students' and the community’s beliefs” (Romanowski, 1996, p. 302).
Understanding history as a representational practice invites recognition that different groups, and indeed different historians, have organised their histories differently, underscoring Wineburg’s (2001) assertion that historical thinking is an “unnatural act” (p. 3). If we accept that history is in fact a thoroughly ‘cultural-historical act’, then systematic induction into the variety of methodologies, forms and theories underpinning historical representation becomes even more pressing.

Without historiography, efforts to develop a critical History are inevitably limited to the questioning of particular interpretations, stopping short of questioning history as a disciplined form of knowing. However, while it is essential for the tenability of history to leave historiography as the ‘unsayable’, a curriculum that neglects historiography can only be sustained by ignoring or rejecting the postmodern induced crisis of historical representation. It can only be sustained by allowing history to remain ‘outside’ of history. Once history is understood to be the artefact of a social/temporal situation, then the possibilities of resisting historical discourse become available. Thus, reclaiming historiography as ‘the unsayable’ of historical discourse becomes a strategy for opening new curricular possibilities. In the section that follows, I explore important contributions to the postmodern debate over the nature of historical representation, in order to begin the process of reclaiming historiography (as a meta-theoretical discourse) for the curriculum.

**Theorising history as historiography**

Historiography, like ‘history’, is a word with many meanings and associations. Sometimes it is used to refer to the study of the theories, methods and principles of historical research, the results of which are typically presented in the form of an historical narrative or typology.
that highlights changes and continuities in historical practice (see for example, Iggers, 1997; Warren, 1999; Norman J. Wilson, 2005). It may even be used to define that category of texts that provide advice on research methods for aspiring historians (Black & MacRaild, 2000; Howell & Prevenier, 2001; McDowell, 2002). More importantly, it refers to literature that comments on methodological issues related to the practice of history as a discipline (Curthoys & Docker, 2006; LaCapra, 1985; 2000). It has also been used to refer to texts that explore (see for example, Burke, 2004; and Hunt, 1989, on 'cultural history'; MacRaild & Taylor, 2004, on 'social history'; or Perry, 2002, on 'Marxist history'), or argue for a specific approach to historical research (see Jenkins, 1991; 1999; 2003; Munslow, 2003; Southgate, 2003, on 'postmodern history'). Historiography has also been used as a term for studies that examine the writings of particular historians or philosophers of history, as they relate to each other, a particular methodology, or a specific period (Althusser, 1977; Jenkins, 1995; LaCapra, 2000; Mandelbaum, 1938/1967; H. White, 1973), or that debates the reliability of the work of a particular group of historians (take for example, the debate over Aboriginal history between Attwood, 2005; Manne, 2003; Ryan, 2001; and Windschuttle, 2002). Likewise, it may be used to refer to literature that attempts to describe or define the nature of historical research more generally (E. H. Carr, 1990; Collingwood, 1946/1994; Gaddis, 2002; Jenkins & Munslow, 2004b; Marwick, 2001). At other times, it has been used to refer to a discrete body of historical literature that focuses upon a particular topic – often using a common methodological approach – as in the use of a label like ‘the new Aboriginal historiography’ (see Chapter IV). Further, it may be used to refer to existing findings and interpretations on a particular topic, answering the question about what we know at this point about a particular person, period, event, idea, culture, etc. Finally, it may refer to the actual practice of writing histories, based on available methodologies.
What these different meanings have in common is a focus on historiography as a metatheoretical discourse that explores the changing forms and methods of historical representation. Importantly, since the late 1960s, a body of work has developed that collapses the distinction between history and historiography. In what follows, drawing upon the insights of postmodern theory and its critique of historical representation, I theorise history as historiography, as a prelude to exploring possibilities for an appropriate ‘critical’ curricular response to ‘the end of history’.

Representation and the ‘reality effect’

It has been argued at various points throughout this dissertation, that one of the central problems that postmodernism presents to history as both discipline and discourse, is the problem of representation. Whether it is Rorty (1979) arguing that our representations can be said to constitute our ‘reality’ rather than mirror it, Baudrillard (1995) arguing that reality and representation have imploded, Derrida (1976) arguing that there is nothing outside text, or R. J. C. Young (1990) arguing that what we think of as histories are actually ‘white mythologies’, we are confronted with the problem of representation. Willie Thompson (2004) has argued that “the concept of representation is at the heart of all postmodern thinking” (p. 41), given that, from the perspective of postmodernism, our representations of the world constitute reality as we know it, and that, consequently, reality is never known outside of our systems of representation. As I noted in Chapter I, this does not mean that representations actually create the material world. But it does mean that our representations of reality predispose us to view and engage with the world in certain ways, leaving us in a state where “we can believe in reality but not know the true nature of things-in-themselves” (Munslow, 2003, p. 59). Thus, manifesting a “profound distrust of the idea that referential
language works through mirroring or mapping reality” (Potter, 1996b, p. 68), postmodern theory inverts our common-sense perspective that signs reflect things in the world and replaces it with the view that our understanding of things in the world is constituted by the semiotic systems we have inherited and appropriated.

In his essay, *The discourse of history*, Barthes (1967/1997) made his now famous pronouncement, that “historical discourse is in its essence a form of ideological elaboration” (p. 121). Being a semiologist, and moving through both structuralist and poststructuralist phases of textual criticism (Trifonas, 2001), Barthes was, in a sense, arguing that ‘history’ is historiography, a process of writing in which traces of the past are worked into a narrative form of representation. Barthes’ scepticism about the truth-value of historical discourse did not come from the identification of ‘biased content’ in a particular narrative; the weighing up of one historical account (or narrative) against another; or the testing of a narrative against the evidence. For Barthes, the recognition of the ‘ideological nature’ of historical discourse emerged from an examination of the way in which historical narratives are structured. According to Kansteiner (1993), Barthes argues that “the illusion of a direct link between past reality and its historiographic representation . . . is primarily based on the absence of any signs of the author in the text” (p. 275). Barthes’ theory appears to have been that the:

impersonal style diverts attention from the limits of the specific textual perspective and produces the paradox that the historical fact which exists only as discourse is treated as a phenomenon of the nondiscursive domain of the real. (Kansteiner, 1993, p. 275)

The result is that the reader of an historical narrative is given the sense that what they are reading is fact rather than fiction.
Barthes’ claim was made amidst a series of debates that were occurring in the French academy over the relationship between histoire and discourse (the analogue, translation problems acknowledged, of English-speaking debates over the relationship between of history and narrative). His comments, to some extent, rested on arguments put forward by Morton White (1965) and Arthur Danto (1965) “that the typical mode of explanation employed by historians was narrative” (G. Roberts, 2001, p. 2). Barthes’ argument prefigured much that has since been articulated by scholars such as Hayden White (1973) at the level of rhetoric, and Frank Ankersmit (2001b) at the level of the statement. Barthes’ contribution to theory, that history was foremost a literary genre, paralleled other positions at the time. However, a number of those complementary constructions of history as story were derived, according to Ricoeur (1983), “more from a psychology of reception than from a logic of configuration” (p. 151), from research into reader expectation rather than from an analysis of textual form. The narrativist conception of history was also ‘advanced’ in the work of Louis Mink (Ricoeur, 1983). Mink (1978/2001) argued that historical narrative was best understood as “an artifice, the product of individual imagination”, that acted as a “cognitive instrument” whose function it was “not just to relate a succession of events but to body forth an ensemble of interrelationships of many different kinds as a single whole” (p. 218). Mink’s vision of the events of the past being woven into a narrative whole was later seconded by Ricoeur (2000), who described historical narrative as a “synthesis of heterogeneous elements” (p. 297). Hans Kellner’s (1989b) assertion that “the straightness of any story is a rhetoric invention” makes a similar point (p. x). Together, these scholars can be taken as developing a particular historio-graphic view of history, in which the ‘real events’ of the past are seen to be organised by the structuring effects of the narrative form, having no inherent structure in themselves. This view is sometimes referred to as ‘narrative impositionalism’. The suggestion is that subject to the ‘gaze’ and writing
practices of the historian, the events of the past are transformed into, or reconceptualised as, an historical narrative. Alternatively, we could say that subject to the selective, ordering, re-contextualising strategies of the historian, the past becomes an object that we can ‘re-cognize’ as a history. Although many scholars have contributed to the narrative conception of history, and hence to this theorisation of history as historiography, one theorist stands out in terms of the audacity of his claims, and the impact of his ideas.

Narrative, rhetoric, and the historical imagination

The ideas of Hayden White have had a mixed reception among historians (for a detailed discussion of responses to White see, Ankersmit, 1998; and Vann, 1998). Like Barthes, Hayden White has been accused of seeing “historical narrative as intrinsically no different than fictional narrative, except in its pretense to objectivity and referentiality” (Spiegel, 1987, p. 139). Sometimes Hayden White has been quite explicit about this, though he denies that he is saying that the past didn’t really exist, or certain events didn’t really happen (H. White, 1978a). Sometimes characterised as an “unrepentant structuralist” (Ankersmit, 1998, p. 185), and at other times as a leading-edge postmodernist (Jenkins, 1995), Hayden White’s (1978c) main argument seems to be that historical narratives are artefacts of an interpretive act constituted in part by an historian’s aesthetic, epistemological and ethical commitments, and in part by the underlying tropic forms of language itself. Exploring the literary structure of the historical text, Hayden White (1973) has advanced a sophisticated ‘tropology’ or poetic theory of historical discourse, which has proven important in the philosophy of history, and has recently been championed by Jenkins (1995; 1999) and Munslow (1997), among others, as an important contribution to a

62 See Bernstein (1999) for a discussion of the ‘gaze’ as that which allows the acquirer “to look at (recognise) and regard, and evaluate (realise) the phenomena of legitimate concern” (pp. 171-172).
postmodern approach to history. According to Hans Kellner (1980), Hayden White’s work “represents an aggressive move to turn historical thought from a logical to a rhetorical form, and a defensive entrenchment against any counter-movement from rhetoric to logic” (p. 28), again suggesting the necessity of refiguring history as historiography in the process.

According to Hayden White (1973), when historians begin the process of writing a history, they are predisposed to organize their insights in one of four modes, derived from and limited in choice by what he believes to be the tropic ‘deep structure’ of our language. In true Structuralist or ‘Formalist’ fashion (see White's comments in Domanska, 1998, p. 19 & p. 27), Hayden White (1975) believes these tropes to be the deep structure of the ‘figurative’ or what Chartier (1997) has called “the historical imagination” (p. 29). Hayden White’s scheme appears to synthesize and extend earlier schema developed by Vico (H. White, 1978d), and Mannheim and Pepper (Ricoeur, 1983), among others. Hayden White put forward the theory that the four tropes of metaphor (representation), metonymy (reduction), synecdoche (integration), and irony (negation), prefigure the production of any historical narrative, and when combined with particular modes of argument (ideographic, organicist, mechanistic, contextualist), emplotment strategies (romance, comedy, tragedy, satire), and ideological commitments (anarchist, conservative, radical, liberal), constitute “the historiographical ‘style’ of a particular historian or philosopher of history” (H. White, 1973, p. x). Further, he argues that “most historical sequences can be emplotted in a number of different ways, so as to provide different interpretations of those events and to endow them with different meanings” (H. White, 1978b, p. 85). I think it can be safely said that this is usually considered Hayden White’s most controversial claim. His point is not that particular events didn’t happen, as we might see argued in the revisionist narratives of anti-Semitic holocaust-denying historians (see the discussion of Irving in R. J. Evans, 1997,
Rather, Hayden White (1975) argues that there is no inherent meaning in an event, and that it is meaningful to us only after we give the event significance through our narrativisation of it, a position that Richard J. Evans (1997) feels leaves “no objective criteria by which fascist or racist views of history can be falsified” (p. 239). However, the work of Ankersmit (2001a) refutes such a claim, a point I will return to later in this chapter.

Hayden White evidently holds “a distrust of narrativity itself which emerges from its potentiality as a repressive force, a potentiality which was increased when the emerging discipline of history rejected rhetoric and presented itself as a ‘scientific discipline’ in the nineteenth century” (Ashcroft, 2001, p. 89). Therefore, it should not be surprising to find that Hayden White makes no claims for the ontological reality to which historical narratives refer. The historic past comes to us, in Hayden White’s view, always ‘mediated’ by textual forms (Roth, 1995a, p. 143). Despite Hayden White’s rejection of history as anything other than a literary artefact, there is an emancipatory agenda underlying his tropological scheme. Hayden White developed the scheme with the idea that it would provide historians with a way “beyond irony” (Roth, 1995a, p. 145), and beyond “narrative enclosure” (Jenkins, 1995, p. 144), giving them the opportunity to consciously elect to deploy a particular trope, emplotment strategy, etc. to render the past meaningful in a variety of ways. Interestingly, this type of ‘freedom’ to select different ways of writing about the past surely involves the adoption of an ironic approach to history/historiography, making it questionable whether one is really then as free as Hayden White supposes. The very fact that he identifies ‘irony’ as the mode in which he figures his own ‘meta-historical’ work (H. White, 1973), is symptomatic of this problem. Given that Hayden White (1973) also assigns dominant tropes to particular periods of historical scholarship – apparently after a particular
interpretation of Foucault’s notion of the *episteme* (Munslow, 1997) – the scheme sometimes becomes quite complex, and has not been without its critics.

Chartier (1997) has indicated an uneasiness about Hayden White’s commitment to a semiological approach to the study of history texts that ignores questions about the text’s “reliability as witness” (p. 38) to specific events, although the event must be given some ontological status if it can be emplotted in a number of different ways. Despite this, Lorenz (1998) has challenged Hayden White on the basis that his theory of history does not allow historical narratives to appeal to ‘the evidence’ in order to verify their truth claims, thus conflating history and fiction, projecting them “as two exemplars of the same species” (p. 329). However, there is a clear difference in the process of producing (and for that matter ‘reading’) an historical account and a fictional novel, despite the universal presence of similar tropic structures, and adopting an aesthetic orientation towards history does not preclude such a recognition. Indeed, according to Golob (1980), “Collingwood showed with great precision how evidence limited the formation of historical narrative and how it disciplined imagination” (p. 59). Thus, it should not be surprising to learn that the later Hayden White “allows that the data may resist representation in a given form and therefore require a different tropological structure” (Kansteiner, 1993, p. 279).

Other critics of Hayden White’s ‘narrative impositionalist’ theory have raised questions about whether the tropes are linguistic structures or whether they are better understood as modes of consciousness, attitudes, moods, or directions of imagination (Nelson, 1980). Vann (1998) has expressed concern over the efficacy of the tropological theory, given that Hayden White (1973) selected both historians and philosophers of history to test his thesis regarding the pre-configurational effects of the tropes, in his important work, *Metahistory.*
Given the potential for cultural bias in schema such as Hayden White’s, one also wonders whether it is necessary to go as far as White in defining the tropes as ‘deep structures’ of ‘historical consciousness’, given his own investigations were limited to Nineteenth-Century European historians and philosophers of history. Surely, the usefulness of his scheme would not be disturbed by supposing the tropes as recurring strategies of a “literary subculture” (p. 38) as Pomper (1980) has suggested. It may well be the case that Hayden White could have circumvented some of the criticism of his work had he avoided “positing a general scheme, [and] a fixed sequence of phases” (Pomper, 1980, p. 38). Likewise, Hayden White’s reduction of ‘history’ to text, and neglect of history as a discipline, place him in “an extreme nominalist position” (Struever, 1980, p. 61) that focuses upon product at the expense of analysing process. Despite these caveats, Hayden White’s work remains important for the attention it draws to rhetorical, tropological, narratological, and ideological analyses of the content and form of history texts (Berkhoffer, 1995), for the liberation of history from its insensitivity to “the modalities and figures of discourse” (Chartier, 1997, p. 38), and for its central argument that “history is intrinsically historiography . . . a literary artifact” (Ricoeur, 1983, p. 162). However, while Hayden White, like Barthes, Mink and others, may argue that the past is radically heterogeneous, and only becomes ‘morally ordered’ and ‘cognitively apprehended’ as a history through its narrativisation (Holton, 1994), there have been some interesting criticisms of this view, not the least of which have come from the phenomenologist, David Carr.

The narrative structure of experience

David Carr (1986) argues that our experience of reality is an experience of ‘being in time’, complete with a past, present and future, or beginning, middle and end. He gives examples
such as hitting a ball with a baseball bat, to indicate that even an everyday action has a
narrative-like structure consisting of a beginning (eyeing the ball released from the hand of
the pitcher), middle (swinging for the ball) and end (connecting with the ball). David Carr
seems unconcerned about the completely arbitrary way in which such designations are
assigned. He appears undisturbed that we might want to place the beginning at the
commencement of the game, at the change rooms where the team is getting dressed, at the
start of the season, etc. He only mentions the ‘follow through’ of the swinging bat to be
slightly problematic for his three-fold temporal sequence. This does not stop David Carr
from arguing that the experience of the temporal dimension of being is the ground from
which narrative forms emerge. David Carr (1986) believes that “narrative structure
pervades our very experience of time and social existence”, independent of “our
contemplating the past as historians” (p. 9). Thus, he argues that the past and history do
not differ in form, only content.

David Carr poses his argument against those – like Roland Barthes and Hayden White –
who see narrative form as an imposition on an otherwise disordered past. If we take David
Carr seriously, then, Norman (1991) argues, Carr’s historian is relegated to the role of
‘stenographer’, documenting events in a pre-existing sequence that is already determinate of
the narrative that will emerge in the historian’s writing, but we don’t have to take up David
Carr’s point this way. We could, like Conle (1999; 2000; 2003), see narrative as a quest for
self-knowledge and, like A. Macintyre (1984), recognise that “it is because we all live out
narratives in our lives and because we understand our lives in terms of the narratives we
live out, that the form of narrative is appropriate for understanding the actions of others”
(p. 214). Nevertheless, this does not say that our narratives are accurate representations of
what really happened. It does not provide convincing evidence that events have a
narratively-organised existence of their own independent of their participant-narrator. The important point is that just because we live our life as the unfolding of a narrative which remains forever unfinished and subject to additions, deletions, rewrites, and revisions of all kinds, does not mean that our narrative conception of the past is not an imposition upon the past. It is my position that narrative imposition is just as problematic at the level of memory and experience, as it is at the level of the historical narrative. Explorations of episodic memory and its susceptibility to abuse (as in the case of repressed memory syndrome) provide support for this position (Loftus & Ketcham, 1996).

It is useful to consider, at this point, the arguments of the environmental historian, Cronon (2001), who asserts that historians use narratives “because narrative is the chief literary form that tries to find meaning in an overwhelmingly crowded and disordered chronological reality” (p. 411). Thus, Cronon believes history is often constructed in narrative form, not because events really unfold in a story-like fashion, but because narrative as a form does what an historian needs it to do. According to Cronon (2001), “whenever we choose a plot to order our environmental histories, we give them a unity that neither nature nor the past possesses so clearly” (p. 411). However, it is unlikely in Cronon’s view, that any experience can be explained in its entirety by a single story. Thus, we must concede that:

narrative succeeds to the extent that it hides the discontinuities, ellipses, and contradictory experiences that would undermine the intended meaning of its story. Whatever its over all purpose, it cannot avoid a covert exercise of power: it inevitably sanctions some voices while silencing others. (Cronon, 2001, p. 411)

Like Cronon, Friedman (1995) would assert that the narrative mode of knowing that is central to the production of histories, involves the selection, organization, ordering,
interpreting and allegorizing of traces of the past. It thus constructs as much as it reconstructs the past. This is an important rejoinder to David Carr’s thesis. While we might accept that the experience of being has a temporal or narrative sense to it, this does not mean that a history built by documenting a person’s experience of the past precludes it from critical analysis. On the contrary, such a history is just one story, and as Kurosawa’s (1950) haunting masterpiece Rashomon – in which four people recount their own versions of the murder of a man and the rape of his wife – demonstrates, people rarely experience any event in the same way. If we accept the ‘Rashomon effect’, then there is a profound difference between the history text and the past, between what we tell ourselves about events, and the events themselves – even though both our experience of the events and our retelling of the events as a history share a commitment to narrativisation. The conclusion one must draw then, is either that past events are effaced by ‘history’ or, as Ankersmit (2005) argues, that historical representation arises as an inevitably partial attempt to overcome the profound rupture that exists between our present and our past. What we know as the past is not what actually happened in any trans-subjective sense (H. White, 2001), but our own narrative account of what happened. Making history is not just something a professional historian does, but something that engages us all. History is both the process of narrativising the subjective experience of our lives, and the production of the historical narratives that are written to document those experiences.

Failing to acknowledge the problematic nature of the truth claims that emerge from our own memories and stories is the flaw in the phenomenologist’s argument. Experience should not be equated with truth (Ankersmit, 2005). Just because our experience of being in time is a temporal, narratively organised experience, does not mean that the history we write about it is a true depiction of ‘what happened’, nor in fact does it mean that it
compromises the truth of the past either (Norman, 2001). A narrative might be accurate to our experience, but it is a category mistake to believe that our perspective is universally shared, complete in itself, or an exact replica of the past. As Dening (1996) argues:

relics of the past come directly from the past but they are reconstituted in their meanings by all the cultural systems that give them meaning. They gain meaning out of every social moment they survive. (p. 43)

David Carr’s critique of ‘narrative impositionalism’ may help explain why narrative is important in the production of histories, but it says nothing about the truth value of what is presented as a history (Crowell, 1998). If anything, it reinforces the importance of the narrative form for the historian (D. Carr, 2001b; 2004), but does not commit us to viewing its products as any more or less credible. Whether we believe we are retelling a story that pre-exists our writing process (D. Carr, 1986), using the narrative form because it is the most “appropriate means” (D. Carr, 2004, p. 259) for telling the truth of the past, or believe we are the inevitable authors of the past we are attempting to represent (H. White, 1978a; 1978b), history is unavoidably “the texted past” (Dening, 1996, p. 42). It is precisely because history as we know it is ‘the texted past’ that History remains of value, even while its foundations have been shaken.

Encountering the limits of historiographic representation

If one particular area of history has presented a particular problem for the postmodern approach to history, then it is the area of Holocaust studies. Taking seriously the assertions of methodological postmodernism, that there can never be ‘un-mediated access’ to the world (and therefore by analogy, to the past), and that our mediating frameworks actually constitute what we come ‘to know’ (about the world/past), can we answer with any conviction, questions about the reality of the Holocaust? According to historian Deborah
postmodernists have placed themselves in a predicament that renders them silent on questions about the status of events like the Holocaust. In her book on ‘Holocaust denial’, Lipstadt (1994) aims her sights on “deconstructionism” as creating the conditions that have fostered Holocaust denial (p. 18). In the United States, deconstruction – as it is more typically labelled – is associated with the ‘Yale School’ of literary theory, founded by alleged Nazi collaborator Paul de Man and further developed by Jacques Derrida, whose reading of de Man’s work has at times bordered on the apologetic when referencing de Man’s collaborationist past (LaCapra, 2000). Lipstadt (1994) argues that ‘deconstructionism’, here standing in as a symbol for all forms of methodological postmodernism:

at its most radical . . . contended that there was no bedrock thing such as experience. Experience was mediated through one’s language. The scholars who supported this deconstructionist approach were neither deniers themselves nor sympathetic to the denier’s attitudes; most had no trouble identifying Holocaust denial as disingenuous. But because deconstructionism argued that experience was relative and nothing was fixed, it created an atmosphere of permissiveness towards questioning the meaning of historical events and made it hard for its proponents to assert that there was anything “off limits” for this skeptical approach. The legacy of this thinking was evident when students had to confront the issue. Far too many of them found it impossible to recognize Holocaust denial as a movement with no scholarly, intellectual, or rational validity. (p. 18)

Richard J. Evans (1997) agrees, arguing that:

the increase in scope and intensity of the Holocaust deniers’ activities since the mid-1970s has among other things reflected the postmodernist intellectual climate, above all in the USA, in which scholars have increasingly denied texts had any fixed meaning, and have argued instead that meaning is supplied by the reader. (pp. 240-241)

Lipstadt is famous for placing ‘the reality’ of the Holocaust ‘on trial’, when sued by British WWII historian, David Irving, after alleging in her book, Denying the Holocaust, that Irving was a ‘Holocaust denier’. Lipstadt won the case, which is detailed in Evans (2002), Guttenplan (2001), and her own recent work, History on trial.
However, one surely must agree with Guttenplan (2001), when he chides Richard J. Evans for asserting “that Holocaust denial is merely an epiphenomenon of postmodernism” (p. 290). As Guttenplan (2001) argues, Irving and alleged ‘Holocaust deniers’ like him, are rarely if ever postmodernists, though they may well have capitalised on postmodernism’s scepticism towards truth claims and, as Richard J. Evans (1997) argues, used it as a device to sanction their revisionism. But, this is a form of misappropriation, not poststructural theory; misappropriation as a form of ‘selective attention’ being the signature strategy of ‘the deniers’. More importantly, it might be possible, at least in part, to understand the rise of Right wing revisionism as a reaction to, rather than being fostered by, the cultural pluralism espoused within postmodernism (see my comments on ‘white disenfranchisement’ in Chapter IV). Methodologically, it is important to note that revisionists tend to reject poststructuralist postmodernism’s principle that texts are open to multiple interpretations, arguing instead that “every text has only one meaning or it has no meaning at all” (Faurisson cited in Guttenplan, 2001, p. 290). Hence, Holocaust denial, as a particular species of revisionism, works to put forward its own interpretation of ‘the sources’ as an exclusive reading, not as simply one possible interpretation among many.64

Traumatic events, like the Shoah or Holocaust, appear to demand and resist representation simultaneously. They work as ‘limit events’ that “test our traditional conceptual and representational categories” (Friedlander, 1997, p. 389). LaCapra (1998) rightly argues:

the traumatic event has its greatest and most clearly justifiable effect on the victim, but in different ways it also affects everyone who comes in contact with it: perpetrator, collaborator, bystander, resister, those born later. (pp. 8-9)

64 This same practice would appear to be evident in Windschuttle’s (2002) The fabrication of Aboriginal history. Windschuttle (1996) admits to being opposed to postmodern sodal theory in all its forms, but his work takes a much more ‘black and white’ view of historical evidence than is typical among professional historians, even those who share his opposition to the influence of the postmodern (Attwood, 2005; Manne, 2003).
There is, as Oliver (2001) explores in her study of ‘witnessing the Holocaust’, an ethical imperative to represent the Holocaust. Friedlander (1997) supports this view, arguing that the problem of representation is not solely aesthetic or intellectual, but also an issue of morality. However, as Oliver (2001) claims, testimony of trauma is both a “necessity and impossibility” (p. 53). It is a necessity because we must not be allowed to forget the tragedies that have occurred, particularly those like the Holocaust that have had a wide ranging impact, and raise ethical and political questions that demand answers. However, it is an impossibility, because no representation of the trauma can ever fully capture its totality, since there are inevitably “silences and . . . blindness inherent in the event” (Oliver, 2001, p. 53). Kansteiner (1997), discussing Lyotard’s contribution to the debate over representations of the Holocaust, repeats his analogy:

that compared Auschwitz to an earthquake which destroys all seismographic devices and therefore cannot be measured and represented within the applicable sign systems . . . [and leaves us with] a vague but powerful feeling of its enormity and unrepresentability. (p. 416)

Perhaps we should also add, though self-evident, that part of the limit condition imposed on historiographic representation is that the depiction of an event is never the event itself (though it may be sometimes confused with it). Thus, we may learn about the traumatic past through its representation, and we may be affected by our encounter with that representation, but we can never claim to have experienced what happened. Our experience in this case is of the historiographic representation, not the event itself. No matter how much we are moved by the testimony, we remain at best an onlooker, whose understanding of the event is always limited by the horizon of our own socio-historically constituted sense-making technologies or, to put it in poststructural terms, what Hans Kellner (1997) calls our “culturally-available models” (p. 398).
There is an additional point about the problem of representation that must be made. As Wyschogrod (1998) states:

the commonsense view of history presupposes that the historian aims to tell the truth about the past where truth is understood as a matching of event or pattern with what is said about it. Even if what is alleged about some specific detail happens to be false, the truth of a proposition is thought to depend upon its correspondence with an object or referent. (p. 2)

The problem for history and historians is that histories are never simply a series of propositions (statements of fact), each of which can be verified or falsified. According to Hayden White (1997), ‘history’, as an account of the past, may be understood as “a list of facts [that] is transformed into a story” (p. 393). Adhering to Hayden White’s philosophy of history, Jenkins (1997) argues that:

[If] “facts” are to be significant [historically], they can only gain that significance through being narrativized. This narrativization in its emplotment and troping confers on the facts a significance that a different emplotment and troping could take away. (p. 385)

Ankersmit (2001a) makes this problem clear in his example of “the Renaissance”. ‘The Renaissance’ is a category that historians apply to a series of events that could have been ordered, described, selected, defined, periodised, or segregated in some other way (Jenkins, 2003). While ‘the facts of the matter’ may include reference to Leonardo Da Vinci, Michelangelo, and a host of other ‘important’ figures and their ‘contributions’ to the intellectual and cultural life of their times, ‘the narrative’ of the Renaissance, which furnishes these people and events with ‘meaning’, arises from particular interpretations of ‘the facts’. Thus, a debate about what the Renaissance was or means, “is not a debate about the actual past but about narrative interpretations of the past” (Ankersmit, 2001b, p. 241). Ankersmit (2001b) argues that “Interpretation is not translation. The past is not a text that has to be translated into narrative historiography; it has to be interpreted” (emphasis in the
original, p. 237). Further, he asserts that “Narrative interpretations apply to the past, but do not correspond or refer to it (as statements do)” (emphasis in the original, p. 239). As “proposals”, narrative interpretations of the past “may be useful, fruitful, or not, but cannot be either true or false”, according to Ankersmit (2001b, p. 241). This is because only an individual statement can be verified as true or false (Ankersmit, 2001b).

Quite powerfully, I think, Ankersmit (2001b) also argues that “a historical narrative is a historical narrative only insofar as the (metaphorical) meaning of the historical narrative in its totality transcends the (literal) meaning of the sum of its individual statements” (p. 243). Where this is not the case, the set of statements is probably better described, as Hayden White (1973) argues, by the term “chronicle”. Ankersmit (2001a) asserts that “the ultimate challenge for both historical writing and the historian is not factual or ethical, but aesthetic” (p. 176). Viewed in this way, historical research only becomes ‘history’ as the traces of the past are given meaning within a narrative structure (a historiographic form). To quote Jenkins (1995), “most historiography is the imposition of meaningful form onto a meaningless past” (p. 137).

65 Of course, there will be some postmodernists who would reject the truth-claims of any referential statement, placing in jeopardy an important aspect of Ankersmit’s (2001a) thesis. From a Foucauldian inspired perspective, according to Seals (1998), it might be possible to posit three kinds of referential statements: the subjective, such as “I’m hungry” that only the speaker can verify; the inter-subjective, such as “the sky is blue today”, which can only be verified by people sharing the same cultural assumptions, linguistic orientations, and spatial-temporal location; and the trans-subjective, such as “a rock released from a rooftop onto the road below will definitely fall”, which is ‘true’ no matter one’s cultural-historical background or temporal location (providing there is some common language in which to communicate, or that interlocutors share an understanding of the concepts). According to this model, only statements of the trans-subjective kind can actually be consistently verified or falsified. Subjective statements are not subject to either verification or falsification in the scientific sense. Inter-subjective statements may be verified or falsified, but only within a given culture, situation, or paradigm.

66 Taking this point to its logical extreme, White would have to agree with Veyne (paraphrased in Ricoeur, 1983) that “history is only the construction and understanding of plots” (p. 174).
We might want to assert, once again, that some traumatic events such as the genocide of the Jews committed by the Nazi regime demand that we provide meaning for their existence, whether we want to or not, whether impossible or not. We do this, of course, by transforming ‘the facts’ that we can derive from ‘the traces’ left behind into the narrative of ‘the Holocaust’. Thus, ‘the Holocaust’ operates at the level of narrative representation, and not actually at the level of the statement, attempting to provide ‘meaning’ to the acts of lethal violence committed against European Jewry during WWII through the particularities of its aesthetic construction.

The problem of representation at the heart of Holocaust history is, for Ankersmit (2001a), like Hayden White (2001), ultimately a question of the ‘appropriateness’ or ‘respectfulness’ of the aesthetic form, with regard to the trauma that occurred. At the level of the narrative, the meaning of a set of statements is, from a postmodern perspective, always at least a partially open question (and ‘relative’ to the reader or writer attempting understanding and interpretation). However, while this suggests that each historian will develop a narrative that makes the set of factual statements meaningful to themselves and their communities, interpretation has its socially (and linguistically) imposed limits. According to Hayden White (2001), while a neo-Nazi revisionist might be able to represent the extermination of the Jews in some satirical form, this would never be acceptable for a serious historian, who is likely to depict the events as a tragedy. Importantly, Ankersmit (2001b) contends that while interpretations may be challenged by alternative interpretations (narratives by competing narratives), only individual statements can be (and should be) challenged by ‘the facts’. Thus, ‘Holocaust denial’ is only such, if it can be falsified at the level of the statement. This is precisely what Richard J. Evans put into play when he took the stand in the Irving libel case, annihilating Irving’s suspect narratives by demolishing the statements.
upon which they stood, showing that the claims of reference that they intended were selective, false, or inaccurately rendered (Guttenplan, 2001). Should Richard J. Evans have agreed that Irving had built his narrative interpretations upon an accurate set of the ‘available’ factual statements (regarding the extermination of the Jews of Europe by the Nazi regime), he would have had to accept that Irving’s interpretation could not be discounted as a possible rendering of the past. He could of course provide a more plausible interpretation of ‘the facts’ himself, however, this would not, of itself, lead to a verdict that Irving was a ‘Holocaust Denier’. What Richard J. Evans showed, without necessarily accepting any of Ankersmit’s premises, was that at the level of the statement, Irving’s research was found wanting. Likewise, Richard J. Evans argued that there were better interpretations of ‘the facts’ than the ones Irving provided, which in most cases, though not all, was an argument accepted by the judge in the trial (Guttenplan, 2001).

Of course, there is a step between the determination of ‘statements of fact’ and the production of an adequate or plausible narrative interpretation. That step is the determination of what will count as ‘evidence’ for the specific ‘history’ that is to be written. According to Jenkins (2003), “nothing is ever intrinsically historical” (emphasis in the original, p. 39), rather objects of enquiry can be used as evidence within “any number of [historical] discourses without belonging to any of them” (p. 39). Within the postmodernist approach to history, ‘evidence’ does not simply equate with ‘facts’. ‘Statements of fact’ become ‘evidence’ only when used to support a particular historical interpretation or explanation (Jenkins, 1991). The evidence needed to support a particular interpretation is typically only a partial collection of available ‘facts’, determined by the questions that are guiding the research being conducted. For example, it may be a verifiable fact that almost six million Jews were murdered by the Nazi Regime during WWII. However, this fact only
becomes ‘evidence’ for particular types of historical inquiry. It may be useful if we are exploring questions related to the fate of European Jewry under the Nazi Regime, or if we are exploring Nazi policies towards the Jews. However, it is unlikely to be mobilised as evidence if our question concerned the success or otherwise of German military strategy during WWII. It might still appear in the historical explanation as a statement of what was happening on the home front, however, it is unlikely to be critical to an argument that seeks to understand or explain why German strategic decisions on the Russian Front met with success or failure. Tweak the question only slightly and such a ‘fact’ becomes ‘historically significant’. Imagine if the historian had a question about whether or not German military strategy on the Russian Front was motivated by a belief that large numbers of the Russian army were Jewish. In such a case, the extermination of European Jewry inside and outside of German borders would become ‘historically significant’. The point of this example is that research questions typically pre-exist the determination of what will constitute ‘data’ or evidence (Popkewitz, 2001; Smagorinsky, 1995). While facts might stimulate the generation of particular research questions, the evidence for a particular historical interpretation is always determined by the question or problem that the historian is attempting to solve or understand. Thus, postmodernists will often talk about the evidence being constituted by the researcher’s question. When this claim is made, it is the ‘historical significance’ of ‘the facts’, and not ‘the facts’ themselves that is at stake.

67 Likewise, the epistemological assumptions underpinning the collection of data also impact on what will constitute a statement of fact, though such epistemological assumptions are usually shared by members of a particular discourse community. In other words, while social historians and cultural historians might disagree on epistemological grounds about what are appropriate approaches to the collection of data, they would generally agree with other members of their respective traditions.
Bringing historiography out of quarantine

In the preceding discussion, I explored a series of compelling arguments that history is an act of writing that transforms, rather than simply gathers, the traces of the past into a narrative text. Whether we are examining Barthes’ (1967/1997) notion of the way the impersonal style of the historical narrative encourages us to read it as fact, Hayden White’s (1973; 1999) argument for the prefigurative power of an historian’s aesthetic, epistemological and ethical commitments, operating in conjunction with the underlying tropic forms of language itself, David Carr’s (1986; 2004) case for the narrative structure of everyday experience; or Ankersmit’s (2001a) conception of the way the metaphorical meaning of an historical narrative transcends the literal meaning of the sum of its referential statements, the overall message must surely be that history is historiography.

Theorising history as historiography comes at a price, and that price is the truth-claim of the historical narrative. It is not, as Ankersmit (2001a) has argued, a complete dismissal of any claim history has to being a factual discourse. Rather, understanding history as the transformation of factual statements into a narrative form, or the imposition onto the evidence of a set of meanings that challenge the silences of the evidence, problematises the truth claims of history as an explanatory or interpretive discourse. Importantly, if we accept this reconceptualisation of history as historiography, then we are not simply trading history in for fiction. Historiography is as much process as it is product, a technology of representation as much as a narrative artefact. As Curthoys and Docker (2006) note, there is a particular quality of “doubleness” to history that prevents it from escaping either its sources or its representational forms (p. 11). Historiography assists us to work “in the space between history as rigorous scrutiny of sources and history as part of the world of
literary forms” (Curthoys & Docker, 2006, p. 11). It leads us to the realisation that “history is a method rather than a truth” (Ashcroft, 2001, p. 86). It also invites challenge to history’s methods, given their own socio-historical contingency, allowing for the possibility of escaping historical discourse altogether (Jenkins, 2003) which, I will argue in the final section of this chapter, is vital for a critical History. However, I first want to examine what the theorisation of history as historiography means for current curriculum prescriptions.

From the preceding discussion, it is difficult to see how a curriculum that is critically oriented, and that takes seriously the postmodern critique of historical representation, can ignore historiography. However, it must also be clear that the solution to school History’s null curriculum cannot simply be the insertion of a historiography course into the explicit curriculum. While I applaud the recent development and inclusion of a historiography course as an option within the History strand of the Higher School Certificate (matriculation curriculum) in NSW, I am concerned about the way that placing a course such as this at an extension level in the post-compulsory years of schooling – which makes sound ‘developmental’ sense, of course – effectively quarantines the effects of recent debates over history. For those who will be enrolled in this subject constitute a small number of our brightest history candidates, and those who teach it are but a very few committed teachers. Given its particular place in the hierarchy of history subjects, the History Extension course will only ever provide the critical tools of historiography to a small number of teachers and students, yet all teachers and students will encounter historical discourse throughout their lives, in a wide variety of forms. Such a course is likely, by virtue of its unique mandate to address historiography, to exclude most students from any debates that seek to question the truth claims made for historical representation. Thus, it reduces the likelihood of students thinking critically about their own histories and the histories they encounter in the wider world. Students will, no doubt, continue to have
the chance to develop historical explanations and interpretations by critically evaluating alternative or rival sources, encountering the cornerstone methodology of the discipline. However, divorced from historiography, this encounter with the disciplinary practices of history is likely to hide the controversy that is central to historical inquiry and representation, in much the same way that Apple’s (1975) early work demonstrated how controversies at the centre of the scientific enterprise are hidden from students in Science curriculum, because of its neglect of the history and philosophy of science. Regardless, it would seem unlikely that the claim of history to be able to represent the past will ever get anything like the scrutiny it would get, were historiography considered integral, rather than supplemental, to the study of history.

If simply incorporating historiography into the curriculum as a discrete unit is unsatisfactory within a postmodern frame of reference, then it is necessary to explore what a more effective curricular response to the problem of historical representation might be. One possible curricular response could certainly be to do away with History (as the study of the past) altogether, and replace it with Historiography (as the study of historical representations). This would radically reclaim History curriculum as a site of ‘critical’ history. However, those dedicated to curriculum as a vehicle of cultural reproduction may reject the place of such a radical form of critical history in schools. Likewise, those committed to a developmental continuum are likely to perceive a critical History curriculum based on historiography as beyond the capability of junior high school students. However, looking at the growing body of North American scholarship into the development of historical reasoning among youth (P. Lee & Ashby, 2000; P. Lee & Shemilt, 2003; Shemilt, 1980; 1987; VanSledright, 2000), I would argue that, given appropriate instruction (Greene, 1994), students are capable of far more complex forms of
historical reasoning than politicians and many educators realise. Therefore, I reject the views expressed in recent media-led debates by conservative journalists such as Luke Slattery (2005a; 2005b) and Sarah Golsby-Smith (2005), that challenge the appropriateness of the teaching of ‘postmodern theory’ and ‘critical literacy’ in Australian schools.

Typically, the journalists and educationalists involved in polemics against postmodernism in schools, present attempts to incorporate critical approaches to knowledge and postmodern theory into the curriculum as “irresponsible” and “doctrinaire” (Luke Slattery, 2005a, p. 10), and “a cause for unease” (Donnelly, 2004, p. 60). Their strategy is usually to construct postmodern theory as confusing and ideologically-loaded, while their own content-driven curricula are supported by ‘common-sense’. Their arguments against postmodern theory typically consist of tired misconceptions and inaccuracies, such as the notion that postmodernism’s assumptions include “truth is a matter of opinion . . . [and] there is no real world outside of language and hence no facts independent of our descriptions of them” (Luke Slattery, 2005a, p. 10). Given the highly significant, but subtle, difference between these claims and the actual assumptions of postmodern theory, it is unlikely that the Australian public – known for their ambivalence towards academe – will be persuaded by a defence that seems to be intellectual nit-picking. However, this renewed conservative assault against the deployment of postmodern theory in schools need not stop the project of rethinking history as historiography that I am fleshing out here. To avoid a doomed battle with the conservative critics of postmodernism whose voices currently dominate the media, and likewise, to avoid simply replacing one set of beliefs about history with another, other ways of bringing historiography out of quarantine should perhaps be sought. Certainly, if historiography is incorporated into History curriculum as an integral part of History education, then its implications are far reaching.
Reclaiming the unsayable: Interrupting History curriculum

To use historiography to understand, after Foucault (1969/1972), the conditions of existence and possibility for a given historical representation, is to extend the gaze of an historian from the traces of the past, to his or her narrativisation of the enduring ‘evidence’. In their attempt at writing a historical narrative that explains or interprets the past, historians exceed ‘the evidence’ (Ankersmit, 2001a). The resultant historical narratives form discourses that can be compelling and seductive. From a structuralist perspective, historical discourse can be said to ‘hail’ us in a variety of ways, providing the conditions of self-formation. In the Althusserian sense, we are ‘born into’ ideology, the subject positions offered by the discourse of history providing “a sense of identity and social meaning” that is reinforced “by ideological state apparatuses” that include institutions such as the church, the police, and education (Ashcroft, 2001, p. 36). Foucault’s poststructuralism, that owes a debt to Althusser’s structuralist Marxism, describes this situation as having “a body totally imprinted by history” (Foucault, 1971/1994, p. 376). That is, contra-Rousseau (and his position on ‘society’), Foucault sees discourse not as a power that corrupts the ‘natural human self’, but as a force that is productive of particular subject positions rather than others. As Grosz (1995) argues, discourses through which subjectivities are constituted, “make the body into a particular kind of body – pagan, primitive, medieval capitalist, Italian, American, Australian” (p. 172). It is the productive differentiation of subject positions within discourse that has an enabling effect on our capacity to act in particular ways, and that simultaneously acts upon us to limit our capabilities, our desires, and what we feel is possible. Importantly, Foucault (1984/1996) argues that it is not simply the institutions of the state that exercise these coercive relations, but also what individuals do to themselves, through what he describes as ‘technologies of the self’, discourses and social
practices that are appropriated and applied to oneself as part of the process of self-
formation.

As beings “totally imprinted by history” (Foucault, 1971/1994, p. 376), we are in many
ways bound within historical discourse. According to Ashcroft (2001) in his examination of
transformation in postcolonial societies:

this capacity [of cultural institutions and technologies] to interpellate
imperial subjects, to inculcate a particular view of the world, a particular
morality, a range of aesthetic, ethical, political and social values in the
colonized, is a very good demonstration of hegemony. (p. 37)

However, this focus on the way discourse shapes available subject positions should not
suggest, as has sometimes been argued, that poststructuralism cannot account “for the
subject’s ability to act as an agent, to contravene the subject-forming power” (Ashcroft,
2001, p. 36). Foucault’s (1971/1994) argument that history becomes critical or ‘effective’
“to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our very being” (p. 380), suggests the
possibility of resistance. Further, if subjectivity is a by-product or artefact of historical
discourse, then freedom is a problem of history. Foucault defines freedom throughout his
later work as resisting who we are (Foucault, 1984/1996), because if human subjectivity is
constituted through an historical process, then who we are is the subject of historical
contingencies, and to be free would mean being other than how we have been constituted
to be, within historical and other cultural discourses. By definition then, critical History
must provide the opportunity for developing a capacity to interrupt or disengage from
historical representation. For without the capacity to disengage from historical discourse,
we are unlikely to be able to resist interpellation. One of the earliest attempts to
conceptualise a critical history that aimed at building just such a capacity to interrupt or
disengage from historical discourse can be found in Nietzsche’s (1874/1983) *On the uses and abuses of history for life.*

In his ‘untimely meditation’, Nietzsche (1874/1983) posited the idea of an *unhistorical* sense that would protect the individual against the excesses of a variety of forms of historicization. For Nietzsche, an absent or deficient historical sense might make us ‘beasts’, but an ‘excess’ of history, by constraining us within the borders of a moribund past, renders ‘life’ inert (Bambach, 1990). Nietzsche’s essay on history emerged from his concern with “the chauvinistic nationalism” of Germany under Bismarck (Davison, 2000, pp. 10-11). Contemplating the uses and abuses of ‘history’, as deployed by conservatives, liberals and radicals, Nietzsche proposed his three-fold anti-historicist historiography. According to Nietzsche (1874/1983) ‘history’ typically manifested in the form of: (1) the *monumental* (in which past events and deeds were valorised and venerated); (2) the *antiquarian* (in which attempts were made to preserve the past as cultural heritage and source of identity); and (3) the *critical* (in which aspects of the past were challenged from the standpoint of present ‘truths’). According to Nietzsche’s scheme, each of these uses of history was subject to abuse (by being used exclusively, or to excess), in which case it would lead to human subjugation rather than freedom. His answer was to pit the various forms of history against each other, in a complex balancing act. While Nietzsche’s conceptualisation of critical history is intriguing, it seems overly complex for any sort of translation into a critical History curriculum. However, it does raise the interesting problem of how students might be taught to disengage from historical discourse while still ‘doing history’.
According to Ashcroft (2001), there are a number of ways to resist historical discourse that can be revealed through an analysis of the strategies used by postcolonial subjects to challenge their interpellation and inscription within dominant representations of the historic past. In his latest book, *Post-colonial transformation*, Ashcroft (2001) addresses “some of the fundamental issues which arise in post-colonial responses to imperial discourse” (p. 13). Particularly interested in “the question of resistance” (Ashcroft, 2001, p. 13), he argues that across many postcolonial societies, and he counts Australia among them, one sees four reactions to the discourse of history. First, there is *acceptance* of historical discourse, and one’s location within it. The history that was taught prior to the 1992 Syllabus in NSW, was underpinned by a sense of acceptance of the grand narrative of Australia’s great achievements, in the context of a larger history of the ‘British Empire’, and thus reflected precisely this acquiescence in regard to historical discourse. Secondly, Ashcroft (2001) identifies a reaction characterized as *rejection*, in which the very concept of history is challenged as a cultural construct. Ashcroft (2001) warns that since rejection involves:

> a powerful statement of a different cultural consciousness . . . [it] may function as a group insularity, neglecting the transformative way in which cultures may develop by using appropriated influences. (pp. 100-101)

Struggles over an ‘authentic’ Aboriginality, or a single Aboriginal history are one of the ways this particular response to historical discourse has played out in the Australian context (Russell, 2001). The result is that even a radical curriculum document like the 1992 History syllabus, poses a singular ‘Indigenous perspective’ as an antidote to the dominance of ‘white mythologies’.

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68 While this is undoubtedly correct, many Indigenous Australians have found the term ‘postcolonial’ potentially relegates “Indigenous people and their rights to land to a prehistoric, pre-colonial period, conceives of them becoming unauthentic in the colonial period and then shuffles them into a state of fantastically optimistic postcoloniality” (Hemming, n.d., p. 61).
Alongside rejection, Ashcroft (2001) argues that it will be possible to identify resistance to the discourse of history emerging as the *interjection* of counter-narratives into the popular arena. Ashcroft (2001) argues that, as a response to historical discourse, interjection demonstrates an acceptance of “the basic premises of historical narrative . . . [but presents] a contrary narrative, which claims to offer a more immediate or ‘truer’ picture of post-colonial life, a record of those experiences omitted from imperial history” (p. 101). He sees “this insertion of contesting narratives, a ‘re-writing’ of history . . . [as] an important strategy in the process of discursive resistance” (Ashcroft, 2001, p. 102). The strategy of interjection was of course the signature of the 1992 History syllabus, with its incorporation of the counter-histories of women and Indigenous peoples. Importantly, this form of resistance seeks to operate “within the spaces opened up by history, and in this way [to] redirect it” (Ashcroft, 2001, p. 102, emphasis in the original). The limitations of this strategy, as noted at the end of Chapter IV, include its failure to engage with the problem of historical representation itself. Which of course brings us to the final strategy that Ashcroft (2001) has identified in his analysis of postcolonial resistance to historical discourse.

In the strategy of *interpolation*, the dominant discourse is interrupted, not by outright dismissal, or by challenging narrative closure through the construction and circulation of one’s own stories, but by destabilizing the very forms through which the dominant discourse is produced, consumed and exchanged. This final strategy involves a meta-awareness of the genres and disciplines through which the dominant discourse operates, and disturbs and disrupts by reconfiguring forms, crossing boundaries, and challenging disciplinarities via their strategic reconstitution. Ashcroft’s (2001) conceptualisation of interpolation is probably worth quoting at length:
responding to this ubiquitous master narrative, the aims of post-colonial writing seem curiously contradictory: the aim is on one hand to insert post-colonial experience into the programme of history, on the other to reject history because of its imperial narrativization of the past. But the problem here is that in history, as in other discursive formations, the post-colonial exists outside representation itself. The remedy is not ‘re-insertion’ but ‘re-vision’; not the re-insertion of the marginalized into representation but the appropriation of a method, the re-vision of the temporality of events. This is interpolation in its fullest sense, and is crucial to the political interpretation of post-colonial experience because it is an attempt to assume control of the processes of representation... to re-inscribe the ‘heteroglossia’, the hybrid profusion of life, into the linear and teleological movement of imperial history and, by so doing, to change our view of what history is. (p. 98)

According to Ashcroft (2001), “the key function of the post-colonial interpolation of history is to subvert the unquestioned status of the ‘scientific record’ by re-inscribing the ‘rhetoric’ of events” (p. 92). Ashcroft thus provides a good description of the required characteristic of a critical or transformative History curriculum. It must, as has already been argued, interrupt historical discourse by drawing attention to its representational practices. Of course, how it does this may vary widely. Critically, interpolation as pedagogy must involve returning the gaze of the historiographer. Historiography renders visible the genealogy of a given historical representation by refurnishing it with a set of temporal moorings, opening the possibility for students, teachers, and historians to resist the interpelling effects of the well-told narrative. Recognising the historicity and rhetorical construction of a history compels us to see that all stories of the past have contingent foundations. Invoking the contingency of historical representation invites us to apprehend it as open to change, never the final word. Thus, a pedagogy of interpolation, by drawing attention to the historicity and rhetorical forms of all histories taught, would seem to be an appropriate curricular response to postmodernism’s challenge to historical representation.
Conclusion: The paradox of historiography

In this chapter, I began by identifying historiography as the null curriculum of History education in NSW during the period under study. I argued that the neglect of historiography meant that History curriculum represented the practices and forms of history as objective, rational, natural, universal, unchanging, and unproblematic, since historiography is that ‘system of reasoning’ that extends the gaze of the historian to everything, even themselves, revealing the historical specificity of all forms of historical knowledge and practice. To maintain history’s claim to truth, I suggested that historiography must remain the ‘unsayable’. The paradox of historiography is such that if historiography is made explicit, if it enters into historical discourse, then history is profoundly ‘interrupted’. The result of this interruption is to render history’s truths ‘relative’, to time, place, culture, method, methodology, autobiography of the historian, etc. I argued that simply integrating a historiography unit into the existing curriculum is inadequate, because it fails to recognise the historiographic nature of history itself. Once history is understood to be the artefact of a social/temporal situation, then the possibilities of resisting historical discourse become available. Thus, reclaiming historiography as ‘the unsayable’ of historical discourse becomes a strategy for opening new curricular possibilities. In the closing sections of the chapter, I argued that Ashcroft’s (2001) notion of ‘interpolation’ could serve as the underlying principle for a curricular response to ‘the end of history’, by encouraging a pedagogy that re-inscribes “the ‘rhetoric’ of events” (p. 92). In other words, after ‘the end of history’ in which all historical representation has been called into question, curriculum must bring historiography out of quarantine, interrupting historical discourse by drawing attention to its representational practices.
VI

CONCLUSION

History: A ghost in the curriculum?

I began this study suggesting that history is haunted by predictions of its immanent end. I want to conclude by proposing that History/history might best be thought of, given its posthumous status, as a ghost that haunts the curriculum. In playing with this metaphor of a ghost in the curriculum, I want to begin by acknowledging a debt to Curriculum visions, the relatively recent collection edited by Doll and Gough (2002). Although I realise that it is rather atypical to introduce ‘new material’ at this point in a dissertation, it would be remiss of me not to allow my interlocutors some material presence in the text. The idea of thinking about curriculum as haunted by ghosts (Doll, 2002), I found particularly generative for considering what I might say about the (im)possibilities of History curriculum after ‘the end of history’, and a important direction my thesis suggests for future research.

In taking seriously postmodernism’s rejection of naïve realism, essentialism and foundationalism (see particularly chapters I, III, and V), my study is perhaps at odds with those, like Willie Thompson (2004), who see postmodernism as:

a quasi-theological form of discourse, repellent to all but the initiated and which will certainly come to figure as no more than a bizarre curiosity of intellectual history. (p. 128)

I can say little in response to such wonderfully crafted hyperbole, except that over the last decade I have been among those ‘possessed’ by postmodernism. Unlike Willie Thompson,
I am not prepared to speculate about how long this possession will last, but I am prepared to say that I think it will take some powerful incantations to exorcise it from me, for I find postmodernism convincing. As I look back over my text, I remain confident that writing histories involves the transformation of traces of the past into a narratively-organised explanatory or interpretive text, exceeding, rather than simply gathering, what counts as ‘evidence’ for the questions asked, or problem posed (see particularly my discussion of Ankersmit, 2001a, in Chapter V). This is not to deny that important discipline-informed cognitive processes are at work in this act of transformation (R. J. Evans, 1997; McCullagh, 2004), beyond tropological choices, a point often overlooked or downplayed by some postmodern history theorists (H. White, 1973; 1999). Regardless, there are many objections to the ‘narrative impositionalist’ view revisited above (D. Carr, 1986; 2004), and perhaps I have been neglectful in not engaging with them more comprehensively. However, it was not my thesis to weigh up the worth of postmodernism, but to re-examine historical and methodological postmodernism’s apparent ‘threat’ to history, and the subsequent implications of this threat for History as curriculum.

It is not always clear to the critics of methodological postmodernism – particularly those who, like Windschuttle (1996), lump together poststructuralists, critical theorists, hermeneuticists, semioticians, multiculturalists, social constructionists, and literary theorists – that there are often highly significant epistemological differences between many of these disciplinary fields and practices, despite some overt similarities and complementarities. One important difference between critical theory and poststructuralism, for example, has implications for what we understand by the idea of the ‘critical’. The many forms of critical theory are supported by a common epistemology that posits language as an ideological medium that often distorts our vision of reality. Habermas’ “ideal speech situation”
depicting a state of near telepathy, in which interlocutors communicate without static or distortion, is crafted as the antithesis of the critical theorist’s vision of reality. The practice of critique in critical theory becomes the means by which “to unmask the lies of the established disorder that appears as transparently normal” (Haraway cited in Gough, 2002b, p. 4).

In alignment with critical theory, poststructuralism agrees that language is opaque, but sees our visions of reality as both productive and repressive simultaneously. Poststructuralists typically reject the idea that our representations ever unproblematically correspond with reality, and thus resign themselves to a position that reality can never be known outside our systems of representation. Thus, you will hear poststructuralists saying, our systems of representation constitute reality, as we know it. Unlike the notion of ‘critical’ that is often mobilised in the Marxist-inspired literature of radical pedagogy, which implies a capacity to challenge representations in order to uncover an obscured truth, poststructuralism’s notion of ‘critical’ amounts to a concern that even our best attempts at revealing reality are suspected to produce hallucinations. Critique, in a poststructuralist sense, involves an attempt to expose as thoroughly cultural-historical enterprises, discourses and systems of logic that are taken as normal and natural. Recognising the historicity of a discourse or knowledge system means acknowledging that it is, as LaCapra (2004) would say, always “in transit” (p. 1), always open to the possibility of ‘transformation’. Thus, the poststructuralist notion of ‘critical’ is about opening what Foucault (1988/1994) describes as “spaces of freedom”, spaces to think and act differently, rather than the unveiling of a final truth. This has been both the method and argument of this thesis.
I have argued in this dissertation that if History curriculum is to be a critical/transformative enterprise, then it must attend to the problem of historical representation. In my analysis of History curriculum in NSW during the 1990s, it became apparent that while there was institutionalised resistance to the idea of a single ‘grand story’ of the nation, operationalised in the form of a ‘radical’ syllabus, historiography failed to register as part of the curriculum. This neglect of historiography meant that while metanarratives might be challenged through a ‘pedagogy of counter-memory’, historical discourse itself remained beyond the horizon of critique. It was my thesis that after postmodernism, History curriculum remains possible, but in a reconceptualised form, in which historiography haunts the curriculum as a disruptive force.

As a ‘disruptive force’ in the study of histories, historiography functions like ‘the stranger’ in Wang’s (2002) text, whose presence promises to “shatter taken-for-granted perceptions and assumptions, to challenge conventional truth, and to bring the promise of new life” (p. 294). This is because, historiography as the ‘stranger’ for History curriculum, comes as “someone alien to us” (Wang, 2002, p. 294), the ‘unsayable’ that helps constitute history by its absence. Wang (2002) is certainly under no illusions, warning that “to encounter the stranger can be threatening” (p. 296), and “to invite the stranger into our horizon is to risk questioning our own views and ways of being” (p. 294). LaCapra (2004) remarks on a similar transformative possibility when he argues, “history in the sense of historiography cannot escape transit unless it negates itself by denying its own historicity and becomes identified with transcendence or fixation” (pp. 1-2, my emphasis). Historiography, as a meta-historical discourse, is history’s ‘stranger’ because its presence challenges history’s claims to stand ‘outside’ of time. Historiography forces history into a painful reflexivity that paradoxically allows the historian (or history student) to disengage from historical
discourse, even while rendering the gaze of the historian panoptical. Acknowledging history’s historicity through an encounter with historiography is tantamount to killing history, since it leaves us with only the practices and forms of historiographic representation. After historiography, history can only function as a ghost, an apparition that stands in for an unrecoverable original. According to Doll (2002), “ghosts have an ethereal presence; they can be seen, often felt, but have no material substance” (p. 24).

To place the problems of historical representation at the centre of a critical History curriculum is to teach History under erasure, to conjure a pedagogical situation in which histories are both presented and deconstructed in the same ‘lesson’. A History curriculum that places historical representation at its centre must also of necessity develop an historical hermeneutics. Such a hermeneutics must find ways of illuminating the epistemologies that haunt representations of the past, summoning them to the fore. Mobilising Jenkins and Munslov’s (2004a) reconstructionist, constructionist, and deconstructionist heuristic as a frame through which to ‘read’ histories in the classroom, could be one particular manifestation of this historical hermeneutics, channelling historiography’s disruptive force, in the same way that history as genealogy, after Foucault (1971/1994), interrupts the logic of the disciplines by re-establishing their historicity. This movement towards the development of a pedagogical hermeneutics is a project for the future. It need not deny the importance of ‘disciplined inquiry’ in the sense described by Seixas (2000), but it does add an extra dimension to critical historical study that is frequently ignored. Without some form of historiographic hermeneutics, there can be no easy disengagement from historical discourse, and therefore, we will remain haunted by our histories.
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