Moral Judgement to Moral Action: 
Implications for Education

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A Thesis
Submitted to Fulfill the Requirements of the Award of the Doctorate of Philosophy

July 2010
Declaration

I hereby certify that the work embodied in this thesis is the result of original research and has not been submitted for a higher degree to any other University or Institution.

Arini Rosalee Beaumaris
Acknowledgements

The writing of this thesis, while challenging and difficult, has been one of the most rewarding experiences of my life. I am so grateful for the opportunity to explore an area of education that has become one of my passions. Dealing with so many behaviour management issues in children and youth, while an initial source of irritation, ultimately became a source of joyful learning in exploring new dimensions of values and character education. I now thank all those challenging children for every lesson I learned from them about the human condition.

The completion of this research would not have been possible without considerable support along the journey of discovery. This journey has been one of crisis and victory. My former husband, Peter Beaumaris, who was born in a Nazi Labour Camp, of a Jewish mother and Polish father, did not give up on encouraging me until I accepted the challenge of enrolling in a Doctoral Program.

Finding an initial supervisor was a challenge in itself, granted I was exploring a new field of study. It was through a relative of one of my staff members in Canada that I was advised about a unique and open-minded man, Dr. Bernard Mageean, from Flinders University in South Australia. He was prepared to take on students who wished to explore topics that ranged from the psychological to the religious. I would like to acknowledge and thank Bernard who was courageous enough to take me on as an external student while I was living overseas, despite his misgivings in supporting a student from a distance. His open and flexible approach supported my academic inquiry to explore a complex and challenging field in order to understand more about the process of moral functioning and moral learning. Unfortunately, he retired, and very sacrificially supported me for a further three years, almost to the final stages of the completion of my thesis.

I was now faced with finding a supervisor in an area in which it was difficult to find university expertise. Fortunately, the Australian Government had seen fit to explore this new field of endeavour through the Australian Values Education Framework and its related projects. I had heard of Professor Terence Lovat, so on finding his name on the Australian Government’s Values Education website, I was able to communicate with him about my dilemma. He kindly accepted to take me on as a transferee into The University of Newcastle. I was delighted to have been fortunate enough to have the
privilege of being supervised by one of Australia’s leading proponents of values education. His clear guidance and vision were invaluable in assisting me to make sense of my research project and to bring it to completion. His support and encouragement gave me confidence to continue to improve my capacity to understand the academic rigour required to complete this research thesis. His brilliant choice of an assistant supervisor, in Dr. Kerry Anne Dally, enabled me to complete this project with a much deeper understanding of the technical requirements of academic writing. I will be forever grateful for their ongoing support and encouragement to bring this research project to completion.

To Drs. Frank de Mink in the Netherlands, who supported my initial research by offering me a roof over my head for a year, a wonderful library of books on moral education and many vigorous discussions on the subject, I will be eternally grateful. Sustaining study from a distance was made possible by the support of a fellow doctoral student, Sitarih Alai, who was undertaking research in the area of trustworthiness. Her clever mind and avid exploration of the written word accelerated my ability to access a wide range of references. We spent many hours exchanging insights and exploring moral topics that helped me to develop my understanding of the field. I am very grateful for her help and support along the learning journey. To Dr. Caroline Aazami, and Dr. Marjorie Tidman who had both trodden this path before me, I offer thanks for their feedback and support as I drew close to the finish. The opportunity to share and exchange ideas with both these gifted ladies was invaluable to my learning process.

I wish to thank my research respondents who willingly gave of their time and insights to help me to understand the lived experience. In particular, I would like to acknowledge the coordination work of a loyal friend of mine, Rose Wendel, who ensured I found research participants to expedite the last stages of my research undertakings in a timely manner.

To my brilliant children, my son Anton Jones, his wife Marjan, and my daughter Nicholle A-Khavari and her husband Afshin, my deep appreciation for their love, constant feedback and encouragement. Finally, to my four grandchildren, Naysan, Kian, Lachlan and Zoe, who have been a living laboratory for application of the many insights gained from this doctoral thesis.
Dedication

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my parents who have both passed away, my Father at age 94 in October 2008. First, I dedicate it to my mother, Iva, who was one of the first teachers in South Australia to train as a teacher of graphic arts. She imbued me with a love of learning and a fascination with the educative process. Her delight in my ability to perceive patterns encouraged me to continually pursue understanding patterns in all aspects of life. Her high level of creativity, capacity to explore the unknown and her courage to venture into the new spiritual domain of accepting the Bahá’í Faith, provided an invaluable legacy to our family. Her unerring guidance has enabled me to live a meaningful life and to contribute to the advancement of humanity.

Second, I dedicate this thesis to my father, Eric Leedham, who always believed in my capacity to make a difference, who always loved to hear of any new area of learning I was pursuing, and his constant encouragement to achieve any goal I undertook. He would say of me that my most notable quality was determination, which I am sure I learned from his sterling example.
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Abstract

Recent educational research has pointed to the potential for values education to enhance student wellbeing by helping to develop their pro-social behaviours and effective work habits. Most crucial to the process of values education is understanding more about the ways in which children learn to consistently act-on-moral judgement and so function in the moral or ethical domain.

This study focuses on appraising, with the use of research literature and the lived experience of 22 adults from diverse cultural backgrounds, ‘what works’ in translating moral judgement to moral action. It explores, from scientific, religious and educational perspectives’, elements of success in moral functioning, with the goal of shedding greater light on the processes of moral learning and moral functioning.

On the basis of the study, it is postulated that moral functioning is a competency, based on acting out of the highest stages of the domains of knowing (cognition), loving (affect), and willing (conation). Hence, it is proposed that a person who develops the capacity to reflect on emotional feedback and the consequences of their actions (knowing), to consider the needs of others (loving), and who is prepared to take responsibility in a situation (willing), is more likely to act-on-moral judgement.

The proposition above supports brain functioning theories on moral learning and challenges conventional notions of how we learn to function in the moral domain. On the basis of such insights, the study suggests that children would benefit from an intentional process of facilitated reflection upon feeling states and personal moral experiences, in a safe and caring environment. Facilitated reflection supports the creation of new moral prototypes, or exemplars, to help develop moral imagination and to learn how to respond more appropriately the next time a child is faced with a similar moral scenario. It is further proposed therefore that such methodology should be incorporated into values education in schools.
Arriving on the shores of Vancouver Island, Canada, in 1996 to take up the position of Principal of an independent secondary school, called Maxwell International Bahá’í School, took me deep into the heart of values education, as it is known in Australia, and moral or character education in North America. The curriculum on offer was based on the British Columbian secondary school requirements with an additional mandate of a values based educational program, inspired by the Bahá’í Writings, the writings of the most recent independent world religion, the Bahá’í Faith. Students at the school came from over 35 different countries and from many different religious and non-religious backgrounds. It soon became apparent that the lofty values and goals of the school were more stated than practiced. This was not owing to any lack of dedication or effort, nor from the many apparently effective activities around values education. It was simply that there was a gap between the rhetoric of values and their translation into practice. Time and again, it was seen that students who had committed infractions of the school rules and values were not led to understand the consequences of their actions, either at all or until well after the event. In other words, the explicit and practical end of values education was lacking, in spite of the good intentions that were evident. It was a pedagogical issue as much as anything and so my central question centred on the capacity of the educational process to improve in this regard.

By this stage in my career, I had faced many challenging scenarios as an educational leader and had developed a reputation as a trouble shooter, sorting out difficult educational environments, and taking seven institutions through significant change. I began my career as a home economics teacher in Port Augusta, South Australia, teaching rural industrial students, including a proportion of indigenous students. In this context it soon became apparent that I was dealing with many different value sets and that traditional methods of discipline were relatively ineffective. I later undertook a teaching role in an urban industrial area, leaving me convinced that my vocation in life was elsewhere. I left the school sector largely owing to the inordinate amount of time that needed to be spent on behaviour management. I discovered that I had a preference for working with adults who were interested in developing a body of expert knowledge.

I was fortunate to spend 20 years in Technical and Further Education (TAFE), including the last five as one of the first female College Directors in the TAFE system in South
Australia. I did not escape young people altogether, as high rates of unemployment and changing policy regarding unemployed youth resulted in many angry youth arriving on the doorstep of TAFE. At this time, I was elected as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Australian Bahá’í Community resulting in a departure from traditional education.

After a three year break away from formal education, I once again returned to secondary education, this time as principal of Maxwell International Bahá’í School, having been selected for the role from a worldwide community of applicants. I was now working in an even more complex environment of dealing with teenagers from over 35 different countries, including being face to face with the particular problems of North American youth. I was challenged once again to focus on how to educate in order to support the development of appropriate social behaviour, or what could be termed moral maturity.

Traditionally, the process of discipline has been used as a means of addressing aberrant behaviour, not only on the pretext of what is deemed good for the individual but also to ensure the individual’s social adjustment as a participating member in a family or community. In dealing with adolescent students, I realised that the lack of discipline was often a form of under-developed virtue, brought about by the lack of positive influences. It was not that they wanted to be disobedient necessarily but that they did not understand either the causes or the implications of their behaviour. If this was the case, then traditional methods of punishment were useless in helping a young person develop virtuous action. More often than not, these methods resulted in even more aberrant behaviour and an attitude of “catch me if you can.”

This was very clear with a particular group of students once sent to my office for pushing a student into the lake, opposite the school grounds. This group had been teasing a student in fun, so decided that, as they were standing on the wooden platform over the edge of the quite shallow lake, they would push him in. One of the teachers happened to see this event and sent them to see me. After they had told me what occurred, I said that if anything had happened to the student, how did they think I could explain to a parent that their son had been pushed into the lake, hit his head on a stone and died. They were shocked, they said, “he was all right and nothing like that had happened, it should be seen as being mere fun.” I found again and again with teenagers that they did not, in the spur of the moment, begin to think about the consequences. I realised that, even though this was a developmental stage, we had not prepared them
sufficiently well to understand that any action can have unforeseen consequences and that, in some instances, these will be bound to be unfavourable or harmful to others. I said to this particular group: “what if the student had been hurt; how could they make amends once the hurt had been inflicted?” They were mystified by such an idea but began to understand and feel remorseful. They eventually decided that they would go and apologise to the student.

The lack of understanding of the consequences of actions, and how to change this, was brought home to me when one of the students at this school was found to be wearing a special belt that he had made from a seat belt of a car. Someone in the school had information about the stealing of a seat belt with a special buckle. When she saw the student wearing a belt with a buckle of this description, she reported it to the Dean of Student Services. When she sought my advice, I asked her to organise a meeting with the victim of the theft, and to consult together to see where it led. It seemed that the student needed at least to apologise and to offer to pay for the damage. She carried out this meeting as instructed and reported that the victim was very grateful for the action we had taken. So, some amends were made as far as the victim was concerned and the offending student had had to endure a very embarrassing situation, coming face to face with the person he had offended. The result was that his parents decided he should use the money he had earned during his summer break to pay for the damage. I found out after this event that this was not the first time that this boy had vandalised and that he was awaiting a trial in his home town for a number of similar offences. He had never had to deal directly with the consequences of such violations before. Ultimately, I heard that, after a troubled adolescence, this boy became an outstanding and contributing citizen.

After this incident, the local police sergeant invited me to serve on a community justice committee. It was a new initiative that had been introduced via New Zealand and Australia into Canada. The strategy was referred to as ‘restorative justice’ whereby, if a youth was convicted of an offence, he or she could choose to follow the path of sitting in a community conference with all the parties concerned, including the victim and the offender. This group would determine an appropriate action in order to make reparation for the committed offence. Using this approach resulted in very low recidivism.
It would seem that, unless we have an opportunity to make amends or to apologise for an offence, guilt remains as an obstacle to achieving closure on such an event. The restorative justice model has continued to demonstrate that closure can be achieved, so allowing both victims and offenders to get on with their lives. Perhaps this works because the offender undertakes a learning process, which enables reflection and to learn from others what would have been more appropriate in the situation. Furthermore, offenders did not enjoy the feeling of embarrassment or shame that they experienced, suggesting that the desire to move away from shameful or sorrowful conditions to more positive outcomes is a powerful motivation in achieving closure.

I was able to see students transform from being self-centred to other-centred when there was an intentional and reflective process used, rather than using traditional punishment and consequence systems utilised by many school communities. Obviously, it seemed that there were approaches that brought greater results than others, so the challenge was to probe into the most effective and demonstrably beneficial processes. My quest became to deliver a systematic process based on research evidence by which educators could address some of the most challenging behaviours in young students.

With the support of key staff at Maxwell, we began the process of looking at best practices in values-based youth programming from around the world. In a four-month period, the school designed an incentives-based World Citizenship Program, *From Copper to Gold*, with four levels of certification based on key moral and ethical leadership capabilities. These capabilities were adapted from a moral and ethical leadership program that had originally been developed at Nur University in Colombia, South America.

Within one year of the implementation of an intentional and integrated program across the curriculum, we began to see quite significant results in spite of the challenges placed on the staff in implementing this new approach. The results were seen in a significant reduction in behaviour management problems, increased student participation in community service activities and, at the year’s end, 64% of final year students being placed on the British Columbia’s Government Honour Roll. It could therefore be surmised that the issue of character development is best addressed through an intentional educational response. What was happening here and why were the results so promising? I wished to understand why this approach seemed to have worked and why
it had resulted in such dramatic differences in student performance. Could it be articulated and replicated in other educational situations?

There were also a number of other newly emerging character education programs in North America that also cited experiences similar experiences to our school. This began my research journey to probe the question concerning what might be some of the key influences and factors that support a person to consistently translate moral judgement into moral action.

Directly following this three year experience, I moved to Prague, in the Czech Republic, to be the Director of an international pre-school, only to discover very similar behaviour patterns I had experienced with the teenage population. It seemed that it would be easier to deal with behaviours at a younger age than to deal with entrenched patterns of behaviour found in the teenage cohort. By this time, I truly wanted to understand better the phenomena surrounding such behaviour and how this knowledge could be translated into an educational program for implementation from the earliest years of life. One of the more significant challenges for character education programs and educational programs in general is in proving their effectiveness. If factors can be identified in the gap between judgement and action, and these can be articulated and quantified, it is hoped that it will help to inform us about what needs to be included or excluded in educational practice. Schooling has been referred to as a ‘graveyard’ wherein we are always adding more to the curriculum but rarely taking anything out.

My personal experiences as an educator, outlined in the Foreword, have left me in no doubt about the value of introducing character or moral education programs into schools. Despite the evidence of improved student results, while I was Principal of Maxwell International Bahá’í School, I was not clear whether the strategies we had introduced had really worked and, even if so, why they had worked. My quest in undertaking this thesis was to gain greater insights into the process of moral functioning and moral learning as they relate to the translation of moral judgment into moral action, as well as the resultant implications of this process for education. I wanted to understand how to articulate this educational process, and to replicate it, in order to assist myself and other educators in the development and implementation of quality character education programs. As we move into the 21st Century, there is a greater need to understand ‘processes’ rather than just focusing on the acquisition of ‘knowledge’ if
our hope is to develop an articulated and replicable educational format that will assist students to translate moral judgement into moral action.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1 will provide an introduction and context to the research topic. First, it will explore what is understood by moral behaviour and moral action. Second, the deteriorating societal conditions and the link between social problems and declining morality in our young population will be investigated. This apparent decline has led to the reintroduction of an educational response, referred to primarily as ‘character education’ in the United States of America (USA), ‘values education’ in the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia, and more generally as ‘moral education’. For the purposes of this thesis, values education is the preferred term, although character education will be referred to on occasion, especially in reference to US based research, and moral education will be referred to where authors and government documents use this term. A brief outline of an evolving history shaping the current values education approach will be explored. Third, evidence will then be examined to see if educational responses demonstrate any significant impact on an array of intended outcomes ranging from positive social conditions to improved academic results. If the outcomes of an educational response are positive, then what can be learned from educational initiatives or ‘programs that work?’ will be a driving question. Fourth, the question “what should be the goals of values education and what else needs to be researched in order to gain greater insight into the moral learning process?” will be asked. Fifth, from this initial exploration, discussion will turn to the rationale and focus of the study as well as detailing the broad research objectives. The final section will provide the reader with an overview of the organization of the thesis from Chapter 2 onwards.

1.1 Moral Behaviour

The process of gaining insights into the nature of the gap between moral judgement and moral action begins with understanding the term ‘moral’. A simple definition (as given by www.Dictionary.com) gave several definitions of the word ‘moral’:

*of, pertaining to, or concerned with the principles or rules of right conduct or the distinction between right and wrong; ethical: moral attitudes, capable of conforming to the rules of right conduct: a moral being and of, pertaining to, or acting on the mind, feelings, will, or character.*
It should be noted here that textbooks on ethics and morality define moral principles as not just any principles, but those that are consistent with goodness, truth and human happiness.

There is no consensus on the definition of moral behaviour, however, this research will initially use the definition provided by Kitwood (1990), who has been influenced by the works of Kohlberg (1971;1981) and Gilligan (1982) in developing a theory on the psychology of conscience and morality. Kitwood (1990) suggests that morality is based on respect for persons, and engages not only intellect but also a feeling of concern for others:

> Morality is concerned fundamentally, with respect for persons, and hence with person-in-relationship; beyond that, with the whole quality of social life within which persons have their being. The study of morality takes us deeply into the areas of relatedness, trust, and responsibility; into the experience of value, the sense of freedom, the transcendence of social conditioning, the coming together of intellect and feeling in concern for other (p. 40).

### 1.2 The Nature of Moral Action

It could be assumed that an action deemed moral must meet some standard of adequacy, but what is considered adequate or virtuous? Candee (1984) argues that there are two central philosophical issues in defining ‘moral’ or ‘morally commendable action’. The first is the issue of relativity: whose standard of rightness do we use in defining an action as moral? Is it that of the actor him/herself, that of society, or that of some universal philosophical judgement of right action in light of moral principle? There is a second fundamental philosophical issue related to defining moral action. This concerns whether the morality of an action is dictated: (a) by the behaviour itself as it conforms to a norm; and/or (b) by the intention, judgement or principle guiding the act; or (c) by the welfare of all parties involved and the consequence of the act. What a moral action is dictated by may also depend on how the individual processes factual information about the situation, how a person perceives the interests and feelings of others, or how a person may predict the consequences of an action.
Moral action is also referred to as a process. From a philosophical perspective, Wilson (1990) refers to the involvement of the will in relation to the motivation to carry out a moral action. He distinguishes between two kinds of trying (to do ‘the right thing’) and perhaps what could be referred to as two senses of ‘the will.’ Trying appears to be very different when motivation is adequate compared to when it is inadequate. Wilson (1990) describes the situation as follows:

*I love my wife; I enjoy philosophy and gardening; so I try to please her. My disposition is adequately engaged in the forms of life; there are difficulties, but I delight in facing and overcoming them. That kind of trying is indeed central to human life. On the other hand, if my motivation is inadequate, I have to try in a different way. It is painful: I feel the pricks of conscience, they fight against my natural desires, I have to force myself with whatever “will-power” I can muster, I ‘struggle’ in a different sense of the term. And this as our argument suggests, is not only unpleasant but in principle unnecessary: as a rational person I should use my external agency which will keep me up to the mark (pp.43-44).*

Wilson (1990) introduces a concept of the notion that will power is not needed when there is a loving relationship, or love of task. Conversely, Wilson suggests that if your motivation is not influenced by love, then it is much harder to motivate oneself to act. It will require engaging the conscience and subsequently employing ‘willpower’ because greater effort is now required to act in a moral way. Here, we see that the human capability to love or to care, used in association with what Wilson refers to as ‘will’, becomes a source of motivation.

In the following example, moral action is defined by a series of capabilities. Wilson (1973) refers to the capacities that are required to be able to act morally. He specifies the ideal of ‘a morally educated person’ based on all the components or elements which would lead that person to do actions that have good consequences for others and self. These components include the moral and non-moral factors that are important for a good outcome. His components includes ‘phil’, a moral principle of respect for persons (which is distinctly moral), ‘krat’, a will factor, ‘emp’, a psychological knowledge factor, and ‘gig’, a factor of factual knowledge and skills of information-processing (cited by Kohlberg & Candee, 1984, p. 510).
The literature reviewed so far suggests that moral action seems to be greatly influenced by both reason and judgement as well as by caring about the relationship with the other. These factors impact on how much effort or will is required to translate moral judgement into action. Understanding the nature of these competencies seems to be important if we are to educate a person to act morally. Moral action appears to be highly influenced by the social relationships inherent in the situation. The notion proposed by Wilson suggests that moral action appears to be more than just a right action or an event. It is an interactive process involving different domains of human functioning that could be termed a ‘competency’, and, as such, is therefore educable. Attention will now turn to understanding more about the social conditions that have led to rethinking values education.

1.3 Current Societal Conditions –Social Evolution

Any study of moral action needs to be embedded in our experience of our social life. The last century has witnessed struggle between social groupings and ideologies on an unprecedented scale, causing a vast loss of life and social dislocation. Will this continue or is it possible to view such upheavals in a different context? As we reflect upon the nature of such conflicts, clearly the trend towards globalisation will only survive if the people of the world can respect the diversity of cultural understandings of the world’s people. This process will require a rethink of who we are as human beings, and a very different set of values and approaches from those that have characterised independent nation states. From a religious perspective, the supreme governing body of the Bahá’í Faith, The Universal House of Justice (1986), identifies this problem in the following way:

*The primary question to be resolved is how the present world, with its entrenched pattern of conflict, can change to a world in which harmony and co-operation will prevail. World order can be founded only on the unshakeable consciousness of the oneness of mankind, a spiritual truth which all the sciences confir. Anthropology, physiology, psychology, recognises only one human species, albeit infinitely varied in the secondary aspects of life (p.13).*

The above quotation suggests that there is a need for humanity to evolve from relationships based on entrenched conflict to relationships based on our fundamental
unity as one human race, and that knowledge of, and application of this principle would lead to a world where cooperation and social harmony are the norm.

In the light of my own professional experiences referred to in the Foreword, it was interesting to learn that I was not alone in my search to address the mismatch between espoused and practiced values. In the 1990s, parents, teachers, school principals, politicians, and even the then President of the United States of America, had become deeply concerned about a deteriorating social environment, and were convinced that schools and communities could and should be doing more to prevent or resolve social problems.

It is understandable that, once the extent of the problems facing education in the USA were examined by government commissions and task forces in the late 1970s, they initially shied away from suggesting that schools reassert their traditional role in the moral education of children. The public in the USA, however, did not show the same reluctance. In September, 1980, a Gallup poll posed the question, “would you favour or oppose instruction in the schools that would deal with morals and moral behaviour?” A vast majority (79%) of the total sample said that they favoured such instruction. Among those respondents who had children attending public schools, 84% favoured such instruction (Ryan, 1986).

By 1996, the then President of the United States of America, Bill Clinton, deemed it necessary to hold more than one joint White House-congressional conference on character-building as a solution to declining social conditions. The question can be asked: “why did the emphasis on the development of character become the object of serious consideration by not only the leaders of thought but also the leaders of the land?” The call for action had reached a crescendo, partly prompted by the tragic loss of life of pupils and staff in shootings at school sites in the USA.

If moral education is to be re-introduced into schooling in a pluralistic changing society, questions also arise regarding what is sound moral character, how we educate to achieve moral or ethical character development and the purpose of education or educational outcomes.
1.4 Evolving History of Moral Education

There has been an evolving history in moral and values education. Even though the first amendment, in the United States constitution separated Church and State, prior to the 20th century, character development was one of the primary goals of education. Debates have ensued for several decades about who should take responsibility for moral education and what should be taught. Guttman (1987) pointed out the universal agreement that the family has preeminent responsibility for the moral and character formation of children. Nevertheless, democratic polities have a profound interest in the moral formation of its citizens. Although families have first priority in educating their children, the state has its own interest because democracies require skilled and participating citizens. Indeed, according to Gutmann (1987):

*Moral education in a democracy is best viewed as a shared trust of the family and the polity, mutually beneficial to everyone who appreciates the values of both family life and democratic citizenship (p. 54)*.

As the United States became more culturally heterogeneous over the course of its history, the values that seemed obvious for public schools to teach became increasingly obscured by fundamental debates about the nature of a pluralistic democratic society and the purpose of schooling. Families became less willing to cede the proper role of character education to schools. In fact, some argued that parents should be the ones to teach values, not teachers. As Lickona (1991b) put it:

*Should the schools teach values? Just a few years ago, if you put that question to a group of people, it was sure to start an argument. If anyone said yes, schools should teach children values, somebody else would immediately retort, whose values? (p. 3)*

A series of court cases began in 1947 which resulted in schools being banned from teaching aspects that were considered to be religious practices such as prayer. Schools were then largely considered places for conveying factual information, including facts about the moral life. As if to fill the vacuum, new approaches to moral character formation arose. In the 1960s, more liberal, less directive approaches to values education were tried such as values clarification (e.g., Raths, Harmin, & Simon, 1976), which supported the values the child brought to the classroom, and moral dilemma
discussion (e.g., Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, 1989), which promoted critical thinking about fairness and the development of moral reasoning.

According to Narvaez (2006) these approaches to values education were strongly criticized. Advocates of traditional character education attacked the approaches for allowing students to have a say in decisions that the traditionalists considered adult prerogatives, and for avoiding the strong prohibitions and rewards that traditionalists think are better suited to fostering good character (Wynne, 1991). In fact, since the 1950s, traditional moralists have blamed youth behaviour (e.g., crime, cheating, drug use, pregnancy) not only on the media, materialism, privatism, and divorce, but also on liberal programs in schools that convey value neutrality (Ryan & McLean, 1987) and “de-value America” (Bennett, 1992).

Narvaez (2006) has articulated that two dominant educational approaches to moral education have been debated in recent decades, centred around the advantages and disadvantages of traditional character education versus rational moral education. Traditional character education focuses on the inculcation of virtuous traits of character as the proper aim of education. In contrast, rational moral education seeks to facilitate the development of autonomous moral judgment and the ability to resolve disputes and reach consensus according to canons of fairness. The first approach, then, is concerned with the educational requirements that contribute to the formation of character. The second is concerned with the development of reasoning and autonomy. Unfortunately, the debate has often taken on an either/or quality that has obscured common ground and integrative possibilities.

What is defined as a value is also not clear however, Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990) generated a conceptual definition of values that incorporates five formal features that are common to most definitions of values in literature (Rokeach, 1973). “According to the literature, values (a) are concepts or beliefs, (b) are about desirable end states of behaviour, (c) transcend specific situations, (d) guide selection or evaluation of behaviour and events, and (e) are ordered by relative importance” (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, p.551).
In 1995, the lack of clarity about conflicting approaches and the advisability of educating students about values and character were addressed by Secretary Riley and the US Department of Education in a document titled, ‘Teaching Values.’ In his report, he brings together the notion of values and virtues in the following way:

> Although schools must be neutral with respect to religion, they could play an active role with respect to teaching civic values and virtue, and the moral code that holds us together as a community. The fact that some of these values are held also by religion does not make it unlawful to teach them in school (Riley, 1995, p.9).

Despite the use of different terminology to describe an evolving history of character or values education with different conceptual frameworks, it is important to clarify that a number of different terms are used currently, depending on the country of origin, to describe a common phenomenon. These are ‘values education’, ‘character education’, ‘character building’ and ‘moral education’. In recent literature, the most frequent titles have been referred to as character education in the United States of America (USA) and values education in Australia and the United Kingdom (UK). These latter titles seem to be more acceptable and have assisted in removing the confusion between what is religious and what is secular. References to character and values education in this thesis will mainly focus on research findings from the USA and Australia. The reasons for this approach relate to the long history of character education offerings in the USA and the introduction by the Australian Government in the last few years of values education in state and private schools.

The educational focus in character and values education programs in the USA has changed from a past focus in the 1970-1980s of mere examination of moral dilemmas to the wider development of the whole person in the 1990s. There is always a danger of faddism, or populism, when new educational programs are based on popular ‘opinion’ regarding an immediate relief of symptoms, rather than based on empirical research with replicable outcomes. Educational responses are frequently introduced without sufficient understanding of the theoretical underpinning of the problem nor based upon research that might lead to more informed choices of solution; to ensure that the mistakes of the past are not repeated or exacerbated. The impact of social changes demonstrates this point. This is reiterated by Huit (1997):
Character development traditionally has focused on those traits appropriate for the industrial age: obedience to authority, work ethic, working in groups under supervision, etc. However, modern education must promote character appropriate for the information age in terms of: truthfulness, honesty, integrity, individual responsibility, humility, wisdom, justice, steadfastness, dependability, etc. It is important for educators to define expected skills and competencies for being successful in the family, work, social, and other environments in which they will participate in this modern age and to include those aspects of character and moral development which are deemed important. (p. 5)

Therefore, the content and process of the curriculum of values education programs need to address what will lead to expert moral functioning, including how to adjust to an ever-changing social and cultural milieu and how to make decisions within different situations in the context of an emerging global civilization. This broader base for values education is crucial if we desire to live in a peaceful and harmonious society. We will also need to understand more about the learning processes that are most suitable for developing our capacity to act consistently according to moral judgement.

1.5 Programs that Work

While growing sentiments occurred in the 1990s in the USA that character education should be part of schooling, a number of questions arise as to how we design character education programs that will result in individual character development outcomes as well as improved social conditions. What do these programs look like? What do we already know about how we learn moral attributes? In the early part of the last century, when character education was part of the education system, research resulted in casting character education programs as areas of disrepute. The findings of Hartshorne et al. (1928, 1929, 1930) showed that particular techniques of character training, such as in-class discussions, or even practicing helping activities, bore little or no significant relationship to pupils’ later patterns of moral conduct.

There has been a growing trend in the 1990s by US educators to explore new ways of delivering character education programs. Since the clarification in 1995 by Secretary Riley, a number of states in the USA, such as Georgia and California, have mandated the introduction of character education programs. At the same time as this movement
has been emerging, a disturbing trend of lowered educational standards has spearheaded another quest to identify the key factors that help students to succeed in the enterprise of learning. This is referred to as the ‘Quality Teaching’ movement (Newmann et al., 1996; Darling-Hammond, 1997). The Quality Teaching movement has overturned many notions as to what helps students succeed. Among these are that the development of caring, trusting relationships are at the heart of student success (Rowe, 2004; Hattie, 2004). This is a fundamental feature of character and values education that points to the role it can play in nurturing student success.

### 1.6 Successful Implementation of Values Education

A recent study undertaken by The Character Education Partnership (Merle J. Schwartz, Alexandra Beatty, Eileen Dachnowicz and Ed. D. 2006) points to a growing body of research on character education indicating that the relatively recent renewal of the practice of teaching ethics and morality in schools is showing a range of positive social and academic outcomes for students.

It is interesting to note that three recent studies in the USA showed that effective character education programs go hand-in-hand with academic success. This notion is of great significance in an educational environment where test results are the major measure of school effectiveness and reinforces the notions of the Quality Teaching movement (Newmann et al., 1996; Darling-Hammond, 1997). In order to help schools and districts develop effective character education programs, three research-based studies, supported through the funding of the John Templeton Foundation and, in some cases, the Character Education Partnership, provide insights into what constitutes effective programs. Each study explored character education programs from a different perspective.

Individual schools that have won the National School of Character award from the Character Education Partnership (CEP) in Washington, D.C. report that their character education initiatives have resulted in reduced office referrals, improved attendance and test scores, increased skills for conflict resolution, lessening of risky behaviour, and overall improved school climate and civility.
The first study, *Links to Academic Achievement on the Elementary Level: The Relationship of Character Education Implementation and Academic Achievement in Elementary Schools* (Benninga, Berkowitz, Kuehn, & Smith, 2003), written up in *Phi Delta Kappan* (Benninga et al., 2006) explored links between character education programs and improvements in academic achievement in elementary schools. Most existing research addresses only the effects of individual programs. Benninga et al. were able to obtain more general results by comparing scores on a rubric measuring traits of character education programs in more than 600 California schools and linking these to a numeric indicator that summarised the results of various state-wide assessments. The team found that schools with the strongest character education scores tended to have higher academic scores by a small but significant margin.

The team identified three program attributes that had the strongest links with academic achievement. These included:

1. a school’s ability to ensure a clean and safe physical environment;
2. evidence that parents and teachers modeled and promoted good character education; and,
3. opportunities for students to contribute in meaningful ways to the school and its community. (Schwartz, et al, 2006, pp.25-30)

The second study on *Examining Successful Secondary Level Programs* identified successful practices in character education at the secondary level and took centre stage in *Smart & Good High Schools: Integrating Excellence and Ethics for Success in School, Work and Beyond* (Lickona & Davidson, 2005). The researchers selected 24 schools that had received external recognition for excellence and collected information about them using focus groups, classroom observations, interviews, observations of school-specific programs, and analysis of program materials and archival data. The authors identified six principles for developing an ethical learning community in “Smart and Good” high schools. The six principles were:

1. *Develop shared purpose and identity*. Explicit expectations for personal behaviour as well as academic achievement, such as an honour code, school motto, and school traditions provide important guidance for students.
2. **Align practices with desired outcomes and relevant research.** Offering staff and parents specific guidance about research-based strategies for meeting designated goals reinforces the school’s efforts.

3. **Have a voice; take a stand.** When students are allowed a voice in the classroom, the opportunity for all to express their integrity and courage contribute to excellence and ethics in the school.

4. **Take personal responsibility for continuous self-development.** Adult members of the school community can set a critical example for students by promoting the value of striving for excellence. The ongoing process of self-reflection contributes to creating a culture of excellence within classrooms and school-wide, as well as fostering personal responsibility.

5. **Practice collective responsibility for excellence and ethics.** In a community that values ethics and excellence, adults and students need to intervene immediately when others need support to succeed and do the right thing.

6. **Grapple with tough issues.** Collective responsibility for an ethical learning community entails a responsibility to confront institutional practices or issues that are at odds with the school’s commitment to excellence and ethics.

(Schwartz et al., 2006, pp. 25-30)

The third study was based on reviewing the existing research. The authors of this study, *What Works in Character Education: A Research-Driven Guide for Educators* (Berkowitz & Bier, 2005), looked instead at existing research on character education programs and drew conclusions about the strategies that proved most effective. The team found 33 studies that provided scientifically sound evidence that the program studied was effective. The outcomes included improvements in socio-moral cognition, problem-solving skills, emotional competency, academic achievement, and attachment to school. The researchers identified key characteristics of the successful programs, these included:

1. **Professional Development.** All 33 programs of the effective programs incorporated ongoing professional development for teachers.

2. **Peer Interaction.** All 33 programs incorporated strategies for fostering peer interaction, such as discussion, role-playing, and cooperative learning.
3. **Direct Teaching and Skill Training.** Many of the programs included direct instruction about character development as well as teaching of specific intra-personal (e.g. self-management) and interpersonal (e.g. conflict resolution) skills and capacities.

4. **Explicit Agenda.** More than half the programs studied used specific language about character, morality, values, or ethics.

5. **Family and/or Community Involvement.** Including parents and other community members, both as recipients of character education and as participants in the design and delivery of the programs, was a common strategy.

6. **Models and Mentors.** Both peer and adult role models appeared to foster character development.

7. **Integration into Academic Curricula.** Nearly half of the effective programs were integrated with academic curricula in some way, most often in social studies and language arts curricula.

8. **Multiple Strategies.** Virtually all of the effective programs used a multi-strategy approach, rather than relying on a single model or tool.

(Schwartz et al., 2006, pp.25-30)

Parallel to the North American experience, a concerted effort to identify key values for Australian schools has been implemented by the Australian Government, under the auspices of the Values Education Good Practice Schools Project (VEGPSP). Funds have been forthcoming to support initiatives in selected schools wishing to participate in exploring different educational approaches to teaching values. At the Project Advisory Committee briefing held on 24 February 2006, under the ‘Key Findings to Date’ (Lovat, 2006), the cluster leaders identified a similar list to the three reports given above. In order to assist in identifying similarities between the two countries, the list has been categorised by the researcher into groupings that are similar to the results reported in the American studies. This approach is taken to identify what patterns are also emerging in the Australian context. These include:

**Greater student engagement and learning**

- Greater levels of student engagement in the mainstream curriculum;
- Modelling, living out and practising the values that are being enunciated in the curriculum;
- Demonstration of greater student responsibility for local, national and international issues;
- Greater student resilience and social skills and improved relationships between students demonstrating care and trust;
- Intellectual depth among students demonstrated by a willingness to become involved in complex thinking across the curriculum;
- Knowing the good and moving to do the good;
- Deep knowledge, deep understanding and meta-learning;
- Depth of thinking necessary for ethical reasoning and ethical decision-making.

**Greater teacher engagement and skills**
- Quality teaching and pedagogy;
- Intellectual depth in teacher understanding;
- Pedagogical approaches that match those espoused by ‘Quality Teaching’.

**School environment**
- Taking a whole school approach;
- The ‘ripple’ or ‘trickle-down’ effect that Values education is having across the school;
- Modeling: living out and practicing the values by students and teachers that are being enunciated in the curriculum.

**Involvement of Stakeholders**
- Maximum ‘buy’ in by all the stakeholders;
- Quality relationships within and between the schools of the cluster (geographical area of proximity);
- Quality leadership at cluster and school level, especially where understanding of the comprehensive reach of values is clearer and the link in practice is demonstrable (pp.5-6).

The evidence clearly indicates the importance of intentional programs that provide a complex set of strategies that support successful values education programs, which are
linked with improved academic results. The nature of the relationships between students, staff, parents and the wider community are also suggested as important. In particular, the value of effective role modeling by adults is highlighted in all the research findings that have been included in this section.

1.7 Key Leanings from ‘Programs that Work’

This research suggests that values education, when implemented effectively, can result not only in improved academic achievement, but positive youth development that leads to an increase in pro-social behaviour and a decrease in risky behaviour. The findings from the initial three studies are consistent and, according to Schwartz et al. (2006), three key points stand out that are crucial for effective programs:

1. Goals should be both explicit and ambitious;
2. Professional development of teachers is critical;
3. The whole school community should be involved, and everyone should have a voice.

The conclusions from these studies suggest that values education requires a set of integrated strategies in order to help students develop the attitudes, knowledge, skills and habits/virtues, or what could be termed moral capabilities, that lead to improved academic and social performance. Clearly, research evidence of ‘programs that work’, as examined in the above three studies and the recent findings from the Australian VEGPS (2006) project, supports the notion that moral functioning is educable. This statement is supported by research evidence that shows a clear link between intentional values education programs and transformation of behaviour resulting in more desirable behaviours including higher academic performance and pro-social behaviours that could be defined as distinctly moral. Evidence is seen in such factors as reduced office referrals, improved attendance and test scores, increased skills for conflict resolution, lessening of risky behaviour, and overall improved school climate and civility. The evidence also demonstrates the power of positive relationships with people, inclusive of all stakeholders who touch the lives of students, who role model qualities that can be defined as distinctly moral in character such as respect, trustworthiness, and open-mindedness, within a nurturing environment.

These findings stand in contrast to the early studies of Hartshorne et al. (1928, 1929, 1930) where there appeared to be little correlation between education and resultant
behaviour. So, what is the difference in current values education programs? It would seem that a safe environment is an important factor, along with opportunities to see significant others modeling these capacities. Additional factors include opportunities to explore a wide range of values sets, opportunities to process information internally, and being able to arrive at decisions and learn through a process of discovery, through trial and error, in respectful engagement with others, rather than a passive engagement or simple discussion about moral behaviour.

Hence, a three-way interactive process seems to be involved. One element of this concerns the education of children to become expert moral agents. The second element involves educating parents, professional educators and other people who enable children to consistently learn from experience, to become responsible and expert moral role models and educators. The third element is the need for safe and supportive environments, where all stakeholders can have a voice, to assist in the development and provision of ‘quality moral education’ (Schwartz et al., 2006).

This suggests a very different process of learning from that pertaining to traditional approaches to education, where the teacher was the knower of all and it was their job to make sure they shared the knowledge. In this approach, the child’s job was to learn and regurgitate the knowledge or apply it in given situations. To understand more about the educative process that leads to moral learning would seem worthy of investigation in order to learn from other researchers what they have understood to date about the processes that enhance ‘moral functioning’.

### 1.8 Rationale for Study

Having spent two years designing and implementing a character education program in Canada which resulted in a considerable positive change in student behaviour and higher academic results, I was curious to know what elements may have contributed to successful outcomes, in order to replicate it at a future time. Acknowledgement is given that such auto-ethnographic involvement may create bias in the way the study is conducted and interpreted. To overcome a potential bias, it became important to find relevant empirical research in the literature review to use as an objective point of comparison with other findings.
Key insights about what seems to support students’ success have been gleaned by looking at ‘programs that work’. A review of these programs indicated that in order to acquire ‘moral functioning’, the moral learning process engages more than didactic teaching. By looking at factors that support or impede acting on moral judgement, new understandings may emerge that have not been discovered to date by researching specific elements of moral learning and moral functioning. This study will focus on a relatively small sample of interested adults, reflecting on a holistic process of moral functioning, for the purpose of discovering any trends that may emerge. Such findings can then form the basis of more extensive empirical research at a later date. The limitation of this approach is that the findings will not be able to be generalised to the wider population. Nevertheless, the study could make an important contribution to identify any missing elements involved in the process of moral functioning and moral learning and the resultant implications for education.

To know the good does not necessarily translate into ‘doing’ the good. There is an acknowledged gap between moral judgement and moral action, which researchers have not yet been able to adequately quantify or explain. Kohlberg & Candee (1984) was able to identify that there was greater consistency between reasoning and action at the highest levels of Kohlberg’s (1971; 1981) stage theory of moral reasoning. Even at this level of moral maturity, however, it is a well identified phenomenon that individuals can know what the appropriate moral action is, but will still weigh up the consequences and the situation before deciding whether they will enact the moral judgement. This notion is further validated by Blasi (1980) and Thoma (1994) who articulate that despite the indisputable importance of moral reasoning, there is only a weak link between moral reasoning and moral action. In fact, the disparity between knowing and doing has become increasingly evident across psychological fields, instigating a paradigm shift in mainstream psychology (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).

Considerable insights have been gained to date into aspects of moral development as they relate to the cognitive domains of human development. However, little is known about how all the different identified domains and elements work together, as a process, to ensure that a person develops a stable disposition to consistently translate moral judgement into moral action.
1.9 Focus of Study

The scope of the thesis focuses on discovering from research literature and the lived experience ‘what works’ in translating moral judgement into moral action. It explores from the scientific, religious and educational perspectives elements of success in moral functioning, with the goal of translating such ‘learnings’ into understanding more about the process of moral learning and the resultant implications for the educational process. These findings are then triangulated with Habermas’s theory of communicative action (1972, 1974, 1984, 1987, 1990) and the Danesh (1994) matrix of individual social competence in order to suggest an emergent theory of moral learning and moral functioning.

For the purposes of this study, the religious perspective will be examined through the lens of members of the Bahá’í Faith because of its focus on developing individual moral capacity within a community which values service to the common good. A brief introduction to the Bahá’í Faith is presented as the religious context.

The Bahá’í Faith originated in 1844, in Iran. The personages of the Báb and Bahá’u’llah are recognised as twin manifestations of God. Bahá’u’llah’s son ‘Abdu’l-Bahá and later his grandson Shoghi Effendi were recognised as the official interpreters of the Bahá’í revelation. The Bahá’í Faith recognises the divinity and progressive revelation of all former religions as coming from the same God, each addressing the spiritual and social needs of the age in which each religion was revealed. The Bahá’í Faith was also selected as it is among the more recently revealed revelation traditions and is recognised by the United Nations as an independent world religion, with consultative status with this world body. The Bahá’í Writings consist of over 100 volumes that address the need to develop a unified, interdependent global civilisation, based on spiritual principles. This Faith was also selected because its writings have extensive teachings regarding the spiritual, moral and secular education of children. In addition, its teachings have influenced a number of values and character education programs, such as the Virtues Project (www.virtuesproject.com), which has spread to many countries of the world and inspired character education programs in the United Kingdom, USA, Australia and New Zealand. Additionally, I was involved in Canada for three years in the application of a Bahá’í approach to values education, developing a world citizenship program based on ethical and moral capabilities.
The purpose of the research is to explore recollections of the lived experience of people facing ethical choices and identify the factors and influences that might impact on the gap between ‘knowing’ what to do and actually ‘doing’ it. These insights will be compared with findings from the literature review about moral functioning and educational programs that work, to identify any additional factors involved in moral learning and moral functioning. The combined findings will then be reviewed to discover any implications for how we design and deliver values education programs and facilitate the development of rectitude and refinement of character.

The role of emotions in the decision-making process was also researched to understand more about the interrelationship between cognition, affect and volition in the process of translating moral judgement into moral action. The research findings provided a source of data from the lived perspective, about capabilities that seem to impact on the ability to act-on-moral judgment. A comparison was then made to findings articulated in the Literature Review.

1.10 Research Objectives

The thesis will explore, from both the scientific and religious perspectives each of the following: first, the nature of the gap between reason (cognition), desire (affect and volition), and action; second, the role if any, that the human powers of will (volition) and conscience play in the process of moral learning and moral functioning; third, gender similarities and differences in translating moral judgement into moral action; fourth, the domains of learning which appear to be involved in the process of moral functioning; and fifth, the implications of all these findings for the educative process.

1.11 Organisation of this Thesis

The thesis began with the Foreword, which conveyed information about the background of the researcher in relationship to the topic of the research study. Chapter 1 provided an introduction to the thesis and the current influences relating to the topic of acting-on-moral judgement. Chapter 2 presents the research literature which explores the epistemology underlying the thesis and analyses the most recent discoveries impacting upon our understanding of the moral learning process. Chapter 3 looks at the psychological understandings and research trends from a research perspective of the
process of moral functioning. Additionally, this section explores current models of moral functioning and their application to the educative process. Chapter 4 summarises the key findings in relationship to both moral learning and moral functioning. Chapter 5 provides the rationale, and methodology for this study. Chapter 6 presents the results for Questionnaire 1, which explores the two positions of acting and not acting-on-moral judgement from the respondents’ perspective. Chapter 7 presents the findings of Questionnaire 2, which focuses on the role of emotions in the learning process. Chapter 8 focuses on the development of an emergent theory of moral functioning, which integrates two cycles of moral learning in order to achieve rectitude and refinement of character. The final chapter, Chapter 9 summarises the key research findings and their implications for education. This chapter also refers to areas that would be advantageous to explore through further research.

Summary of chapter
Many current educational systems acknowledge, as a result of social deterioration, that there is a need to reintroduce some form of character or values education in order to redress this situation. There is a need to educate young people to show greater respect for others and to take responsible action to ensure the safety and wellbeing of all. It is hoped that this analysis will give guidance to the elements and experiences that will be helpful in educating children to develop moral capabilities to act consistently on moral judgement. So far in educational history, we have yet to understand how to do this consistently and in a sustainable way. The goal of the research will be to gain additional insights into the process of moral learning and moral functioning from the lived experience of adults interested in moral functioning, in order to advance knowledge about translating moral judgement into moral action and to better inform the character or values education process.
CHAPTER 2
NEW INSIGHTS INTO THE PROCESS OF MORAL LEARNING

The literature review will begin in this chapter with a focus on the underlying epistemology of the thesis based on an exploration of the nature of being human as articulated by Kitwood (1990) and an understanding of how his perceptions relate to both Habermas’s understanding of ways of knowing and the Bahá’í Faith. The chapter then focuses on exploring new research insights that challenge traditional understandings of the moral learning process. The second section will initially describe understandings of the moral-learning process, expanding to brain research findings and brain functioning theories on moral learning that both validate former findings, as well as bring into question conventional understandings of the moral learning process. The third section will review both former and new research insights into the role of emotions in the moral-learning process. The fourth section will explore the impact of the social and learning environments on the moral-learning process. An example is cited of an educational paradigm called the Anisa Model that postulates the critical influence of the environment on the developmental process, reinforcing recent findings from ‘programs that work’. The fifth and final section of Chapter 2 discusses a Bahá’í approach to the conceptual framework of the process of moral learning.

Chapter 1 cited research by Schwartz et al. (2006), who identified that intentional character education programs resulted in improved academic achievement and social functioning. The notion that moral functioning is educable is in contrast to the earlier research findings of Hartshorne and colleagues (1928, 1929, 1930) where there appeared to be little correlation between education and resultant changes in behaviour. Successful programs identified by Schwartz et al. (2006) identified a three-way interactive process that appears to be involved. The first element of this concerns the process of educating children to become expert moral-agents. The second element involves educating parents, professional educators and other people who enable children to consistently learn from experience, to become responsible and expert moral role models and educators. The third element is the need for safe and supportive environments where all the stakeholders can have a voice, and assist in the development and provision of ‘quality moral education’. The work by Schwartz et al. suggested that a
different learning process appears to be involved than was apparent in the research conducted in the late 1920s by the likes of Hartshorne et al. As a result, there has also been resurgence in the introduction of values and character education programs in countries such as the USA, UK and Australia.

If an important element of character education is educating a child to become an expert moral-agent, it would seem important to first understand more about the nature of the human condition, such as who are we, what we are educating a child to become, and how we learn to be an effective moral agent.

What we have learned from programs that work, as identified by Schwartz et al. (2006), suggests that moral learning is a complex process that can be acquired over time and that this process engages more than cognition. The primary focus of existent research has centred mainly on cognitive processes; hence, it would seem important to look at an epistemological approach that provides a more comprehensive approach to understanding the human condition than just looking at human learning being based on theories of cognitive development. If a human being has capacities in a number of different domains, it would seem important to analyse theorists who have espoused more integrated understandings of the human condition. The next section explores the theories of Kitwood (1990), Habermas (1972, 1974, 1981, 1984, 1987, 1990) and the Bahá’í Faith that all articulate a triune approach to moral functioning.

2.1 The Nature of Being Human
A review of moral literature suggests there is limited agreement about how the process of moral functioning works. At this point in the discussion, it would seem of value to examine a more fundamental question about the nature of what it means to be human and what it means to be a moral agent. If a conceptual framework can be identified, it can act as a guide to examine contributing factors to effective moral functioning. The question ‘Who are we?’ has been the cause of both fascination and deep concern by humanity and the subject of documentation throughout the annals of written history. This question continues to re-surface as society tries to find solutions to the current social dilemmas confronting the human race, as we move from a series of independent nation states with differing social mores, to an interdependent global society.
Despite this interest in the nature of being human, we are yet to agree on a common vision of what it is to be human. Mussen, Conger, and Kagan (1969) state:

*There is no single comprehensive theory encompassing the vast body of accumulated data in the field of developmental psychology. A complete theory would have to include explanatory concepts accounting for the origins, as well as the mechanisms of change and development, of all aspects of psychological functioning - motor, cognitive, emotional, and social. It may be impossible to construct such an ideal theory; certainly no one has accomplished it yet. (p.16)*

Why is the task of developing a complete theory so challenging? A study of history and of archaeology indicates that humanity has gone through a number of both physical and cultural evolutionary changes over many millennia. The imperative to survive by adapting in a more and more sophisticated manner to changes in the environment, or to respond to a genetic predisposition, has enlarged our understanding of human capability:

*According to generally accepted anthropological findings, the anatomical evolution of human nature was virtually completed some fifty thousand years ago. Since then the human body and brain has remained essentially the same in structure and size. On the other hand, the conditions of life have changed profoundly during this period and continue to change at a rapid pace. To adapt to these changes the human species used its faculties of consciousness, conceptual thought, and symbolic language to shift from genetic evolution to social evolution, which takes place much faster and provides more variety* (Capra, 1982, p. 298).

Research on moral action has identified that there seem to be specific powers and capabilities that directly impact on our ability to develop and act as moral persons. Many a theory has been pursued, dialogued, critiqued, applied and advanced with a new or different understanding, each movement gaining momentum and enlarging our view of human capability. Maybe the challenge lies in the following notion:

*Of the few theoretical attempts that have been made, most have assumed a final state or culmination in development. Such closed system models do not adequately explain the dynamic process of development because they give no satisfactory explanation of novelty or creativity.....this serious weakness fails to*
account for one of the most fundamental characteristics of development, its very open-endedness. ......descriptions of human life developed to date seem to leave no room for the kind of self-determination that can transcend the programming of family, culture, and tradition. The phenomenon of transcendence has been disregarded. (Jordan and Kalinowski, 1972, p. 18)

In other words, the possibility of what is called the creative advance into novelty has been ignored (Whitehead, 1968). In the light of experience, we can reflect and change our responses in future situations, thus indicating our capacity for creativity and growth and for learning from experience.

The different moral theorists appear to have some elements in common and a wide range of diversity in viewpoint, depending on which school of thought or field of study has influenced their perception of the human condition. Evidence suggests that cognition and affect are often seen as two different influences in the process of moral action. In addition, Kant (1949) and Wilson (1990) introduced the notion of will as being integral to moral action. The challenge is to gain common agreement with regard to overarching concepts about the nature of being human, even if we do not agree on the details.

2.1.1 On Being Human

As the process of moral functioning seems to involve a number of factors, the work of Kitwood (1990) will be reviewed because he has attempted to articulate the fundamental question of what we mean by a person in a holistic and comprehensive way. The religious writings of Baha’u’llah will also be referenced. Baha’u’llah was a 19th Century figure whose writings suggest a renewal of spiritual teachings and a blue-print for developing personal transformation in the context of an interdependent global community based on international peace and world unity, consistent with our current social evolution.

Kitwood (1990) suggests that the concept of being human has a long and evolving history. He defines a person in the following way:
someone who is worthy of recognition: who legitimately belongs to a community of responsible agents; who merits treatment with respect, carrying with it moral or pro-moral implications from the outset. (pp. 45-56)

Kitwood outlines two overarching aspects of person-hood, namely, self with self and agency, or, self with others. He also defines three aspects of person-hood detailed in the following sections.

2.1.1.1 Semiotic/Capacity to Know
First, Piaget (1948, 1965) described what Kitwood (1990) calls the ‘semiotic function’ as the capacity that the child acquires to use both symbols and signs. Baha’u’llah (1817-1892) explains this capacity as the human power to know or the ability to search for truth. We can represent the world to ourselves in many ways and we can juxtapose and rearrange our responses in a purely intellectual activity without physical operations on the world. We do not simply live in a given environment, but live in a social milieu where meanings are shared. Each culture seems to fill out the whole domain of experience with significance, creating myth and fantasy in those areas where it has not rigorously tested the evidence. Kitwood (1990) comments further:

*The semiotic function makes it possible to transcend mere ‘conditioning’, to go beyond the given. With that comes the possibility for human beings to behave towards one another with a cruelty and destructiveness that has no parallel in the animal world. But there is also the opportunity for them to understand one another in their uniqueness, and to develop ideas about what is good.* (pp. 45-56)

This phenomenon is referred to in the Bahá’í Writings as a dual nature, the dual being the higher (human) and lower (animal) or instinctual nature of the human species.

2.1.1.2 Sentience/Capacity to Love
The second aspect of person-hood is referred to as ‘sentience’. This refers to the feeling or ‘mooded’ aspect of our subjectivity and inter-subjectivity; present in all actions, relationships and understandings, even when not recognised, reflected upon or explicitly conceptualised. Baha’u’llah (1817-1892) refers to it as the human power of ‘loving’. It is sometimes referred to as ‘emotionality’, although emotions are often understood as
states of arousal, of deviation from some equilibrium. The concept of equilibrium in this instance is the state of feeling, and possibly the more significant because it relates to a person’s enduring attitudes, or stances, taken towards and within the world. Sentience is the whole modality or what is also referred to as ‘sentiment’ and as ‘affect’ in educational terminology. Stages of development are apparent in this aspect of personhood. In the first year of life, humans form their fundamental apprehension of the world, as a self is gradually formed and begins to give meaning to a vast amount of information, both from within and without. The first meaning would seem to be in the modality of feeling and condensed into a world of private symbols. Later, they are reworked through the medium of language.

All our practical activity, including our relating to one another, involves our sentience. Sentience also includes in this definition the position made famous by Descartes, concerned with pure reflection, involving a state of passivity, quietness and detachment. Kitwood (1990) suggests that there is no radical division between the domains of intellect, feeling and willing. In the development of an individual, the capacity for thinking in a way that is apparently separate from emotionality involves a long period of socialisation, especially in school, where prolonged engagement with theoretical problems is given high priority. For all persons, the purely intellectual mode can only grow out of sentience. Sentience shows wide cultural variation although there seems to be certain expressions on a person’s face and their gestures that are universal, such as fear, anger, surprise and disgust. While these emotions are demonstrated by universal expressions regardless of culture, it can be suggested that as cultural change has taken place, there has been a shift in the way sentience is experienced and conceptualised, consistent with changes in the apprehension of selfhood. As a result, there have been variations in facial expressions; for example, some ethnic cultures believe that looking down rather than directly at a person is a mark of respect.

It is sentience which enables humanity to have a deeper perception of each other. We know a person in the sense of having feelings for and with him/her. This has a direct bearing on our understanding of morality. Most of our moral apprehensions are acquired as sentient beings, when we are not yet capable of indirect, symbolic communication. The morality that is held by a mature and integrated person is not derived primarily from textbooks or instruction but from the lived, felt experience of relationships that
impel feelings of care, support, respect, love, hatred, fear or rejection. These sentiments are then reflected upon and incorporated into a person’s world-view.

2.1.1.3 Selfhood

The third aspect of person-hood relates to selfhood. Kitwood (1990) suggests that a newborn baby gradually becomes, or acquires, a self as she or he enters the social world, aided by intimate care and dialogue provided by others. In many respects, the world shapes what self becomes. Then, as awareness grows, the child learns how to articulate his or her actions skillfully in social life, and to observe these actions very much as if observing another. It is the sense of self that underlies concern for others. Self-hood is universal, but the experience of it is bound by culture. The sense of self in a primal society was seen not only as co-existent with the body but as flowing out into the world; as being permeated by and permeating other selves. It belongs to the larger social matrix.

In contrast to moral primal societies, in society today, a sense of self has shrunk to become more or less bound by the body surface, clearly distinct from other selves. Hence, a sense of loneliness and existential anguish has become more common. Perhaps the only remaining aspect of what was known as selfhood in primal society is the feeling of connectedness and expansiveness that accompanies deep emotional intimacy; and, in certain kinds of mystical experiences, in which the sense of being is enhanced and yet, paradoxically, the sense of individuality disappears, leading to what can be termed as a sense of oneness. Nagel (1970) put forward the concept that it is possible to take up a metaphysical standpoint in which ‘I recognise that I am simply one person among others; they too have their special reality, their desires and reasons, which have as much claim to validity as my own’. A moral standpoint would be one in which this sense of being ‘one among others’ was maintained consistently. However, we continually lapse into a form of solipsism, where we become insensitive to the self-hood of others, recognising the validity of our own reasons and only using others for our own purposes.

2.1.1.4 Agency/Capacity to Use One’s Will

Another major concept Kitwood (1990) elaborates about is ‘person as agency’, or the capacity identified by Baha’u’llah of utilising free will. Whilst a person lives in the
world of nature, we apprehend ourselves in some sense as separate from it, as creators of culture, inhabiting an inter-subjective human reality, and continually transforming the world. If we, as a species, were fixed and bound by nature, there would be no moral questions. Kitwood (1990) goes on to elucidate that humans have a certain degree of freedom, as well as possibilities of making choices and knowing that we are doing so. The capacity for critique and self-transcendence means that we are, or can become, moral beings. In particular, the person can choose (at least sometimes and to some extent) to go beyond self-interest and take others into account. In the Kantian tradition and Augustinian Christianity, morality is often associated with doing the difficult thing, with the overriding of desire in obedience to some higher principle through the exercise of will. This is the sense of having to decide, or to ask for help. The second aspect of agency that Kitwood (1990) refers to is the notion that, at times, we can feel inwardly divided, as if pursuing incompatible goals, or torn between a sense of duty and desire. The third aspect of agency relates to us holding others responsible by asking them to explain their actions, expecting intelligent answers; and then allocating praise or blame.

The concept of agency is not limited just to the exercise of will. It also takes into account that, even though each person occupies a distinctive position and acts individually, the actions all articulate together to produce a complete act that forms the continuing pattern of the culture. An analogy of this phenomenon is like a stitch in a tapestry. Each person has to define and understand the social reality and interpret the actions of others in order to shape his or her own actions. This needs to be executed as each act is accomplished.

Kitwood (1990) looks at the concept of human freedom in relationship to the notion of agency. He suggests that the freedom of each individual is bounded by temperamental and constitutional endowments, derived from what was genetically inherited. ‘Freedom’, in this context, is not seen as absolute and we can be self-deceived about its extent. Nature itself sets the ultimate limits, simply because of the properties of molecules and atoms. The social world within which we live, and over which we have relatively little control, imposes many constraints not only on what can be done, but on what we conceive to be possible. A context of domination is liable also to transform every definition, emotion and desire. Kitwood (1990) and Davidson (1962) argue that the general notion of intentionality suggests that a person’s actions are to be explained
by naming first a “pro-attitude” (a desire, a goal, a value, and so on) and second, a belief that the action is such as would fulfil the desire, promote the goal, or actualise the value. However, common experience suggests that there are many actions (as well as beliefs and desires) that appear to be deeply irrational, and which could be described as a weakness of will.

Davidson’s argument is that the only way to resolve the problem is by supposing that there is, within the person, more than one self-like structure, each of which is a more or less a coherent centre of intentionality. Davidson does not suggest that reason is overcome by desire or passion, but suggests rather that one intentional centre can influence another area of intentionality. Within the psyche, there are causes in operation that are not based on reason, as well as causes that are based on reasons (relating actions logical to intentions). The flattering idea of the unitary self, which has underlain European thought since the seventeenth century, is thus untenable. Additionally, a psychology that builds on this idea is inadequate both to direct experience and to the logic of action-explanation. Davidson goes on to articulate another aspect of agency that relates to the possibility of developing values. He suggests that we can step back from our desires, attitudes, and other motives and evaluate them according to their worth as judged by some other criterion. For a social and moral being, the development of values is a matter of taking an objective stance towards the self, and viewing in a holistic way the aspects of one’s self to which particular motives and actions might belong. Thus, the desire to change or transform self must come from another self-like centre, holding different motives.

A person’s values can become a vital part of a conscious frame of reference, intimately bound up with the sense of personal identity, and hence the motivational structure of the self that occupies the seat of consciousness. Yet, values are not fixed; they too are subject to reappraisal in the light of new experience. Anyone who is open enough to reconsider his or her values is putting at risk both identity and being an agent in the profoundest sense. Anyone who can do this is well on the path to integration of the psyche. Another way of describing this particular process could be when one discovers a need to change one’s particular way of seeing the world, it involves reflection on and the rethinking of one’s mind-set in order to survive what could be termed an existential crisis. This suggests that we evolve through different levels of consciousness. This
concept is reinforced by Erikson’s (1980) theory concerning the process of resolving conflicts at each developmental level. Erikson (1980) proposes that a healthy personality ‘weathers’ these conflicts and emerges and re-emerges with an increased sense of inner unity, with an increased good judgement, and increased capacity to do well and in accord with the standards of those who are significant to him (Erikson, 1980).

2.2 Rethinking Moral Action in the Light of what it means to be Human

Kitwood’s (1990) view of the nature of person-hood has described several interactive processes, including semiotic (capacity to know), sentience (capacity to love) and a sense of agency (capacity to use one’s will) in relationship to self and others. The integration of these processes, Kitwood (1990) suggests leads to psychic integration. Recognition was given to a sense of self, which enables us to recognise the needs of others. In acting as a moral agent, we use these aspects of the human condition or what could be described as human powers, to know, to love and to will.

The aspect of personal identity, as Kitwood (1990) elaborates, is closely linked to our values systems. How we interface with our values in different situations, suggests that these are not fixed. Humans are capable of reflective thought and re-evaluation, therefore, our value systems can change in the light of experience. This aspect of consciousness suggests a higher level of development from which we can view the world. We can reflect upon our experience, gain insight and change our response in future situations. This suggests we can evolve through different levels of consciousness as a result of experience, which could be termed ‘learning through action’.

Examining Kitwood’s (1990) overview of what it means to be human reinforces the view that moral functioning is complex and engages three domains of human capacity of semiotic, sentience and a sense of agency, or, as given above in simpler terms, the capacity to know, the capacity to love and the capacity to use one’s will to translate knowledge and love into action in relation to self and others. While it is useful to look at the ontological view of man, it still does not address the issue of how each of these domains works together to articulate moral functioning. Moral functioning needs to be understood as a developmental process which interacts with situational factors which support moral action. Habermas’s (1972; 1974; 1984; 1987; 1990) theory of
communicative action provides some preliminary insights into how the domains of being human may integrate into a process of translating judgement into action.

2.3 Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action and Discourse Ethics

Kitwood’s (1990) classification of the different capacities of the human condition refers to the capacity of human beings to be meaning-making, conscious beings. For a sentient or feeling being, the first meaning would seem to be in the modality of feeling. Feelings are condensed into a world of private symbols which are later reworked and expressed in action through the medium of language. Kitwood (1990) further articulates that we do not simply live in a given environment, but live in a social milieu where meanings are shared. The capacity for critique and self-transcendence indicates that we are, or can become, moral beings. The capacity to communicate between one agent and another, or from one person to another, enables humanity to search for truth and gain shared meaning. As conscious beings, we view the world through a particular lens. In the light of experience, we can reflect and change our responses in future situations, thus indicating our capacity for creativity and growth and for learning from experience.

The key capacities of what it means to be human bear an interesting relationship with the work of Habermas (1972, 1974, 1981, 1984, 1987, 1990), especially as enunciated in his Theory of Communicative Action (TCA). Kitwood (1990) considers that the highest level of being human is in the ability to share meaning through the medium of language, which enables us to gain and share knowledge. Habermas has developed a theory of the key ways of knowing that result in communicative action, or praxis, which has been influential in assisting educators to understand more about the process of learning.

Habermas’s (1981) Theory of Communicative Action (TCA) articulates a process that he believes contributes to the development of personal identity and ethical discourse. It is based on a concept of communicative reason, which is distinguished from the rationalist tradition in that it considers the site of rationality to be the structures of interpersonal linguistic communication rather than the structure of either the cosmos or the knowing subject. He makes the assumption that communicative action is the process through which people form their identities through learning who we are as autonomous agents from our basic relations with others. This notion appears to be in alignment with
Kitwood’s (1990) definition of the moral person “Morality is concerned fundamentally, with respect for persons, and hence with person-in-relationship; beyond that, with the whole quality of social life within which persons have their being.” (p.40) Habermas conceptualizes that communicative action serves to transmit and renew cultural knowledge, in a process of achieving mutual understandings. It then coordinates action towards social integration and solidarity. This theory implies the importance of the interrelationship between the internal and external environment, or ‘life world’ as termed by Habermas. He shifts the emphasis in our concept of rationality from the individual to the social.

His notion of communication is "oriented to achieving, sustaining and reviewing consensus - and indeed a consensus that rests on the intersubjective recognition of criticisable validity claims." (TCA, 1981 book 1, p. 17) A pluralistic mode of critical inquiry suggests a different norm of correctness: that criticism must be verified by those participating in the practice and this demand for practical verification is part of the process of inquiry itself. He defines Communicative Rationality as:

1. The processes by which different validity claims are brought to a satisfactory resolution.

2. The relations to the world that people take to forward validity claims for the expressions they deem important. (TCA, 1, 1981 p. 75)

For Habermas, rationality consists not so much in the possession of particular knowledge, but rather in “how speaking and acting subjects acquire and use knowledge” (TCA, 1, 1981 p. 11). Any such account is “pragmatic” because it shares a number of distinctive features with other views that see interpreters as competent and knowledgeable agents. Most importantly, a pragmatic approach develops an account of practical knowledge in the “performative attitude,” that is, from the point of view of a competent speaker. Habermas’s theory of rationality attempts to reconstruct the practical knowledge necessary for being a knowledgeable social actor among other knowledgeable social actors.

The fundamental form of coordination through language, according to Habermas, requires speakers to adopt a practical stance oriented toward “reaching understanding,”
which he regards as the “inherent telos” of speech. When actors address one another with this sort of practical attitude, they engage in what Habermas calls “communicative action,” which he distinguishes from strategic forms of social action.

In communicative action, or what Habermas (1998b) later came to call “strong communicative action” speakers coordinate their action and pursuit of individual (or joint) goals on the basis of a shared understanding that the goals are inherently reasonable or merit-worthy. Whereas strategic action succeeds insofar as the actors achieve their individual goals, communicative action succeeds insofar as the actors freely agree that their goal is reasonable, that it merits cooperative behavior. Communicative action is thus an inherently consensual form of social coordination in which actors “mobilize the potential for rationality” given with ordinary language and its telos of rationally motivated agreement

A speech act succeeds in reaching understanding when the hearer takes up “an affirmative position” toward the claim made by the speaker (TCA 1, 1981, pp. 95–97; 282; 297). In doing so, the hearer presumes that the claims in the speech act could be supported by good reasons (even if she has not asked for them). When the offer made by the speaker fails to receive uptake, speaker and hearer may shift reflexive levels, from ordinary speech to “discourse”—processes of argumentation and dialogue in which the claims implicit in the speech act are tested for their rational justifiability as true, correct or authentic. Thus the rationality of communicative action is tied to the rationality of discourse,

The complexity of social interaction then allows him to find three basic validity claims potentially at stake in any speech act used for cooperative purposes (i.e., in strong communicative action). His argument relies on three “world relations” that are potentially involved in strongly communicative acts in which a speaker intends to say something to someone about something (TCA 1, 1981: 275ff). For example, a constative
(fact-stating) speech act (a) expresses an inner world (an intention to communicate a belief); (b) establishes a communicative relation with a hearer (and thus relates to a social world, specifically one in which both persons share a piece of information, and know they do); and (c) attempts to represent the external world. This triadic structure suggests that many speech acts, including non-constatives, involve a set of tacit validity claims: the claim that the speech act is sincere (non-deceptive), is socially appropriate or right, and is factually true (or more broadly: representationally adequate). Conversely, speech acts can be criticized for failing on one or more of these scores. Thus, fully successful speech acts, insofar as they involve these three world relations, must satisfy the demands connected with these three basic validity claims (sincerity, rightness, and truth) in order to be acceptable.

This theory of communicative action could be said to describe a process of moral engagement, so it is not surprising that Habermas has also elaborated on a notion of discourse ethics. Habermas's version is heavily indebted to the Kantian tradition. Like Kant, he considers morality a matter of unconditional moral obligations: the prohibitions, positive obligations, and permissions that regulate interaction among persons. The task of moral theory is to reconstruct the unconditional force of such obligations as impartial dictates of practical reason that hold for any similarly situated agent. Also like Kant, Habermas links morality with respect for autonomous agency: in following the dictates of impartial reason, one follows one's own conscience and shows respect for other such agents. Unlike Kant, however, Habermas takes a dialogical approach to practical reason, as his discourse theory requires. Kant assumed that in principle each mature, reflective individual, guided by the Categorical Imperative, could reach the same conclusions about what duty requires. This assumption has long been recognized as problematic, but in pluralistic and multicultural settings it becomes entirely untenable: one may plausibly claim to take an impartial moral point of view only by engaging in real discourse with all those affected by the issue in question.

What one gets, according to Habermas, is a dialogical principle of universalization (U): “A [moral norm] is valid just in case the foreseeable consequences and side-effects of its general observance for the interests and value-orientations of each individual could be jointly accepted by all concerned without coercion” (i.e., in a sufficiently reasonable discourse) (1998a, 42; trans. amended). To regard a moral norm as valid, one must
presume it would hold up in a fully inclusive and reasonable discourse. Habermas takes a further step, however, insisting that (U) is a principle of real discourse: an individual's moral judgment counts as fully reasonable only if it issues from participation in actual discourse with all those affected. Moreover, (U) requires not simply that one seek the input of others in forming one's conscience, but that one gains their reasonable agreement.

In moral discourses of application, one must test alternative normative interpretations of the particular situation for their acceptability before the limited audience of those immediately involved, on the assumption that one is applying valid general norms. Even at the level of application, however, discourse cannot always include all the affected parties (e.g., when the issue concerns the fate of a comatose patient). Habermas's discourse ethics thus implies that, regarding many if not most of our moral rules and choices, the best we can achieve are partial justifications, arguments that are not conclusively convincing for all, but also are not conclusively defeated, in limited discourses with interlocutors we regard as reasonable.

According to Habermas, moral maturation involves the growing ability to integrate the interpersonal perspectives given with the system of personal pronouns; the endpoint of that process coincides with the capacity to engage in the mutual perspective-taking required by (U).

Habermas postulates that if individuation depends on socialization, then any anthropologically viable system of morality must protect not only the integrity of individuals but also the web of relationships and cultural forms of life on which individuals depend for their moral development. Discourse ethics, Habermas claims, meets this two-fold demand in virtue of the kind of mutual perspective-taking it requires. If we examine (U), we see that it requires participants to attend to the values and interests of each person as a unique individual; conversely, each individual moderates her judgment about the moral import of her values and interests on what all participants can freely accept. Consequently, moral discourse is structured in a way that links moral validity with solidaristic concern for both the concrete individual and the morally formative communities on which her identity depends.
Unlike truth, the rightness of a moral norm does not consist in reference to an independently existing realm of objects, but rather in the worthiness of the norm for intersubjective recognition. Thus rightness, unlike truth, means ideal warranted assertibility (2003a, chap. 6: 2005b, p. 93).

In addition to Habermas’s theory of Communicative Action and Discourse Ethics, he has further elaborated on the more practical application of these theories in three ways of knowing as clearly articulated by Lovat (2006). Apart from the generally accepted way of knowing through ‘empirical-analytic’ knowing, which has characterised much of the way that schools have traditionally approached learning, Habermas refers to the second way of knowing as being more challenging and authentic. Habermas described this second way as ‘historical-hermeneutic’ or ‘communicative knowledge’, that is, the knowledge and understanding that results from engagement and interrelationship with others. The third way of knowing is referred to as ‘critical knowing’ or ‘self reflectivity’, that is, the knowing and understanding that comes from the critique of all one’s sources of knowledge and ultimately the critique of one’s own self. In Habermas’s terms, this comes from knowing oneself, perhaps for the first time. Habermas considered this type of knowledge to be the supreme knowing that marked a point of one’s arriving as a human being. Kitwood (1990) reasons that anyone who is sufficiently open to reconsider his or her values, is putting identity at risk, and is thus being an agent in the profoundest sense. Anyone who can do this is well on the path to psychic integration. As Lovat (2006) suggests, in describing Habermas’s theory, “there is no knowing without knowing the knower” (p.3), where the knower is oneself, and a consequent change of belief and behaviour inevitably follows. This change is described by Habermas as ‘praxis’, a practical or communicative action designed to right wrongs in one’s environment.

The question can be asked ‘Is knowing enough?’ Plato held that to know the good was to do the good. Therefore, how does Habermas define knowledge? His definition indicates that knowledge arises from a process that involves more than our capacity to think or what, in educational terms, is called ‘cognition’. Implicit in the second way of knowing is the notion that the quality of a relationship depends on a desire to engage and relate to another person in the first place. Is this quality only based on knowledge or does it involve other domains of human capacity? Davidson (1962) articulates that we
do not function as a unitary self but have competing centres of intentionality. Kitwood (1990) suggests that we not only exist as a semiotic being with our capacity to know, but also our sentient or feeling capacity, or capacity to love. This capacity to feel, or care, or love, would seem to describe the same phenomenon. It would seem to be a necessary condition for developing the second way of knowing, as described by Habermas. He described this way as historical-hermeneutic or communicative knowledge, or the knowledge and understanding that results from engagement and interrelationship with others.

Habermas has described an inherently moral process. He refers to communicative capacity as the ability to reflect on one’s own life and being able, as a self-reflective knower, to realise that a life view is just one of a myriad of possible life views. Communicative capacity leads to communicative action wherein a reflective-self knower takes a step beyond mere tolerance to take a stand both for justice and for oneself because one’s new found self, one’s own integrity is at stake. This is a concept about personal commitment, reliability and trustworthiness that spills over into practical action that makes a difference, or what Habermas describes as *praxis*. It is the kind of action that can only come from the wellspring enshrined in the notion of self reflectivity, from one who knows who they are, values the integrity of being authentic and commits oneself to establishing the kinds of caring and trusting relationships that bear the best fruits of human interactivity (Lovat, 2000). This process describes what could well be termed ‘moral action’. Hence, Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action is a useful way of describing the process of moral action.

Habermas refers to communicative capacity as the ability to reflect on one’s own life and being able, as a self-reflective knower, to realise that a life view is just one of a myriad of possible life views. This process suggests that a person needs to become competence in the art of reflection or what could be termed moral learning.

### 2.4 The nature of Being Human from a Bahá’í Perspective

There are a number of similarities between the theories of Kitwood and Habermas and the Bahá’í perspective of being human. Different terminologies are used but there are concepts which appear to be describing similar human phenomena. The Bahá’í Writings refer to human nature as having three major aspects. The first aspect is our physical
being that is able to use our five senses to interact and interpret the physical environment through the process of perception. This is the seat of the ‘ego’ or ‘lower nature’ as it is referred to in the Bahá’í literature (Abdu’l-Bahá, 1978) and includes the basic drives for survival, growth and reproduction as well as ‘negative’ emotions such as fear, anger and jealousy. The second aspect is our intellectual being, also called the rational soul, which is endowed with the powers of imagination, thought, comprehension and memory. These intellectual capacities are used to engage in the learning process and combine to develop our capacity to reason, analyse, and gain what can be referred to as intellectual knowledge. The third aspect of our being is referred to as the spiritual being and encapsulates three powers, including: ‘knowing’ which is interpreted in a spiritual sense as being conscious of our own knowledge and reactions; ‘loving’ which refers to the capacity to give and receive love; and employing our ‘free will’ in order to identify a range of potential actions, choose a particular action and then implement this choice.

The intellect acts as a bridge between the physical and spiritual being and enables us to use our spiritual powers of knowing, loving and willing to develop virtuous characteristics which lead to moral judgements and moral action. The notion of the spiritual capacity to know and to reflect on action is referred to in secular literature as consciousness (Damasio, 1999).

Bahá’ís believe that humanity is made in the image of God, in that each individual potentially possesses all the names and attributes of God; that is, virtues, such as mercy, kindness and justice. The purpose of human existence is to develop innate potential into virtuous behaviour, through both the formal educative process and the broader workshop of life experience. The Bahá’í Writings suggest that virtue is developed through the process of engaging knowledge, volition and action. When we leave this physical condition (that is, when the physical body dies), the only dimensions that will remain are the virtues or spiritual qualities that we have acquired throughout our lives. The journey of life is to develop balance between our physical, intellectual and spiritual beings. The highest expression of human capacity is regarded as service to humanity, service which helps bring about peace and justice amongst our fellow human beings.
The process that Baha’u’llah considered essential to human interaction, and especially for solving any human problems or dilemmas, was termed ‘consultation’. Consultation is a process used within a given group, for example, by a couple within marriage or within a family unit or within an otherwise defined group, say an elected body, which shares common interests, responsibilities and concerns. In the process each person speaks their own truth in a spirit of open, frank and loving consultation which has the aim of seeking the truth of a situation, achieving unity of understanding (moral judgement) and then deciding upon harmonious lines of action (moral action).

Baha’u’llah advises on the importance of making decisions based on spiritual principles such as unity, justice, oneness and equality, depending on which principles apply, within the context in which the decision is to be made. Bahá’í consultation can be likened to communicative action as described by Habermas. This notion of principled decision-making is resonant with the highest stage in Kohlberg’s (1984) stages of moral development.

2.5 Understanding the Moral Learning Process

The discussion now turns to research regarding how we learn to be moral. Moral learning has been researched more from the outcomes of moral education rather than the moral-learning process. In classical operant conditioning, learning was defined as a change in the frequency of a particular response. As Bechtel and Abrahamsen (1991) have observed however: “The major limitation of this work was a lack of an adequate means of modeling what occurred inside the system as it learned” (p.67). In fact, this limitation was regarded as a virtue: learning theorists preferred to regard the organism as a black box. Some investigators developed notions of mediated learning that referred to internal stimuli and responses but had no way of actually building models of the internal events.

Hartshorne and colleagues (1928, 1929, 1930) identified that carrying out helping activities and moral discussions did not result in changed behaviour nor the application of moral values, which implies that the traditional approach to learning used in schools was not effective when teaching moral behaviour.
Kohlberg (1971; 1981), who developed a stage theory of moral development (see Chapter 3), says that his stages are not the product of maturation. That is, the stage structures and sequences do not simply unfold according to a genetic blueprint or as a product of socialisation. That is, socialising agents (e.g., parents and teachers) do not directly teach new forms of thinking. The stages emerge, instead, from our own thinking about moral problems. Social experiences do promote development, but they do so by stimulating our mental processes. It seems that as we get into discussions and debates with others, we find our views questioned and challenged and we are therefore motivated to come up with new, more comprehensive positions. More advanced stages reflect these broader viewpoints (Kohlberg et al., 1974). Kohlberg (1976) sometimes speaks of change occurring through role-taking experiences, and opportunities to consider others’ viewpoints. As children interact with others, they learn how viewpoints differ and how to coordinate them in cooperative activities. As they discuss their problems and work out their differences, they develop their conceptions of what is fair and just.

Whatever the interactions are specifically like, they work best, Kohlberg (1976) states, when they are open and democratic. Kohlberg refers here to the notion that the less children feel pressured simply to conform to authority, the freer they are to settle their own differences and formulate their own ideas. When Kohlberg explains that his stages are hierarchically integrated, he means that people do not lose the insights gained at earlier stages, but integrate them into new, broader frameworks. For example, people at stage 4 can still understand stage 3 arguments, but they now subordinate them to wider considerations. Hence, Kohlberg’s notion of moral functioning suggests that development occurs from one stage to the next when individuals are challenged to think at higher levels. This, according to Kohlberg, can be achieved by role-playing of more complex dilemmas and engaging the person to see another’s perspective in an environment that allows for freedom of expression.

Kohlberg’s research findings suggest that moral learning is essentially a cognitive process, impacted on by the social environment. As was borne out by Hartshorne et al. (1928, 1929, 1930), Kohlberg concludes that moral learning does not occur in the traditional way that aligns with many teachers’ ideas about children’s learning. It is increasingly evident that moral functioning is a complex process which engages a
number of dimensions in the learning process. Even though Kohlberg recognized that children needed to think the dilemmas through for themselves, he did not have the benefit of tracking what was happening inside the brain, nor being able to track how the learning process was engaged in moral endeavours. It would seem of value initially, to review research findings in the neurosciences in order to see if this new field of learning can provide deeper insights into the moral-learning process occurring inside the brain.

2.5.1 New Insights into the Moral Learning Process offered by Neuroscience

Theories of learning now have the possibility of being informed from the actual operation of the brain through new diagnostic imaging tools of neuroscience, such as magnetic resonance imaging, position-emission tomography and functional magnetic resonance imaging (Lieberman, 1998). Additional insights about the operation of the brain have been gained from research with human subjects who have suffered some impairment to a particular section of their brains through either accident or illness (Damasio, 2003). It is now possible to develop theories of learning which are not based solely on what external behaviours suggest about our neural capacities to learn.

Marshall and Zohar (2000), in their review of the functioning of the brain, have identified three patterns of brain activity, or neural organisation, that could have a direct bearing on understanding more about how we process information and learn. One kind of neural organisation enables us to do rational, logical, rule-bound thinking. This is generally known as Intelligence Quotient (IQ). This is linked to the nervous system and works along neural tracks. It is like Christmas lights that are wired serially; if one goes off, they all go off. Learning along this route is step-by-step and rule-based. This mode of functioning also accounts for instinctual behaviour. An instinct can be thought of as a fixed program. This mode of thinking finds it difficult to bend the rules and learn new ones. The higher form of this kind of thinking based on neurological pathways is also useful for solving rational problems or achieving definite tasks in practical, day-to-day life. It is also useful for strategic planning and analysis and it is accurate, precise and reliable. It is the thinking most valued by western education systems and forms the basis of scientific thinking.

Another kind of brain functioning allows us to do associative, habit-bound, pattern-recognising emotive thinking, referred to as Emotional Intelligence (EQ). It links emotion to an action. For example, it will help form associations between hunger and
the food that will satisfy it, even though our logic might give us a different story. This
system works by neural networks that develop with repeated actions. It is the link
between one emotion and another, between emotions and bodily feelings, and emotion
and the environment. It is the ‘thinking’ with the heart and body. The simplest use of
this neural organisation is operant conditioning. Neural networks allow more complex
associative patterns to be learned. The strength of interconnections between elements is
modified by experience, thus allowing the system to ‘learn’. All associative learning is
done by trial and error. If a trial run fails, no neural connection is wired in; if it
succeeds, the brain strengthens that connection. This kind of learning is heavily
experienced-based. Learning to ride a bicycle is an example. In this mode, we feel our
skills, we do our skills, but we do not think or talk about them. It is also habit bound. If
we feel anger about a particular situation, it is difficult to react differently the next time
a similar situation occurs so it becomes an automatic mode. Emotional reactions are
held in the long-term memory. It is the kind of thinking that can handle nuances and
ambiguity in a given situation.

What has become evident is that there appears to be cooperation between these two
modes of operation in a third mode of operation, Marshall and Zohar, 2000, originally
referred to this function as Spiritual Intelligence (SQ)). Research carried out by Linas,
Rodolfo, and colleagues (1993) using Magneto-encephalograph (MEG) technology,
discovered more about the 40 Hz oscillations across the brain that appear to be
responsible for the integrative mode of functioning of the brain. These oscillations seem
to communicate and collate perceptual and intellectual processing across the whole
brain. This action only ceases when a person is in a coma, or anaesthetised and there are
only slight oscillations in deep, dreamless sleep. Linas and colleagues concluded that
consciousness (knowing that you know, or being able to observe one’s actions) is an
intrinsic state of the brain rather than simply a by-product of sensory experience.

This third kind of operation of the brain makes it possible to engage in creative,
insightful, rule-making, rule-breaking thinking. This is referred to as integrative or
unitary thinking (SQ), which is the ability to reframe or reconceptualise our experience
and results in a transformation of our understanding of the experience. Kaku (1994) uses
the analogy of a gold fish in a bowl to explain this process. He describes how the fish
does not know that it is in a bowl until it takes a big leap that raises it above the surface
of the water of the bowl. In this action, the goldfish realises that it exists within a larger world outside the bowl, a medium in which to move other than water. The fish has re-contextualised its original situation and transformed its view of reality. This presupposes of course that a goldfish is able to think in such terms. Even if not, it is nevertheless a simple example of the nature of integrative thinking.

These three modes of operation of the brain seem to provide the basis for three types of knowing described by Habermas (1972; 1974; 1984; 1987; 1990). First, is the sequential mode of processing for empirical knowing; second, is the associative mode of processing for knowing through interaction with others. Finally, the third mode of operation, known as the unitary or integrative way, supports Habermas’ third way of knowing, or self-reflective knowing, which is said to be essential to communicative action.

These three modes of operation of the brain provide an initial overview of a holistic view of brain functioning; however, it is worth reflecting on a recent wave of cognitive theory, called Connectionism which is described below. It is based on current conceptions within neuroscience and models the brain as a parallel, distributed processor (Ramsey, Stich and Rumelhart, 1991). Using this model, Connectionism offers a theory of learning based in new understandings of how the brain operates which have interesting insights in relationship to how moral functioning may develop within the brain. While there is still a great deal that is simply not known about the operation of the brain and how we use it to learn, there is now a sufficiently credible body of research to support the Connectionist theory and its broad outline of how we learn. It is within the paradigm offered by Connectionism that it is possible to offer a new and more acceptable neural basis for moral learning, as suggested by Churchland (1996).

Like other forms of learning, moral learning is made possible by the particular neural architecture of our brains. Recent research in neuroscience (Kelso, 1995; Churchland, 1996) suggests that this neural architecture more closely resembles the operations of a massively powerful parallel distributed processor than the linear computing model originally adopted by cognitive theorists over two decades ago. Kelso (1995) describes the brain as fundamentally a pattern-forming, self-organised, dynamic system poised on the brink of instability. It is this near instability that allows the brain to be flexible and
switch among a large repertoire of spatio-temporal patterns. It is in response to such theories that new models for brain functioning and learning have been developed.

Cognitive psychologists have developed the so-called Connectionist model where the brain’s operation is conceived of as a network of elementary units or nodes, each of which has some degree of activation. These units are connected to each other so that active units can excite or inhibit other units (Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 1991). The degree to which these connections can either excite or inhibit other units depends on the "synaptic weight" of these connections, where this is understood as the varying significance that the brain attaches to signals from these nodes. Within this model, learning from experience involves changing the significance of the connections in our brain. Therefore, the Connectionist model proposes a radically different explanation for the representation of reality by the human mind. In the earlier symbolic paradigm, representation was considered to be the exclusive province of symbols stored and retrieved from memory, then transformed according to various rules such as those of syntax. In contrast, the Connectionist model proposes that representation of reality is carried out via the use of prototypes, which are not exclusively symbolic in character. It is proposed that these prototypes are the product of vector-coding that charts the varying dimensions of our physical and social world.

For example, in developing a vector-code for faces, our brain codes various dimensions for faces such as eye separation, nose width, mouth fullness. As Churchland (1996) explains, if humans represent faces with a ten-dimensional vector, with only five increments of discrimination along each of its ten dimensions, then we should be able to discriminate roughly 10 million different faces. We are able to use this information to form a prototype of a face. It is this knowledge of the prototype that enables us to do a quick sketch of a face without reference to any direct model of a face. We learn to distinguish new faces by comparing them to the basic prototype and noting the ways in which they diverge from this prototype.

Churchland (1996) believes that, just as we develop prototypical understandings about the human face, so also we develop prototypical understandings of moral concepts. Moreover, our social interactions with others provide the context within which such moral learning occurs. Just as we learn about important aspects of our physical space,
we must also learn, as we have already noted, about significant aspects of our social space. We have to learn a hierarchy of categories for social agents, events, positions, configurations and processes and, as Churchland (1996) notes; we have to learn these categories despite degraded inputs, chronic ambiguity and even deception. Above all, we have to learn appropriate social behaviour just as surely as we must learn to walk, grasp food and find shelter. In order to do this, we have to learn to generate socially acceptable or socially advantageous behaviour. Churchland (1996) hypothesises that the neural network produces its input-output behaviour, not by applying any rules that have come to be applied internally, but rather through the embodied multiplication of a vector by a large matrix of synaptic connections to yield a new vector as product.

Nevertheless, a trained network can produce highly regular behaviour to the extent that some sets of rules can accurately specify or re-create that input-output behaviour. Churchland (1996) says that a normal human’s capacity for moral perception, cognition, deliberation and action, has rather less to do with rules, whether internal or external, than is commonly supposed. He sees our moral capacity being exercised through a hierarchy of learned prototypes for both moral perception and moral behaviour, prototypes embodied in the well-tuned configuration of a neural network’s synaptic weights.

As Churchland (1996) has stated, “social and moral cognition, social and moral behaviour, are no less activities of the brain than is any other kind of cognitive behaviour” (p.124). Furthermore, social and moral comprehension has as much right to the term, knowledge, as does scientific or theoretical comprehension. Moral knowledge, as any other form of knowledge, develops over time through the vicissitudes of ordinary experiences and is as hard-won, as robustly empirical and objective, and as vital to our well being as any other type of knowledge. Churchland (1996) believes that, like other forms of cognition, moral cognition is subject to the same ambiguities that characterise perception generally, is just as susceptible to the occasional prejudice that recurrent neural pathways make possible, and is also capable of the same cognitive reversals that fresh knowledge makes possible. On these assumptions, Churchland (1996) sees moral agency as involving a matching exercise to determine which moral prototype is most nearly relevant to a particular moral issue or problem, given a hierarchy of moral prototypes from a substantial number of relevant examples. Damasio (2000) refers to
this phenomenon via the term, ‘somatic maps’. Churchland (1996) sees these moral prototypes as being supra-verbal and exemplar-driven in that one’s ability to recognise instances of cruelty, patience, meanness and courage, for instance, far outstrips one’s capacity for verbal definitions of those notions.

Accordingly, Churchland (1996) recognises the need to protect moral perception from self-deception and self-service, as well as from group think and fanaticism, through encouraging individuals to see moral problems in "more than one way" and to "evaluate the relative accuracy and relevance of those competing interpretations” (p.125). This competence, Churchland (1996) believes, requires moral imagination which draws from a rich store of moral prototypes and utilises skills developed through recurrent manipulation of one’s moral perception in order to recognise local divergences from a prototype and so develop alternatives. This description validates Kohlberg’s (1971, 1981) findings on the value of children being engaged in the solutions-finding process in relation to moral dilemmas.

Like Churchland (1996), Johnson (1993) reasons that our prototypical moral concepts provide us with a point of comparison in evaluating new moral problems, and our moral imagination enables us to deal with these problems. In fact, Johnson (1993) ascribes a particular role to moral reasoning as a constructive imaginative activity which enables us to develop metaphoric moral concepts at two levels. According to Johnson (1993), our most fundamental concepts, such as those relating to will, freedom and right, are typically defined metaphorically by multiple metaphoric mappings for a single concept. Second, Johnson (1993) maintains that the way we conceptualise a situation depends on our use of systematic conceptual metaphors that make up the common understandings of members of our culture. For example, he identifies the Social Accounting Metaphor, (e.g. “He must pay the price for manslaughter”), as being one such metaphor in common use in our society. Johnson (1993) sees human beings as imaginative, synthesising animals, able to make use not only of metaphoric mappings and prototypes, but also of image schemas, semantic frames and metonymy.

Recent research by Krebs and Wark (1996) suggests that moral development is more additive-inclusive than transformational-displacement. These findings are consistent with the Connectionist model for learning and suggest that Kohlberg’s (1968, 1981)
fixed hierarchical stages of moral development are questionable. Krebs’ and Wark’s (1996) study of 55 female and 55 male undergraduates investigated whether different types of moral dilemmas evoke different forms of moral judgment and found that, contrary to Kohlberg’s (1984) hypothesis about moral stages, most students (i.e. 76%) did not base their moral judgments on one over-riding stage structure with respect to the three dilemmas used in the study. Krebs and Wark (1996) concluded that “old stage structures are not transformed and displaced by new structures; they remain available and may be evoked by appropriate stimuli” (p.228). They also found, contrary to Gilligan’s (1982) hypothesis of gender differences with respect to moral orientation, that only 9% of the students’ responses reflected such specific gendered orientations. This would support the view of Walker (1995) who identified that there are two major cognitive components underlying moral action. One component is the interpretation of moral situations and the other is the resolution of moral conflict. This suggests that the situational and experiential elements impact on a stage approach, implying a process that can be termed ‘exigency’ (context and intent of action) rather than ‘precedence’ in the way an individual interprets what to do in a given situation.

Another phenomenon concerning brain functioning was noted in the research work of Hart (1983, 1999). Hart found that when there were conditions of stress, the brain activity moved from the neo-cortex to lower areas of the brain and she coined the term ‘downshifting’ to describe the phenomenon. ‘Downshifting’ is a term that provides a metaphor for a change in brain functioning. This field of study is still imprecise however Damasio (2003) was able to demonstrate this same phenomenon. Damasio showed how electrical functioning occurs in the brain under joyful conditions yet shifts from the frontal lobe to lower in the brain stem when in a sorrowful condition. He postulates that joyful and sorrowful conditions are the basis of all our motivation regarding what actions we will take in a given situation. We prefer to avoid sorrowful conditions. He also found that when a person suffered damage to the frontal lobe, they would frequently exhibit amoral behaviour, demonstrating that the frontal lobe has a critical part to play in moral judgement. This discovery of Damasio (2003) suggests a link between a purely cognitive approach to the involvement of the emotions in brain functioning that can impact on the learning process, as defined by the Connectionist theorist in moral learning. The discussion now turns to what researchers know about the engagement of the emotions, or the affective domain.
2.5.2 Role of Emotions in the Learning Process

Kagan (1984) and Hoffman (1976, 1983, 1988) proposed that emotion, rather than cognition, provided the foundation for morality. They proposed that the potential for moral-emotional reactions is present at birth and that natural feeling states provide a “platform upon which a set of universal, or principled, moral standards could be built” (Kagan, 1984, p. 123). This introduced the notion that empathy is at the heart of moral action, which implies that some emotional states could be more supportive of moral action than others.

These findings were in sharp contrast to the work of Kant (1949), Piaget (1965) and Kohlberg (1976), who suggested that moral decision-making was based largely on cognitive processes. The research work of Gilligan (1982) and Noddings (1984) identified a morality based not only on justice but also on caring, thus supporting the notions of Kagan and Hoffman that emotion and social relations, rather than just cognition, provide the foundation for morality. Damon (1988) built on the findings of Kagan (1984) and Hoffman (1977, 1983,1983), proposing that early emotional reactions provide a natural base or energising structure for moral learning, which is inextricably tied to cognitive and social aspects of children’s development. Rest (1983) and Berkowitz and Grych (1998), in their examples of integrative models of moral functioning, bring together the notion that it is not either/or, but a dynamic relationship between cognitive and affective functioning that is instrumental to moral learning and functioning.

What is meant by an emotion? A definition of emotions, relevant to this thesis is:

A psychic and physical reaction (as anger or fear) subjectively experienced as feeling and physiologically involving changes that prepare the body for action (www.dictionary.com).

This definition describes a complex and interrelated process that ultimately results in preparing the body for action which implies that emotion is directly connected with action. Current literature identifies that each emotion is experienced in the body as a polypeptide chain and a cell wall develops a receptor to a particular emotion, giving weight to this notion (Pert, 2003). This creates a chemical reaction that is interpreted by the brain and then translated by a process of cognition into a feeling. If it is experienced
as a positive emotion, the brain will continue to function in the frontal lobe in a problem-solving or creative mode (Damasio, 2003). However, if it is a negative emotion, it might create a fight, flight or freeze response (Hart, 1983). Another way of expressing the phenomenon of a negative emotion is in terms of a ‘natural’ emotion because it has an immediate physical impact or what could be termed an instinctual reaction.

‘Abdu’l Bahá’ (1911/1978) classifies negative and positive emotions as either ‘natural’ or ‘spiritual’

“Man possesses two kinds of susceptibilities; the natural emotions, which are like dust upon the mirror and spiritual susceptibilities, which are merciful and heavenly characteristics. (p. 244)”

He further describes the impact that positive and negative emotional states have on cognitive processes.

“In this world we are influenced by two sentiments, joy and pain. Joy gives us wings! In times of joy our strength is more vital, our intellect keener, and our understanding less clouded. We seem better able to cope with the world and to find our sphere of usefulness. But when sadness visits us we become weak, our strength leaves us, our comprehension is dim and our intelligence veiled.”

(Abdu’l-Baha, 1911/2006 p.109)

Damasio (1999) has also elaborated on the notion that many emotional responses occur in the body below the level of consciousness and may impact the emotional centre of the brain. Over time, this creates an automatic emotional response that has not engaged a conscious thinking process but which instantaneously triggers a reaction in the body to respond to a ‘negative’ emotion such as fear. It is not until there is a conscious registering of an emotion through engaging cognitive processing or imaging the emotion, that other feeling states become available. This suggests that it may be beneficial for people to register and recognize their emotional reactions so they can objectively appraise what they are feeling in a given situation.

Different models have been suggested to account for the nature and role of the emotions and these have been described by Griffin and Mascolo (1998, p.5) as including: (1)
biological; (2) cognitive; (3) structural-developmental; (4) functionalist; and, (5) social-cultural. Griffiths (1998) believes that there is a strong case for accepting an evolutionary, biological basis for the emotions. This approach endorses Darwin’s (1901) view that the emotions evolved as particular patterns of response to enable us to survive and thrive in the variety of situations we encounter as a species. Izard (1991) notes that the early work of Darwin (1872/1965, 1877), and the more recent work by himself (Izard, 1984), have revealed certain ‘fundamental emotions’ which have the same expressions and experiential qualities the world over, including isolated, preliterate cultures which have had virtually no contact with western civilisation.

The Differential Emotions Theory that Izard (1984) presents is one which sees the basic emotions of joy, interest, sadness, anger, fear, surprise and disgust as being hardwired into our neural architecture before birth, with the primary function of helping us to adapt to our environment. Within Differential Emotions Theory, the emotions are seen as "discrete sets of neuro-chemical processes involving expressive behaviours and feeling states, each with its own neuro-physiological state and each independent of cognition" (p.87).

Ackerman et al. (1998) identify the emotions of interest, joy, sadness and anger as being apparent in babies from their first weeks. Therefore, it could be extrapolated that the first educative task for a baby will be to recognise facial expressions. The emotion of fear, typically, appears a little later when babies are between seven and nine months old. Guilt and shame emerge even later, not usually until the latter half of the second year. These emotions are thought to be the product of cognitive-affective processes.

Overall, the emotions are seen by Izard (1984; 1991) as having an essentially adaptive function in equipping the individual to respond appropriately within given environments in order to survive and thrive. Perhaps there is no better example of the utility of the emotions than when one considers the role the emotions play in the bonding process between mother and child. As Izard (1991) observes, social bonding is an important human characteristic that seems to be one of the functions of the emotions.

While Ackerman et al. (1998) admit that much of the neural architecture related to the emotions is yet to be identified; they observe that some progress has been made in this
direction. Neural circuits have been shown to mediate conditioned fear and it is believed that these circuits operate independently of the neo-cortex (Davis, 1992; Le Doux, 1992, cited in Ackerman et al., 1998). Furthermore, Le Doux (1987, cited in Ackerman et al., 1998) has identified the amygdala (area of emotional processing in the brain) as the sensory gateway to the emotions, with a pathway for the emotions that is independent of the neo-cortical and cognitive pathway (Ackerman, Abe & Izard, 1998).

Izard (1991) notes the early development of cognitive-affective structures as emotions become linked to mental images, symbols or thoughts. For example, an image of his mother’s face elicits a positive emotion in an infant. So, while Izard (1991) claims that "fundamental emotions are subserved in innate neural programs" (p.95), he also recognises that emotions can be, and are, modified by experience, with emotional development consisting in the main of "increases in inter-system communication and the construction of control mechanisms for monitoring and regulating cognition" (Ackerman et al, 1998, p.95). This suggests that emotions are a major determinant in patterning memories associated with physical actions.

Differential Emotions Theory endorses the view that "emotions are causal in their own right and that system organisation and complexity emerge out of stable patterns and interactions of discrete emotions" (Ackerman et al., 1998, p. 89). It also implies that "emotion thresholds differ among individuals as does intensity of a feeling state when an emotion is activated" (Ackerman et al., 1998, p. 89). As with other aspects of human functioning and development, it is possible to identify common mechanisms, processes and patterns, but there still remains the idiosyncratic performance by the particular individual at a particular time and place (Bowlby, 1971). The work of Human Dynamics (Seagal & Horne, 1997) reinforces this position, suggesting that the brain is hardwired to process information through either a mental/thinking, emotional/relational, or physical/doing modality. These affective-cognitive structures also become increasingly sophisticated and complex with the maturation of the brain (Ackerman et al., 1998). As well as being activated by biogenetic processes (e.g., hormones), organismic information reflecting physiological drive states (e.g., sex drive), or sensory feedback from somatic activity (e.g., facial feedback), the emotions can also be activated by cognitive representations.
Pert (2003) has further identified that each emotion forms a separate polypeptide chain, which will impact at the level of the cell wall, which can become highly receptive to specific emotions. When the cell divides it will take this receptor with it. This viewpoint is further elaborated upon by Damasio (2000). He proposes that the brain forms a ‘bodyscape’ through interpreting the chemical and electrical reactions of the body, (emotions) which are translated through a cognitive process in the frontal lobe of the brain into what we term feelings. Damasio’s work provides an explanation of the link between cognition and emotion in contrast to purely cognitive models, where the emotions are seen as being driven solely by cognitive appraisal and cognitive processes, rather than being acknowledged as a separate system of response.

While there are key emotions that are expressed facially in the same way across all cultures, Bowlby (1971) notes, human behaviour is very variable, it is true but not infinitely so; and though cultural differences may be great, certain commonalities can be discerned. For example, despite obvious variability, the patterns of human behaviour, often very intensely motivated, that result in mating, in the care of babies and young children, and in the attachment of young to parents, are found in almost all members of the human race and seem best considered as expressions of some common plan. Since these actions are of obvious survival value, they appear to be instances of instinctive behaviour.

There seem to be solid reasons for believing that we possess evolved predispositions for forming close relations to kin and that our emotions play a leading role in developing these relationships and in helping us to interact with what Bowlby (1971) calls our “environment of evolutionary adaptedness” (p.224). Bowlby (1971) sees our environment of evolutionary adaptedness as being geared to an essentially primal environment where the young need protection from various predators. Consequently, Bowlby (1971; 1975) sees attachment by the infant to others as essentially adaptive behaviour, which is imperative in terms of survival. The role of the emotions in this bonding process is dramatically apparent. As Bowlby (1971) says:

*No form of behaviour is accompanied by stronger feeling than is attachment behaviour. The figures towards whom it is directed are loved and their advent is greeted with joy.* (p.257)
Indeed, because we are born with initially underdeveloped cognitive faculties the emotions play a crucial role in our interactions with our first carers. Bowlby (1971) notes that during the first month after birth the neocortex is not very developed and behaviour operates at a reflexive, tracking level. Even by a child’s second birthday the prefrontal lobes, responsible for inhibiting an immediate response, are not very well developed. Bowlby’s (1971) conclusion is that throughout many years of childhood the sophistication of behavioural systems is strictly limited by the state of development of the brain. Recent work (Sowell, Thompson, Holmes, Jernigan & Toga, 1999) in neuroscience suggests that the myelination of the nerves linking the amygdala and the neocortex may not be completed until young people are in their mid to late twenties and thus young people may in fact have a physiological reason for a tendency to act impulsively.

So long as a young child is in the unchallenged presence of a principal attachment figure or within easy reach, s/he feels secure. A threat of loss creates anxiety, and actual loss sorrow; both, moreover, are likely to arouse anger. These findings suggest the emotions play a fundamental role in establishing relationships of attachment to others and as being causal in their own right. Inevitably, then, these findings contribute to a different conceptualisation of the role of the emotions in the moral process to that proposed by Kant (1788/1991, pp.68 and 71). Kant saw the emotions as simply distracting the moral individual from the pursuit of duty. Indeed, the findings suggest a revised conception of ourselves as beings whose fundamental emotions play a critical role in our survival and adaptation to our environment. The findings present a picture of our common humanity as involving the interrelated, though separate, processes of both cognition and affect. The operation of the emotions within processes such as kinship bonding also suggests reciprocity in our relationships with others in that the love that parents show to their children is usually reciprocated by the children. Indeed, reciprocity often characterises our relations with others.

Research has therefore uncovered a vital link between the cellular level and brain processes that seem to be part of the generation of emotion and feelings that become part of an independent feedback loop about the nature and state of our social interactions, independent of our cognitive system. It would appear that priority is given to the processing of the emotional response over the cognitive, in the first instance.
Therefore, it will require learning to delay reaction or an act of will to an emotive stimulus and using cognition to determine what the action should ultimately be in any given situation. This does not imply that the cognitive and emotional systems are not interlinked but it could be concluded that emotions play a vital role as a signal system within the action process, of responding in the moment, to stimulus in both our internal and external environments.

2.5.3 Moral Learning within a Social Context

The literature review now turns to examining the research findings about the nature of social relationships that appear to impact learning and the development of moral capabilities. There is strong evidence from psychology to reinforce the picture of human morality developing in the context of our social relations with others. Psychologist, Tom Kitwood (1990) contends:

…the self is relational, and in a sense, moral in its very essence, and that we may well suppose that the strength of the self – the person’s ontological security, depends on the extent to which … relationship (with parents or first carers) embodies empathy, respect, concern and reliable provision: qualities that are usually taken to be of the essence of morality (p.109).

The infant comes to an awareness of self as one-who-trusts. If trust is not developed in the earliest relationships then there can be little cause for hope, which Erikson (1964) saw as the fundamental building-block for all subsequent psychosocial development across the lifespan. Such a view emphasises the critical nature of the environment and the moral capabilities of the first caregivers.

Later research by Henry (1996), an early childhood educator indicates that secure attachment between mother/carer and child is based in ‘interactional synchrony’ (Isabella and Belsky, 1991, cited in Henry, 1996), where both child and mother are attentive and responsive to each other. Interactional synchrony requires the mother/carer not only to attend to the baby’s needs for food and a dry nappy but also to respond to the baby’s needs for attention, and for responses to small signals. As Henry (1996) says: These signals may be very subtle: like the wind wafting across the grass a smile may pass from child to adult, or the adult’s coo may return an answer to the baby’s chirrup (pp.18-19).
Henry (1996) believes that repeated responsiveness to the infant from the mother or another caring figure, builds up trust and a feeling of autonomy and associated confidence in the child that he/she has the power to affect the world. Henry (1996) sees this process as paralleling Erikson’s first three psychosocial stages of trust versus mistrust, autonomy versus shame and doubt, and initiative versus guilt.

Henry’s view is confirmed by earlier research such as that conducted by Bowlby (1971) and Ainsworth et al. (1978), that it is through the meeting of their physiological needs and their needs for recognition that babies are able to develop trust and a secure base in their relationships with close others such as their mother. It is from such a secure base that it is then possible for the child to have the confidence to take action on behalf of not only the self but also of others. It is also within this secure set of relationships that the child is able to develop the bonding with close members of his/her family that forms the basis for positive reciprocal relations with others.

The research work of Ainsworth et al. (1978), with mothers and new born babies, found a year later that, as commented upon by Lewis, Amini, Lannon (2001):

> A mother who had been consistently attentive, responsive and tender to her infant raised a secure child, who used his mother as a safe haven from which to explore the world. He was upset and fussy when she left him and reassured and joyful when she came back. A cold, resentful, rigid mother produced an insecure-avoidant child, who displayed indifference to his mother’s departures and often pointedly ignored her on her return, turning his back or crawling away to a suddenly fascinating toy in the corner. The baby of a mother distracted or erratic in her attentions became an insecure-ambivalent toddler, clutching at his mother when they were together, dissolving into wails and shrieks when the two were separated and remaining inconsolable after their reunion. (p.74)

As the study went on, Ainsworth found that babies of responsive mothers developed into grade-schoolers who were happy, socially competent, resilient, persistent, likable, and empathic with others. They had more friends, were relaxed about intimacy, solved problems on their own when they could, and sought help when they needed it. Infants
raised by cold mothers grew up to be distant, difficult to reach kids who were hostile to authority, shunned togetherness, and wouldn’t ask for comfort, particularly when they were hurt. They often seemed to take pleasure in provoking and upsetting other children. The children of unpredictable mothers became children who were socially inept, timid, hypersensitive and lacking in confidence. Hungry for attention and easily frustrated, they frequently asked for help with simple tasks that were in their range of competence.

In the first instance, it is our early social interactions that are critical in terms of what we learn about and how we should relate to others. In fact it seems that from a connection with primary care-givers, we are first able to create our sense of self and to develop our capacity for social perspective co-ordination. This provides a fundamental underpinning for the capacity to act morally, that is, to be responsive to and responsible for, the other. In this sense personhood is an ineluctably moral enterprise, which is embedded and embodied in social interaction. There are grounds, as Kitwood (1990) says, for believing that the moral life of an individual begins with selfhood. These findings therefore support the notion that the nature of our connection to others can be a source of motivation to act on moral judgment. Hence the importance of educating parents and care-givers to understand the need for love and nurturance in the early years of a child’s life and setting up learning experiences in ever widening circles of social interaction, from family to community.

The importance of the kind of care given in early childhood has been borne out by the clinical work undertaken in psychopathology by Selman, Watts and Hickey-Schultz (1997) and others (Noam, 1993; Nakkula and Ravitch, 1998). These authors suggest that children who suffer neglect or abuse of various kinds in relationships with their earliest care-givers, actually experience disconnection and as a consequence are unable to develop adequate self-perspectives, let alone the perspectives of others. They are literally locked into a cycle of egocentricity where the characteristic behavioural styles are impulsive and unilateral in nature (Hickey-Schultz, 1997), and they lack the range of psychosocial competencies that are required to act in ways that consider the needs of others as well as self. This state of being seems to be reversible to some degree with appropriate intervention. This suggests that despite initial setbacks, humans have a
capacity to continue to learn, provided suitable environmental conditions and support are provided.

The pair therapy that Selman et al. (1997) have designed to assist emotionally traumatised children, is based upon the notion of giving these young people a positive experience of relationship. This is achieved by fostering friendship with a similar peer within the safety net provided by facilitation and guidance by a therapist. The aim of such pair therapy is to enable the young people involved to develop Core Levels of Social Perspective Coordination, which are identified as involving movement along a continuum from egocentricity in the direction of mutuality and towards increasingly responsive and responsible behaviours towards others. As Selman, Watts and Hickey Schultz et al (1997) have realised; this movement along the continuum involves the increasing ability to coordinate self and other perspectives.

The role of the family as a social unit has been explored in the research undertakings of Milnitsky (1991) who notes that there is ‘interpersonal investment’ involved in any close relationship because the parties in such close relationships have mutual expectations of each other. Milnitsky (1991) identified five types of interpersonal investment in research conducted in South Brazil with children and teenagers from two communities, one urban and the other rural, which shared a similar Italian cultural background. On the basis of her research, Milnitsky (1991) reports five types of interpersonal investment, and these are as follows:

TYPE 1 characterised by expectations of reciprocity, very similar to those identified by Kohlberg at the stage 2 of instrumental exchange, for example, "I’d do it for my father because I’m sure he would do the same for me."

TYPE 2 characterised by expressions of affection for the family member, for example, "I’d pick my brother because I love him."

TYPE 3 characterised by a sense of moral obligation because of family norms or ties, for example, "He should pick his brother; one needs to help a brother."

TYPE 4 characterised by one or more types of interpersonal investment, for example, "If you love your brother, like a real brother, you’d always pick him to play with."

TYPE 5 characterised by the provision of principled reasons based on protecting the interests of the family, for example, “He should go and help his parents because it is his obligation to do it, and they need help." (p. 7)
In each of the examples given above, it is possible to note that the motivations appear to be those of love and reciprocity allied with a sense of obligation to other members of the family and more highly developed levels of consciousness. These findings support the sentience capacity as defined by Kitwood (1990) and the capacity to love as defined by Danesh (1994). While Milnitsky (1991) found differences between the rural and urban communities in that the former were more tied to a strict sense of obligation to family members, there was nevertheless a strong sense of commitment to other members of the family by both groups of children and teenagers. While Milnitsky’s (1991) findings demonstrate the influence of cultural factors on perceptions of moral obligations within interpersonal relationships, they also confirm the findings of sociobiology that we are predisposed to behave altruistically towards close kin. Moreover, empirical findings reveal very early evidence of altruism in children.

Surprisingly, there is not a considerable body of opinion in psychological circles (e.g. Damon, 1988; Gilligan and Wiggins, 1988; Kitwood, 1990) to support the view that it is these reciprocal bonds which characterise our early attachments and provide the foundation of our capacity for moral responsiveness and responsibility. Damon (1988) declares that moral living revolves around the assumption that social actions are reciprocal. This assumption has implications for one’s conduct towards others as well as for one’s expectations concerning others’ conduct towards oneself. One, therefore, takes responsibility for the former, and asserts rights with regard to the latter, and these responsibilities and rights exist in reciprocal relationship to one another. The reciprocal nature of our relationships with others seems entirely reasonable given the fact that we are purposive beings concerned with survival and maintenance of well being, both on an individual and collective basis.

This ability to coordinate self and other perspectives also involves engagement with others in a dialectical process that is self transformative for those involved and which simultaneously leads to increasingly more responsive and responsible ways of relating to others. Hickey Schultz (1997) identifies the highest level of social perspective coordination as ‘Societal/In-Depth’, and this level is characterised by an interpersonal understanding of ‘autonomous interdependence’ and by an interpersonal negotiating style of ‘collaboration’. This factor has profound implications for the educational
experiences and interventions to develop a moral capability of ‘autonomous interdependence’. This approach also supports Habermas’s (1972; 1974; 1984; 1987; 1990) second way of knowing.

2.6 Environment as a Context for Development

The former exploration on the importance of the social environment leaves no doubt as to the central role of the environment to stimulate the learning process. Kegan (1992) has identified that a person will move from one stage of development to the next depending on the degree of support and challenge he or she is offered in the learning process. Kegan (1992) articulates that there is a dynamic balance between challenge and support. Too much support will result in learned helplessness, and too much challenge will result in the child becoming too frustrated, and giving up on the learning process. Therefore, it will require great sensitivity to the individual reactions of each child, to refine the process of challenge and support. ‘Programs that work’ identified that a safe and supportive environment is an essential foundation for effective moral learning (Schwartz et al., 2006).

A stage of development will also act as the foundation for the development of the next stage; each stage demonstrates certain patterns or rhythms. Learning occurs through three processes of differentiation, integration and generalisation or extrapolation to other situations (Jordan & Kalinowski, 1972). This approach suggests a constantly evolving process of developing innate potential through a guided experience of interaction with the environment. Therefore, learning seems to occur through a process of trial and error until we gain mastery and move to the next stage of maturation or development. Vygotsky (1937/78) refers to this process as entering into the zone of proximal development through a process of ‘scaffolding’, which involves observing the child’s response and being prepared to challenge the child or arrange the environment to support the child to demonstrate skills associated with the next level of development.

The review of the literature will now turn to understanding how the environment can play a part in the developmental learning process. First, there is a need to explore how we are using the terminology of the environment. The environment refers to the physical, as well as the emotional, social and cultural elements of the environment in which learning is being facilitated. Educationalists were often challenged by the notion
of heredity versus the environment in assessing a child’s capacity to learn. Hence, the circular argument, on whether it is nature or nurture which has the greatest influence on the capacity to learn. The approach that it has to be ‘either-or’ has limited our thinking to trying to defend a position rather than identifying a process of transcendence which sees each perspective as part of a whole and more complex set of relationships:

The dichotomy between heredity and environmental influences is not a useful or realistic distinction. It is more productive to understand how the expression of genetic endowment presupposes environmental influences and why the nature of the environmental pressures cannot be understood apart from the genetic predisposition of the organism and the modification of the environment due to the organism’s presence within it. This reinterpretation has major implications for the study of development, shifting the focus of inquiry away from the study of innate vs. acquired characteristics as separate elements and concentrating rather upon the nature of the interaction between the organism and its environment. (Jordan & Kalinowski, 1972, p20).

Jordan & Kalinowski (1972) draw our attention to the importance of the interactive nature between the person and the environment. The words of Shoghi Effendi, who was the authoritative interpreter of Bahá’í writings in his role as head of the Bahá’í Community from 1921-1957, eloquently refers to the nature of this relationship:

We cannot segregate the human heart from the environment outside us and say that once one of these is reformed everything will be improved. Man is organic with the world. His inner life moulds the environment and is itself also deeply affected by it. The one acts upon the other and every abiding change in the life of man is the direct result of these mutual reactions. (1933, p.84)

These sentiments have been supported by the work of Vygotsky (1937, 1978) who suggests that we construct knowledge based on our social and cultural interactions with our environment. All successful character education programs refer to the importance of the environment to support the learning process. Little is understood, at this stage, of the nature of environments that will support moral learning.

The initial exploration will look at a description of what is meant by the process of development. A view of how this vital process works and influences our level of
development is articulated in an innovative model of education referred to as the ANISA Model that I researched more than 30 years ago, during an overseas educational research tour in 1976. The model remains relevant, and it lends theory and structure to the development of this thesis.

2.6.1 ANISA Model

As a number of theorists have identified morality as a developmental process, reference will now be made to a description of the ANISA Theory of Development, an educational model developed during the seventies, which has attempted to articulate a comprehensive Theory of Education which includes a Theory of Development. It was developed by the Centre for the Study of Human Potential in the School of Education at the University of Massachusetts, under the Directorship of Jordon. This Centre researched educational thinking over the last two hundred years and attempted to integrate the diverse findings into a comprehensive, coherent framework which gave meaning about whom we are educating and the purpose of education.

The Centre defined development as the process of becoming - the process of translating potentiality into actuality. Development is comprised of any changes which have a continuous direction and which culminate in phases that are qualitatively new (Jordan & Kalinowski, 1972). The notions of process and existence presuppose each other; existence cannot be dissociated from process. This concept is amplified by Whitehead (1968):

*If the universe be interpreted in terms of static actuality, then potentiality vanishes. Everything is just what it is. Succession is mere appearance, rising from the limitation of perception. But if we start with process as fundamental, then the actualities of the present are deriving their characters from process, and are bestowing their characters upon the future. Immediacy is the realisation of the potentialities of the past, and is the storehouse of the potentialities of the future* (pp. 99-100).

A process can be defined as the ordered expression of a potentiality. The potentialities of a human being are probably infinite. To actualise a potential is to translate a power of the organism through a process. Processes themselves are initiated and maintained through interaction with the environment:
The importance of a process is defined by two criteria: (1) the degree to which it engenders effectance (ie, the degree of control over the environment it brings to the organism), and (2) the extent to which it is fundamental to other processes (ie., the extent to which it creates or extends potentiality) (Jordan & Kalinowski, 1972, p19).

In addition, the theory identifies the ‘rhythm’ of development as process presupposes movement and this movement has a rhythm. Pattern is identified as being reflected in sequence. Developmental sequence is seen to be an orderly and sequential process, as it is conceived to be any change which has a continuous direction and culminates in a phase that is qualitatively new. These changes involve passage through successive stages, each of which presupposes its antecedent and are in turn a prerequisite to its successor. A stage is a section of a developmental sequence circumscribing a basic unit of change in an organism. Within each of these stages, basic units of change of differentiation and integration were identified, as well as the process of generalisation which is also seen at a biological level of the differentiation of cells and their integration to form parts of the body. The process of generalisation was seen as the ability to use a re-combination of knowledge in other situations. The processes of differentiation, integration and generalisation were seen as the basis of evaluating learning competence. This provides insights into the process of moral education, because a rules-based approach to moral education does not encourage this process of thinking through; that is what is learned in one experience and how it can be generalised into another situation.

The development of a human being is therefore dependent on a combination of a genetically-determined series of stages which it has in common with its biological ancestors, and processes of learning that provide the means by which a new stage with new properties can be developed over a single lifetime. Completing one stage prepares the organism for the next. A higher level therefore can only come into existence through a process not manifested at a lower level. Polanyi (1960) refers to this hierarchical structure as applying to all creation, rising from inanimate to the living and onto the subsequent layers of each biotic level, as the process of emergence, which has culminated in the reality of man.
The most critical argument put forth by Jordan and Kalinowski (1972) is that processes themselves are initiated and maintained through interaction with the environment. Hence, according to their argument, if the environment is not conducive to growth, moral development will be stunted. Their theory supports the notion that moral learning and subsequent moral functioning will be a product of development that will be either supported or limited depending on the nature of the environment. This factor has been supported in ‘programs that work’; hence, the nature of the environment seems to be a critical foundation of the moral education process. This is further validated by Kohlberg’s (1968, 1981) findings that whatever the interactions are specifically like, they work best, Kohlberg says, when the interactions or the environment are open and democratic. The less children are pressured to conform to authority, the freer they are to settle their own differences and formulate their own ideas.

2.7 Bahá’í Approach to Moral Learning
The question could be asked that, if we learn through a process of trial and error, how do we then view moral action or the lack of moral action? If we fail to act, should this be taken as a cause for punishment or for reflection? A commonly-held view in behaviour management is that if a child is punished for ‘wrong doing’ or failure to act-on-moral judgement, the child will try and avoid the pain of punishment, overcome ‘temptation’ and do the ‘right thing’ next time. This approach has resulted in many failed forms of behaviour management and an attitude in students of ‘catch me if you can’ and a failure to accept responsibility for personal action, as indicated by the research of Lehrer (1967), Kohlberg, and Candee (1984). The discussion will now turn to look at a religious notion of learning from trial and error that provides a different insight as understood by the religious approach of the Bahá’í Faith.

From the Bahá’í perspective, spiritual teachings are renewed from one religious dispensation to the next, all coming from the one God. The laws relating to social aspects of society change, however, from age to age depending on social evolution. For example, in line with the notion of social evolution, Christianity forbade divorce yet the Islamic Faith, revealed at a later date, permitted divorce owing to a very different set of social conditions. As the Bahá’í Faith was revealed in 1844 and is recognized by the United Nations as the latest independent world faith, attention will turn to reviewing, through analysis and assessment of the writings of the central figures of the Bahá’í
Faith, writings which span a period of over 100 years, the Faith’s approach to moral learning.

The Bahá’í Writings refer to ‘achieving rectitude and refinement of character’, suggesting the unfoldment of a moral-learning process. The concept of refinement implies that we can set a goal to behave in a virtuous way by acting-on-moral judgment. If we fail to do this, then we can work towards a process of rectification, of making amends or learning from our mistakes. Moral learning might therefore be a process of trial and error based upon moral judgement and related action, reflection, and then new moral judgement and related action. A human being is considered to have a dual nature. One part of this nature is where we are influenced by our basic instincts and drives, and the other part, where we can make a conscious choice to develop divine virtues and also act-on-moral judgement. These sentiments are encapsulated in the quotation:

...every child is potentially the light of the world-and at the same time its darkness..........If however a child be trained to be both learned and good, the result is light upon light (‘Abdu’l-Bahá’, 1912/1978, pp. 130-136).

Drawing on an analogy ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’ has written:

Children are even as a branch that is fresh and green; they will grow up in whatever way ye train them. Take the utmost care to give them high ideals and goals, so that once they come of age, they will cast their beams like brilliant candles on the world, and will not be defiled by lusts and passions in the way of animals, heedless and unaware, but instead will set their hearts on achieving everlasting honour and acquiring all the excellences ...and praiseworthy virtues of human kind (‘Abdu’l-Bahá’, 1912/1978, p. 130).

Therefore ‘refinement of character’ is seen from a Bahá’í perspective as the development of the potential goodness and virtue that lies inherently within each individual. The process of education has the responsibility of training the individual in goodly habits of mind, heart and action. In this sense, the word ‘rectitude’ is defined as the process of education and training to develop these qualities as explained in this quotation:

Man is even as steel, the essence of which is hidden: through admonition and explanation, good counsel and education, that essence will be brought to light.
If, however, he be allowed to remain in his original condition, the corrosion of lusts and appetites will effectively destroy him

(Bahá’u’llah, cited by National Bahá’í Education Task Force, 1995, no.10, p.3).

Justice is seen as the means of training the human soul, or of achieving rectification of character. The twin pillars of reward and punishment are seen as the instruments which shape the virtue of justice. These terms are newly defined not only as external events meted out on the individual but also intrinsic to the individual; for example, reward being the doing of the good deed itself, and punishment as the lack of doing the good deed. This approach suggests that morality is a developmental process.

‘Abdu’l Bahá’ (1912/1978) elaborates on this view:

_The root cause of all wrong doing is ignorance, therefore, hold ye fast to the tools of perception and knowledge._ (p.136)

This reinforces the notion that morality is a learned process that requires us to perceive or to be conscious of what we are doing. This very process of action and reflection enables us to reflect and learn from our ‘ignorance’ or the concept that we did not know what we did not know until after the misdeed.

If the individual’s behaviour impacts negatively upon the well being of the community, sanctions might be applied. The dictionary definition (Oxford) of ‘sanctify’ is to make holy. The Latin meaning of ‘making holy’ is to make morally and spiritually excellent. Hence, inappropriate behaviour in the Bahá’í community might lead to community sanctions with the purpose of encouraging an individual to reflect upon their behaviour, to feel a sense of remorse and ultimately be prepared to rectify their conduct to be in conformity with the laws and admonitions of spiritual conduct. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá suggests that acquiring these spiritual qualities, or virtues, can be achieved through a process of knowledge, volition and action and that the acquisition of virtues is a life-long process.

Here, we see a connection to Lickona’s (1991) description of character being made up of moral knowing, moral feeling and moral action. From a social science perspective, the concept of morality is linked to the development of character. Lickona builds onto the concepts of classical philosophical understanding. He states that ‘character’ consists
of operative values that are values in action. We progress in our character, as a value becomes a virtue, a reliable inner disposition to respond to situations in a morally good way. Character, so conceived, has three interrelated parts: moral knowing, moral feeling, and moral behaviour. Good character consists of knowing the good, desiring the good and doing the good—habits of the mind, habits of the heart, and habits of action. All three are necessary for leading a moral life; all three make up moral maturity (Lickona, 1991).

Modern brain research has identified that motivation is sustained by an internal process of achieving the goal or task, in contrast to the original view of behaviourists that motivation was shaped through a process of external rewards and punishments (Jensen, 1998). Whilst the latter approach has short-term effect and would initially appear effective, it does not sustain long-term motivation, as teachers have experienced again and again in managing children with disruptive behaviour patterns in school environments. Marshall and Zohar’s (2000) description of how the associative memory works, reinforces the importance of the process of trial and error as the way a parallel processor works, in strengthening the neural networks related to a particular response.

These findings in the last section of Chapter 2 indicate how scientific notions can be in accord with religious concepts of moral learning.

*Summary of Chapter*

The review of literature in Chapter 2 in relation to brain-based learning, the role of emotions and the social environment, suggests a radical rethink of the moral learning process and subsequently how we educate children to develop moral action. The creation of somatic maps or moral prototypes on the frontal brain suggests the importance of both modelling moral behaviour and guided self-reflection within experiential situations. The findings raise many more questions as to how this process of moral functioning works within the human psyche. The research findings reinforce the importance of the third way of knowing, of self-reflection, as elaborated by Habermas.

Moral learning is clearly a complex process requiring a more comprehensive educational response that takes into account multidimensional models of moral functioning. The discussion in Chapter 3 will now review literature about current
understandings of the process of moral functioning including how to develop our capacity to act morally in society and also, the implications for the educational process.
CHAPTER 3
MORAL FUNCTIONING

Chapter 3 focuses on gaining insights into research findings related to what is known about the complex process of moral functioning and the subsequent implications for education. The chapter begins by reviewing research related to translating moral judgement into moral action and then turns to exploring the insights into moral functioning that have been elicited through the research of moral development theorists. This section will review theorists who have looked at unitary, dual and triune approaches to moral functioning. A third section will explore a conceptual model of moral functioning that integrates the epistemological approach outlined in Chapter 2. The next section discusses emerging attempts to develop integrative models of moral functioning, followed by a section which reviews two models of character and values education that incorporate notions of moral functioning. Finally, the implications of these findings about moral functioning on the educative process are considered.

3.1 The Translation of Moral Judgement to Moral Action

Even if we understand what action should be taken in response to a moral encounter, there is no guarantee that a person will consistently act on their moral judgement. There is a paucity of research about moral action; this section will explore findings to date. Candee (1984) explains that the relationship between moral thought and moral action has, over the years, been studied in two different ways. The original approach, best exemplified by the Hartshorne and May's (1928, 1929 and 1930) experiment, was to try to correlate the strength with which an individual held a moral value (e.g. honesty) with his or her performance of moral behaviour. The research pointed to a strong situational effect. It produced little evidence to support the idea that moral behaviour was determined by general moral attitudes. The reason for the failure is claimed to be that when individuals are confronted with a real moral situation, individuals do not reason in terms of abstract moral values but rather define the situation in terms of concrete rights and duties. This is further exacerbated by the notion argued by Blasi, (1980) and Thoma (1994) that, despite the indisputable importance of moral reasoning, there is only a weak link between moral reasoning and moral action.
A commonly proposed position is that behaviour, such as honesty, results from a conflict between a temptation and a moral standard. This has evolved from Saint Paul’s teachings to Freud’s (1930/1958) conception of the battle between the ‘id’ and the ‘superego’. As expressed by Saint Paul, “The flesh lusteth against the Spirit and Spirit against the flesh so that ye cannot do the things ye would” (Galatians 5:17, p134.). This suggests that moral dilemmas involve at least two competing forces, the lust of the flesh or of needs, and the anticipation of the guilt of the conscience. Moral behaviour results when the ego, self or will mediates and temptation is resisted.

Lehrer (1967) undertook a series of research activities to try to test or evoke “a battle of conscience” and discovered that moral behaviour is essentially defined by situational factors, including expediency. Kohlberg & Candee (1984) surveyed over a dozen studies relating emotive measures of conscience strength to behavioural measures of conscience strength through to behavioural measures of honesty. Like Lehrer, they found as follows:

......evidence fails to support the psychoanalytic hypothesis relating projective test guilt to actual resistance to temptation behaviour. Neither fantasy punishment reactions nor ‘total guilt’ measures seem to be positively related to measures of behavioural conformity or internalised standards (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984, p.292).

Thus, Kohlberg and Candee concluded that emotional arousal does not seem to be an internal determinant sufficient to cause moral behaviour (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984). These findings demonstrate that if the use of punishment or consequences are meted out in order to make a child feel ashamed or guilty about their behaviour, such an approach is unlikely to result in changed behaviour or a desire next time to do the ‘right thing.’ This outcome suggests a re-thinking of traditional behaviour management systems.

A number of studies have shown low correlation, no relationship, or even negative relationships between values and resistance to temptation (e.g., Hartshorne et al.1928: 1929: 1930), or between guilt and resistance to temptation (e.g. Grinder, 1962; Allinsmith Greening, 1955). No studies have demonstrated that strength of moral values, resistance to temptation, and proneness to give projective guilt responses, co-vary (Pittel & Mendelson, 1966). Grinder (1962) suggests that we are dealing with two
essentially different systems, one a system of moral thought and the other a system of moral behaviour. We might learn on a verbal level that certain actions are supposed to be right, according to a set standard of behaviour, but we learn on a situational level that other actions can be rewarded as actually being acceptable.

Nisan (1985) proposes that knowledge of a situation is not adequate to act in a moral way. That is, moral deviation does not seem to derive from ignorance of the moral content or from a lack of insight into its moral validity. It would appear to relate more to a condition of placing a low moral weight and gravity on various transgressions. Individuals allow themselves to deviate from what is right by their own judgement, however, this deviation is limited; otherwise, it would lead to a total abandonment of morality. This idea refers to the concept of a level of accepted morality. Therefore, the key question is ‘would it be acceptable for me to commit this sin?’

Nisan’s (1985) findings suggest that individuals do not aspire to perfect behaviour in accordance with a moral ideal, but accept a certain distance from the ideal as being acceptable. I know that it is morally desirable to perform certain acts, but I do not perform them and do not aspire to be righteous in such a situation. This incorporates the concept of ‘bounded rationality’ suggested by Simon (1956 cited by Nisan, 1985). He theorised that the limitations of a human being’s information processing capacity brings them to adopt a principle of ‘satisficing’ rather than the rational principle of maximisation of utility (where a person wishes to act out of the highest level of behaviour they are capable of performing). People will satisfy themselves with an acceptable alternative, rather than search and try for the best one. A study by Nisan and Koriat (1977) suggests that this type of bounded rationality is already found in 6 year-olds. Nisan suggests that this concept has implications for educators to find ways to help individuals behave in a manner that they accept as proper and to narrow the gap between individuals’ ideals and their actual behaviour. Such an aim could be conceived as education towards self-actualisation and towards the realisation of one’s higher-order motivations (Allstone, 1977). Several educational conceptions such as intentional character education programs pursue a similar aim, namely, to bring the pupil closer to an intrinsic ideal (Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972).
Kohlberg & Candee (1984) investigated the relationship between a person’s moral judgement stage and their actions and found that there is often a relationship between the way in which subjects define rights and duties in hypothetical verbal situations and the way in which they define them in actual ones.

As can be seen, there is a diverse range of understandings of the process of moral development and what leads to the translation of judgement-to-action. An overview of the different perspectives has been elaborated upon by Berkowitz (1998) and highlights how different domains of knowledge have focused on different explanations or influences on the development of morality. Examples, cited by Berkowitz (1998), are as follows, ‘Psychoanalytical models (e.g. Sagan, 1988) tend to focus on internalised societal norms for behaviour (i.e. conscience or superego) and the corresponding emotions of self-reproach (e.g. guilt). Behaviourists (e.g. Pelaez-Nogueras & Gewirtz, 1995) focus on overt behaviour as the core of psychological morality (e.g. sharing, helping, cheating, etc). Socio-cultural theorists emphasise the role of cultural transmission of values, personality traits (moral character) and cognitive patterns (e.g. Staub, 1979). Biologists tend to focus attention on evolutionary functions, genetic selection of moral characteristics, hormones and neuro-anatomy (e.g. Alexander, 1987). Cognitive psychologists emphasise moral reasoning and decision-making (e.g. Kohlberg, 1976). Berkowitz (1998) suggests that this is further exacerbated by the problem of studying people at different developmental levels.

It is apparent from the research findings discussed previously that moral functioning is a complex process and that it is not based simply on an equation between temptation and will power. If love and care for the other person are not present, however, then this type of battle between ego and desire is more likely to occur (Wilson, 1990). A person can also weigh up, whether they can get away with a misdemeanour in this situation through a process referred to as ‘satisficing’ (Nissan, 1985). ‘Satisficing’ suggests there is a personal acceptable range below which a person will not go. Research by Lehrer (1967) identified that a person will act differently in a contrived situation than in a real life situation, therefore acting-on-moral judgement seems to be impacted on by situational factors. The discussion will now turn to gaining greater insight into the elements involved in moral functioning from a moral development perspective.
3.2 Developmental Theories of Moral Functioning

Psychological interpretations such as Piaget’s (1932, 1965) have identified morality as a developmental process. Vessels’ (1998) definition of morality involves a complex set of processes that engages values, feelings, reason and reflection, indicating what could be termed a process of moral functioning. The discussion will now review developmental theorists’ approaches and research findings about the process of moral functioning. It becomes apparent that there are different emphases on what influences the process of moral functioning and how it is developed. There is always a danger that these are conceived to be opposing positions rather than conceptualised as describing different facets of the same gemstone, through the lens of various individual theorists.

The ancient philosophical teachings of Aristotle and Plato have laid the foundations for the theories that emerged before and during the 20th Century. These two philosophers did much more than identify the cardinal virtues by offering an explanation for how children develop into moral beings and what adults must do to facilitate this development. Aristotle viewed habituation (an action that you repeat without consciously thinking about it) as necessary in early life to prepare the ‘soul’ for rational teaching. Aristotle’s levels of ethical development (ethics of fear, ethics of shame, ethics of wisdom) correspond to Plato’s (Eastman, 1967; Colby and Kohlberg 1987) three parts of conscious life or ‘soul’ (appetites, spirit, reason) and they resemble Kolberg’s (1971; 1981) preconventional, conventional and post-conventional levels of moral development (Burnyeat, 1980). Aristotle implied, and Plato later stated, that these parts of the ‘soul’ or ‘psyche’ must be educated sequentially (Simon, 1986).

3.2.1 Unitary Theory of Moral Functioning

This section will focus on theories that attribute the basis of moral development to the cognitive domain of human development. The work of Piaget (1965) linked moral development with the cognitive domain and described different stages of development within the domain, particularly in relation to a child’s ability to use thinking operations to move from self to others. According to Piaget’s general theory of cognitive development, two to six year old children cannot ‘decenter’ or take the perspective of others. At this stage, children are perceptual rather than being able to think about their own thinking. Seven to eleven year old children willfully engage in social cooperation and can adopt the perspective of others, and gradually move from perceptual to
conceptual thought, but still cannot reason abstractly or imagine events that are not also real events. At this stage, children are beginning to manipulate objects symbolically (concrete operations). Children from twelve years of age and older can think both logically and abstractly, manipulate symbols in their mind, consider many viewpoints, imagine hypothetical as well as real events, introspect and think about their own thinking and tend to be more self-conscious than younger children. Piaget viewed the rules of children’s games as an important origin for morality, and he delineated four stages that reflect the ‘practice of rules’ and three that reflect the ‘consciousness of rules’. Stage two of his four stages of rule practice, called ego-centrism, was described as an intermediate stage between the purely individual play of toddlers and the socialised behaviours of children aged seven and older. The egocentric stage, which lasts until about age six, includes playing with others without an interest in winning. At the third stage, which emerges at about age seven and is called the ‘stage of cooperation’, players want to win but have only a vague notion of the rules. The differences between stage three and four is one of degree. In the last stage, children master the rules and exhibit an intense interest in them.

Piaget felt that constraints necessarily imposed by authority during the early stages of child development effectively maintain ego-centrism and that only cooperation and reciprocity, born of mutual respect, can deliver children from unconscious ego-centrism and heteronomy into the realm of moral autonomy, where they feel the desire to treat others the way they wish to be treated. He suggested that during this transition, rules and commands are interiorised and generalised. Justice, he believed, required nothing more for its development than mutual respect and solidarity that holds amongst children. Piaget believed that justice was an imminent product of social relationships. According to Piaget, all development emerges from action; that is to say, individuals construct and reconstruct their knowledge of the world as a result of their interactions with the environment.

Kohlberg’s (1971; 1981) cognitive-moral stages were influenced by Dewey’s emphasis on the social nature of learning, Kant’s formalistic emphasis on the duties and obligations of moral people, and Piaget’s emphasis on stages of cognitive development. Kohlberg considered that ethical judgements by young children have more to do with external consequences than an understanding of intrinsic goodness. Children from ages
four to ten initially understand justice by viewing ‘good’ as behaviour that gains the approval of others. Older children view ‘good’ as behaviour that adheres to rules that extend beyond the immediate situation. Kohlberg’s six stages of moral development reflect qualitatively different styles of thinking sequenced from punishment, to pleasure, to acceptance, to status, to law and to justice. The key concepts in his theory are justice and social perspective taking, which are gradually acquired.

Kohlberg’s Six Stages are:
Level 1. Preconventional Morality
Stage 1. Obedience and Punishment Orientation. Kohlberg’s stage 1 is similar to Piaget’s first stage of moral thought. The child assumes that powerful authorities hand down a fixed set of rules, which he or she must unquestioningly obey. They see morality as something external to themselves, as that which the big people say they must do.

Stage 2. Individualism and Exchange. At this stage, children recognise that there is not just one right view that is handed down by the authorities. Different individuals have different viewpoints. Since everything is relative, each child is free to pursue his or her individual interests. In contrast to stage 1, punishment is simply a risk that one naturally wants to avoid. Although stage 2 children sometimes appear amoral, they do have some sense of right action. This is a notion of fair exchange or fair deals. The philosophy is one of returning favours—“If you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours.

Level II. Conventional Morality
Stage 3. Good Interpersonal Relationships. At this stage children—who are by now usually entering their teens—see morality as more than simple deals. They believe that people should live up to the expectations of the family and community and behave in “good” ways. Good behaviour means having good motives and interpersonal feelings such as love, empathy, trust, and concern for others. There is a shift from unquestioning obedience to a relativistic outlook and a concern for good motives.

Stage 4. Maintaining the Social Order. Stage 3 reasoning works best in two-person relationships with family members or close friends, where one can make a real effort to
get to know the other’s feelings and needs and try to help. In contrast, at stage 4, the children become more broadly concerned with society as a whole. Now the emphasis is on obeying laws, respecting authority, and performing one’s duties so that the social order is maintained.

Level III. Post-conventional Morality

Stage 5. Social Contract and Individual Rights. At stage 4, people want to keep society functioning. However, a smoothly functioning society is not necessarily a good one. A totalitarian society might be well-organised, but it is hardly the moral ideal. At stage 5, people begin to ask, “What makes for a good society?” They begin to think about society in a very theoretical way, stepping back from their own society and considering the rights and values that a society ought to uphold. They then evaluate existing societies in terms of these prior considerations. Basically, they believe that a good society is best conceived as a social contract into which people freely enter to work toward the benefit of all. They recognise that different social groups within a society will have different values, but they believe that all rational people will agree on two points. First, they would all want certain basic rights, such as liberty and life, to be protected. Second, they would want some democratic procedures for changing unfair law and for improving society.

Stage 6 Universal Ethical Principles has a clearer and broader conception of universal principles (which include justice as well as individual rights).

Kohlberg’s theory of moral functioning suggests that there are different motives for action at each stage of development. The moral motivations underlying each stage are:

Stage 1, avoidance of punishment;
Stage 2, desire for reward or benefit;
Stage 3, anticipation of the disapproval of others actual or imagined;
Stage 4, anticipation of dishonour;
Stage 5, maintaining the respect of equals and the community;
Stage 6, concern about self-condemnation for violating one’s own principles.

Kohlberg’s apparent emphasis on stages of cognition attracted criticism because other aspects of human capability, such as the capacity to care for others or the affective domain, were not taken into consideration.
3.2.2 Dual Theories of Moral Functioning

This section focuses on theories that incorporate two domains of moral functioning, suggesting that moral development emerges initially out of the emotional domain which is further developed into the social domain as the child’s cognitive capacity develops. In contrast to the work of Piaget and Kohlberg, Kagan (1984) and Hoffman (1976, 1983, 1988) proposed that emotion, rather than cognition, provides the foundation for morality. These authors propose that the potential for moral-emotional reactions is present at birth and that natural feeling states provide a platform upon which a set of universal, or principled, moral standards can be built (Kagan, 1984). They propose that empathy begins in infancy as discomfort at another’s distress and develops by age one or two into feelings of genuine concern that constrains aggression. They propose that moral emotions such as this emerge during the first two years as cognitive development brings with it the ability to take the perspective of the other. Kagan identified as core emotions: (1) fear of punishment, disapproval, or failure; (2) empathy towards those in distress; (3) guilt over callous and irresponsible behaviour; (4) disgust from the over-satiation of desire; and, (5) anxiety over the awareness of inconsistency between belief and actions (Vessels, 1998).

Initially, Hoffman (1976) identified flaws in the first studies of perceptual role-taking which involved variants of the classic test devised by Piaget and Inhelder (1956, cited in Hoffman, 1976), in which the child is seated facing a scale model of three mountains and then tested for the ability to predict how the model would look to another child seated in another position with reference to the model. As Hoffman (1976) observes, the presence of the other person is incidental and what is being tested is the child’s competence in visualising spatial relations. Little wonder, given the nature of this test, that Piaget (1932, cited in Hoffman, 1988) assumed that children were seven or eight before he thought they were able to appreciate someone else’s perspective. By way of contrast to Piaget’s (1932) notion of a heteronymous morality operating until the ages of about seven or eight, Hoffman proposes the existence and development of the pro-social capacity for empathy from the first year of life onwards. Hoffman (1988) suggests that there are four broad levels in the development of empathy, namely:

1. Global Empathy developed during the first year and demonstrated by the infant responding to another’s distress by acting as if the distress is happening to self;
2. Egocentric Empathy experienced between twelve months and two years of age where the child is aware that the distress is happening to someone else but is yet unable to understand what the other’s internal state might be as a result of this distress;

3. Empathy for another’s feelings experienced initially between the ages of two and three where the child is able to empathise with another’s feelings and understand a wide range of complex emotions;

4. Empathy for another’s life condition demonstrated by about age twelve and involving empathy for a whole group of people who suffer discrimination, deprivation or some other form of misfortune (p.509).

Hoffman’s theory is supported by various empirical studies. Murphy’s (1937 cited in Hoffman, 1988), study of empathy in nursery school age children, showed that “experiencing distress when another is in distress seems primitive, naïve and reasonably universal” (p.126). In their study of empathy in young children, Feshbach and Roe (1968, cited in Hoffman, 1976), found that four to seven year olds typically showed empathic responses to a series of slides depicting other children in different affective situations. Research by Zahn-Waxler and colleagues (1992) shows evidence of altruistic behaviours in quite young children. Research by Emde and colleagues (Emde, Johnson and Easterbrooks, 1987, cited in Gilligan, 1988) confirms the responsiveness of very young children to familiar others by demonstrating that nine month-old babies have already established specific patterns of social interaction with parents, siblings and other close members of the family, and that they initially prefer their mothers to respond to their actions.

Hoffman’s (1988) theory about the early development of empathy sits well with the earlier findings from socio-biology that suggest we have evolved predispositions for close bonding with our children and they with us. It is proposed that it is out of this bonding with figures to whom we are attached and with whom we often identify, that the moral impulse is born. As Vygotsky (1935/1978) realised, what is experienced interpersonally over time is translated into intrapsychic experience, which then mediates our further interpersonal relations. This view is encapsulated by Vygotsky, when he observed in relation to the development of a child that, “cultural development appears
twice: first, on the social level, and later, on the individual level; first between people (interpsychological), and then inside the child (intrapsychological)” (ibid, 1978, p.37).

Erikson (1964; 1968, 1980) alluded to the moral-developmental relevance of resolving conflicts at each developmental level. He proposed that the healthy personality ‘weathers’ these conflicts and emerges and re-emerges with an increased sense of inner unity, with an increase of good judgement, and an increase in the capacity to do well, according to the standards of those who are significant to him (Erikson, 1980).

Havighurst referred to the early-childhood/preschool stage as the beginning of moral responsibility and the dawn of conscience (Havighurst, 1953). Both Erikson and Havighurst describe middle childhood as the stage in which conscience becomes an ‘inner moral guide’ or ‘governor’ of initiative (Havighurst, 1953, p. 21). They contend that, if properly installed through love (which promotes identification with an adult care giver) and a form of discipline that is neither too excessive nor too permissive, the young child takes into him/herself the controlling voice of his/her parents and begins to feel appropriately guilty even for thoughts and deeds that his parents have not witnessed. Havighurst referred to the inner moral voice of the parents as an ‘authoritarian conscience’ and proposed that it is gradually replaced during elementary school by a ‘rational conscience’ (Havighurst, 1953, p. 53). Finally, he proposed that adolescents internalise a complete set of moral principles used to judge themselves and others.

Research by Zahn-Waxler, and colleagues (1979) shows that even children as young as two years of age have “the cognitive capacity to interpret the physical and psychological states of others” as well as “the emotional capacity to affectively experience the other’s state” and “the socio-biological repertoire that permits the possibility of trying to alleviate discomfort in others” (p127). Zahn-Waxler and colleagues (1979) speculate that pro-social behaviour demonstrated through empathy, sharing, and co-operation may have precursors in earlier attachments to care-givers. They say that these bonding patterns “prepare the child for later empathetic development through the sharing and exchange of emotions as well as co-operation and turn taking in social interactions between parent and child” (p.126). As Zahn-Waxler and colleagues (1979) conclude, their research points to a theory of moral development which is at odds with Freud’s
(1930/1958; 1938) and Piaget’s (1932/1965) theories of young children as primarily egocentric, demanding, dependent and socially inept.

Damon’s (1977) original theory applied to 4 to 10 year old children and focused on the development of four aspects of social knowledge: namely, positive justice (sharing and fairness); friendship; authority; and social regulations. He saw the “roots of justice growing in the soil of early friendships” (Damon, 1977, p. 138). Damon’s research and related theoretical propositions suggested that other developmental theorists, including Kohlberg, have been too heavily influenced by the subservience of young children to authority and too quick to conclude that the most primitive forms of morality are characterised by fear-induced adherence to externally-imposed rules. He acknowledged the importance of the child’s authority-obeying perspective, but he did not find in this the origins of morality. In his later work, Damon (1988, 1999) drew heavily from Kagan (1984) and Hoffman (1976, 1983, 1988) who were the first to suggest that morality emerges from feeling states which are present at birth in rudimentary form. He proposed that early emotional reactions provide a natural base or energising structure for moral learning, which is inextricably tied to the cognitive and social aspects of children’s development. He proposed that through active participation in peer relationships, the development of perspective-taking skills is promoted and introduces norms or reciprocity and standards of sharing, co-operation and fairness. Damon proposed that adult relationships demonstrate social standards that foster respect for social order. Such an approach offers moral development guidance through ‘respectful engagement’, and children’s natural emotional reactions are transformed into enduring moral values (Damon, 1988). Hence, where a teacher engages respectfully with a student, the teacher is modelling social standards and respect for social norms.

In line with the research of Damon (1988), which suggests that morality emerges out of an emotional state of being, it is worth exploring the stages of friendship development identified by Youniss (1980) and Selman (1990). Youniss’ findings suggest that children’s friendship knowledge moves from conceptions based on the sharing of material goods and pleasurable activities at about age six to conceptions based upon mutual sharing of private thoughts and feelings. Selman identified the highest level of the maturation of friendship as autonomous interdependence. Whilst parties are close and intimate they are able to grant one another the autonomy and independence to have
other close friends. These findings suggest that the nature of the relationship as it matures may influences the desire to act morally towards another.

Hay’s (1994) beginning theory of pro-social development (defined as actions which benefit others or promote harmonious relations) was based on more than 700 empirical studies. He proposed five developmental hypotheses. He noted that the moral emotions of shame (the reaction felt when violating others’ standards) and guilt (the reaction felt when violating standards set by oneself) are normally acquired before children enter school and that pre-schoolers become aware of reciprocity in their dealings with people and use pro-social behaviours to establish friendships.

Most notable of the theories based on a dual approach to moral functioning incorporating both cognition and emotion is the work of Gilligan (1982). She challenged the findings of Kohlberg that the male view of individual rights and rules was considered a higher stage (stage 5) than the women’s point of view of development in terms of its caring effect on human relationships (stage 3). Using Kohlberg’s moral stage theory construct resulted in women’s responses indicating a lower level of moral development than those of men, because women would respond to the level three stage of development and men more to the level five stage. She asserted that women’s moral and psychological tendencies are different from those of men. According to Gilligan, men think in terms of rules and justice and women are more inclined to think in terms of caring and relationships. Women were taught to care for other people and expect others to care for them. She asks that Western society begin to value both equally. By listening to women’s experiences, Gilligan suggested that the morality of justice and rights is based on equality, while morality of caring and responsibility is premised on non-violence. This could be seen as two different injunctions. The first is the injunction not to treat others unfairly (justice) and the second injunction is not to turn away from someone in need (care).

Gilligan’s methodology also revealed important insights into the differences between men and women. Gilligan (1982) chose to move beyond the approach of using hypothetical dilemmas to using real-life dilemmas. The dilemmas involved situations faced by young men thinking about enlisting for the Vietnam War, and women who were contemplating abortions. These dilemmas could be classified as potentially life-
changing events. She used a series of interviews with these young people, and used an interpretative research methodology in order to see what patterns emerged from the voices of these young men and women. It was from this method that she identified what is termed an ‘ethic of care’, as a different domain from an ‘ethic of justice’. It was the lived experience that helped her to see the different ways that women approached the moral decision-making process, to how men approached the decision-making process. While this method evoked considerable controversy about its validity, it produced very different insights from the moral decision-making process than had emerged from purely hypothetical situations. This would imply that when research involves talking about your own experiences, the process engages the emotional domain as well as rational thinking processes. The engagement of both affect and cognition therefore resulted in quite different answers to situations where only cognition was involved.

Gilligan helped to form a new psychology for women by listening to them and rethinking the meaning of self and selfishness. She asked four questions about women’s voices: who is speaking; in what body; telling what story; and in what cultural framework is the story presented? Gilligan’s findings correspond to the notions of the human powers to know, which seeks to find the truth, leading to the just action: and the power to love, or to care about the well-being of others, leading to the desire for harmony and unity. Gilligan’s findings would support the premise that there are at least two different intentional centres, knowing and loving. Although Gilligan’s work has been criticised for the use of anecdotal evidence, her research has increased the awareness that care is an integral component of moral reasoning.

### 3.2.3 Triune Theories of Moral Functioning

The early work of Erikson (1964) identified in addition to cognition and emotion the domain of ‘the will’ to human functioning. He developed a theory based on an eight-stage psycho-social hierarchical pattern of development that linked stages in psychological development to various social stages in the life-cycle. Erikson (1964) believed that if an infant’s need for care at both the physical and psychological levels was reasonably satisfied, then the infant would be able to attain a sense of hope. This sense of hope was the prerequisite for moving to the second stage of early childhood associated with the development of what Erikson called ‘will’. Erikson’s notion of will
is not to be equated with willfulness but rather refers to the ability to gradually gain the power of increased judgment and decision-making.

Erikson saw the development of will as a prerequisite to purpose, that is, the courage to envisage and pursue valued goals. This, in turn, led to competence or “the free exercise of dexterity and intelligence in the completion of tasks” (Erikson, 1964, p.124) at school age. Competence is followed by fidelity, which Erikson (1964) defined as the “ability to sustain loyalties freely pledged in spite of the inevitable contradictions of values systems” (p.125). Erikson (1982) associated this stage with the psycho-social tasks of adolescence and the formation of an identity. This fifth stage then led to the stages of young adulthood, adulthood and old age, associated respectively with love, generative care and wisdom. Erikson saw these eight stages as beginning with a maternal person and then radiating out to encompass parental persons, basic family, neighbourhood and school, peer groups and out-groups, partners in friendship and sex, the wider world of work and a shared household, and finally humankind. The picture that Erikson created through his eight-stage model of psychological and moral development is one which recognises the centrality of relationship within our lives. We are morally constituted in and through our relationships with others as they are, at least to some degree, by contact with us.

The Triune Ethics Theory (TET) developed by Narvaez (2008) is one of the most recent examples of looking at moral functioning as an integrative process which incorporates the domains of emotion, cognition and will. Her theory incorporates recent research on how the brain responds when making a moral decision. She postulates that TET helps to explain the disconnection between reasoning and emotion, as underdevelopment, or lack of expertise, or as an engagement ethic shutdown from a security orientation.

Narvaez’s integrative theory demonstrates a triune or holistic approach to moral functioning, which is derived from psychological, evolutionary, and neurosciences. It emphasizes the importance of the limbic system (affective domain) and related structures for moral information processing and behaviour. Most research in moral psychology has focused on the work of the neocortex (e.g., deliberate reasoning), or the cognitive domain which can be described as a unitary approach to moral functioning, often neglecting the motivational structures that lie underneath. This theory also seems
to provide deeper insights into the three ways of formulating knowledge and communicative action as described by Habermas (1972, 1974, 1984, 1987, 1990).

TET has four goals. First, it emphasizes motivational orientations driven by unconscious emotional systems that predispose one to process information and react to events in particular ways. Second, TET seeks to explain individual differences in moral functioning. Individuals differ in early emotional experiences that influence personality formation and brain wiring and in turn affect information processing. Third, TET suggests the initial conditions for optimal human moral development. The characteristics of the “environment of evolutionary adaptedness” (Bowlby, 1988) that support optimal brain development, which differ from modern childrearing practices, influence the development of a fully functional “moral” brain. Fourth, TET offers an explanation for the power of situations in influencing moral responses. Although one’s personality might have gelled around one ethic or another, situations can also influence which ethic will be put into play.

Triune Ethics Theory identifies three basic attractors for moral information processing within the brain (Narvaez, 2008), inspired by theories of brain evolution (MacLean, 1990). Narvaez describes three distinctive moral systems, rooted in basic emotional systems that propel human moral action on an individual and group level. The first system is termed the Ethic of Security, the second, the Ethic of Engagement and the third the Ethic of Imagination.

The first formation, termed the Ethic of Security, is rooted in the R-complex (MacLean, 1990), or the extrapyramidal action nervous system (Panksepp, 1998). Dominant in reptiles, the R-complex relates to stereotyped behavior in many animals and several forms of behavior in mammals, including territoriality, imitation, deception, struggles for power, maintenance of routine, and following precedent. The Ethic of Security is based in these instincts, which revolve around physical survival and thriving in context, instincts shared with all animals and present from birth. Primitive systems related to fear, anger, and sexuality reside here. Because they are primarily hardwired into the brain, these systems are not easily damaged, unlike those of the other two systems, making these the default systems when other things go wrong. The Ethic of Security is based primarily in instincts for survival and physical flourishing. Subcortically-driven
instincts for seeking (autonomous exploration) and emotional circuitry for fear and rage when autonomy or safety is thwarted are examples of systems shared with all animals (Panksepp, 1998). The security ethic is oriented to physical factors in two senses. First, it maintains physical survival through self-protection, exploration, and autonomy. Second, the security ethic is attendant to physical flourishing through status enhancement (hierarchy or pecking order) and in-group loyalty (purity). The security ethic is in ascendance when individuals seek out uniqueness of self or group. When a security ethic is a cultural norm, inclusivity is an unwelcome message.

Like Kohlberg’s (1984) preconventional stages, the security ethic is very concerned with self-preservation and personal gain, although it operates primarily implicitly. It can easily dominate thought and behavior when the person or group is threatened (MacLean, 1990). When the security ethic is triggered, defenses go up, in-group/out-group differences are emphasized, rivalry and the pecking order are stressed, and/or superorganismic (mob) thinking and behavior is set in motion (Bloom, 1995).

Narvaez identifies that in order to minimize triggering the defense systems of the security ethic, the environment must be emotionally and physically safe. Providing a safe, secure environment where basic needs are met allows individuals to minimize triggering the security ethic and allows an emphasis on the ethics systems that better represent human aspirations (engagement and imagination). Control systems that can act as an over-ride to the security ethic such as those in the prefrontal cortex may not be fully developed until the middle 20s (Giedd, Blumenthal, & Jeffries, 1999) and can be overtaken by the hindbrain’s self-protective impulsivity (Bechara, 2005) therefore it could be assumed that adults must still offer guidance until the brain is fully developed.

A focus on a security ethic relating to the moral self is oriented to physical flourishing through wealth, status, and power. In the mind of the security ethic, it is “right” to be dominant and maintain inequality. Moral systems are hierarchical and ordered. Self-control, particularly of soft emotion or perceived weakness, is fundamental. It is moral to hold in contempt outgroup members or those who violate the moral rules. The virtues of the security ethic are self-protective loyalty and obedience.
The Ethic of Engagement involves the emotional systems that drive us towards intimacy. These systems were identified as the locus of human moral sense by Darwin (1871/1981; Loye, 2002) because they are the root of our social and sexual instincts and also of affectionate parental care. Although evolution has prepared the human brain for sociality and moral agency, proper care during development is required for normal formation of brain circuitries necessary for successful social engagement and cultural membership (Greenspan & Shanker 2004; Panksepp 1998; Schore, 2003a). Human brains are reward-seeking structures, evolved to obtain rewards primarily from social relationships (Nelson & Panksepp, 1998). With adequate care, the Engagement Ethic develops fully and leads to values of compassion, openness, and tolerance (Eisler & Levine, 2002). The self in the present, in relationship, in emotional context, drives our relational moral orientation towards trust, love, and reciprocity (engagement) or towards mistrust, uncertainty, and shame (security; see Schore 1994).

As Narvaez elaborates an Engagement moral self has a greater capacity for meaningful relationships and a deeper sense of connection to others, along with a sense of responsibility for the welfare of others (Oliner & Oliner, 1988).

The third ethic is the Ethic of Imagination, which links primarily to these recently evolved parts of the brain, the neocortex, particularly the prefrontal cortex. In one way the Imagination Ethic has been studied extensively in moral psychology, at least in terms of deliberative reasoning. Deliberative reasoning, which resides in explicit memory and develops slowly through experience and training, was Kohlberg’s focus of study and that of the cognitive developmental tradition more generally. Most of what is learned is learned implicitly, resides in tacit memory, and is not available to explicit description (Keil & Wilson, 1999). So a distinction has been made between the deliberative, conscious mind and the “adaptive unconscious” (Wilson, 2002) or intuitive mind.

Narvaez articulates that Triune Ethics Theory suggests that the real work of moral judgment and decision making has to do with the coordination of these two “minds.” That coordination is handled by the Imagination Ethic. In the parlance of Triune Ethics Theory, the Imagination Ethic responds to and coordinates the intuitions and instincts of
the Engagement Ethic and the Security Ethic. The Imagination Ethic sorts out the multiple elements that are involved in moral decision making in a particular situation.

The Imagination Ethic, as explained by Narvaez, has two powerful tools. One is the ability to countermand instincts and intuitions with “free won’t” (Cotterill, 1998), the ability that allows humans through learning and willpower to choose which stimuli are allowed to trigger emotional arousal (Panksepp, 1998), implying the ability to control how one responds to an emotional reaction. This describes the condition referred to earlier in the text as will or the conative capacity of the human condition. Humans appear to be the only animals with this capability. The other powerful tool is the ability to explain behavior. The deliberative mind, largely through the brain’s “interpreter” (Gazzaniga, 1985), is facile in explaining any behavior, sometimes unaware that it is “making things up.” Typically, the interpreter adopts the narratives of a cultural, familial, or affiliative group. The social narrative is further refined into a personal narrative, both of which also drive behavior (Grusec, 2002). Krebs (2005) reinterprets Kohlberg’s stages through the lens of evolutionary psychology, viewing the stages as social strategies reflecting the evolution of respect for authority, altruism, cheating, justice, and care.

Like the brain areas related to the Engagement Ethic, the development of brain areas related to the Ethic of Imagination seems to require a nurturing environment. The prefrontal cortex and its specialized units take decades to fully develop and are responsive to experiences due to environmental factors, both early (Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1999) and late in development (Newman, Holden, & Delville, 2005).

The Imagination Ethic provides for a greater moral sense than the other ethics. Imagination Ethic provides a means for a sense of community that extends beyond immediate relations. Indeed, a self grounded in the Imagination Ethic is broadly aware of human possibilities, including the power of relational co-creation in the moment. Such a self is broadly reflective, demonstrating exquisite self-command for envisioned goals. The Imagination Self has unpinned itself to particular security, it is not caught in local particularities, but rather finds meaning in an autopoetic self-expansion (Varela, 1992).
Humans are at their most moral Narvaez goes on to explain, following Darwin’s moral evolution (Loye, 2002), when the Ethic of Engagement is linked with the Ethic of Imagination. As noted, the Security Ethic is the default system when all else goes wrong. The other two ethics must be developed through proper nurturing and environmental support. Although parenting provides the most important context for early brain wiring for engagement and imagination, educators can have an influence on which ethic dominates the classroom and school, and which orientation is nurtured in the classroom. Narvaez’s Integrative Ethical Education model seeks to provide stepwise guidance to cultivating ethical expertise in the engagement and imagination ethics.

The evolution of theories on moral functioning starting with the view that cognition is the basis to moral development contrasted by theorists that postulate that emotional development is the foundation to moral development, seem to be integrated under an umbrella of the notion of a triune approach to moral functioning which incorporates the domains of cognition, affect and conation.

3.3 A Conceptual Model of Moral Functioning

The question still needs to be answered as to what supports a person to move from one stage of development to the next and what would these stages of development look like in a triune approach. How does a child or an adult move from being pre-occupied with self, only acting out of their personal interests, to a desire to grow and understand both their own needs as well as others needs? A number of theorists have articulated some promising models of moral function.

The first one to be explored has been developed by Danesh (1994) who has postulated a developmental model of moral functioning that incorporates stages of development that relate not only to the self but also to our relationships with each other in the areas of triune moral functioning of cognition, affect and conation. The discussion will now examine this model which seems to encapsulate the view of the nature of being human as articulated by Kitwood and encapsulated by Habermas in the process of communicative action and three ways of knowing. The model also seems to relate to the triune ethics in the descriptors of behaviours described at the three levels of Ethic: Security, Engagement and Imagination. The Danesh model has articulated three stages
of development in each of the domains of cognition or what he terms ‘knowing’, the
domain of affect or what he terms ‘loving’ and conation (desire or will to perform an
action) or what he terms ‘willing’ as it relates to the self and relationships with others.

3.3.1 Danesh’s Model of Human Concerns and Powers

Moral action seems to be greatly influenced by both reason (or judgement) (Kohlberg,
1971; 1981) and by caring about the relationship to the other (Gilligan, 1982). These
factors impact on just how much effort or will is required to translate moral intention
into action (Wilson, 1990). The learning domain of will or volition is not a commonly
accepted domain. It can be referred to as ‘conation’. Motivation has been the more
commonly used term, which seems to link together the affective and motivational
aspects of human functioning. However, the term motivation seems to be a less accurate
way of describing the concept and does not give recognition to the notion of will as a
separate intentional centre of human development. Narveaz (2008) describes this
process as an activity of the neo-cortex, as part of the Ethic of Imagination, as the ability
to countermand instincts and intuitions with “free won’t” (Cotterill, 1998), the ability
that allows humans through learning and willpower to choose which stimuli are allowed
to trigger emotional arousal (Panksepp, 1998).

Danesh (1994), a practicing psychiatrist, has written a book entitled The Psychology of
Spirituality, in which he asserts that the capacities to know, to love and to use one’s will
are inherently spiritual powers of the soul. His professional experience led him to
believe that most mental illness relates to a dysfunction with one or more of these three
powers. This would imply a definition of moral functioning that consists of cognitive,
affective and conative domains of human functioning. Danesh (1994) has elaborated
upon the concept of will being a separate domain of development, just as reference is
made to the domains of cognition and affect. This notion is in alignment with Kitwood’s
(1990) view of what he terms moral agency. Moral action therefore would imply that
there are factors of knowing or reason, factors of caring (love) or relationship and
factors of volition or desire to act-on-moral judgement. The latter is also referred to in
some of the literature as ‘moral will’. Danesh (1994) refers to three elements of being
human, that is, knowledge, love and will as ‘powers’ and defines them as follows.
• Knowledge is defined as having the power to discover and demonstrate the realities of things. The term, to know, is used in its broadest sense referring to all kinds of knowing and understanding, such as conscious, subconscious and unconscious forms of knowing, including intuition, and knowledge gained through inspiration and insight. The purpose of knowledge could be to gain insights into self-knowledge as well as trying to apprehend the truth of a particular matter. This definition bears similarities to Habermas’ first way of knowing (empirical/analytic) (p. 64).

• Love has the power of attraction, and is a force which brings people, things, and ideas together. In the physical world, it functions as the power of attraction among the various parts of the atom. It is what makes families and societies work, through a feeling of being connected to each other. The main activity of love could be referred to as creation, because the outcome of love creates life, nurtures and enhances growth and development, and creates unity and harmony. This definition would seem to be an underpinning of Habermas’ second way of knowing (historical-hermeneutic) (pp. 68-69).

• Will refers to our freedom to choose between action and inaction, between good and evil and to determine the direction and quality of our lives. Our will gives us motivation, the courage to act, or a sense of responsibility, and the where-with-all to be creative. This definition would seem to underpin the shift that Habermas identifies between communicative capacity and communicative action (through critical knowing) (pp. 70-71).

Each of these domains is seen to have two modes of expression, one in relationship to one’s own actions and the second in the relationship between self and others. Danesh indicates that each of these areas of capability emerge through a process of development, suggesting three hierarchical stages of development. He also introduces the notion of human concerns in relation to self, relationships and time. These relationships are presented in Table 3.1.

This schema, or matrix, provides some interesting correlations with the processes described in Habermas’ theories of Communicative Action and Ways of Knowing. Habermas identified three processes that help a person to understand their gaining of
shared insights by a series of interactive processes that underpin the accruing of knowledge about self and others. He referred to ‘empirical-analytic’ knowing, a knowing of facts and figures that characterised much of the way that schools have traditionally approached learning. He referred then to second more challenging and authentic way of knowing described as ‘historical-hermeneutic’ or ‘communicative knowledge’, that is, the knowledge and understanding that results from engagement and interrelationship with others. The third way of knowing was referred to as ‘critical knowing’ or ‘self reflectivity’, an emancipated knowing that includes ultimately the knowing of self.

Likewise, there seems to be a correlation with Narvaez’s (2008) TET. Danesh’s category of ‘Knowing’ has a similar set of descriptors as Narvaez’s Ethic of Imagination, the category of ‘Loving’ to the Ethic of Engagement and the category of ‘Willing’ to one of the functions of the Ethic of Imagination.

Danesh postulates that each of the stages is a precondition of the next stage and involves mastery to progress to the next stage of development. The model could be seen as a series of interactive processes that engage all three domains of knowledge, love and will in the process of moral functioning. An example of this interactivity is suggested by the following process. Once a person has engaged in a moral encounter, it would be necessary to be able to reflect on experience. If a person is self preoccupied, they will not be able to self-discover. Once one is able to self-discover and self-accept, then self-knowledge is required before a person can commit to a path of growth where greater self-knowledge comes out of reflection and re-evaluation. The ability to self-accept gives a person an inherent sense of confidence that would enhance one’s confidence in the learning process. This ultimately assists a person to take responsibility for their own views and actions in relationship to themselves and others in order to make a difference in society. What is helpful in the Danesh Matrix (1994) is the articulation of a series of hierarchical stages that lead to a more complex way of acting at higher levels of development. This matrix provides a useful framework for examining the elements involved in moral functioning but it does not address the dynamics of how each aspect can work as a coordinated whole. The model was developed by Danesh as grounded theory as a result of his clinical practice and action research.
Table 3.1
The Danesh Matrix of moral functioning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Human Concerns</th>
<th>Knowledge</th>
<th>Love</th>
<th>Will</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self</strong></td>
<td>• Self-experience</td>
<td>• Self-preoccupation</td>
<td>• Self-control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Self-discovery</td>
<td>• Self-acceptance</td>
<td>• Self-confidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Self-knowledge</td>
<td>• Self growth (development)</td>
<td>• Self-responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relationships</strong></td>
<td>• Sameness of people</td>
<td>• Acceptance of others</td>
<td>• Competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Uniqueness of people</td>
<td>• Empathy with others</td>
<td>• Cooperation and equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Oneness of people</td>
<td>• Unity</td>
<td>• Movasat (meaning service before self)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time</strong></td>
<td>• Present (here and now)</td>
<td>• Primary union</td>
<td>• Desire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Mortality</td>
<td>• Separation</td>
<td>• Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Immortality</td>
<td>• Secondary union</td>
<td>• Action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.4 Emerging Attempts towards an Integrative Model of Moral Functioning

This section looks at models that have integrated research findings into hypothetical models of moral functioning. The challenge that emerges in trying to gain insights into moral functioning is that there are many different theoretical perspectives, all coming from different basic assumptions. Theorists in recent times are attempting to test different conceptual models to gain greater insights into the process of moral functioning. This has been achieved by connecting a number of theorists’ findings into a suggested process of moral functioning. Berkowitz (2000) likens this phenomenon to blind men touching different parts of an elephant and then trying to describe what an elephant looks like. Your perception of reality depends on which part you are feeling or exploring. This suggests that moral functioning might be characterised as a complex system of interrelated processes that make up a series of moral competencies. In recent years, several attempts have been made to integrate the different aspects of moral development into more comprehensive models of moral functioning. Berkowitz (1998)
has identified three that are promising. The affect-cognition triad (Lickona, 1991), the seven (Hay, 1994) and the four component model (Rest, 1985).

Three research-based approaches to developing a model of moral functioning will be examined in the following section. First, the Rest model (1985) has been selected from the above models mentioned by Berkowitz for further elaboration. This is selected because it is one of the few examples of extensive integration of research findings into key areas of moral functioning and has been further developed into an educational model, based on identified moral capabilities. The second model is one formulated by the moral theorist, Candee (1984), who worked very closely with Kohlberg and has been strongly influenced by his theory. The third model is an overview of recently researched elements that have been proven to have an impact on moral functioning, as described by Berkowitz and Grych (1998).

3.4.1 Rest’s Model of Moral Functioning
An ambitious task was undertaken by Rest (1983) to analyse all the psychological theory and research available in the early 1980s. From the research findings, he proposed a series of steps to be taken when one is faced with a moral dilemma and is required to determine how to act-on-judgement. He identified four major processes that incorporate the different research perspectives in relation to cognitive-affective interactions. The four processes include:

Component 1: - The first step is to interpret the situation in terms of how one’s actions affect the welfare of others. This step is based on research findings related to the cognitive-affective interaction of drawing inferences about how the other will be affected, and feeling empathy, disgust, etc. for the other (Response to emergencies: Staub, 1979; Schwartz, 1977; Social Cognition development: Shantz 1983; Selman, 1980; Empathy: Hoffman 1976; all references cited in Rest, 1983).

Component 11: The second step is to formulate what a moral course of action will be; to identify the moral ideal in a specific situation. This step is based on research findings related to the cognitive-affective interaction, of abstract and
attitudinal-valuing aspects involved in the construction of systems of moral meaning; moral ideals comprised of both cognitive and affective elements. Research included Cognitive developmental (e.g. Piaget, 1932/1965; Kohlberg, 1969, 1976); DIT research (Rest, 1979); Post Piagetian (Keasey, 1978) (all references cited in Rest, 1983).

Component 111:- The third step is to select, among competing values or ideals, which one to act on; deciding whether or not to fulfil one’s moral ideal. This step is based on research findings related to the cognitive-affective interaction of calculation of relative utilities of various goals; mood influencing outlook; defensive distortion of perception; empathy impelling decisions; social understanding motivating the choice of goals. Research considered included decision-making models and factors which affect decision-making, such as Pomazal & Jacob (1976); Lerner (1971); Isen et al. (1978); as well as moral motivation such as Wilson (1975); Aronfreed (1968); Bandura (1977b); Kohlberg (1969); Hoffman, Durkheim (1961); Rawls (1971) (all references cited in Rest, 1983).

Component 1V:- The fourth step is to execute and implement what one intends to do. This step was based on research findings related to the cognitive-affective interaction of task persistence as affected by cognitive transformation of the goal. Ego strength and self-regulation, as set out by Mischel and Mischel (1976); Krebs (1967); Staub (1979) (all references cited in Rest, 1983 pp. 80-84).

The Rest model places greater emphasis on the cognitive and affective domains of human functioning and refers to the process of motivation as an important element that leads a person to execute and implement what they intend to do. This process can be termed ‘acting on moral judgement’. Rest’s model suggests a similar model of moral functioning, as referred to in the three domains of knowing, loving and willing in the four components making up moral functioning, however, different terminology is used.

3.4.2 Candee

A year after Rest’s (1983) work, another attempt was made by Candee (1984) to integrate research findings into a model of moral functioning. This model is worthy of
review because it links back to Kohlberg’s (1971; 1981) stage level theory of moral development. An extensive survey of empirical research established a connection between the higher levels of moral judgement at Stages 5 and 6 of Kohlberg’s (1971; 1981) theory. Stage 5 is referred to as ‘Social Contract Orientation’, where the person considers what makes for a good society where they consider the rights and values that a society ought to uphold. Stage 6 is the ‘Universal Ethical Principles’ where the person has a clearer and broader conception of universal principles which include justice as well as individual rights. Candee suggests a relationship between moral judgement and moral action such that cognition, or a set of cognitions, serves each of these functions.

The first function of Candee’s model, defining the problem or interpretation of the situation, is served by Selman’s (1980) cognitive structures of social perspective-taking, which are necessary but not sufficient to be described as moral. These structures interpret the moral situation, and sensitise the actor to relevant claims, as well as to the feelings of each of the characters in the situation. What moral stage and moral sub-stage of development a person is at, according to Kohlberg’s classification, in turn, determines two more specific judgements which have been found to be tied directly to moral action. These are the judgements of ‘deontic choice’ (judgement of what is right, typically derived from a principle) and judgements of ‘responsibility’ (to act on what one has judged to be right). Deontic choice seems to be tied to a stage and sub-stage of development in the sense that, where all universalisable moral principles lead to a single alternative as being ‘more moral,’ that choice will be made almost invariably by persons at Stage 5 and sub-stage B (Kohlberg). Judgements of responsibility are also tied to a moral stage and sub-stage at each higher stage and sub-stage B. People at Stage 5 of moral development will often hold themselves responsible for putting their deontic choices into practice.

Candee identifies the fourth stage in his model as the ‘non-moral’ skills needed for follow-through. These include such cognitive skills as intelligence (i.e., figuring out a plan to achieve the moral result), attention (i.e. avoiding distractions), and delay of gratification (i.e., persevering in one’s chosen plan). Stage four perhaps suggests an involvement of what has been defined in this text as moral will. Candee’s research has identified an important factor of moral maturity being linked to a person being more likely to act-on-moral judgement. Stage 5 levels of development were not found
generally in Kohlberg’s (1971; 1981) research findings until a person had reached adulthood. This would suggest, from his findings, that a long developmental process would be involved in a person learning how to consistently act-on-moral judgement.

3.4.3 Berkowitz and Grych Model

Rest (1983), Candee (1984) and Berkowitz (1998), in their categorising of research findings, have demonstrated a fundamental problem in moral development research. That is, researchers are exploring the process from different domains of knowledge. The human condition does not seem to function in a way that is easily measured by empirical research. It is difficult to isolate the individual from the environment in which they are acting and prove it categorically. Exploring findings across disciplines suggests that moral action is predicated on a complex set of interrelated processes that are situationally-based. Berkowitz has added to the work of Candee and Rest in defining a seven-part taxonomy which he refers to as the moral anatomy involved in the process of moral functioning. This taxonomy includes moral behaviour, moral values, moral character, moral reason, moral emotion, moral identity, and meta-moral characteristics. Berkowitz elaborated that moral behaviour is intentional, that moral values reflect beliefs and attitudes that have an affective component and that moral character, or the expression of virtuous behaviour, is reflected in personality or a stable disposition to act in a moral way (Vessels, 1998).

As a further amplification of this approach to dealing with the complex process of moral decision-making, Berkowitz and Grych (1998) have attempted to integrate the diverse factors identified from current research about aspects that foster goodness in children, or help to develop moral character. As the focus of this research thesis is to understand more about the gap between moral judgment and moral action and the implications of this gap for education, the literature review will focus now on what has been found in research findings to be critical in ensuring the moral development of children. As Berkowitz and Grych’s (1998) research findings identify crucial elements necessary for a model of moral functioning, they are worthy of mention.

Berkowitz and Grych (1998) identify four foundational components of character: (1) social orientation; (2) self-control; (3) compliance; and (4) self-esteem. As well, they identify four moral components: (1) empathy; (2) conscience; (3) moral reasoning; and,
(4) altruism. In addition, they identify five parental strategies that research has consistently identified as being positively correlated with developing moral thought, feeling and action in children. These are: (1) parents use of induction; 2) nurturance and support; (3) demanding-ness and limit setting; (4) modelling; and, (5) democratic open family discussion and conflict resolution style. (These components of moral functioning are elaborated in greater detail in Appendix G). It is interesting that this model of moral functioning incorporates the parenting strategies that foster goodness in children. In the initial analysis of ‘Programs that Work’, a key component was the importance of role models in the students’ environment. The parents, as the first educators of the child, are engaged in a critical relationship with the child and therefore act as powerful role models during the early formative years.

The notion of conscience, which is one of the four moral components seen as being influential on acting on moral judgement articulated by Berkowitz, is worthy of greater elaboration. The work of Kochanska and her colleagues (Kochanska, et al., 1994; Kochanska, Murray and Coy, 1997) describes conscience as having two major aspects, one an affective component and the other a cognitive component. These are:

1. **affective discomfort** which encompasses the emotional results of transgression (e.g., guilt, apology, empathy for the victim, etc); and,

2. **active moral regulation or vigilance**, which encompasses the classical internalisation of standards along with confession, reparation and monitoring of others’ wrongdoing.

Kochanska has also established a link between early temperament, specifically high inhibitory control and low impulsivity and later conscience development. Allinsmith and Greening (1955) reported that the avoidance of power assertion by parents increases guilt more than does reliance on power assertion, because greater learning occurs through reasoning throughout the scenario. Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967, cited in Berkowitz and Grych, 1998) found that parental use of induction led to increased internalisation of moral standards and guilt in children (children’s understanding is stimulated as to the reasons one behaviour is chosen over another and the impact of the behaviour on another person).

These attempts at integrating research findings detailed above, have identified important component parts of moral behaviour and linked them together as essential elements
involved in the process of moral functioning. A model has yet to emerge which identifies how all these elements work together to enable a person to consistently act on moral judgement. It is still not clear from the research how a person moves from one stage of development to another and actually learns how to act on moral judgement. It is apparent that there are a number of moral competencies involved in a complex process from moral judgement to moral action and that a person can be educated to act morally.

The focus of the discussion will now turn to reviewing educational models that have utilised elements of moral functioning to educate children to act on their moral judgement.

3.5 Educational Models

Two educational models will be reviewed as examples of the translation of theoretical frameworks that incorporate the conceptual model of what it means to be human (Kitwood, 1990) as detailed in this literature review.

3.5.1 The Community Voices Program

Narvaez et al. (1999) worked with Rest to translate his theoretical model of moral functioning into an applied character education model called ‘The Community Voices Program’. It is interesting to note that this model includes ethical motivation or the conative or volitional aspects of human functioning. Hence, she has incorporated the three domains of cognition, affect and conation.

Communities Voices is a character education program which shows considerable promise. It was funded by the Federal Government of the USA (1998) for further development. It has utilised the four component model devised by Rest (1983). Rest’s theory has formed the basis of a major Community Voices and Character Education program that has been conjointly developed by the Minnesota Department of Children, Families and Learning, The Centre for the Study of Ethical Development at the University of Minnesota, the Minnesota Schools’ Participants and the U.S. Department of Education (Narvaez et al., 1999). The schema is described in the following section. Each of these components has identified a series of ethical behaviour categories, which have formed the basis of educational experiences.
Ethical sensitivity
Component I: Ethical Sensitivity- Interpret the situation according to who is involved, what actions to take and what possible reaction and outcomes might ensue.

Ethical judgement
Component II: Ethical Judgement- Reason about the possible actions in the situation and judge which action is most ethical.

Ethical motivation
Component III: Ethical Motivation- Prioritise the ethical action over other goals and needs.

Ethical action
Component IV: Ethical Action- Implement the ethical action by knowing how to do so and follow through.

In addition, five skill levels have been designed, based on the notion of supporting students to develop from a novice to an expert. These phases of development comprise both a process (a way to learn a skill) and a product (the skills learned). The purpose of the levels is to assist the teacher in identifying what students need for developing a particular skill, knowledge or attitude or to identify a student’s level of expertise. The five levels are identified as Level 1:- Immersion, multiple engaging activities; Level 2:- Focusing Attention, elemental skills; Level 3:- Practice, try out many skills through practice and exploration; Level 4:- Integration, finding more information and working with mentors; and Level 5:- Expertise, scholar/performer/leader in the areas of synthesis, creativity and generativity.

This approach of developing skills over time through different stages of learning, from novice to expert, is similar to the theory expressed by the Gordon Training Institute (2004). The four stages of learning identified by Gordon Training are: (1) unconscious ignorance, where a person does not know they do not know or are in the stage of denial; (2) conscious ignorance implies a person now knows they do not know but are not expert enough to know what to do; (3) conscious knowledge implies that a person now knows what they need to do but need to consciously think their way through applying their knowledge; and, (4) unconscious knowledge where a person acts almost in an
automatic mode where their behaviour has become habituated or wise in knowing what to do in a given situation.

3.5.2 The Child Development Project

Attention now turns to reviewing a grounded research project that has been identified as having made a consistent difference in educational outcomes over time. The Child Development Project (CDP) has been designated as one of the Educational Programs That Work (National Diffusion Network, 1995) Huiit (1995).

This approach was initially designed to help teachers and parents enhance children's 'prosocial' behaviours and attitudes (Watson et al., 1989, 1992). The CDP program operates in a school district in California where children are offered with instruction on how to be fair, caring, and responsible in the classroom. They are also provided with opportunities to think about and discuss the meaning and importance of fundamental prosocial values and to practice these values primarily in the classroom but also in the school at large, at home, and in the community. The CDP demonstrated that the combination of instruction, practice, and reflection is a powerful way for children to learn. The program is shaped by three general propositions:

1) Adults play an active and important role in shaping the development of children's character;

2) Character develops from within the child on the basis of the child's own thinking and experiences; and given an adequate family environment, children will be disposed to be concerned about others as well as themselves; and,

3) The interventions are designed to influence three different but interrelated systems--affective, cognitive, and Behavioural. It is based on the idea that children need to learn both specific skills and conventions, as well as the accumulated moral wisdom of our culture.

There are five kinds of experiences that are deemed important for the development of children's prosocial orientations. These include:

1) Supportive adult-child relationships: children are inclined to emulate adults with whom they have positive relationships;
2) Exposure to societal values: not only social customs and conventions but also the accumulated moral wisdom of adult society. This occurs by exposing children to prosocial models and explaining the reasons for moral action;
3) Opportunities for peer interaction and pro-social action: help children to develop self-control, increase their moral and social understanding and concern for their fellows;
4) Opportunities to think about and discuss moral issues: the work of structural developmentalists has demonstrated that children strive to develop coherent moral systems and this is fostered by providing opportunities to discuss and think about moral situations. As children approach adolescence their trust in adult authority weakens and they strive for independence. At this stage they will need to have reasons for moral action that they regard as their own; and,
5) Experiences that promote understanding of others: the ability to take the perspective of others has been proposed by cognitive-developmental theorists as a central ingredient of prosocial action.

The results of this program showed that enrolled students were more helpful and cooperative and more frequently displayed affection, concern, support, and encouragement toward one another. They showed better cognitive, social, problem-solving skills and strategies and were generally more committed to certain democratic values. Program children were more likely to engage in assertion responsibility, that is, state one's own position even though it seems unlikely to prevail. They were also more likely to state belief in equality of representation and participation, that is, a belief that all members of a group have a right to participate in a group's decisions and activities.

3.6 Implications for Education
The research work of Kohlberg (1971;1981) based on a stage theory, suggests that a person can be classified as more or less morally mature, depending on what stage they demonstrate consistent responses to a series of fictional moral dilemmas. Wark and Krebs (1996) challenge this notion and suggest that it would be misleading to characterise people as morally mature or immature, or as possessing a care-based or justice-based moral orientation on the basis of their responses to a small sample of often unrepresentational dilemmas, which provided the testing base for Kohlberg’s research subjects. Wark and Krebs (1996) maintain that what develops is moral competence, that is, the capacity to make more sophisticated moral judgments. This view is certainly
consistent with the notion of the capacity of the brain to draw on quite specific, highly individuated moral prototypes and to become increasingly able, through recurrent manipulation, to apply and extend these prototypes (Churchill, 1996). Damon’s (1999) research about how children progressively develop more sophisticated understandings of ‘fairness’ also supports this notion of the brain being able to develop and increasingly extend moral concepts on the basis of feedback from social interaction and observation. It also supports the notion of Narvaez et al. (1999) that a child will pass through stages of skills acquisition from a novice to finally becoming an expert.

Just as it is possible to have a rich or poor understanding of any domain of knowledge, it follows that our moral knowledge can consist of an extensive or limited hierarchy of moral prototypes. Similarly, we might be thoroughly familiar with or, alternatively quite unused to, the recurrent manipulation of these prototypes. Furthermore, our specific environment might provide admirable, or less than admirable, moral exemplars to offer some basis for the prototypes we develop in relation to moral concepts such as honesty and justice. These findings give weight to the importance of the role model in any ethical character development program, as identified in the review of ‘programs that work.’

As noted previously (see p.50), it appears that our basic emotions are ‘hardwired’ (Izard, 1991) and play a major role in our capacity for responsiveness to others and the development of relationships with others. ‘Hard-wired’ in this context means ‘innate’ or fixed in the neural structure from before birth, including all of the moral reactions that these relationships entail. These hard-wired emotions tend to influence our moral reactions. As Hoffman (1988) realised, we have an obvious early capacity for empathy where our emotions play a key role. It could therefore be speculated that emotions in humans can supply ‘default values’, that is, they might provide base-line values that are already present in our neural substrate and are subsequently modified by what is put into the system. ‘Default values’ are defined as ‘approximate values’ which are entered into a system as a starting point but might be subject to change. By way of comparison, a word processor will have initial settings with respect to font size and type when first operated but these can be altered when the need arises. Hence, the importance of creating a learning environment that will be both supportive and challenging to evoke
further development of moral aptitude. This suggests that the conditions for moral learning are crucial in terms of the social and cultural context.

An acceptance of moral learning via prototypes has radical implications for ethical character education and constitutes a significant philosophical and epistemological challenge to the type of moral education that simply involves the learning and application of rigid, moral rules, which are universal, ahistorical, asocial and acultural. To accept the dynamic, emergent properties of moral prototypes and their formation within specific socio-cultural contexts is to deny a ‘transmission approach’ to moral education. Children are not empty vessels into which the requisite knowledge can be poured. Neither are children simply blank slates upon which the necessary moral encoding can be written, to be reproduced in the desired manner at the appropriate time. Such approaches deny both the complexity and the potential of our minds to undertake the unique pattern of moral growth and regression constituted by our individual lives.

A neural-based approach to moral learning is one which not only accepts individual differences but which actually emphasises the inevitable nature of such differences and their consequent impact on shaping highly individuated moral responses. Within the Connectionist paradigm, moral knowledge is empirical in nature for the following reason:

...because it results from the continual readjustment of our convictions and practices in the light of our unfolding experience of the real world readjustments that lead to greater collective harmony and individual flourishing (Churchland, 1996, p. 291).

Similarly, Piaget (1948) observed that all development emerges from action; that is, individuals construct and reconstruct their knowledge of the world as a result of their interactions with the environment.

The Connectionist theory (Churchland, 1996) emphasizes the importance of experiential learning to develop moral prototypes. At a fundamental level, the work of ethical character education becomes interventionist in the sense of trying to either consolidate or modify an individual’s ‘synaptic weights’ in a morally and socially desired direction as determined by the telos for ethics and ethical character education. This concept is
elaborated in the Bahá’í Writings as the process of rectitude and refinement of character or the ‘mining of hidden gems’. Furthermore, humans are fortunate that our neural architecture makes us pre-eminent in our dynamic capacity for learning and responding. In an age of rapidly accelerating social and technological change, there are now many situations for which there are no explicit rules, and even in more familiar situations, contextual factors often make the simple application of a rule a far from straightforward task.

If we accept Izard’s (1991) notion that basic emotions are hard-wired and provide a basis for early empathic response, then this lends weight to the proposition that we have certain inbuilt social predispositions. If the prevailing environmental conditions nurture these predispositions, provided that we ourselves do not suffer from some innate neurological handicap of some kind, we are likely to develop positive reciprocal relations with others.

### 3.7 Conclusions from the Literature Review

Clearly, the notion that moral action or moral behaviour can be conceptualised as resistance to temptation, resulting from algebraic outcomes of two forces, the lust of the flesh or of needs, and the anticipation of the guilt of the conscience as mediated by an ego, self, or will, has been revoked by the research findings of Kohlberg and Candee (1984):

*Thus they concluded that emotional arousal does not seem to be an internal determinant necessary to define moral behaviour.* (Kohlberg and Candee, 1984, p. 502)

A number of studies have shown low correlation, no relationship, or even negative relationships between values and resistance to temptation (e.g. Hartshorne et al. 1928; 1929; 1930), or between guilt and resistance to temptation (e.g. Grinder, 1962; Allinsmith & Greening, 1955). No studies have demonstrated that strength of moral values, resistance to temptation, and proneness to give projective guilt responses, co-vary (Pittel & Mendelson, 1966). Grinder (1962) suggests we are dealing with two essentially different systems, one a system of moral thought and the other a system of moral behaviour. We might learn on a verbal level that certain actions are supposed to be right, but we learn on a situational level that other actions can be rewarded as
actually being right. This suggests that knowledge is not sufficient on its own for informing moral judgement and impelling moral action.

Wilson (1973) introduced the idea of a morally-educated person, based on all the components, or elements, which would lead that person to perform actions that have good consequences for others and self. These components include both moral and non-moral factors important for a good outcome. His list includes phil, a moral principle of respect for persons (which is distinctly moral), krat, a will factor, emp, a psychological knowledge factor, and gig, a factor of factual knowledge and skills of information processing (Candee, 1984, p. 510). Hoffman (1977; 1982; 1983) and Kagan (1984) proposed that emotion rather than cognition provides the foundation for morality. They propose that the potential for moral-emotional reactions is present at birth and that natural feeling states provide a ‘platform upon which a set of universal, or principled, moral standards can be built’ (Kagan, 1984, p. 123). This introduces the notion that empathy is at the heart of moral action. This approach introduces the idea that translating judgement to action engages a number of factors but does not suggest how these factors work together to sustain translating judgement to action. Additional factors of ‘will’ and skills factors have been added to the notion of what influences the translation of moral judgement into moral action.

An even more complex process is alluded to by Berkowitz and Grych (1998) who identified a seven-part taxonomy which referred to a moral anatomy involved in the process of moral functioning. Berkowitz and Grych elaborated that moral behaviour is intentional, that moral values reflect beliefs and attitudes that have an affective component and that moral character, or the expression of virtuous behaviour, is reflected in personality or a stable disposition to act in a moral way (Vessels, 1989).

Berkowitz and Grych (1998) and Rest (1985) have undertaken extensive reviews of the literature and have identified a number of factors that impact on moral development. What is not apparent in the literature is how these factors impact on each other and how they can be developed in the growing child to achieve a systematic and sustainable educational approach to develop ethical character. Community Voices and the Child Development project offer very promising approaches as verified by research results,
particularly the Child Development Project that supports the notion that it is equally important to educate a child to be learned and to have a moral character.

Unless, a clearer understanding can be gained about an integrated process of moral functioning across the stages of moral development, it is difficult to identify when and what key competencies should be included in an educational program.

**Summary of Chapter**

All moral theorists support the notion that the development of the ability to act morally engages a developmental process. While one might focus more on the cognitive domain, or the affective domain, and others on the social and cultural domains, the question still needs to be answered as to what helps a person move from one stage of development to the next.

The research findings in Chapter 3 challenge the notion of cognitive models of moral functioning where the emotions are seen as being driven by cognitive appraisal and process. All the research findings discussed in Chapter 3 reinforce the notion that to consistently act-on-moral judgement involves a series of capabilities that develop over time, in different situational contexts and domains that impact on moral functioning. Narvaez’s (2008) Triune Ethics Theory identifies the importance of early nurturance and the importance of safe and nurturing environments on the capacity to access the Engagement Ethic and the Imagination Ethic. The three domains identified to date by Kitwood (1990), Habermas (1972; 1974; 1984; 1987; 1990) Narvaez (2007) and Danesh (1994) incorporate: cognition or the capacity to know; affect, or the capacity to love; and, the factor of motivation, or the capacity to use one’s will or conation in relation to one’s self and others to act on moral judgement. How these three domains work at the systems level is still to be understood.

Although the Community Voices model (1999) has identified a number of key capabilities related to the four-part model of moral functioning, as identified by Rest (1985) as a comprehensive set of moral capabilities, a holistic process of moral functioning and moral learning is yet to be discovered. The question therefore is what else can be learned about moral functioning and the situational factors that impact on translating moral judgement into moral action? Chapter 4 will summarise the emergent
themes from Chapters 2 and 3 about what research has identified as key influences on the process of moral learning and moral functioning and their impact upon the research process.
CHAPTER 4
EMERGENT THEMES ABOUT MORAL FUNCTIONING FROM THE LITERATURE REVIEW

Chapter 4 summarises the emergent themes from the literature review detailed in Chapters 2 and 3 regarding research to date about moral functioning. The various components identified in the process of moral judgement to moral action will be reviewed initially, followed by a review of the role of development and experience in the process of moral functioning. Situational factors impacting on moral functioning will then be explored, leading to an understanding of how these various components might be interrelated in the process of moral functioning. The next sections of the chapter will review the impact of gender and also the impact of brain functioning on moral learning. The final section will explore the implications of these findings and identify the critical research foci, leading into the research design presented in Chapter 5.

4.1 Judgement to Action: A Number of Components

It is evident from the research literature that there are a number of capacities involved in the ‘judgement to action’ cycle, and that these components are interconnected in some way within the human being. How they work together as a total process to support the translation of what is considered “the appropriate thing to do” in a given situation; that is, applied moral action, is still to be discovered.

A review of the literature reveals at least six dimensions which influence the ‘moral judgement to action’ process. These are: the centres of intentionality (cognition, affect and conation or ‘will’); maturation (which includes the person’s level of development plus experience); situational factors; the possible interdependence of the different domains of moral functioning; gender; and brain functioning. These dimensions will be presented in turn.

4.1.1 Centres of Intentionality

The review of current literature has identified that lack of action in a moral encounter is not simply a weakness of will. Research has identified that cognition (Kohlberg, 1984; Piaget, 1965) and affect (Hoffman, 1976; Kagan, 1984) are deeply involved in the judgement-to-action process. Additionally, aspects of ‘will’ have been referred to as
contributing to this process (Wilson, 1973). Over the last three decades of the 20th Century, researchers were divided over whether moral development is essentially a cognitive process or an emotional/social aspect of cognition, with little resolution being made in this polarisation of thought. Grinder (1962) suggested that we are dealing with two essentially different systems: one, a system of moral thought, and the other, a system of moral behaviour.

How can we make sense of this divergence of thought? As argued in the literature review, it is useful to look at a vision of what it means to be human; one that supports a more complex understanding of moral functioning. This vision can then be used as a reference point to assess current research directions and to review models which might explain how an integrated system of moral functioning might occur. Traditionally, research has focused on specific elements that might be defined and tested empirically to support a given hypothesis. The emerging trend, in examining moral functioning, is to identify the different elements of human capacity which play a part in this process. The works of Danesh (1994), Berkowitz and Grych (1998), and Narvaez, et al (1999, whose work was based on Rest’s theory 1983, 1985), were documented in the literature review as examples of some preliminary attempts to define the ‘moral judgement to action’ cycle.

In the 1980s and 1990s, Rest (1983; 1985), Kitwood (1990), and the earlier work of Davidson (1962), identified that there were a number of capacities, or centres of intentionality, that influence the translation of moral judgement to action. The work of Danesh (1994) offered one of the few models, along with Rest (1983, 1985), that suggested that there were separate domains of functionality or intentionality within the human being. Danesh (1994) has identified three intentional centres or domains of what he terms human powers. These are the capacity to know, the capacity to love and the capacity to use our will (as detailed in Table 3.1, page 91). Danesh’s classification is not dissimilar to the three ways of knowing identified by Habermas (1972; 1974; 1984; 1987; 1990). Habermas identified knowing, first, through empirical-analytic knowing (similar to Danesh’s capacity to know); second, through the knowing and understanding that results from engagement and interrelationship with others (similar to Danesh’s capacity to love); and, third, through ‘critical knowing’ or ‘self reflectivity’ (related to Danesh’s capacity for ‘will’ which includes reflection on action). The existence of these
domains is also supported by several different researchers. Kagan (1984) and Hoffman (1976; 1982; 1983) who propose that emotion is the foundational domain to moral functioning, and which could be linked to Danesh’s domain of ‘loving’.

In the field of education, these three capacities are referred to as domains of development, and are termed cognition (the capacity to know), affect (the capacity to love), and conation (the capacity to use our will). It is well-accepted that we have different domains of functioning that impact on our ability to learn. One of the best known examples is found in Bloom’s Taxonomy (1956). Bloom’s Taxonomy divides educational objectives into three domains, namely, Cognitive (knowledge), Affective (attitudes) and Psychomotor (skills). These three domains have been used by curriculum designers to identify the competencies that should be covered in the curriculum under the categories of knowledge, attitudes and skills. Like other taxonomies, Bloom’s Taxonomy is hierarchical; this means that learning at the higher levels is dependent on having attained prerequisite knowledge, attitudes and skills at lower levels. In spite of this, the domain of conation, or the capacity to use one’s will to act, has not been identified in Bloom’s Taxonomy as a developmental process. The literature review supports the hypothesis that three domains of human capability, cognition, affect and conation, are involved in the moral judgement to action cycle.

4.1.2 The Role of Development and Experience

A person’s level of development, or moral maturity, seems to have an influence on moral action. Kohlberg & Candee (1984) identified that a person operating at stage 5 in Kohlberg’s model is more likely to act-on-judgment. At stage 5, people are making an independent effort to conceptualise what a society should value, and trying to determine logically what a society ought to be like (Kohlberg, 1981). Stage 5 respondents are working towards their own conception of the ‘good society’. This stage is sometimes summarised as entering into a voluntary contract or self-chosen action, in contrast to in Stage 4, when a person will conform to a view based on respect for, or fear of, the laws of the society rather than because they think this would be good for society. Therefore, moral action at Stage 5 is based on ‘ought’, rather than a ‘compulsory’ or enforced action. Hence, it could be assumed that if an intended action is in their ‘ought frame of reference’, a person is more likely to act-on-moral judgement. These assumptions imply
that acting-on-moral judgement is both a developmental and a learned process, which is impacted on by several different intentional centres.

Furthermore, the process involves different levels of consciousness or experience ranging from novice to expert (Narvaez, et al., 1999). Narvaez et al. identified five levels of experience that a person will pass through on the journey of mastering moral action. They are identified as: Level 1: Immersion - multiple engaging activities; Level 2: Focusing Attention - elemental skills; Level 3: Practice - develop many skills through practice and exploration; Level 4: Integration - finding more information and working with mentors; and Level 5: Expertise - scholar/performer/leader in the areas of synthesis, creativity and generativity (Narvaez, et al., 1999, p. 89).

4.1.3 Situational Factors

Moral action also seems to be strongly dependent on situational factors rather than on how strongly a moral value is held (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984; Grinder, 1962; Lehrer, 1967). The notion of situational factors is elaborated upon by Kohlberg & Candee (1984), who identified that the relationship between moral thought and moral action had been studied in two different ways. The original approach, best exemplified by the Hartshorne and May (1928; 1929; 1930) experiment, was to try to correlate the strength with which an individual held a moral value (e.g., honesty) with his or her performance of moral behaviour. This research pointed to a strong situational effect. It produced little evidence to support the idea that moral behaviour was determined by general moral attitudes. The lack of evidence to support a correlation between values and behaviour is evidenced in the fact that, when individuals are confronted with a moral situation, they do not reason in terms of abstract moral values but rather define the situation in terms of concrete rights and duties. An abstract moral value relates to a belief system about how one ‘ought’ to behave. When an individual is faced with a choice of how to act, however, s/he will be examining this choice in terms of the entitlelements, individual rights and specific duties or responsibilities one has towards a particular person in a specific context.

Situational factors are strongly influenced by another trend identified in the literature review, referred to as social evolution. The notion of situational factors is important to explore, because of the phenomenon of social evolution. This implies that the type of
moral dilemmas encountered constantly change, as social conditions change and increasing social complexity emerges along with the movement towards a global civilisation. In other words, moral behavior is not simply a person learning a certain repertoire of moral actions. The person will also need to take into account the specific situation and also the social context when deciding how to act on a moral dilemma.

4.2 Interdependent Domains and Influences that Impact on Moral Functioning

How do all these components or variables of moral functioning influence each other; that is, the three domains of functioning, the person’s developmental stage and level of experience, and the situation and context in which the decision is being made?

Researchers contend that moral judgement to action will be influenced by a number of components important to acting on judgement that can be termed distinctly ‘moral’ and ‘non-moral’. Berkowitz and Grych (1998) identified four foundational components of character, namely: (1) social orientation; (2) self-control; (3) compliance; and, (4) self-esteem, and four moral components, namely: (1) empathy; (2) conscience; (3) moral reasoning; and (4) altruism. Wilson’s (1973) list included phil, a moral principle of respect for persons (which is distinctly moral), krat, a will factor, emp, a psychological knowledge factor, and gig, a factor of factual knowledge and skills of information processing. The initial work of Narvaez’s (1999) in the Community Voices Model, based on Rest’s (1985) research, identified four components, namely Ethical Sensitivity, Ethical Judgement, Ethical Motivation and Ethical Action. Narvaez (2007) in her later research work has linked moral functioning to theories on triune brain functioning inspired by the work of MacLean (1990). She has identified three distinctive moral systems, rooted in basic emotional systems that propel human moral action on an individual and group level; namely, the ethic of security, the ethic of engagement and the ethic of imagination. She has explored the notion that the ethic of security may become a default system if the person does not feel safe and secure in a particular situation suggesting that the involvement of other two systems will depend on factors of emotional safety.

Findings suggest that these interdependent domains of cognition, affect and conation that impact on the moral judgement to action cycle are further impacted on by three additional factors. First, as identified by Narvaez, et al. (1999), the experiential factor
which supported a person to move, through repeated experience, from a novice to an expert. The second factor related to the developmental stage of the person involved (Danesh, 1994; Kohlberg, 1981). The third factor concerned the environment in which we live and function (Jordan & Kalinowski, 1972). The interdependent nature of this third factor is further elaborated in the Bahá’í Writings by Shoghi Effendi (1933) who stated:

_We cannot segregate the human heart from the environment outside us and say that once one of these is reformed everything will be improved. Man is organic with the world. His inner life moulds the environment and is itself also deeply affected by it. The one acts upon the other and every abiding change in the life of man is the direct result of these mutual reactions_ (p.84).

### 4.3 Gender

The role of gender could also be an influencing factor on translating moral judgement to moral action. Gilligan (1982) asserted that women have different moral and psychological tendencies from men. According to Gilligan, men think in terms of rules and justice while women are more inclined to think in terms of caring and relationships. These factors point to another dimension of moral functioning, which is that gender might influence how people respond to a situation. If this is the case, gender might also need to be considered, particularly in the design of educational programs.

### 4.4 Brain Functioning Related to Moral Learning

Brain research also casts new light on the moral learning process. Churchland’s (1996) connectionism theory has identified the brain as a parallel distributed processor. This theory indicates that there are a number of neural processes that are capable of having a revolutionary influence on how we view the moral learning process. Kelso (1995, p. 24) describes the brain as fundamentally a pattern-forming, self-organised, dynamic system poised on the brink of instability. It is this near instability that allows the brain to be flexible and switch among a large repertoire of spatio-temporal patterns. This suggests that the process of moral judgement to action is not a linear process based on one modality of operation which dominates all other modalities, but that it is an integrated system of operation. These new insights indicate that moral learning is more “caught than taught” through the development of moral prototypes, or what Damasio (2003) refers to as ‘somatic maps’, based on past experiences in dealing with moral encounters.
This advance in knowledge suggests that emotion and cognition are deeply interconnected in the process of translating moral judgement to action. However, the way in which these modalities influence each other in the decision-making process is not clear.

Marshall and Zohar (2000) have articulated that research work done in recent studies on the functioning of the brain has described the brain as more than a parallel distributed processor. They have identified three patterns of brain activity, or neural organisation that might have a direct bearing on understanding more about how we process information and learn. One kind of neural organisation enables us to do rational, logical, rule-bound thinking, generally referred to as Intelligence Quotient (IQ). This is linked to the nervous system and works along neural tracks. Another kind of brain functioning allows us to do associative, habit-bound, pattern-recognising emotive thinking, referred to as Emotional Intelligence (EQ). EQ links emotion to an action. For example, it will help form associations between hunger and the food that will satisfy it, even though our logic might give us a different story. This system works by neural networks that develop with repeated actions. What has become evident is that there appears to be cooperation between these two modes of operation in a third mode of operation. Research carried out by Llinas, and Ribary (1993), using Magneto-encephalograph (MEG) technology discovered more about the 40 Hz oscillations across the brain that appear to be responsible for the integrative mode of functioning of the brain, and referred to by Marshall and Zohar (2000) as Spiritual Intelligence (SQ). Spiritual Intelligence as described by Zohar and Marshall could be related to the notion of moral functioning, therefore such research findings about brain functioning imply that moral functioning could be a result of integrative processes in the brain.

4.5 Implications of Literature Review Findings for the Research Process

One of the challenges for the research process will be how to explore these multiple variant factors in a meaningful way that is both coherent and integrated in approach.

The first aspect to explore is the notion of whether all three domains of cognition, affect and conation are involved in the judgement to action cycle. If so, to what extent are they manifested and how does one modality influence another, to work together to support the process of moral functioning? Can the modalities or domains of moral functioning
that are involved at different stages in the process of moving from moral judgement to moral action be identified?

The second aspect will be to explore how situational factors may impact upon a person’s capacity to act on moral judgement and to what degree situational factors influence a person’s capacity to act or not act on their moral judgement. The literature review suggests that moral learning is not a linear process so it is important to understand which environmental factors have the greater impact on the learning process and which patterns, if any, can be discerned in this cycle of moral judgement to action.

In order to track this process, it is necessary to seek the perspectives of mature adults who have some level of competence and an interest in reflecting upon the process of moral functioning. By examining two opposite positions of acting upon moral judgement and not acting upon moral judgment in the same person, it is postulated that the factors impacting on this process may become more apparent. Such an approach may also identify how relational and developmental issues, gender and experience factors may influence the process of moral learning and moral functioning.

**Summary of Chapter**

Chapter 4 has outlined a summary of research findings about moral functioning, particularly about the judgement-to-action cycle. Moral functioning can be identified as a complex process, involving a number of different components of knowing (cognition), loving (affect) and willing (conation), which is highly dependent on an interrelationship between developmental, situational and social-environmental variables.

To gain deeper insights into the process of moral functioning, the research methodology described in Chapter 5 will articulate the process to be followed to learn from the lived experience of respondents. Respondents will be asked to reflect on scenarios where they were successful in acting-on-moral judgement and scenarios where they failed to act-on-moral judgement, in order to determine whether any additional factors to those presented in this review of the research literature can be identified in the gap between moral judgement and moral action.
CHAPTER 5
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Chapter 5 details the procedures used to research the topic of 'From Moral Judgement to Moral Action- Implications for Education’. The first section describes the aim of the research endeavour and the key research questions. The second section details the overall research design and the rationale for the choice of the methodology to research the lived experience of moral functioning. The specific methods used to generate research data are explained in the third part of the chapter, which details the methodology of developing the two questionnaires as well as describing the sample and the procedures used for the administration of the questionnaires. This third section of the chapter is divided into two parts. The first part discusses how the first questionnaire emerged, the reasons for the selection of each section of the questionnaire, the data collection procedures and the nature of the research sample. The second part of the third section discusses how the second questionnaire emerged, the reasons for the selection of each section of the questionnaire, and the data collection procedures. The fourth section of the chapter describes the approach used for the analysis of both questionnaires. The final section summarises the goals of the research thesis.

5.1 Aim of Research Undertaking

The purpose of this research was, first, to better understand the moral judgement-to-action process from the lived adult holistic experience of adults who may be considered as operating at a higher level of moral functioning or who may be considered as ‘expert’ in moral functioning, as defined in the literature (Narvaez, et al., 1999). Given that there is a paucity of research on the process of moving from moral judgement to moral action, it was important to employ a sample of informants who could clearly articulate their experiences and responses in a particular situation in order to identify the factors that may impact on a person ‘knowing’ what to do (moral judgement) and actually ‘doing’ it (moral action). Through closer study of the reflections of ‘morally aware’ informants on the congruence or disparity between their judgments and actions it may be possible to identify insights that have not been discovered in larger empirical studies using hypothetical scenarios. In the light of the initial research findings, the second research purpose was to explore how emotions impacted on the moral decision-making process. The third research goal was to explore any emergent findings about moral learning
based on both the qualitative and quantitative data, gained from ‘expert’ practitioners, as well as the triangulated data, towards the formulation of a conceptual theoretical model of moral functioning. The fourth research goal was to undertake an initial exploration of any possible implications of a proposed model of moral functioning for the moral education of ‘novices’.

In summary, the research focus is to identify the key trends, influences and factors involved in translating moral judgement into moral action, based upon the lived experience of adult ‘experts’, and to interpret these findings in a broad sense to their possible implications for the complex process of educating children to develop moral capability.

The specific questions addressed by the research are as follows:

1. What factors influence a person to act or not to act-on-moral judgement?
2. How do these factors impact on the movement from moral judgement to moral action?
3. Is there a gender difference in translating moral judgement into moral action?
4. What domains of learning seem to be involved in moral functioning?

The findings will be examined and then used to challenge, validate or extend the emergent theories of moral learning and moral functioning.

5.2 Research Design

The research approach used to explore these questions is a Mixed Methods approach. This is a relatively new research paradigm that employs different proportions of qualitative and quantitative methodologies at different stages in the research process. Creswell (2003) has classified the variants of mixed methodology research, according to the relative weighting given to each of the qualitative and quantitative methods and the sequence, in which they are implemented. The mixed-method variant used in this research design is termed the Concurrent Transformative Strategy (Creswell, 2003). It is classified as concurrent because although quantitative and qualitative data collection may be conducted during different phases of the research process, the analysis and interpretation involves the combination of the two forms of data to obtain convergent results. The term transformative was first used by Greene and Caracelli (1997, cited in Creswell, 2003) as a distinct form of mixed-methods research. It gives primacy to
action-oriented research, which uses a theoretical lens or conceptual framework to develop an emerging theory or set of patterns. In this study the concurrent design approach involved the quantitative and qualitative analysis of surveys as well as the qualitative research methodology of theory building through analysis of both text and numeric data (Creswell, 2003). The qualitative approach predominates in this study and forms the basis of analyzing the survey data utilising Chenail’s Qualitative Matrix (1992) to identify both expected and any unexpected trends and/or factors apparent in the process of moving from moral judgement to moral action. The rationale for this approach is described by Chenail (1992) as follows:

Qualitative researchers have a habit of focusing on what is familiar and central to the study at hand…..What may be missed through this study of inquiry is an opportunity for investigators to know what might not be known to them prior to the study….Also, the margins of a project often provide some of the most interesting and informative patterns for investigators if they include a curiosity for the exception in their work and a hesitancy to explain quickly that which might turn out to be unexplainable. (p.44)

The Chenail Matrix provided a qualitative framework to classify data that supported expected and unexpected tendencies in acting upon moral action. A quantitative approach was then used to identify which trends appeared to be more influential in this process.

5.3 The Mixed Methods Procedure

In light of the literature review which identified gaps in knowledge about moral action, an initial survey was conducted. The findings from this survey prompted further questions that were included in a second survey. The initial survey incorporated both open and closed questions asking the respondents to reflect on their lived experience when they acted or did not act-on-moral judgement. The second survey asked respondents’ open questions about their emotional responses related to the decision-making process of acting or not acting-on-moral judgement. The results of the two surveys provided insights for the development of an emerging theory which was mapped against the existing theoretical framework of Danesh (1994). This triangulation of the data provided further insight into the process of moving from moral judgment to moral action.
Figure 5.1 outlines the emergent design of the qualitative dimensions of the research process and shows the linkage between the results of the first questionnaire (Phase 1) that influenced the design of the second questionnaire (Phase 2).
Figure 5.1
Characteristics of the emergent qualitative design research process used for the first and second phase of the research. (Adapted from Lincoln and Guba, 1985)
5.4 Rationale for Research Design of Mixed Methods Concurrent Transformative Strategy

The use of a mixed-methods concurrent transformative strategy enabled the tracing of emergent tendencies of identifiable and replicable patterns. This process helped in the quest to describe and understand the perceived reality of the lived experience and thereby improve our understanding of moral functioning. Qualitative questions in this study set out to understand why human beings may know the right thing to do, but are not always able to translate this knowledge, and even intention, into consistent action.

An emergent qualitative method and the Chenail’s Qualitative matrix, which are interpretative methodologies and tools used to identify processes and patterns in the analysis of data in qualitative research, were used as part of the concurrent transformative strategy design. The intention was to see what expected and unexpected tendencies and patterns emerged from the first questionnaire, which were then used to formulate the second questionnaire. As stated by Lincoln and Guba (1985) and Stake (1995), it is the very notion of pursuing important or salient early discoveries that undergird qualitative approaches to inquiry. Important leads were identified in the early phases of data analysis and pursued by asking new questions, by observing new situations and by observing previous situations with a slightly different lens in the second questionnaire. The consequent sampling of new people and settings was anticipated and planned (Maykut & Morehouse, 1995). It also provided limited quantitative data in order to quantify emerging trends that were further integrated with the qualitative data.

In the light of Gilligan’s (1982) experience, it seemed most appropriate to have incorporated a major element of qualitative research in order to explore how respondents viewed the experience of acting upon, as opposed to merely exercising, moral judgement. As controversy surrounded Gilligan’s results and the subsequent attempts at validation of them (see pp. 80-81), it also suggested that the use of dialogue alone in this research endeavour would not provide specific insights as to why a person in one situation will act, yet in another situation fail to act. Therefore, a questionnaire that utilised both quantitative and qualitative methods concurrently was considered a better way to access data from the lived-experience. In this approach, the same questions were asked in order to gain insights into two scenarios, one of acting and one
of not acting-on-moral judgement. This enabled the results from two scenarios to be compared and contrasted.

Specifically, by reflecting upon both instances and non-instances of translating moral judgement into moral action in the lived-experience, it was hoped to gain greater insight into the process of moral functioning. By researching the views of the same subject, it was possible to gain insights into emergent patterns. The first questionnaire asked participants to reflect on a dilemma in which they acted-on-judgement, and then participants were asked to reflect on a dilemma in which they did not act-on-judgement. This approach also provided an opportunity to explore the learning processes and competencies that were evident in moving from the stance of non-action to action and thus afforded the opportunity to learn from practical insights of the lived experience. The disadvantage of this approach was that it had to rely upon memories of past experiences. A more powerful exercise could have been to engage respondents in reflecting on an immediate experience. However, for the practicalities of this research process, past experiences needed to suffice. One factor that was of assistance in this process was that emotion helps to embed memory. This means that recalling a situation that has emotional connotations, if it is not too painful, enables immediate access to memory patterns (Jensen, 1998).

The research methodology of mixed-methods concurrent transformative strategy utilises a conceptual or theoretical framework to triangulate the data (Cresswell, 2003). The findings from the Literature Review suggested that a triune framework of moral functioning was appropriate because it captured the developmental process of moral functioning. Two models qualified as providing a triune framework, namely, the Rest Model (1984), which was further developed by Narvaez (1999), and the Danesh Matrix (1994). The Danesh Matrix was selected to triangulate the data because it had the additional advantage over the Rest Model of defining possible developmental stages relating to each area of capability as they related to self and others. In addition, the developmental areas incorporate three domains of functioning that were also apparent in the nature of being human, as articulated by Kitwood (1990) and Habermas’s three ways of knowing. These three areas of capability, defined by Danesh, are the capacity to know, the capacity to love, and the capacity to use our will. For the sake of brevity in the text, these three capacities of the human condition will be referred to as knowing, loving and willing, respectively. These three capacities may be used to develop virtuous
action through the process of knowledge, volition and action. Therefore, these three capacities, of knowing, loving and willing were used to provide a useful framework for grouping and analysing any competencies that emerged from the research data.

5.5 Approach to Research Methodology
The next section is divided into two parts. The first part details the methodology used in Phase 1 relating to the first questionnaire and the second part, Phase 2, relates to the methodology used for the second questionnaire. Each part details how the questionnaires emerged and the factors that influenced their design. Each follows on with the methodology relating to the formulation of the questionnaires, data collection procedures, data analysis and the specific details about the sample used in the research process.

5.5.1 Phase 1
As there is limited research knowledge about moral functioning as an integrated function, it was considered appropriate to use a broader survey that looked at situational factors as well as factors involved in acting or not acting-on-moral judgement. The research method sought to capture what people did informally and naturally, when they reviewed and asked themselves questions about their feelings and activities about moral functioning. The research process aimed to explore this tacit or natural knowledge and make it more formal and explicit, through a questionnaire to establish how people went about the task, of acting or not-acting-on-moral judgement.

A questionnaire was selected rather than using open dialogue, for the purpose of capturing some quantitative data in order to compare across participants more precisely the responses to the different scenarios. A majority of closed questions were chosen, as the aim of the research was to identify which factors helped or hindered the translation of moral judgement to action. The review of the literature identified several factors that are likely to impact on this process and the use of closed questions, with a gradient scale, ensured that the relative impact of each factor was assessed. If it was possible to reflect and analyse what was involved when a person was successful in translating judgement to action, then it could be assumed that, in some circumstances and instances, a person had mastered this process or become an ‘expert’. By examining the opposite position within the same subject it was proposed that this might inform what factors were the same and what factors changed. Therefore, asking respondents to
complete two separate parts to the questionnaire, using the same questions adapted to action or non-action scenarios, afforded an opportunity of comparing and contrasting between the two positions. Therefore, this self-reporting method was used to find out from individuals what it was like for them in the area of translating moral judgement into moral action.

The function of the open questions were designed to enable the individual to reflect and report on the lived experience, with the purpose of understanding how this experience reflected the essence of behaviour, and to analyse any patterns of behaviour that might emerge. This approach was seen as an initial exploratory study, so the method used was a mixture of researcher structured ideas and prompts for their responses about their experiences, and participant reflections about their own history of acting or not acting on moral judgement.

### 5.5.2 Questionnaire 1 Format

Questionnaire 1 contained two parts. Each part was based on a different scenario. The first part (Part A) asked the participants to think of a situation where they had acted-on-moral judgement, while the second part (Part B) asked participants to think of a situation where they had not acted-on-moral judgement. Responses to the questionnaire were measured by a five-point scale to indicate the gradient of response. A rating of ‘1’ indicated the lowest value, while a rating of ‘5’, indicated the highest value. A copy of Questionnaire 1 is included in Appendix A.

Part A focused on what worked and why, when a person acted-on-moral judgement. Respondents were asked to think of a recent moral encounter where the participant had to weigh up conflicting priorities and goals to make a moral judgement and found it easy to act upon or carry out the moral action. The person was asked to replay, or ‘freeze frame’, the incident and then reflect on their reasons for action and what they might have learned from the process.

In Part B of the questionnaire, the respondents were asked to think of a recent moral encounter where they had to weigh up conflicting priorities and goals to make a moral judgement and then failed to act upon their moral judgement. The design of the questionnaire meant that respondents did not have to describe sensitive personal information about any of their past actions regarding their failure to act on a moral
judgement. Respondents were not asked to reveal to the researcher the particular moral incident but to recall a specific incident or scenario for themselves as a point of reflection. It was suggested that they might like to detail it for their own personal reference before commencing the research questionnaire. However, this information was not shared with the researcher. This approach was utilised because it afforded the person the opportunity to be more open in responding to the questionnaire. It was anticipated that not being obliged to disclose the event would enable respondents to focus and reflect on more serious moral dilemmas.

The participants were only required to reflect upon the process involved in their actions of acting or not acting-on-moral judgement. A questionnaire format helped participants to frame their responses objectively; however, open-ended questions were also included to provide opportunities for more personal comments for each section of the questionnaire.

For each part of the questionnaire, that is, the action and non-action situations, respondents were asked to respond to five areas of inquiry that emerged from the literature: (1) Factors relating to the situation or context, (2) Reactions to the situation, (3) Values involved in the decision-making process, (4) Reasons for acting in the way they did, and the (5) Level of moral ideal and responsibility in the situation.

Section 1, factors relating to the situation, was comprised of a number of aspects including who was involved, the level of moral weighting, the nature of the relationship, the degree of experience and difficulty, the degree of safety, the level of temptation or deprivation and the level of responsibility for self and others. The second section, reactions to the situation, focused on whether the participant was in a fight, flight or flow mode. The third section, values involved in the decision-making process, looked at whether there were any conflicts in values, the reward or cost factors involved and how the participants justified their actions. The fourth section, reasons for acting, incorporated key areas identified from research and the literature review. The last section, the level of moral ideal and responsibility in the situation, focused on how well, in their own estimation, the respondent lived up to their moral ideal or level of responsibility.
5.5.2.1 Section 1 - Factors Relating to the Situation

Section 1, asked questions about factors regarding the situation or context in which the participant made their decision to act or not act-on-moral judgement. A number of researchers have identified that situational factors are an important factor related to acting-on-moral judgement (Lehrer, 1967; Walker, 1995; Benninga, Berkowitz, Kuehn, & Smith, 2003). Eleven situational questions were designed to help the respondent reflect on the situation.

Question 1 focused on identifying who was involved. Kitwood (1990) has postulated that morality emerges out of relationship. In order to see if the nature of the relationship between the people involved was important, respondents were asked to circle the relevant relationship from a choice of a relative, a friend, acquaintance, or stranger.

Question 2 asked respondents to indicate the moral weighting of the situation, defined by the seriousness of the moral choice in the situation. A ranking of ‘1’ indicated not very serious, while a ranking of ‘5’ indicated a high level of seriousness. This question was included in order to investigate whether moral seriousness would impact on how a person responded in the situation.

Question 3 focused on respect towards others in the situation. Hoffman (1976; 1982; 1988) believed that empathy was foundational to morality, so it was important to explore what value the respondent placed on the personal relationship in the situation. The respondent was asked to circle the relevant number, indicating the relative weighting given to this factor. In this question, a weighting of ‘1’ indicated not very respectful, while a weighting of ‘5’ indicated very respectful. An example of the format of this question and all other situational questions is as follows:

1.3 How respectful did you feel towards the person/people? 1 2 3 4 5

All other questions in Section 1 were formatted in the same way as in the example given above.

Questions 4 to 6 focused on situational factors around experience (Narvaez et al, 1999), namely, familiarity and difficulty, which might provide insights into the knowledge domain (Danesh, 1996). The answers to such questions will help determine whether it is easier to act-on-moral judgment if a person has had previous experience in a similar situation, or whether it is easier to act-on-judgement if you have greater knowledge and
experience of acting in a familiar situation. Even if a person has experience, they may also be impacted by the degree of difficulty or skill required in the situation. Narvaez et al. (1999) proposes that a person moves from the beginning stage of a novice to an expert in making moral choices, implying a person develops skill over time. In these questions, a weighting of ‘1’ indicated less experience and familiarity and a low level of difficulty, while a weighting of ‘5’ indicated high experience and familiarity and a high degree of difficulty.

Question 7 (as well as question 2.1 in Section 2 of the questionnaire), focused on another situational phenomenon, that of the influence of brain functioning. Hart (1983; 1999) identified that in conditions of stress, or not feeling safe, brain activity moved from the neo-cortex to lower areas of the brain and Hart coined the term ‘downshifting’. Damasio (2003) showed how electrical functioning occurred in the frontal lobe of the brain under joyful conditions, yet shifted to lower in the brain stem to the emotional centre of the brain, the amygdala, when in a sorrowful condition. He postulated that joyful and sorrowful conditions are the basis of all our motivation regarding what actions are taken in a given situation. This question was formulated in order to determine how safe, secure and cared for the person felt in the situation or environment, in order to determine if such conditions impacted on the ability to act-on-judgement. In this question, a weighting of ‘1’ indicated not feeling safe, secure and cared for, while a weighting of ‘5’ indicated feeling very safe, secure and cared for.

Questions 8 and 9 related to issues of feeling deprived or tempted. These emotions have traditionally been a part of the early thinking on reasons why a person did not act on judgement. As expressed by Saint Paul: (Galatians 5:17) “The flesh lusteth against the Spirit and Spirit against the flesh so that ye cannot do the things ye would” (p. 134). This quotation suggests that moral action is a direct result of resistance to temptation, resulting from algebraic outcomes of two forces, the lust of the flesh or of physical needs, in contrast to the anticipation of the guilt of the conscience as mediated by an ego, self, or will. While research has not provided evidence of this factor by itself, it will be interesting to see whether it has any part to play in looking at a holistic perspective of moral functioning. In these questions, a weighting of ‘1’ indicated not feeling deprived or tempted, while a weighting of ‘5’ indicated feeling very deprived and tempted.
Questions 10 and 11 focused on the level of responsibility in the situation in relationship to self and others. Kitwood (1990) stated that, from a psychological perspective:

*Morality is concerned fundamentally, with respect for persons, and hence with person-in-relationship; beyond that, with the whole quality of social life within which persons have their being. The study of morality takes us deeply into the areas of relatedness, trust, and responsibility; into the experience of value, the sense of freedom, the transcendence of social conditioning, the coming together of intellect and feeling in concern for others.* (pp.40-42)

In these questions, a weighting of ‘1’ indicated not feeling very responsible towards self and others, while a weighting of ‘5’ indicated feeling very responsible towards self and others.

5.5.2.2 *Section 2- Reactions*

Situational factors alone do not fully explain how a person will respond in any given situation. The second section of the questionnaire focused on the factors that acted as a bridge between a person’s perception of the situation and how his/her reaction was translated into action. This section explored if there was any impact created by a self-determined fight, flight or flow brain response, as identified by the research work of Hart (1983, 1999). Respondents were asked to indicate with an ‘X’ if any of the three factors of fight, flight or flow were present in the given scenario.

In the next part of Section 2, respondents were asked to indicate with a 1, if their decision to act or not act was based to a lesser degree, through to 5 if their decision was based to a greater degree, on any of the following factors: (1) previous encounters, (2) perception of the situation, (3) feelings, (4) knowledge of the facts, and (5) who was involved. Participants were invited to record any additional factors not covered by the provided list.

5.5.2.3 *Section 3 - Values*

The third section focused on exploring how a person’s values base in the scenario impacted on the translation of judgement to action. This factor is extrapolated from the comprehensive definition of moral action by Vessels (1998). He defines moral character as the individual’s personality being characterised by moral values and feelings (conscience), the ability to reason autonomously, fairly, and sensitively about moral
issues (ethical reflection), and the habit of acting in a manner consistent with their moral reasoning and moral feelings (virtue).

Three questions were given in this section based on asking the respondent to give a written description on whether, in the situation chosen by the respondent, one had a conflict of values and if so what it was. Participants were also asked to describe the reward/risk/cost factors in relation to the potential psychological and/or physical and/or material reward of moral behaviour against the potential cost (punishment) of doing the wrong thing. The next question focused on how the respondent justified or rationalised their behaviour in the particular situation. As in all other sections, a space was left for any additional comments to ensure all views were captured in the given responses.

5.5.2.4 Section 4 - Reasons

Section 4 of the questionnaire focused around a pick list of possible reasons for either acting or not acting-on-judgment. Some of these link back to situational factors, to see what weighting may have been given to a particular element, and to try to understand the reasoning processes that supported action or lack of action.

Respondents were asked to circle or highlight, which statement(s) best described their reason for wanting to act upon their moral judgement. The list included the following reasons for acting or not acting-on-judgment:

- You did not want to experience the consequences of failing to act,
- You knew how you would feel if you did the wrong thing,
- You could not get away with the situation (other people would know),
- You respected the people involved,
- Other goals and priorities were not as important,
- You had the strength of conviction to carry out the action,
- You would not feel deprived,
- You are self disciplined.

An additional space was given to add any reasons not included in the list provided.

5.5.2.5 Section 5 - Responsibility

The last section focused on the notion expressed by Kohlberg & Candee (1984) of a person’s perception of their moral self. In further research, Kohlberg & Candee (1984),
and Krebs et al. (1996) found that ego strength makes students who are already high in moral judgement, even more moral, that is, it makes them cheat less. However, students in a lower moral stage tended to cheat more. Section 5 was designed to explore the congruence of respondents’ self-perception with their actual actions. In order to gain insights into this aspect of functioning, respondents were asked to reflect on and scale the importance of acting-on-moral judgement. Respondents were also asked how satisfied they were with their actions, for example:

‘How satisfied were you that you lived up to your moral ideals’ 1 2 3 4 5

A rating of ‘1’ indicated low satisfaction while a rating of ‘5’ indicated the highest level of satisfaction in regard to living up to their moral ideals. Finally, respondents were asked how they would rate their level of moral responsibility.

5.6 Data Collection for Questionnaire 1

The survey was designed to elicit both quantitative and qualitative data. Table 5.1 shows the data collection approach that was used for each section of the questionnaire indicating the use of both closed and open questions.

Table 5.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section of Questionnaire</th>
<th>Type of question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The situation or context</td>
<td>Quantitative and qualitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Closed and open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Reactions</td>
<td>Quantitative and qualitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Closed and open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Values involved</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Reasons for acting or not acting</td>
<td>Quantitative and qualitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Closed and open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Level of moral ideal and responsibility in the situation</td>
<td>Quantitative and qualitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Closed and open</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Chenail Qualitative Matrix (1992) was used as a framework for the aggregation of qualitative data gleaned from the open and closed questions. Data were allocated to four categories. These included allocating data to central tendencies and notation of any variations within these categories. The other two categories related to identifying
expected data that correlated to the literature review and any unexpected data that did not fit into notions already explored in the literature review.

5.7 Research Sample for Questionnaire 1

As the research approach was largely based on qualitative research, a smaller ‘expert’ sample rather than a larger, more representative sample was selected. One reason for this was to enable a more thorough analysis of many interrelated factors and complexities to see if any new trends emerged that have not as yet been identified by traditional empirical research methods utilising large samples for the purpose of generalisation. A justification for employing a small expert sample is provided by findings emerging from previous research in the Quality Teacher movement (Newmann et al., 1996; Darling-Hammond, 1997, see Chapter 1 p.10). In Darling-Hammond’s study a small sample of students who were successful in their studies was recruited. This approach enabled the researcher to identify factors that were influential when a person was successful in translating their judgement into a moral action. One of the new factors that was identified by Darling-Hammond was the presence of caring, trusting relationships between students and staff. The participants in this thesis study were asked to reflect upon a process that enabled them to identify what happened when they did and did not act on moral judgement. Thus, looking at the perceptions of respondents who knew how to acted-on-judgement and analyzing the factors that appear to contribute to their success is likely to yield important insights into ‘what works’.

A sample of 30 people was invited to participate in the research, with consent provided by 22 respondents. A higher percentage of the Bahá’í community were invited to participate as the religious teachings of the Bahá’í Faith were selected as the religious basis for the study, based on the rationale provided in Chapter 1. Members of the Bahá’í Community regard one of the main purposes of life as the acquisition of virtues, and the highest station of human endeavour as service to humanity. Because the purpose of the study was to investigate how people translated moral judgement into moral action, it was advantageous to have a greater sample of religious than non-religious participants. It was considered that such a population would be more inclined to reflect upon their internal processes in relation to moral functioning and articulate their thoughts and feelings about situations when they acted and did not act-on-moral judgement. Creswell (2003) describes such a sample as a ‘purposeful sample’, where the sample chosen might not be representative of the general population but includes participants who will
best help the researcher understand the problem and the research question. This does not necessarily suggest random sampling or selection of a large number of participants, as is typically found in quantitative research.

It is recognized that although the involvement of a small sample of largely religious participants introduced aspects of bias that may impact upon the authenticity and trustworthiness of the data, this sample was selected in order to confirm whether factors that have already been validated by former empirical research studies were evident and whether there were any new factors which may be worthy of further research. Owing to the ethnographic and emergent nature of the research approach, the original intention was to use Phase 1 as a pilot study to inform a more rigorous quantitative study with a larger and more representative sample in Phase 2. However, a new and unexpected finding emerged in the first phase and an investigation of the nature of the emotional landscape behind the moral decision making processes of the Phase 1 participants was conducted instead. In order to verify the initial findings and help to overcome issues of authenticity and the trustworthiness of data, the results of the lived experience were then triangulated with a theoretical model of moral functioning.

The sample group for Questionnaire 1 comprised 22 adults, consisting of 11 females and 11 males. Three-quarters of the sample comprised people who had an expressed interest in moral education and the other quarter were selected from a racially diverse group. These participants did not have an expressed interest in moral education but were chosen in order to provide a range of different cultural backgrounds, educational levels and age groups. Appendix B details the background and specific details of each respondent.

The sample represented ten regions of the world, namely, Asia-Pacific, South America, Europe, Canada, Australia, Caribbean, Middle East, United Kingdom and North America. The age-range was represented by the following groupings: 22-30 years (2 male, 2 female); 30-40 years (3 male, 1 female); 40-50 years (3 female); 50-60 years (4 female, 5 male); and 60+ years (1 female, 1 male). Eleven respondents in the sample were under 50 years of age and eleven were over 50 years of age. The participants’ occupations were as follows, four homemakers, one general employee, one trades person, two students, eleven professionals and three executives. Their education backgrounds ranged from high school to Ph.D. levels with one completing high school
only, four college-educated, eight with Bachelor degrees, eight with Masters degrees and one with a Ph.D. The majority of the sample was highly educated and hence more likely to be able to articulate their experience.

The final sample was inclusive of religious and non-religious backgrounds. Half of the sample was constituted by members of the Bahá’í Faith, comprising eight women and three men. Of the remaining eleven (eight men and three women), six were Christian, one was a Hindu, one a Humanist and the other three had no religious adherence.

It was anticipated that additional insights were to be gained by analysing insights from religious and non-religious perspectives. The interpretation of data was considered in the light of the non-representative nature of the sample, and hence might not be suitable for broad generalisation. Nevertheless, the sample provided sufficient feedback to be able to formulate a framework that could be explored with a broader research sample in the future.

5.8 Procedure for Administering Questionnaire 1

The establishment of trust was of key importance to the nature of this investigation because respondents were asked to reflect on their lived experience. This was achieved in several ways. A number of the respondents were well acquainted with the researcher or were introduced to the researcher by a mutual friend. The majority of respondents had an interest in the research topic and so were keen to see how they could assist the research process. Feedback on the research outcomes was also provided if the participants so desired.

The ethics approval of the research design was granted by the Flinders University Human Ethics Committee. A letter of introduction was provided to each respondent to describe the nature of the research process, its aims, procedures and the voluntary nature of their engagement in the process. All participants were provided with information about the study, and written consent was obtained prior to responding to the research questionnaires. Copies of the information letter and consent form are attached in Appendix C.

Respondents were assured that they would not be identified in reporting the research results. Only the characteristics that each respondent shared with the researcher would be included in an appendix about the research sample.
The questionnaire was conducted in two different ways. As a number of respondents lived in different parts of the world, the first method involved sending the materials by e-mail to respondents who then had the possibility of questioning the researcher for any points of clarification by e-mail. These respondents then mailed their consent forms and responses back to the researcher.

The second method of conducting the questionnaire was via the home of a friend. For this group, the researcher was able to gather the group together, explain the task, provide time for the participants to read about the requirements of the research task and sign their consent forms prior to answering the questionnaire. The researcher was present to answer any queries or points of clarification in person, as the respondents undertook answering the questionnaire. All respondents were allowed as much time as they required to answer the questions.

After the completion of the questionnaire, the researcher and the respondents had a meal together. It was in this context that informal comments were made regarding situations that were recalled when answering the questionnaire. In some cases, there were still uncomfortable thoughts around non-action, as these participants had not known how to respond in the situation they recalled and some still felt guilty about their lack of action.

5.9 Phase 2

This next section of this chapter focuses on the rationale and focus for the development of Questionnaire 2. The second questionnaire was based on a preliminary analysis of the responses and comments arising from the first questionnaire and on findings from the research literature.

The qualitative emergent design strategy supported the notion that key findings may emerge from an initial research tool that could be followed up with a smaller sample of respondents. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the results from the first questionnaire suggested that one of the major reasons people gave for acting-on-moral judgement related to knowing how they would feel if they failed to act-on-judgement. Conversely, in relation to the non-action scenario, a number of respondents reported that they did not know how they would feel until after they had failed to act-on-moral judgement. This implied that feelings may be a key factor related to a possible continuum between non-
action to action on moral judgement. Did this mean that at some point a person gained sufficient experience or skill in knowing how one would feel in a situation if one did not act-on-judgement? This continuum from not knowing how one would feel to knowing how one would feel, suggested a learning process may be involved in moving from a state of ignorance to a state of certainty. However, how emotion informed this learning process was neither explored nor explained in the first questionnaire.

If emotion operates as an independent neural network to cognition (Ackerman, Abe and Izard, 1998) it seemed important to understand, from a respondent’s lived experience, what particular emotions may have impacted on this learning process. It is also important to understand how emotion may have influenced a person’s thinking, decision making and learning processes. Rather than validating the situational factors that had been studied in Phase 1, this important emergent lead was followed, given that the driving research focus was to identify what factors could best promote the moral development of children. In this regard, emotion appeared to be a crucial factor in individuals shifting from non-action to action. If greater insights could be found into how this process operated, it would perhaps serve to inform what learning experiences would be of the greatest value to the developing child, rather than extending and replicating the Phase 1 focus with a larger sample.

Research to date on the influence of emotions on the moral learning process has focused on areas such as the early attachment bond between mother and child (Ainsworth, 1974), the theory of empathy (Hoffman, 1988), social perspective taking (Selman et al, 1997), cognitive-affective interaction, and in interpreting how one’s actions affect the welfare of another (Rest, 1983). However, there appears to be little research work to date on the role of emotion in the judgement-to-action cycle. Hence, it was decided to go back to some of the original respondents to explore how emotions might have influenced the moral judgement to action cycle.

5.9.1 Questionnaire 2 Format

The aim of the second questionnaire was to seek additional responses in order to explore the role that emotions, or what are more commonly referred to as feelings, played in influencing people’s decisions to act or not act-on-moral judgement in a particular situation.
Questionnaire 2 comprised thirteen open-ended questions. The first section of the questionnaire, Questions 1 to 6, focused on reflections on either the same situation participants recalled in the first questionnaire or on two new scenarios. Similar to the first questionnaire, participants were asked to first consider their emotional state when they acted-on-judgement, and second, to reflect on their emotional state when they did not act-on-judgement.

Table 5.2

**Example of Questionnaire 2 Format**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action on moral judgment scenario</th>
<th>Non-action on moral judgment scenario</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Can you name what your feelings were before you decided to act or not act on your judgment, in the two scenarios of action and non-action?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2 provides an example of how the first part of Questionnaire 2 was formatted. A copy of the complete questionnaire is provided in Appendix D.

The second section of the questionnaire, Questions 7 to 13, focused participants’ reflections on more general questions about emotional responses related to the learning process.

The results from Phase 1 prompted a second search of the literature on the impact of emotions on learning. The research literature did not specify the exact nature of how emotions impact on learning, except to note that myelination of the neural emotional pathways, as identified by Sowell et al. (1999), particularly between the amygdala and the neocortex, might not be completed until people are in their mid to late twenties. Hence, it seemed to be relatively fluid and could be altered according to experience. It was therefore important to design a questionnaire that enabled respondents to range broadly across the judgement-to-action process and have a number of prompts and different overlapping angles to see what sort of responses were generated. As this is still a very exploratory field of research, it was obviously not clear where the responses would take the research findings, so in designing the questionnaire more opportunities for reflecting on emotional responses rather than fewer opportunities were offered, to see if deeper insights were possible.

The first questionnaire elicited feelings of guilt and disquiet. It was decided therefore to go back to a segment of the original sample to explore these participants’ emotional
reactions in the original scenarios. This proved to be challenging as it was about a year later that participants were asked to reflect on those experiences. If participants were not able to remember their own original scenarios, then it was still of value to generate two new scenarios and seek their responses accordingly.

In Questionnaire 1, participants indicated that when acting-on-judgment, they were very clear about understanding their feeling state and chose to act-on-judgment. The opposite was true of the non-action scenario. Typically a person did not know how they would feel until after they had failed to act-on-judgement. This implied that at some stage a person, for whatever reason, moves from a state of ignorance about their feelings to one of conscious knowledge. When conducting the first questionnaire, the researcher noted that several respondents needed to debrief after responding to the questionnaire, because uncomfortable feelings had been evoked when they focused on non-action on judgement. This suggested a link between memory and emotion. In the light of this observation, it seemed of value to ask respondents several questions that would take them back, if possible, to revisit this experience. The participants were asked to review their emotional state before, during and after the decision-making process and to describe any further reflections and any impact on learning due to their previous inaction.

One of the goals of Questionnaire 2 was to provide insight into a movement from ignorance to conscious knowledge, and to explore any insights that could be gleaned about the role of emotion in the learning process. There were two main sections: the first section of the questionnaire, Questions 1 to 6, was designed around specific reflections around their feelings related to acting or not acting-on-moral judgement. The second half of Questionnaire 2 was designed to find out more about general observations on how and what feelings were related to evoking conscience, and the role of feelings in the more general, moral-learning process. As identified by Kochanska et al. (1994, 1997), conscience was described as having two parts, affective discomfort and active moral regulation or vigilance which could be termed a cognitive process. Emotion appeared to play a central role in arousing conscience in the first instance. A further consideration that was reflected upon by respondents was the role of feelings in translating affective discomfort into taking corrective action; that is, respondents were preoccupied with how they could make amends for their lack of moral action-on-judgement.
Thus, the questionnaire was designed to see if such sentiments could be captured with open-ended questions and to generate reflection around these themes and experiences. The last two questions in Questionnaire 2 provided opportunities, in the broadest sense, for the respondents to add any additional comments that may not have been addressed in specific questions and any further insights into understanding how they learned to act on moral judgment.

5.10 Data Collection for Questionnaire 2

As indicated for Questionnaire 1, both quantitative and qualitative data were collected. The majority of data in Questionnaire 2, however, was qualitative because the questions were all open-ended. The sample for Questionnaire 2 included seven of the original respondents and five additional respondents, totaling twelve respondents for Questionnaire 2.

It was intended to work with approximately half of the sample size of the original group. As the researcher was located in the United States of America at the time, the group that had been brought together to respond in a group environment to the first questionnaire was re-invited to participate in the second questionnaire. This original group represented several different cultural, religious, age, educational and professional status perspectives, as noted in Appendix B. However, only seven of the original respondents were able to participate and this group did not include the more diverse religious or non-religious samples. A wider sample was still invited but, of the additional five that were able to participate, three respondents were Christian and two were Bahá’ís. The original sample included a 50% sample of Bahá’ís.

The second sample contained a more religious bias. However, because of the introspective nature of the research, it was important to work with a sample of people who have a particular desire and focus on living by chosen moral principles and who were prepared to try to model these principles in their lives. It is noted at the outset that this could skew results and hence the findings might not be able to be generalised to more secular segments of the population nor to ‘other’ religious populations. The sample for Questionnaire 2 still contained a diverse range of people of different ages, race, levels of education and professional status. Seven females and five males responded to the second questionnaire.
5.11 Procedure for Administering Questionnaire 2

All 12 respondents were invited to a private home to complete the questionnaire and, after completing the questionnaire, to share lunch together to thank them for their contribution to the research process.

The respondents were handed a questionnaire to complete, which also contained written instructions for responding to the questionnaire (see Appendix D). The guidelines for each respondent who had participated in Questionnaire 1, were to think back to the ‘moral dilemmas’ that the respondent had used in the original questionnaire. If this was not possible, the former respondents and new respondents were asked to think about two new scenarios, one where they were able to act-on-judgement and one where they failed to act-on-judgement. The respondents were asked to use these to respond to the questionnaire for both scenarios. The respondents were also given the option, if they could not think of any responses, to move onto the next question.

The researcher remained present throughout the exercise to respond to any clarification of questions that was required. Participants were able to spread out throughout the living space and find a quiet area in which to respond. The session went very smoothly and people were not under any pressure to respond by a given time. Most of the respondents filled out the questionnaire within a one and a half-hour period. After the session, participants were keen to know about the initial findings from the first questionnaire as several were educators and interested in understanding more about the moral learning process.

5.12 Data Analysis

In general terms the methodology of hermeneutics or interpretation in the form of a guided questionnaire was used as a basis for researching individuals’ perspectives in relation to their understanding of morality and the key influences that helped or hindered their capacity to translate moral judgement into moral action. According to Odman (1988), the purpose of hermeneutics is to increase understanding regarding other cultures, groups, individuals, conditions, and lifestyles, both in the present and in the past. The data are the words, views and judgements of individuals. The parts and the whole are interpreted in the light of each other. In order to understand an activity, one must relate its elements to their context which, in turn, is made intelligible by these
elements. This is referred to as the hermeneutic circle. Each of the questionnaires was studied individually as well as numerically to explore emerging patterns and possible interpretations of these patterns.

In both phases of the research process, responses to the first and second questionnaire were analysed in both qualitative and quantitative terms, and then the data were integrated. Initially, questionnaire responses were analysed qualitatively to identify trends, then quantitatively to determine the dominant trends in the data. Comparisons were made between each respondent for the action and non-action scenarios, as well as looking at the data for the total sample.

The tool used to identify trends in the data was the Chenail Qualitative Matrix(1992). The use of this tool involved identifying the participants’ common themes or central tendencies that could be gathered into emerging categories. Within these categories, the ranges were explored to assess the differences in variation to a common theme that occurred. An additional process was used to help validate and triangulate data. The emerging themes were compared to research findings from the literature review. The findings were organised into two categories of expected and unexpected trends. The expected findings related to ideas explored by the researcher in the literature review. The second aspect related to findings that departed from the findings anticipated by the literature review. These trends were then quantified to explore what were the most common factors for the research sample as a whole, and then for males and females. This approach of looking at the expected and unexpected findings enabled the discovery of the unexpected, instead of focusing only on what is known through literature searches and previous observations.

In order to identify what learning domains were involved in participants’ responses, the emergent trends were then analysed in relation to the Danesh Matrix. The purpose of this approach was to see if there were any correlations between respondents’ answers and the proposed stage theory of Danesh regarding moral functioning.

Using this approach, the researcher looked for any interrelated variables moving from obvious to more abstract patterns. These patterns were further identified as constructs, which formed a basis for theory. Such constructs were triangulated with the Danesh Matrix (1994), adding any new dimensions of meaning and understanding. The insights
gained from the analysis of the questionnaires and the triangulation with the Danesh matrix were then integrated with the pertinent findings from the literature review to propose an emergent theory of moral learning and moral functioning. The results of this part of the process have been detailed in Chapter 8. The implications of the proposed theory for values education programs are then considered.

Summary of Chapter
The goal of the research process was to understand more about the nature of the gap between moral judgement and moral action in the process of moral functioning. Initially, current research was reviewed to establish what is known and what still needs to be explored in order to identify the specific influences and factors that impact on the moral judgement-to-action cycle. The mixed-methods research design supported a two-phased approach. The first phase employed a larger sample and investigated the broader aspects of the gap between moral judgement and moral action, while the second phase employed a smaller sample and looked more specifically at the role of emotion in the moral learning process.

The specific research questions are:
1. What factors influence a person to act or not act-on-moral judgement?
2. How do these factors impact on the movement from moral judgement to moral action?
3. Is there a gender difference in translating moral judgement to moral action? and,
4. What domains of learning seem to be involved in moral functioning?

The findings relating to these questions will be examined in light of the current research literature to propose an emergent theory of moral functioning. The implications of the findings and the proposed theory for values education programs will also be addressed.

Chapter 6 will focus on the analysis and interpretation of participants’ responses to Questionnaire 1 in order to address the first three questions above.
CHAPTER 6

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF QUESTIONNAIRE 1

Chapter 6 focuses on the findings and analysis of the first phase of the research process, detailing responses from Questionnaire 1, based on highest percentage or most common responses. It is worth noting that, because the sample size was small, the data can only indicate trends which are then examined and interpreted. The results will be presented in accord with the four key research questions. The first section looks at the findings in relation to the factors that may influence a person to act or not act-on-moral judgement. The second section focuses on results pertaining to how these factors impacted on the movement from moral judgement to moral action. The third section interrogates the data to examine whether there are gender differences in the translation of judgement to action. The final section examines which domains of learning appear to be involved in moral functioning.

6.1 What Factors Influence a Person to Act or Not Act-on-Moral Judgement?

The findings are presented as they relate to the five sections of Questionnaire 1 (see Appendix A). The five sections are: (1) the situation or context, (2) the respondents’ reactions, (3) the reasons for participants acting the way they did; (4) the values involved, and, (5) moral identity in the situation. Results that were expected and not expected as per the methodology of the Chenail Matrix (1992) have been tabulated in Appendix F: Table F9 and F10 which helped to interpret a comparison between collected data in the action and non action scenarios.

6.1.1 Section 1- Situational Factors

Respondents were required to respond to eleven questions about each of the two situations (action and non-action) which they had chosen. The questions relating to the situation included: who was involved; the level of moral weighting; the nature of the relationship between the participants and the other/s in the scenario; the degree of familiarity with the other or the situation; the level of experience and difficulty in a similar situation; the level of experience and difficulty in making the decision to act or not to act; the degree of safety; the level of temptation; the level of deprivation; and the level of responsibility for self and others. The first question required the respondents to select from a defined set of relationships who was involved in the scenario, noting that they were free to select one or more than one person (relationship). Table 6.1 details the
The responses to Question 1 presented in Table 6.1 indicated that when the respondent acted-on-judgement the moral encounter involved mainly a friend (40%), a relative (32%), an acquaintance (27%) and to a lesser extent, a stranger (14%). A similar pattern is discernible for the non-action scenario, where the moral encounter involved friends (45%), and to a lesser extent relatives (14%) or acquaintances (18%), but no strangers. When a person did not act-on-judgement it appeared that the scenario was less likely to involve a relative. The data supports Kitwood's (1990) notion that morality is engaged in relationship.

For the remaining 10 questions, respondents were asked to circle a relevant number, between 1 and 5 corresponding to the relative weighting given to each factor. A rating of ‘1’, indicated the lowest weighting, and a rating of ‘5’, indicated the highest weighting for the given factor. Data are presented in the tables based on the classifications of low, moderate and high. Ratings of 1-2 were classified as low (L); a rating of 3 was rated as moderate (M) and a rating of 4-5 was rated as high (H). Table F1 in Appendix F presents the situational data according to the order of the questions asked for questions 2-11.

Four general discernible factors in section 1 (Appendix F, Table F1) appear to be indicated when a person acted-on-judgement. The first factor related to the quality of the relationship, with 100% of respondents feeling moderately to highly respectful towards others, 95% of respondents feeling moderately to highly responsible towards self and 91% feeling moderately to highly responsible towards others. The second factor related to feelings of competence, with 59% feeling moderately to highly familiar with the situation, and 68% feeling moderately to highly experienced in handling this type of moral scenario. The third factor related to the respondents feeling moderately to highly
safe, secure and cared for in the situation (68%) or what could be termed emotional safety. The fourth factor centred on feeling a low level of temptation and feeling a low level of deprivation (50% and 73% respectively) or what could be termed not being self-pre-occupied.

When respondents did not act-on-judgement, the same four factors that were prominent in the action scenario were also evident. The first factor related again to the quality of relationships, with 77% of the respondents feeling moderately to highly respectful of the other, and 82% feeling moderately responsible for self and others, which was not expected as this is only slightly lower than when respondents acted-on-judgement. The second factor related to competence. Even though 68% of respondents were moderately to highly familiar with the situation, 59% of the respondents experienced moderate to high difficulty in knowing what to do, and 55% reported low experience in handling an encounter with a high moral weighting which was also expected as Narvaez et Al (1999) have identified experience as an influencing factor for acting-on-moral judgement. The third discernible factor related to emotional safety with 45% of respondents not feeling safe, secure and cared for in the situation. The fourth factor related to issues of self-gratification, or what Danesh (1994) terms self-preoccupation. Respondents indicated feeling moderately to highly tempted (73%) and moderately to highly deprived (77%), which could be expected as contributing factors to not acting-on-moral judgement as the percentages are higher than in the action scenario.

6.1.2 Section 2 –Reactions in the Moral Encounter

In Section 2 of the questionnaire, respondents were asked to indicate which factors impacted on their reactions or perceptions of the situation in the two scenarios. This section of the questionnaire was included in order to elicit information about the participants’ perception of how they felt at the time of responding to the situation.

The first part asked respondents to indicate whether they reacted out of a fight, flight or flow mode. ‘Fight’ mode refers to wanting to openly disagree, ‘flight’ means to run away from the situation and ‘flow’ refers to being in harmony with what is happening and not wishing to flee or fight. The ‘fight-flight’ response has been termed as ‘downshifting’ (Hart, 1983, 1999), suggesting that when a person is in a situation of stress, brain activity has moved from the neo-cortex to the emotional centre of the brain. As discussed previously (see p. 47), according to Hart, a ‘downshifting’ response means
that a person is acting more from a reactionary or instinctual mode and operating out of the emotional centre of the brain, rather than a reflective mode, which acts out of the thinking part of the brain.

6.1.2.1 Action and Non-Action Scenarios: Fight, Flight, Flow

As indicated in Table 6.2, when respondents acted-on-judgement, there was an identical reaction for male and female respondents whether they were in fight, flight or flow mode. The majority of respondents were in a state of flow which could be expected when they acted-on-judgement since 64% of both males and females selected this state. By contrast, 18% of males and 46% of females indicated a flow mode when they did not act-on-judgement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action Scenario</th>
<th>Non Action Scenario</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factor</td>
<td>Male %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fight</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flow</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This suggests that respondents may not be feeling stressed or were in greater harmony with the situation when making the decision to act-on-judgement. Of significance is the fact that no respondent felt like fleeing in the action scenario, whereas, in the non-action scenario, 46% of males and 18% of females indicated the desire to flee. These findings could be expected as they conform to Hart’s (1983, 1999) findings that brain activity remains in the frontal lobe when in a non-threatening environment and brain activity moves to the emotional centre of the brain in a threatening environment. However, 36% of respondents did wish to fight regardless of whether they were in the action or non-action scenario, which was unexpected as it could be assumed from Harts (1983, 1999) findings that the desire to fight would downshift brain activity to the emotional centre of the brain. This may suggest that it was their capacity to fight for what they believed to be right or their ability to access somatic maps on the frontal brain (Churchland, 1996) that might have supported acting-on-moral judgement (Appendix E). Quite different emotional states seemed to be emerging in the two different scenarios resulting in different responses to the specific situation.
The challenge here is to understand how the terms ‘flow’ and ‘fight’ are being interpreted in both scenarios and the resultant different emotional reactions. If flow mode was indicated in the non-action scenario, there seemed to be a different interpretation than if it was indicated in the action scenario. In the non-action scenario, it appeared to be interpreted in several ways as backed up by other comments in the responses. One person indicated that she lacked the courage to do what she had judged to be correct in the situation and had failed to act-on-judgement. To another person, it meant not fighting for what he believed in. Another lacked the courage to act-on-judgement, while the remaining respondents in this category felt overwhelmed. The idea that ‘flow’ was often interpreted as feeling overwhelmed was supported by a number of responses to the situational factors where respondents indicated they were not feeling competent or able to manage their emotional state. These responses indicate that flow has been interpreted in several ways, in a positive sense initially in the action scenario as no respondents were in flight mode and to a more disabling mode in the non-action scenario to a level where the person felt overwhelmed or incompetent. These aspects of generating different responses was considered worthy of additional follow up and were incorporated in the second phase of the study in order to see how emotions may be impacting on the judgement to action cycle.

6.1.2.2 Additional Reactions

In the second part of Section 2, respondents were asked to circle a number between 1 and 5, corresponding to the relative rating given to each element. A weighting of ‘1’, indicated the lowest rating, while a number ‘5’ indicated the highest rating for the given aspect. Data are presented in Table 6.3 based on the classifications of low, moderate and high. Ratings of 1-2 were classified as low (L); a score of 3 was rated as moderate (M) and a score of 4-5 rated as high (H). The data are presented according to the order of the questions asked.

Table 6.3 presents the aspects that were involved in influencing the respondents’ reactions to, or perceptions of, the situation in the action and non-action scenarios. All elements were involved in the participants’ reactions, or influenced their perception in the action and non-action scenarios. Of interest is the high rating given to previous encounters which appeared to be more influential in the action scenario than in the non-action scenario. This finding indicates that respondents were more likely to take action
if they had dealt with similar situations in the past. However, 32% of respondents gave a low weighting to the influence of past encounters. These participants may have been acting more out of habit as they were not so challenged by the situation. The lower influence of previous encounters indicated by 22% of respondents in the non-action scenario suggests that inexperience or lack of competence is linked to inaction.

Table 6.3
Initial Reactions in the Action and Non-Action Scenarios, expressed as a percentage of the total sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situational Factor</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th></th>
<th>Non-Action</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L %</td>
<td>M %</td>
<td>H %</td>
<td>L %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Previous Encounters</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Your perception of the situation</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Your feelings</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Knowledge of the facts</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 Who was involved</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7 Other, please describe *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Possibility of talking it through, have values and researched it’

*The desire not to hurt somebody and be alone, Conflicting messages from parties.

The two most influential aspects for the action scenario were the respondents’ feelings (77%) and their knowledge of the facts (72%). The findings suggest that heightened feelings played a greater role in the action scenario and may provide some evidence for the awareness of the emotional state in the action scenario. In the non-action scenario, the two most influential aspects for respondents were knowledge of the facts (72%) and who was involved (72%). The role of feelings appeared to be less influential in the non-action scenario (54%) or it could be that participants were functioning out of the emotional centre of the brain and unable to access cognitive processes to analyse which emotions they were feeling (Hart, 1983, 1999).

6.1.3 Section 4 - Reasons for Actions and Non-Action-on-Judgement -
As described in Chapter 5 (p.128), the group of reasons for acting-on-moral judgement was based on the research literature. Respondents selected the reasons that they felt
were relevant to their respective scenarios. Presentation of the data for the whole sample in the action and non-action scenarios is detailed in Appendix F: Tables F2 and F3.

As indicated in Appendix F, Table F2 the majority of responses fell into four categories. The most common reason was the respondent “had the strength of conviction to carry out the action” (68%), implying a belief that despite whatever else was operating in the circumstances it was the right thing to do and the person had the will and courage to act.

Three other reasons were rated as equally important by 31% of participants. These were “You did not want to experience the consequences of failing to act,” which suggested the human power of knowing or a cognitive reason, “You knew how you would feel if you did the wrong thing,” which implied a maturity of emotional experience or the development of competencies in the cognitive-affective domains, and “You respected the people involved.” The latter reason implied the notion that morality is supported by a caring and respectful relationship with others (Damon, 1988) and perhaps a desire not to hurt a person by a thoughtless action. In other words, an empathic response was activated (Hoffman, 1976; 1983; 1988; 1991; 2000).

A converse picture appears in the non-action scenario, (Appendix F, Table F3) with the highest-ranked reason for not acting being “not knowing how you would feel by doing the wrong thing” (40%). This response implies that the cognitive-affective domain of moral functioning was evident when people acted-on judgement. The next two equally ranked reasons (both 27%) were “You could get away with the situation” (no-one would know) and “You were not self-disciplined enough”. These findings implied that there are factors related to insufficient competence in the domain of willing when a person does not act-on-judgement. This notion is further supported by the reason of “Not having strength of conviction” was absent as a major reason for non-action, unlike the action scenario where the majority of respondents stated “strength of conviction” as the major reason for acting-on-moral judgement. With only a small percentage difference, the next three reasons given with an equal ranking of 23% were “Other goals and priorities were more important,” “You did not have the strength of your conviction” and “You would feel deprived.”
6.1.4 Section 3 - Values

The ‘values’ section looked at whether there were any conflicts in values, the reward or cost factors involved in the dilemma and how the respondents justified their actions. Some actions occur out of habit without consciously thinking through the reason for the action (Vessels 1998). It was deemed worthy of trying to understand if congruence of values with actions did in fact influence the process of judgment-to-action. Even though the respondents were not asked to describe their chosen moral scenario, the responses in the values section nevertheless gave insights into the type of dilemmas that respondents were reporting. This was useful for the research, even though it was an unintended outcome of this section of the questionnaire.

This section utilised an open-ended approach to allow participants an opportunity to describe the values they considered relevant or important. Of the 22 respondents, 18 gave insight into the nature of the role of values in the decision-making process. References were made by the respondents to the nature of the clash of values. These are detailed in Appendix E.

6.1.4.1 Conflict in Values

In the action scenario, 5% of respondents did not answer this section of the questionnaire, 31% of respondents reported not having a conflict of values and 68% reported a conflict of values. This was not an expected result in the action scenario because despite this high proportion of conflict the respondents were still able to act-on-judgement. Reasons for acting or not acting were also examined as recorded in the individual analysis of each of the questionnaires reported in Appendix E, to see if additional insights could be gained into why participants decided to act or not to act. It is interesting to note that, of the 68% indicating a conflict of values, half reported that one of the reasons given for acting-on-moral judgement was owing to the strength of their convictions. Hence, despite a conflict in values the majority of respondents were able to act-on-judgement it appears that for half of the respondents it may be due to the strength of their belief. This finding suggests that action is perhaps more strongly predicated by strength of belief rather than what is valued. This may suggest that belief is perhaps a higher order influence over action, compared with values. Of the 68% who were conflicted in their values in the action scenario, 9% (2 people) of these respondents gave the reason that ‘They did not want to experience the consequences for failing to act’. Another person had ‘Other goals and priorities that were more
important’, and a fourth person gave his own reason that he “felt a deep need to please God and only the truth would do” (see p. 273, Appendix E). These responses suggest that some people may also make a decision based on a higher-order principle such as a sense of accountability to God for his actions.

Conversely in the non-action scenario, the majority of respondents (82%) reported they had a conflict of values, which was to be expected according to the definition of Vessels (1998) that moral action is supported by congruency of values; while only 14% of respondents did not have a conflict of values (note that, 4% of the respondents did not respond to this section of the questionnaire). Of those 14% of respondents who did not have a conflict of values, 9% did not give reasons for not having a conflict of values. The other respondent reported that the reason he/she did not act-on-judgement was that he/she did not know how he/she would feel by doing the wrong thing. This result was not expected because it could be anticipated that a person makes a conscious decision not to act-on-judgement based on a number of different factors as explored in section 6.1.3 of this chapter.

Not acting-on-moral judgement seems to relate, not so much to what a person knows or values, but to what happens in the affective and volitional domains to either support or undermine the judgement-to-action cycle. This notion is supported by Hart’s (1983, 1999) findings that the brain downshifts from the cognitive functioning part of the brain to the emotional functioning part of the brain as also discovered by Damasio (2003). This finding provides a different insight to the understandings of Kohlberg and Piaget who attribute cognition as the basis to the process of moral functioning. Downshifting to the emotional domain appears to sabotage the ability to act-on-judgement or to implement what a person knows to be the right action in a situation.

6.1.5 Section 5 – Moral Identity in the Situation

Section 5 focused on how well, in their estimation, the respondents lived up to their moral ideal or level of responsibility. The final section of the questionnaire asked respondents to evaluate their decision-making processes. Participants responded to three questions asking how important it was to them to live up to their moral ideals, how satisfied they were that they lived up to their moral ideals, and how they would rate their level of moral responsibility. A rating of ‘1’ indicated a lesser degree of living up to their moral ideals and a rating of (5) indicated a higher estimation of living up to their
moral ideals with regard to the three questions. Ratings of 1-2 were classified as low (L); a rating of 3 was rated as moderate (M) and a rating of 4-5 was rated as high (H). Appendix F, Table F4 shows respondents answers to the action and non-action scenarios.

In the action scenario all of respondents considered it ‘moderately to highly important’ to live up to their moral ideals, were satisfied with their ability to live up to their moral ideals and also highly rated their level of moral responsibility.

These reflections would be expected in the action scenario because respondents identified that they acted-on-judgement because of their strength of conviction. They knew how they would feel and understood the consequences if they did not act on their moral judgement.

In the non-action scenario, the opposite position would be expected in regard to satisfaction with living up to ideals because the respondent failed to act-on-moral judgement. However, only half of respondents rated themselves with low satisfaction scores, and half gave a rating of moderate to high levels in regard to living up to moral ideals. This was not expected because it was anticipated that if a person did not act-on-judgement they would not be satisfied with living up to their moral ideas. However, this finding does support the notion of ‘satisficing’ (Nisan, 1985) that people can justify deviating from what is right by their own judgement within a certain latitude.

Summary of Research Question 1
Research Question 1 focused on discovering which factors seemed to influence a person to act or not-act on moral judgement. Five categories were explored. These were, namely, the situation, respondents’ reactions, reasons for participants acting the way they did, the values involved, and, their moral identity in the situation. The first category focused on situational aspects identifying four key factors that appeared to impact upon acting-on-moral judgement; these were, namely, the quality of the relationship, perceptions of competence, respondents’ feelings of emotional safety, and, the degree to which a person was self pre-occupied. All four factors were also evident when a person did not act-on-judgement but the evidence was less prominent.
The second category identified that, when a person did not act-on-judgement, they indicated the desire to flee the situation. When the respondents did act-on-judgement, however, there was an absence of wanting to flee the situation. The third category identified that, when a person acted-on-judgement, the most common reasons given were as follows: they had the strength of their convictions, they did not want to experience the consequences of failing to act, they knew how they would feel afterwards, and, they respected the people involved. Conversely, when a person did not act-on-judgement, the most common reasons given were as follows: not knowing how they would feel by doing the wrong thing, they could get away with the situation, and, they were not self-disciplined enough. These reasons suggest a lack of competence in the domains of affect and conation.

The fourth category focused on the impact of values. The responses here indicated that a conflict of values impacted more when a person did not act-on-judgement. The fifth category identified that, when a person acted-on-judgement, they had a high moral identity and sense of moral responsibility. However, the converse was not true for all respondents. Half of the research sample remained highly satisfied with their moral identity and capacity, even though they failed to act-on-judgement, so demonstrating the notion of ‘satisficing’ (Nisan 1985).

6.2 How do these Factors impact on the Movement from Moral Judgement to Moral Action?

This section will first interpret how each of the identified factors, or trends, in the first section of the chapter may impact upon the movement from moral judgement to moral action. Second, this section will explore broader overall patterns that emerged from the analysis of the data from Questionnaire 1.

6.2.1 Situational Factors

There were similar factors expressed in both the action and non-action scenarios, therefore, the difference between the two scenarios seems to be a matter of the degree of difference in the expression of the four identified factors. The first factor, the quality of the relationship, while still important, appeared to be less important when a person did not act-on-judgement. When they acted-on-judgement, over 90% of females and 100% of male respondents highlighted the importance of respect and responsibility towards
self and others. In the non-action scenario, the percentage dropped to 77%-82%. This is still relatively high, indicating the importance of relationships in the moral domain.

The research literature also suggests that respect and responsibility for others is important in developing moral behaviour. Kitwood (1990) suggests that morality begins in, and is supported by, quality relationships. The Quality Teacher movement (Newmann et al., 1996; Darling-Hammond, 1997) provided research evidence that clearly identified that ‘values education’ and the development of caring, trusting relationships are at the very heart of student success (Rowe, 2004, Hattie, 2004). The factors of respect and relationship are traditionally classified as emotional-social issues, indicating their higher influence over issues of knowledge and skill or the cognitive domain (Damon, 1988). However, in this study, quality relationships alone appeared to be insufficient to support a person to act-on-judgement.

The second factor relating to competence, indicated that when respondents acted-on-judgement, 68% had moderate to high experience whereas only 45% had moderate to high experience when respondents failed to act-on-judgement. When respondents did not act-on-judgement, despite moderate to high familiarity and a moderate to high degree of difficulty, they did not feel experienced enough to actually carry through to the action stage.

The third factor related to an environmental factor of feeling ‘emotionally safe’. In the action scenario, 68% of respondents felt moderately to highly safe, secure and cared for in comparison to 45% of respondents feeling the same level of emotional security in the non-action scenario. It appears emotional safety supports brain activity in the frontal lobe to access prototypes or somatic maps developed through experience (Churchland, 1996; Damasio, 2003).

The fourth factor indicates that respondents felt less self-preoccupied (Danesh, 1994) in the action scenario than in the non-action scenario. In the action scenario only half of the respondents indicated moderate to high levels of temptation, in comparison to 73% of respondents who reported feeling moderate to high temptation in the non-action scenario. Only 27% of respondents reported that deprivation was an issue of moderate to high importance in the action scenario, compared with 77% of respondents who indicated deprivation was moderately to highly important in influencing their decision
not to act. The same trend is evident with deprivation. It appears that self-preoccupation may inhibit the process of self discovery, reflection on action and experiencing empathy with the other person which appears to be an important factor to support a person to know how they will feel or understand the consequences of their actions as identified in situational factors when a person acted-on-judgement.

6.2.2 Reactions
An interesting finding regarding reactions in section 2 of Questionnaire 1 was that no respondents indicated they were in flight mode in the action scenario, whereas, in the non-action scenario, one third of respondents indicated this state. This suggests that fear or stress does not seem to be impacting to the same degree when a person is able to act-on-judgement. This further supports the finding that feelings of competency contribute to the likelihood of action. However, fear and stress appear to be a deterrent to acting-on-moral judgement, suggesting a ‘downshifted’ mode in brain activity.

6.2.3 Reasons
The four reasons given when respondents acted on judgement imply a dynamic may exist between belief, (strength of conviction) level of experience and knowledge (a person did not want to experience the consequences; that is, they anticipated how they would feel if they did the wrong thing), and empathy or the quality of a relationship (they respected the people involved). The understanding of knowing the consequences for your actions and how you would feel if you did the wrong thing, seemed to be important insights relating to a person’s experience over time, or what could be termed wisdom, in the decision-making process. It suggests that respondents did not want to experience either the same mistakes again, or the same feelings, since they already knew what that would be like. These results suggest that they can extrapolate from the past and project into the future, and/or engage moral imagination as referred to by both Churchland (1996) and Johnson (1993). These authors reason that our prototypical moral concepts provide us with a point of comparison in evaluating new moral problems, and our moral imagination enables us to deal with these problems. This also supports the work of Narvaez et al. (1999) regarding the notion that individuals move from novice to expert in their capacity to act on moral judgement. It could therefore be considered that learning to become moral, required trial and error, practice and analytical reflection, suggesting an “examined life” of action and reflection. This
finding implies that emotional and social aspects may have a key role to play in the cycle of learning.

Understanding the feeling state seemed to have a bearing on the capacity to act or not act-on-judgement, impacting at the base level of inner drives and the feeling states of joy or sorrow (Damasio, 2003). Once again, the majority of responses in the non-action scenario appeared to be in the affective–conative domains as distinct from the purely cognitive domain, with the exception of the response by 36% that “Other goals and priorities were more important.”

6.2.4 Values

Respondents indicated a weak connection between having a value and acting on it, suggesting that holding a value does not always translate into moral action. This notion was also found by Hartshorne et al. (1928, 1929, 1930) who found there was no correlation (no relationship, not even a negative relationships between values and resistance to temptation; and similarly, Allinsmith & Greening (1955) and Grinder (1962) found no correlation between guilt and resistance to temptation.

The other trend that was insightful was that a conflict of values seemed to impair the ability to translate judgement into action if it was not offset by strength of belief or certitude. This was a case in point for respondent 1M3 (Appendix E, p. 273) who stated in the values response that when he did not act-on-judgement, “Fight for what I believed to be right or go with the flow avoid a hassle.” However, in the reasons for not acting-on-moral judgement, three reasons he gave for not acting-on-moral judgement were, ‘I did not know how I would feel by doing the wrong thing’, ‘Other goals and priorities were more important’ and ‘I did not have the strength of conviction to carry out the action’. The same respondent had a conflict of values in the action scenario stating “The adults can live their lives the way they see fit (even my kids) but when it sets a wrong example for one’s child I had to step in.” In this action scenario, one of the reasons given for acting-on-moral judgement, was strength of conviction.

However, despite a conflict in values a person may act-on-judgement due to other compelling reasons, such as the strength of their convictions. The data suggests, therefore, that a conflict of values may be more influential in the non-action scenario.
6.2.5 Evaluation of Moral Identity

In relation to rating their level of moral responsibility, (Appendix F, Table F4) 40% of respondents gave themselves a low score while 60% gave themselves a moderate to high score. In the non-action scenario the data implies that half of the respondents were able to reflect upon their lack of action, and gave themselves a low score on their level of satisfaction with their lack of action. It would appear that half of the respondents were ashamed of their failure to act-on-judgement indicating the arousal of their conscience. The other half of non-action respondents, however, despite not acting-on-moral judgement, considered themselves highly satisfied that they had lived up to their moral ideals, and almost two thirds rated their level of moral responsibility as moderate to high.

So what is happening for this second group of respondents? Conscience does not seem to be evoked in the same way as appears evident for the respondents who reported they were not satisfied with their level of moral responsibility. Certainly, it seemed that those who were satisfied with their decision were able to justify not acting-on-moral judgement. This was evident in the responses of a number of the respondents who gave the reason for not-acting was that ‘They could get away with their decision and nobody would know’. This was a case in point for respondent 4M8 (Appendix E, p. 279) who gave himself a rating of ‘5’ on each of these three questions. Regarding it being important to live up to his moral ideals, he was highly satisfied that he had lived up to these ideals and he considered he had the highest rating for his level of moral responsibility. The reason for not acting-on-moral judgement was that ‘I could get away with the situation’. His conflict of values stated “Between two ladies that I love.” However, in the values section he also stated “Lying is not telling, is better, if it harms the others. I can handle it, just as everyone: Lying, not telling everything is part of everyone’s life.” This phenomena seems to be similar to what has been referred to by Nisan (1985) as ‘satisficing’, in that a person has a certain level below the ideal they are prepared to go, and still consider themselves to be moral. Thus, these respondents must have considered they were still within their margin of allowable latitude. It could also be classified as a response that lacks being able to take the perspective of the other, or what could be termed more self pre-occupied or ego-centred than other-centred, preventing a person from understanding and valuing the other’s perspective.
6.2.6 Emerging Trends

This section focuses on the integration of data generated by both quantitative and qualitative methods, to gain insights into any emerging trends that can be triangulated to existing research findings and identify any additional insights. Two general patterns discernible from the data referred to in the previous sections of Chapter 6 were the phenomenon referred to as ‘downshifting’, and ‘satisficing’. Each of these will be examined in greater detail.

6.2.6.1 Brain Response/Chemistry "Downshifting"

Hart (1983; 1999) identified that when a person seemed to be under stress or engaged in certain types of conditions, the response was one of fight or flight, causing the brain functioning to shift from the frontal lobe to the emotional centre lower down in the brain. Damasio (2003) has also identified that when a person is in a sorrowful condition brain activity moves to the emotional centre, lower in the brain and out of the frontal brain. Under joyful conditions, activity is found to be present in the frontal brain of the neo cortex. When respondents acted-on-judgement, there was no mention of flight mode, only the mode of flow and fight (see Table 6.2). However, in the non-action scenario, 32% of the respondents (see Table 6.2), showed a shift from flow mode in the action scenario to flight mode and 36% were in fight mode. This would infer that the flight mode might be impacted on by a sense of fear, lack of safety or stress in the non-action scenario. When situational factors were also referenced, 50% of respondents indicated they did not feel safe, secure or cared for, and 54% experienced high difficulty in the non-action scenario (see Appendix F, Table F1). This suggests that at least half of the respondents could potentially be classified as being in a ‘downshifted’ mode of operation (Hart, 1983; 1999). In this condition, the brain activity moves from the frontal lobe in the problem-solving area to lower in the brain stem. Thus, access to moral prototypes is then unavailable to reference a possible suggested action response (Churchland, 1996; Johnson, 1993). Under these conditions, the person may no longer be involved in a rational mode, acting now out of their instinctual or emotional mode of operation. This seems to impact negatively on their ability to make wise moral choices and could be a factor for some participants in their failure to act-on-judgement. This might provide insight into the reason that some respondents indicated that they did not know how they would feel in the situation, or what the consequences would be until after they had made their judgement, as tabulated in Appendix F, Table F3. Just because
a person is in a ‘downshifted’ mode, however, does not imply that the person is not capable of shifting out of this mode.

Although 36% of respondents were in a fight mode in the action scenario, this did not preclude them from acting-on-moral judgement. Hence, despite being in a ‘downshifted’ mode, respondents still acted-on-moral judgement. So what else may be happening for these respondents? As has been previously identified, all of these respondents (see Appendix F, Table F2), also indicated that one of the reasons for acting-on-moral judgement was due to ‘strength of conviction.’ This would suggest that the desire to act-on-judgement was not ultimately impacted on by the ‘downshifting’ phenomenon.

It appears that, in a ‘downshifted’ mode, a person becomes more reactive, being more influenced by instinct or what is sometimes referred to as our lower nature or inner drives. Despite this situation, particularly if fight mode was experienced along with ‘strength of conviction’, we can still use our capacity of will, to make a choice to act out of our higher nature, as indicated by 68% of respondents who gave ‘strength of conviction’ as the primary reason for acting-on-moral judgement (see Appendix F, Table F2). What is not clear in the responses is what influenced this belief or strength of conviction. This phenomenon of ‘downshifting’ may be an inhibiting factor in the moment, preventing clarity of thought. It can take anything from 20 minutes to 48 hours, depending on the severity of the trauma or dilemma, before normal brain activity is registered once again, where brain activity moves from the emotional centre, the amygdala, to the neo-cortex (Damasio, 2003).

This phenomenon of ‘downshifting’ could also be referred to as an indication of the duality of human nature. This concept of duality is referred to in the Bahá’í Writings as a ‘lower’ nature which is based on instinct, versus the spiritual (or higher) nature which is based upon our capacity for transcendence of an instinctual response supporting the notion that human beings have a dual nature. When a person uses their powers of knowing, loving and willing, or what is termed ‘the powers of the soul’ to make a choice, to act out of a rational or higher course of action, they are responding from their higher nature. Responses suggested that in some situations people had sufficient strength of conviction to act, despite situational factors, implying the importance of belief about their moral identity. This was apparent for respondent 1M3 (see Appendix
E, p.273), who indicated situational factors of quality relationships were important, however, experienced low familiarity, low experience, high difficulty, low feelings of safety, security and feeling cared for. He also indicated low levels of temptation and deprivation which may be of assistance to him as well and also cited ‘strength of conviction’ as a reason for acting-on-moral judgement.

6.2.6.2 ‘Satisficing’
The reflection questions in Section 5 of Questionnaire 1, sought to understand first, how satisfied respondents were that they had lived up to their moral ideal and second, how they would rate their level of moral responsibility. For the non-action scenario, 36% of the 22 respondents (Appendix E, 9M18, 4M8, 2M4, 1M, 5M9, 1F1, 2F2, 3F5, 5F12), in the non-action scenario, gave a high score for level of satisfaction and 55% of respondents gave a high rating to their level of moral responsibility even though they did not act on their judgment. This seemed to be in contrast to the rest of the respondents, who all judged themselves as being disappointed that they had not lived up to their moral ideal, as would have perhaps been expected in the non-action scenario.

These results showed a trend towards a phenomenon referred to in the literature as ‘satisficing’. Nisan (1985) discovered that individuals sometimes deviated from what was right by their own judgement, however, the deviation was limited: ‘Would it be acceptable for me to commit this sin?’ Of the respondents in satisficing mode, 36% were in flight or fight mode in the non-action scenario. This suggested that when a person is in fight or flight mode, the ‘downshifted’ mode of being, might prevent one accessing moral prototypes (Churchland, 1996; Johnson, 1993).

*Summary of Research Question 2*
Research Question 2 focused on how the factors discovered in Research Question 1 impacted upon the movement from moral judgement to moral action. A comparison was made between what happens when a person acts-on-judgement and when a person fails to act-on-judgement. The findings suggested that quality relationships alone were insufficient to support a person to act-on-judgement. Acting-on-moral judgement also involved competence or higher levels of experience. Learning to become moral appears to require practice and a process of reflection. When a person acted-on-judgement, he/she understood how he/she would feel and knew the consequences of his/her actions. Whereas, the converse was true when a person failed to act-on-judgement, that is,
he/she did not understand how he/she would feel and did not know what would be the consequences of his/her actions.

A conflict of values appears to be a contributing factor when a person does not act-on-judgement. This conflict can be overcome, however, if a person has sufficient strength of conviction to override the internal conflict. In addition, if a person becomes entrapped in self-preoccupation, it may result in the phenomenon of ‘satisficing’ which may reduce a person’s capacity to translate moral judgement into moral action.

Responses have indicated that the process of moral functioning is complex, involving a number of variables, and it is also highly dependent on situational factors, in particular, how emotionally safe a person feels in an environment. If a person feels unsafe and insecure, moral functioning may be sabotaged by the process of ‘downshifting’. It appears that the process of judgment-to-action will not be automatically sabotaged. It will depend on the capacity of the person to recognise the phenomenon and to develop skills or competencies and strength of conviction to overcome what could otherwise be an adverse effect on the moral judgement to moral action cycle.

6.3 Is there a Gender Difference in Translating Moral Judgement into Moral Action?

The third key research question explores the notion expressed in the literature, particularly by Gilligan (1982), that females have a different way of solving moral dilemmas than males. This section will compare the reasons which male and female respondents gave for acting and not-acting on judgement.

6.3.1 Gender Analysis of Situational Factors for the Action Scenario

The four situational factors identified as a result of analysing the combined data of high and moderate responses in Appendix F, Table F5 were used to compare data between male and female responses when they acted-on-judgement. The same four situational factors of relationships, competence, emotional safety and self-pre-occupation will be used to compare responses. The sum of the moderate and high rankings was chosen in this section for comparing data in order to look at the broader perspective of participants’ responses.
Factor one concerns relationships and the gender comparison revealed that the three most common situational factors were the same for both males and females with small variations in the percentage responses. All males felt moderately to highly responsible for their own actions, and respectful towards others, while 91% of males felt responsible towards others. All female respondents felt moderately to highly respectful towards others, and 91% of female respondents felt responsible towards both themselves and others.

Factor two related to situational competence. For male respondents, 55% were familiar with handling the moral encounter, 65% were experienced and 91% reported high difficulty in handling the scenario. For female respondents 64% were familiar with handling the moral encounter, 64% were experienced and 46% reported difficulty in handling the scenario. Situational factors of familiarity and experience were almost the same for males and females. However, when females acted on judgement they found it less difficult (46%) compared to males (91%).

Factor three related to emotional safety, with responses indicating similar levels for both males and females when they acted-on-judgement, showing 72% of male respondents and 64% of female respondents feeling safe, secure and cared for.

Factor four related to the notion of self-preoccupation. For male respondents, 54% reported high temptation and 36% reported high deprivation in situations where they acted-on-judgement. Whereas, for females, 46% felt high temptation and 18% felt high deprivation when they acted-on-judgement. Thus, compared to males, a lower percentage of females reported feeling tempted and deprived.

Overall, in the action scenario, apart from the two situational factors, there was little variation between male and female respondents in their rankings of situational factors. Females appeared to feel less deprived and found the situation less difficult than male respondents in situations where they decided to act-on-judgement.

6.3.2 Gender Analysis of Situational Factors for the Non-Action Scenario

The four situational factors identified as a result of analysing the combined data of high and moderate responses in Appendix F Table F6 were used to compare data between male and female respondents when they did not act-on-judgement.
Factor one was concerned with the quality of the relationship and the responses indicated that 91% of males felt respectful towards the other person, and 91% felt responsible towards others, while 82% of male respondents felt responsible towards themselves. A similar pattern is evident for female respondents, with 82% feeling responsible towards themselves, 73% feeling responsible for others, and 64% feeling respectful towards others. It is noteworthy however that 36% of females felt low respect in comparison to 9% of males feeling low respect towards others. In the action scenario, neither males nor females ranked respect as low. Therefore, the indication of low respect may be one of the contributing factors to non-action on judgement, particularly for females.

Factor two related to competence and the responses indicated that for male respondents 64% felt high familiarity with the situation and 82% felt experienced in handling the moral encounter. However, 73% of male respondents reported moderate to high levels of difficulty. For female respondents, 73% were familiar with the moral dilemma, and 64% were experienced. However 64% nonetheless experienced difficulty in handling the dilemma. Males, therefore, showed a similar pattern to females except in the area of experience where more females indicated a lower level of experience.

The third factor related to emotional safety in the situation and the analysis of the responses suggests that there is a substantial difference between males and females in this regard. While 64% of male respondents indicated that they felt a low level of safety, security and feeling cared for, only 27% of female respondents reported low levels of emotional safety.

The fourth factor related to respondents feeling self-preoccupied. Once again, there appeared to be differences between males and females in this aspect, with 91% of male respondents indicating that they felt tempted and 100% feeling deprived, compared to 54% of female respondents who reported feeling both tempted and deprived.

There appeared to be different priorities of factors for male and female respondents in the non-action scenario. While there were a number of similarities, there were also some noteworthy differences. It appears that male respondents were more affected by feelings of deprivation, temptation and emotional insecurity. On the other hand, female
respondents appeared to be more affected by lack of experience and low respect for others.

6.3.3 Gender Analysis -Reactions
As indicated in Table 6.2, when respondents did not act-on-judgement, more males wished to flee the situation than females, and equal numbers of males and females were in fight mode. These data support the findings from the situational factors as indicated in Appendix F Table F6, in that a higher percentage of men than women felt unsafe, not cared for or secure in the given situation. More females were in a state of flow compared to males. The sense of flow suggested in respondents’ reactions seemed to be more about keeping the status quo or not wanting to ‘rock the boat’ rather than the definition of being in harmony with what was happening and not wishing to flee or fight.

6.3.4 Gender Analysis of Reasons for Acting-on-moral judgement
A comparison of the highest ranked reasons given by males and females in the action scenario (Appendix F, Table F7) shared almost identical results for males and females, with one exception for each. In descending order, reasons given by males for acting-on-moral judgement were; ‘strength of conviction’ (54%), ‘respect for people involved’ (45%), ‘not wanting to experience the consequences of failing to act’ (36%) and ‘knowing how they would feel if they did the wrong thing’ (36%).

For females, in descending order, the reasons included: ‘strength of conviction’ (81%); ‘self discipline’ (27%); ‘not wanting to experience the consequences of failing to act’ (27%); and ‘knowing how they would feel if they did the wrong thing’ (27%).

The one different male perspective in comparison to females in the higher ranking responses related to what could be termed an external motivator, ‘respect for the people involved’. There were two other factors given by a small percentage of males that were not indicated by females. These were: ‘you could not get away with the situation’ and ‘other goals and priorities were not as important’. This suggests a sense of responsibility towards others that was taken into account when deciding to act-on-judgement.
6.3.5 Reasons for Not Acting-on-moral judgement analysed by Gender

In the non-action scenario, (Appendix F, Table F8) a very different picture is presented between male and female respondents. Unlike the action scenario there were no common reasons given between males and females. There seemed to be a very different process in place when males and females failed to act-on-judgement. The reasons given by males implied a lack of self-knowledge of their emotions (you did not know how you would feel by doing the wrong thing) and a lack of knowledge about the consequences of actions (you were unaware of what the consequences would be for failing to act).

This lack of understanding of feelings and consequences could be termed ignorance, and suggests that males had a sense of self-preoccupation with their own needs being met. For female respondents the reasons focused more on self (they were not self-disciplined enough, they did not have the strength of conviction) and their relationships to others. The reasons concerning self, suggested that females felt a sense of self-recrimination about their lack of action. Also noteworthy was that 27% of females did not respect the people involved, suggesting that respect may be a motivating factor for women to want to act-on-judgement. The reasons given by females suggest that the process used to arrive ultimately at learning how to act-on-judgement may be quite different for females than it is for males.

Of the 36% in the ‘satisficing’ mode, 50% were men and 50% were women (see Appendix E), suggesting that this is a human quality to make excuses for our actions when we want to justify our inaction. Males, on average, gave more reasons for not acting-on-moral judgement than females. It is not clear why males provided more reasons, particularly, as the nature of the dilemma was not known. Multiple reasons may suggest that the dilemma was relatively complex hence, more reasons were given or it could be that males gave more excuses for their non-action.

6.3.6 Is the Process of Moral Judgement-to-Action Different for Males and Females?

Variations in responses were discernible in responses given by both men and women to situational factors (Appendix F: Table F5 and Table F6) and reasons for acting or not acting-on-moral judgement (Appendix F: Table F7 and Table F8). Overall, the four situational factors, including quality of relationship, competence, emotional safety and self-preoccupation, were evident in both the action and non-action scenarios. In the action scenario, females felt less deprived and found the situation less difficult to handle
than men. This finding correlates with the Danesh Matrix for Self-Willing-Stage 2 (Confidence) and suggests that females had greater confidence in the situation which prompted them to act. This suggests that females may have greater competence in the willing domain than males when they choose to act-on-judgement.

The analysis of reasons for action was based on the four highest ranking reasons for acting-on-moral judgement. Male and female responses were compared to each other to identify trends (Appendix F: Table F7). In the action scenario, responses to reasons for acting were almost identical for men and women, with the exception of one different factor for women and one for men. For women this related to an internal factor of self-discipline. This also equated with Danesh’s first stage of our capacity to will, that is ‘self-control’. The one additional male perspective related to an external motivator of feeling respectful towards the people involved. This could equate with the first stage of loving/relationships, ‘acceptance of others’. This would suggest that men are generally socialised to maintain networks of people that may be advantageous to their advancement. Conversely, women seemed to be more familiar with their inner world and were more comfortable reflecting on their vulnerability or admitting to their weaknesses.

Situational factors in the non-action scenario for males and females indicated many similar factors with small variations. Variations seemed to impact on male respondents in the factors of deprivation, temptation and not feeling emotionally safe in the situation. This suggests that, for male respondents, factors concerned with exerting their will were implicated. On the other hand, female respondents appeared to be more affected by lack of experience and low respect for others. This suggests a lack of confidence in their capacity and a lack of a respectful relationship with others.

The reasons given by men and women when they did not act-on-judgement (Appendix F: Table F8) indicated different priorities for each. There were no similarities in the most common reasons given by males and females in the non-action scenario. This suggested that men and women might have different ways of processing information when they do not act-on-judgement. Reasons given by females related to judgement about others’ actions, their relationships with the other person or internal judgements of their own behaviour (reflective of inadequacies). On the other hand, for males, the reasons related to the impact on themselves and their personal wellbeing, or the
perceptions of others about their actions. These findings indicate support for the notion by Gilligan (1982) who asserted that women have different moral and psychological tendencies than men. According to Gilligan, men think in terms of rules and justice and women are more inclined to think in terms of caring and relationships, a gender difference which is borne out in these findings.

The findings regarding the different ways that males and females process their reactions after not acting-on-moral judgement were triangulated with Rest’s model (1983) of moral functioning. Rest’s model suggests a judgement-to-action cycle which might be useful as a point of comparison to gain greater insights into the different ways of moral processing for males and females. A comparison will now be made concerning how the variation of factors between male and female responses in the non-action scenario correlates to each stage of Rest’s model.

First is ethical sensitivity or interpreting the situation according to who is involved, what actions should be taken and the reactions and outcomes that might ensue. Females indicated less respect for people in the moral encounter in the non-action scenario. Male respondents indicated they ‘did not know how they would feel’ or ‘what the consequences would be’, ‘they could get away with it’, and would ‘feel deprived’ if they acted-on-judgement. Male respondents also reported feeling highly unsafe, insecure and uncared for. Findings relating to this part of the cycle suggest there are greater challenges for male respondents than for female respondents. This implies that males may need more education in relationship to developing sensitivity to the consequences of their actions.

Second is ethical judgement or reasoning about the possible actions in the situation and judging the action deemed to be the most ethical. Female respondents indicated that a common reason for non-action was ‘Other goals and priorities were more important.’ There was little evidence that this stage had impact for males, suggesting that perhaps males found this stage less challenging. The reasons given by males for not acting-on-moral judgement do not seem to fit within this category. The negative aspect of one of the cited reasons given by males was that they could get away with the situation, which suggests judging what will serve their own needs first, rather than judging which action is more ethical.
Third is ethical motivation or prioritising the ethical action over other goals and needs. Female respondents indicated that they were not self-disciplined enough. Male respondents indicated that they felt highly tempted. Although different reasons were implicated for males and females, issues of ethical motivation appear to be involved in not acting-on-moral judgement.

Fourth is ethical action or implementing the ethical action by knowing how to do so and how to follow through. Female respondents indicated that they did not have the ‘strength of their convictions’ to act-on-judgement and they did not have ‘sufficient experience’ to know what to do. Male respondents did not indicate any aspects that correlate to this phase of the cycle. However, reasons given by females indicate greater reflection than males about their lack of action.

The analysis against the Rest Model indicated that males and females operate out of different stages of the judgement-to-action cycle. This could imply a different way of learning or source of motivation for males and females and a different set of competencies that need to be mastered to gain the competency of acting-on-moral judgement.

Another common trend emerged regarding situational factors for male respondents which, is referred to as ‘satisficing’. This factor of ‘satisficing’ was indicated by all men who reported feeling highly tempted (see Appendix E) and by 80% who felt highly deprived and 20% who felt moderately deprived in the situation. This could mean that these respondents were self-absorbed or self-preoccupied (Self-Loving-Stage 1, Danesh, 1994) in their desire to satisfy their own needs and did not think about the impact of their actions on another person. For females, this factor was not as influential, as they recorded low levels of temptation and deprivation. For male respondents there appeared to be a strong connection between feeling deprived or tempted, and a justification for not following through from judgement-to-action. In a sense, the person felt overcome by inner drives, or they wished to compensate themselves for a sense of losing out in the situation, and felt they would have to suffer too much if they chose to follow through on judgement.

Three-quarters of the male respondents gave one of their reasons for not acting-on-moral judgement as ‘they could get away with it.’ They were, as Damasio (2003) would
say, wishing to avoid a situation they considered would bring sorrow rather than joy. For 25% of males, it appeared they were prepared to fight for what they wanted, and were able to justify their stance due to a sense of possible future deprivation that was also supported by a feeling of being highly tempted in the situation. This same pattern was not apparent for women who were in ‘satisficing’ mode. For this group of females, factors seemed to relate to Section 4 of the questionnaire relating to reasons for not acting-on-moral judgement. Half of the females stated their main reason for not acting was ‘other goals and priorities were more important’, while one quarter indicated they were ‘not self-disciplined enough’ and one quarter ‘didn’t know how they would feel’. All of these factors suggest that female respondents were more likely to be self-preoccupied.

Summary of Research Question 3
The results from the gender analysis indicate that there is a difference between the way males and females translate moral judgement into moral action. There appears to be a learning continuum that varies for males and females, even though ultimately when they do act-on-judgement, situational factors and reasons for acting on moral judgement were almost identical for both genders.

The results of this study appear to support the contradictory findings of both Gilligan (1982, 1988) and Wark and Krebs (1996) but would seem to apply to different parts of the cycle from moral judgement to moral action. It appears that, when the data were examined in the action scenario, there were few differences between males and females, supporting Wark and Krebs findings of a limited gender difference. Conversely, in the non-action scenario, there was little similarity between reasons given by males and females. This finding supports the idea of gender differences, as noted by Gilligan (1982), that men tend to think in terms of rules and justice and women are more inclined to think in terms of caring and relationships. These findings suggest that men may have a greater pre-occupation with meeting their own needs and women are more focused on reflecting about their own actions and tend to be motivated by how respectful they feel towards the other.

6.4 What Domains of Learning are involved in Moral Functioning?
To gain additional insights into classifying data emerging from Questionnaire 1, the key findings, particularly as they relate to situational and reasons for acting or not acting on
judgement, will be used to triangulate the data against the stages of the Danesh Matrix documented below in Table 6.4, which is included here for easy reference. The purpose of this analysis will be to see if any of the domains of learning, which may be involved in the process of moral learning, can be identified from the collected data. While the data is presented by gender, the major focus of this section of the chapter is to identify any stages of development that present when a person acts or does not act-on-moral-judgement.

Table 6.4
*Domains and Developmental Stages for the Danesh Matrix (1994)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Human Concerns</th>
<th>Main Human Powers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Knowing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self</strong></td>
<td>Self-experience (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-discovery (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-knowledge (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relationships</strong></td>
<td>Sameness of people (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uniqueness of people (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oneness of people (3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The developmental stages of the Danesh Matrix of moral functioning are classified as the three human powers of knowing, loving and willing in relationship to the two primary human concerns of ‘self’ and ‘relationships’. The definitions for each of these categories can be referenced on p. 89. A number has been assigned to each stage of development in each domain in Table 6.4 so that each stage can be referenced easily in the subsequent text when documenting the triangulation of the data with the Danesh Matrix. In Table 6.4 Stage 1 is the lowest stage and is represented by the symbol (1) through to Stage 3, the highest stage of development, which is represented by the symbol (3).

6.4.1 Developmental Stages Related to Situational Factors Action Scenario

It should be noted here that this analysis is to look at broad trends to explore what processes may be involved in moral learning. The four situational factors that seemed to impact on the respondents’ ability to act-on-judgement can also be broadly classified
into the domains of knowing, loving and willing (Danesh, 1994). The first factor involving relationships, with regard to respect can be classified under the loving domain, and responsibility can be classified under the willing domain.

The second factor of competency relates to experience and difficulty and relate to the knowing domain, and familiarity to the willing domain. The third factor relates to emotional safety: feeling safe, secure and cared for, which could be classified under the loving domain. The final factor of self-preoccupation incorporates the notion of temptation, and could be classified under the willing domain where temptation has lead to the lacking of exercising self control. The aspect of deprivation could be classified under the loving domain under the first stage of development referred to as self-preoccupation.

Table 6.5 identifies the most common situational factors based on the combined rankings of medium and high, that are above the percentile of 70% for both males and females when they acted-on-judgement mapped against the Danesh Matrix (1994). These factors are examined to explore which domains are most influential in supporting action-on-judgement for both males and females. Each situational factor is analysed in relation to the stages of knowing, loving and willing as outlined in the Danesh Matrix (1994) Table 6.4. The percentage response for males and females is included in Table 6.5. The factors are listed according to percentage ranking.

As indicated in Table 6.5, when males acted-on-judgement, they were influenced most by the quality of relationships, their feelings of competence and their level of emotional safety. Only one situational factor was apparent for women, namely quality of relationships. It is interesting to note that males experienced high difficulty, yet they still acted-on-judgement.

Using the Danesh Matrix classification, Table 6.4 shows that for males, acting-on-moral judgement involved all three domains of loving, willing and knowing. The factors of respect and feeling safe, secure and cared for can be identified as Relationships-Loving-Stage 2 (Empathy with others). The classification of respect as a form of empathy appears appropriate because according to the New Webster Dictionary, the definition of respect is “special esteem or consideration in which one holds another person” (p. 349). Factors of responsibility can be identified on the Danesh Matrix as Self-Willing-Stage 3
(Responsibility). The factor of difficulty can be identified as Self-Knowledge-Stage 2 (Self-Discovery).

Table 6.5

*Analysis of the most Common Situational Factors for Males and Females in the Action Scenario, Mapped against the Danesh Matrix (1994)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Situational Factor</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factor 1 Quality Relationship</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High respect towards the person/people</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Relationships - Loving- Stage2 (Empathy with others)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High responsibility in the situation for your own actions towards yourself</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Self-Willing-Stage 3 (Responsibility)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High responsibility in the situation for your actions towards the other person/people</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Self-Willing-Stage 3 (Responsibility)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factor 2 competence</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High difficulty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factor 3 emotional safety</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe, secure and cared for</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For women, acting-on-moral judgement primarily involved an emphasis on relationship, loving and willing factors. It is noteworthy that both men and women were operating out of the highest stage of willing Self-Willing-Stage 3 (Responsibility), alongside their sense of respect for the other of relationships Loving-Stage 2 (Empathy). Therefore, the capacity to use one’s will and the capacity to love appear to be important factors for both males and females in being able to act-on-judgment. This supports Kitwood’s (1990) notion that morality develops best in loving, respectful, social environments.
6.4.2 Developmental Stages Related to Situational Factors Non-Action Scenario

Table 6.6 identifies the most common situational factors, combining the medium and high ranking scores above the percentile of 70%, for both males and females when they did not act-on-judgement, mapped against the Danesh Matrix (1994). These factors are examined to explore which domains are most influential in impacting on non-action-on-judgement for both males and females.

Table 6.6
Analysis of the most Common Situational Factors for Males and Females in the Non-Action Scenario, Mapped against the Danesh Matrix (1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Factor 4 Self-Preoccupation**  
Deprivation in the situation if you did the right thing  
Loving-Stage 1 (Self-Preoccupation) Concerned about your own well being, do not want to miss out on something that is self-gratifying. | 100 | **Factor 1 Quality Relationship**  
Responsibility in the situation for your own actions towards yourself  
Self-Willing-Stage 3 (Responsibility) | 82 |
| Temptation to do the wrong thing in the situation  
Lack of willing–Self-Willing-Stage 1 (Self-Control) It may take self control to overcome temptation | 91 | Respect towards the person/people | 82 |
| **Factor 1 Quality Relationship**  
Respect towards the person/people  
Relationship-Loving-Stage 2 (Empathy with others) | 91 | High responsibility in the situation for your actions towards the other person/people  
Self-Willing-Stage 3 (Responsibility) | 73 |
| High responsibility in the situation for your actions towards the other person/people  
Self-Willing-Stage 3 (Responsibility) | 82 | **Factor 2 Competence**  
Familiarity with type of encounter  
Self-Willing-Stage 2 (Confidence) | 73 |
| Responsibility in the situation for your own actions towards yourself  
Self-Willing-Stage 3 (Responsibility) | 91 | **Factor 3 Emotional Safety**  
Safe secure and cared for  
Relationship-Loving-Stage 2 (Empathy with others) | 73 |
| **Factor 2 Competence**  
Experienced in handling the encounter  
Self-Knowledge-Stage 3 (Self-Knowledge) | 82 |
The situational factors were analysed in relation to each of the stages of knowing, loving and willing as outlined by the Danesh Matrix (1994) in Table 6.4. The purpose of this is to identify the domains and stage levels that are evident in the different situational factors between males and females. The lack of a stage is used to describe the particular situational factors where the developmental stage is not apparent in the respondents’ actions, for example, low experience, could be interpreted in the Danesh Matrix as a lack of confidence and self-experience. Likewise high temptation could be considered a lack of self-control in the Danesh Matrix.

The three most common situational factors associated with non-action for males were self-pre-occupation, quality relationships, and competence. For female respondents who did not act-on-judgement, quality relationships had the highest ranking, with competence having the second and emotional safety the third highest ranking.

When males did not act-on-judgement the situational factors involved, related to the domains of Self-Loving-Stage 1 (Self-Preoccupation) and the lack of Self-Willing-Stage 1 (Self-Control). Similar factors to when males acted-on-judgement were also involved, namely, Relationships-Loving-Stage 2 (Empathy), Self-Willing-Stage 3 (Responsibility) and Self-Knowledge-Stage 3 (Self-Knowledge). Despite the presence of these higher stages of knowing, loving and willing, males still did not act-on-judgement. It appears that their actions were sabotaged by self-preoccupation and the lack of the first stage of willing, namely, self-control.

When females did not act-on-judgement situational factors according to the Danesh Matrix (1994), were present in the domains of Self-Willing-Stage 3 (Responsibility), Relationships-Loving-Stage 2 (Empathy) and Self-Willing-Stage 2 (Confidence). It would appear in comparison to the Danesh Matrix that factors relating to knowledge were not as highly developed in the non-action scenario for females.

In Table 6.6, the reporting of male responses that are different to female responses could be described as high temptation, which indicates a lack of self-control, Self-Willing-Stage 1 (Self-Control). Another factor that is noteworthy is that 64% of males felt low safety, security and being cared for as well as 100% experienced moderate to high
deprivation. Both these factors related to self-preoccupation Self-Loving-Stage 1 (Self-Pre-Occupation).

The triangulation of the non-action scenario data with the Danesh Matrix in Table 6.6 identified that males particularly appeared to be acting out of a lower stage of development than in the action scenario. This suggests a lack of competence in their actions, such as the lack of confidence (Self-Willing-Stage 2), or the lack of self control (Self-Willing-Stage 1) accompanied by a tendency for self-preoccupation (Self-Loving-Stage 1). For females, as stages of Self-Loving and Self-Willing are present, it appeared the lack of action may be attributed to a lack of knowledge and skill as there is no indication of Stages 2 and 3 of Self-Knowing.

6.4.3 Developmental Stages Related to Reasons for Acting-on-moral judgement
The triangulation of the reasons given for acting-on-moral judgement with the Danesh Matrix is presented in Table 6.7 for males and females.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.7</th>
<th>Reasons Given by Males and Females for Acting-on-moral judgement Triangulated with the Danesh Matrix (1994)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male Reasons</strong></td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You had the strength of conviction to carry out the action</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Willing-Stage 3 (Responsibility) &amp; Self-Knowing-Stage 3 (Self-Knowledge)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You respected the people involved</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship-Loving-Stage 2 (Empathy with others)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You did not want to experience the consequences of failing to act</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Knowledge-Stage 3 (Self-Knowledge)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You knew how you would feel if you did the wrong thing</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Knowledge-Stage 3 (Self-Knowledge) &amp; Loving-Stage 3 (Self-Growth)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As indicated in Table 6.7, the triangulation of the data for the male respondents demonstrates that over half of the sample group of men acted out of ‘strength of conviction’, which represents the highest stages of Self-Willing-Stage 3 (Responsibility) and Self-Knowing-Stage 3 (Self-Knowledge). This reason was followed by ‘Respect for others’ which corresponds to Danesh’s second stage of Relationships-Loving-Stage 2 (‘Empathy with others’). The other two reasons, ‘knowing the consequences’ and ‘how you would feel’, correspond to the highest stages of Self-Knowing-Stage 3 (Self-Knowledge) and Self-Loving-Stage 3 (Self-Growth). When a number of males acted-on-judgement their reasons demonstrated that they acted out of the highest stages of knowing, loving and willing, with the additional aspect of the relationship aspect of loving, ‘empathy with others’.

In Table 6.7, the four most common reasons provided by female respondents for acting-on-moral judgement are compared to the stages of development in relationship to knowing, loving and willing. These findings demonstrate that the majority of women acted out of Self-Willing-Stage 3 (Responsibility) and Self-Knowing-Stage 3 (Self-Knowledge). A higher proportion of women than men cited ‘strength of conviction’ as a reason for acting-on-moral judgement. Female respondents ranked the next three reasons equally and these reasons related to Self-Willing-Stage 1 (Self-Control), Self-Knowing-Stage 3 (Self-Knowledge), and Self-Loving-Stage 3 (Self-Growth). When a number of females acted-on-judgement their reasons demonstrated that they acted out of the highest stages of knowing and loving and the first stage of willing.

6.4.4 Developmental Stages Related to Reasons for not Acting-on-moral judgement

Table 6.8 shows the triangulation of the four most common reasons given by males and females for not acting-on-moral judgement with the Danesh Matrix (1994).

In Table 6.8, the data from male respondents indicated that the four most common reasons for not acting-on-moral judgement, when compared to the stages of development in relationship to knowing, loving and willing, demonstrated that the majority of men acted out of the lowest stage of Self-Knowing-Stage 1 (Self-Experience). The next main reason for not acting-on-moral judgement for male respondents was acting out of Self-Loving-Stage 1 (Self-Preoccupation). The same stages as the previous two are repeated again in the next two reasons given for not
acting-on-moral judgement, that is, ‘You would feel deprived’ and ‘You were unaware of what the consequences would be for failing to act’.

All of the reasons given for not acting-on-judgment indicate that male respondents were operating in the lower stages of moral functioning according to the Danesh Matrix (1994). The most significant feature is the absence of factors related to the exertion of will. Clearly there is a lack of alignment in knowing, loving and willing in the non-action scenario. This suggests that an alignment at the higher stages of each of these domains may be necessary in order for males to act-on-judgment.

In Table 6.8, each of the reasons given by females for not-acting on judgement indicates that they were not demonstrating proficiency at even the lowest stage of willing and relationships/loving.

### Table 6.8
*Reasons Given by Males and Females for not Acting-on-moral judgement Triangulated with the Danesh Matrix (1994)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male Reasons</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Female Reasons</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>You did not know how you would feel by doing the wrong thing</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>You were not self disciplined enough</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Self-Knowing-Stage 1 (Self-Experience)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Self- Willing lack of Stage 1 (Self-Control)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You could get away with the situation (no-one would know)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>You did not respect the people involved</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Self-Loving-Stage 1 (Self-Preoccupation)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Relationship-Loving lacking Stage 1 (Acceptance of others)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You would feel deprived</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Other goals and priorities were more important</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Self-Loving-Stage 1 (Self-Preoccupation)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Self-Loving-Stage 1 (Self-Pre-occupation, Self-Knowing-Stage 3 (Self-Knowledge)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You were unaware of what the consequences would be for failing to act</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>You did not have the strength of conviction to carry out the action</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Self-Knowing-Stage 1 (Self-Experience)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Lack of Self- Willing-Stage 2 (Confidence) &amp; Self-Knowing Stage 1 (Self-Experience)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The females only demonstrated Stage 1 development in Self-Loving (Self-Preoccupation) and Self-Knowing–Stage 1 (Self-Experience) and lacked Stage 2 of Self-Willing (Confidence). These results indicated that there was an absence of competence when females did not act-on-judgement. Even though female responses to the non-action scenario were different to male reasons, similar modes of functioning at a lower stage of development were apparent among both genders.

A comparison of the results presented in Tables 6.5, 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8 supports the notion that acting-on-moral judgement appears to be reliant on higher stages of willing, loving and knowing (Stages 2-3). There appears to be a lack of competence in all three domains when males and females did not act-on-judgement. In the non-action scenario, it is noteworthy to recognise that it may not simply be a lack of overall development, because in the action scenario a person had the necessary competence to act-on-judgement yet, given another situation, the same person failed to act-on-judgment. Even though the higher stages of moral functioning were not actualized in the non-action scenario, the higher stages actually were available to the individual but were not employed or operationalized in that particular situation.

The research by Wark and Krebs (1996) suggests that moral development is more “additive-inclusive” than “transformational-displacement.” These authors concluded that “old stage structures are not transformed and displaced by new structures; they remain available and may be evoked by appropriate stimuli” (p. 47). The respondents’ lack of access to the higher stages in the present study appears to support the findings of Wark and Krebs. Given the highly religious sample population that aspired to act-on-moral judgement, it is evident that situational factors impacted on the respondents’ ability to access the necessary repertoire or somatic maps (Damasio, 2003) to be able to act out of the highest stages of development on the Danesh Matrix (1994). Another factor could be impacting here regarding emotional safety with 45% overall and 64% of males in the current study reporting low levels of safety and security in the non-action scenario.

Therefore, the data suggests that situational factors appear critical to providing the necessary conditions for a person to be able to access and employ the higher stages of self in all three domains of knowing, loving and willing in order to act-on-judgement.
These findings suggest a person may be operating from different levels of moral functioning depending on the situation.

**Summary of Research Question 4**

The results presented relating to which domains of learning appear to be involved in moral learning suggest that all three domains of knowing, loving and willing are indicated when a person acts on judgement. When respondents acted-on-judgment, they were acting out of the higher stages of development of knowing, loving and willing (Danesh Matrix 1994), with the additional aspect of the relationship - loving domain, ‘empathy with others’, particularly evident for male respondents.

When respondents did not act-on-judgement, they appeared to be operating out of the lower stages of development (see Table 6.7 p. 173 and Table 6.8 p. 175), where respondents acted out of knowing and loving - Stage 1. This implies that the capacity to act-on-judgement is linked to levels of competence, as evidenced when comparing reasons for acting to reasons for not acting-on-moral judgement. When reasons for not-acting were triangulated, they suggested that respondents were operating out of lower stages of knowing, loving and willing. The data in Table 6.7 (p. 173) and Table 6.8 (p. 175) indicated that the willing, or conative, capability was absent. This would suggest that two factors might be operating when a person acts-on-judgment. First, a person needs to be competent to act out of the highest stages of all three domains of knowing, loving and willing, and, second, there also needs to be an alignment or interdependence between all three domains to be successful in acting-on-moral judgement.

For both males and females, the desire to continue to justify their actions or stay in what they considered to be a more joyful state, prevented the respondents moving from the first stage of loving, self-preoccupation, to the second stage of loving (See Table 6.4, p. 168). Danesh describes this second stage of love as one of ‘self-acceptance’, wherein a person can accept they have made a mistake. It appears that, if a person felt too deprived to move beyond their current perception of the situation, this prevented him/her from moving to the second stage of loving. A lack of empathy, brought about by self-preoccupation, seems to prevent a person from reflecting upon another’s point of view and moving beyond his/her own justification of the situation. This finding appears to support the view of Erikson (1964) and Hoffman (1998) that empathy is the foundation of morality.
The findings also supported the notion that developmental stages are “additive-inclusive” rather than “transformational-displacement” (Wark & Krebs, 1996). The findings support the notion that moral action is also situationally based because, in some moral dilemmas, the same respondent was able to act out of higher stages yet, in other dilemmas when the person failed to act-on-judgement, the person was operating in the lower stages of moral functioning on the Danesh Matrix.

**Summary of Chapter**

This chapter has used qualitative and quantitative methods to identify key patterns reported by respondents in Questionnaire 1. The four key research questions namely: which factors influence a person to act or not act-on-moral judgement; how do these factors impact on the movement from moral judgement to moral action; is there a gender difference in translating moral judgement to moral action; and what domains of learning seem to be involved in moral functioning; were used to analyse emerging trends of moral learning and moral functioning.

The findings suggest that when the respondents followed through on judgement, the important factors in the knowing domain were that they were more experienced, more familiar with the situation or found it less difficult. They felt safe, more secure and cared for, more respectful of the other and less deprived in the domain of loving, while in the domain of willing, they felt less tempted and more responsible for self and others. In nearly all cases there were at least two domains involved and in some responses all three domains were evident. This would suggest there may be a dynamic interplay between the powers of knowing, loving and willing. When these domains were highly developed, a respondent was more likely to act-on-judgement, and conversely if they were less developed, a person was less likely to act-on-judgement. When a person acted-on-judgement, there was evidence that the highest level of each of the domains was in operation.

When a person acted-on-judgement he/she appeared to be conscious of all three of the highest stages of knowing, loving and willing, for example, self-knowledge (knowing what the consequences would be) by analysing or reflecting on the impact of his/her actions before acting-on-moral judgement, recognition of a conscious process of self-growth (knowing how he/she would feel if they failed to act on their judgement) and a
desire to accept responsibility for not only him/herself but also how they treated others. In addition, respondents had a high respect for the person involved in the moral encounter. This suggests they are feeling empathy with the other and are operating in Relationships-Loving-Stage 2 (Empathy) on the Danesh matrix. These findings coincide with the notion of Triune Ethics as postulated by Narvaez (2008).

The analysis of both the situational factors and the reasons for acting-on-judgment support the notion of the additional domain of conation or the capacity to use one’s will, as defined by Kitwood (1990) and Danesh (1994). Danesh has referred to sequential stages of development as self-control, confidence and responsibility, in the willing domain. It appears that how one feels in a situation may sabotage the ability to act-on-judgement or to do what a person knows to be the right action in a situation. It appears that not acting-on-moral judgement is not so much to do with what a person knows but what happens in the emotive and conative domains or it could be said involves the additional engagement of the ethic of engagement and the ethic of imagination (Narvaez, 2006).

Additionally, the findings from Questionnaire 1 have indicated that there are two processes that could be said to sabotage the translation of moral judgement to action, namely ‘downshifting’ and ‘satisficing’. The phenomenon of ‘satisficing’ demonstrated a dynamic interplay between knowing, loving and willing and the notion of ‘additive-inclusive’. ‘Satisficing’ indicated issues involved in the domain of loving. If a person regressed to self-preoccupation because they were feeling deprived in a situation, they were acting out of the first stage of this domain. They did not wish to accept the constraints that were being imposed through their perception that if they acted-on-judgement they would be missing out on something they considered joyful. Hence, they would feel a sense of sorrow if they did not do what they wanted in the moment. Therefore, the phenomena of ‘satisficing’ demonstrated that, in any one area of knowing, loving and willing, if a person is not operating out of the highest level of each of these domains, a person might not act-on-judgement. This finding supports the notion of Narvaez (2008) that, under certain conditions, the brain defaults back to a security ethic.

An unexpected finding from the first questionnaire was that emotion appeared to play a strong role in the transition from not acting to acting-on-moral judgement. This was
indicated by one of the main reasons given for acting, which was that the respondents knew how they would feel if they did not act-on-judgement. Therefore, knowledge of the feeling state may be influential in prompting a person to act-on-judgement. Conversely, in the non-action scenario a number of respondents indicated they did not know how they would feel until after they had failed to act on their judgment, hence; this was one of the factors in their failure to act. This would suggest a possible insight into a continuum of learning. How do feelings impact on the judgement to action cycle and at what point does a person know how they will feel?

In order to explore this notion a second questionnaire was administered in order to gain deeper insights into the development of moral competence and to see if additional light could be shed on the process of moral functioning and moral learning. The role of emotions in the learning process is explored in the next chapter, which focuses on the findings arising from the analyses of responses to Questionnaire 2.
CHAPTER 7

RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE 2

Chapter 7 presents the results from Questionnaire 2 which was administered to a small sample including some of the same respondents to Questionnaire 1 as well as some new participants. The second questionnaire was developed to investigate the role of emotions in the decision-making process and what influence they have on the learning process. The first part of Chapter 7 presents and analyses the 12 participants’ responses to Questionnaire 2. The Questionnaire comprised 26 paired questions: 13 open-ended questions about a scenario where they had acted-on-judgement and 13 parallel open-ended questions about a (different) scenario where they had failed to act-on-judgement. The responses were analysed using both qualitative and quantitative methods; and these analyses are discussed in the second half of the chapter, focusing on the role of emotions in the moral-learning process.

The aim of the second questionnaire was to discover more about the feeling state associated with the decision-making process of acting-on-moral judgement compared to not acting-on-moral judgement. An emotional bond between two people has been identified as critical to a person’s capacity to be able to take on another’s perspective (Milnitsky, 1991; Selman et al, 1997). Research to date on the influence of emotions on the moral-learning process has focused on areas such as the early attachment bond between mother and child, (Ainsworth, 1974), the theory of empathy, (Hoffman, 1988) social perspective-taking (Selman et al, 1997), and cognitive-affective interaction (Rest, 1983). There seems to be little research work to date, however, on the role of emotion in the judgement-to-action cycle, or what could be termed the moral learning process.

The first half of Questionnaire 2, questions one to six, focused on each respondent’s reflections about the feeling state before and after they had made the decision to act, or not to act-on-judgement. The second half of the questionnaire, questions seven to thirteen, focused on more general questions about their emotional responses related to the learning process. A copy of the second questionnaire is included in Appendix D.

All feeling states and responses identified by the respondents are presented as the data set for each question. If more than one of the same type of feeling statements was given,
the total number of any repeated feelings is included in brackets after the specific feeling; for example, anger (3).

Unlike the first questionnaire, where respondents answered mainly closed questions, this questionnaire was based on open-ended questions. The data set is the written responses of the respondents, which was then analysed by content. When emotions were identified they were grouped in categories (wherever possible); and when descriptions were made, meaningful phrases were aggregated to help identify patterns emerging within the data. Emotions were classified as either natural emotions or spiritual emotions (see p. 49 of the literature review). Natural emotions are also called instinctual responses and include emotions such as fear, anger and sadness. Such emotions are deemed to be ‘negative emotions’ because they are likely to ‘downshift’ brain activity to the emotional centre of the brain where access to thinking processes can be inhibited. Spiritual emotions, or susceptibilities, are sometimes referred to as attitudes or virtues and include emotions such as joy, contentment, peacefulness. These emotions are deemed to be ‘positive’ because they are often experienced when a person is engaged in positive activities and/or thought processes, resulting in brain activity staying in the frontal lobe of the brain, where they can readily access thinking processes.

Respondents who participated in Questionnaire 1 are coded with an M (male) and F (female) and their participant number. Any new respondents are coded with an N (new) before their gender and also assigned a new number; for example, NM12.

7.1 Emotions Reported by Respondents

Feelings before

Question 1 asked respondents to name what their feelings were before they decided to act or not act-on-judgment in the two scenarios of action and non-action. Table 7.1 details respondents feeling states before they acted or did not act-on-judgement.

When respondents acted-on-judgement, there seemed to be two trends that emerged regarding the type of emotions felt before a decision was made and expressed as feelings. The feelings represented both natural emotions and spiritual susceptibilities. For some respondents, the feelings indicated a more joyful or pleasant feeling state, for example, confident, responsible and caring. These feelings could be categorised into two areas under the classification of the Danesh Matix (see Table 6.5). These two areas
include, first, a capacity to love and, second, a capacity for experiencing joy. Love was expressed by compassion and caring for the other person with whom the respondent was interacting.

Table 7.1
How respondents felt before acting or not acting-on-moral judgement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Non Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spiritual Susceptibilities (positive emotions)</td>
<td>Spiritual Susceptibilities (positive emotions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confident, (2) responsible,(3) compassionate, caring, relaxed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Emotions (negative emotions)</td>
<td>Natural Emotions (negative emotions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enraged, afraid, worried, angry, (2) irritated, frustrated, resentful, feeling of dread</td>
<td>Confused, (2) angry, (2) surprised, determined, overwhelmed, conflicted, apathetic, sad, hopeless, burdened, agitated, upset, irritated, frustrated, resentful, stressed, tired, distracted, feeling of dread, guilty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conversely, when respondents failed to act on moral judgement, they reported no spiritual susceptibilities. The only feelings they identified were those which could be described as natural emotions: for example, anger, sadness and guilt. These feeling states, according to the brain research of Hart (1983), may indicate a ‘down-shift’ in the brain to fight or flight and the lack of access to logical thinking. An example would be in expressions of feeling sad, agitated and overwhelmed. Damasio (2003) has identified that, when a person is feeling sad, brain activity is evident only in the emotional centre of the brain and there is no activity in the cerebral cortex.

It is interesting to note that, for some respondents, there was a conflicted emotional state when they acted upon judgement. For some it was a positive experience while for others it was a negative experience. Acting-on-moral judgement is not simply a matter of a positive state of being, because despite being in a ‘downshifted’ state in some situations, some respondents were still able to act-on-judgement. This implied that some respondents were able to overcome their “downshifted” mode and act according to what they believed was right. Therefore, other factors, apart from their emotional state, seemed to be impacting on their behaviour when a person acted-on-judgement. For example, the data set from Questionnaire 1 (under the section on values), identified that for some respondents, belief had an important role and the main reason for acting-on-moral judgement was identified as strength of conviction. By contrast, there were no spiritual susceptibilities expressed when respondents reported that they had failed to act-
on-judgement. Respondents only expressed natural emotions, implying that they were choosing to act from a “downshifted” position in the brain.

**Feelings After**

The second question focused on asking respondents to reflect on how they felt after they had made the decision to act or not act-on-judgement. The data from the responses to this question are detailed in Table 7.2 under the headings of spiritual susceptibilities and natural emotions as they related to acting and not acting-on-moral judgement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Non Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spiritual Susceptibilities (positive emotions)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Spiritual Susceptibilities (positive emotions)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good (2), honest, trustworthy, accomplished, deeper connection, spiritually uplifted, proud, relieved, satisfied, contented, happy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Natural Emotions (negative emotions)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Natural Emotions (negative emotions)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rage, disappointment (2), confusion, upset, irritated, angry with themselves and others involved.</td>
<td>Guilty (5), ashamed (3), sad (2), regretful (2), disappointed, upset, irritated, bad, discontented, disconnected, disgusted, lacking backbone, immoral, irresponsible, stressed, tired</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When respondents reflected upon their feeling state after taking action on moral judgement, the same trend of positive and negative emotions co-existing was evident. In the area of positive emotions, the feelings identified included contentment, happiness, and satisfaction. Feelings associated with virtuous actions such as honesty and trustworthiness imply that respondents made a positive self-judgement of their actions.

The natural emotions arising after taking action included, for example rage, irritation, disappointment, anger and confusion. These emotions seem to suggest a state of righteous indignation. One respondent (1M3), for example, indicated that he was irritated with his granddaughter’s financial irresponsibility and felt irritated and angry about her lack of concern. However, he realised on reflection that the cause of his irritation was irritation with himself. The other person in the scenario did not live up to
his expectations so ‘somebody had to do the right thing’ and therefore he needed to act responsibly, hence his anger and irritation.

By contrast, when respondents failed to act-on-judgement, there appeared to be a state of dissatisfaction or dis-ease expressed by words such as sad, disconnected, upset and irritated. There was also a strong sense of judgment of their actions expressed as feeling guilty, ashamed and regretful. All of the respondents discussed emotions such as guilt, shame or regret, which relate to feelings of affective discomfort. Kochanska et al, (1994, 1997) have described conscience as having two major aspects. The first is affective discomfort, which encompasses the emotional results of transgression; (for example, guilt, apology, empathy for the victim). The second is active moral regulation or vigilance which encompasses the classical internalisation of standards along with confession, reparation, and monitoring of others’ wrongdoing. The fact that all 12 respondents identified similar feelings suggests that inaction-on-judgement has evoked conscience. It needs to be remembered in this context that all of the respondents were religious.

The emotional responses that came after the situation was resolved were of a different nature from the emotions evoked when thinking about whether action should be taken. Once a person had acted or decided not to act, a different set of emotional responses was noted. The emotions identified prior to acting suggested a state of being that evoked confidence about the proposed course of action. This was in contrast to how the respondents felt after they acted, where the emotional state implied a judgement of their actions, yielding a sense of satisfaction with the results. Again, this judgemental trend is evident when a person did not act-on-judgement. Feelings such as guilt, shame and regret implied a greater sense of dissatisfaction with their response. This would imply a state of consciousness that is ever vigilant about both proposed and actual behaviour.

When respondents thought about a proposed action, a state of being seemed to emerge such as feeling confident, relaxed or resentful. Whereas, as soon as a decision had been enacted, a state of judgement about their action was apparent. It could be assumed that it was a state of judgement because words such as ashamed, disgusted, upset and disappointed were mentioned when a respondent did not act-on-judgement. Prior to making their decision not to act, respondents did not mention such sentiments. It
appears that the nature of the emotional state is acting as a signal system or feedback loop in the judgement-to-action cycle.

Reflections

Question 3 asked respondents whether their feeling state influenced any reflection about their actions or non-action. The focus of this question was to understand how respondents viewed the relationship between feelings and reflection. When they acted-on-judgement the majority of respondents indicated they had reflected on their feeling state, while two respondents did not answer this section. Some respondents indicated their feeling state impacted on them over time or after they had consciously reflected. For example, one respondent said “First was mixed, good and kind of sorry, bad, after meditating about it I feel something good was accomplished” (1F1). Statements such as, “It (process of reflection) calmed me down and gave me a sense of ….direction” (NF2). “It gave me a sense of confirmation that I had done the ‘right thing!’”(11M21), “Proud”(7F14), suggested feeling states that seemed to be related to a sense of confirmation, pride, calm, sense of accomplishment and assistance in determining what should be done. Feelings of disquiet were also mentioned, even though the person had acted-on-judgement, “Yes made me look inside myself to find the true cause of my irritation and of course it was irritation with myself” (1M3). This response indicates that the reflective state enabled a person to be self-governing (Damasio, 2003) or self reflective about their own actions.

The sentiments expressed about the reflective process when respondents failed to act-on-judgement could be referred to as self-examining and self-critical. The sentiments included feelings of guilt, sadness, “realised I had messed up” (11M21), “Upset with myself” (NF2), “a replaying of the scenario and obsessing” (NF1), and suggested a stirring of the conscience. Such feelings of discomfort seemed to raise the consciousness level and a wondering of why they had acted in this way, “guilt, do not know if I acted in who’s best interest,” “wondering why I acted like I did” (7F14).

The level of moral development seemed to impact as well, such as the statement of respondent 1M3 that he “felt uncaring by not bailing her out of difficulty,” when he did not act on his moral judgement. In this scenario the grandfather had provided a car for his granddaughter. He had not acted on his judgement as he considered the feelings of his granddaughter as being more important than acting on his better judgement. This
notion of acting-on-moral judgement, based on maintaining good interpersonal relationships over what he judged as being right, is indicative of a person acting out of stage three of Kohlberg’s (1976, 1984) stages of moral development.

In both the action and non-action scenarios, a reflective emotional state was evoked for the majority of respondents. Generally action-on-judgement seemed to lead to a more settled state of being, characterised by words such as ‘sense of confirmation’, ‘proud’, ‘calmed me down’. A lack of action-on-judgement seemed to leave the person with a feeling of being ill at ease. It was characterised by a more agitated state evoking varying degrees of conscience, some vortexing on their lack of action, or feeling sad and guilty. The feeling state was aroused in both action and non-action scenarios. Both positive and negative emotions were evoked when respondents acted-on-judgement but only negative emotional states arose when there was a failure to act.

**Self-knowledge**

Question 4 asked respondents whether they had learned anything about themselves from examining their feelings. For the action scenario respondents were able to express a clear assessment about their moral self-concept. Acting-on-moral judgement appeared to help them feel a sense of accomplishment and seemed to reinforce their identity as a moral person. For example, “I learn that I feel better when I do the right thing. I learn that there is a sense of peace that accompanies doing good, and a peace that you wish to find over and over in your life” (8F15). Statements ranged from reflections of a strong feeling state, for example, “trust my gut instincts” (11M21), to a position where respondents were conscious that feelings had been aroused but that the feelings were positive and constructive, “sense of peace that accompanies doing good” (8F15). “Learn to appreciate what my emotions can teach me” (4F7), “I am an honest and trustworthy person” (7F14). Some feelings were perceived to be negative but not destructive, “uncomfortable but not harmful” (1M3), while other respondents indicated that feelings should not rule the way they respond in a situation, “feelings should not control my actions” (1M3).

When respondents did not act-on-judgement, there seemed to be a very different state of awareness between male and female responses. Four of the five males considered that initially they did not learn anything about themselves, however over time this perception changed. Some men saw no need to change themselves, “No, pretty
consistent with past experiences,” or “No, I am pretty rigid in my beliefs and I don’t deviate from them very much if at all” (NM3). Some saw some change in their attitude over time, while others started to see how they could improve if they reflected on the scenario, “Initially no, on later reflection, I was able to more clearly see ahead where I could improve and run through beneficial scenarios in my head” (NM1). An alternative approach was to allow their heightened emotional state to subside before making a decision, as expressed by participant (11M21), who said he had waited until he had “cooled down” before making a decision.

All the female respondents expressed self criticism about their state of being. This was indicated by statements such as “totally depressing” (1F1), “strong feelings that cloud my ability to think clearly” (4F7), “lack backbone” (7F14), “many unwanted feelings that are difficult to overcome” (8F15), “rehashing was more painful because of anger and regret” (NF1). These feelings seemed to engender a depressive feeling state.

Emotion seemed to play different roles for different people and different genders in both the action and non-action scenarios. For some emotion was a feeling state, “trust my gut instincts” And for others, emotion influenced what they did and how they acted: for example, it was a “sense of peace that accompanies doing good.” Others appeared to think about what their emotions were telling them and how they could learn from them, for example, “I can think clearly before taking action,” or I can “Learn to appreciate what my emotions can teach me.”

Responses to this question for both the action and non-action scenarios suggested that women generally reflected immediately with some form of self-recrimination when they did not live up to their moral ideals. This was also evident in the reasons given in Questionnaire 1 (Appendix 7, Table F 8) by women as to why they did not act-on-judgment. In Questionnaire 1, women indicated they were not self-disciplined or did not have the strength of their convictions. Similarly, the responses to Questionnaire 2 also suggested that women seemed to internalise immediately and self recriminate, for example, “many unwanted feelings that are difficult to overcome.” In contrast, the reaction of most men in the questionnaire, suggested that feelings do not impact at first, but will impact later on with the passage of time, when it seemed to become an internal process.
It is evident that emotions play a part in moral learning because the emotional response ultimately focused the respondents on reflection about their actions. However, there are variations regarding how this process works for different individuals. Ackerman, Abe and Izard (1998) acknowledge that “emotion thresholds differ among individuals as does the intensity of a feeling state when an emotion is activated” (p. 51). It would require further research into the different variables to understand more about how the connections are made between emotions and the learning process, and to what degree levels of consciousness and different types of information processing might impact on moral learning.

**Future Actions**

Question 5 asked respondents whether any of their feelings impacted on a possible resolution for acting differently when faced with a similar situation in the future. When respondents acted-on-judgement, all the sentiments expressed, except one, focused on confirming or affirming their actions. “I will do the same in this situation because my moral values are the same”(1F1), “I would have done the same thing”(7F14), “continue to do what feels right”(8F15), “I will act the same way regardless of my feelings” (1M3), “compelled to be as assertive”(NF1), “made me more firm on acting on a situation” (NF2), and “caused me less hesitation” (11M21).

The influence of social norms in helping a person to act-on-judgement was apparent in one of the responses. Respondent 4F7 stated “To take these feelings and turn them into a productive and moral place - I think I am not yet wholly convinced of their immoral designation. Therefore the ‘turning’ has not occurred. The change to empathetic and not personal feelings gave me the ability to act with some sense of trust and confidence.” The respondent stated she had acted on what she believed was the socially-accepted convention, which she did not elaborate on, so it is not clear what she was referring to. She also stated she was not convinced of the immoral designation of the action or social norm given, to what was considered the ‘socially right action’. Owing to social convention and an empathetic understanding of the other person involved, she was still working on turning her “conflicted thoughts into a moral and productive place.” She was able to do this by looking through the eyes of the other person involved in the moral dilemma, and this can be termed an empathetic response.
In the non-action scenario, three of the respondents did not answer Question 5. However, all other respondents suggested their feelings impacted on a possible resolution for acting differently when faced with a similar situation in the future. There was a sense that after initial paralysis sets in, as mentioned by respondent NM1, “Initially my feelings reduced my ability to consider doing things better at another time, after reflection I felt more confident about future scenarios.” Over time it appears that one person started to think about what happened and what could be done differently. It seems therefore, that reflection helps to restore hope that the person could feel more confident about handling future scenarios: for example, another comment was “I was compelled to be less afraid to speak up” (NF1) and “Caused me to analyse my thoughts and feelings and not think the worst of a situation or its possible outcomes” (11M21).

Comments related to how the process seemed to work in moving participants from non-action, to at least reflecting about their non-action: “Try to do what is best for her over the long run” (1M3), and “I wouldn’t behave the same way” (NF2). Some statements indicated a change in perception such as from taking it personally to having empathy for the other parties, as indicated by respondent 4F7: “The change to empathetic and not personal feelings gave me the ability to act with some sense of trust and confidence.”

Sentiments were also expressed suggesting a reframing of the situation, which helped the respondents to see the situation in a different light: “Analyse thoughts and feelings and not think the worst of a situation or possible outcomes” (11M21).

Another theme emerged from respondents who appeared to be making an effort to do better next time. This goal of reparation or personal growth was suggested by statements such as: “trying to acquire a backbone” (7F14), “stop myself falling into an apathetic state” (8F15), “compelled to be less afraid to speak up” (NF1), “try to do what is best for her over the long run” (1M3), and “I wouldn’t behave the same way” (NF2).

Emotional discomfort appears to cause a person to begin reflecting on the situation, to examine whether they might see the situation differently, rather than focusing on self-criticism. There is evidence that the reflective process moves some people into contemplating their non-action in the scenario which leads them to resolving to try harder next time. This was indicated by comments concerning the need to develop more courage, not fall into a despondent state, and resolving to act differently in the future. There seems to be a response continuum from the point of reframing and accepting personal responsibility to deciding not to act in the same way. There was evidence that a
reflection was the beginning of a process which led towards the possibility of behavioural change in the future.

**Questionnaire 1 Reflections**

Question 6 asked those respondents who had responded to Questionnaire 1, if they had reflected about feelings that were evoked after responding and if so, how had they reflected and what was the result? Seven of the twelve respondents were part of the original sample. Of these seven, two chose a different scenario and one could not remember their previous scenario, therefore the results are based only on the responses of four respondents. One of the respondents reported that she experienced intense emotions immediately after acting-on-moral judgement but that these feelings diminished over time: “back then I was a little emotional but after one year I moved on” (1F1). Reflections of respondent 7F14, affirmed her decision to act-on-judgement when she wrote: “presented with a similar situation 7F14 acted the same.” One respondent recalled her desire for continuous improvement: “I reflect on what could be done better always” (3F5); and the remaining respondent indicated the building of greater confidence after acting-on-moral judgement: “I think about the liberation of being honest with myself. I feel less hesitant about making big decisions” (11M21). Acting-on-moral judgement demonstrated feeling states of affirmation, the desire for continuous improvements and the building of confidence due to successful action. All of these sentiments supported the respondents to continue to make the decision to act-on-judgement.

Only three of the seven respondents made comments concerning their reflections about their emotional state after answering the non-action scenario in Questionnaire 1: “My action had a bad reaction on my feelings because of the consequences re separation of family members” (1F1) and “A lingering guilt since I keep it as an example” (4F7). These comments suggest that the feelings became deeply embedded in the psyche as there had been no resolution. Another example of the enduring repercussions is suggested in the statement: “Yes I daily think of how easy it is to let an opportunity slip through my fingers and how important it is to value and nurture good rapport through tact” (11M21). Regardless of whether it was acting or not acting-on-judgment, a reflective process appeared evident. It would seem to vary according to the nature of the situation. For respondent 11M21, the memory had impacted on her to such a degree that she reflected daily about the need to “value and nurture rapport through tact.” However,
she did not say that it had helped her to act differently in the future. The lingering guilt seemed to be counter-productive because it had not led her towards a resolution to act differently. This finding suggests that feelings of guilt unless resolved in some way, keep a person in what could be termed ‘suspended animation’. This state may or may not lead to a change in moral development but rather it indicates a vague hope that it will be different next time. These responses suggested that the decision to act-on-judgement would take more than uncomfortable feelings to change a reflection to an action.

**Impact of feelings on the decision-making process**

The second section of the questionnaire investigated the impact of feelings in the moral decision-making process. Question 7 asked respondents to consider how seriously they took notice of their feeling state in helping them decide how they should act. Eight of the twelve respondents took serious note of their feeling state when making a moral judgement. Feelings seemed to play a number of roles in the decision-making process. Responses ranged from being ruled by them as noted with NF1: “I don’t think I notice them as much as I am simply ruled by them”. Some respondents commented on the interplay between the thinking and feeling state: “try to balance feelings with thoughts” (8F5), “strongly, I do what I think is correct, period” (NM3). Another viewed feelings as one of three components (4F7) however she did not elaborate on the other two components. It was suggested that feelings needed to be modified by a reflective process: “temper with some reflection and introspection” (11M21). Another respondent considered that the possible repercussions of doing what he believed to be right was a more significant influence than feelings, “I will do what I believe is right regardless of how my feelings play out” (1M3). In one situation conscience played a greater role than feelings: “My conscience knows that but my reaction is faster than my own feelings” (1F1).

The last two responses indicate that uncomfortable feelings might influence a future change in behaviour, “Feelings that are uncomfortable usually make us change one’s situation” (7F14). Despite a reflective process another respondent identified that it was still difficult to act on their new resolution: “think about it seriously but hard to put in action at times” (NF2).
The answers suggest that emotions can play a number of different roles along a continuum. The effect of emotions ranged from having minimal impact to ruling a person’s actions. In one instance, a person’s instinctive reactions were faster than an awareness of their feeling state as indicated by this comment: “My conscience knew that [what was right] but my reaction is faster than my own feelings.” This comment supports the comments made in response to Question 4 which suggest that the emotions have varying degrees of impact upon people. The comments also suggest that people use their emotional state in different ways. For some, emotions have a deep influence on their actions, while others tend to act first and identify or respond to their emotions later. These responses give weight to the ideas offered by Seagal and Horne (1997) who suggest that people process information in three different ways: through the feeling state, or through thinking, or through acting. Furthermore, in this study it appears that the feeling state is variable in its impact at the point of making a decision about a moral dilemma.

**Feelings influencing action**

Question 8 aimed to gain deeper insights into the role of emotion in the judgement-to-action cycle in relation to how feelings influenced the desire to act-on-moral judgement. The analysis of the responses to Question 8 indicated a number of different ways that emotions influenced the person to act-on-moral judgement. Some people were very aware of the process, while others dismissed any impact of feelings at all. Responses to Question 7 revealed that the majority indicated a central role of feelings in the decision-making process. The order of importance when acting-on-moral judgement, however, is different. The responses to Question 8 were grouped according to the classifications of acting on feelings, thinking about feelings and dismissing feelings.

Two respondents indicated that they acted on feelings. Comments included: “often react to these feelings, then later reflect on the reaction and decide if the action was appropriate or not. After reflection, I might act differently next time” (8F15).

Three respondents indicated that they thought about feelings. Statements included, “I analyse my feelings, think about my “baggage” surrounding the situation, try to understand what my feelings are telling me about what I should do” (11M21); “see where the feeling is coming from (e.g. knee jerk reaction, response to a situation or a build up from others”) (7F14); and “When I have negative feelings I am not as
proactive in acting on moral decisions” (NM1). The last statement supports the notion of ‘downshifting’ (Hart, 1983, 1999), where an emotional reaction results in shifting brain activity away from the thinking part of the brain to the emotional centre of the brain. The respondent noted he/she became less pro-active as a result.

Two respondents indicated an interaction between thinking and feeling, suggesting inter-dependence rather than a step–by-step process. This is indicated by the following statements: “downplay feelings giving lead to logical rational, then how I feel about things, weigh everything and then act” (4F7); and “Try to determine if I’m acting on feelings or acting on facts or a planned deliberate outcome” (1M3). These last comments expressed by respondents are in line with the ideas articulated by Kitwood (1990) who said that there is no radical division between the domains of intellect, feeling and willing because he had found it takes a long period of education to develop a capacity to separate emotionality from thinking.

Four respondents considered that feelings needed to be discounted or should not be an influencing factor because it was more important to consider if it was ‘right or wrong’ as the deciding factor:

“My feelings don’t influence me, actions are either right/wrong per situation” (NM3);
“I tend to discount how I feel about something, I am more interested in deciding if it is right or not” (NM2);
“My moral judgement is separate from my feelings. I must control my feelings” (3F5); and
“When it comes to moral, seems to be an obligation of my own being- I need to do something” (1F1). Another respondent did not mention a feeling reaction but referred to the need to “Think and pray about the situation a lot” (NF2).

The focus of Question 8 was to identify how and in what way emotion might lead to the point of action. Two respondents indicated their emotional reaction led to action, however, five respondents engaged both emotion and thinking to determine what should be their action. This suggests that the feeling state gained their attention, however they needed to think about what to do before acting. Four respondents indicated that it is more about what is the ‘right’ action that motivated them to act. This might provide some insight into the notion of strength of conviction as this was the main reason given by respondents in Questionnaire 1 for acting-on-moral judgement. It needs to be remembered that the majority of the sample had an interest in moral development and so
was probably more articulate about the feeling state than would be true of the general population. These responses support the notion that there is interplay between feelings and thinking and perhaps it is not only a matter of how a person processes feelings, but also the degree to which feelings are separated from thinking. One explanation for this phenomenon is articulated by Kitwood (1990) who suggests that it takes a long period of education to be able to dispassionately separate feelings from thinking.

Role of Time

Question 9 aimed to discover what role time played in relationship to the impact of the feeling state on the decision-making process. This question asked respondents to focus on discovering whether feeling states impacted on them immediately or at a later date and what factors might influence this process. The majority of respondents reported that they were immediately affected by feelings, supported by statements such as: “Reaction comes before reflection for the most part” (8F15), and “feeling of responsibility” (1F1).

Four respondents indicated that they reflected initially, before moving into a feeling state. Statements such as: “I freeze and go into a rational mode…I later reflect and mull on the entire scenario comparing and contrasting with all sorts of other experiences” (4F7) “I try to avoid making a decision for action until I can deliberate on that situation” (1M3), “When I do reflect I am usually able to prepare myself better for future scenarios” (NM1), and “I also reflect upon them later and this is influenced by my obsessing” (NF1). One respondent said it “depended on the situation” (11M21) whether their feelings impacted them immediately or not.

For some of the respondents, it was clear that feelings do not impact immediately. One respondent commented on the value of reflecting on emotion in preparation for dealing with future moral encounters, “When I do reflect I am usually able to prepare myself better for future scenarios” (NM1).

The process of how their feelings impacted on respondents over time seemed to vary. Some respondents arrived at their feeling state through guilt and obsession, while others used a more thoughtful and rational process. This latter approach is expressed by the description, “I am given more to reflection. I am not one to react quickly just based on how I feel, I tend to “do the math” i.e. if I do X then Y will probably happen. If I think I will like Y, then I go ahead and do X, otherwise I restrain myself” (NM2). This
response is an example of a person considering the consequences before taking the step to action.

Responses indicated that time does impact on the emotional state; for example, one respondent was influenced by her obsessing about her actions, while for another it depended on the situation. For another respondent, she froze and went into a rational mode and came back to her feelings at a later date. It seemed that time impacted in varying ways, depending on how people processed emotion. If a person put emotion aside initially, it appears they came back to their feeling state at a later stage.

**Impact of uncomfortable feelings**

The aim of question 10 was to explore affective discomfort and to see how one might deal with this emotional state. Question 10 asked respondents whether uncomfortable feelings were aroused when they failed to act-on-judgement, and if so, how did they deal with these feelings? In addition, respondents were asked in what way uncomfortable emotions might influence future decisions to act-on-judgement.

The responses to the questions appeared to align with three of the four stages of learning identified by Gordon Training (2004), namely, (1) unconscious ignorance, (2) conscious ignorance, (3) conscious knowledge and (4) unconscious knowledge. The last stage of unconscious knowledge may not have been apparent because the questionnaire did not ask any questions that related specifically to this stage. Another explanation could be that once knowledge becomes unconscious it becomes automatic and below conscious thought. This is similar to the notion of Narvaez, et al (1999) that a person passes through the stages from novice to expert. The responses are recorded according to stages of Gordon Training in Table 7.3.

The responses ranged from denial, which could be termed an ‘under reaction’ or unconscious ignorance, to obsessing about discomfort, which could be termed an ‘over reaction,’ or what could be classified as conscious ignorance. The next stage, where people were able to calmly reflect about their actions, typifies conscious knowledge, while taking positive steps to deal with the uncomfortable feelings suggests the same stage of conscious knowledge. There was no evidence of stage 4, referred to as unconscious knowledge, which means a person no longer has to think about what to do,
but does it automatically without conscious thought. As elaborated upon previously, the questionnaire did not probe for evidence of this stage.

Table 7.3

*Responses categorised according to Gordon Training’s three stages of learning*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 1 Unconscious ignorance</th>
<th>How feelings are dealt with</th>
<th>How feelings influence future decisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NM2</td>
<td>“Tend to ignore them”</td>
<td>“Doing the right thing does not always result in a pleasant experience”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 2 conscious ignorance</th>
<th>How feelings are dealt with</th>
<th>How feelings influence future decisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NM3</td>
<td>“I Don’t worry about it if I feel I was correct in my decision”</td>
<td>“Failing to act is still an action of not doing”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1M</td>
<td>“Generally rationalise”</td>
<td>“Try to make up some other day, I don’t usually allow one decision’s outcome to influence a future decision unless directly related”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7F</td>
<td>“Go over it and over it”</td>
<td>“affect how I react”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NF1</td>
<td>“Talk to friends and family to try to sort it out”</td>
<td>“I try to react or react differently next time”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NM1</td>
<td>“Getting even more stressed and depressed”</td>
<td>“If I do not take time to reflect on these situations later, then future decisions are likely to surface as well”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NF2</td>
<td>“Give myself a hard time, reflect and say prayers”</td>
<td>“try not to do them in the future but not always successful”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11M</td>
<td>“I berate myself then try to sort out what I am feeling and why I failed to act on judgement”</td>
<td>“vow to do better in the future and after enough opportunities I improve slightly, I am better able to catch myself in similar situations”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 3 conscious knowledge</th>
<th>How feelings are dealt with</th>
<th>How feelings influence future decisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3F</td>
<td>[No comments given]</td>
<td>Be certain I did the right thing to avoid the discomfort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1F</td>
<td>“Feel like I let a situation of improvement pass me by”</td>
<td>“It will not happen again”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8F</td>
<td>“Pray to let go of negative feelings, write a journal or talk to somebody else”</td>
<td>“Try to learn from the negative feelings to do better next time, but often fail”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4F</td>
<td>“Need to be worked through at each step of growth”</td>
<td>“Previous experiences are revisited and integrated to what occurs in the present and current dilemmas”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The comment of NM2 that she/he “tend to ignore them [my feelings]” represent a classic answer at Stage 1 by indicating that this respondent did not wish to acknowledge or deal with the feeling state. Responses at the second stage of learning demonstrated an
almost obsessive response once a person became conscious of their failings, for example, “Go over it and over it” 7F, “Getting even more stressed and depressed” NM1, leading to a more conscious reflection to analyse their actions: “I berate myself then try to sort out what I am feeling and why I failed to act-on-judgement” (11M). At Stage 3 of learning, respondents demonstrate a more conscious process of reflection upon action, for example, “Feel like I let a situation of improvement pass me by” (1F) and “Need to be worked through at each step of growth” (4F). This stage suggests a movement towards action as indicated by 4F’s comment on the impact on how feelings influenced future feelings: “Previous experiences are revisited and integrated to what occurs in the present and current dilemmas.”

The majority of respondents reported sentiments in the stage of conscious ignorance. People in this stage typically demonstrate a sense of awareness of their own shortcomings. This finding is congruent with the emotional responses that linked with guilt and shame, as articulated by respondents in Question 2 when they did not act-on-judgement. Reflections about how uncomfortable feelings influenced future actions, showed a gradation from acceptance, to a struggle to learn from past actions and a wish to improve. The responses suggested that there is a reflective process in place that supported the notion of learning from action as postulated by Piaget (1932, 1962).

It is evident that learning to act-on-moral judgement is a slow process and may take repeated failure and success before one becomes an expert, or what can be termed ‘morally competent’. This notion was indicated by respondents who vowed ‘to do better next time’ and ‘not to do the same thing again in the future’. This did not seem to be a seamless process, however, and respondents indicated that it was a struggle to move from non-action to action as a result of the active stirring of their conscience. Respondents suggested that their uncomfortable feelings affected how they reacted. There was also an indication of the second stage of remorse as identified by Kochanska et al. (1997) expressed in the desire to make up some day for past actions.

The comments of 4F, who indicated that current reactions are integrated into future learning, indicated that this respondent recognised the feedback opportunity afforded by working through feelings and the subsequent need to integrate these reflections back into the current situation. The responses to Question 10 suggested that emotions served as a feedback loop in helping people to reflect on and learn from inappropriate actions.
The passage of time seemed to help a person move from lesser to greater knowledge, provided that a reflective process about their emotional state was consciously undertaken. It would appear that ‘denial’ of recognising the emotional reaction impedes the potential learning process as it circumvents a conscious process of reflection. To recognise a feeling state, therefore, seemed to involve acknowledgment of the emotion or what can be termed as a cognitive process. Danesh (1992) identified this as a process of “self discovery” and classified it as the second stage in the development of the capacity to know.

Resolution

Question 11 asked respondents to reflect on whether they felt uncomfortable when they failed to act-on-judgement, and how they came to feel at peace with themselves again. All responses have been included in Table 7.4 in a gradation of responses, from simply thinking about how they came to peace within themselves, to allowing time to pass where the pain became dimmed, to asking for assistance through prayer and meditation. One person did not respond to this question.

The passage of time seemed to be a significant factor suggesting that perspective and learning comes with time and experience. Three respondents (8F, 11M, NM2) recognised that it may simply have been a test that they failed, and they saw their actions and reactions as a process of moral learning.

The last two responses in Table 7.4 (NF2 and NM2) alluded to the concept of reparation. Reparation involves the person making amends or correcting their actions in future so they can feel at peace and happy once again with themselves. These responses indicate the presence of the second phase of the development of conscience identified by Kochanska, et al. (1994; 1997).

It is interesting to note that no mention was made of this process of amendment of non-action prior to this question. Question 5 reflected on how the person’s emotional state may influence future actions. Becoming stuck in uncomfortable feelings as indicated in Question 5, however, did not seem to result in any change of action. Perhaps, as suggested by respondents NF2 and NM2, it will take an act of reparation to overcome feelings of discomfort and guilt.
Table 7.4

How respondents came to peace with themselves

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1F</td>
<td>“Hard to forgive but I don’t forget easily”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NF1</td>
<td>“Talking with others and passing of time”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3F</td>
<td>“Think things through and be prepared to do better the next time”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4F</td>
<td>“I think I usually take action if only to think on the dilemma”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7F</td>
<td>“Being Honest. Acknowledge my feelings. Pray that next time I will do better”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1M</td>
<td>“Most feelings pass over time as a general rule….peace comes with time”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11M</td>
<td>“Time heals, if similar situations come up and I do better, then I see my first failure as a lesson”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NM1</td>
<td>“Sometime prayer and mediation helps, other times, time and rest, occasionally meditation is needed”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8F</td>
<td>“Don’t give up and recognise life is full of tests, God will keep sending it to you until you ultimately learn from it”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NF2</td>
<td>“When I take care of the situation and I act on judgement I feel at peace and happy with myself”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NM2</td>
<td>“Overlook my own sins…. See if there is any way to correct the situation. Apologise”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Consistent action

Question 12 asked respondents to give any additional comments regarding what motivated them to learn to act more consistently on moral judgement. The responses to Question 12 indicated a range of strategies employed in the journey of self improvement. Table 7.5 tabulates the responses to question 12 in gradation from statements about reliance on personal actions to reliance on a higher power.

The first three responses in Table 7.5 reflected what people needed to do personally, referring to their need for honesty, to act as a role model and to the impact of the values of the society. These responses suggested a greater emphasis on an internal locus of control that motivated them to act-on-moral judgement.

While a small number of respondents found strength from within, the majority of responses suggested a belief in or reliance on a higher power or force outside the person’s locus of control. Support from a higher power was seen as a major motivator. The respondents’ life was seen as a spiritual pathway to achieve growth and learning. The capacity to learn from others or what could be termed ‘the power of example’ and the ‘power of prayer and mediation’ were seen as a source of motivation. In the responses to the fourth section of Questionnaire 1 (see Appendix F, Table F7, p.322),
the majority of respondents cited “strength of conviction” as the major reason for acting on moral judgement.

Table 7.5

*Motivation or strategies to act more consistently*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Motivation or strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7F</td>
<td>“Being honest, acknowledging my feelings, pray that next time I will do better”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3F5</td>
<td>“My conscience and importance of being a role model for my family”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4F</td>
<td>“Strength of emotion and society impact”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NF2</td>
<td>“Seeing results from acting on moral judgement”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NM1</td>
<td>“Growth and constant improvement are my highest values, pray and meditate”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1F</td>
<td>“My spiritual Life, If I didn't have a spiritual guide I will be in trouble”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8F</td>
<td>“Deep sense of faith and commitment… Life is a journey full of opportunities for growth”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11M</td>
<td>“Best maintained by reading and leaning of moral heroes in my faith, prayer, reading the Scriptures, reflection and detachment”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NM2</td>
<td>“Love for the revelation of Baha’u’llah that motivates me to do anything good”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NM3</td>
<td>“Gut feeling or the Bible”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1M</td>
<td>“Consistency on moral judgement is best maintained by how you want to be judged morally (ie do unto others) Never make decisions based on what other people think”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some responses to Question 12 elaborate on how strength of conviction may be understood. All respondents in this sample were religious in their belief system. Others who were not as religious were invited but were unable to participate, so the sample population responding to this question is skewed toward those with a religious belief. It will nevertheless be useful to reflect upon these responses with the proviso that any insights may not be generally applicable to the wider population.

*Insights on moral action*

Question 13 asked respondents to provide any additional insights for the researcher as to what had helped them to act-on-moral judgement. The responses are listed in Table 7.6 as given by the respondents, and they are presented in no particular order.
Table 7.6

Influences affecting action-on-moral judgement

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NF2</td>
<td>“Feelings on both sides could be very close to each other in spite of how we act”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3F</td>
<td>“Unwavering correctness can be a burden, I am no fun”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4F</td>
<td>“My wish to progress as an individual…Strongest element in building an ever advancing civilisation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7F</td>
<td>“Being a parent and wanting to set an example of what it is to follow my faith”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NM2</td>
<td>Overlook one another’s faults,”… “Let integrity and uprightness distinguish all of thine acts”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1M</td>
<td>“Avoid making decisions based on other peoples’ approval and act according to your principles”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11M</td>
<td>“We have to make a positive mark every chance we get and if we do not we need to forgive ourselves and forgive others”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8F</td>
<td>“Prayer and deepening on God’s revelation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1F</td>
<td>“Importance of spiritual education and achieve a better judgement”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The responses in Table 7.6 indicated a wide range of additional insights. Respondent NF2 highlighted what was apparent in responses to Questions 1 and 2 of this chapter, where respondents indicated feelings of disappointment and irritation and also feeling upset both when he/she acted and did not act-on-judgement: “Feelings on both sides could be very close to each other in spite of how we act.” This sentiment suggests that even though a person acted-on-judgement they still expressed feelings of anger and sadness. These sentiments were not merely associated with not acting-on-moral judgement. Evidence suggested that it is also a process of being non-judgemental about another’s actions: “Overlook one another’s faults,”… “Let integrity and uprightness distinguish all of thine acts” (NM2); and undertaking a path of self-growth: “We have to make a positive mark every chance we get and if we do not we need to forgive ourselves and forgive others” (11M). The value of being a role model was highlighted in the comment “Being a parent and wanting to set an example of what it is to follow my faith” (7F).

The value of acting based on principles is indicated by 1M “Avoid making decisions based on other peoples’ approval and act according to your principles,” which aligns with Kohlberg’s 6th stage of moral development where a person will make a moral choice based on a specific principle such as justice. In this instance the respondent is referring to an internalised process that is not dependent upon external influences but rather based on their internal moral compass. The last two comments indicate the value of reliance upon a higher power or higher value set to guide and assist one’s actions:
“Prayer and deepening on God’s revelation” (8F) and the “Importance of spiritual education and achieve a better judgement” (1F).

These additional insights suggest that morality appears to be at the very foundation of our relationships with our self, our family, the society and, for the current sample of respondents, with God. Suggestions were given as to how to achieve this, through prayer and deepening on God’s revelation and the importance of spiritual education, learning to pray and knowing more about the word of God and the development of virtues. These comments need to be considered in the light of the religious nature of the sample and may not apply to a broader sample of people.

7.2 Discussion of Results - Questionnaire 2

The goal of the second questionnaire was to discover more about the feeling state associated with the decision-making process of acting or not acting-on-moral judgement and the role of emotion in this judgement-to-action cycle, or what could be termed the moral-learning process. The literature research evidence suggested that emotions are not simply a subset of cognitive processes and seem to be able to operate as a separate system (Davis, 1992, Le Doux, 1992, cited in Ackerman, et al. 1998). Damasio (2003) suggests that emotion and cognition are interrelated in the process of the recognition of emotion as a feeling state. Perhaps this is an explanation of why Kitwood (1990) postulates that it takes a long process of education to separate out emotion, cognition and will. It is also evident from the responses to the questionnaire that people process emotion quite differently. Some people have immediate access to their feeling state, and others need to process their emotions by thinking about what their feeling state is indicating to them. The work of researchers such as Rest (1983), and Berkowitz and Grych (1998) have drawn together a number of research findings to support the claim that moral functioning is predicated on a complexity of interrelated processes.

7.2.1 Emotions as a Feedback Loop for Moral Learning

It is clear from the responses to the second questionnaire that emotions were evoked as part of the moral judgement to moral action process. Furthermore, when judgement resulted in action, a person also experienced emotions, which in turn lead to further judgement and action. Table 7.7 categorises the action emotions and the non-action emotions cited by respondents into areas that could be part of a competency or lack of a competency. The term ‘competence’ initially emerged from Bloom’s Taxonomy (1956).
This classification system was used in traditional curriculum design to identify the aspects of knowledge (cognition), attitudes (affect) and skills (psychomotor) that the teacher needed to cover over the course of instruction. These three domains were used in categorizing responses in Table 7.7, given that Bloom’s Taxonomy has detailed developmental stages particularly in the domain of cognition. An additional category is added owing to the respondents mentioning of virtues associated with acting-on-moral judgement.

It is worthy of note that ‘responsibility’ can be classified as both a virtue and a skill. To act in a responsible way implies the necessary skills to complete an agreed task. As a virtue (being responsible) implies the way a person might carry out a particular function. Multiple responses are indicated by a number in brackets after the specific quality.

All of these emotions and attitudes could be classified as describing a state of being, which perhaps is a necessary feedback loop or signal system that prepares or, influences the person to be propelled towards action or to inhibit action. What is interesting to note is that while some emotional states were the same between the action and non-action scenarios, only the action scenario elicited any positive emotional states, for example, ‘relaxed’. Therefore, despite feeling natural or negative emotions, a person can still act-on-judgement. This suggested that it is not only the emotional state that will influence the subsequent course of action. It could be assumed, however, that if positive emotions are not present, a person will not act-on-judgement. This finding was also evident in some of the responses to the first questionnaire wherein strength of conviction was presented as being an influence which helped to overcome negative emotions. The first questionnaire did not, however, provide specific insights into emotional states. It is notable that two respondents felt responsible in the action scenario while there was no evidence of these skills in the non-action scenario for these two respondents. These responses imply that when acting-on-moral judgement in some situations a person needs to feel confident, relaxed, compassionate and responsible, suggesting that some degree of knowledge, experience, empathy and skill is necessary to be prepared to act-on-judgement; that is, a person needs to have acquired competencies in all four areas of knowledge, attitude, virtue and skill in order to be prepared to act-on-judgement.
Table 7.7

Feeling expressed by respondents before making a judgement to act or not to act.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Non-Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self Knowledge</td>
<td>Confident (2),</td>
<td>Aware of attitudinal state as listed below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude</td>
<td>Relaxed, enraged, afraid, worried, angry (2), frustrated, resentful, feeling of dread</td>
<td>Angry (2), conflicted, distracted, confused (2), stressed, tired, feeling of dread, guilty, surprised, resentful, overwhelmed, apathetic, hopeless, burdened, sad, upset, agitated, irritated, frustrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virtue</td>
<td>Compassionate, caring, responsible</td>
<td>Determined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skill</td>
<td>Responsibility (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conversely, the non-action natural emotional state implied a lack of knowledge and skills and a lack of clarity and confidence about what to do, as well as a lack of energy to carry out the desired action, coupled with a deep sense of hopelessness as expressed by emotions such as dread, feeling overwhelmed, hopeless and agitation. “Determined” was the only word that could be classified as a virtue although it might depend on how the respondent used this word because it might also relate to the person’s motive for not acting-on-judgment, which would not then be virtuous behaviour. This picture generally supported the notion that “the cause of all wrong doing is ignorance” (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, 1978). Perhaps we do not know what we do not know until after we have taken an initial action. It is at this point that emotions can provide feedback that will attract our attention. What we do about these feelings would seem to help move a person towards the next step. A review will now be taken of how respondents felt after having actually acted or not acted-on-their judgement.

Table 7.8 presents the data set of responses to having acted or not acted-on-judgement. The responses indicate that the types of emotional expressions moved from what could be classified as states of being. When a person acted-on-judgement, they seemed to indicate stronger self-reflection and when they did not act-on-judgement they seemed to express self-criticism. This implies a different state of self-awareness or consciousness of one’s actions is occurring after the scenario (whether action or non-action).
Table 7.8
*Feelings expressed by respondents after action and non-action scenarios*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Non-Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self Knowledge</td>
<td>Deeper connection, spiritually uplifted</td>
<td>Aware of emotional and attitudinal state as listed below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude</td>
<td>Happy, contentment, satisfaction, pride, relief, confused, upset, disappointed (2), irritated, angry, rage</td>
<td>Guilty (5), shame (3), regret (2), bad, disgust, disconnectedness, sadness, sad, upset, disappointed, discontent, stressed, tired, lacking backbone, irritated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virtue</td>
<td>honest, trustworthy</td>
<td>Immorality, irresponsible (lack of virtues)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skill</td>
<td>Good (2), accomplished</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The same pattern emerged in Table 7.8, as in Table 7.7; that is, there is an absence of positive emotions when there is a failure to act-on-judgement. The affective discomfort, however, might not automatically lead to feelings of guilt and shame. Careful note should be made of the types of natural emotions experienced between action and non-action scenarios. While a person might have felt confused, disappointed, irritated or angry in the action scenario, there is no mention of feelings of guilt, shame, sadness and regret. The term used by Kochanska, et al (1994, 1997) of affective discomfort may be too gross a way to explain the phenomenon of arousing conscience. There may be very specific emotions that are necessary to arouse conscience. According to the work of Pert (2003), each emotion has a specific polypeptide chain that stimulates cell receptivity. Therefore, specific emotional states or chemical responses may be critical in the moral judgement to action cycle. Damasio (1999) identified that there is a reading of the bodyscape (chemical responses) by processes occurring in the brain that are part of the emotive-cognitive, feeling cycle. This hypothesis would require more specific research work to identify the specificity of each emotional response in the judgement-to-action cycle.

How soon feelings of guilt and shame are engaged seems to be a more complex process, and variables related to reflection, the developmental stage and time become evident. In Question 3, the reflective process after action or non-action suggested a further change in the emotional state. Respondents identified a shift, to one of self-examination and self-criticism, implying a part of self that is able to be a conscious observer of action. Acting-on-moral judgement seemed to lead to a more settled emotional state of being, while non-action-on -judgement resulted in a more agitated emotional state, depending on the degree of consciousness or reflection about the emotional state as discussed in...
responses to Question 4. This state of agitation takes on different forms resulting in stances such as denial, obsession or studied reflection and subsequent change regarding future actions. Responses were evident about the role of emotion spurring some respondents to desire to overcome their non-action but not always succeeding in subsequent, similar moral dilemmas. This suggests that the stirring of conscience is not sufficient to cause a change in future actions or ultimately to impel a person to act-on-judgement. It might therefore be assumed that other factors are involved apart from the arousal of conscience.

It is evident in responses to Question 4 that feelings were experienced at different levels of intensity and seemed to initiate in some respondents a desire to change their response of not acting-on-moral judgement. This supports the findings of Ackerman, Abe and Izard (1998) who identified that “emotion thresholds differ among individuals as does the intensity of a feeling state when an emotion is activated” (p. 89). It appears that emotions provide different types of feedback, depending on what phase the person was in, in the judgment-action-reflection cycle. The degree to which a person can notice or specify what is happening in this emotional feedback loop would appear to involve factors such as level of development, level of awareness, level of skill and degree of competency or learning. This was also evident in the situational factors of experience and difficulty and aspects of feeling safe and secure, identified by respondents in the situational section of Questionnaire 1.

Both prior to making a decision not to act-on-judgement and then after not acting-on-moral judgement there was no reference to having any virtuous feelings apart from ‘determination’. By contrast, a number of virtues, such as compassion and caring were cited in the action responses. It could therefore be implied that the development of a virtue may be an integral part of being able to consistently act morally in a situation or to demonstrate a stable trait of character such as trustworthiness. In other words it may not be sufficient to know what one should do in a given situation, or have the right attitudes or values or have some elements of skill, if a person is also unable to practice or demonstrate the required virtue in a situation.

The virtues of compassion and caring were mentioned when respondents noted feelings that were evoked prior to the action-judgment phase. This supports Hoffman’s (1976, 1983, 1988) theory that empathy is foundational to moral action. The virtues identified
after acting-on-moral judgement are also significant, in that feelings of having been honest and trustworthy could perhaps be extrapolated as foundational virtues to acting-on-moral judgement in the future. The Bahá’í Writings state that trustworthiness is the king of virtues. Perhaps demonstrating virtuous behaviour is inextricably inter-woven in our capacity to act morally and is therefore, a necessary reinforcement for ongoing altruistic behaviour.

These findings suggested that judgement about moral decisions is a cognitive process that does not exist in isolation of emotional feedback. There was a strong interplay between cognition and affect, evident in the responses provided. This would imply that emotions are a powerful signal system providing feedback in the moment and for future behaviour. Whether we are immediately conscious of this message is a different question. An emotional awareness seemed to register, as Damasio (2003) postulates that can be classified as a more joyful or sorrowful emotional state. This notion was supported by respondents reporting that they felt happy and contented when they acted-on-judgement, and sad, regretful, disappointed and discontent when they did not act-on-judgement. These emotions were identified in Questions 1 and 2, when a person acted or did not act-on-judgement. Damasio suggests that joy and sorrow are the source of all motivation to act, as verified by respondents when they acted-on-judgement, who stated feeling good and accomplished. When a person did not act-on-judgement there were no joyful emotions expressed perhaps contributing to the lack of action as Damasio postulates.

Summary of Chapter

The second phase of the research identified that there is an ‘emotional landscape’ that changes in form as a person passed through the process of thinking about what to do, acting or not-acting-on-moral judgement and then reflecting after having either acted or not acted-on-moral judgement. Emotion seemed to act as a signal system to help inform the respondent of their state of being or reaction, at every stage in the action or non-action scenario. A respondent can choose to either heed or ignore each feeling state. How much a person values his/her emotional state, or how competent a person is in examining his/her emotions, influences the attention they give to their emotional state.

What is clear is that the emotional state is not sufficient by itself to move a person to act-on-judgement, but seems to be a vital feedback loop in the moral judgement to
moral action cycle. Feelings of guilt appear to have aroused conscience in all the respondents, bearing in mind the religious nature of the research sample. It appeared for some respondents that feelings of guilt might, over time, have led to a change in action. The role of reflection seems to be the link between non-action and action, and capacity for reflection seems to be at the heart of what could be termed moral learning. If respondents were able to understand what their emotional state was telling them, they were more likely to re-examine their actions. Understanding the importance of learning to reflect on the emotional state to inform action would seem to be of vital importance to the moral-learning process. Levels of development and experience also seemed to be important factors, which once again supported the notion that moral competence is essential to the capacity to-act-on moral judgement. The role of virtue in promoting action emerged in the respondents’ discussion of acting-on-moral judgement, which suggests that the development of virtue may be an important determinant in the ability to initiate and/or sustain consistent action-on-moral judgment or to embed moral learning.

Emotions of guilt and shame seem to have an impact on creating a desire or a resolution to try harder next time. This was evidenced by statements such as: “trying to acquire a backbone,” “stop myself falling into an apathetic state,” “compelled to be less afraid to speak up” and “I wouldn’t behave the same way.”

Reflection seemed to be the point at which moral learning begins to happen as evidenced by statements such as: “I analyse my feelings, think about my “baggage” surrounding the situation, try to understand what my feelings are telling me about what I should do” and “After reflection I may act differently next time.” These statements indicate a change in perception from ‘taking it personally’ to having empathy for the other parties, analysing thoughts and feelings and not thinking the worst of a situation or possible outcomes. These sentiments are indicative of the respondents’ capacity for reframing the situation to help them see it in a different light, and that this reframing may be the next step towards action. This notion was supported in one respondent’s comment, “If I feel guilt about non-action I will rehash it over and over in my head. Rehashing it will make me act differently next time on non action”. Emotion may create a desire for action, but it is only through considered action and an act of will that moral learning can be embedded within one’s character, as exemplified by the respondent’s
comment: “Overlook my own sins…. See if there is any way to correct the situation. Apologise.”

Chapter 7 has focused on reporting the results from the second questionnaire. This questionnaire explored the role of emotion in the judgement-to-action or non-action cycle verifying the critical role of emotion in the judgement-to-action cycle. Emotions appear to be just one factor, however, in a multi-constructed process of moral functioning. Data gleaned from the respondents clearly reinforced the notion that acting on moral judgement is a competency, of which emotional awareness is an essential element.

Evidence from the lived experience was provided by respondents about the role of emotions acting as a signal system or feedback loop, either when a person acted or did not act-on-judgement. Respondents tended to feel guilt and shame for their failure to act, and in the action scenario feelings of relief, satisfaction, contentment and happiness were evident. Emotional responses are clearly indicated as integral to the process of learning to act-on-moral judgement. Attention will now turn in Chapter 8 to integrating respondents’ insights detailed in Chapters 6 and 7, in acting or not acting-on-moral judgement, to understand more about the process of moral learning and moral functioning.
CHAPTER 8
TOWARDS AN EMERGENT THEORY OF MORAL FUNCTIONING

An emergent theory of moral functioning is proposed in Chapter 8, based on the triangulation of the data from the lived-experience presented in the surveys and reported in Chapters 6 and 7 with the moral research findings discussed in the literature review. The first section of this chapter will review the insights gained from respondents into the moral learning process. The second section will focus on the implications of the role of the emotions in the learning cycle. Two cycles of learning are explored, one based on restorative justice and the other based on an educative approach of goal setting and encouragement. The next section of the chapter will integrate the research data into a proposed model of moral functioning based on the stages of development postulated by the Danesh Matrix (1994) in the domains of knowing, loving and willing. The last section of the chapter will explore the implications of the proposed theory of moral learning and moral functioning for the educative process.

8.1 The Moral Learning Process
In order to understand more about the possible moral-judgement to moral-action learning-cycle, a review will be made of the influences gleaned from respondents about their lived-experience in the action and non-action scenarios. These influences will be reviewed in relation to situational factors, reasons for action or non-action, the role of emotions and reflection, and the involvement of the domains of knowing, loving and willing in the moral-learning process.

8.1.1 Insights from Respondents into the Moral-Learning Process
In Chapter 6, four situational factors were apparent in both the action and non-action scenarios. When respondents acted-on-judgement, the first factor related to the quality of relationships, where respondents felt highly respectful towards others and highly responsible towards themselves as well as others. The second factor included aspects related to feeling competent, with respondents feeling highly familiar and highly experienced in handling a moral encounter. The third factor related to aspects of the environment where a majority of respondents felt highly safe, secure and cared for in the situation. The fourth factor centred on respondents feeling low levels of temptation
and deprivation prior to acting-on-moral judgement and also low levels of empathy towards the other person.

When respondents did not act-on-judgement, the same four factors were apparent. The first factor related again to the quality of relationships. Even though respondents did not act-on-judgement, they still reported feeling highly respectful and responsible for self and others. These feelings, however, may not have been sufficient to motivate respondents to move to action-on-judgement. The second factor related to competence. Even though the majority of respondents were familiar with the situation, they experienced difficulty and inexperience in responding to the moral encounter. The third discernible factor related to environmental aspects where the respondents did not feel safe, secure and cared for in the situation. The fourth factor related to issues of self-gratification or, what Danesh (1994) terms, self-preoccupation. Respondents indicated feeling highly tempted and deprived, and hence, were not successful in acting-on-moral judgement.

Even though the importance of quality relationships to the process of moral functioning is validated by a number of researchers (Darling-Hammond, 1997; Hattie, 2004; Kitwood, 1990; Newmann et al., 1996; Rowe, 2004), relationships alone, even though they have a higher influence over issues of knowledge and skill or the cognitive domain (Damon, 1988), appear to be insufficient to support moral functioning. Without a quality relationship, however, it could be assumed that a person might also fail to act-on-judgement as indicated by 23% of respondents when they failed to act-on-judgement and by zero respondents reporting low respect when they acted-on-judgement.

The second factor related to competency and the findings suggest that despite feeling familiar with the moral scenario, factors of difficulty and experience seem to be part of the continuum from non-action to action. This suggests that a high level of experience will be required to act-on-judgement. The third factor identified that when a person feels safe, secure and cared for he/she is more likely to act-on-judgement.

In the action scenario, the last factor translates to being empathic to the needs and well-being of others in the moral encounter, as identified by factors of low temptation and deprivation. There appeared to be a continuum between the action and non-action scenarios in that all four factors impacted both scenarios, however, a person’s capacity
appeared to be less developed in the non-action scenario. This finding suggests that moral action is therefore, a competency and is therefore, educable.

The question is how do we ultimately learn to act-on-moral judgement? Evidence from respondents will now be reviewed. Reasons for acting-on-moral judgement seem to begin to give some insights into the process of moral learning. Reasons given for acting-on-moral judgement identified four key reasons: (1) ‘strength of conviction’; (2) ‘knew how you would feel in the situation’; (3) ‘knew what the consequences would be if you failed to act on judgement’; and (4) ‘you respected the people involved’. These four reasons implied that a learning dynamic may exist between belief (strength of conviction), level of experience and knowledge (did not want to experience the consequences), empathy (you knew how you would feel if you did the wrong thing) and the quality of the relationship (you respected the people involved).

The understanding of knowing the consequences of your actions and how you would feel if you did the wrong thing, seemed to be an important insight relating to a person’s experience over time, or what could be termed wisdom, in the decision-making process. It suggests that respondents did not want to experience either the same mistakes again, or the same unpleasant feelings, since they already knew what that would be like. This notion of learning over time was also supported by respondents in Questionnaire 2, as expressed by comments such as: “I berate myself then try to sort out what I am feeling and why I failed to act-on-judgement”, and “vow to do better in the future and after enough opportunities I improve slightly, I am better able to catch myself in similar situations”. These comments suggest that respondents are beginning to comment on a process referred to by both Churchland (1996) and Johnson (1993) of extrapolating from the past and projecting into the future, that is, to engage their moral imagination. These researchers reason that our prototypical moral concepts provide us with a point of comparison in evaluating new moral problems, and our moral imagination enables us to deal with these problems. This interpretation of the results also supports the work of Narvaez et al. (1999) who found that individuals move from novice to expert over time.

Experience, while an essential element of the moral judgement-to-action cycle, appears to be insufficient without another influence relating to the domain of willing. Reasons given for not acting-on-moral judgement allude to this aspect. Respondents indicated that when they failed to act-on-judgement they “could get away with the situation”, and
“they were not disciplined enough”, which implied that there are also influences of having insufficient competence in the domain of willing to be able to act-on-judgement. It could be considered, therefore, that learning to act-on-moral-judgement requires trial and error, practice and analytical reflection, suggesting an “examined life” of action and reflection.

Understanding the feeling state seemed to have a bearing on the capacity to act or not act-on-judgement, impacting at the base level of inner drives and the feeling states of joy or sorrow (Damasio, 2003). Once again, the majority of responses in the non-action scenario appeared to be in the affective –conative domains, or Danesh’s domains of loving and willing, as distinct from the cognitive domain.

However, the powers or domains of loving and willing seem to ultimately serve our capacity to know, as it reinforces Piaget’s (1932) notion that development emerges from action; that is to say, individuals construct and reconstruct their knowledge of the world as a result of their interactions with the environment. It appears that unless the capacities of loving and willing are also developed equally as well as knowledge, the process of learning or reconstructing knowledge could be severely limited. Without the reflective process to identify what thoughts, feelings and actions need to change when faced with future moral dilemmas little learning seemed to occur (‘satisficing’, Nisan, 1985). A person would ultimately need to work out what part he/she had played in not acting-on-moral judgement, and find the desire and commitment to action, to apply their new learning in the decision-making process or to make amends for their past actions.

Evidence from responses to Question 6 (reported in Chapter 7), indicated that the emotional state was not sufficient by itself to move a person to act-on-judgement. The emotional state seemed to be a vital feedback loop in the moral judgement to moral action cycle. Feelings of guilt appeared to have aroused conscience in all the respondents when they failed to act-on-judgement, bearing in mind the religious nature of the research sample. Emotions of guilt and shame seemed to have an impact on creating a desire to try harder next time. This is evidenced by statements such as, “trying to acquire a backbone,” “stop myself falling into an apathetic state,” “compelled to be less afraid to speak up,” “I wouldn’t behave the same way.”
Reflection seemed to be the point at which moral learning begins to happen, as evidenced by statements such as “I analyse my feelings, think about my “baggage” surrounding the situation, try to understand what my feelings are telling me about what I should do,” and “After reflection I may act differently next time”. These statements indicated a change in perception or mindset such as, from taking it personally to analysing thoughts and feelings. These sentiments suggested a reframing of the situation to help a person see the situation in a different light, which may be the next step towards action. This notion is supported in the respondent’s comment: “If I feel guilt about non-action I will rehash it over and over in my head. Rehashing it will make me act differently next time on non-action”. This would suggest that emotion may create a desire for action but it is only through considered reflection and an actual act of will that moral learning can be embedded, as exemplified by the respondent’s comment: “Overlook my own sins…. See if there is any way to correct the situation. Apologise”.

Clearly there are stages to the moral learning process and it would appear a number of different competencies need to be mastered to be successful in acting-on-moral judgement. Initially the role of emotion and conscience in the learning process will be further explored.

8.1.2 The Role of Emotion and Conscience in the Moral Learning Process
Chapter 7 has identified an emotional landscape behind the decision-making process. These findings appear to support research evidence that emotions are not simply a subset of cognitive processes but seem to operate as a separate system (Davis, 1992, Le Doux, 1992, cited in Ackerman, Abe and Izard, 1998). How does this dynamic system, when presented with novelty in any given new moral dilemma, prepare a person to respond with the appropriate moral action? Different emotional responses seem to arise under action and non-action scenarios. It could be postulated, therefore, that emotion is highly influential in the process of moral learning.

From the findings, it appears that emotions influence the learning process in two ways. The first, and most common way, seems to be evoked through the emotions of guilt and shame, evoking conscience. A person needs to recognise such feeling states, reflect upon their impact and decide to make amends in the situation by a process of restorative justice. This cycle of learning is based initially on not acting-on-moral judgement. The consequences of inaction are the evocation of feelings of guilt and shame, which lead to
'negative' emotions and a process of reflection. This sequence may move the person ultimately to the action phase in future situations.

The second pathway is through an educative or intentional process that evokes positive emotions or spiritual susceptibilities. This pathway has only recently begun to be understood, because scientists now have greater knowledge of the internal workings of the brain. Research into how the brain functions in the moral-learning process has identified that moral prototypes (Churchland, 1996), or what Damasio (2003) termed somatic maps, are held in the frontal brain. Provided there is an emotionally safe environment where positive emotions such as joy and happiness are evoked or sustained, somatic maps can be accessed when faced with a new moral dilemma. Hence, positive emotional states support the use of our moral imagination (Churchland, 1996 and Johnson, 1993), to extrapolate from the past and project into the future. Moral learning is acquired in much the same way as any cognitive process such as reading and writing (Churchland, 1996). This implies another way of moral development where we can learn to be moral, based on encouragement and the role modeling of moral actions from people whom we respect and value in our lives.

Encouragement is based on the notion of reinforcing actions that make up virtuous behaviours as they occur naturally in the developmental process. Naming such behaviours and drawing a child’s attention to the value of their action and how it impacts those around them, is referred to as ‘induction’ (Hoffman, 2000). In this way somatic maps can be built so there is a repertoire to call upon when faced with a moral dilemma. The process of action and reflection, of focusing on what works and why, also contributes to embedding through positive emotions, appropriate actions in moral encounters. In order to be most effective, however, this process would ideally begin from birth so that positive actions can be reinforced naturally, generating positive emotional states, which help to pattern memory (Jensen, 1998). Life is not always predictable, however, and we are faced with unknown moral dilemmas that will need different solutions to the ones used in the past. We often do not feel emotionally safe in an environment and the brain processes ‘downshift’ and so access to our somatic maps might not always be possible. Hence, the importance of the process of trial and error, reflecting on what we could do differently next time or on how we can make amends will also help to embed new moral prototypes. If the trial and error process results in feelings of guilt and shame, the person might be motivated to reflect upon the cause of
these negative emotions (in order to avoid experiencing them again) and so ‘reflection’ returns the person towards moral-learning.

These two approaches to how emotions influence moral leaning will now be explored in greater detail. The first approach uses the notion of what can be termed restorative justice and the second is based on encouragement and goal-directed behaviours, supported by respectful and encouraging relationships.

8.1.3 Restorative Justice Mode of Moral Learning Based on Emotions of Guilt and Shame

A state of affective discomfort, such as feelings of guilt, shame, disappointment, disgust and discontent, seems ultimately to be a cause for reflection. Anecdotally, as a high school principal, I frequently saw this pattern of behaviour emerging in students who would break the rules, resulting in a state of facilitated reflection. Students were aware that any infraction of the school rules required a process of facilitated reflection. One student was caught smoking in the corridor close to the dormitory area and the security person would always walk along this path. When the student came to my office, I said “you are a very bright intelligent student why would you choose to smoke in a place where you are likely to get caught.” Ever charming, he said to me, “I think I wanted to get caught.” He knew his mother would be furious and had threatened to take him out of the school if he kept failing to follow the school rules. This threat failed to correct his behaviour. He was able to admit he needed help, yet had been unable to simply say “I have this problem and I need assistance”. He was no exception. When students were coping with a difficult challenge, we found a frequent pattern of behaviour in that they would say that they thought they wanted to get caught so they could get assistance.

A suggested model of how this mode of moral learning may work, based on evoking conscience through guilt and shame, is detailed in Figure 8.1. It places in diagrammatic form a proposed model of a mode of moral learning based on restorative justice. The concepts articulated in the description are based on respondents’ replies from Questionnaires 1 and 2 that articulated the role of emotion in evoking conscience. Numbers are placed in brackets for easy reference to the steps being referred to in the text.
The model describes a cycle of restorative justice where a person initially fails to act-on-judgement then moves ultimately to the action phase. It would seem that affective discomfort is not sufficient to support a change in behaviour, unless the person also engages in a process of making reparation. Reparation appears to be an essential part of a cycle of learning. This learning cycle, is referred to as restorative justice, which in practice has demonstrated high levels of success. This approach began in New Zealand utilising a traditional method among indigenous people of dealing with moral infractions. It is now referred to as ‘restorative justice’ and has enjoyed considerable success by community policing groups in New Zealand, Australia, Europe, Canada and USA reducing recidivism amongst youth offenders (Wilkinson, 1997).

Step 1
Questionnaire 2 identified that feelings of guilt and shame (1) surfaced after people did not act-on-judgement. Hence, it could be assumed that failure to act in a moral encounter frequently evoked an emotional response of guilt and shame. This may result in a person experiencing a reaction of fight or flight or ‘downshifting’ preventing access to somatic maps (Damasio, 2003) in the frontal lobe of the brain.

![Diagram of Mode of Learning Based on Restorative Justice]

Figure 8.1

Mode of Learning Based on Restorative Justice

Step 2
Once we begin to reflect on feelings of guilt and shame, then typically conscience (2) is stirred, creating affective discomfort (first stage of conscience - Kochanska, et al.,1994). If a person is able to ultimately gain a more reflective state and think about their feeling
state, it may result in feelings of remorse about their past actions or lack of action-on-judgement. This process may not occur until much later, when a person is reminded in some way of a previous situation when feelings of guilt and remorse have been evoked.

**Step 3**
Feelings of remorse will only occur if conscience has been properly embedded in early childhood through empathy (Hoffman, 1976, 2000). Reflections on remorse will help to create the desire to move towards the second part of conscience, referred to as active moral regulation and vigilance by Kochanska, et al. (1994), which will ultimately help to move a person to take corrective action for the error of judgement, or what can be termed reparation (3) to overcome feelings of remorse.

The next three steps help to move a person from the restorative justice mode of learning and introduce him/her to the goal-directed mode of moral learning. The second mode of moral learning is explained in diagrammatic form in figure 8.2. Hence, references in the text relating to steps 4 to 6 in the restorative justice mode of learning will make reference to figure 8.2.

**Step 4**
Taking some form of action or reparation, which requires an act of willing, such as making some form of an apology or reparation Figure 8.1 (3), and/or the victim forgiving the perpetrator for their actions, seems to relieve the person of the emotional burden of guilt and shame. This appears to move a person to a reflective state of being and a possible new learning-cycle, described as the goal-directed mode of moral learning. In making the reparation, a person has a new *self-experience* by putting a new decision into action: see Figure 8.2 (1). This equates to Self-Knowing-Stage 1 (Self-Experience) 1 in the Danesh Matrix (1994).

**Step 5**
The process of making amends (3) Figure 8.1 seemed to provide a person with a new experience as described in Step 4, which in turn provided a new opportunity to *self-discover* (Self-knowledge-Stage 2), (Danesh Matrix, 1994), Figure 8.2 (2), through the feedback of a more likely positive or joyful feeling state, resulting from acting-on-moral judgement or making amends. Emotions expressed in Question 2, Questionnaire 2 when people acted-on-judgment were stated as feeling good, honest, trustworthy,
accomplished, deeper connection, spiritually uplifted, proud, relieved, satisfaction, contented and happy.

Step 6
Feeling positive emotions enables a person to experience the impact of their actions on themself and others, resulting in new self-knowledge (Self-knowing-Stage 3), (Danesh Matrix, 1994), see Figure 8.2 (3). As a result of learning to reflect upon their feeling state a person becomes aware of how their actions have impacted upon themselves and others. This will lead a person to discover new approaches to responding to similar moral encounters in the future. This allows a person to learn through a process of trial and error, provided he/she is able to reflect upon his/her feeling experience and subsequently learn how to cope with a new moral dilemma. New successful actions can then be embedded as somatic maps on the frontal brain (Damasio, 2003) or stored as moral prototypes (Churchland, 1996) through evoking more joyful feelings and embedding the new learning.

It would appear that the more a person is able to learn from reflection on their feelings of guilt and make reparation or learn from their mistakes, the more the person is able to develop certitude or ‘the strength of their convictions’ as mentioned by 64% of respondents in Questionnaire 1, when they acted-on-judgement. This is evidenced by a respondent’s comment in Questionnaire 2: “When I take care of the situation and I act on judgement, I feel at peace and happy with myself”. At some stage, people have enough repeated experiences of this cycle and have sufficient competence to know in a new situation, how they would feel if they did not act-on-judgement, and also to understand what the consequences would be if they did not act-on-judgement.

It is worthy to note at this point that Erikson (1964; 1968; 1980) and Havighurst (1953) refer to the role of conscience becoming an inner moral guide provided it has been instilled in childhood through love and a form of discipline that is neither too excessive nor too permissive. This latter perspective implies that it is a relationship between the inner world and the outer environment, where the conscience can play the role of mediator of moral action. Erikson also refers to the relevance of resolving moral conflicts and proposes that a healthy personality ‘weathers’ these conflicts and emerges and re-emerges with an increased sense of inner unity. This would appear to be the case when respondents in some situations, know how they are likely to feel and wish not to
feel such feelings, hence will act-on-judgement. Respondents’ reflections on their emotional state would therefore imply that the subtle change of emotions through the judgement-action phases seemed to provide feedback on the internal state of being. Experience suggested that when these emotional states are attended to, it will result in reflection and new resolves or learning will occur, resulting in knowing how to act-on-judgement in the future. Learning how to act-on-judgement, will likely lead to a more joyful state of being. If a person is able to continue to learn through a process of trial and error, through action and non-action, ultimately it will lead to greater wisdom in their choosing of future responses to moral dilemmas.

8.1.4 Goal Directed Model of Moral Learning Based on Encouragement

The next section will present a model of moral learning based on goal setting and encouragement, or what can be termed learning from moral action when a person responds to a moral encounter, by acting-on-moral judgement. Figure 8.2 provides a diagrammatic explanation of a suggested model of how this cycle of learning may occur. Numbers are placed in brackets for easy reference to the steps being referred to in the text.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 8.2**

*Learning cycle based on goal setting and encouragement - Moral Action*

The model of learning depicted in Figure 8.2 describes the process of learning from the actual process of acting-on-moral judgement.

**Step 1**

The person encounters a moral dilemma and is able to access cognition or their powers of knowing and somatic maps. The person determines that they will act-on-judgement
because they understand what the consequences might be, or how they might feel if they fail to act-on-judgement. The decision to act may also depend on having sufficient strength of conviction in the situation. Another scenario might be that the person has set a goal to work on acquiring, say a virtue, such as patience and has determined that the next time he/she is challenged to demonstrate being patient, he/she will try to act on his/her judgement and respond with a ‘patient’ response. The person therefore has an experience of acting-on-moral judgement, Self-Knowledge-Stage 1 (Self-Experience), (see figure 8.2 (1).

**Step 2**

When respondents acted-on-judgement, they reported feelings related to peace, contentment and happiness. As a result of acting-on-moral judgement or meeting their anticipated behavioural goal, the respondents self-discovered (2) (see figure 8.2), that their actions generated within themselves a positive feeling state (Self-Knowledge-Stage 2 (Self-Discovery), (Danesh, 1994). The respondents were also observant of how their respectful interaction with the people involved resulted in a positive consequence, by being sensitive to the others’ reactions to their behaviour. It brought out feelings within themselves that could be referred to as feeling virtuous or noble.

**Step 3**

As a result of acting-on-moral judgement and discovering the positive emotional response, the respondents increased their knowledge of the impact of their decision to act-on-judgement on their feeling state, as well as the resultant positive feeling state in the other person. If the person involved gave them words of encouragement also for their actions towards the other, it also appeared to embed, through arousing positive feelings, the value of their chosen action. Hence, a person can develop greater self-knowledge (3) (see figure 8.2) (Self-Knowledge-Stage 3 (Self-Knowledge), through reflecting on the behaviour of acting-on-moral judgement.

When a person has greater self-knowledge (3) it suggests a person is more likely to feel comfortable reflecting on their feeling state. If it does create a more joyful state, (Damasio, 2003) the person is more likely to repeat the new action. This process is in alignment with the viewpoint of Locke’s (1983) set of models where he points out the recursive nature of the judgment-action process. The experience of one’s past moral behaviour influences one’s actual interpretation of a morally relevant situation. According to Piaget, (1932; 1962), all development emerges from action; that is to say;
individuals construct and reconstruct their knowledge of the world as a result of their interactions with the environment. This can be illustrated by the following example: an adult names a virtuous action demonstrated by a child and says: “I noticed your patience when you waited your turn to ride the bicycle.”

This cycle of learning based on goal-setting and encouragement suggests that a person can probably learn just as effectively, if not more effectively, without other psychological challenges that result from the non-action to action cycle of learning. The non-action to action cycle of learning discussed is based on feelings of guilt and shame that were generated by non-action-on-judgement and could be referred to as reactive learning. Reactive learning occurs when a person knows what to do but does not do it, or a person makes an unintentional mistake, which may be generated by a state of ignorance. The generation of uncomfortable feelings and the desire to remove them might ultimately result in a person becoming engaged in a learning process. The education cycle of learning implies the critical importance of role modeling of appropriate moral action, as a necessary foundation for an educative cycle of moral learning. Such a cycle of learning is based on intentional learning, where goals are set and supported, rather than reactive learning based on an original failure to act-on-judgement.

It appears that moral learning occurs through these two types of learning cycles. One is what results from “not” acting-on-moral judgement and the other from “acting-on-moral judgement”. Both approaches can result in greater knowledge and expertise. The first learning cycle, depicted in Figure 8.1, can be referred to as the cycle of rectitude as the learning occurs as the result of initial lack of action-on-judgement. The second cycle can be referred to as the cycle of refinement, where a person continues to develop greater expertise, leading to greater strength of conviction, and ultimately wisdom, in knowing how to respond appropriately when faced with a moral encounter. In the Bahá’í Writings, Abdu’l-Baha refers to the processes of the achievement of rectitude and the refinement of character. These processes are evident in respondents’ answers to the research questions. Furthermore, it is through the cycle of rectitude that a person seems to progress to the cycle of refinement of character. These two cycles of rectitude and refinement could therefore, be termed as two interacting cycles of moral learning, as both cycles appear to be interactive, and together they comprise the process of moral functioning.
The next section will now look at a suggested model for moral functioning that incorporates the two cycles of moral learning to achieve rectitude and refinement of character. The proposed model is based on the integration of data from the two questionnaires utilising the stages of moral functioning delineated in the Danesh Matrix (1994).

**8.2 A Proposed Theory of Moral Functioning**

Data relating to the situational factors and the reasons for acting and not acting-on-moral judgement were triangulated with the Danesh Matrix which was articulated in Chapter 6, in relationship to the stages of development of the 3 separate capacities of knowing, loving and willing. It was evident that when respondents acted-on-judgement, they acted out of the highest stages of self-knowing, self-loving and self-willing. By contrast, the lack of action-on-judgement resulted from respondents acting out of the Self-Loving-Stage 1 (Self Pre-Occupation) and Self-Knowing-Stage 1 (Self-Experience), but there was no evidence of acting out of any stage of willing. This was not a permanent lack of capacity but seemed to be situationally-bound, for example, through lack of experience and/or lack of desire to overcome self-pre-occupation.

**8.2.1 Acting on Judgement - insights from the Danesh Matrix (1994)**

Danesh (1994) has described the three domains of knowing, loving and willing as each having developmental stages. The respondents’ replies indicated that the stages also present as ‘additive and inclusive’ rather than one stage of development replacing a former stage of development. The research data from Questionnaire 1 indicated that a person was more likely to act-on-moral judgement if a person was operating out of the highest stages of development in each of the categories of knowing, loving and willing in relationship to self and others. The highest stages Danesh referred to in relationship to self are being capable of *self-knowledge, self-growth and self-responsibility*. In relationship to others in the loving domain *acceptance of, or a sense of oneness with others, a desire to remain unified and the person is prepared to engage in service to others before self.*

For example, if a person has acquired, through a process of personal experience and discovery, accurate *self knowledge*, they will know how they are likely to feel and know what the consequences are likely to be if they act or do not act in certain ways. To arrive
at this point requires the interplay of the processes to do with knowing, loving and willing. As the respondents have described, it is the process of emotional feedback that will help provide insights or knowledge as to the level of development in each of these domains. Engaging the will and acting-on-moral judgement will give further feedback through resultant emotional feedback. This process will now be articulated in greater detail as a proposed model of moral functioning.

In the previous section, it was proposed that two cycles of learning are engaged in moral functioning. It could therefore be assumed that there are two modes of arriving at action. The first mode of arriving at action appears to be through a more challenging process of trial and error, where a person becomes self absorbed, as was noted by a large number of respondents who went into a ‘downshifted mode’ (Hart, 1983, 1999) or justified their actions as being within the range of acceptability, unaware of the real impact on others in the encounter and remaining in a ‘satisficing’ mode (Nisan & Koriat, 1977). The stirring of conscience, where all respondents expressed a strong sense of judgment of their lack of action, expressed as feelings of guilt, shame and regret, appeared to be an important stimulus for respondents. If conscience had been appropriately embedded when a person was young, it seemed to lead to conscious reflection on their feeling state, which ultimately encouraged the person to try a new course of action. The emotional feedback of positive emotions or spiritual susceptibilities such as in the action scenario, where feelings of relief, satisfaction, contentment and happiness were reported, appears to provide the impetus for feeling confident about a new course of action. This would suggest that feeling states provide an important reinforcement or motivation for people to consider acting-on-moral judgement the next time, depending on how experienced they have become and depending on the situational factors surrounding the moral encounter. This cycle could be referred to as the ‘Cycle of Rectitude’.

The second mode is through a conscious choice or the active engagement of the will. A number of respondents said they knew how they would feel and they understood the consequences of not acting-on-moral judgement, therefore they acted-on-judgement. This cycle suggests mastery of a number of complex skills. This could be referred to as the ‘cycle of refinement.’ It appears that in order to arrive at this cycle of refinement, a person undergoes considerable learning and trial and error, however, once mastered there seems to be sufficient understanding to continue to act-on-judgement and action is
sustained by ‘strength of conviction’ or the belief that the chosen action is the appropriate action in the situation.

These two proposed interactive cycles of developing rectitude and refinement of character have been reconstructed from the experiences of the respondents of what it was like for them, when they acted or did not act-on-judgement. The interactive cycles have been depicted with three levels of moral functioning for the purpose of understanding more about the stages in the learning process. If developmental stages can be reliably identified and assessed, then interventions can be implemented to support a person to gain mastery in the process of moral functioning. How each cycle works will now be discussed in further detail in relationship to the developmental stages of the Danesh Matrix (1994). Abbreviations will be used in the subsequent text to denote the stages and interactions involved. In the domain of Knowing, Stage 1 is Self-Experience (1KSE), Stage 2 is Self-Discovery (2KSD), and Stage 3 is Self-Knowledge (3KSK). In the domain of Loving, Stage 1 is Self Pre-Occupation (1LSP), Stage 2 is Self-Acceptance (2LSA), and Stage 3 is Self-Growth (3LSG). In the domain of Willing, Stage 1 is Self-Control (1WSC), Stage 2 is Self-Confidence (2WSC), and Stage 3 is Self-Responsibility (3WSR). Abbreviations in regard to Relationships in the domain of Loving are Stage 1, Acceptance of others (1RLA) and Stage 2, Empathy with others, (2RLE). The model will be discussed in three levels of functioning.

8.2.2 Cycle of Rectitude

8.2.2.1 Level 1 of moral functioning

A person will encounter a moral dilemma engaging the participant in the knowledge domain of Self-Experience-Stage 1 (1KSE). The person feels highly tempted or deprived in the situation and does not have sufficient self-control, or is not self-disciplined enough to act-on-judgement, or does not feel emotionally safe so chooses to act on their impulses and remains self-preoccupied (1LSP). This response may be repeated again and again, with the person lacking the will to move beyond ‘satisficing’ (Nisan & Koriat, 1977). Another scenario is that the person feels very unsafe in the environment and they have ‘downshifted’ (Hart, 1975; 1999) in their brain functioning so access to moral prototypes is unavailable (Churchland, 1996), hence, the person acts out of his/her natural emotions such as fear and anger. This level indicates that a person does not have sufficient strength of their convictions, or at the time acted out of a state
of ignorance or denial, as he/she did not know what he/she did not know. This state is referred to as ‘unconscious ignorance’ (Gordon Training, 2004).

The bridge to the next level of moral functioning appears to be the arousal of feelings of guilt and shame or what is termed the first stage of conscience, affective discomfort, (Kochanska, Murray & Coy, 1997) as a result of not acting-on-moral judgement. This can also result in a person remaining self-pre-occupied with their shame and guilt. It appears that an act of will to engage in the reflective process on their actions provides the gate to the next level of moral functioning where a person takes notice, or takes control, of their feeling state and decides to think about what their feelings are telling them about their chosen course of action (1WSC).

Figure 8.3 indicates the suggested sequence of functioning at Level 1 of moral functioning in the cycle of rectitude.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 1</th>
<th>Lack of self control</th>
<th>Self-preoccupied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Encounters a moral dilemma (1KSE)</td>
<td>Does not act on judgement</td>
<td>(1LSP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Repeat Step 1 until

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 2</th>
<th>Continues to dwell on guilt and shame</th>
<th>Remains self-pre-occupied with feelings of guilt and shame (1LSP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experiences guilt and shame</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Repeat Step 2 until

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 3</th>
<th>Takes control of feelings (self-control) (1WSC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Takes notice of feelings of guilt and shame</td>
<td>Stuck in feelings of guilt and shame</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8.3

*Level 1 moral functioning- cycle of rectitude*

8.2.2 2 Level 2 of moral functioning- cycle of rectitude

At this point, if a person consciously decides as a result of discovering that they have made a mistake (2KSD) by not acting-on-moral judgement, and that they also do not wish to stay trapped in feelings of guilt and shame, a person may accept what they have done (2LSA) and try to take a different action. If a person acts-on-judgement at this juncture, emotions of relief, satisfaction, contentment and happiness may be evoked,
increasing the person’s self confidence (2WSC) about taking a new course of action, or acting-on-moral judgement. Figure 8.4 demonstrates the flow of moral functioning at Level 2 of the process in the cycle of rectitude.

Step 4
Recognise you made a mistake (2KSD) —> Accept you made a mistake (2LSA)

Step 5
Decide on new action – Act on judgement make an apology —> Reflection on feelings resulting from action (2KSD)

Step 6
Increased confidence by feeling good about actions (2WSC)

Figure 8.4
Level 2 of moral functioning – cycle of rectitude

8.2.2 3 Level 3 of moral functioning - cycle of rectitude
At the third level, a person has increased his/her feelings of confidence (2WSC) and is comfortable with the process of trial and error, that is, even though they have made a mistake they feel empowered to correct it by making amends. Hence, demonstrating a desire to continue to learn (3LSG) from previous mistakes and grow in self-knowledge. When a person takes responsibility (3WSR) for their actions it will increase their self-knowledge (3KSK) of what it felt like to act-on-judgement. This implies that a person has now acquired a particular virtue that will enable him/her to sustain consistent action on a value he/she holds, such as respect and responsibility in their relationships with others. Figure 8.5 indicates the flow of actions required to continue functioning at Level 3 of moral functioning in the cycle of rectitude.

Step 7
Increased confidence creates a desire for self growth (3LSG) —> Takes responsibility for mistakes by making amends (3WSR) —> Taking responsibility for actions increases self knowledge (3KSK)

Figure 8.5
Level 3 of moral functioning – cycle of rectitude
If a person fails to act-on-judgement again it will result in repeating the same cycle of rectitude at all three levels until they have acquired the strength of conviction to determine that no other course of action but to act-on-judgement is the desired outcome.

8.2.3 Cycle of Refinement.

8.2.3.1 Level 1 of moral functioning-cycle of refinement

At Level 1, a person encounters a moral dilemma (1KSE) and has sufficient knowledge to know what the consequences will be and how he/she will feel in the situation. This understanding is accompanied by feelings of respect towards the other person and responsibility for one’s actions and the effect on the other people involved. Under these conditions a person feels emotionally safe and so uses their will (1WSC) and makes the decision to act-on-judgement. The person now feels emotions such as confidence, responsibility, compassion, care, and comfortable with their proposed decision, motivating them to now act on their decision. If emotions such as feeling enraged, fearful, worried, angry, irritated, frustrated, or resentful arise, they have sufficient strength of conviction to know that they still wish to act-on-judgement. Figure 8.6 demonstrates the flow of actions at Level 1 of the cycle of refinement.

Step 1
Moral encounter (1KSE)                     Makes the decision to act on judgement (1WSC)

Figure 8.6:
Level 1 of moral functioning-cycle of refinement

8.2.3.2 Level 2 of moral functioning-cycle of refinement

At Level 2, a person discovers after reflection (2KSD) what action he/she wishes to take. Even though the person may still be feeling some disquieting emotions they accept this is the way they are feeling (2LSA), and still have sufficient confidence (2WSC) or conviction to carry out their desire to act-on-judgement. The person then discovers that once they have acted-on-judgement they now feel emotions such as goodness, honesty, trustworthiness, accomplishment, deeper connection, spiritually uplifted, pride, relief, satisfaction, contentment, and happiness. If their emotional state, is (as respondents also identified after acting-on-moral judgement) one of rage, disappointment, confusion, sadness, irritation, or anger with themselves and others involved, they may still recognise their emotional state and accept that despite these feelings it is more
important to act-on-judgement (2LSA). Figure 8.7 indicates the flow of actions involved at Level 2 of moral functioning in the cycle of refinement.

**Step 2**
After weighing up situation has sufficient knowledge of self to know what action they should take. (2KSD)  
Able to understand what their feelings will be and still decide to act. (2LSA)  
Sufficient confidence to know what to do and how they will feel and are able to act-on-judgement (2WSC)

Figure 8.7:
*Level 2 of moral functioning-cycle of refinement*

8.2.3.3 **Level 3 of moral functioning-cycle of refinement**
At Level 3, a person has acquired a sense of responsibility towards themselves and others (3WSR), as well as sufficient knowledge (3KSK) about their feelings to motivate them to continue to initiate action when faced with similar moral encounters in the future. Their desire to live up to their moral ideals and their belief in the importance of acting-on-moral judgement, helps to sustain their capacity to develop strength of conviction and the desire to continue to grow and develop their moral character (3LSG). Figure 8.8 depicts the flow of activities involved at Level 3 of moral functioning involved in the cycle of refinement.

**Step 3**
Feel a high sense of responsibility to continue to act-on-judgement when faced with a moral encounter (3WSR)  
Sustained by sufficient knowledge about their feelings and the consequences of their actions on others (3KSK)  
Desire to continue to grow and learn from both past and new experiences (3LSG)

Figure 8.8:
*Level 3 of moral functioning-cycle of refinement*

The description of the moral learning process also describes what could be termed a process of moral functioning. It concurs with the four stages of the Rest (1984) and Narvaez (1999) models of moral functioning in that a person needs to be, first, ethically sensitive to interpret the situation according to who is involved, what actions to take and what possible reactions and outcomes might ensue. Second, a person needs to judge
reasons about the possible actions in the situation and judge which action is most ethical. Third, a person needs to be ethically motivated to prioritize one action over other actions which might meet other goals and needs. Finally, a person needs to implement the ethical action in order to acquire expertise.

In summary, this proposed, interactive-process model of moral functioning can be postulated as follows. One will not gain self knowledge (Self-knowledge-Stage 3) if one stays self pre-occupied (Self-loving-Stage 1) in an emotional state of guilt and remorse. It will take a desire to self accept (Self-loving-Stage 2) one’s frailties and lack of action to be able to reflect and self-discover (Self-knowing-Stage 2) what has been learned from the experience. This awareness will still not be sufficient to embed the learning; it will take an act of self-control (Self-willing-Stage 1) or courage (virtue) to decide to act differently next time. This act of courage, or will, may depend on the quality of the relationship and the degree to which empathy (Relationship-Loving-Stage 2) has been evoked and whether the person wishes to still feel at one with or connected to the person (Relationship-Loving-Stage 3 Unity) or the relationship is important enough to elicit the desire to make amends. The decision to make amends through an act of self control (Self-Willing-Stage 1), or an act that will take courage to overcome a loss of face to act differently next time (Self-Loving-Stage 2), demonstrates a desire for self-growth (Self-loving-Stage 3). Reflection upon taking a restorative action will evoke feelings of confidence (Self-willing-Stage 2) which will give a person greater self knowledge (Self-knowing-Stage 3) and knowledge of the situation, and provide the foundation for taking a more responsible (Self-Willing-Stage 3) action next time.

8.3 Implications for Education

The former sections of this chapter have provided insights into the processes involved in moral functioning and moral learning that could have implications for both pedagogy and curriculum design. The key implications for education will now be discussed briefly.

The implications of the proposed theory of moral learning in this chapter imply that educationalists need first to recognise that conation is a necessary domain of development, in addition to the commonly accepted domains of cognition and affect. Educationalists would therefore need to consider how to develop the capacity of will as an integral part of educational programs and experiences. The analysis of both
situational factors and reasons for acting-on-judgment support the notion of the domain of conation or the capacity to use our will, as defined by Kitwood (1990) and Danesh (1994). It would appear that ‘not acting-on-moral judgement’ is not so concerned with what a person knows (cognition) as with what happens in the affective and conative domains. The affective domain deserves the attention of educators in determining how best to develop the stages of loving (Danesh, 1994) within educational programs; this includes, namely, how to facilitate students to move from self-preoccupation to self-acceptance and thus move towards a continuous desire to learn from experiences when they had not acted-on-moral judgement. Danesh has referred to the domain of willing as one that has sequential stages of development. These stages are, self-control, confidence and responsibility. Educationalists therefore could do more to ensure that there are educational opportunities for students to consciously develop self control, confidence and a sense of responsibility towards themselves and others. Respondents in this study provided insights that these competencies were what lead them to moral action.

The articulated theory of moral functioning appears to call into question current approaches to moral learning. The proposed theory suggests a dynamic interplay between the two cycles of learning, namely, through achieving rectitude and refinement of character. The learning process appears to be supported initially by an empathic response towards the other people involved and an understanding of how a person’s actions have impacted on another. This learning helps to motivate a person to move from self-preoccupation, in their guilt and shame, to a consideration of another’s needs over their own. It takes personal courage, which can be described as both a virtue and an act of will, to overcome one’s frailties or lack of action on judgement.

The quality of the relationship and a person’s sense of responsibility towards another, as suggested by respondents in Questionnaire 1, seem to evoke an empathic response. The process of making amends, therefore, helps a person to move beyond the stage of self-preoccupation to a readiness for making an apology. This is engendered when there is a sense of remorse or humility about their lack of action. If a person feels safe, secure and cared-for, they might overcome their sense of inadequacy and find the courage to act differently next time. An environment of safety, care and encouragement is, therefore, more likely to support a person to learn through the process of trial and error. This notion implies the critical importance of teachers and educational managers taking responsibility for the creation of a safe and supportive classroom and school learning.
environments. Additionally, creating safe and supportive learning environments provides a foundation for building caring, trusting relationships, which was found to be a key element in the academic success of students in ‘Quality Teaching’ research (Newmann et al., 1996; Darling-Hammond, 1997; Rowe, 2004; Hattie, 2004) referred to in Chapter 1.

These theoretical insights into moral functioning imply a need to review traditional approaches to how we educate children about desired social and moral behaviours. The research findings suggest that ethical behaviour is made up of a series of capabilities related to the domains of knowing, loving and willing. The cycle of rectitude, or the restorative justice learning cycle, suggests that, if a child has not acted-on-judgement, then a facilitated process to help him/her to reflect on his/her emotions and to feel remorseful would be an important first step. Once a child has acknowledged his/her part in the incident, agreements can be reached as to how to make amends for his/her lack of action. It would seem to be helpful to identify the missing competence that has caused the inappropriate behaviour, help a child to recognise this and acquire the desired competency. The research findings imply the use of encouragement to support the embedding of appropriate behaviour when the behaviour happens naturally, rather than creating an environment of shame, blame and consequences. Creating an environment of encouragement helps to create a safe and supportive learning environment. Educators need to set goals in areas where there is a lack of competence in their students and design educational experiences that will develop and strengthen these particular competencies.

**Summary of Chapter**

Chapter 8 has articulated a proposed model of moral learning that is integral to moral functioning and also proposed the implications for education. It appears that a person can arrive at moral competence as a result of initially not acting-on-moral judgement or as a conscious choice to act on-moral-judgement. Two cycles of moral learning, based on two different emotional responses were discussed. First, a cycle of learning based on restorative justice where a person makes amends to overcome emotions of guilt and shame, by an act of restoration to make right the wrong the person inflicted upon another. The second cycle of learning is based on the notion of a conscious act to set a moral goal, and to work towards its achievement with support and encouragement from
others such as parents and teachers and the resultant feedback to students of their positive emotional states.

A model of moral functioning that utilised the respondents’ data to demonstrate the integration of the stages of the domains of knowing, loving and willing, based on the Danesh Matrix (1994), has been proposed as an emergent theory of moral functioning. The two learning cycles were ultimately described as a cycle of rectitude and a cycle of refinement. These cycles appear to be interactive components of the process of moral functioning. Three levels of moral functioning were proposed as a hierarchy of moral functioning. It was suggested that progress from one level to the next is dependent upon moral competence in each of the stages of the domains of knowing, loving and willing. Competency in these domains is supported by the presence of certain situational factors and quality relationships which seem to support the moral learning process.

The proposed theory of moral functioning articulated in Chapter 8 about cycles of moral learning has significant implications for how we educate children and youth to constantly strive to act morally. The proposed model of moral learning and moral functioning suggested a very different educational process might be required to be effective in developing moral capacity than has traditionally been used to support moral learning. The model suggests the need for a facilitated process to assist students to reflect upon and understand their feeling states, and thus to understand why one action is more effective than another in a given situation involving moral judgement and moral action. This chapter has also highlighted the importance of educators providing educational opportunities which enable students to learn from repeated cycles of action and reflection in a safe and supportive environment.
CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION: SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY

The first section of Chapter 9 provides an overview of the findings of the study, and explores the significance of the study in two areas. The first area of significance involves the interdependence of the domains of knowing, loving and willing in the process of moral functioning. The second area of significance suggests that reflection on the feeling state is integral to moral learning. In addition, two noteworthy findings will be explored, namely, the influence of virtue on moral action, and gender differences in translating moral judgement into moral action. The second section of Chapter 9 explores the implications of the research findings for education and the third section identifies possibilities for future research. The final section of the chapter is a summary statement about the thesis.

9.1 Overview

The findings from Chapters 6, 7 and 8 have identified a number of emerging themes regarding the process of acting-on-moral judgement. A central theme in exploring the nature of the gap between moral judgement and moral action revolved around the notion that moral action is a competency and is therefore educable. The research findings have indicated that the gap between moral judgement and moral action, or what can be termed moral functioning, is made up of multiple constructs, including: situational influences; levels of competence in the domains of knowing, loving and willing; levels of moral development; and gender influences.

The findings suggest that there is a learning continuum between non-action and action-on-moral judgement. This learning continuum is not a straight continuum from non-action to action and can easily be sabotaged by two processes referred to as ‘downshifting’ and ‘satisficing’. Furthermore, there is an emotional landscape that acts as the backdrop for a person’s moral decision-making processes, providing feedback though his/her emotions at crucial times of progression towards acting-on-moral judgement. Feelings of guilt and shame indicated a lack of appropriate action while feelings of satisfaction, joy and contentment were indicated when a person was successful in acting-on-moral judgement.
The evoking of feelings of guilt and shame seem to be of insufficient cause to move a person towards moral action. Findings suggest that there are two interactive learning-cycles based on two different emotional responses that contribute towards the process of moral functioning. It appears that a person can arrive at moral competence as a result of one of the following: either initially not acting-on-moral judgement or consciously choosing to act on-moral-judgement. Within these options lie two potential cycles: the first cycle is based on a form of ‘restorative justice’ whereby a person, in order to overcome emotions of guilt and shame, needs to make amends by an act of restoration that repairs the wrong that has been done to another person. The second cycle of learning centres on a conscious act that sets a moral goal and works towards its achievement with the encouragement and resultant feedback of a positive emotional state.

Critical to this learning process is the ability to reflect on and analyse one’s feeling state and to consider in an empathic way the implications of one’s actions for the other parties involved in the moral encounter. The level of respect towards other people and the degree of responsibility one feels towards others and oneself were also strong influences on a person’s ability to act-on-judgement. In addition, the degree to which one could exercise a virtue seemed to provide the necessary impetus to finally act-on-judgement.

These multiple influences on the process of acting-on-moral judgement were ultimately integrated into a proposed theory of moral functioning which incorporated the two learning cycles towards achieving rectitude and refinement of character.

Another finding that emerged from Questionnaire 1 related to the notion that there might be different ways that males and females engage in the learning process, even though there is little difference once the process of acting-on-moral judgement has been learned.

The main aim of the study was to identify the key influences involved in translating moral judgement into moral action. A secondary aim was to explore the implications of these influences for educating children. The study also compared the adult perspective of acting and not acting-on-moral judgement, in order to gain insights into the process of moral functioning and moral learning. The data obtained from the respondents were
triangulated with Danesh’s (1994) conceptual framework of moral functioning, which in turn correlated with Habermas’s (1972; 1974; 1984; 1987; 1990) three ways of knowing, to understand more about the moral judgement to moral action cycle.

These emerging themes will now be examined in greater detail to identify the insights gained from this study into the process of moral learning and moral functioning.

9.2 Overall Significance of the Study

This study has proposed a theory of moral functioning based on the integration of two cycles of moral learning. This next section will focus on two areas of significance related to the proposed theory of moral learning and moral functioning. The first area of significance is the apparent interdependence of the domains of knowing, loving and willing in the process of moral functioning. The second area of significance suggests that reflection on the feeling state is integral to moral learning. In addition, two noteworthy findings will be explored, namely: the influence of virtue on moral action and gender differences in translating moral judgement into moral action.

9.2.1 Interdependence of the Domains of Knowing, Loving and Willing in the process of moral functioning

The findings of this study provide support for the notion that “know the good is not sufficient to do the good”. This suggests that knowledge is insufficient in itself in impelling the good, especially if a narrow interpretation of knowledge is applied. Habermas’s (1972; 1974; 1984; 1987; 1990) three ways of knowing gave greater insight into what we really mean by ‘knowing’. Similarly, Danesh (1994) has used very similar components to Habermas’s three ways of knowing but has postulated them as distinct human powers of knowing, loving and willing. Using Danesh’s developmental matrix to classify situational factors and reasons for acting-on-moral judgement, the research demonstrated that all three domains and levels of development articulated in knowing, loving and willing are implicated in acting-on-moral judgement. The majority of influences impacting on the ‘moral judgement to moral action’ cycle, however, relate to issues concerned with the domains of loving and willing. These two domains correlate with Habermas’s second and third ways of knowing.

As discussed in Chapter 8, in order to engage in the process of moral action, a person needs to use the domain of knowing or cognition to begin with and after acting upon an
experience he/she needs to reflect and self-discover. If a person is self-preoccupied (Self-Loving-Stage 1), that is, operating at a lower level of moral functioning, however, this will create barriers to the process of self-discovery. Furthermore, if a person lacks confidence (Self-Willing-Stage 2) and is not feeling a sense of responsibility (Self-Willing-Stage 3), they might ignore the emotional signals experienced as affective discomfort. Thus, a person might become stuck in feelings of guilt and shame which will then reduce their ability to translate moral judgement into moral action. The current study found that, when respondents did not act-on-moral judgement, they did not know how they would feel until after they did not act-on-judgement. This indicates a stage of learning referred to as unconscious ignorance (Gordon Training, 2004).

When a person operated out of higher levels of moral functioning in the domains of knowing, loving and willing, they were more likely to act-on-judgement and, conversely, if they acted out of lower levels of moral functioning, a person was less likely to act-on-judgement. The findings suggest that, when respondents acted-on-judgement, they: 1) had strength of conviction; 2) understood what the consequences would be; and, 3) understood how they would feel in a given situation. It appears from the findings that the capacity to act-on-judgement is more likely to occur if a person has the capacities to reflect on action and self-discover, the desire to continuously learn and grow from past experiences and mistakes, and values being a morally responsible person. Together, these capacities and values can be referred to as ‘conscious knowledge’ (Gordon Training, 2004). These findings imply that the ability to act-on-moral judgement is a competency that needs to be developed through a process of action and reflection. Hence, if knowledge is interpreted in a wider context than cognition or the capacity to know, the research would be in agreement with Socrates’ notion that ‘to know the good is to do the good’.

The findings suggest that there could be a dynamic interplay between the powers of knowing, loving and willing in the process of moral functioning. When a person acted-on-judgement, there was evidence that they were acting out of the highest developmental level of each of the domains. The person was often conscious of self-knowledge through a process of reflection (Self-Knowing-Stage 3), recognition of a conscious process of self-growth (Self-Loving-Stage 3) and a desire to accept responsibility (Self-Willing-Stage 3) for not only self but also how they treated others. There is evidence that the competencies mastered in each of the developmental stages of
these three domains also describes a process of moral functioning as enunciated in Chapter 8. The stages of development (Danesh Matrix, 1994) of each of the domains are apparently additive and inclusive. This notion suggests that lack of action was not a permanent lack of capacity but seemed to be situationally-bound.

It is not sufficient to know what to do but also important to know how to assess and respond to situational factors. Regarding situational aspects, the research findings indicated that when respondents acted on judgement they felt: 1) highly respectful towards others; and 2) highly responsible towards self and others; indicating that a quality relationship was involved. The situational aspects can be summarised under the headings of the three domains of knowing, loving and willing. In the knowing domain, respondents were more experienced, familiar with the situation or found it less difficult to act-on-judgement. In the loving domain, respondents felt safe, more secure and cared for, more respectful and less deprived. In the domain of willing, they felt less tempted and more responsible for self and others. In nearly all cases, there were at least two domains involved when a person acted-on-judgement and, in some responses, all three domains were evident.

The findings of this research confirm the comments of Churchland (1996), in which he explains that the moral person is someone who is reflective about his or her own moral prototypes and seeks to extend and refine them in the light of additional knowledge. This involves considering a variety of perspectives and evaluating the relative accuracy of competing interpretations of moral issues in specific situations. Without such competencies, the individual is literally not capable of making the informed, critical and responsible decisions that are the precursors of moral behaviour. The moral person is therefore someone who has acquired a complex set of subtle skills of the perceptual, cognitive and behavioural kinds. This perspective supports a cognitive approach to learning. The responses of participants in this study, however, indicated that there was more than cognition involved in the process of moral functioning. Moral functioning could be said to be made up not only of perceptual, cognitive and behavioural competencies but, additionally, it engages competencies in the emotional (affective), and the willing (conative) domains of human functioning. Emotional signals seem to alert a person to consider what action to take and also to reflect upon emotional feedback after action or non-action. If a person is acting out of the highest developmental levels of knowing, loving and willing, they are more likely to have the
competencies to reflect upon emotional feedback (knowing), consider the needs of others (loving), and be prepared to take responsibility in the situation (willing). The activation of all three competencies allows a person to subsequently enact a new action based on feedback from a previous action.

9.2.2 Reflection on the Feeling State - Integral to Moral Learning

The findings from the first questionnaire indicated that emotion played a pivotal role in the transition from not acting to acting-on-moral judgement. Understanding the emotional consequences was indicated as one of the main reasons leading a person to action-on-judgement. In the action scenario, respondents identified that they could project into the future as to how they would feel if they did not act-on-judgement. By contrast, in the non-action scenario, a number of respondents indicated that they did not know how they would feel until after they failed to act on their judgment. Hence, their lack of reflective capacity contributed to their inaction. Questionnaire 2 revealed that respondents tended towards self recrimination and feel guilt and shame for their failure to act, yet, in the action scenario they reported feelings of relief, satisfaction, contentment and happiness. These findings suggest that knowledge of the feeling state can be influential in prompting a person to act-on-judgement. Positive feelings reinforce a desire to act-on-judgement, whereas, negative feelings because of the emotional discomfort they seem to cause, might initiate the start of the ‘cycle of rectitude’ which lead to an action-on-judgement in the future.

Findings from the second phase of this research suggest an ‘emotional landscape’ which describes the process of thinking about what to do, acting, then reflecting on the decision, after having either acted or not acted-on-moral judgement. The findings also suggest that emotion works like a signal system to help inform a person of their state of being or their reaction at any given moment or stage in the moral judgement to moral action cycle. A person can heed or choose to ignore the feeling state. Essentially, the process appears to depend upon how much a person values or takes notice of their emotional state or how competent a person is in examining their emotional state. Emotions of guilt and shame seem to be instrumental in evoking conscience. The evoking of conscience, however, needs to be properly embedded by empathy (Hoffman, 1976) and the early development of self-control (Rest, 1985). The evoking of feelings of guilt and shame can ultimately be the process that creates affective discomfort.
(Kochanska et al., 1994) and might gain the conscious attention of the learner to re-examine or reflect on their actions.

The survey responses indicated that an emotional state or feedback on emotions was not sufficient by itself to move a person to act-on-judgement, but seemed to be a vital feedback loop in the moral judgement to moral action cycle. Importantly, it was the feelings of guilt which appeared to have aroused conscience in all the respondents. The researcher does, however, note the religious nature of the sample population. The emotions of guilt and shame seemed to have an influence on the respondents by creating a desire or a resolution to try harder next time.

Emotional responses appear to offer insight about the progress of moral learning, suggesting that a person demonstrates behaviours, depending on their level of maturity, along a continuum from egocentrism to mutuality (Selman et al., 1997). The responses gained from the first questionnaire suggest that there is not a simple learning continuum but rather a learning process on this continuum which can be impacted on by emotions, such as anger, guilt, fear, or by not feeling safe, secure and cared. These negative emotional states ‘downshift’ (Hart, 1983; Damasio, 2000) brain functioning away from the frontal lobe, the location that supports the processes of moral judgment. In addition, a person might wish to justify their actions, as in a ‘satisficing’ (Nisan & Koriat, 1977) response. These two processes of ‘downshifting’ and ‘satisficing’ could be said to sabotage the translation of moral judgement to action. This does not mean that the process of judgment-to-action will automatically be sabotaged. It will depend on the capacity of the person to recognise emotions that ‘downshift’, or to recognize that they are justifying their actions, and develop competence and strength of conviction to overcome what could be an adverse effect on the moral judgement to moral action learning cycle.

The role of reflection on feelings seemed to be the possible link or catalyst between non-action and action, which appears to be at the heart of what might be termed ‘moral learning’. Reflection on feelings seemed to be the point at which moral learning begins to happen. The reframing of the situation seems to help a person see the situation in a different light which could be the next step to action. This would suggest that emotion can create a desire for action but it is only through considered reflection and an act of
will that moral learning can be embedded within the person’s moral habits to develop moral character.

The survey responses reinforced the notion that acting on moral judgement is a competency, of which emotional competence is an essential element. The competency includes a conscious act of willing to reflect on feeling states. If a person is able to understand the meaning of their emotional state they are more likely to re-examine their actions. Understanding the importance of learning to reflect on the emotional state to inform action would seem to be of vital importance to the moral learning process. Emotions, however, appear to be just one factor in a complex and multi-variable process of moral functioning.

9.2.3 The Influence of Virtue on Moral Action

The influence of virtue in acting on moral judgement became evident in responses to Questionnaire 2 (see Table 7.7, p.205 and Table 7.8, p.206). No virtues were mentioned when a respondent failed to act-on-moral judgement. When a person acted-on-moral judgement, however, virtues such as compassion, caring, responsibility, respect, honesty and trustworthiness were identified. This suggested that the development of virtue might be an important determinant in the ability to sustain consistent action on moral judgment or to embed or reinforce moral learning.

These findings suggest that a virtue needs to be present or sufficiently developed in a person in order to continuously translate moral judgement into moral action. Otherwise, it could be suggested that moral action might just remain as a good intention, in that a person might know what he/she wishes to do and desire to do the right action but fail to act on this, if the relevant virtue is undeveloped.

This insight was noted in some of the responses to Questionnaire 2 where some respondents desired to act-on-moral judgment but they seemed to encounter many failures before they had the strength of conviction to consistently act-on-moral judgement. In Questionnaire 1, the presence of two key virtuous actions was apparent. First, typically, respondents who acted-on-moral judgement felt high levels of respect towards others. Second, they felt highly responsible towards self and others. However, it is not just about learning any virtue. It appears that it is critical to learn which virtues apply in a given situation, implying the acquisition of what could be termed ‘wisdom’.
Wisdom implies knowing which virtue to apply in a particular circumstance. These results would suggest that the development of virtues, and knowing which virtue to manifest in a given moral situation, is a critical component in any educational program.

9.2.4 Gender Differences in Translating Moral Judgement into Moral Action

While there were a number of similarities in the way males and females function in the moral domain, there were also some noteworthy differences. The results of Questionnaire 1 indicated that when males and females acted-on-judgement there were very similar situational factors. Overall, there was little variation between situational factors for male and female respondents, except for two situational factors for women, namely feeling less deprived and more experienced than male respondents when they acted-on-judgement. Different priorities of factors were evident for male compared to female respondents, however, when they did not act-on-judgement. Male respondents were more impacted on by a perceived sense of deprivation, temptation and not feeling safe, secure and cared for in the non-action scenario. On the other hand, female respondents appeared to be more impacted on by a perceived lack of experience and low respect for the other person in the non-action scenario.

Situational factors for men related more to the affective or loving domain (temptation, feeling safe, secure and cared for) whereas, for women, both affective (temptation) and cognitive (experience) domains were implied. This would suggest that males need to acquire more skills in the affective domain and women need to acquire skills not only in the affective domain but also in the cognitive domain. Lack of experience also implies lack of confidence, which relates to the domain of willing.

Similar reasons were given when males and females acted-on-judgment. The one additional male perspective related to an external motivator of feeling respectful for the people involved. This equates with the first stage of Relationships /Loving (Danesh, 1994), ‘acceptance of others’, and would suggest that men are generally socialised to maintain networks of people that might be advantageous to their advancement in work and life. Conversely, for women, the additional factor was that they felt self-disciplined. Women seemed to be more familiar with their inner world and were more comfortable than men about reflecting on their vulnerability and/or admitting to their weaknesses.
There were no similarities of reasons given by males and females when they failed to act-on-judgement. This suggested that men and women might have different ways of processing information when they do not act-on-judgement. Reasons given by females seemed to relate to judgement about the others’ actions, their relationship with the other person or internal judgements of their own behaviour (reflective of inadequacies). On the other hand, results for males suggested that their reasons related to the impact on themselves and their personal well-being, or the perceptions of others about their actions.

These findings would indicate support for Gilligan’s (1982) assertion that women have different moral and psychological tendencies than men. According to Gilligan (1982), men think in terms of rules and justice and women are more inclined to think in terms of caring and relationships. Wark’s and Krebs’ (1996) findings contradicted Gilligan’s (1982; 1988) hypothesis of gender differences. because the former researchers found that only 9% of the students’ responses in their study, reflected such specific gendered orientation. It needs to be noted here that the research methodology used in the current study used the lived experience, as did Gilligan’s initial research that highlighted gender differences.

In spite of the difference in the way males and females process moral encounters, when they ultimately learned to act-on-judgement, it would appear that the situational reasons for acting-on-moral judgement were almost identical. The research data indicate that findings from both Gilligan (1982; 1988) and Wark and Krebs (1996) have relevance. Gilligan’s findings seem to pertain to the research findings related to the scenario where a person did not act-on-judgement as there was a wide variation between male and female responses. However, Wark and Krebs found in their study only a 9% variation between male and females responses, perhaps these findings related to the scenario where a person acted-on-judgement where there was little variation between male and female responses. Therefore, their findings would seem to apply to different parts of the cycle from moral judgement to moral action. This would imply that males and females have different ways of learning or sources of motivation for gaining the competency of acting-on-moral judgement. Further research would need to be undertaken to investigate these initial findings more closely.
9.3 Broad Implications for Education

The insights gained through the research process of translating moral judgement into moral action imply that the development of moral capability is not simply translatable into a separate curriculum package. It will need to be integrated across the curriculum, introduced and reinforced in many subjects and experiential learning areas of the school day. This does not mean, however, that moral education should be left to each individual teacher’s initiative but rather it should be part of intentional school-wide processes designed to provide opportunities for students to engage in activities and reflections that will develop the identified moral competencies. Many of the competencies can only develop as a result of social interactions which tend to develop outside of the current school curriculum and are more a process of what has been termed extra-curricula activities, including break times in the school day. Therefore, these research findings imply the importance of an educational curriculum that integrates education for the development of moral competence across the whole school context.

The factoring-in of gender differences to the educational process is another important consideration. Situational factors for males related more to the affective or loving domain (temptation, feeling safe, secure and cared-for) whereas, for females, both affective (temptation) and cognitive (experience) domains were implied. This suggests that different educational experiences are important in helping males and females to internalise moral learning. Females appear to be affected by internalised processes of reflection on their own actions. In contrast to females, males appear to be impacted on more by relational factors in the external environment, which seems to be a more powerful determinant in motivating males to act-on-judgement.

The study’s findings suggest that feeling guilt and shame is not sufficient to move a person towards moral action. This finding is of significance in that a number of behaviour management systems have been premised on arousing feelings of guilt and shame in the student when they are given consequences for disobedient actions or inappropriate behaviour. It would appear that to support the process of moral learning, opportunities need to be provided to learn through a facilitated process of trial and error, and reflection on experience, with a plan of action to learn from moral challenges. This is premised on the importance of role-modelling by loved ones of behavioural expectations to assist in the development of moral prototypes (Churchland, 1996).
an approach is in stark contrast to a rules-based approach where punishment or withdrawal of love is meted out if the child breaks the rules. Instead moral education should be a process of support and challenge, through facilitated interactions with the child in a specific environment to enable the development of moral capacity. It also implies the need to engage with parents and community members to gain their support in the development of moral competence, suggesting an interdependent relationship between parents, teachers and the community or people who influence the lives of children. This last implication was a key finding in ‘programs that work’ (Schwartz et al., 2006), (Chapter 1, p.9).

9.4 Suggestions for Further Research
This study has identified that the gap between moral judgement and moral action relates to a series of competencies in the domains of knowing, loving and willing. Additionally, situational and experiential factors were also implicated. This study has also focused on understanding more about the integrated process of moral functioning and moral learning. One of the limitations of this study was that data were generated from a relatively small purposive religious sample which was, to some degree, considered to be ‘expert’ in moral functioning, in order to identify factors and influences that lie in the gap between moral judgement and moral action. Hence, the authenticity and trustworthiness of the data were limited and the findings can only be considered as possible indicators towards a theory of moral functioning. Additional research is required to validate these initial findings.

A number of interesting trends have emerged, however, that were triangulated with previously researched data and Danesh’s conceptual model of moral functioning. More extensive research is needed to validate these findings. Future research would need to employ a larger sample from a more diverse group of people, involving a cross-section of society and, possibly, comparing Western and Eastern cultural communities.

The findings from the current study indicate that the most common reason for acting-on-moral judgement related to strength of conviction. It was not clear, however, what this encompassed. Notions emerged around a number of respondents who still acted-on-judgement, even though they indicated they had a conflict in values or that situational factors were not ideal. All of these respondents indicated that they had strength of conviction, implying a certainty or a belief that acting-on-moral judgement was the only
acceptable course of action in the scenario. It would seem of value to understand the role and nature of belief in relationship to strength of conviction and what role belief has in supporting acting-on-moral judgement.

The domain of conation or willing was also indicated as an important component of moral functioning. It was beyond the scope of this thesis to gain greater insights into the role of willing in the moral learning process. The findings therefore provide some evidence that moral functioning engages the three domains of knowing, loving and willing. The proposed theory of moral functioning has identified an interdependent relationship between these three domains. The proposed model would need further investigation with a broader sample including children.

This study has identified that there appear to be two approaches to moral learning. One approach is based on a form of ‘restorative justice’ whereby a person, in order to overcome emotions of guilt and shame, is motivated to make amends by an act of restoration that repairs the wrong that has been done to another person. The second approach of learning centres on a conscious act that sets a moral goal and works towards its achievement with the encouragement and resultant feedback of a positive emotional state. Brain research has suggested that moral learning is impacted on by the development of moral prototypes (Churchland, 1996) on the frontal brain. Reflection on emotional signals and on action appears to be integral to moral learning, implying the need for adults to model this approach when facilitating learning experiences. The implications of this new approach to the moral learning process would need to be validated before it could be proposed as a more effective behaviour management approach.

This study has provided evidence that acting-on-moral judgement is a competency. The competency is related to a series of developmental stages within the domains of knowing, loving and willing. Additional research would be needed to identify the specific knowledge, attitudes, skills and virtues required at each stage of development in each of the three interrelated domains of moral functioning.

Gender differences in moral learning were evident in the findings from the study. Future research could further explore the different pathways engaged in the process of moral learning for males and females. It would be worth gaining deeper insights into gender
differences in order to explore any implications for the development of moral competence that might pertain to the educational environment.

Summary of Chapter
This research thesis explored four key questions, namely:

1. What influences a person to act or not act-on-moral judgement?
2. How do these influences impact on the movement from moral judgement to moral action?
3. Is there a gender difference in translating moral judgement to moral action?
4. What domains of learning seem to be involved in moral functioning?

The findings about these questions were then reviewed to look at the implications for education and to advance a theoretical understanding of moral learning and functioning.

The review of current literature and research identified what we have understood to date about moral learning and moral functioning. The lived experience, as described by respondents, was used to explore the dynamic relationships between the different components that seem to impact on the process of translating moral judgement into moral action. Considerable insights have been gained to date into aspects of moral development as they relate to the cognitive and affective domains of human development, but little has been researched on how these domains of human functioning work together when a person is faced with a moral dilemma. This study identified that the additional domain of conation was integral to moral functioning. The study explored how the three domains of cognition (knowing), affect (loving), and conation (willing) were implicated in the process of moral functioning.

The overall findings of this research support the notion that acting-on-moral judgement is a competency. A comparison of the responses to the action and non-action scenarios identified four key situational factors that appear to influence a person’s capacity to act-on-judgement. First, there is the quality of relationships. Second, there is competence, as demonstrated by level of experience. Third, there is the issue of an environment where the respondents feel safe, secure, encouraged and cared for. Fourth, is that a person’s state of self-pre-occupation with their own needs and desires prohibits reflection on how another might feel in the scenario. This transforms into an empathic response in the action scenario. There appeared to be a continuum between the action
and non-action scenarios in that all four factors were evident in both scenarios, however, a person’s capacity appeared to be less developed in the non-action scenario. The findings suggest that moral action is therefore, a series of competencies which can be identified in the domains of knowing, loving and willing and that it is, therefore, educable.

The integration of the findings from two questionnaires was triangulated with findings from the literature review and the Danesh Matrix (1994) in order to develop a proposed theory of moral functioning. Two cycles of moral learning were postulated to be involved in the process of moral functioning. The first was based on a cycle of restorative justice, while the second cycle was based on goal-setting and encouragement. These two cycles seemed to be integral to each other in order to achieve what has been termed ‘rectitude’ and ‘refinement of character’.

The findings challenge conventional notions of how we learn to function in the moral domain and subsequently how we educate children to become moral. The study indicates that children would benefit from an intentional process of facilitated reflection on feelings states and personal experiences, in a loving, caring environment, in order to learn how to respond more appropriately the next time they are faced with a similar moral scenario. Learning in the moral domain, therefore, could be said to involve hard-edged knowledge in the development of moral competencies as do other cogitative processes such as learning to read and write. The implications of these findings, suggest that researchers and educators need to rethink the way moral capabilities are developed in children. Greater understanding of the complex processes involved in developing moral competence, will eventually lead to more insightful and effective educational programs which train and inspire the next generation of children to be morally competent youth and adults. This direction of future research deserves attention in that it has the potential to make a significant contribution to the advancement of civilization.
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Appendix A

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SCENARIO 1, PHASE 1

Think of a recent moral encounter that you had, where you had to weigh up conflicting priorities and goals to make a moral judgement and found it easy to act upon or carry out the moral action.

Reflect upon that particular moral encounter, detail for your own private use the situation and circumstances and please respond to the following questions circling the appropriate ascending scale 1 representing the least to 5 the greatest.

1. Situation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.1 Who was/were involved please circle or underline –</th>
<th>yourself, a relative, a friend, acquaintance, stranger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.2 What degree of moral weighting (how serious was the moral choice involved)</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 How respectful did you feel towards the person/people</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 How familiar were you with the type of moral encounter (new- highly familiar)</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 How experienced where you in handling such an encounter (less-greater experience)</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 How difficult was it to carry out your decision (easy-hard)</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7 How safe, secure and cared for did you feel in the situation or environment</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.8 How tempted to do the wrong thing did you feel in the situation</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9 How deprived did you feel in the situation if you did the right thing</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.10 How responsible did you feel in the situation for your own actions towards yourself</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.11 How responsible did you feel in the situation for your actions towards the other person/group.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Reaction:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2.1 Did you want to mark with an X fight ( ) flee ( ) stay or go with the flow of the situation ( )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your initial reaction was based to a lesser (1) to greater degree (5) on:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 2.2 Previous encounters | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 2.3 Your perception of the situation | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 2.4 Your feelings | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 2.5 Knowledge of the facts | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 2.6 Who was involved | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 2.7 Other please describe | |

3. Values

| 3.1 Did you have a conflict of values if so what were they? | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|
3.2 Describe the reward/risk/cost factors in relation to the potential psychological and/or physical and/or material reward of moral behaviour against the potential cost (punishment) of doing the wrong thing.

3.3 How did you justify or rationalize your behaviour in the particular situation?

3.4 Other /Comments

4. **Action**

Please circle or highlight which statement(s) best describe your reason for wanting to act upon your moral judgement

4.1. You did not want to experience the consequences of failing to act
4.2. You knew how you would feel if you did the wrong thing
4.3. You could not get away with the situation (other people would know)
4.4. You respected the people involved
4.5. Other goals and priorities were not as important
4.6. You had the strength of conviction to carry out the action
4.7. You would not feel deprived
4.8. You are self disciplined

4.9 Other Please describe

5. How important was it to you to live up to your moral ideals 1 2 3 4 5
6. How satisfied were you that you lived up to your moral ideals 1 2 3 4 5
7. How would you rate your level of moral responsibility. 1 2 3 4 5
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SCENARIO 2, PHASE 1

Think of a recent moral encounter that you had where you had to weigh up conflicting priorities and goals to make a moral judgement and then **failed to act upon your moral decision**.

Reflect upon that particular moral encounter, detailing for your own private use the situation and circumstances and please respond to the following questions circling the appropriate ascending scale 1 representing the least to 5 the greatest

1. Situation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.1 Who was/were involved please circle or underline –</th>
<th>yourself, a relative, a friend, acquaintance, stranger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.2 What degree of moral weighting (how serious was the moral choice involved)</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 How respectful did you feel towards the person/people</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 How familiar were you with the type of moral encounter (new - highly familiar)</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 How experienced where you in handling such an encounter (less - greater experience)</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 How difficult was it to carry out your decision (easy - hard)</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7 How safe, secure and cared for did you feel in the situation or environment</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.8 How tempted to do the wrong thing did you feel in the situation</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9 How deprived did you feel in the situation if you did the right thing</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.10 How responsible did you feel in the situation for your own actions towards yourself</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.11 How responsible did you feel in the situation for your actions towards the other person/group.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Reaction:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2.1 Did you want to mark with an X fight ( ) flee ( ) stay or go with the flow of the situation ( )</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your initial reaction was based to a lesser (1) to greater degree (5) on:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Previous encounters</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Your perception of the situation</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Your feelings</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Knowledge of the facts</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 Who was involved</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7 Other please describe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3. Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.1 Did you have a conflict of values if so what were they?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.2 Describe the reward/risk/cost factors in relation to the potential psychological and/or physical and/or material reward of moral behaviour against the potential cost (punishment) of doing the wrong thing.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.3 How did you justify or rationalise your behaviour in the particular situation?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.4 Other/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### 4. Action

Please circle or highlight which statement(s) best describe your reason for failing to act upon your moral judgement:

- 4.1. You were unaware of what the consequences would be for failing to act
- 4.2. You did not know how you would feel by doing the wrong thing
- 4.3. You could get away with the situation (no-one would know)
- 4.4. You did not respect the people involved
- 4.5. Other goals and priorities were more important
- 4.6. You did not have the strength of conviction to carry out the action
- 4.7. You would feel deprived
- 4.8. You were not self disciplined enough

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.9 Other Please describe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### 5. How important was it to you to live up to your moral ideals 1 2 3 4 5

### 6. How satisfied were you that you lived up to your moral ideals 1 2 3 4 5

### 7. How would you rate your level of moral responsibility. 1 2 3 4 5
### Appendix B

#### Background Information of 22 Research Subjects in Sample Population 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Age Range</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Highest Level of Education</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>60+</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>B Ed</td>
<td>Christian Evangelical</td>
<td>Retired Elementary School Principal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>22-30</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M Eng</td>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian/Australian</td>
<td>50-60</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>B Ed</td>
<td>Bahá’í</td>
<td>Teacher/coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian/Nth American</td>
<td>40-50</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Masters</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Elementary School Counsellor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>50-60</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>Bahá’í</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French/Caucasian</td>
<td>50-60</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M A</td>
<td>Bahá’í</td>
<td>Psychologist/Trainer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African Caribbean</td>
<td>30-40</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>Bahá’í</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian/Nth American</td>
<td>30-40</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Research Scientist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German/Nth American</td>
<td>50-60</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>Bahá’í</td>
<td>Musician-historian/Co-ordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian/Irish/American</td>
<td>22-30</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M Ed</td>
<td>Bahá’í</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazilian</td>
<td>60+</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>College</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>Travel Agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino/</td>
<td>22-30</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>B Eng</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian/Nth America</td>
<td>50-60</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>MBA</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>General Manager/Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish</td>
<td>22-30</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>College</td>
<td>Bahá’í</td>
<td>Mother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South American Indian/ Spanish/African</td>
<td>30-40</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>Electrician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian/ Nth American</td>
<td>30-40</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Mother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Eastern/Italian/Maltese</td>
<td>40-50</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>Bahá’í</td>
<td>Home Maker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino/ Brazil</td>
<td>40-50</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>College</td>
<td>Bahá’í</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian/Dutch</td>
<td>50-60</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M.Sc</td>
<td>Humanist</td>
<td>Consultant/Trainer High School Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>50-60</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Some College</td>
<td>Bahá’í</td>
<td>Homemaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian</td>
<td>50-60</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M.Ed.</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Director College of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian/Irish/German</td>
<td>50-60</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>MSSW</td>
<td>Bahá’í</td>
<td>Social Worker</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The cultural origins of the research subjects in sample 1 included 10 regions of the world: Asia, the Pacific, South America, North America, Europe, Canada, Australia, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and the United Kingdom.
The gender distribution of research subjects in sample 1 was 11 males and 11 females.
The age group distribution of research subjects in sample 1 were as follows: 22-30 years – 4 subjects; 30-40 years – 4 subjects; 40-50 years – 3 subjects; 50-60 years – 9 subjects; 60+ years - 2 subjects.

The religious identity or philosophical orientation of the research subjects were as follows: Bahá’í – 11 subjects; Hindu – 1 subject; Christian (non-Catholic) – 3 subjects; Christian (Catholic) – 3 subjects; Humanist – 1 subject; None – 3 subjects.

The occupational distribution amongst the research subjects was as follows: 11 Professionals, 2 students, 1 Tradesperson, 3 Mothers/Homemakers, 1 Businessperson and 1 Manager/Executive.
Appendix C

GPO Box 2100
Adelaide 5001 Australia

Telephone: (+61 8) 8201 2613
8201 2441
Fax: (+61 8) 8201 3184
Email: Bernard.Mageean@flinders.edu.au

31st January 2002
Dear Sir/Madam,

This letter is a formal introductory letter for Ms. Arini Beaumaris, who is a postgraduate research student undertaking Ph.D. studies in the School of Education at Flinders University.

She is undertaking research leading to the production of a thesis or other publications on the subject of the development of moral thinking in our lives, and ways in which moral thinking leads to, or fails to lead to, action. She wishes to use the results of her research to discuss options for school-based programmes in the area of moral development. The title of the project is 'From Moral Judgement to Moral Action: Implications for Character Education'.

She would like your assistance in this research, either by helping her get in touch with children or adults who will participate directly, or by volunteering to spare some time to assist directly in this project, by agreeing to answer some questions in an interview setting, and possibly following this up in a further interview or interviews. Arini would negotiate the time involved with you beforehand. Between one and two hours would be required for each interview, but you should feel free to specify any limit. All persons involved will provide an informed consent and will at no time be under any pressure.

Be assured that any information provided will be treated in the strictest confidence and none of the participants, or institutions they are associated with, will be individually identifiable in the resulting thesis, report or other publications. You are, of course, entirely free to discontinue your participation at any time or to decline to answer particular questions. Please be clear that you are in charge of your participation and the information you give. It will be used in accord with the general assurances set down above, and in accord with any conditions agreed between yourself and Arini. A consent form for the participation will be provided.

She wishes to tape record the interviews and advises that it is best, for the sake of anonymity and confidentiality, if names or other identifying details are not mentioned specifically. The tapes will not be made available to any other persons, save in the case where assistance with transcription is needed, in which event the transcriber will observe the same conditions of confidentiality as the researcher.

Any enquiries you may have concerning this project should be directed to me at the address given above or by telephone on (61 8) 8201 2613, fax (61 8) 8201 3184 or e-mail Bernard.Mageean@flinders.edu.au.

This research project has been approved by the Flinders University Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee. The Secretary of this Committee can be contacted on (61 8) 8201-3513, fax (61 8) 8201-5034, e-mail Lesley.Wyndram@cc.flinders.edu.au.

Thank you for your attention and assistance.

Yours sincerely,

Dr. Bernard Mageean, Senior Lecturer, School of Education.
Appendix C Continued

FLINDERS UNIVERSITY: ADELAIDE, AUSTRALIA

Consent Form for participant in the research project ‘From Moral Judgement to Moral Action: Implications for Character Education’ of Arini Beaumaris

I (give name)
being over the age of 18 years
I am happy to participate in the research project being conducted by Arini Beaumaris.

I am satisfied that
1. Full and relevant information has been provided
2. Details of procedures and any possible risks have been explained and that the same will be provided and explained to all persons involved at a level appropriate for understanding.

I agree to information being tape-recorded if that is required.
I am aware that a copy of this form and any information material should be retained for future reference.

I understand that the following conditions apply without exception to all participants:

1. people may not benefit directly from participation
2. it is made clear that people are free to withdraw from the project at any time and are free to decline to answer particular questions
3. while the information gained will be used for publications as explained, people involved will not be identified and individual information will remain confidential
4. people may have any recording stopped at any time and may withdraw at any time from the session or from the research without obligation to give reasons
5. if a transcriber is used for any of the tapes, that person will be bound by the same conditions regarding confidentiality as is the researcher.
6. people will be given every consideration to ensure that there is no discomfort or distress caused by any aspect of the research.

Signature of participant:

________________________________________________________________________

Researcher declaration:

I certify that I have explained the study to the above signatory and any other person involved, and consider that they understand what is involved and freely consent to participation in the light of the above conditions.

(Signed)---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix D

The following information details the information shared with the research participants and formed the front section to Questionnaire 2.

Reflection on Feelings Questionnaire

Name:…………………………………………………………….

Purpose
Analysis of results from the initial questionnaires suggested that a number of respondents did know how they would feel, if they failed to act on moral judgement. As it is true conversely, respondents did not know how they would feel about not acting, until the incident was over and they had failed to act on their moral judgement.

Now additional responses are sought in order to explore the role which feelings may play and what kind of feelings impact the process of deciding to act or not to act on moral judgement in a given situation.
Guidelines regarding responding to questionnaire.

Can you think back to the ‘moral dilemmas’ that you used to respond to the original questionnaire where you were asked about a moral judgment? If you remember them, can you comment on the following questions?

If you cannot recall the moral dilemma that you used in the previous survey can you think about two situations; one where you were able to act on judgement and one where you failed to act on judgement, and use these instead to respond to the following questions for both scenarios?

If you cannot think of any response to any of the questions feel free to skip to the next one.

1. Can you name what your feelings were before you decided to act or not act on your judgment in the two scenarios of action and non-action?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action on moral judgment scenario</th>
<th>Non-action on moral judgment scenario</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

2. Can you name what your feelings were after or are, on reflection about your actions or non-action?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action on moral judgment scenario</th>
<th>Non-action on moral judgment scenario</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

3. Did your feeling state influence any reflection about your actions or non-action? If so, how?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action on moral judgement scenario</th>
<th>Non-action on moral judgement scenario</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

4. Did you learn anything about yourself from your feelings? If so, what was learned?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action on moral judgment scenario</th>
<th>Non-action on moral judgment scenario</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

5. What impact did these feelings have re any possible resolution for acting differently when faced with a similar situation?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action on moral judgment scenario</th>
<th>Non-action on moral judgment scenario</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

6. Since responding to the former questionnaire did you reflect about the feelings that were evoked then? If so, how and when was this, and what was the result?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action on moral judgement scenario</th>
<th>Non-action on moral judgement scenario</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Now, thinking more generally about these issues, can you respond to the following questions:

7. How seriously do you take notice of your feeling state in helping you to decide how you should act on judgment?

8. Can you describe the process of how your feelings influence you to act on moral judgment?

9. Do your feelings impact on you immediately or do you find that you reflect upon them at a later date? What influences this process?

10. If uncomfortable feelings are aroused when you fail to act on judgment, how do you deal with them? In what way do they influence future decisions to act on judgment?

11. If you felt uncomfortable when you failed to act on judgment, how did you come to feel at peace with yourself again?

12. Can you give any additional comments regarding what motivates you or helps you to learn to act more consistently on moral judgment?

13. As a participant in this research, do you have any additional comments for the researcher as to what has helped you to act on moral judgment?
Appendix E

Individual Responses Scenario 1 & 2 Compared and Contrasted

This section focuses on the presentation and analysis of each of the 22 subjects’ responses, and is divided into sections by gender. It compares each respondent’s data set in relation to action (scenario 1) and non-action (scenario 2). The use of term ‘low’ refers to respondents indicating a number one or two on the response scale. Similarly, use of the term ‘moderate’ refers to respondents indicating number three on the response scale, and use of the term ‘high’ refers to respondents indicating either number four or number five on the response scale. The purpose of analysis by comparison is to determine if any patterns of responses emerge in the way subjects discussed their own moral functioning.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male 1 - Profile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age Range:</strong> 50-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender:</strong> Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of Education:</strong> MBA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date of Subject’s Response:</strong> 28/3/2003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Response data from questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Failure to act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Situation</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 Situation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involved self &amp; relative.</td>
<td>(no response given to situation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High weighting, high respect, low familiarity, low experience, high difficulty, low safety, low temptation, low deprivation, high responsibility for self/others</td>
<td>High weighting, moderate respect, moderate familiarity, low experience, moderate difficulty, low safety, moderate temptation and deprivation, high responsibility for self and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Reaction</strong></td>
<td><strong>2 Reaction</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fight mode</td>
<td>Flow mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A perception, facts, who was involved</td>
<td>facts, who was involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 Values- Rewards/risks/cost factors</strong></td>
<td><strong>3 Values- Rewards/risks/cost factors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent values and grown child’s values. Reward was the successful outcome, the event did not take place.</td>
<td>Fight for what I believed to be right or go with the flow, avoid a hassle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I still regret my lack of will to fight for what was right.</td>
<td>I still regret my lack of will to fight for what was right.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 Values – Justification</strong></td>
<td><strong>3 Values – justification</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I felt and know I was right, said so and would not permit it without a battle. Prevent the setting of a wrong example for one’s child</td>
<td>Long distance from parties involved with, at the time on active military duty. Fight with what I believed to be right or go with the flow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4 Action</strong></td>
<td><strong>4 Action</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aware of consequences of not acting</td>
<td>You did not know how you would feel by doing the wrong thing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aware of how you would feel by doing the wrong thing</td>
<td>Other goals and priorities were more important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of conviction</td>
<td>Did not have the strength of convictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self disciplined</td>
<td>Respected people</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reflection-5,6,7</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Non Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How important was it to live up to your moral ideals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How satisfied were you that you lived up to your moral ideals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you rate your level of moral responsibility</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Summary of data male 1

Scenario 1
Involved a situation of high moral weighting about a course of action, where there was a conflict of values between self and a highly respected grown child. He was not familiar or experienced with such a conflict and found it difficult to deal with the incident. He felt highly responsible for his actions towards himself and his relative but not very safe. He did not feel tempted to do the wrong thing or deprived if he acted on his judgement. He was prepared to fight for what he believed to be the right course of action. Whilst he respected the person involved he was aware of how he would feel if he did not act upon his judgement and had the strength of conviction and self discipline to translate judgement into action.

Scenario 2
Involved a moderately respected unknown person (not stated) who lived a long distance away. The respondent was on military service. It involved a situation of high moral weighting and a choice to fight for what he believed to be right or to go with the flow. He had low experience and moderate familiarity and found it moderately difficult to deal with the situation. He felt low safety and highly responsible for his actions towards himself and others. He felt moderately tempted to do the wrong thing and would feel moderately deprived if he acted on judgement. He did not have the strength of his convictions, decided other goals and priorities were more important but responded that he did not know how he would feel until after he failed to act on judgement.

Analysis of Response
Responses given with regard to the situational factors show little variation between the two scenarios. It does highlight that while both situations were of high moral weighting, he had low familiarity and experience in both scenarios with such moral encounters. There is a slight change of weighting from low to moderate in feeling tempted and deprived in the second scenario. In the action scenario it is clear he considered the proposed action of his relative was wrong. He was prepared to fight for what he believed to be right, demonstrating a high level of conviction that motivated him to correct something he felt strongly about. He did not need an external reward, he considered to achieve what he believed to be the right action, was reward enough, implying an internalised reward system.

In the non action-scenario he was not as intimately involved and was a long way from the scene and rationalised it was easier to go with the flow. In this scenario we see almost the reverse of the first, his strength of conviction was not strong enough to take the necessary action to follow through on his judgment and other goals and priorities were more important. However, he did not realise it would impact upon him emotionally, until after he had failed to act on his judgement. His commentary identified that he still felt regretful, even after the event for not having had the “will to fight for what was right.”

In scenario 1 he had a high moral expectation of himself and was satisfied he had lived up to this expectation. His self assessment in scenario 2, showed a dissatisfaction with living up to his ideal and his level of responsibility, although he had only set a moderate level of importance in living up to his ideal.
Male 2- Profile

| Age Range: | 50-60 |
| Occupation: | Director, College of Education |
| Gender: | Male |
| Ethnic Background: | Caucasian |
| Level of Education: | M.Ed |
| Religious Background: | Christian |
| Date of Subject’s Response: | 31/03/03 |

Response data from questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Failure to act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Situation</strong>&lt;br&gt;Involved self and relative. High moral weighting, high respect, high familiarity, high experience, moderate difficulty, high safety, low temptation, moderate deprivation, high responsibility towards self/others</td>
<td><strong>1 Situation</strong>&lt;br&gt;Involved self and acquaintance, moderate moral weighting, moderate respect, high familiarity, high experience, low difficulty, low safety, high temptation, moderate deprivation high responsibility self and low responsibility towards others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 2 Reaction | Fight mode<br>Flow mode<br>Previous encounters, perception, feelings, facts, who was involved | Perception, feelings, facts, who was involved |
|------------|----------------------------------------------------|
| **3 Values- Rewards/risks/cost factors**<br>No Conflict values<br>No Honesty pays and it is often contagious | **3 Values- Rewards/risks/cost factors**<br>If I ignored the situation others would view it as favouritism or me not willing to take a stand |

| 3 Values – justification | **3 Values – justification**<br>I just did what was right, treated employee as I would want to be treated. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4 Action</th>
<th>Did not know how they would feel by doing the wrong thing&lt;br&gt;Could get away with it&lt;br&gt;Other goals and priorities were more important.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reflection-5,6,7</strong>&lt;br&gt;Action</td>
<td>Non Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How important was it to live up to your moral ideals</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How satisfied were you that you lived up to your moral ideals</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you rate your level of moral responsibility</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of data male 2

**Scenario 1**

Involved a highly respected relative and himself in a situation of high moral weighting about a course of action relating to the need to be honest. He was highly familiar and highly experienced with such a situation and found it moderately difficult to deal with the incident. He felt highly safe and highly responsible for his actions towards himself and his relative. He did not feel tempted to do the wrong thing and would feel moderate deprivation if he acted on his judgement. He did not have a conflict of values and experienced a flow mode as he respected the person involved, he had the strength of his convictions and considered he was self-disciplined enough to translate judgement into action.
Scenario 2
Involved a moderately respected acquaintance and himself in a situation of moderate moral weighting, where he could address or ignore a work situation. He had high experience and high familiarity and did not find it very difficult to deal with the situation. He felt low safety and highly responsibility for his actions towards himself and low responsibility for his actions towards others. He was highly tempted to do the wrong thing and would feel moderately deprived if he acted on judgement. He experienced a fight mode and failed to act on judgement as he could get away with it, other goals and priorities were more important but he did not know how he would feel, until after he had failed to act on judgement.

Analysis of Response
There are four areas of similarity between the two scenarios, high familiarity, high experience, moderate deprivation and high responsibility for one’s actions towards self. From scenario one to two there is a shift from high to moderate moral weighting, high to moderate respect, moderate to low difficulty, high safety to low safety, low temptation to high temptation and high to low responsibility for one’s actions towards others. Five areas may be impacting the failure to act on moral judgement: There is a slight shift from high to moderate re moral weighting and respect for the person. However there is a greater shift from high to low re situational factors of safety, temptation and responsibility for actions towards others.

In the first scenario he did not have a conflict of values; in the second scenario he could either address or ignore a work situation. If he ignored the situation he believed others would view it as favouritism or him not willing to take a stand. It is not clear what action he took that failed to translate judgement into action, but he stated that he “just did what was right, treated employee as I would want to be treated.” Whatever action he took impacted upon him to experience a desire to fight, whereas in the first scenario he reacted in a flow mode. It appears likely that in the second scenario, he was fighting a cause, and perhaps his decision was against a given policy. If this ‘best guess’ is correct, then he considered fighting against a policy as failure to act on moral judgement. It implies more of a conflict between what the organization saw as correct action and what he considered to be correct action in the situation. In this scenario he chose to be disobedient to a work requirement. Alternatively, he may have misinterpreted the instructions in the questionnaire.

His response to the reflection about his actions indicated the highest score for all three questions in both the action and non-action scenarios. It was highly important that he lived up to his moral ideals, he was satisfied that he did and considered he was also highly responsible. Even though he failed to act on judgement he felt highly justified for his actions. It would seem that over time he was able to review this as he selected the scenario as one where he failed to act on judgement.
Male 3 Profile/6

| Age range: | 30-40 |
| Occupation: | Electrician |
| Gender: | Male |
| Ethnic Background: | South American Indian, Spanish |
| Level of Education: | High School |
| Religious Background: | Catholic |
| Date of Subject’s Response: | 3/28/03 |

Response data from questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Failure to act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Situation</td>
<td>Involved self. Low moral weighting, high respect, low familiarity, low experience, low difficulty, high safety, low temptation, low level of deprivation, high level of responsibility for self and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Situation</td>
<td>Involved self and a friend. Moderate moral weighting, high respect, low familiarity, low experience, high difficulty, moderate safety, high temptation, moderate deprivation, high level of responsibility for self and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Reaction</td>
<td>Go with the flow, influenced by perceptions, feelings, and facts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Reaction</td>
<td>Flight mode, influenced by perceptions, feelings and facts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Values</td>
<td>No conflict of values felt good with myself. My parents taught me well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Values</td>
<td>Conflict of values related to loyalty, friendship. He would do the same for me.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Action</td>
<td>Knew how you would feel by doing the wrong thing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Action</td>
<td>You did not know how you would feel by doing the wrong thing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reflection-5,6,7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Non Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How important was it to live up to your moral ideals</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How satisfied were you that you lived up to your moral ideals</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you rate your level of moral responsibility</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of data male 3

**Scenario 1**
Involved the respondent with a situation of low moral weighting about a course of action, where he had high respect for himself. He was not familiar or experienced with such a scenario but did not find it difficult to deal with the incident. He felt very safe and highly responsible for his actions towards himself. He did not feel tempted to do the wrong thing or deprived if he acted on his judgement. He was in a flow mode and did not experience a conflict of values and felt good with himself as he considered his parents had taught him well. He was aware of how he would feel if he did not act upon his judgement.

**Scenario 2**
Involved a situation of moderate moral weighting between himself and a highly respected friend, where he felt conflicted re the right thing to do versus the values of loyalty and friendship. He felt moderately safe and highly responsible for his actions towards himself and others. He had low experience and familiarity and found it very difficult to deal with the situation. He was highly tempted to do the wrong thing and would feel moderately deprived if he acted on judgement. He experienced flight mode and considered that in the same scenario, his friend would do the same for him, hence he did not act on moral judgement. He did not know how he would feel, until after he had failed to act on judgement.
**Analysis of Response**

In scenario 1 the situation seems to be relatively easy for him to follow through from judgement to action, yet difficult in scenario 2. Comparing scenario 1 with 2, his perception of the level of safety has decreased from high to moderate, temptation has increased from low to high, and sense of deprivation has increased from low to moderate.

His reaction in scenario 1 was to go with the flow, however in scenario 2 he shifted to a flight mode. The second scenario he appears to find more difficult, does not feel as safe and his levels of temptation and deprivation have increased. This is verified in his statement that he has become conflicted in his values and is struggling with his sense of loyalty and friendship, which outweigh his desire to act on judgement.

In both scenarios he had low familiarity and experience, however, in the first scenario he did not have a conflict in values but in the second scenario he did. When there was a consistency in values he was very clear about acting on judgement and he also knew how he would feel if he failed to act. In the second scenario it was more important to be loyal to his friend but he did not realise how he would feel until he compromised his values.

His reflection about his action in scenario 1, showed high levels of satisfaction and responsibility, and in scenario 2, a low level of satisfaction that he had not lived up to his moral ideal. He did not rate his level of moral responsibility as highly in the second scenario.
Male 4 Profile/8

| Age Range: | 50-60 |
| Occupation: | Consultant Trainer |
| Gender: | Male |
| Ethnic Background: | Caucasian (European) |
| Level of Education: | Masters Degree |
| Religious Background: | Humanist |
| Date of Subject’s Response: 07/04/2002 |

Response data from questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Failure to act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Situation High moral weighting, high respect, high familiarity, high experience, high difficulty, moderate safety, high temptation, low deprivation, high responsibility self/others</td>
<td>1 Situation High moral weighting, high respect, moderate familiarity, moderate experience, high difficulty, low safety, high temptation, high deprivation, high responsibility self/others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Reaction Both fight and flow mode. Based on previous encounters, perception, feelings, facts, who was involved and possibility to talk it through, share values and research it</td>
<td>2 Reaction Flight mode. Influenced by previous encounters, perceptions, mostly by feelings and who was involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Values Conflict of values related to freedom, independence/growth through new situations versus care, solidarity, love. Possibility of feeling imprisoned, controlled versus feeling lonely, unhappy and not stimulated. Independence/growth is more important than to be nurtured cuddled and safe. The concept of marriage is for me connected to feelings and values: boring automated, closed, rule –based behaviour, too easy, no creativity, no initiative, the “other will think and feel for you,” no surprises, taking over each other’s life, meaning of life connected to the other instead to ones own values.</td>
<td>3 Values Between two ladies that I love. Feeling guilty towards my own values; maybe loosing both ladies. No one of the two ladies should feel hurt, that was impossible to combine. Lying is not telling, is better if it harms the other. I can handle it, just as everyone: lying, not telling everything is part of everyone’s life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Action Knew how feel if you did the wrong thing, Strength of convictions to carry out action, Not feel deprived.</td>
<td>4 Action You could get away with the situation (no-one would know)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reflection-5,6,7</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Non Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How important was it to live up to your moral ideals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How satisfied were you that you lived up to your moral ideals</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you rate your level of moral responsibility</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of data male 4

Scenario 1

Involved a situation of high moral weighting between himself and a person he loved and highly respected, where there was a conflict of values between “loss of freedom, independence/growth through new situations versus care, solidarity and love.” (Marry or not to marry) He was highly familiar and highly experienced with such a conflict and found it very difficult to deal with the choice. However, he felt highly tempted to marry but would not feel deprived if he did not. He felt moderately safe and highly responsible for his actions towards himself and the other person. He felt somewhat conflicted as he experienced both a fight and flow mode. He was able to act...
on his judgement as he would not feel deprived and knew how he would feel if he did the wrong thing. Ultimately he had the strength of his convictions to act on his judgement.

**Scenario 2**
Related to a situation with high moral weighting where he was involved with two women, he highly respected and chose not to tell one of the women about his involvement with another woman, so as not to hurt her. He had a moderate degree of experience and familiarity with such a situation but still found it moderately difficult to deal with. He did not feel very safe and experienced the desire to flee but felt highly responsible for his actions towards himself and the others. He felt highly tempted to do the wrong thing and would feel highly deprived if he was true to his value system. He was aware that his actions may lead to loosing both women. As he believed he could get away with the situation (no-one would know) he failed to act on judgement.

**Analysis of Response**
Both scenarios had similar factors such as high moral weighting, high difficulty, high temptation and high responsibility for self and others. Yet in scenario one he could act on moral judgement. So what is different. Two factors seem to have impacted, the safety level has dropped from moderate to low and the deprivation factor has moved from low to high in the second scenario.

In both scenarios his values have been clearly articulated in how he has weighed conflicting sets and decided what values have a higher order status. In the first scenario he is battling with himself between two opposing positions so he states he is in both a fight and flow mode, feeling comfortable ultimately with his acting on his decision. In the second scenario he experienced a flight mode. He has decided to compromise his values as he felt he could lie (by not telling) to the other person, hoping he could get away with the situation and nobody would know. He justified the situation by stating “lying is part of everyone’s life.”

It is interesting to note that he shows no disappointment in his failure to act on judgement and considers that he lived up to his moral ideals and has a high level of moral responsibility. He has convinced himself this is acceptable behaviour and nobody will know and neither woman should feel hurt, as he loves them both. The only aspect commented on, is that he is feeling guilty about not adhering to his value base, however his sense of deprivation and consideration that he could get away with it, perhaps, overrides his sense of guilt.
Response data from questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Failure to act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Situation</strong> Involved self, high moral weighting, high respect, low familiarity, low experience, moderate difficulty, high safety, high temptation, low deprivation, high responsibility self/others</td>
<td><strong>1 Situation</strong> Involved self, moderate moral weighting, low respect, low familiarity, low experience, low difficulty, low safety, high temptation, high deprivation, high responsibility self/others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Reaction</strong> Flow mode, Previous encounters, perception, facts</td>
<td><strong>2 Reaction</strong> Fight mode. Previous encounters, perception, facts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 Values</strong> Yes, religious principles vs. personal pleasure. Personal pleasure against not knowing what could happen in the future. Religious background.</td>
<td><strong>3 Values</strong> Ridiculous rules don’t have to be followed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4 Action</strong> Other goals and priorities were not as important</td>
<td><strong>4 Action</strong> You would feel deprived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflection-5,6,7</td>
<td>Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How important was it to live up to your moral ideals</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How satisfied were you that you lived up to your moral ideals</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you rate your level of moral responsibility</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of data male 5

Scenario 1
Involved himself, whom he felt very respectful towards, in a situation of high moral weighting about a course of action, where there was a conflict of values between religious principles vs. personal pleasure. He was not familiar or experienced with such a conflict and found it moderately difficult to deal with the incident. He felt high safety and highly responsible for his actions towards himself and others but highly tempted to do the wrong thing yet would not feel deprived if he acted on his judgement. His reaction was to go with the flow and as other goals and priorities were not as important, he was able to act on moral judgement.

Scenario 2
Involved himself in a situation of moderate moral weighting, where he made a choice not to follow the rules. He had did not feel respectful, or safe in the situation with which he had low familiarity and experience but did not find it difficult to handle. He felt highly responsibility for his actions towards himself and others. He felt highly tempted to do the wrong thing and would feel deprived to act on judgement. His fighting mode considered the rules to be ridiculous and he would feel deprived if he had to follow the rules.

Analysis of Response
There are a number of factors in common between the two scenarios. Both situations have either a moderate or high moral weighting, low familiarity, low experience, high temptation and moderate and low difficulty. There seems to be three factors that may be impacting the failure to act on judgement. In the first scenario there is high respect and it moves to low respect in the
second scenario, along with shifting from high safety to low safety and lastly from low deprivation to high deprivation.

In scenario 1 the reaction is based on going with the flow but in the second one it is based on a fight mode. Even though both scenarios involve high temptation it did not impact in the first. The reason given for acting on judgement was based on other goals and priorities were not as important. However, in scenario 2 the reason given was that he would feel deprived, along with his values assessment that they were ridiculous rules and should not be followed. As further explanation was not given, it is not clear what these rules related to; the moral situation was expressed as of low weighting.

In scenario 2 similarly with the response for Male 4, importance of living up to moral ideals was high and he was highly satisfied he had lived up to his ideals and still considered himself highly responsible. He has broken the rules, as he does not consider them to be worthy of following. It was not his problem but the problem belonged to the rule makers. It is not clear if he was prepared to acknowledge there might have been any valid reason for the rules.
Male 6 Profile/10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Range:</th>
<th>60+</th>
<th>Occupation:</th>
<th>Retired Elementary Principal Consultant</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender:</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Ethnic Background:</td>
<td>Filipino</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Education:</td>
<td>Bachelor of Education</td>
<td>Religious Background:</td>
<td>Christian Evangelical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of Subject’s Response:</td>
<td>03/15/02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Response data from questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Failure to act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Situation</strong> Involved self and relative. High degree of moral weighting, high respect, high familiarity, high experience, high difficulty, high safety, moderate temptation, high deprivation, high responsibility self/others</td>
<td><strong>1 Situation</strong> Involved Self and Relative High moral weighting, high respect, high familiarity, moderate experience, high difficulty, moderate safety, high temptation, high deprivation low responsibility towards self and conflicted between low and high for others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Reaction</strong> Fight mode, based on previous encounters, perception, feelings, facts, who was involved</td>
<td><strong>2 Reaction</strong> Fight mode Based on previous experiences, perception, feelings, facts, who was involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 Values</strong> Relationships, reality judgements Satisfaction of providing assistance, good relationship with relatives; bankruptcy, possible break up of family and blaming one another. Being realistic weighing facts vs. emotions.</td>
<td><strong>3 Values</strong> Doing what is right versus emotions/relationships Reward-Feeling of acceptance, being kind, risk/Cost bankruptcy, break up of family. Blood is thicker than water.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4 Action</strong> You did not want to experience the consequences of failing to act, you respected the people involved, had strength of convictions, self disciplined</td>
<td><strong>4 Action</strong> You did not know how you would feel by doing the wrong thing, did not respected the people involved, did not have the strength of conviction to carry out the action, not self disciplined enough.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reflection-5,6,7</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Non Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How important was it to live up to your moral ideals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How satisfied were you that you lived up to your moral ideals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you rate your level of moral responsibility</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of data male 6

**Scenario 1**

Involved a situation of high moral weighting between a highly respected relative and himself, about a course of action, where he was helping a relative to weigh between facts and emotions re possible bankruptcy. He was highly familiar and highly experienced with such a scenario but found it difficult to deal with the incident. He felt high safety and high responsible for his actions towards himself and his relative. He felt moderately tempted to do the wrong thing and high deprivation if he acted on his judgement. He was prepared to fight for what he believed to be the right course of action. He respected his relatives and did not wish to experience the consequences for not acting on judgement, he also had the strength of conviction and self discipline to translate judgement into action.
Scenario 2
Related to a situation of high moral weighting with a highly respected relative, involving a choice between doing the right thing and maintaining the relationship and unity of the family. He had a moderate degree of experience and high familiarity with such a situation but still found it very difficult to deal with. He felt moderately safe and low responsible for his actions towards himself and conflicted between low and high responsibility for his actions towards others. He was reacting in fight mode and felt highly tempted to do the wrong thing and would feel high deprivation if he acted on judgement. He did not respect the people involved, he did not have the strength of his convictions, he did not know how he would feel by doing the wrong thing and that felt he was not self disciplined enough.

Analysis of Response
The majority of factors are almost identical, both scenarios are of high moral weighting, involving high respect, high familiarity, high difficulty, high deprivation and high respect for others. In the second scenario five factors seem to have impacted. The respect factor has moved from high to low, high to moderate experience, the safety factor has moved from high to low, from moderate temptation to high temptation and from high to low responsibility for self.

This last statement is verified by the clash of values in scenario 2 where he is torn between what is right and the needs of his family and his desire to be kind and accepted by his family. In order for him to go against what he considered the right thing to do, it reduced his view of self-responsibility to low. While in the first scenario he did act on judgement, it did not seem to involve a choice against his value base but coincided with his relationship values.

It is interesting to note that in both scenarios he was in fight mode. It would seem what he was fighting about was different. In the first situation it was fighting to save something and to be realistic in weighing up between facts and emotions.

With the exception of the first reason, the reasons given for action in the two scenarios are almost the opposite or juxtaposition of each other. In scenario1 he understood the consequences of failing to act on judgement in the second he did not understand until after the event how he would feel. He realized he did not respect the people and also considered he did not have the strength of his convictions or the self-discipline to act on moral judgement.

When reflecting on his moral capabilities in scenario one he gave himself the highest rating in all three questions. In the second scene it was not important to live up to his ideal, he was not satisfied that he had and rated his level of moral responsibility at the lowest level. Clearly he was dissatisfied with his response and gave up any expectation that he could do the right thing, but had considered that it was more important to support his family, “blood is thicker than water.”
Male 7 Profile/11

Age Range: 50-60
Gender: Male
Occupation: Consultant
Level of Education: BA
Date of Subject's Response: June 2002

Ethnic Background: African American
Religious Background: Bahá’í Faith

Response data from questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Failure to act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Situation</strong> involved self, relative and acquaintance. High moral weighting, high respect, low familiarity, moderate experience, high difficulty, low safety, low temptation, moderate deprivation, high responsibility self/others</td>
<td><strong>1 Situation</strong> involved self and a stranger, high moral weighting, high respect, moderate familiarity, high experience, high difficulty, low safety, high temptation, moderate deprivation, high responsibility for self and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Reaction</strong> Flow mode reaction based on perception, feelings, facts, who was involved</td>
<td><strong>2 Reaction</strong> Go with the flow, based on perception, feelings facts, who was involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 Values</strong> To be a truth seeker and teller on a liar Risk loss of job, loss of prestige, hurt to family and friends. Reward retention of personal integrity, having comfort knowing I told the truth. Matter of spiritual conscience</td>
<td><strong>3 Values</strong> I could address the racially biased comments made or not. I wanted to stand up for my colleagues who were falsely and unjustly accused in a wrong doing. I could have lost favour of the group. My administrator could have terminated my contract. I did not like my colleagues being accused unjustly, thus working for justice was a higher priority even though I felt this way. I did not speak up because I rationalized the matter was not terribly important and would blow over.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4 Action</strong> Felt a deep need to please God and only the truth would do. This caused me to feel better.</td>
<td><strong>4 Action</strong> Lacked courage to take a stand</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reflection-5,6,7</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Non Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How important was it to live up to your moral ideals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How satisfied were you that you lived up to your moral ideals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you rate your level of moral responsibility</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of data male 7

Scenario 1

Involved a situation of high moral weighting between self, relative and acquaintance, whom he respected highly, about a course of action, whether to be a truth seeker and teller on a liar or not. He was not familiar and only moderately experienced with such a conflict and found it highly difficult to deal with the incident. He felt low safety but highly responsible for his actions towards himself and others. He did not feel tempted to do the wrong thing and would feel moderate deprived if he acted on his judgement. Even though his choice involved the risk of job loss, loss of prestige, hurt to family and friends, his reward would be retention of personal integrity and having the comfort of knowing he told the truth. His reaction was based on a flow mode and he felt a deep need to please God and only the truth would do. This caused him to feel better.
**Scenario 2**

Involved self and a highly respected stranger in a situation of high moral weighting in a course of action where he could address the racially biased comments made or not. He had high experience and was moderately familiarity with the scenario but found it very difficult to deal with the situation. He did not feel safe but felt highly responsible for his actions towards himself and others. He was highly tempted to do the wrong thing and would feel moderately deprived if he acted on judgement. He experienced a flow mode as he rationalized the matter was not terribly important and would blow over. He was conflicted about the implications for speaking up and did not wish to take the risk of not having his contract renewed, he considered he lacked the courage to take a stand.

**Analysis of Response**

There are only subtle differences between the responses for the two scenarios regarding situational factors. Equal weighting was given to a high moral weighting, high respect, low safety, moderate deprivation and high responsibility for self and others. In scenario 2 it moves from low to moderate familiarity, moderate to low experience, and the greatest gap is between low to high temptation. In both cases he was in the flow mode so it could be assumed he is approaching the dilemmas in a rational way.

Two factors may be significant, the low safety and the high temptation factor. Even though it exists in both scenarios the safety factor can be interpreted in relation to the stated values factors. In the first scenario, his reason for acting on moral judgement was expressed as “a deep need to please God and only the truth would do” and a matter of “spiritual conscience,” even though the consequences could have been the same as the second scenario. In the second scenario, the reason given was that he lacked the courage to take a stand. This is supported in the light of a values statement in scenario 2 that he had rationalized the situation as “not being terribly important and would blow over.”

Hence if he did not feel the environment was safe and there was a risk of loosing favour with the group as well as the risk of the non renewal of his contract, even though he expresses that working for justice was a higher priority, he chose not to speak up for something he believed in. He had weighed up the pros and cons of the different courses of action, he was highly tempted not to follow through on judgment and decided he needed to protect himself first. At this time he may not have had the protection of the law against discrimination regarding racial comments.

When reflecting on his moral capabilities in scenario one he gave himself the highest rating for importance of living up to moral ideals and satisfaction that he had lived up to them but a moderate rating re moral responsibility. In the second scene it was important to live up to his ideal, he gave the lowest rating re his satisfaction and responsibility levels. Clearly he was dissatisfied with his response.
Male 8 Profile/16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Range:</th>
<th>30-40</th>
<th>Occupation:</th>
<th>Research Scientist</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Caucasian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Level of Education:</td>
<td>PH.D.</td>
<td>Religious Background:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>03/28/2003</td>
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</table>

Response data from questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Failure to act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Situation involved self and friend, High moral weighting, high respect, low familiarity, low experience, high difficulty, moderate safety, moderate temptation, low deprivation, high responsibility self moderate responsibility to others.</td>
<td>1 Situation involved self and friend, high moral weighting, high respect, low familiarity, low experience, low difficulty, low safety, low temptation, moderate deprivation, moderate responsibility for self, high responsibility for others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Reaction Flow mode, based on previous encounters perception, feelings, who was involved</td>
<td>2 Reaction Flight mode, based on perception, feelings, facts and who was involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Values Reduced time to get to a certain goal in educational career.</td>
<td>3 Values No comments given.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Action Did not want to experience the consequences for failing to act, had strength of convictions</td>
<td>4 Action You were unaware of what the consequences would be for failing to act. You did not know how you would feel by doing the wrong thing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reflection-5,6,7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How important was it to live up to your moral ideals</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Non Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How satisfied were you that you lived up to your moral ideals</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you rate your level of moral responsibility</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of data male 8

Scenario 1

Involved a highly respected friend and himself in a situation of high moral weighting about a course of action, which would reduce the time to get to a certain goal in his educational career. He was not familiar or experienced with such a process and found it difficult to deal with the scenario. He felt moderately safe, highly responsible for his actions towards himself and moderate responsibility to others. He felt moderate temptation to do the wrong thing and low deprivation if he acted on his judgement. He reacted in a flow mode and did not want to experience the consequences for failing to act and considered he had the strength of conviction to act on moral judgement.

Scenario 2

Involved self and a highly respected friend in a situation of high moral weighting. He had low experience and familiarity with the scenario and did not find it difficult to deal with the situation. He did not feel safe but felt moderate responsibility for his actions towards himself and high responsibility for his actions towards others. He experienced low temptation to do the wrong thing and would feel moderately deprive if he acted on judgement. He experienced a flight mode and was unaware of what the consequences would be for failing to act. In addition he did not know how he would feel by doing the wrong thing.
Analysis of Response
A few of the situational factors are the same in both scenarios, high moral weighting, high respect, low familiarity, and low experience. The second scenario moves difficulty from high to low, safety from moderate to low, temptation from moderate to low, deprivation from low to moderate, responsibility for self from high to moderate and responsibility for other from moderate to high. The only factors that may impact are the slight shift to a lower feeling of safety, small shift in feeling more deprived and feeling less responsibility for actions towards self. Another impact may be the change in reaction from going with the flow in the first scenario to wanting to flee in the second one.

No comments were given re the values involved, the only other insights relate to the reasons given for failing to act, of not realizing the consequences or how he would feel regarding his failure to act. It would suggest a factor of ignorance and the situational factors of low expedience and low familiarity would seem to support this interpretation.

While the experience and familiarity facts were the same in scenario 1 his reasons for acting on judgement were that he did not want to experience the consequence and he had the strength of conviction to act on judgement. Wanting to reach an educational goal in reduced time, motivated him to action.

In scenario 2 he had a high level of importance to live up to his moral ideals but a low satisfaction with living up to his ideals and his level of moral responsibility indicating dissatisfaction with his ability to act on judgement.
Response data from questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Failure to act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Situation</strong> involved self and friend. Moderate moral weighting, moderate respect, high familiarity, high experience, moderate difficulty, moderate safety, low temptation, low deprivation, high responsibility for self and moderate responsibility for others</td>
<td><strong>1 Situation</strong> involved self and friend. Moderate moral weighting, high respect, moderate familiarity, moderate experience, moderate difficulty, high safety, high temptation, high deprivation, high responsibility for self and moderate responsibility for others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Reaction</strong> Fight mode, based on previous encounters, perception, feelings, facts and who was involved</td>
<td><strong>2 Reaction</strong> flight mode, previous encounters, perception, feelings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 Values</strong> No Conflict—Nothing much in this situation. Not very bad and not very good</td>
<td><strong>3 Values</strong> Yes which to prefer Yes felt bad for sometime, no money involved so no hassles. No justification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4 Action</strong> You could not get away with it. Had the strength of convictions.</td>
<td><strong>4 Action</strong> You were unaware of what the consequences would be for failing to act. You did not know how you would feel by doing the wrong thing, You could get away with it and felt deprived</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reflection-5,6,7</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Non Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How important was it to live up to your moral ideals</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How satisfied were you that you lived up to your moral ideals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you rate your level of moral responsibility</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Summary of data male 9

**Scenario 1**
Involved himself and a moderately respected friend in a situation of moderate moral weighting. He had high familiarity and experience with such a scenario and found it moderately difficult to deal with. He felt moderately safe, highly responsible for his actions towards himself and moderately responsible for his actions towards others. He did not feel tempted to do the wrong thing or deprived if he acted on his judgement. He did not have a conflict in values and although he was in fight mode, he decided he could not get away with not acting on judgement. He also had the strength of convictions to act on judgement.

**Scenario 2**
Involved a situation of moderate moral weighting between himself and a highly respected friend, where he felt conflicted re “which to prefer.” He had moderate experience and familiarity and found it moderately difficult to deal with the situation. He felt high safety and highly responsible for his actions towards himself and others. He was highly tempted to do the wrong thing and would feel highly deprived if he acted on judgement. He experienced flight
mode and “felt bad for sometime, no money involved so no hassles.” He felt deprived and considered he could get away with it, however, he was unaware of what the consequences would be for failing to act or how he would feel, until after he had failed to act on judgement.

**Analysis of Response**

Several factors are the same between the two scenarios. Both had a moderate moral weighting, moderate respect, moderate difficulty, high responsibility for self and moderate responsibility for others. Variations are indicated in the second scenario relating to a shift from high to moderate familiarity, high to moderate experience, moderate to high safety, low to high temptation, low deprivation to high deprivation.

Four factors seem to impact in the second scenario, he is slightly less familiar and experienced in the scenario and is more tempted and feels more deprived. These situational factors are supported by the reason given in scenario 2 of not being aware of the consequences for failing to act, and not knowing how he would feel, reinforces the lack of familiarity and experience. The second aspect of he could get away with it and would feel deprived, seem to relate to the situational factors of feeling highly tempted and highly deprived.

The reaction mode has changed from fight in the first scenario to flight in the second one. The motivation for action in the first scenario was that they could not get away with it and his strength of conviction. It also did not involve a conflict of values. Here the factor of belief along with external accountability has influenced the desire to act. In the second situation his personal desires to make a choice of one person over another and that he could get away with it.

Responses to reflections in the second scenario indicate a desire to live up to his moral ideals, even though he failed to act, he rated his satisfaction and level of moral responsibility highly. It would seem at the time he considered he had a right to choose one person over the other and did not know himself well enough, to know the impact of his failure to act on his judgement. It resulted in him “feeling bad for some time.” Even on reflection it would appear he still felt as though his actions were justified or he could suffice his actions, hence his high ratings.
Male 10 Profile/20

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<th>Age Range:</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Level of Education:</td>
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<td>Religious Background:</td>
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Response data from questionnaire

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Failure to act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Situation</td>
<td>involved self and a friend. High moral weighting, moderate respect, moderate familiarity, high experience, high difficulty, moderate safety, high temptation, low deprivation, high responsibility self/others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Situation</td>
<td>involved self and a friend. High moral weighting, high respect, moderate familiarity, low experience, high difficulty, high temptation, high deprivation, high responsibility self/others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Reaction</td>
<td>Flow mode, previous encounters, perception, feelings, facts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Reaction</td>
<td>Flow mode, perception, feelings, facts, who was involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Values</td>
<td>I wanted to be right almost at any cost. The cost was extremely high at risk was more than 20 years reputation of honest hard work. That I had the right because of my experience and work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Values</td>
<td>Conflict of values, religious vs. moral Justification: others were doing it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Action</td>
<td>Did not want to experience the consequences for failing to act. Knew how would feel by doing the wrong thing. Respected people involved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Action</td>
<td>You could get away with the situation (no-one would know) You would feel deprived; You were not self disciplined enough.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reflection -5,6,7</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Non Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How important was it to live up to your moral ideals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How satisfied were you that you lived up to your moral ideals</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you rate your level of moral responsibility</td>
<td>4</td>
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</table>

Summary of data male 10

Scenario 1

Involved a situation with a moderately respected friend and himself, of high moral weighting about a course of action, where he wanted to be right almost at any cost. He had moderate familiarity and high experience with such a situation and found it highly difficult to deal with the incident. He felt moderately safe and highly responsible for his actions towards himself and his friend. He felt highly tempted to do the wrong thing but low deprivation if he acted on his judgement. Even though he wanted to be right at almost any cost he realized the risk to his 20 years reputation of hard work and experience and reacted in a flow mode. He respected people involved and did not want to experience the consequences for failing to act as he knew how he would feel if he failed to act on judgement.

Scenario 2

Involved a situation of high moral weighting between himself and a highly respected friend, where he felt conflicted re religious values versus what was moral. He had moderate familiarity and low experience and found it very difficult to deal with the situation. He felt low safety and
highly responsible for his actions towards himself and others. He was highly tempted to do the wrong thing and would feel highly deprived if he acted on judgement. He experienced a flow mode and considered that in the same scenario, “others were doing it,” hence he did not act on moral judgement. In the situation he felt deprived and decided not to act as he could get away with the situation (no-one would know), but realized he was not self disciplined enough.

**Analysis of Response**

The two scenarios had a number of factors in common, high moral weighting, moderate familiarity, high difficulty, high temptation and high responsibility for actions towards self and others. The variations occurred from scenario 1 to 2 in the areas of high to low experience, moderate safety to low safety, low deprivation to high deprivation. These three factors seem to be influential in the failure to act.

Both scenarios indicate he was in a flow mode. In the first scenario he had sufficient experience to understand the consequences of his choices and how he would feel if he failed to act, supported by his respect for the person. In the second scenario his lack of experience plus his sense of deprivation would seem to have influenced his decision not to act on moral judgement. While he had a conflict of values between his religious and moral values he justified his action that other people were also doing what he wanted to do. It is not clear how he has differentiated between moral and religious values except that he may have broken a religious law but justified it by saying that others were doing it hence the moral value may be interpreted as a norm in this situation.

He links his reasons together that he would feel deprived and could get away with it but realized he was not self disciplined enough to act on moral judgement. His remorse re his actions is suggested in a high desire to live up to his ideals and a high level of dissatisfaction with living up to these ideals and a low rating for his level of moral responsibility.
Male 11 Profile/21

| Age Range: | 30-40 |
| Occupation: Teacher |
| Gender: | Male |
| Ethnic Background: | Central American, African |
| Level of Education: | B.A. |
| Religious Background: | Bahá’í |
| Date of Subject’s Response: | 03/28/2003 |

Response data from questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Situation involved self and a friend. High moral weighting, high respect, high familiarity, moderate experience, high difficulty, low safety, high temptation, high deprivation, high responsibility for self, low responsibility for others.</td>
<td>1 Situation involved self and a friend. High moral weighting, moderate respect, low familiarity, low experience, high difficulty, low safety, high temptation, high deprivation, low responsibility for self and high respect for others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Reaction Flow mode previous encounters, perception, feelings, who was involved</td>
<td>2 Reaction Fight mode, based on perception, feelings, knowledge of the facts and who was involved. The desire not to hurt somebody and not to be alone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Values Friendship based on trust, the person wanted a friendship based on pleasure. Self respect versus momentary pleasure. I wanted to have a break with past habits, start on a new clean slate. I wanted to hold my head up high and be secure in a relationship.</td>
<td>3 Values Wanted solid friendship based on trust and communication. They wanted something based on convenience. Loneliness versus acceptance. I thought I could break away at a later time or the situation would change. My self-respect plummeted after failing to make the critical right choice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Action Did not want to experience the consequences of failing to act. Respected people involved To revive my conscience</td>
<td>4 Action Unaware of the consequences of failing to act Did not know how feel if you did the wrong thing Could get away with it You would feel deprived</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of data male 11

Scenario 1

Involved a highly respected friend and himself in a situation of high moral weighting about a conflict of values between self-respect versus momentary pleasure. He was highly familiar and had moderate experienced with such a scenario and found it difficult to deal with the situation. He didn’t feel safe but highly responsible for his actions towards himself and low responsibility for his actions towards the other. He felt highly tempted to do the wrong thing and highly deprived if he acted on his judgement. He experienced a flow mode perhaps because he was convinced he “wanted to break with past habits and start a new clean slate.” He “wanted to hold his head up high and be secure in a relationship.” He respected the person involved and did not want to experience the consequences of failing to act and to revive his conscience.
**Scenario 2**
Involved a moderately respected friend in a situation of high moral weighting between himself and a highly respected friend, where he felt conflicted re his actions to avoid loneliness versus acceptance. He had low experience and familiarity and found it very difficult to deal with the situation. He felt low safety and low responsibility for his actions towards himself and high responsibility for his actions towards others. He was highly tempted to do the wrong thing and would feel high deprivation if he acted on judgement.

**Analysis of Response**
He experienced flight mode, as he wanted a solid friendship based on trust and communication rather than something based on convenience. He did not translate his judgement into action as he would feel deprived and considered he could get away with his actions. He was unaware of the consequences and how he would feel, until after he had failed to act on judgement.

There are a number of similar situational factors involved in the two scenarios, high moral weighting, high difficulty, low safety, high temptation, and high deprivation. Variations occur from scenario 1-2 from high to moderate respect, high to low familiarity, moderate to low experience, high to low responsibility for actions towards self and low to high responsibility towards others for actions.

Two areas seem to be highlighted in failure to act on judgement, his lower level of experience and familiarity and relational factors of a lessening respect for the person as well as himself. His mode of reaction changes from flow to fight (would appear with himself, re his value system versus his emotional needs) indicating a downshifted position. In the first scenario he had sufficient experience to understand what would be the consequences for his actions yet in the second he did not, as one of his reasons given was he was unaware of the consequences or how he would feel until after the fact. In the first case he respected the people involved however, in the second situation he felt less respect for the person.

The values articulated and reason for not following through support these stated situational factors. His sense of deprivation re not meeting his emotional needs of friendship, trust, communication and acceptance influenced his decision not to act on moral judgement. He also considered he could get away with it, however, he did not realize how he would feel about his decision until after he failed to act on his moral judgement.

His statement “My self-respect plummeted after failing to make the critical right choice” is supported by his reflections re his low assessment of his satisfaction with living up to his moral ideals and level of moral responsibility. However he had only set himself a very low expectation of his level of how important it was to live up to his moral ideal. His emotional needs have influenced his decision not to act on judgement. Once again it is the situation of sufficing as he hoped to break away from the situation over time or he hoped the situation would change.
Response data from questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Failure to act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1 Situation involved self. High moral weighting, high respect, high familiarity, high experience, high difficulty, high safety, moderate temptation, low deprivation, high responsibility self/others. | 1 Situation involved self and a relative
Moderate moral weighting, moderate respect, high familiarity, low experience, low difficulty, moderate safety, low temptation, moderate deprivation, high responsibility for self and moderate responsibility for others |
| 2 Reaction Flow mode. Previous encounters, perception, feelings and who was involved | 2 Reaction Flow mode, previous encounters, perception, feelings, knowledge of facts, and who was involved |
| 3 Values No Conflict values. Felt good doing the right thing. | 3 Values Family and religious values-heart broken. I feel strongly about moral values and sometimes I feel that people get confused about liberty and forget boundaries. |
| 4 Action Did not want to experience the consequences for failing to act | 4 Action Other goals and priorities were more important |

Reflection-5,6,7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How important was it to live up to your moral ideals</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Non Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HOW satisfied were you that you lived up to your moral ideals</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you rate your level of moral responsibility</td>
<td>5</td>
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</table>

Summary of data female 1

Scenario 1
Involved a situation of high moral weighting where she highly respected herself. She was highly familiar and highly experienced with such a conflict and found it highly difficult to deal with the incident. She felt highly safe as well as highly responsible for her actions towards herself and others. She experienced low temptation to do the wrong thing and low deprivation if she acted on her judgement. She did not experience any conflict in values and reacted based on a flow mode, not wanting to experience the consequences for failing to act on judgement.

Scenario 2
Involved self and a moderately respected relative in a situation of moderate moral weighting where she felt conflicted re family and religious values. She had low experience and high familiarity and did not find it very difficult to deal with the situation. She felt moderately safe and highly responsible for her actions towards herself and moderate responsibility for her actions towards others. She was feeling low temptation to do the wrong thing and would feel moderately deprived if she acted on judgement. Even though she experienced a conflict in values, she reacted based on a flow mode, as other goals and priorities were more important.
Analysis of Response
Only two situational factors are the same between the two scenarios, high familiarity and high responsibility for actions towards self. The difference between scenario 1 and 2 shifted from high to moderate respect, high to low experience, high to moderate safety, moderate to low temptation and low to moderate deprivation and high to moderate responsibility for actions towards others.

It may be that these moderate shifts are not very significant in the light of the reason for not acting on moral judgement, stated as other goals and priorities were more important. This is further validated by the highest assessment for both scenario 1 and 2 of how important it was to live up to moral ideals, how satisfied and the rating of her level of moral responsibility. It would seem she does not consider she has made a mistake in her judgement, it was simply a matter of different goals and priorities.

In both cases she operated in a flow mode, the conflict of values was between her family and religious values. She is clear that moral values are important but it is not clear how she has chosen, except to say she was heart broken but does not state about what. The only insight is in the statement “I feel that people get confused about liberty and forget boundaries.”
Response data from questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Failure to act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Situation involved self. Moderate moral weighting, high respect, high familiarity, high experience, high difficulty, moderate safety, low temptation, low deprivation, high responsibility self/others</td>
<td>1 Situation involved self and an acquaintance. Low moral weighting, high respect, high familiarity, high experience, low difficulty, high safety, low temptation, moderate deprivation, high responsibility self/others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Reaction Flow mode. Previous encounters, perception, feelings, facts and who was involved</td>
<td>2 Reaction Flight mode. Previous encounters, perception, feelings, facts, who was involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Values No conflict of values. My conscience guides me I want to do the right thing The Bible and Prayer guide me too.</td>
<td>3 Values No Conflict of values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Action You had strength of conviction</td>
<td>4 Action Other goals and priorities were more important</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reflection-5,6,7 Action Non Action

| How important was it to live up to your moral ideals | 5 | 5 |
| How satisfied were you that you lived up to your moral ideals | 5 | 5 |
| How would you rate your level of moral responsibility | 5 | 5 |

Summary of data female 2

Scenario 1
Involved a high respect for self in a situation of moderate moral weighting about a course of action, where there was no clash of values. She was highly familiar and highly experienced with such a scenario and found it very difficult to deal with the incident. She felt moderately safe and felt highly responsible for her actions towards herself and others. She felt low temptation to do the wrong thing and low deprivation if she acted on her judgement. She was in flow mode stated that conscience, prayer and the Bible guided her and that she had the strength of her convictions to act on judgement.

Scenario 2
Involved self and an acquaintance in a situation of low moral weighting about a course of action, where there was no clash of values. She had high experience and high familiarity and did not find it difficult to deal with the situation. She felt highly safe and highly responsible for her actions towards herself and others. She was not tempted to do the wrong thing and would feel moderately deprived if she acted on judgement. She experienced flight mode and failed to act on moral judgement as she considered other goals and priorities were more important.

Analysis of Response
The two situational factors for scenario one and two are almost identical, both have high respect, high familiarity, high experience, low temptation, low deprivation and high
responsibility for actions towards self and others. Variations occurred from scenario 1 to 2 from moderate to low moral weighting, high difficulty to low difficulty, moderate safety to high safety. No one factor appears to be significant. This follows a similar pattern to female respondent 1 who also gave the reason for failure to act on judgment as other goals and priorities were more important. Likewise there is no difference between scenario one and two, the highest rating was given to both re importance of living up to moral ideals, level of satisfaction and rating of moral responsibility.

There was no conflict in values for the second scenario. She was highly familiar and experienced in both scenarios. She was feeling moderately deprived in the second scenario and was experiencing a desire to flee. A shift re feeling deprived and desire to flee seem to be the only two insights that may have impacted. Other goals and priorities seems to be interpreted as an acceptable course of action without a sense of guilt or judging herself as falling short re lack of action.
Female 3 Profile/5

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Response data from questionnaire

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Failure to act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Situation involved self and a relative. High moral weighting, high respect, low familiarity, low experience, low difficulty, low safety, low temptation, low deprivation, high responsibility self/others</td>
<td>1 Situation involved self and an acquaintance. High moral weighting, high respect, low familiarity, low experience, low difficulty, high safety, low temptation, low deprivation moderate responsibility for self and others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Reaction Flow mode, based on previous encounters, perception, feelings, facts, who was involved</td>
<td>2 Reaction Flow mode, based on perception, feelings, facts and who was involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Values No, unfortunately for the person asking for permission to do something not acceptable to me, my beliefs are immovable. Being able to reflect upon my behaviour and judgement is very important to me. At the end of the day I have to live peacefully with myself. I had to make sure the people involved would do the right thing and sooner or later they would recognize they were wrong. I had faith in them and they did do the right thing.</td>
<td>3 Values No conflict of values. The worst punishment is administered by my conscience, therefore no material reward is worth that punishment. Felt led in to a situation that I could not predict the outcome.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Action You had strength of conviction</td>
<td>4 Action You did not know how you would feel by doing the wrong thing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of data female 3

Scenario 1
Involved a highly respected relative and herself in a situation of high moral weighting about a course of action, where the person was asking for permission to do something not acceptable to her. She stated her beliefs were immovable. She had low familiarity and low experience with such a scenario and found low difficulty in dealing with the incident. She felt low safety, but felt highly responsible for her actions towards herself and others. She felt low temptation to do the wrong thing and low deprivation if she acted on her judgement. She was in flow mode and gave the reason for acting on judgement as having the strength of her convictions.

Scenario 2
Involved self and a highly respected acquaintance in a situation of high moral weighting, where there was no clash of values about a course of action where she felt led into a situation that she could not predict the outcome. She had low experience and low familiarity and did not find it difficult to deal with the situation. She felt highly safety and moderate responsibility for her actions towards herself and others. She was not tempted to do the wrong thing and would not
feel deprived if she acted on judgement. She experienced flow mode and failed to act on moral judgement, as she did not know how she would feel by doing the wrong thing until after the event.

**Analysis of Response**

The two scenario situational factors appear to be almost identical, both have high moral weighting, high respect, low familiarity, low experience, low deprivation, and low temptation. In the second scenario the safety factor moves from low to high and from high to moderate in responsibility for actions towards self and others.

The low familiarity and experience factors may be impacting. Even though it is true in both scenarios, in the first scenario she had the strength of her convictions and she was very clear about her beliefs and what was acceptable and not acceptable. She states in the second scenario that she “Felt led into a situation that I could not predict the outcome.” Her reason for not acting on moral judgement stated she did not know how she would feel by doing the wrong thing. It would appear she felt only a moderate sense of responsibility for her actions towards self and others. She seems to have abrogated her will and ability to choose by her comment that she felt led and could not predict the outcome indicating she thought it was beyond her control, supporting the assessment of low experience and low familiarity.

Here again we see the phenomena of the highest score re reflections on importance of living up to moral ideals and how satisfied she is with living up to these and rating of level of moral responsibility. She is in a flow mode for both scenarios and has no conflict of values in either scenario and at the time did not judge herself as falling short of her expectations.
Female 4 Profile

Age Range: 50-60
Gender: Female
Level of Education: B.A.

Occupation: Musician, historian, coordinator.
Ethnic Background: German/American
Religious Background: Bahá’í Catholic

Date of Subject’s Response: 03/28/03

Response data from questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Failure to act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Situation involved self. Low moral weighting, high respect, high familiarity, high experience, low difficulty, high safety, moderate temptation, low deprivation, high responsibility self/others.</td>
<td>1 Situation involved self and relative. High moral weighting, high respect, low familiarity, low experience, moderate difficulty, low safety, low temptation, high deprivation, high responsibility for self and others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Reaction Flow mode. Based on previous encounters, feelings, facts, who was involved</td>
<td>2 Reaction Flow mode. Based on perception, feelings and who was involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Values Don’t covert/steal regardless of ownership when ownership vs. to take if ownership cannot be established. I could have something that I got free but I knew it was not mine. I could get a monetary punishment or in a more serious case prison which may affect career etc. The object was not mine so I had no business to make it my own but left it for the owner to retrieve.</td>
<td>3 Values Love the relatives who were making bad choices, the need to explain the bad choices to them. If I explain the bad choices then I may not be loved and may be shunned by the relatives. How can I imperfect being with my own values, judge others actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Action You respected people involved, strength of convictions and had self disciplined</td>
<td>4 Action Other goals and priorities were more important, you would feel deprived</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ref: Response data from questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reflection</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Non Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.6.7 How important was it to live up to your moral ideals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.7 How satisfied were you that you lived up to your moral ideals</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.7 How would you rate your level of moral responsibility</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of data female 4

Scenario 1
Involved high respect for self in a situation of low moral weighting about a course of action of “don’t covert/steal regardless of ownership.” She was highly familiar and highly experienced with such a scenario and did not find it difficult to deal with the incident. She felt highly safe and felt highly responsible for her actions towards herself and others. She felt moderate temptation to do the wrong thing and low deprivation if she acted on her judgement. She was in flow mode stated that “the object was not mine so I had no business to make it my own but left it for the owner to retrieve.” She respected the people involved, had self-discipline and the strength of her convictions to act on judgement.

Scenario 2
Involved self and a highly respected relative in a situation of high moral weighting about a course of action, where she loved the relatives who were making bad choices. She had low experience and low familiarity and found it moderately difficult to deal with the situation. She felt low safety and highly responsible for her actions towards herself and others. She was not
tempted to do the wrong thing and would feel highly deprived if she acted on judgement. She experienced being in a flow mode and failed to act on moral judgement as she considered other goals and priorities were more important, of maintaining the relationship with her relatives.

**Analysis of Response**

Only two situational factors are the same between scenario 1 and 2 high respect and high responsibility for actions towards self and others. The difference are a movement from scenario 1 to 2, low to high moral responsibility, high to low familiarity, high to low experience, low to high difficulty, high to low safety, moderate to low temptation, and low to high deprivation. The factors that may be impacting here relate to lower familiarity and experience, increased difficulty, feeling less safe and an increased sense of deprivation.

The flow mode was experienced in both scenarios. In both cases her values base is clearly articulated and she is sure about her reasons for action and non-action. In the first scenario she respected the people involved and had strong convictions about the right action and considered herself to be self disciplined, even though she was moderately tempted. In the second scenario she states that other goals and priorities of maintaining the love and not being shunned by her relatives who were making bad choices, was of greater priority. Her next comment “How can I imperfect being with my own values, judge others actions.” gives her rationale that even though she considered they were doing the wrong thing, she does not have the right to judge their actions either.

In both scenarios she considered it highly important to live up to her ideals, in the first one she was moderately satisfied but in the second she gave herself the lowest rating. Clearly she was dissatisfied with her choice even though she rationalized that she did not have the right to judge another. The rating for her sense of moral responsibility was high even though she didn’t act on judgement perhaps, because she valued the interpersonal relationship over acting on judgement.
Response data from questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Failure to act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Situation</strong> involved self and relative. High moral weighting, high respect, high familiarity, high experience, high difficulty, high safety, low temptation, high deprivation, high responsibility self /others</td>
<td><strong>1 Situation</strong> involved self and a friend. high moral weighting, high respect, high familiarity, high experience, low difficulty, high safety, low temptation, low deprivation and high responsibility for self and others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Reaction</strong> Flow mode, based on previous encounters, perception, feelings, facts, who was involved</td>
<td><strong>2 Reaction</strong> Flow Mode. Based on previous encounters, perception, feelings, facts, who was involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 Values</strong> Separating out role of parent with grown daughter. The reward was in finding that our moral values are very similar. Life experience helps human beings to grow and appreciate the wisdom that comes with it. Knowledge, wisdom, spiritual perception and eloquent speech are grounding factors for moral growth.</td>
<td><strong>3 Values</strong> Conflict re standing firm on your beliefs, feeling good about my self-respect. Living with myself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4 Action</strong> You were aware of the consequences for failing to act, knew how you would feel if you did the wrong thing, respected people, had strength of conviction and you were self disciplined</td>
<td><strong>4 Action</strong> You were not self disciplined enough</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of data female 5**

**Scenario 1**
Involved a highly respected daughter and herself in a situation of high moral weighting in a scenario of separating out role of parent with grown daughter. She was highly familiar and highly experienced with such a scenario and found it very difficult to deal with the incident. She felt highly safety and felt highly responsible for her actions towards herself and others. She felt low temptation to do the wrong thing and high deprivation if she acted on her judgement. She was in flow mode as she respected her daughter, had the strength of her conviction, was self disciplined, aware of the consequences and knew how she would feel if she failed to act on judgement.

**Scenario 2**
Involved a highly respected friend and herself in a situation of high moral weighting about a course of action, where she was conflict re standing firm on her beliefs. She had high experience and high familiarity and did not find it difficult to deal with the situation. She felt highly safe and highly responsible for her actions towards herself and others. She was not tempted to do the
wrong thing and would not feel deprived if she acted on judgement. She experienced flow mode but failed to act on moral judgement as she considered she was not self disciplined enough.

**Analysis of Response**

Factors between the two scenarios are almost identical both had a high moral weighting, high respect, high familiarity, high experience, high safety, low temptation and high responsibility for actions towards self and others. The only differences were a movement from high difficulty in the first scenario, to low in the second and high to low deprivation. None of these situational factors would seem to be impacting her lack of following through from judgement to action.

In both scenarios she is in a flow mode and in her assessment of her reflections she has scored both scenarios equally high in all three questions.

The only insight is to be found in her stated reasons for action and non-action. In the first scenario her reasons said she understood the consequences of her actions and knew how she would feel supporting her assessment of the situation that she was highly familiar and experienced in this dilemma. In addition she respected the people involved and felt she was self disciplined and had the strength of her convictions to act on judgement. Her reasons for not following through in the second scenario are not based on anything to do with the external environment but on an internal aspect, her lack of self-discipline.

As she has also rated herself highly re living up to moral ideals and being satisfied that she did, would also suggest a she judged herself at the time as not falling short. She has accepted that she is not perfect and has a variable standard re her response to this situation.
Female 6 Profile/13

| Age Range: | 50-60 | Occupation: | psycho-dramatist/trauma specialist, workshop facilitator. |
| Gender: | Female | Ethnic Background: | Belgium French |
| Level of Education: | Graduate School | Religious Background: | Bahá’í |
| Date of Subject’s Response: | 03/29/03 |

Response data from questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Failure to act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Situation</strong> involved self, friend and colleague. High moral weighting, high respect, high familiarity, high experience, high difficulty, low safety, low temptation, low deprivation, high responsibility self/others</td>
<td><strong>1 Situation</strong> involved self and friend/employer. High moral weighting, low respect, high familiarity, low experience, high difficulty, low safety, moderate temptation, high deprivation, low responsibility for self and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Reaction</strong> Flight mode. Based on previous encounters, perception, feelings, facts and who was involved</td>
<td><strong>2 Reaction</strong> Fight mode. Based on previous encounters, perception, feelings, facts, and who was involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 Values</strong> Responsibility to organisation versus responsibility to self and sense of “worth.” Need for steadfastness vs. patience and tolerance. Loss of position (job) leading to potential feeling of loss of self-esteem, being true to myself and value needs/moral obligation Prayer and meditation before taking actions, consultation with others. Challenge of “doing what’s right” in the larger context even if it “infringes” on my personal “needs.”</td>
<td><strong>3 Values</strong> Letting things go versus defending my integrity. Loss of self esteem and integrity doing the wrong thing but the reward would have been continued employment. I was emotionally, mentally and spiritually wounded and paralysed into feeling defeated, powerlessness, rage and impotence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4 Action</strong> Strength of conviction, would not feel deprived</td>
<td><strong>4 Action</strong> You did not know how you would feel by doing the wrong thing You did not respected the people involved and maybe it was just not important enough.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reflection-5,6,7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Non Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How important was it to live up to your moral ideals</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How satisfied were you that you lived up to your moral ideals</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you rate your level of moral responsibility</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of data female 6**

**Scenario 1**

Involved a highly respected friend and colleague and herself in a situation of high moral weighting about a course of action re responsibility to the organization versus responsibility to self and sense of “worth.” She was highly familiar and highly experienced with such a scenario and found it very difficult to deal with the incident. She felt low safety, and felt highly responsible for her actions towards herself and others. She felt low temptation to do the wrong thing and low deprivation if she acted on her judgement. She was in flight mode stated that she faced the “challenge of “doing what’s right” in the larger context even if it “infringes” on my personal “needs.” She had the strength of her convictions to act on judgement and would not feel deprived in so doing.
Scenario 2

Involved friend/employer whom she had low respect for and herself, in a situation of high moral weighting about a course of action re letting things go versus defending her integrity. She had high familiarity and low experience and found it highly difficult to deal with the situation. She felt low safety and low responsibility for her actions towards herself and others. She was moderately tempted to do the wrong thing and would feel high deprivation if she acted on judgement. She experienced fight mode and failed to act on moral judgement as she did not respected the people involved also considered it maybe was just not important enough and did not realise how she would feel by doing the wrong thing.

Analysis of Response

Four factors are rated the same between the two scenarios, high moral weighting, high familiarity, high difficulty and low safety. The following changes in ratings occurred between scenario one to two; high to low respect, high to low experience, low to moderate temptation, low to high deprivation and high to low responsibility for actions towards self and others.

Even though she was in flight mode for the first scenario she had the strength of conviction to act on judgement and would not feel deprived. However in the second scenario many situational factors have deteriorated, she has lost respect for the person, she had less experience of this scenario, she is moderately tempted, feels highly deprived and does not feel very responsible for her action plus she has moved into a fighting mode. In both situations she is not feeling safe either.

In both scenarios she experienced a conflict in values but in the first situation her strength of conviction overcame this conflict. In the second scenario she chose to maintain her employment opportunity over maintaining her personal integrity. She did not have a lot of experience of such situations and was unaware until after the fact of how she would feel about such a compromise. Maybe this was also due to feeling such low self-esteem and did not consider it important enough or was feeling too wounded, even though she stated she was in a fight mode of reaction.

She was only moderately satisfied that she had lived up to her moral ideals in the second scenario and considered she had been highly morally responsible. Her responses are conflicted as she states a low sense of responsibility for her actions towards self and others. It indicates that she does not believe she has played any part in the situation and it is beyond her control.
Response data from questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Failure to act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Situation</strong> involved self and a stranger. High moral weighting, moderate respect, low familiarity, low experience, low difficulty, low safety, high temptation, low deprivation, high responsibility self/others&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;<strong>2 Reaction</strong> Flight mode. Based on perception, feelings and facts.</td>
<td><strong>1 Situation</strong> involved self and an acquaintance. High moral weighting, low respect, high familiarity, low experience, high difficulty, high safety, moderate temptation, low deprivation, moderate responsibility for self and high responsibility for others.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;<strong>2 Reaction</strong> Fight mode. Based on previous encounters, perceptions, feelings, facts who was involved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 Values</strong>&lt;br&gt;Honesty /responsibility&lt;br&gt;I could have lost some money when I had little. I did not want to feel bad, I would have broken the law if I did otherwise but I would probably have gotten away with it. I did what I would want another to do to me.</td>
<td><strong>3 Values</strong>&lt;br&gt;Responsibility- accountability.&lt;br&gt;It has little risk but there could have been problems for the other person. I may have been “punished” but the other person would have been for sure. I called my friends, asked opinions. I am still very conflicted.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Non Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>4 Action</strong>&lt;br&gt;Aware of the consequences of failing to act, knew how you would feel if you did the wrong thing and had the strength of your convictions.</td>
<td><strong>4 Action</strong>&lt;br&gt;Did not have strength of convictions and was not self disciplined enough</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reflection-5,6,7</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Non Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How important was it to live up to your moral ideals&lt;br&gt;5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How satisfied were you that you lived up to your moral ideals&lt;br&gt;5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you rate your level of moral responsibility&lt;br&gt;4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of data female 7

**Scenario 1**
Involved a moderately respected stranger and herself in a situation of high moral weighting about a course of action, where there was a clash of values between honesty versus responsibility. She had low familiarity and low experience with such a scenario and did not find it difficult to deal with the incident. She felt low safety and highly responsible for her actions towards herself and others. She felt high temptation to do the wrong thing and low deprivation if she acted on her judgement. She experienced being in a fighting mode but knew how she would feel in the same situation, therefore had the strength of her convictions to act on judgement and was aware of the consequences for failing to act.

**Scenario 2**
Involved self and a lowly respected acquaintance in a situation of high moral weighting about a course of action, where there was a clash of values re responsibility versus accountability. She had low experience and high familiarity and found it very difficult to deal with the situation. She felt highly safe and moderately responsible for her actions towards herself and highly
towards others. She experienced moderate temptation to do the wrong thing and would not feel deprived if she acted on judgement. She experienced flight mode and failed to act on moral judgement as she did not have the strength of her convictions and considered she was not self disciplined enough.

**Analysis of Response**

Both scenarios shared four factors in common, high moral weighting, low experience, low deprivation and high responsibility for actions towards others. The shift in the situation has occurred from scenario one to two from moderate to low respect, low to high familiarity, low to high difficulty, low to high safety, high to low temptation and high to moderate responsibility for actions towards others. Factors that may be impacting here are she is feeling less respectful, the situation is more difficult and she is feeling less responsible for her actions.

In the first scenario she is feeling very responsible for her actions towards self and others, even though she is in flight mode, has low experience and familiarity and is feeling highly tempted. She is aware of the consequences and how she would feel if she failed to act on moral judgement. She states she had the strength of her convictions to act on judgement.

In the second scenario she experienced a fight mode and was conflicted between responsibility and acceptability. To this day she is still feeling very conflicted about her failure to act on judgement, this is borne out by her high dissatisfaction with living up to her moral ideals. She also felt she was not self disciplined enough to act upon her judgement.
Female 8 Profile/15

| Age Range: | 22-30 | Occupation: | Teacher |
| Gender: | Female | Ethnic Background: | Persian/Irish American |
| Level of Education: | Studying for Masters Degree | Religious Background: | Bahá’í |
| Date of Subject’s Response: | 03/28/03 |

Response data from questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Failure to act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Situation</strong> involved self and a friend. High moral weighting, moderate respect, low familiarity, low experience, moderate difficulty, moderate safety, moderate temptation, low deprivation, high responsibility for self and low responsibility for the other.</td>
<td><strong>1 Situation</strong> involved self and a friend High moral weighting, high respect, moderate familiarity, moderate experience, high difficulty, high safety, high temptation, moderate deprivation and high responsibility towards self and others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Reaction</strong> Flow mode. Based on perceptions, feelings, facts and who was involved</td>
<td><strong>2 Reaction</strong> Fight mode. Based on previous encounters, perceptions, feelings, facts and who was involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 Values</strong> Upbringing versus self desire The reward would have been transitory the risk could have been life-long. The wrong action could have changed my life forever, and caused me to live a lifestyle I would not have been happy with. I justified my behaviour by thinking rationally, and weighing all possible outcomes. I thought about my upbringing and did not want to upset my Mother. I thought about my religious beliefs, prayed and asked for guidance. I did not follow peer pressure. The situation took place while I was in high school.</td>
<td><strong>3 Values</strong> Fight mode Conflict between belief and what wanted to do. The reward was temporary and the risk was great and long-lasting. The punishment was internal guilt, knowing I was doing wrong when I could be doing right. I had a very difficult time rationalizing my behaviour. I don’t think I ever fully did this. It was very difficult knowing I had done wrong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4 Action</strong> Strength of convictions and self disciplined</td>
<td><strong>4 Action</strong> Did not have strength of convictions and was not self disciplined enough</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reflection-5,6,7</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Non Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How important was it to live up to your moral ideals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How satisfied were you that you lived up to your moral ideals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you rate your level of moral responsibility</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of data female 8

Scenario 1

Involved a moderately respected friend and herself in a situation of high moral weighting about a course of action, where there was a clash of values re upbringing versus self desire. She had low familiarity and low experienced with such a scenario and found it moderately difficult to deal with the situation. She felt moderately safe, felt highly responsible for her actions towards herself and low responsibility for actions towards others. She felt moderate temptation to do the wrong thing and low deprivation if she acted on her judgement. She was in flow mode and stated that she had the strength of her convictions to act on judgement and was self disciplined enough to act on judgement.
Scenario 2
Involved self and a highly respected friend in a situation of high moral weighting about a course of action, where there was a clash of values between belief and what she wanted to do. She had moderate experience and moderate familiarity and found it very difficult to deal with the situation. She felt highly safe and highly responsible for her actions towards herself and others. She was highly tempted to do the wrong thing and would feel moderate deprivation if she acted on judgement. She experienced fight mode in relationship to her internal values and failed to act on moral judgement as she did not have strength of convictions and found she was not self disciplined enough to act on moral judgement.

Analysis of Response
Three factors are in common between the two scenarios; they both had high moral weighting, moderate difficulty and high responsibility for actions towards self. The second scenarios moved from moderate to high respect, low to moderate familiarity, low to moderate experience, moderate to high safety, moderate to high temptation, low derivation to moderate deprivation and low to high responsibility for others. Situational factors impacting may relate to some shift to greater temptation and possible feelings of deprivation.

She experienced a flow mode in the first scenario however, and a fight mode in the second scenario, suggesting an internal fight with her value system. Both scenarios depict a conflict of values between upbringing, as well as belief and personal desires or what she wanted to do. In the first scenario she considered she had the strength of her convictions and was self disciplined to be able to overcome this conflict and act on judgement. The opposite was true in the second scenario, she did not have the strength of conviction and found that she was not self disciplined enough. She felt and still feels guilty about her failure to act on judgement.

This is supported by a low assessment of her satisfaction of living up to moral ideals and her level of moral responsibility yet a high assessment in all three areas of reflection in scenario one.
**Female 9 Profile/17**

| Age Range: | 50-60 |
| Occupation: | Teacher/Coordinator |
| Gender: Female |
| Ethnic Background: Australian/Caucasian |
| Level of Education: B.Ed. |
| Religious Background: Bahá’í |
| Date of Subject’s Response: 01/31/02 |

**Response data from questionnaire**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Failure to act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Situation involved self and acquaintance. Moderate moral weighting, moderate respect, high familiarity, high experience, low difficulty, moderate safety, moderate temptation, low deprivation, low responsibility towards self, high responsibility for others</td>
<td>1 Situation involved self, relative and friend. Moderate moral weighting, low respect, low familiarity, low experience, high difficulty, moderate safety, high temptation, low deprivation, moderate responsibility for self and high responsibility for others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Reaction Flow mode. Base on previous encounters, perception, feelings, facts, and who was involved</td>
<td>2 Reaction Flow mode. Based on perception, feelings, facts, who was involved and conflicting messages from parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Values Grievance procedure, honesty Reward in following a correct Departmental procedure meant a fizzling of implications by parents of my role as a responsible teacher. Took responsibility for all actions on my part whether accused or not of wrong doing in the student’s /parent view</td>
<td>3 Values According to my religious beliefs not acceptable. Cost factors – loss of personal connection, mental abuse, through jealousy on the part of the friend. Greater dependency on me to sort out the situation. Tried to be detached from the implications of the situation. Imposition of extra needs meant a greater call on my time hence had to juggle issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Action Strength of convictions. Had gone through similar experience of student accusation with a successful outcome.</td>
<td>4 Action You were unaware of what the consequences would be for failing to act</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Reflection-5,6,7**

| How important was it to live up to your moral ideals | 5 | 5 |
| How satisfied were you that you lived up to your moral ideals | 5 | 3 |
| How would you rate your level of moral responsibility | 4 | 3 |

**Summary of data female 9**

**Scenario 1**

Involved a moderately respected acquaintance and herself, in a situation of moderate moral weighting about a course of action related to presenting an honest viewpoint in a grievance procedure. She was highly familiar and highly experienced with such a scenario and did not find it very difficult to deal with the incident. She felt moderately safe, felt highly responsible for her actions towards herself and others. She felt moderate temptation to do the wrong thing and low deprivation if she acted on her judgement. She was in flow mode and stated that she had gone through similar experience with a prior student accusation with a successful outcome and that she had the strength of her convictions to act on judgement.

**Scenario 2**

Involved self, relative and lowly respected friend in a situation of moderate moral weighting about a clash of values between her religious beliefs and her desired action. She had low experience and low familiarity and found it very difficult to deal with the situation. She felt moderate safety and moderately responsible for her actions towards herself and high
responsibility towards others. She was highly tempted to do the wrong thing but would not feel deprived if she acted on judgement. She experienced being in a flow mode and failed to act on moral judgement as she was unaware of what the consequences would be for failing to act.

**Analysis of Response**

Four situational factors were the same in both scenarios, moderate moral weighting, moderate safety, low deprivation and high responsibility for actions towards others. All other factors show variations from scenario one to two, from moderate to low respect, high to low familiarity, high to low experience, low to high difficulty, moderate to high temptation and low to high responsibility for actions towards self.

There seems to be an impact on the second scenario of lower respect, lower familiarity, low experience of such scenarios, and higher temptation. Both scenarios were experienced in a flow mode. In the first scenario she had had previous experience and was aware of the value of honesty and the use of departmental grievance procedures, as a means of dealing with such a complaint against her. Her strength of conviction that she was doing the right thing enabled her to act on judgement.

A conflict relating to her religious values with regard to an interpersonal dynamic is stated in scenario two. The situational factors relating to lower experience and familiarity and higher temptation impacted her decision, as she states she was unaware of the consequences for not acting. It would appear that the high sense of responsibility in her actions towards others and only moderate towards self, also influenced her choice of trying to support the other person over her religious values.

In scenario one she rated all areas of reflection highly but in scenario two she was only moderately satisfied with living up to her beliefs and her level of moral responsibility. Her view suggests that she blames the other person for causing her these extra problems, through their expression of jealousy and mental abuse rather than on the quality of her choice.
Female 10 Profile/19

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender:</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Ethnic Background:</td>
<td>Middle Eastern/Italian/Maltese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Education:</td>
<td>B.A.</td>
<td>Religious Background:</td>
<td>Bahá’í</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of Subject’s Response:</td>
<td>03/28/03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Response data from questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Failure to act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Situation involved self and an acquaintance. High moral weighting, high respect, moderate familiarity, moderate experience, low difficulty, moderate safety, low temptation, low deprivation, high responsibility self/others.</td>
<td>1 Situation involved self and an acquaintance. High moral weighting, low respect, high familiarity, high experience, low difficulty, no comment on safety, high temptation, low deprivation, high responsibility towards self and low responsibility towards others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Reaction Fight mode. Based on a perception, feelings, facts, and who was involved</td>
<td>2 Reaction Fight mode Based on previous encounters, perception, feelings, facts, who was involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Values The risk involved was alienation of my teenager towards me or from his peers. He was at a party where there were no parents. As a parent I would have wanted another parent to do the same for me. I was an adult who was responsible for my teenager and needed to let another adult know that there had been a potentially dangerous situation in their home. It was against the law as there was alcohol involved.</td>
<td>3 Values Yes conflicted in values, knew that I should not engage in any derogatory comments about this person but I also felt offended by the way I had been treated by this person on many occasions. Issue of justice. Funnily enough I did not feel as bad as I thought I would. I felt justified because it was repeated behaviour that this person continued to do that involved poor sportsmanship and I really felt that they had a serious personality disorder and had had enough of their behaviour. I felt that by mentioning that they were unstable, I was justified in my reactions towards them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Action Strength of convictions. As a parent I was fulfilling my responsibility and I was willing to be snubbed by the other parents.</td>
<td>4 Action You did not respect the people involved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reflection-5,6,7</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Non Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How important was it to live up to your moral ideals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How satisfied were you that you lived up to your moral ideals</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you rate your level of moral responsibility</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of data female 10

Scenario 1
Involved a highly respected acquaintance and herself in a situation of high moral weighting about a situation where she wished to deal with under-aged youth drinking alcohol at a party. She was moderately familiar and moderately experienced with such a scenario and did not find it very difficult to deal with the incident. She felt moderately safe, and felt highly responsible for her actions towards herself and others. She felt low temptation to do the wrong thing and low deprivation if she acted on her judgement. She experience being in a fight mode and as a parent she was fulfilling her responsibility and she was willing to be snubbed by the other parents due to the strength of her convictions to act on moral judgement.
Scenario 2
Involved self and a lowly respected acquaintance in a situation of high moral weighting about a course of action, where she knew that she should not engage in any derogatory comments about another person. She had high experience and high familiarity and did not find it difficult to deal with the situation. She felt highly responsible for her actions towards herself and low responsibility for her actions towards the acquaintance. She was highly tempted to do the wrong thing and would not feel deprived if she acted on judgement. She experienced fight mode and failed to act on moral judgement, as she did not respect the person involved.

Analysis of Response
Three areas are similar between the two scenarios, high moral weighting, low difficulty, low deprivation and high responsibility for actions taken towards self. Differences occurred from scenario one to two re high to low respect, moderate to high familiarity, moderate to high experience, low to high temptation and high to low responsibility for actions towards others. Three of these may have impacted her failure to act, lower respect, higher temptation and low responsibility for her actions towards the other person.

In both scenarios she was in a fight mode indicating she was prepared to stand up for what she believed in the first scenario and to stand up for herself in the second one, even though she considered it wrong to make derogatory comments towards the other person. Her strength of conviction and high sense of responsibility for her actions towards others, seem to have helped her translate judgement into action even though she knew she risked alienation from her son and/or his peers.

The reason for non action on her moral judgement related to her lack of respect for the other person as well as a consideration that she was being treated unjustly. Her concern was that she had endured this type of behaviour from the other, over a long period and considered the other person was mentally unstable so felt justified with her action. Her disappointment with herself related to breaking a moral value of not speaking in a derogatory way to another.

As she did not respect the person she felt more comfortable with her actions as indicated by a high score in her reflection about her level of satisfaction in living up to her moral ideals. However, despite her justifications and satisfaction with telling the woman what she thought about her actions, she scored herself at a low level re her moral responsibility.
Response data from questionnaire

1 Situation involved self and a stranger. High moral weighting, moderate respect, low familiarity, low experience, low difficulty, low safety, low temptation, high deprivation, moderate responsibility for self and others.

1 Situation involved self, and a friend. Low moral weighting, moderate respect, high familiarity, high experience, low difficulty, moderate safety, high temptation, moderate deprivation, low responsibility towards self and others.

2 Reaction Flight mode. Based on feelings, facts

2 Reaction Flight mode. Previous encounters, perception, feelings, facts, who was involved

3 Values
No Conflict of values
I knew I could not just leave the situation and not help because I would have a very bad conscience if I had left. I felt I had to help this person in need, nobody else attempted to.

3 Values
Felt I was betraying a friendship, which existed more for the other person. The reward was that I momentarily felt better about myself. I felt the other person was continuing their actions to demoralize me at every turn, however consciously they did it.

4 Action
Knew how you would feel if you did the wrong thing.

4 Action
You could get away with the situation, (no-one would know) did not respect the people involved, didn't have strength of convictions and not self disciplined enough

Reflection-5,6,7  Action  Non Action
How important was it to live up to your moral ideals  3  1
How satisfied were you that you lived up to your moral ideals  5  1
How would you rate your level of moral responsibility  5  2

Summary of data female 11

Scenario 1
Involved a moderately respected stranger and herself in a situation of high moral weighting about a course of action, where she chose to help a stranger in need. She was not familiar and not experienced with such a scenario and found it of low difficulty to deal with the incident. She felt low safety, felt moderately responsible for her actions towards herself and the stranger. She felt low temptation to do the wrong thing and high deprivation if she acted on her judgement.
She experienced being in a flight mode, despite this as she knew how she would feel in the same situation, she acted on moral judgement.

Scenario 2
Involved a moderately respected friend and herself in a situation of low moral weighting about a course of action where she felt she was betraying a friendship. She had high experience and high familiarity and did not find it difficult to deal with the situation. She felt moderate safety and low responsibility for her actions towards herself and others. She was highly tempted to do the wrong thing and would feel moderate deprivation if she acted on judgement. She
experienced being in a flight mode as she did not respect the person involved, didn’t have strength of her convictions and was not self disciplined enough and failed to act on moral judgement as she could get away with the situation. (no-one would know)

**Analysis of Response**

Only two situational factors are the same between scenario one and two, moderate respect and low difficulty. The second scenario moves from moderate to low moral weighting, low to high familiarity, low to high experience, low to moderate safety, low to high temptation, high deprivation to moderate deprivation and moderate to low responsibility for actions towards self and others. Of these factors perhaps the following may have an impact, low moral weighting, high temptation and low responsibility for actions towards self and others.

In both scenarios she was feeling like fleeing. However, despite the challenges in scenario one of low experience, low familiarity, low safety and moderate deprivation, she was still able to act on moral judgement. She did not have a conflict in values and knew how she would feel if she had been faced with the same situation herself. Here we see that empathy for the others predicament and the fact that she “would have a very bad conscience if she had left,” played an influencing role in translating judgement into action. Research has found that empathy is the foundation of morality.

Conversely in scenario two she felt she was betraying a friendship even though it existed more for the other person than what she felt. Not to follow through on judgement helped her to feel better on a temporary basis as she felt she could get away with her actions, besides she only moderately respect the person involved. Her low responsibility for her actions towards self and others are supported by her statement that she did not have the strength of her convictions and she was not self-disciplined enough.

She only set a low level of moral ideal for scenario two and gave herself the same score re her satisfaction with living up to her ideal. Her level of moral responsibility was also rated at a low level. Whereas in the first scenario she gave herself a moderate rating of her desire to live up to her moral ideals and was very satisfied with ability to live up to this level and to accept moral responsibility.
Appendix F

Appendix F contains tables that relate to the results presented in Chapter 6 regarding the analysis of data from Questionnaire 1.

Table F1 presents the data related to situational factors when respondents acted or did not act-on-judgement.

Table F1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situational Factor</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Non-Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.2 What was the degree of moral weighting? (how serious was the moral choice involved?)</td>
<td>9 14 77</td>
<td>9 27 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 How respectful did you feel towards the person/people?</td>
<td>0 23 77</td>
<td>23 23 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 How familiar were you with this type of moral encounter?</td>
<td>41 9 50</td>
<td>32 27 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 How experienced were you in handling such an encounter?</td>
<td>32 18 50</td>
<td>55 18 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 How difficult was it to carry out your decision?</td>
<td>32 18 50</td>
<td>41 14 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7 How safe, secure and cared for did you feel in the situation or environment?</td>
<td>32 36 32</td>
<td>45 23 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.8 How tempted to do the wrong thing did you feel in the situation?</td>
<td>50 27 23</td>
<td>27 14 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9 How deprived did you feel in the situation if you did the right thing?</td>
<td>73 9 18</td>
<td>23 41 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.10 How responsible did you feel in the situation for your own actions towards yourself?</td>
<td>5 5 90</td>
<td>18 18 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.11 How responsible did you feel in the situation for your actions towards the other person/people?</td>
<td>9 14 77</td>
<td>18 14 68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents were asked to circle the relevant number, between 1 and 5 indicating the relative weighting given to each factor. A rating of ‘1’, indicated the lowest weighting, and a number ‘5’, indicated the highest weighting for the given factor. Data are presented in the tables based on the classifications of low, moderate and high. Ratings of 1-2 were classified as low (L); a score of 3 was rated as moderate (M) and a score of 4-5 was rated as high (H). Table F1 presents the situational data according to the order of the questions asked for questions 2-11.
Table F2 lists the percentages of subjects who responded to each of the reasons listed in Questionnaire 1 for the action scenario. Some respondents gave more than one response, so the proportions do not add up to 100%.

Table F2

Reasons for Acting-on-Judgment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>You did not want to experience the consequences of failing to act</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You knew how you would feel if you did the wrong thing</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You could not get away with the situation (other people would know)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You respected the people involved</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other goals and priorities were not as important</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You had the strength of conviction to carry out the action</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You would not feel deprived</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You are self disciplined</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table F3 presents the quantitative analysis of the reasons given by the total group of respondents for why they did not act-on-judgement. The table lists the percentages of responses for each of the reasons listed in Questionnaire 1 for the non-action scenario.

Table F3

Reasons for Not Acting-on-Judgment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>You were unaware of what the consequences would be for failing to act</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You did not know how you would feel by doing the wrong thing</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You could get away with the situation (no-one would know)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You did not respect the people involved</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other goals and priorities were more important</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You did not have the strength of conviction to carry out the action</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You would feel deprived</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You were not self disciplined enough</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table F4 summarises the responses to Section 5 of Questionnaire 1 on moral identity, expressed as percentages of the sample population.

Table F4
*Evaluation of the Decision-Making Process for the Action and Non-action Scenarios*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Action Scenario</th>
<th>Non-Action Scenario</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L%</td>
<td>M%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How important was it to you to live up to your moral ideals?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How satisfied were you that you lived up to your moral ideals?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you rate your level of moral responsibility?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The same set of situational factors documented in Table F1 are documented again in Table F5 to reflect the priority given by males and females to each of the situational factors that impacted on their capacity to act-on-judgement. The table is presented by contrasting the percentage of responses given by males and females to each of the same situational factors. Data are presented in the tables based on the classifications of low, moderate and high and the combined percentages of medium and high ratings. Ratings of 1-2 were classified as low (L); a score of 3 was rated as moderate (M) and a score of 4-5 rated as high (H). The data are presented according to the order of the questions asked. Table F5 presents the situational data for questions 2-11.
Table F5
Rating Given to Situational Factors for the Action Scenario for Males and Females

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situational Factor</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L %</td>
<td>M %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 What degree of moral weighting? (how serious was the moral choice involved)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 How respectful did you feel towards the person/people?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 How familiar were you with this type of moral encounter?</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 How experienced were you in handling such an encounter?</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 How difficult was it to carry out your decision?</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7 How safe, secure and cared for did you feel in the situation or environment?</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.8 How tempted to do the wrong thing did you feel in the situation?</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9 How deprived did you feel in the situation if you did the right thing?</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.10 How responsible did you feel in the situation for your own actions towards yourself?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.11 How responsible did you feel in the situation for your actions towards the other person/people?</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table F6 shows the ranking of situational factors for males and females when they did not act-on-judgement. Data are presented based on the percentages of classifications of low, moderate and high and the combined percentages of medium and high ratings.

Table F6
*Rating Given to Situational Factors for the Non-action Scenario for Males and Females, expressed as a percentage of respondents within gender groups.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situational Factor</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L %</td>
<td>M %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 What was the degree of moral weighting? (how serious was the moral choice involved)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 How respectful did you feel towards the person/people?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 How familiar were you with this type of moral encounter?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 How experienced were you in handling such an encounter?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 How difficult was it to carry out your decision?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7 How safe, secure and cared for did you feel in the situation or environment?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>64</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.8 How tempted to do the wrong thing did you feel in the situation?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9 How deprived did you feel in the situation if you did the right thing?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.10 How responsible did you feel in the situation for your own actions towards yourself?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.11 How responsible did you feel in the situation for your actions towards the other person/people?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table F7 indicates the percentage of male and female responses for each reason selected for acting-on-moral judgement and Table F8 presents the data relating to the reasons selected in the non-action scenario. Respondents were able to select as many reasons as were relevant to their situations.

Table F7
Reasons for Acting-on-Judgment According to Gender, noting that respondents were able to choose more than one reason.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>Male %</th>
<th>Female %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>You did not want to experience the consequences of failing to act</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You knew how you would feel if you did the wrong thing</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You could not get away with the situation (other people would know)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You respected the people involved</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other goals and priorities were not as important</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You had the strength of conviction to carry out the action</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You would not feel deprived</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You are self disciplined</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table F8
Reasons for Non–Acting-on-moral judgement According to Gender, noting that respondents were able to choose more than one reason.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>Male %</th>
<th>Female %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>You were unaware of what the consequences would be for failing to act</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You did not know how you would feel by doing the wrong thing</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You could get away with the situation (no-one would know)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You did not respect the people involved</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other goals and priorities were more important</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You did not have the strength of conviction to carry out the action</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You would feel deprived</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You were not self disciplined enough</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table F 9  
*Factors that had the same rating between Action and Non-Action Scenarios*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected</th>
<th>Not Expected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relational factors</strong></td>
<td><strong>Relational factors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 High responsibility towards self</td>
<td>9 High responsibility towards others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 High respect</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Competency factors</strong></td>
<td><strong>Competency factors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 high familiarity</td>
<td>5 low familiarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 low experience</td>
<td>3 high experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 moderate to high difficulty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 low difficulty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emotional Safety factors</strong></td>
<td><strong>Emotional Safety factors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 low safety</td>
<td>2 high safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self Preoccupation factors</strong></td>
<td><strong>Self Preoccupation factors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 low deprivation</td>
<td>4 high deprivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 low temptation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table F10
Difference Factors comparison between S1 and S2
Involves a shift in status from Action to Non-Action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected factors</th>
<th>Not expected factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relationship factors</strong></td>
<td><strong>Relationship Factors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 moderate/low respect</td>
<td>2 High responsibility for self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Moderate/Low responsibility towards others</td>
<td>2. High responsibility towards others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 moderate/low responsibility towards self</td>
<td>1 high respect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Other goals and priorities more important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Experience factors</strong></td>
<td><strong>Experience factors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Moderate/low experience</td>
<td>2 low difficulty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Low familiarity</td>
<td>1 high familiarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 More difficult</td>
<td>1 moderate experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 not aware of consequences</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emotional Safety</strong></td>
<td><strong>Emotional Safety</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 low safety</td>
<td>3 high safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 Not knowing how would feel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self pre-occupation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Self pre-occupation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Moderate/high deprivation</td>
<td>5 low temptation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Moderate/High temptation</td>
<td>1 low deprivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Get away with it</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 lack of self-discipline</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Lack of strength of conviction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix G

Four Psychological Foundations for Moral Agency

There are four aspects of character development: (1) social orientation; (2) self-control; (3) compliance; and, (4) self-esteem. These seem to support and facilitate moral functioning but are not necessarily moral or immoral in themselves.

Social orientation
Moral behaviour flows from an interest in and concern for other people. Healthy social orientation develops in childhood through the development of secure attachment bonds in the first few years of life (Ainsworth et al., 1978; Bowlby, 1969). Attachment is defined as a special emotional bond that forms between the infant and primary carers. A securely-attached child is more likely to comply with family rules. Magid and McKelvey (1987) argue that the most consistent cause of anti-social behaviour in childhood is the lack of a secure attachment bond because of the resultant failure to develop a conscience.

Self-control
There is general agreement amongst researchers that effective, mature moral agents must have some capacity to control their behaviours effectively. Self-discipline and empathy are considered to be two basic building-blocks of moral character (Rest, 1985).

Self-control begins first with the achievement of toilet training. Most of the research work has been done with pre-schoolers. As pre-schoolers learn to use mental imagery (Mischel, 1981) and private speech (Luria, 1961), they develop the capacity to resist temptation, suppress impulses and delay gratification. The most critical ages seem to be between ages five and seven (Berkowitz, 1982). Self-control is seen as the first stage in the development of moral will (Danesh, 1994).

The work of Block (1971) identified that impulsive adolescents came from homes in which there is a high level of conflict, especially about child-rearing values, such as what disciplinary approach to use, and homes in which parents neglected to teach their children, and demanded very little of them in terms of household chores and school work.
Compliance with external standards

An effective moral agent must eventually learn to internalise external standards of behaviour, for example, learning that sharing valued objects is socially encouraged (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989). This begins at about 18-19 months when toddlers begin to want to comply with their mother’s demands. They begin to spontaneously make reparations for their transgressions: for example, tattling on themselves; or soliciting praise when complying.

Self-esteem

Self-esteem has been positively correlated to mental health in later life while lack of self-esteem is related to dysfunction and mental pathologies such as depression and anxiety (Harter, 1993, cited in Berkowitz and Grych, 1998). Conversely, overly high self-esteem (inflated sense of self) has also been found to be dysfunctional in peer relations (Hartup, 1983).

Four Moral Components for Moral Agency

Berkowitz and Grych (1998) define moral components as intrinsically moral aspects of functioning and foundational components of character. The four moral components include: (1) empathy; (2) conscience; (3) moral reasoning; and, (4) altruism.

Empathy

Martin Hoffman (1991) defines empathy as an affective (emotional) response to another’s distress that is more appropriate to someone else’s situation than one’s own. Empathy has been identified as one of the core moral emotions (Kagan, 1984). It is therefore critical that a child learns to become attuned not only to its own emotional reactions but also to those of others. It is also vital that children become receptive to the input of others’ emotional expressions, and then learn to modify their own feeling when appropriate. Empathic responding has been positively related to altruism (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987, cited in Berkowitz and Grych, 1998).

Conscience

Is articulated in the text in Chapter 2.
Altruism

Altruism is defined as giving to another at cost to oneself. This can be seen in toddlers’ behaviour, for example, when they give solace to one another. Altruism can be construed as a behaviour (or set of behaviours) or personality trait (character). The latter tends to suggest that there is an enduring tendency to engage in the former (Berkowitz, 1997). Samuel and Pearl Oliner (1988, cited in Berkowitz and Grych, 1998) found that altruistic people were motivated by strong values of care and inclusiveness which were in large part transmitted to them by their parents, through the formation of an early attachment bond. In a review of literature, it was identified that altruistic children tend to be “active, sociable, competent, assertive, advanced in role-taking and moral judgement and sympathetic” (Eisenberg and Mussen, 1989, p. 39). Eisenberg and Mussen also identified that altruism will be influenced by factors such as cost to the actor, the nature of the victim and the mood of the actor. Altruism is also linked with moral reasoning.

Moral reasoning

Kruger (1992) found that the greatest moral development was found in families that are supportive of their children in the discussion and sharing of perspectives (moral reasoning).

The most extensive research into moral reasoning was conducted by Kohlberg. He identified six invariant stages of reasoning about morality. The first three stages are the most relevant in this context as they span from early childhood to adolescence. This frame of reference will be apparent in the way the child reasons and arrives at a conclusion.

- The first stage represents a very dogmatic, physicalistic and egocentric perspective on right and wrong. Acts are right if:
  1. They are sanctioned by authorities or other powerful individuals; or,
  2. They do not result in undesirable concrete consequences to the actor (consequences that are typically understood as inevitable, even magical or automatic).

- In the second stage, right and wrong are still calculated by concrete consequences, but the child has come to see that others can have different perspectives to the self. This opens the door for negotiation. Right is still what maximises desirable and
minimises undesirable consequences, but authorities no longer have absolute control
and consequences are no longer perceived as inevitable. Hence an "I'll scratch your
back if you scratch mine" morality arises (i.e., a morality of exchange).

- In the third stage, right and wrong are no longer limited to the concrete
  consequences of actions or to the consequences befalling a specific individual
  (usually the self). Now morality is based less upon concrete consequences and more
  upon psychological and covert consequences. Furthermore, the consequences are to
  social units, most notably to dyads. Hence, the bottom line for calculating right and
  wrong is relationships with others (e.g., what significant others think is right, what
  will happen to the relationship, what will happen to one’s reputation, etc).

Research suggests that Stage 1 is an early childhood stage, Stage 2 is a middle
childhood stage, and Stage 3 is an adolescent stage, although there are quite varied rates
of development through these stages (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).

Parenting Strategies that Support the Development of Moral and Meta-Moral
Capabilities

Berkowitz and Grych (1998) have identified five processes that are positively correlated
with developing moral thought, feeling and action in children:

1. parents use of induction;
2. nurturance and support;
3. demandingness and limit setting;
4. modelling; and,
5. democratic, open family discussion and conflict resolution style.

Induction

This is the most powerful of all the strategies. It involves explaining to a child who is
unwilling to do a particular action why an action is important such as sharing the ball,
when a child is unwilling to share a ball, and how the other child will feel in
relationship to an action such as when they share the ball. Asking the child open
questions will also engage them in coming up with solutions to a situation. In the above
example, the parent could ask the child why they think that their behaviour (of not
sharing a ball) led the other child to cry, thus, helping the child to think through the
situation. Explaining parental behaviour and its implications for the child and others is
linked to greater empathy, more highly-developed conscience, higher levels of moral
reasoning and altruism. It directly links and connects the moral reasoning and empathy aspects of moral functioning and helps children to internalise standards of behaviour (Schulman & Mekler, 1985). To have the maximum impact, children need to know the values and beliefs that lie behind a situation. This approach also models a rational, respectful approach to interpersonal relationships.

Damon (1988) identified that ‘respectful engagement’ is the underlying requirement for moral parenting:

*Respond to the child’s own experience without intruding upon this experience, while at the same time presenting the child with consistent expectations, guidelines and mature insights clearly explained* (p. 45).

The child needs to feel emotionally safe for this approach to work. It requires the parent to listen initially without making judgements about the child’s behaviour.

**Nurturing and support**

Powers (1982) and Walker and Taylor (1989, cited in Berkowitz & Grych, 1998) found that parent-child discussions of moral issues seem to be most developmentally nurturing when conducted in a respectful and emotionally supportive way. Authoritative parenting (Baumrind, 1980), where a parent provides both love and support as well as having clear goals and expectations, fosters social sensitivity, self-awareness and respect for rules and authority. It has two major components, namely, responsiveness and demandingness. Responsiveness is understood as the provision of nurturance and support, and demandingness will be described as a separate strategy:

*We raise children by giving them love. The kind of love that helps them develop a positive self-concept. A sense of their worth* (Lickona, 1983, pp.28-29).

Parents trying to challenge children to think through the moral consequences of a particular behavior, for example, will be more effective if the parents show support for, and interest in, the child’s point of view and exhibit empathy for the child’s feelings. This will also model to the child what concern for others looks like.

**Demandingness**

Demandingness is the other component of authoritative parenting. The use of this strategy will help children to develop greater self-control, altruism and self-esteem. It has three components:
(1) Parents need to set high but realistic goals for their children which are within each child’s stage of development and clearly communicate these goals to the child;
(2) Parents need to provide the support necessary to achieve these goals, for example, supporting and monitoring homework or an agreed goal; and,
(3) Parents need to monitor whether or not children meet their expectations. Children will quickly recognise the impotence of demands if they are not monitored and followed through.

Modelling

Modelling or setting an example by one’s own behaviour impacts in two ways. First, in how we lead our lives and second, in how we relate to events in our lives. Children closely observe parents’ interactions with each other, with family members and with others. From these observations, children learn a great deal about how to treat others. Families marked by angry, poorly-resolved inter-parental conflict tend to have children who are more aggressive (Grych and Fincham, 1990):

Parents should share openly with children moral reactions to events in their own adult lives. Sharing emotional reactions means demonstrating them when appropriate, describing them clearly, and answering children’s questions about them candidly. (Damon, 1988, p. 44)

Democratic family decision-making and discussion

Democratic family decision-making and discussions influences the development of morality in two ways:

1) Decisions and rules are more likely to be just; and,
2) Participation in the process is more likely to stimulate the moral development of the participants.

The impact of democratic decision-making has been demonstrated empirically in Kohlberg’s ‘Just Community School’ approach (Power et al., 1989). The use of democratic processes produces compliance, moral-reasoning development, conscience, higher self-esteem, and altruism in children. It is effective in family consultations when families respect children’s voices as meaningful contributions to family discussions, decisions, and conflict resolution processes. It lets children know that their voices are valued and offers an opportunity to provide affective support for their participation in family discussions.