AUTARKEIA AND ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS:
THE QUESTION OF THE ANCIENT SOCIAL FORMATION

by

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Thesis submitted to the Department of Classics at the University of Newcastle in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
I hereby certify that the work embodied in this thesis is the result of original research and has not been submitted for a higher degree to any other institution.

(Signed) ...
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Sonnet LIx

If there be nothing new, but that which is
Hath been before, how are our brains beguiled,
Which, labouring for invention, bear amiss
The second burthen of a former child!
O, that record could with a backward look,
Even of five hundred courses of the sun,
Show me your image in some antique book,
Since mind at first in character was done.
That I might see what the old world could say
To this composed wonder of your frame;
Whether we are mended, or whether better they,
Or whether revolution be the same.
O, sure I am, the wits of former days
To subjects worse have given admiring praise.

William Shakespeare
INTRODUCTION

Every historical book worthy of the name ought to include a chapter, or if one prefers, a series of paragraphs inserted at turning points in the development, which might almost be entitled: "How can I know what I am about to say?" I am persuaded that even the lay reader would experience an actual intellectual pleasure in examining these "confessions."

Marc Bloch, *The Historian's Craft*, p.71

Aristotle was a pre-eminent cartographer of Greek culture and ideology. One way in which we can arrive at an appreciation of Aristotle's careful examination of the workings of a polis world, is to explore both Aristotle's conceptual universe and elements of his cultural world upon which he drew for comparative and illustrative purposes. Additionally, we shall reach across Greek historical experience for further comparative evidence which helped characterise the physical, intellectual and symbolic universe in which Greeks lived, thought and died. Aristotle cannot be comprehended in isolation. The environments in which Hesiod, Herodotos and Thucydides wrote, whilst clearly preceding Aristotle's, shared with Aristotle's world thematic elements which revealed the workings of a broad, if turbulent, historical continuity. To this extent, particular aspects of, events or encounters in Greek, Athenian and Spartan historical and cultural experience, at home and abroad, will serve, in terms of time, place and space, as concrete experiential and referential points in this history of a polis paradigm. Similarly, the later world of Dio of Prusa can contribute equally to an unravelling of the elements of this continuity.

What were these thematic elements? First, there was the agrarian household orbit of social relations within a polis. Here, citizen men, women and their households at once defined and outlined the working patterns, the social relations and symbolic forms of their human habitat. The *oikos* and its popular agrarian lore, along with Aristotle's formal analysis of generic household practice and its paradigmatic form, was a potent gathering ground for practical, theoretical and symbolic forms of household life within polis experience. Second, there were the unavoidably material and ideological presences and symbolic
representations of the world of slavery. Slaves did not quantitatively dominate the polis world. This statement should not be taken as, in any way, excluding the diverse and particular experiences of any single polis during the course of Greek history. The relations, the class relations of slave master and owner to slave, that is, the master-slave relationship, formed one hemisphere of polis activity. The other hemisphere that revealed itself as apart from the immediate world of master-slave but not outside or removed from its cultural and ideological presence, was concentrated around the gamut of socio-political and military relations between poleis which were often portrayed by the ideological language of 'free' and 'slave'. The qualitative experiences of slavery formed essential reference points for Greek culture's historical experiences and forms.

I recapitulate the argument concerned with slaves' importance to a polis world. Slaves need not outnumber the free members of a polis for them to have exerted a critical role in the material renewal of a polis. Their roles were concerned directly with exploitative social relations whose aims were the extraction of a surplus. These social relations were an integral part of the agrarian (dry farming, local market trading, fishing, small scale husbandry, craft production and direct household service) polis world. The presence of slavery went well beyond these elemental, fundamental roles and assumed, as well as signalled, ideological values and symbolic forms. Slavery's manifest presence, and this is not solely or simply a moral point, percolated throughout polis thought and action. In an otherwise admirable article, "Freedom, Slavery and the Female Psyche", Just makes the following observation:

But Aristotle was still a philosopher, and by distinguishing two types of slavery, that deriving from nature and that caused by society, he was most probably engaged in a form of analytical nicety not practised by the majority of his contemporaries.1*

Yet, what matters is not whether or not Aristotle's contemporaries were practiced in such "analytical nicety"; rather slavery's pervasive presence in Aristotle's world was (and remains) central.

* Notes to Introduction on p.vi.
In order to reconstruct the meanings and the layering of meaning, particularly contained within Aristotle's language, and to account for its politically centred yet moral process of presentation, one must present a fresh outline of Aristotle's reasoning which will focus particularly upon Politics, Books I and II, and Nicomachean Ethics 1129a-1134a. By a fresh outline, we must appreciate that what is intended is an uncovering of Aristotle's extension of taxonomic reasoning processes to the central anthropocentric focus of his studies - citizens and poleis. Here, we are presented with a particular junction of history and culture, and to understand their intertwined workings one must approach ideas as cultural artifacts. For such an approach to be both useful and successful, one needs a comparative evidentiary eye to locate and examine cultural values within an intensive ideas-in-history perspective which, while focussed upon Aristotle's paradigmatic polis, has extensive historical links with 'archaic', 'classical' and later Greek polis cultural ideals and perspectives.

To realise such a goal, one needs an historical sketch of ancient social theory and its relationship to an autarkic polis form. Such a sketch requires an historian to carry out research on Greek concepts which directly and indirectly (purposefully, culturally and incidentally) examined or cast light upon those ideals and practices which constituted a polis habitat. In turn, these concepts served as foci for reflections upon a model polis formation or stood, by virtue of historical practice and events, as stark reminders that contradictory practical, moral and theoretical forces confronted Greek (particularly Aristotle's most clearly elaborated model of autarkia) autarkic paradigms. The antithetical 'worlds' of khrēmatistikē represented this conflict of theory and practice, this clash of ideas, ideals and actions.

If one intends to provide a clearer, more comprehensive historical account of Aristotle's model of khrēmatistikē, and its antithesis, an exploration of Aristotle's reasoning must include an investigation of the workings of his cultural universe. To help achieve this, one must also, in the words of C. Wright Mills:
Make any trans-historical constructions you think your work requires; also delve into sub-historical minutiae. Make up quite formal theory and build models as well as you can. Examine in detail little facts and their relations, and big unique events as well.\(^3\)

Whilst such an approach may appear adventurous it is not. Rather, an inquiry based upon such a model is a painstaking venture. It recognises the primacy of particular historical experiences and does not assume or presume an automatic cultural affinity or a ready comprehension of a peculiar world's history.

An historical inquiry such as the present work has only been possible within the supporting framework of a social-science methodology. The tools for a complex comparative inquiry into the reasoning processes behind Aristotle's moral universe are not located exclusively within the historian's preserve. A comparative historical methodology has the advantage of being able to stretch itself across time to examine the cultural and historical world within which Aristotle thought and wrote. This methodology can take Greek writers separated by historical time rather than culture and draw their disparate (in the sense of unequal) observations and reflections into a fresh perspective. By deploying such an approach, Aristotle's Politics, Books I and II, and Nicomachean Ethics 1129a-1134a, can be opened to a more meaningful historical appreciation. These works will serve as the primary focus of this investigation and additionally, for the purposes of this inquiry, as a representative sample of Aristotle's comprehension of a polis universe.

Aristotle's formidable intellectual prowess can be traced in his ability not only to construct theories (not always completed or satisfactory) around the general and immediate world of polis experience but also to delve into, reveal and theorise upon the "minutiae" of that particular historical formation. Aristotle grasped with equal vigour the broader socio-cultural environment in which Greek poleis lived and worked. First, he recognised the alternating presences of war and peace.\(^4\) For a
polis this was a given reality. Second, Aristotle recognised that agrarian practices formed the dominant and predominant experiential world of humanity. It is not at all unreasonable to argue that Aristotle's preceding arguments were relative statements based upon his apprehension of Mediterranean, and particularly, poleis' historical experiences. From such a general intellectual vantage point Aristotle went on to apprehend his immediate world through the course of its household, social and exchange relations.

Yet, as we examine a polis world, principally, though far from exclusively, through Aristotle's eyes, and seek to reveal a little further its preferential cultural boundaries and forms (its self interpretations and understandings) we must appreciate after Rostovtsev that:

The cities have told us their story, the country always remained silent and reserved. What we know of the country we know mostly through the men of the cities,...The voice of the country population itself is rarely heard. After Hesiod wrote his poems, the country remained silent for many centuries, breaking the silence from time to time with complaints about the hardships of its life...

Notions of country and country experiences remained shadowy presences in written literary, philosophical and historical material. Yet, if their fleeting presences can be detected, they must be grasped and examined as discrete experiences which can add intellectual integrity and peculiar insights to our perceptions of the social relations and cultural values which formed the subject and object of Aristotle's paradigmatic exploration of a polis formation.

Aristotle's 'world' was not the 'classical' world or 'epoch', it was a Greek world defined within its own self perceptions of geographical space, historical time, philosophical understanding and cultural form. One world's, 'our world's', characterisation of another world's characteristic human form or forms is only valuable to the extent that any historical sketch contributes to a further, fuller or deeper understanding of that world. Aristotle's 'world' invites inquiry.
NOTES: INTRODUCTION


CHAPTER I

MYTH AND HISTORY: REFLECTIONS ON THE GENIUS LOCI

The dawn of conflict between Greeks and barbarians was characterised by Herodotos' deployment of the term, arpaqē.¹ The use of force, the seizure of women, the assaulting of women and carrying them away to foreign land was the first manifestation of forced exchange between Greeks and Phoenicians.² The term rape does not fully or accurately convey the sense of arpaqē. Its meaning was extensive, in the sense that generalised force, sexual or otherwise, was brought to bear on an unwilling recipient. In the cases of Io, Europa, Medea or Helen, men seized women and took them away on their trading-cum-raiding expeditions.³ Of course, the motivations for these actions varied according to the particular mytho-historical version of the incident.

After the kidnapping of Io (or did Io fall pregnant to a seafarer on a trading visit to Argos?)⁴ one could attribute to revenge and reciprocal raiding the status of prime movers for these sex-specific acts of aggression, whether Io went with the Phoenicians because she was pregnant and ashamed to face her parents,⁵ or was forcibly seized and taken away⁶, the subsequent behaviour of Greek seafarers (whether they were raiders, traders, pirates, or a little of each, depended upon the particular situation or opportunities) cannot be adequately accounted for by attributing all their maritime actions to acts of simple revenge or reciprocal counter-measures.⁷ However, it is the core of Greek explanation, and its culturally based reasoning, which concerns us in this dawn account of Greek/Persian mytho-history.

The women involved in these forced transactions would appear to have been transformed not only into exchange objects but also converted to a form of portable royal property.⁸ The daughters and women of kings or chieftains acted as the weights of a scale whose purpose was to balance or restore the status of an offended male member of a particular Greek community. Herodotos was keen to stress the lengths to which Greek communities would go to restore their honour and offended status. One 'Lakedaimonian' woman, as Herodotos' collective and anonymous Persian opinion put it, provided enough cause and offense to bring about the destruction of Priam.⁹
The Persians and Phoenicians allegedly regarded the issue of who
kidnapped whom, of who abducted whom, or who went 'willingly' (or rather,
more accurately and tellingly, went out of necessity as a consequence of
what would have been regarded as shameful conduct in the eyes of her
society) as a matter for concern but certainly not of pressing importance
or real moment, let alone, a cause for organised, large-scale acts of
revenge.\textsuperscript{10} How one is meant to accept or account for such
mytho-historical reports presents the historian with rather ticklish
interpretative problems centred round the relationship of history and
culture. Was Herodotos' account of Persian opinion a serious attempt at
an ethnographical and anthropological reflection of their value system, a
sort of beginner's human ethology? On the other hand, was Herodotos
providing a 'traveller's' account of the diametrically opposed values of
Greeks and Persians, of Greek-speaking peoples and foreign-(non-Greek-)
speaking peoples? The second scenario is probably a more likely
proposition but one need not devalue the presence of an underlying
anthropological element in Herodotos' report. The dominant cultural
values, and ideological responses to, and gulf between Greek and Persian
societies, were being appraised. In this sense, one can argue that
Herodotos was attempting to present his reader with Greek, Persian and
Phoenician responses to the distant mytho-historical origins of
contemporary Mediterranean conflict between the Greeks and the Persian
empire.\textsuperscript{11}

By inquiring into the origins of Greek and Persian enmity,
Herodotos had entered consciously the murky and misty waters of Greek
speaking societies' heritage of rivalry with (in the recent past and most
distant mytho-historical past) their Asia Minor counterparts. In
particular, this meant looking at those foreign peoples generally
dominated by Persian power and influence and collectively listed under
the linguistic and cultural epithet of 'barbarians'. Equally
consciously, Herodotos had entered into the power relations amongst men
in polis societies and between men of different cultural worlds. At
stake here was not the offended innocence, honour or status of a woman
with a claim to a 'royal' or special title in society. Indeed women were
viewed as being responsible for, as being involved complicitly with, men
in their own abduction.\textsuperscript{12}
For what follows, the 'archaic' world of the Boiotian poet Hesiod, as well as that world's fragmentary evidentiary bases, will be drawn upon as sources for a comparative approach to Greek historical and cultural experiences. Although at least two and a half centuries stood between the historical worlds of Hesiod and Herodotos, we must grasp their common grounding in myth, their shared experience of culture over time. Hesiod's and Herodotos' Greek experience stood defined by a broad cultural outlook which shared, consciously and unconsciously, an historical continuum. This can be revealed by an examination of their attitudes towards sexuality and power and these forces' culturally bound historical play within both a broader mythical world and its equally immediate but fragile, domiciliary agrarian world. Yet, it should be emphasised that whilst this world was fragile, it was enduring.

Herodotos was bound closely to his own world's view of women. Historically, this was in literary terms (apart from such notable exceptions as Sappho), an overwhelmingly male tradition. That women were seen as deriving: "... much more pleasure from intercourse than do men, the implication being that their pleasure is so great they are never unwilling ...", could, with the acceptance of violence and male sexuality as historically complementary, lead to women being held responsible for a man's or men's conduct (rather than the other way around), precisely because their women's bodies possessed supposedly inherent or overwhelming and all consuming sexual drives. The historical antecedent of Teiresias can illustrate something of Herodotos' cultural inheritance:

They say that Teiresias saw two snakes mating on Kithairon and that, when he killed the female, he was changed into a woman, and again, when he killed the male, took again his own nature. This same Teiresias was chosen by Zeus and Hera to decide the question whether the male or the female has most pleasure in intercourse. And he said: 'Of ten parts a man enjoys one only; but a woman's sense enjoys all ten in full!' For this Hera was angry and blinded him but Zeus gave him the seer's power.

This pronouncement of Teiresias has told us nothing about women's perceptions of women, but it does reveal something about the sexual powers of women as viewed by one mythological man, Teiresias, through his sexual transformation. That Hera, in terms of the story, blinded Teiresias for his poor judgement on male and female sexuality was highly
unlikely. What was more plausible in the context of Greek myth and its social context, was that a hidden power, namely, sexual enjoyment by women, had been revealed for gods and men alike to see, and for this Teiresias was punished on the one hand by Hera and, on the other, given the seer's power by Zeus, its logical antithesis.

On this point, we must leave Hera for the moment. For, at least according to Herodotos' Greek and Persian sources, it was the reactions of men with leading rank in their societies to these personal affronts to their status (and by direct implication their honour, authority and prestige) through the abduction and sexual assault of their daughters and their women, that were of vital interest. The offended parties were the household or familial possessors and they were men, the kings, fathers, ex-suitors or husbands. The women were victims, mute or otherwise.

These traditions which Herodotos drew upon for the shadowy origins of this conflict were by no means unanimous or clear as to who did what to whom and why. However, Herodotos was quite capable of perceiving the variations present in these rival traditions and accounts of mytho-history. He was content, to some extent, with inquiring into and reporting upon what he was told and letting his presentation of the historical events, and the contesting traditions that arose from them draw their own conclusions for the reader. Herodotos presented to his audience an active researching lens and an inquiring telescope which often dynamically reflected rather than captured, via a frozen image, his world's recent and more distant historical times and events:

ἐγὼ δὲ ἔστω λέγειν τὰ λεγόμενα, πεῖθος οὐκ ὑπ' αὐτὴς ἀναθέτως.

In other words, Herodotos left the reader choices as well as problems, and his primary task remained that of inquirer and reporter, not that of some anachronistic empiricist. Hence it is not surprising to find in Herodotos' account that while both Greek and Persian sources agreed that Io was the name of Inakhos' daughter, the agreement upon name was where agreement ended. Io was abducted by Phoenicians, so one tradition went, while on the beach observing and taking part in the ancient counterpart of 'international' retail trading or, more accurately, the setting up of a spontaneous market on the beach for the opportunistic exchange, trade or barter of foreign goods and objects of social value. This trade
was a singular enterprise with only one ship, its Phoenician crew and
captain involved. The alternative account to that of the Persians, the
Phoenicians' account of their own distant past, claimed that Io became
pregnant to the Phoenician captain in Argos and left for that reason, as
related earlier. Either way Io was trapped. First, because a woman
would not have been abducted unless she allegedly 'consented' to (or
wished to take part in) this act, so Herodotos reported. Second, if
this were not the case, then Io was pregnant and had disgraced herself
and her parents.

One wonders when Io was afforded the opportunity to have
intercourse with the Phoenician captain in Argos and where the other
women, amongst whose presence she was during the trading at least,
were when this incident occurred? The chronology of a short stay (five or six
days) held well for an abduction theory but not for the alternative
Phoenician account of intercourse, followed by the realisation of
pregnancy, and 'voluntary' but necessary exile under the compelling
circumstance of pregnancy to avoid parental disgrace and social
alienation. Unfortunately, and perhaps not surprisingly, the
Phoenician tradition only offered another explanation for Io's abduction,
not a timetabled account of the Phoenician trading vessel's stay in
Argos. Equally, one wonders if Io would have been left to her own
devices in public, at any time, and especially, in the presence of
foreigners and the haggling discourse involved in trade and exchange.
The oral and written sources for the beginnings of written historical
inquiry contained within themselves their worlds' contradictions and
cultural assessments of women's position: their power, powers visible
and invisible, and powerlessness.

The ancients displayed a Janus-headed ambivalence towards women. A
prominent witness to this Greek phenomenon was Hesiod's Theogony. For
example, in this work, Prometheus' stealing fire for men compounded
Epimetheus' mistake of taking Zeus' original woman (gynē) for himself and
thereby set the precedent for the introduction of woman to primordial
male/human society. Under the instructions of Zeus and mediated by the
hands of the great craftsman, the worker of metals and limping god,
Hephaistos, a beautiful woman, Pandora, who was a beguiler, temptress and
seductive trap for men, was formed as a punishment and revenge for
Prometheus' audacity and man's complicity by his acceptance of the gift
of fire from Prometheus which was not his to give. Woman, as a part of
the human species or 'family' (genos), was regarded as rather less than a
mixed blessing. Women were regarded as of no help in poverty and seen
as purely circumstantial beneficiaries in wealth. Indeed, their roles
were compared to those of drones living off the work of presumably Greek
male, 'worker bees'. Their position amongst men was burdensome.

Yet, Hesiod's portrayal of women as drones living off the work of
toiling male worker-bees in the seclusion of their sheltered homes or
storehouses captured the essential contradiction of women's roles in
Greek social life. Here women, as a result of the wiles of one god,
Prometheus, and the vengeful whims of another all powerful god, Zeus, sat
in seclusion, burdensome dependence on men. Yet this judgement did not
cover the gamut of social relations among Greek men and women, it
reflected women's ideological inferiority. However regrettably, for
Hesiod women and marriage, (gynaike and gamos) were necessary, indeed
essential, household-based relations for the reproduction of society -
its material survival and continuity. If ever an argument were double-
edged, Hesiod's account of women's roles in Greek social formations would
certainly qualify as a primary example. Without women, old age would
have been an intolerable burden, a nightmare. Moreover, how else could
a citizen literally reproduce heirs, in order to avoid the division of
his property and possessions, the breaking up and loss of a family's and
a household's identity with their particular piece of land and its
concomitant relationships to the village. Even when a man accepted the
necessity for an association with a woman through marriage, a troublesome
family or recalcitrant offspring (aartéroio genethlès) could produce
continual grief. Problems arising from intra-familial rivalry or the
children's inability to adapt to the running of the household and its
lands provided ample grounds for household crises.

The roles of women in the Greek world were criss-crossed with
generations of myth, folk-lore, misogyny and custom. The violence on
everth was paralleled by, or reflected in, the violence of the gods as
evidenced by Kronos' sexual assault of Rhea which produced the beginnings
of an Olympian generation of gods. Women's roles found their images
and shadows cast amongst the gods. The place of Hekate in the Greek
pantheon and her relationship to the mortal Greeks can help to unmask the
importance and complexity of women's roles in polis society. Hekate's
place among the gods was protected in terms of privilege, in spite of having no brothers, because Zeus acted as her guardian through his honouring and championing of her original rights. 42 Zeus mirrored social relations in Hellas where a male legal guardian (kyrios) oversaw a woman's relationship to property rights and hence, controlled all production relations dependent upon the household's lands.

Where property belonged to the family, it was the head of the family, who had ultimate control over it, for the maintenance of the family's income implied ability to manage the estate; if the family's lands could be sold or given away by the wife, the husband might at any time be deprived of the means to feed his household. In most of Greece, control of property was assured to the kyrios by the rule that the transactions of other members of the family were valid only with his approval. This applied to all dependent members of his household, including his wife, his unmarried daughters, his minor sons, his elderly parents, and any other relatives (sisters, nieces, grandparents) who might be living with him....Within a limited circle, the title of kyrios seems to have been well defined. At a woman's birth, her father was her kyrios; at his death, her brothers. When she married, her husband assumed the economic responsibilities of the kyrios,...After her husband's death or retirement, her sons became her kyrioi. Outside of these relatives, however, the law seems to have allowed more leeway. 43

Hekate, a female deity, under Zeus' guardianship could bestow wealth, victory, and competitive prizes to man and these, in turn, led to parental honour. 44 In other words a man through a goddess's favour could win respect, power and status within his society and his family. Yet he could just as easily watch it vanish from him. 45 Hekate was a potent, fecund symbol for pastoral production and nurse of the young - a protector of fragile life. 46

Here we have another picture of women. No drone was Hekate: her activities transformed the lives of men, their conditions of existence and the human reproduction of the species. The portrait of a secluded, useless and consuming woman begins to fade and the role of Zeus as an Olympian guardian and protector of a woman's original dowry-cum-inheritance rights reveals itself.

Last she (Phoebe) bore Hekate, who above all, is honoured by the son of Kronos, Zeus. He gave her glorious gifts: a share of earth and of the barren sea. In starry heaven she has her place, and the immortal gods respect her greatly.
...Under the Titan gods of old; she keeps her privilege in earth and sea and heaven as it was portioned to her from the beginning. Nor did she get a lesser share because she had no brothers to defend her rights. Her share is greater: Zeus is her advocate.47

The social fabric of Greek life was not simply reflected in Greek myth, rather myth acted as a social filter. The Greek world, in a sense, came to gradually know itself through its own mythology. Zeus regulated and confirmed the place and rights of Hekate just as a kyrios normally regulated and sanctioned a woman's rights. Of course, dowry and inheritance rights varied as did women's rights to property ownership.48 Significantly, from Solon's time, according to Pseudo-Aristotle's Athēnaiōn Politeia, the dikastērion became the focus for, and arbiter of public and personal legal disputation. For as the writer observed, relations between men and women, their inheritances and the roles of heiresses, were closely contested arenas:

Moreover, since the laws are not written down in clear and simple terms, but are like the one about inheritances and heiresses (tōn klērōn kai epitklērōn), disputes over interpretation will inevitably arise,...49

We can better understand the social relations of men and women in their Greek cultural environment, if we venture further in this inquiry and examine a series of specific connections between myth and history, folkloric tales and the beginnings of a consciously historical method. This in turn will further our understanding of the Greek world's understanding of itself and help us to characterise more effectively just what was an ancient social formation.

When we look at Herodotos' incorporation of Solon into his work, we are not looking at this treatment of Solon with the hope of unravelling the historical Solon from Solon the sage. The Solonian persona is altogether too misty a quest and beyond the scope of this work. But what any historian should be prepared to come to grips with is the value of Solon's didactic lessons as revealed by the form in which Herodotos related them to us. The Solonian moral lessons had a direct bearing upon one Greek's perception of his world and his experience of it - namely Herodotos'. Moreover, these tales can serve as a basis for an examination of the diffuse cultural relationships between myth and history, ritual and religion, and life and death for Greeks in the general context of the 'classical era' of their history. While our
evidence propels us towards an essentially - but far from exclusively, in this work - Athenian-orientated social history, this does not mean that one should not employ as full a range of 'historical' sources as possible, in order to commence the task of establishing parameters within which Greeks conducted their social existence and theorised upon it.

As recounted by Herodotos, Solon's visit to Kroisos' Lydian empire and his sojourn at its capital Sardis, will serve as one base for the further exploration of the behaviours and workings of a Greek value system, of Greek self-comprehension. According to Herodotos, Kleobis and Biton, who were the second happiest men Solon had ever encountered or had knowledge of, can shed light on sex/gender and familial relations within a Greek perspective. The respect that Kleobis and Biton accorded to their mother during the festival of Hera, the patron and guardian of Argos, marriage and the family, was regarded as a most considerable addition to the apparently conventional, devotional respect shown by the general Argive citizenry to both Hera and one's mother. Seen from the level of an oikos and its agrarian context, Kleobis and Biton, turned themselves into a source of devoted, substitute animal power for their mother when their oxen had not returned from the fields in time for her to attend Hera's festival. The response of her sons to the need for their mother to attend this festival was, firstly, a model testimony to the depth and extent of familial and parental respect amongst Greeks. This response by the two sons could have stemmed equally from a question of the maintenance of 'face' in the eyes of their mother and household, and out of respect for the Argive citizenry's celebration of Hera. The celebration of Hera's festival was, for the Argives, a ritual demonstration of their faith in Hera's strength as a protective force of their polis. Simultaneously, this festival served as a conduit for an acknowledgement of their unity, and as a renewal of identity with, and a commitment to, their habitat.

Ritual and sacrifice found a particular, if ideal, social expression in the bond between a mother and her sons. Equally, the interlocking of relations between mortality and divinity, of living citizens and the immortal gods and goddesses were, for the Argives and the Greeks in general, an acknowledged reality. Moreover, Kleobis' and Biton's respectful and devotional act of physical strength on behalf of their mother, and its subsequent recognition by their peers, their peers'
mothers and their own mother, bound them not only to each of these social groupings but their action's aura reflected upon the whole polis. Kleobis' and Biton's behaviour openly affirmed their own and the Argive polis' socio-religious ideology. The consummation of the festival—the feasting—was an act of binding and celebration. The feasting can be seen as a manifestation of the congregation of interests between a polis' citizenry and its deities.

Another equally important set of human relations was revealed by Solon's recounting of his first moral tale to Kroisos, king of the Lydian empire. Kroisos regarded himself as the most blessed and prosperous of men and he sought confirmation of this statement from Solon. Unsurprisingly, and according to legendary form, Solon was not put off by Kroisos' display of his power, prosperity and wealth or belief in his greatness. Solon regarded Tellos, the Athenian, as the most blessed, happiest and prosperous (olbiōstatos) of men. Telecos, unlike Kroisos, did not possess great wealth or treasures (tous thēsauros). Nor was his homeland, as was Kroisos' Sardis, at its height of wealth. However, Tellos was regarded by Solon as a man most truly blessed by good fortune—his life had been complete, it was rounded and fulfilled. Tellos did not find happiness in treasures or power, rather this happiness derived from dwelling in a prosperous polis where he had good, well-born sons and, in turn, they all had children. The third generation was at hand.

The key to an understanding of the reasoning behind this didactic Solonian lesson, administered through the device of a model Greek's life, lies in its genealogical continuity. Within the context of Tellos' extended family and household (in the broadest sense of these terms), its complementary unity was expressed in Tellos' children's children's and sons' sons' perpetuation of his line. These social relations defined the core of his prosperity and represented a form of filial insurance for his household's and family's future prosperity.

With these familial advantages in view, Tellos' death in battle against the dwellers of the neighbouring town at Eleusis was regarded as a most noble, beautiful (kallista) act, a culmination of his citizen's existence devoted to his household's succession and his polis' integrity. Tellos had fought alongside his Athenian countrymen, routed the enemies of his polis and in the course of this action had met the
death of a citizen-soldier hero, which was especially honoured by his public burial on the battlefield.61

Tellos' life represented a stylised, powerful portraiture of citizen existence. It served the twin purposes of presenting a didactic lesson to Kroisos, the foreign potentate, and illustrated what the Greeks through Solon and his recorder, Herodotos, regarded as an ideal, fulfilled polis citizen's life. Such views found their embodiment in Solonian legendary wisdom.

The historical metaphor between Kleobis, Biton, Tellos and Solon's final advice to Kroisos was distance. Whether it was approximately forty-five stadia to the temple of Hera that Kleobis and Biton conveyed, by their own physical power, the oxen cart which contained their mother or Tellos' perpetuation of his family's identity and their households through his sons, distance remained the metaphor of familial and extra-familial sacrifice.62 For Tellos', Kleobis' and Biton's deaths served in a sense as a reward and as a distinguishing mark amongst their fellow men. In Kleobis' and Biton's case, their deaths also served as Hera's confirmation of their exemplary conduct. For Kleobis' and Biton's mother and peers there appeared to be no other explanation for these events.

Kroisos was entirely dissatisfied with Solon's first two moral tales and this prompted Solon to further consider human existence from an ideal Greek viewpoint. Within the context of Kroisos' Solon lesson, Herodotos related 'Solon's' considered opinion of how circumstances were able to shape one's life and fortune.63 Through this apparently ethical procedure, Herodotos' Solon tale directly touched upon the cultural values surrounding a human being's age and good fortune and the limits inherent in both.

Solon chose to reckon numerically a theoretical life-span and consider that model person's existence in its broadest sense. In a dramatic addition, perhaps because life expectancy in the ancient Mediterranean was short,64 Solon put forward for Kroisos' consideration a model anthropos with a maximal life-span of seventy years. Here, a further didactic purpose could be driven home by employing as a cultural reckoner the seventy year life-span of this anthropos. Wealth was no absolute determinant of one's being olbios (blessed or happy) nor was it a sure measure for one's personally fortunate existence (eutukhia).65
Indeed one could have been wealthy but unfortunate (anobos). Life needed to have been lived well (kalos) in the sense conveyed by the expression 'correctly', before a determination could have been made on whether one, in Greek eyes, had had both a blessed and fortunate existence.

Herodotos' calculations on his model human life span of seventy years were intended as a numerical dramatisation, a base upon which Herodotos developed his ethically and philosophically clothed, ideal Greek expression of human existence and the role sumphora (circumstance) played in human affairs. For this reason, we shall turn to a consideration of his culturally based calculations. Herodotos' numbers were not essentially mathematical entities. The purposes of his 'numbers' were to act as social guides, to flesh out and illustrate arguments rather than being intended to establish the grounds for some absolute, let alone quasi-scientific proofs. Herodotos' seventy year life-span was reckoned initially (but not in aggregate) as having totalled 25,200 days. Without complicating Herodotos' Solonian calculations, it is their seeming imprecision which is most interesting. The Greek number system was different from the much later innovations of Hindu/Arabic accounting and numeral notation and a decimal system with a zero having a precise mathematical function. The Greek number system had something of a qualitative and guesstimate numeracy about it. The cardinal number ten thousand (murioloi) also represented the expression 'countless': it literally stood for a myriad. Hence, Herodotos' 'number' for twenty-five thousand two hundred days, ἡμέραι δικοσίας καὶ πεντακατ’ χιλιάδες καὶ δισμυριάς, included two ten-thousands (dismurias) and, like all Greek numbers of ten-thousand units, it should be considered as culturally proximate rather than mathematically precise. If we take Herodotos' exclusion of the intercalary month (hembolimous menos), 25,200 days converted to an average year of 360 days when divided by seventy. Yet, with his intercalary addition of one extra month every second year, Herodotos' thirty-five intercalary months (hembolimoi ... triêkonta pente) yielded one thousand and fifty additional days to a seventy year life-span, ἡμέραι δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὑπ' ὑπὸν τοῦ ἕκατον χιλιάτων κατενήθησαν. These 1,050 days in turn yielded an average of thirty days for each of the thirty-five intercalary months.
In Herodotos’ attempt to bring together or come to terms with the seasons, and particularly, to resolve the differences between two systems of reckoning - solar and calendar years - a mathematical discrepancy still remained. Yet this should not be allowed to obscure the moral behind Solon’s tale, its particular cultural form and expression. Rather, the attempt at a numerically based schematisation or sketch of a human life-span could well have been meant to impress the listener and the reader with the force of Herodotos’ report of Solonian argumentation and its didactic purpose. Solon’s tale has a direct bearing on a perception of Greek values and their place in the roles accorded to a human being-as-polis-citizen.

Within the Solonian tradition incorporated by Herodotos, the transitory nature of existence was predominant. A human being’s fortunate or unfortunate experiences were but the results of a series of human and divine actions (actions based around religious experiences or interventions interpreted as having resulted from the activities of a divinity, to theion), unknown or unexpected and determined by an event, circumstance or chance:

οὔτε ἄν κροίος πάν ἐστὶ ἀνθρώπος συμφώνη .75

Interestingly, Solon argued that such were the prevailing conditions of life that a wealthy person was not more blessed or happily placed unless this wealth, and prevailing good circumstances, continued to the end of a person’s life.76 While the wealthy but unblemished man (tou plousiou kai anolbou)77 had the capability, the strength and the power to gain or accomplish what he desired (in other words to dominate material things) and to carry or bear the heavy burden of a material setback:

δὲ μὲν ἐπειθωμίην ἐκτελέσαι καὶ ἄτιν μεγάλην προσπεσοῦσαν ἐνείκαι ἑυναότερος,78

he lacked certain advantages of a simpler, more fortunate existence.

The rich man was regarded as having been not more blessed than the man who had had enough for the day, or for immediate, daily sustenance:

οὐ γὰρ τι δὲ μέγα πλοῦσιος μᾶλλον τοῦ ἐκ ἰμέριν ἔχοντος ἑλεότερος ἐστὶ.79

Here we have had presented to us a picture of a smaller scale of things, a human being with fewer means and hence with fewer realisable needs, that is, less chance to accomplish human material desires and survive a heavy material burden or misadventure. However, the fortunate man
(eutukhes) benefited from having had a life unmaimed, kept away from sickness, a healthy, sound body, and not having suffered from or experienced troubles and evils. His good fortune looked after him, and besides he had been blessed with good, fine children and the requisite good looks that accompanied fine children:

ταύτα δὲ ἡ εὐτυχία αὐτῷ ἀνεφέκτη, ἁπρόσ ἄθι, ἁγνονὸς ἁπάθη
κακῶν, εὐταῖα εὐεύθυς. 80

If this ordinary Greek's life continued to be free from misfortune, then finally, at the end of his days, he could have been described as most happy and blessed, rather than simply a fortunate human being. 81

Solon's argument was designed to sustain an 'ideal type' whose purpose was to serve as a comparative bench-mark for an inseparably moral and socio-cultural analysis of who was, or could have been referred to and defined as, one who had had a happy, blessed and fulfilled life. As Max Weber expressed it:

Before going any further, we should emphasize that the idea of an ethical imperative, of a 'model' of what 'ought' to exist is to be carefully distinguished from the analytical construct, which is 'ideal' in the strictly logical sense of the term. It is a matter here of constructing relationships which our imagination accepts as plausibly motivated and hence as 'objectively possible' and which appear as adequate from the nomological standpoint. 82

Clearly, Solon recognised that no person could have had everything that comprised this happy life. 83 However, whichever land had the most, that is, was the most self-supporting and independent in what it produced for itself, then that place was truly favoured. 84 Just as no land could have been entirely independent or self-supporting, no one human being could have been entirely self-supporting or sufficient in oneself:

ζητεὶ καὶ ὑποδομοῦ σῶμα καὶ ὑποδομὴ ἰδανίας ἐστὶ. 85

Importantly, we find, once again, that only the human being who possessed the most of these 'good things' and who continued life in this vein, as discussed earlier, would have been regarded as a most fortunate man at the end of his time. 86 Material or worldly happiness (oikos) 87 had to be watched, one needed to look to the ends of things. Chance was not something to be taken for granted. However outwardly prosperous and favoured, one could be struck down, as Kroisos was to discover later in Herodotos' history of the Lydian king. 88
The very preoccupation with limit, whether it was the amount of useful things a 'country' possessed or the degree of access to material things one human being had, revealed (and reveals for the historian) something of the ideological complex of the Greek world. Inherent limitations on territorial and human prosperity were apparent as were limitations on a person's self-sufficiency. A social formation then was conditioned by the extent to which immediate self-sufficiency was a feasible goal, or the degree to which a polis must go beyond its immediate territorial boundaries and human (familial and extra-familial) relations in order to reproduce itself successfully. It is within this context that an exploration of Greek values should be undertaken. Whether one is intent on revealing the relationships between the physical environment and the polis citizen, relations between Greek men and women or relations between slaves, their owners and any permutations of the above, one must return to and attempt to unravel Greek perceptions of Greek social existence.

Any approach whose aim is to improve upon an understanding of the Greek world must come to grips with ancient as well as modern perceptions of the polis world. Both work from different historical arenas of self-comprehension but enjoy an equally human experience. Yet whilst sharing much broadly common ground, 'modern' scholarship has been uneven in its interpretation of Greek views. By returning to Hesiod's work one can explore some pitfalls of modern scholarship and, more importantly, further reveal and examine some elemental characteristics which underlay polis social organisation and touched upon a vitally Greek comprehension of a Greek world.

Overgeneralisation and mistranslation often stem from similar origins - non-comprehension or misunderstanding. The social arena of earthly and cosmological relations with women can reveal how much remains to be done. First, Kronos' relationship to Rhea was not one where, "Rhea was subject in love to Kronos." Evelyn White's translation involved a rather loose and liberal 'glossing-over' of the gods' sexual relations.9) Rhea was certainly "subject" (dmétheisa) but the verb Hesiod employed carried far heavier connotations. To begin with, the abstract concept of 'love' did not come into the relationship between Kronos and Rhea, regardless of the benevolent Hestia, goddess of oikos and hearth, being amongst the progeny of this sexual encounter. What was
at stake was Kronos' sexual subjection of Rhea, his subduing and gaining
mastery over her. Rhea was not so much 'subject' in 'love' but rather
subjected. Kronos' sexual assault, his use of force, determined Rhea's
relationship with him. Kronos was the father of her children by right of
physical conquest not by some act of conventional betrothal, let alone,
love.⁹⁰

A second problem presents itself when one examines the role of
Epimetheus in bringing woman down upon men's lives.⁹¹ Epimetheus'
singular act of taking a woman into his life will not be our first
question here; rather, translators' misunderstandings of, γένετ' ἄνδρον
ἀ(fake)ταιται,⁹² will serve, by way of introduction, as a critical focus
upon the social values which underpinned Greek self-perception. Wender
translated the above as, "to men who live on bread" and Evelyn-White
rendered the same words as, "to men who eat bread."⁹³ Here we have a
picture of one Greek's (a Boiotian's) view of the origins of strife for
the original so-called 'bread-eating' men. One must ask, did these
'primal' agrarian men really eat bread? It was more than likely that
these first enterprising men consumed a greater portion of their cereal
diet in the form of barley groats (alphita),⁹⁴ whole barley-meal, and ate
barley-meal (alphitophagos) rather than so-called bread in the form of
unleavened barley-cake (maza).⁹⁵

The generic term 'bread' can easily bring about inaccurate
comparisons with much later cottage and farm bread-making practices. In
addition, the term bread is often, in twentieth-century Western
experience, associated with contemporary mass-produced bread-making
processes which are most distantly removed from ancient cereal production
and consumption. Jasny, a tireless scholar of ancient cereal production,
processing and consumption, in his memoirs and critique of the
interpretations and knowledge of practical, daily ancient cereal
production, commented in detail upon this problem.⁹⁶ In particular,
within a broad-ranging analysis of the ancient socio-economic conditions
which surrounded cereal agriculture, Jasny added a critical note on the
quality of Michell's contribution to understanding the 'economic' or
material conditions of ancient Greece:
The exaltation of antiquity, the ascription to antiquity of attainments made hundreds and thousands of years later, is apparent in much of the ground I covered. Professor Humphrey Michell, for example, in his book The Economics of Ancient Greece, Cambridge, England, 1940 (of which he said in the preface that he endeavoured to give, in short compass, the results of modern research) - in describing the preparation of bread, which included the process of grinding - said: "to separate the flour from the bran the meal was sieved or 'bolted'" (p.194), although μάζα, the standard grain food of the Greeks, was made from unsifted barley meal. Michell informed his readers that 'all kinds of confectionery, fancy cakes, and pastry were made; (sic) we even know the name of one famous confectioner,' he said, yet he neglected to mention the μάζα. What little bread was made by the Greeks in the time of their glory was referred to by Michell as loaves, although it was probably unleavened cakes. All in all, it is difficult to distinguish between the description of bread given by Michell for ancient Greece and one for the time when he was writing his book.97

Nor was Michell the only scholar who in Jasny's view overlooked, over-generalised or misconstrued the ancient evidence.98 Quite often these problems were (and still remain) generated by a lack of specialised knowledge, of paradoxically, over-specialisation and scholarly isolation, or the failure to extend one's research and its methodology beyond the often historically arbitrary lines drawn for a particular academic discipline.99

Given that the greater part of the cereal diet of Hesiodic or archaic Greece, let alone that of classical Greece, was represented by barley-meal consumption (alphitophagos) and that that principally was consumed in the form of 'unleavened bread' (the barley groats [to alphiton] of the Greek world), another level of meaning remains to be recovered from the evidence which produced our previous discussion.

(i) ἐν' ἀλφόσῳ άλποτάμου.
(ii) γενέτ' ἀλφόσῳ άλποτάμου.
(iii) ἄταλαντη ... ἀλφόσῳ άλποτάμου γενέτ' νάμου άλποτάμου.100

The evidence surveyed above also presented an ambivalent legacy on women. This ambivalence can be securely located within the world of Greek myth but only if myth is perceived as an engaged, active expression of a culture's identity within historical time but not concomitantly concerned with historical place or time. Within the arena of human social relations and the 'origins' of their alleged behaviour patterns
and their history, it is salient for this history to note the following arguments from the anthropologists Collier and Rosaldo:

...gender conceptions in any society are to be understood as functioning aspects of a cultural system through which actors manipulate, interpret, legitimate, and reproduce the patterns ... that order their social world.101

I return directly to the immediate problem of an ambivalent Greek legacy on women and its interpretation. This ambivalence is a most important and interesting phenomenon and provides us with valuable insights into a Greek cultural definition of a world principally based upon an agrarian existence. First, we had Epimetheus accepting, or rather more colloquially and accurately, 'falling for' the gift of Zeus (the multi-faceted creation of the Olympians), Pandora, who lifted the lid off the large storage container, the pitcher (pithou mega) that, until that time, had held back from man disease and sundry evils.102 Now these were amongst men. Epimetheus had brought woman into men's presence and, in turn, woman had loosed evil upon the previously utopian lives of men.103 Second, further evidence of ambivalence was brought to the fore by Atalante's behaviour, who quite literally voted with her feet and attempted to escape marriage to this epithetic barley-eating man.104 Quite possibly this was perceived as an attempt to avoid the hard-working, toiling, producing (alphēstaōn, alphēstēisín) life incorporated in this formulaic105 epithet for agrarian man and woman, as it was an utopian expression106 of a longed-for escape from everyday life, the ever-present reality of agrarian labour. The inevitable toil involved in cereal production had been integrated into the very terminology which represented barley-eating humanity. Many terms had incorporated the language of barley-eating and producing: alphē, produce; alphetophagos, barley-eating; alphēstaōn or alphēstēisín, hard-working, toiling, producing.107 All these above terms had become synonymous with work and toil. Moreover, for women, it was not only a question of hard-working or toiling in a general range of essential agrarian activities in order to produce one's immediate material needs but there was the inevitable role of marriage, of citizens' social needs and roles. It is a moot point whether Atalante was seeking to avoid the inevitable toil of a social division of labour or the sexual division of labour which revolved around the production and rearing of children.
These social relations were the primary expression of the reproduction of the male citizen peasant's world. However one views Atalante's behaviour in Greek mythology, Atalante was most reluctant to join through marriage in the toiling, tilling and tending lives of barley-eating agrarian men.

Another source of mistranslations, confusions or sometimes uncomprehensions of Greek values stems from the unfortunate rendering of genos as 'race'.

(i) The translations:
(a) "For from her is the race of women and female kind: of her is the deadly race and tribe of women ..."
(b) "From her comes all the race of womankind,
The deadly female race and tribe of wives ..."¹⁰⁸

(ii) The source:

τὰς γάρ γένοις ἄτοι γυναικῶν ἐνυποεῖναν,
τὰς γὰρ ὀλίσιάν ἄτοι γένος καὶ φῦλα γυναικῶν.¹⁰⁹

The term genos would be more appropriately translated as a 'stock', a generic expression for a broad 'family' line with a patriarchal, genealogical history.¹¹⁰ By viewing genos from this general perspective, one can more effectively interpret the relationships between Greek mythology and the formation of a distinctive Greek cultural belief system. The role played by one 'gilded' maidens (taking 'gilded' in its full range of meanings: from an ornamental gilt covering through to covering generally, to a sense of lustre and specious appearance) and nubile women, Pandora, formed by the triple alliance of Zeus, Hephaistos and Pallas Athene as a cunning revenge upon men for having gained access to fire through Prometheus' agency,¹¹² can be more effectively understood by regarding the term genos not as an exclusive concept based upon some ideologically overloaded notion of so-called 'race' but rather as having represented a general familial classification. The term genos should be seen as having played the roles of a social and sexual taxonomist. Whilst women were viewed as a distinct entity, their position, gender and socio-sexual roles were bound to the fortunes and social relations of a male citizen world and, in turn, men were unwise to separate themselves from the difficult social arena of women and marriage.¹¹³ From Pandora, who represented an archetypal, primal reproductive source, came the future offspring of womankind who composed the generations of women and
wives (gynaike). Both genos and gynē take many levels of meaning. Gender and sex can be attached to a genos-based classification of human relations just as the notion of a sexual mate can be directly attached to the term gynē. A gynē was simultaneously woman and wife, or possessed the potential to be so defined.

Equally important to any clearer view of ancient values and social relations is the need to emphasize that the ancients had no biological, or, rather more accurately, pseudo-biological concept of 'race'. The ambiguous and problematical legacy of the term 'race' is the product of a world order far removed from that of the Greek Mediterranean poleis. To deploy a term such as 'race', as the above translations have done, in Hesiod's world, or to that of later Greek societies, is to conflate unique ancient social formations and the writing of their histories with historical movements in early modern, modern and contemporary world history. The rise of a new ideology, capitalism, its social and material expressions spread through the trans-world reach of European colonialism, capitalist plantation slavery in the New Worlds, and the rise of industrial capitalism, were historical phenomena well-removed from a Greek world-view. The dynamic harmonies as well as dissonant forces contained within the scientific and social momentum of Darwin's and Wallace's theory of evolution comprised another universe of human experience. Rather than using a term such as 'race' to interpret (rather than translate) Hesiod's account of Pandora's role in Greek mytho-history, or applying it (and associated terms) to later Greek historical and cultural experience, we would do better to translate Hesiod's passage (Theogony, 590–591) in the following form:

For from her (Pandora) is the stock of women, the female gender: from her is the deadly, ruinous familial line, and tribe of women/wives.

Pandora was the archetypal link between a cultural past and its present. Hesiod choose to express this relationship in the present tense. His views were a contemporary assessment and reflected their immediate Greek aura.

A fuller comprehension of Greek values can be realised by a further interrogation of Hesiod's other work, Works and Days. In Hesiod's view, there was an ever-present need to be cautious and prepared, to be able to fall back on one's reserves so as not to be left to need (xhrēżisin)
something which should have been present - if a man had been frugal and possessed hindsight. 118 Hesiod's advice to his wasteful, recalcitrant brother was surrounded by an historical metaphor based upon the necessary precautions which needed to be taken and limits imposed on one's conduct-in-society to ensure survival, let alone prosperity. 119 Without paying close attention to the necessary and precarious rhythms of the seasons, heeding one's gods and thanking them for their agrarian favours, or the hope that they will be forthcoming in the due season, a farmer risked losing his means of livelihood. 120 Without due preparations, whether they were attention to particular agricultural tasks in their appointed seasons, or the cultivation of one's social relations with one's neighbours, the basis for socio-economic survival might not have been present.

Cooperative exchange between neighbours was the first rule of household and local, neighbourly maintenance. 121 A bad neighbour was the very antithesis of a system of local services which were based upon a mutual interchange of favours, a cooperative system that was ideally dependent upon a mutuality of interests. 122 This, in a sense, could be said to have been the internal economy of neighbours. If one assiduously cultivated the system of practical, mutually self-supporting assistance, a farmer would have had a line of retreat to fall back upon in a period of real need. 123 However, when one failed to participate in a supportive reciprocal neighbourly network, one entered into a venture fraught with risk if one were obliged by circumstances to call on neighbours for help. Initially, they might have responded favourably but, inevitably, their patience and material assistance would have run out. 124 There was always an element of risk in asking a neighbour for help, he could well refuse you. 125 Of course, Hesiod was most concerned to encourage self-reliance as the best insurance system in agrarian existence. 126

One needs to look further into this Hesiodic schema for more evidence which demonstrated the ambivalent position taken towards women's roles. The seemingly conflicting positions taken by Hesiod on women's roles in the Greek agrarian oikos can be explained by the presence of a three-dimensional split between women's sexuality and women's roles in social production in the context of Works and Days. First there was the dimension of woman as a sexual lure to the unwary man. One example of such social behaviour was described by Hesiod as an action in which a
woman provocatively displayed her 'rump' (pugostolos)\textsuperscript{127}, or more precisely, after having been caught foraging, this woman literally attempted to wriggle herself out of a difficult situation.\textsuperscript{128} Such behaviour by a woman accompanied by other actions which sought to ingratiate herself to a particular man were seen as potential acts of sexual and personal enticement. Moreover, for Hesiod, this particular sexual behaviour or display of sensual wiles (woman perceived in this cultural Weltanschauung as a sexual schemer and lure) was designed to secure for this wife (or a "neighbour's wife or a slave")\textsuperscript{129} a better share of the 'food resources' stored in this peasant farmer's barn\textsuperscript{130} and abode, and hence, through these enticing actions, access to the means of survival. However, not surprisingly, a woman who comported herself in such a manner was to be avoided\textsuperscript{131} and women generally were not to be trusted.\textsuperscript{132} Ideally, one needed to plan either to have one son or if two resulted one must live into old age.\textsuperscript{133} If one did not restrict one's progeny to one or two sons, then, at least, greater family numbers spelt more care and attention (meletē) generally being given to one's agrarian existence and ideally this led to a greater increase or addition (epitēke) to one's familial prosperity.\textsuperscript{134} If prosperity were the farmer's goal, then it was axiomatic that one must be preoccupied with daily tasks necessary for material existence. If one lived for and desired wealth or riches, then work and more work, work added to work was de rigeur:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Eó θε' εἰ πλούτου θομήξ ἔλεηται ἐν φρεσίν \ı̂ \ποιν,}
\textit{οὔ' εἴδειν, καὶ ἦγον ἐν ἔγγυῃ ἐγγάζονται.}\textsuperscript{135}
\end{quote}

The second dimension attributable to Hesiod's assessment of women's roles appeared within the context of the household's sexual and social division of labour:

\begin{quote}
\textit{οἶκον μὲν ψώπἰστα γυναίκα τε βοῶν τ' ἄρτηρα,}
\textit{κηθῆν, οὐ γαμετῆν, ἂτι καὶ θωσίν ἔσκετο ...}\textsuperscript{136}
\end{quote}

Amongst the assets needed for a successful farmer, one was required to possess the infrastructure necessary to maintain an oikos. Animal power, characteristically represented by oxen,\textsuperscript{137} was essential to the world of the agrarian tiller. Hesiod made it quite clear that a peasant farmer needed three material things. These things were essential and performed interrelated functions. First, one needed a material, domiciliary base. Second, there was the need for animal power for the inevitable tillage
and ploughing. Third, one required the services, the human labour of a female slave (ktētē) as opposed to the labour of a married woman or wife (gazetē) in direct agricultural production. Nor need one consider that a ktētē served exclusively in the role of a female agricultural labourer. A female slave's availability and classification as something acquired, a human possession, made her entirely subject to a master's social and sexual demands.

The third dimension to Hesiod's assessment of women located itself around a free woman's/wife's (gynē) roles in the maintenance of the social and reproductive relations of the household. A citizen peasant ideally entered into such a relationship around the age of thirty (when a male citizen had attained the equivalent of his majority) and after he was more securely established on the land. The preferred wife was to be in a virginal state (innocent, in a literal sense) and married after an initial 'maturation' or training period of four years, that is, she was married in the fifth year. Here, Hesiod presented conscious advice which urged a man to marry a young girl or young woman, παενικήν ὀν ναιείν, presumably, around the time of menarche or within several years of a woman's reproductive sexuality being identifiably present. Menstruation was as much a biological as a social sign. Marriage signified one's familial and social bonds. It organised polis life at a fundamental level. The social division of labour was, to this extent, organised around a customary assemblage of the lives of men and women in marriage. Hesiod's marital interregnum (his four year post-pubescent maturation period for the young wife-to-be) can be likened to a physical 'finishing school', under firm parental control, for the young woman and potential wife of the farmer's household. With the passing of this post-pubescent phase, a young woman was nubile. The young woman's next socially logical step was to become a wife in a particular household and ideally, from the husband's perspective, (after leaving her parental realm of sheltered innocence and closeted ignorance) to be trained exclusively by him in the preferred ways of this husband and household ruler. The rite of passage given expression here was a young married woman's induction into and acquisition of customary and useful household behaviour. The oikos was a primary expression of domestic identity and attachment to a larger social order. A wife's reproductive role ensured the social base of a household and for Hesiod this was achieved ideally by the production of one son.
possessions and household succession were insured by such prudent behaviour. Women's roles extended from perceived or imagined threats to the male citizen's landed wealth, to the labouring world of field and household, and finally represented the socio-sexual reproduction of an oikos. A citizen's wife was the domiciliary agent who confirmed familial existence and continuity through the production of an heir.

Hesiod always turned his principal thoughts to household maintenance as the basis for a successful existence. A household's elemental survival must never be taken for granted. From this perspective, Hesiod's advice to his brother to redeem or discharge his financial obligations (debts and pledges) as a matter of expediency, ἀλλ' ἄνευ was a sermon on the necessary steps one must take to possess landed security and a self-sufficient independence. However much Hesiod was concerned with the agricultural management and maintenance of a farmer's property (the correct times for ploughing, vineyard care and reaping the harvest), ultimately one's success in seeking shelter from or avoiding the dogged companionship of famine (limou τ' αλήθεια) was determined, in Hesiod's world-view, by the degree of prescience one displayed in confronting these omnipresent challenges. Hesiod's scale of agrarian production was always small and potentially fragile. It needs to be remembered that ancient peasant farm acreage, usually quite small (60 plethra = 15 acres), obviously varied in terms of agricultural fortunes according to local climate and soil type, as well as its specific land usage history. Clearly oikoi, their size, and productive aims varied according to whether they produced more than a subsistence level of existence. "Non-market" forces (that is, traditional agrarian values and goals) dominated the ancient polis economies or, more precisely, those agrarian activities, in particular, (though not exclusively) which can be characterised as having economic meaning within the predominantly political character of an ancient social formation. The durability of peasant farming practice must be emphasized, whilst simultaneously, its periodic turbulence and fragility, in terms of collective and familial experiences, must be accepted as having been a co-existent feature of this world.
Although slaves were mentioned by Hesiod in plural terms for ploughing and reaping the harvest, his concept of scale still centred round the self-provisioning of one's own wagon and yoke of oxen which provided the farmer's necessary animal labour-power. Without constant attention and preparation, a farmer's life could have been made extremely hazardous. Self-reliance, a trust in one's own sufficiency for the provision of needs (for instance, the building of a wagon and having oxen ready for it) was always a more certain mode of agrarian conduct. A yoke of oxen and a wagon were vital and scarce tools for agricultural production, and if a farmer did not have his own wagon and team, these items were not particularly easy to come by during ploughing and harvesting seasons. The borrowing or acquisition of basic agricultural equipment through some form of rent or favour system was obviously fraught with difficulty during a time of strong seasonal use. Hesiod's warning that one must be as self-reliant as possible, should be viewed as strong advice which encompassed the realm of agrarian contingencies. A farmer had to look to his own farming needs. This was a prerequisite for the maintenance of a particular household's material integrity and social existence.

If one were not prepared for an agrarian mode of existence, the citizen-farmer with his wife, children and household would be thrown upon his neighbours' generosity. Of course, his neighbours could have been equally unprepared or faced with the same set of environmental and agrarian circumstances, for example, a drought. Hesiod's appeal to self-reliance and preparedness was in no way a rejection of gregarious agrarian life, and the role of neighbourly, reciprocal behaviours within a polis. Interdependence and cooperation were part-and-parcel of village and farm household life. If things went wrong, the destitute husband, his wife and children were thrown onto the potentially shaky dependency of good neighbourliness. To the extent that a male landowner's and citizen's agrarian distress (faced, for example, with the prospect of landlessness or an empty granary) had an immediate impact upon his household's prosperity, one could say that his wife, children and all the members of a particular household, were acted upon and not actors in such a crisis.

From this actual world of the physical and social needs of a household's familial structure, we shall turn to consider further
Hesiod's perceptions of women. Women's roles were perceived on real and imaginary planes. Women's roles were regarded as both subject and object within a household social arena. Additionally, women possessed real and phantasmic social position and powers. It is to this relationship between real or apparent material relations and roles of women and their spectral social images that we must turn and consider.

When we examine the question of women's sexuality and potency in Hesiod's world, a few important observations and possible generalisations can be drawn. In the socio-sexual arena of agrarian production women were regarded as being strongest in sexual desire during the seasonal presence of golden thistle and the clear-sounding chirping of the cicada. Summer was women's optimal time of sensuality. Under examination here was not some absolute question of women's identification with pleasure or the sensual world but a particular assertion that women were most wanton or lustful (makhlotatai) during the season of the thistle and the cicada. However, a closer look at Hesiod's views of women's sensual and sexual power is of great value to an investigation concerned with outlining the social and cultural boundaries which gave a peculiar as well as a general character to Greek civilisation. During summer, women's and men's sensual powers were placed in stark opposition with respect to their believed power or powerlessness. Men were in a most powerless, feeble or weak state (aphaurotatoi) at the same time as women were most sensually empowered:
μαχλόταται δὲ γυναῖκες, δεσμοφόρωται δὲ τοῖς ἄνδρεσι εἰσὶν ...163

This particular opposition of gender relations was and is most revealing. The environmental conditions, the seasonal forces of summer which presented and produced the fattest goats and best wine:
τὴνος πυλεταται τ' αἰγες καὶ ἀφιμος ἄμετος, 164

had a singularly fecund impact upon women. Women and men were linked by a form of analogical reasoning which identified itself with summer's capacity both to strengthen or ripen and its antithetical capacity to weaken or exhaust.165 Whilst women grew in sensual strength (makhilotatai) farm animals approached their prime condition and fruits ripened, men sought shelter from Selarios and comfort in the land's produce.166

Hesiod had no doubt that for agrarian man, in a gender-specific sense, Selarios had a debilitating impact upon his productive
activities. For men and women, it was as if one set of environmental conditions (nature's seasonal rounds) and their impact upon a Greek habitat had two socially and culturally distinct sets of results which were given by one's membership of one or the other sex/gender groupings within the human species. Hesiod could well have reflected a 'popular' belief that agrarian bountifulness, Seirios' heat and women's potency were intertwined phenomena. At the very least, what we have gathered from Hesiod was evidence of one thinker's (one perceptive farmer's reflections upon his immediate world's social experience) perceptions of female sensuality and women's potent identification with the natural forces which accompanied summer's heat.

Given Hesiod's relationship between women's desires and environmental conditions, and the evident belief in such generally given relations, women's impact upon men extended to particular social rituals as represented by the general term ablation. Hesiod claimed that a woman had the potential to harm a man if that man washed or bathed in the same water after a woman had used it:

μηδὲ γυναικεῖα λουτρό χρόα σαυρόν κύσα:
ἀνάσα: λευκὰλέα γαῦτ' ἐπὶ χρόου τοι' ἐπὶ κα' τῷ

κούνι. A woman had an invisible power, transferred through her contact with water, to effect adversely the life of a man. Men were warned to protect themselves from the mischievous potential (the forces contained within) present in this unseen plane of women's power. Whatever the origins of such beliefs, the notion of a woman being unclean presented itself in the above form in Hesiod's writing. Whether these fears originated from some fear or misapprehension caused by the presence of menstrual blood is one problem to keep in mind. Certainly, a woman appeared to act as a harmful agent to men by her believed capacity to leave her active bodily presence in the water she bathed herself in. Hesiod's warning that a man should never bathe in this water, implied that the bathing water was no longer a neutral thing in itself but now was tainted. It possessed a harmful potentiality and was hostile to a man's well-being.

In effect, the polluting presence of a woman transformed water into a carrier, a mischief-making courier. This tainted water possessed for an unspecified time, as Hesiod believed, the potential to have acted in a dangerously catalytic fashion upon any man brought into contact with
it. The environment's powers generally (whether represented by Seirios' hot presence or water being transformed by a woman having bathed in it) aided or coincided with women's potential to cause trouble, place demands upon or harm a man.

The natural world actively played upon polis agrarian life. In the eyes of either Hesiod or Herodotos, the survival of a Greek's household was too fragile a human undertaking for a citizen to have assumed either happiness and prosperity, let alone survival, without one's acceptance of the need for daily care, the necessity for agrarian toil and personal sacrifice. The cultural boundaries and historical reach of Greek civilisation recognised women as useful and valuable property\textsuperscript{174} which was open to seizure, needed protection and guardianship.\textsuperscript{175} However useful and valuable women and women's roles were to citizen men, women were regarded as double-edged possessions. They were stores of trouble as well as stores of use.\textsuperscript{176} Greek value terminology not only expressed a particular outlook on material and utilitarian necessity and advantage (itself a peculiarly cultural distillation of Greek social experience), it also conveyed the range and depth of a culture's belief system.
CHAPTER II

MAN AND WOMAN

If one were to generalise, it would be to agree with Aristotle that social relations within a society cannot be distinguished by an assertion of the existence of simple quantitative differences within a particular social framework, such as the polis.\textsuperscript{1} The acknowledgement of a distinction between quantitative and qualitative social forces or factors in an analysis of commanding roles within the polis formed the bases for Aristotle's analysis of the functioning of the polis.\textsuperscript{2} Aristotle quickly came to grips with the problems of appearances - physical expressions and forms of power - as a basis for critical understanding of the polis. The first misleading appearance was that of size. The differences between a large or great household and a small polis, (\textit{μεγάλην οίκιαν} \textit{μικρὰν πόλιν},)\textsuperscript{3} a neat, logical inversion of the problem, were made explicit by Aristotle's deployment of language. At stake here was not just a question of the scale of social relations but the qualitative functioning and political formation of human existence within the historically given forms of poleis.

This assertion in no way should be taken to mean that Aristotle was attempting to write a history of the polis social formation and the diverse political paths it could take within its historical development or experience. Rather, he should be perceived as having written from within the context of a fourth-century Greek, Mediterranean world. This was a world in which Athenian power, in the second-half of this century, faced ever-increasing challenges from Macedon to its great power standing. Equally, after Leuktra, Sparta faced increasing problems in holding onto, let alone regaining, some of her former military, political and territorial power.\textsuperscript{4} Yet, Sparta's image as a great power and her former military strength, political authority and ideological ascendancy over the Peloponnesse remained a disputatious, intellectual arena, implanted deep within the memories of Sparta's supporters and critics.\textsuperscript{5} Macedon, a kingdom to the far north, with an acclaimed tribal king, and not incorporated into the mainstream of polis society, was the new, giant political entity on the horizon of Greek Mediterranean culture.\textsuperscript{6}
Elemental intellectual curiosity, theoretical reflections upon the experiences and pressures of broad historical and political forces (and changes), rather than any immediately temporal desire effectively to halt, let alone direct this process, lay at the core of Aristotle's treatise. The use of proto-scientific reason or a systematic process of reasoning out and discovering knowledge, Aristotle's λόγοι τῆς ἐπιστήμης and the consistent deployment of a systematic reasoning or investigative technique lay at the core of what we can designate Aristotle's 'method':

δὲ λογία τῇ λέγομεν ἐπιστήμον: κατὰ τὴν ὑπηγγένην μέσον. 10

The willingness to deploy theory or a form of discursive reasoning and explanation (logos) to the discovery of knowledge (epistēmē), by a systematic pursuit of knowledge through direct investigation in theory and practice (methodos), gave Aristotle an experimental platform for an exploration of the workings of a polis world. It provided the basis for the simultaneous quest for the raison d'être of any male citizen both in theory and in practice. Just as the shores, rock platforms and tidal pools of the Aegean provided a practical, observational workshop for a theoretical formation of, or a foundation for the beginnings of biological science, so Aristotle's method was carried over into the investigation of his own experiential world, the human habitats of the Greeks. 11 Here were the archetypal elements of a 'scientific method', at once formed upon an intelligible, experiential (not experimental) base, and grounded within a theoretical method.

Starting from the beginning (ex arkhēs), 12 as Aristotle reasoned society to have formed, a biological necessity (ἀνάγκη) 13 gave rise to the association (κοινωνία) 14 of male and female and its corollary, master and slave. But this reproductive-cum-ancestral drive to leave behind another creature of the same kind raises more problems than answers in an examination of Aristotle's thought. First, was a form of biological imperative at stake here in relation to sex/gender relations among the human species? Or, second, were the pressure of social existence and given human roles acted out within a polis world pressing upon Aristotle the need to define and refine an extant historical reality, namely, the 'naturalness' of male-female and master-slave relations? At this point what arose could be called Aristotle's recognition of a division - a dichotomous situation which required a logical exposition. 15 The
presence of biological necessity and social practice, the then existing reality of human needs and practices (and their development through the growth of customary behaviour) presented Aristotle with the opportunity to attempt an account of why commanding and subordinate roles existed generally in his world.

It is not surprising then that Aristotle chose the relations of male to female and master to slave to illustrate his point. First, we shall concentrate upon the roles of women in polis societies and seek to illuminate the interconnected play between sex/gender and human custom, and its concomitant revelation in historical practice. Functionality or the roles performed in society were Aristotle's critical dividing line.16 A form of simple dialectic was propounded: on the one hand, the relationship of natural ruler and natural subject/slave; and on the other, the supremacy or rule of the higher part of man, the intellect or mind, over the subordinate human being whose body acted as a functionary for another's commanding mind:

Δρυχος δε καΙ Δρυχομενον γοσει, έια την σωματιην (το μεν γαρ δευματιν τη διανοια προσωρος Δρυχος φυσει και δευματιν υπερ το ευερος Δρυχομενον καΙ φυσει δοξον εις δευματιν εις δουλεια ταμιτ ευερος συμπεραι).17

The Aristotelian dialectic was that of ruler (arkhon) to ruled or to subjects (arkhomenoi); and of the nebulous quality physis (that represented here a dominant character or force of the mind) to that of a human being limited to, and controlled by, his corporeal existence (soma).18

Hence what Aristotle proposed was that in conjunction with the association of male and female (thēly), for reasons of human procreation, the domination of a 'natural ruler' over a 'natural subject' should be recognised but that there existed qualitatively and functionally different roles for the Greek female and the slave of a Greek.19 Perhaps Aristotle wished to impress upon the reader the apparently immutable association or relationship of male to female and of ruler to ruled. The intellectual rigidity of this position can be explained by Aristotle's need to account for two then historically and socially demonstrable positions in his world: first, that male and female were clearly linked in the domestic reproduction of the human citizenry of the oikos and hence the polis; second, that the rule of man generically
speaking over men and women could be explained, at least partly, by a domination of 'natural' power or strength of head over hand or mind over body. That Aristotle realised that this position on slavery was not tenable in all circumstances will be discussed a little later.\(^{20}\)

Yet what is of prime importance to us was Aristotle's association of a mutuality of interests: as male was to female so, at another level of human social relations, was master to slave. As pairs of Aristotle's dialectic they remained functionally separate, qualitatively removed, yet as members of a particular set their existence was intertwined, if not interchangeable. Slavery was made useful, fitting and expedient within the framework of Aristotle's argument concerning the relationship of master to slave. They were linked by a form of circumstantial expedience as is indicated by the verb *sympherei*:

\[
\deltaις \δευτέρη καὶ διόλυ γενόμενον συμφέροι.\(^{21}\)
\]

When Aristotle came to the position of the female and the slave we rapidly discover the situation as he wished us to grasp it. The Greek female has a distinctive place in her society which was fundamentally different to, but not separate from, that of a slave.\(^{22}\) The sexual status and role of the slave was not in question: rather the sexual role of the female, the citizen woman, was the question. Her role was not multi-purposed, like the smith's wrought or forged bronze Delphic dirk:

\[
(οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡ γυνὴ τοιοῦτοι τοιούτων οἶον
οί γαλατοῦτοι τὴν διάφανὴν μάχαιραν,

\textit{πενιχρῶς, ἀλλ' ἐν ροδίς ἐν...})\(^{23}\)
\]

but rather had a singular goal, to reproduce the human potential of the *oikos*. On the other hand the slave's role was that of supplying the physical and potentially human labour used in the material reproduction of the *oikos*. Both were tools, but while each served an identical master, they each served a different purpose\(^{24}\) and stood in a subordinate position to the master and to each other.

However, underlying Aristotle's delineation between the roles of female and slave lay a more general purpose. In terms of Greek societies, Aristotle accepted that this primary union between male and female admirably served the necessity for procreation of the species\(^{25}\) by harmonizing the sexual drive to a human community's longevity. The desire to reproduce oneself physically conveniently served the individual's' need to leave behind a generic copy.\(^{26}\) But while the role
of a woman who was free was contrasted to that of a slave in the Greek world, amongst the non-Greek speaking "barbarian world" the roles of female and slave were indistinguishable:

Εὖ δὲ τοῖς Βαρβάροις τὰ ἡλύ τὰ ὁμολόγα τὴν αὐτῆς ἑκεί τάξιν.27

Hence the contrast between the worlds of Greek and "barbarian" was, through these contrasting analyses, starkly drawn. Why was the non-Greek world given a sociologically amorphous classification? Similarly, why were the patterns of different non-Greek cultures suspended and submerged by such an apparently bland assimilation between the roles of 'barbarians', free and slave, within their own societies?

One possible answer could be that Aristotle chose deliberately to draw such a contrast in order to reinforce the distance between Greek and non-Greek, and internally, the gulf between a free citizen/woman and a slave, whatever sex/gender that possession might have displayed. Possibly, for reasons which can be called an ancient form, an archetypal expression, of linguistic and cultural ethnocentrism, Aristotle stereotyped (or reflected Greek stereotypes of) the worlds of Greek and barbarian.28

Aristotle's account of the theory and practice of slavery was bound by the culturally given 'logical tools', the ideological armory he employed to account for the practice of slavery within a polis. Aristotle needed a 'theory' to accommodate the treatment of those outside of a polis society as natural slaves, potentially destined for slavery as a result of their cultural and linguistic opposition to the value systems of any polis.29

That Aristotle recognised the elements of a contradiction in both the theory and practice of slavery will be treated later in the broader context of master-slave relations. The effect of Aristotle's reasoning, as outlined above, was to put non-Greek societies on another plane of his theoretically centred, model-based discourse, to place them outside of Greek experience and thus to locate them well and truly at a philosophical and ideological arm's-length from polis experience.30 This antithetical arrangement was accomplished within the geographical boundaries of a Mediterranean environment, and specifically, within an Aegean context where Greek and non-Greek societies lived close to, and intermingled with one another.31 Much as the concept of a polis represented Greek social expression in and around the Mediterranean and
Black Sea, it simultaneously served as a culturally distinctive distancing mechanism which separated one human social experience from another.\textsuperscript{32} A polis achieved particular form by applying restrictive controls to its citizenry and general populace.\textsuperscript{33} However a polis' cultural distinctiveness established itself through an interdependent mixture of visible and invisible social barriers and bonds.\textsuperscript{34}

Within Aristotle's discourse the free woman had a specific biological-reproductive function\textsuperscript{35} which was quite distinct from any reproductive or household role a female slave, let alone a male slave, could perform. A citizen/woman was the reproductive key to the oikos and thus a possession with a peculiar value to the male citizen. A slave's position was inferior to this role, and moreover, he/she served as a live human tool for the material reproduction of the household.\textsuperscript{36} Both the citizen/woman and slave were involved in the physical reproduction of the polis. Each was a tool of production and served within a polis-social formation on two different, broad levels: first, the biological production of citizen heirs, which was legally outside the realm of male and female slave; and second, the maintenance of, and material reproduction, of the household's needs both human and material.\textsuperscript{37} Each one was a possession but a possession of a different order and value.

Aristotle's concern for classification and delineation did not stem from a concern for objective analysis alone. Nor did his analytical mind and its methodological schema exclude passionate argument.\textsuperscript{38} Aristotle's argument concerning women's and slaves' roles would appear to have been developed with one eye over his shoulder at the position of women in Plato's Socratic dialogue, The Republic. Perhaps Aristotle's wish to draw clearly the distinction between a female and a slave was motivated as much by the aim of defining their relationship to the development or inevitability of the 'natural' and dependent social relations of a polis and its primary unit the oikos\textsuperscript{39} as it was by the desire to resist philosophically the drive to hold in common children, women and material acquisitions argued by Plato's Sokrates and reported by Aristotle:

\begin{quote}
\begin{center}
ύμναι καί τòς κύκλοις
\end{center}
\end{quote}

At stake here was Aristotle's explicit desire to defend the particularity of one's own private (household) possessions: the maintenance of the supremacy of one's own (idion) as against the force of joint ownership,
of common possession (κοινόν). \(^{41}\)

Nor was this debate taking place in an historical or philosophical vacuum. Whether one was to continue with an historical emphasis, as at Athens, upon the ὀίκος and the male citizen's dominance of that social order or to bow to a new system which could have been construed as an amalgam derived from Spartan historical practice which, in its turn, was grafted onto a model utopian programme for a polis, was a question of contemporary philosophical relevance in the changing world of fourth-century ancient Greece. At issue here was not just the control of women and children by men - a philosophical and ideological argument by itself - but the form of control that was to be exerted by men in society. Aristotle's polis was not a unitary state where all free men possessed property, the products thereof, and all women and children in common. Rather, the opposite state of affairs was thought appropriate.\(^{42}\)

Aristotle's polis was characteristically and ideally defined by differences among its human membership:

οὐ μόνον ἢ ἐκ πλείστων ἀνθρώπων ἔστιν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνης
dιαφοράς. οὐ γάρ γίνεται πόλις ἐξ ἐκείνης.\(^{43}\)

If all the members of a community were alike in status (like aristocratic 'peers', perhaps as conveyed by the term ὁι ὄμοιοι),\(^{44}\) holding office or power together or in turn, as defined by their equality of class, status or rank) and resembled one another in power then, as a consequence, Aristotle argued, this social configuration could not be said to constitute a polis.

Without what might be called 'social diversity', or more accurately the maintenance of the status quo, there would have been no place for exchange and gift giving between different groups in society. Without the reciprocal basis for exchange (τὸ αντιπεπόθος)\(^{45}\) between men, of property and women, (the material and biological bases of a polis), then that extant order would have been threatened. In other words, the social inequality between members of the polis which was balanced through reciprocal exchange would have existed no longer, and inevitably the mechanism for the maintenance of this polis society, τὸ αντιπεπόθος, would have been rendered equally redundant.\(^{46}\) Aristotle's concept of a polis was embedded in the belief that the extant ὀίκος, whose individual members were subordinate to it, in terms of self-sufficiency, were, in turn, subordinate to the polis. If, Aristotle argued, self-sufficiency
was a desirable condition then it followed that the maintenance or the development of the circumstances conducive to this end, was dependent upon the continuation (the preservation and retention) of the given social relations.

οἶκα μὲν γὰρ αὐταρκεστέρον ἐνῶς, πόλις δ’ οἶκιας, καὶ θῆκεται γ’

The rendering of social relations envisaged by a change to a 'community' of ownership of women and children, οί κοιναὶ χρυσῆς τοῖς γυναικὶ καὶ τοῖς τέκνοις, spelt the mutation of Aristotle's world. For him the reduction of the possessive singular "mine" or "my" (to epo) to the commonality of the plural "theirs" (autōn) meant the undoing of one set of human relations based around the oikos. It would have led to the "all together"? Ownership in terms of possession by "all" could be given at least two meanings (τὸ γὰρ πάντες δίπλως) or rendered doubly confusing. Hence a certain ambiguity and contradiction (as identified by Aristotle in Plato's Republic 462C) in Socrates' words and their meaning could have arisen or crept into any discourse concerned with ownership and possession within a polis based upon a paradigm which assumed community of property, human and material. For Aristotle, language and its meanings were rendered doubly ambiguous within this context, both in terms of its descriptive and analytical powers to transcribe a more precise value to the roles that were to be played by key terms such as "all" (pantes), whether separately expressed as "each one" (hekastos) or expressed severally as "theirs" (auton). The presence of unclear, double-edged meanings rendered the logical reasoning out of these language-and-meaning cul-de-sacs a volatile arena for disputation. Just as this semantic puzzle was capable of producing a contentious arena for fallacious, deductive reasoning (καὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐστικοιὸς τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς) so, Aristotle asserted, ambiguity would extend
itself into social relations of production and the human reproduction of the oikos.

First, Aristotle argued that the care shown for property held in common would be less than that of property cared for by a private owner. Of course, Aristotle had no real analytical tool to prove this assertion - it was a case of deductive powers being yoked to an Aristotelian equivalent of 'common sense'. Aristotle attempted to make a more concrete statement of his position towards common ownership of property as opposed to the common use of property by the employment of an analogy. He likened the service rendered by common property ownership and singular possession of property to the service given in a situation of household service, ἐν ταῖς ὀικοτικαῖς διακονίαις, by a larger number of household servants, ὀσιλοὶ ἄνθρωποι, as compared to that of a smaller number. Aristotle claimed that the greater number did not perform as well as a smaller number and vice versa. Aristotle's language was firmly bound by this analogy to the world of the oikos. His very basis for analogous reasoning was fused with his world's primary unit of social existence. His discourse came from within the polis not from outside of this historical experience.

This was why a new society based on a truly common ownership of women, children and property was to be feared. Aristotle's polemical statement that each citizen would in effect have a thousand sons, γίνονται δέκατα χίλιοι τῶν πολίτων υἱοί, was meant both literally and rhetorically. The old order would be turned upside down and the former notations used for kinship and other sets of human relations would have been stretched and broken down to accommodate new forms of social bonding. Aristotle himself engaged in a little tactical exercise of using 'numbers' to overwhelm his audience and, by inference, Plato in this dialogue. He saw a thousand (χιλίοι), then two thousand (δικχιλίοι), and finally a countless number or ten thousand (μυρίοι) citizens referring to potentially the same person (a "son") as "my son". Moreover, not only would an expansion of kinship terminology have taken place (as in the example of a boy being called a son (ὑιός) by others than his progenitors); but also there would have been a social and semantic confusion over all forms of kin and blood relations, extending to the wider and, simultaneously, pervasive social links of 'clan' and 'tribal' association.
The direction of Aristotle's reasoning led by straightforward inference to a defence of those human bonds which were responsible for defining human discourse within a particular social formation. A reasonably clear delineation of kindred association (syngeneia)\textsuperscript{66} was necessary if one was to preserve the distinctions between one's brother or son of the same mother (adelphos)\textsuperscript{67} or first cousin, let alone, first cousin's son (anespsios)\textsuperscript{68}. The ties of blood relationship (prosaimatos)\textsuperscript{69} and their links with domestic association (whether based upon familial lines, blood relationship or kinship by marriage) and marital connection, ἥκατον δικείότητα καὶ ἐπιστέα,\textsuperscript{70} provided bridges for human bonding and communication, that is, social discourse at a primary level of association. Aristotle's language was an active medium, a vehicle laden with intentional and unintentional messages which conveyed in paradigmatic form the signs of Greek social discourse.\textsuperscript{71} It conveyed the terms which gave expression, that is, theoretical form and meaning, to the 'material' social relations of Greeks.

Clearly, Aristotle argued, his world and his view of it depended upon the maintenance of unambiguous kin/blood relationships, as exemplified by his open preference for one's blood cousin, as opposed to a 'son' who was defined as such by his role as a younger within a polis which possessed women and children in common rather than a 'son' being defined by his direct blood relationship.\textsuperscript{72}

Within what would have been small societies another significant worry (within the context of this hypothetic women-and-property-sharing polis) was a child's supposed affinity to, or likeness to a particular set of parents.\textsuperscript{73} The problem of the resemblances between biological parents and their offspring (τὰς ἡμοιοτάτας),\textsuperscript{74} between what was real and supposed to be real, neatly caught what would have been a dilemma for any society seeking to establish a form of homogeneity of possession of children. However, the problem of resemblances between children and parents was not the principal concern of Aristotle in this context. His primary concern remained the preservation of order within an existing set of human relations.\textsuperscript{75} Aristotle feared the rise of various kinds of assault or personal outrage (aikia), of 'manslaughter' (involuntary 'murder' or accidental killing), murder (that is a voluntary, conscious act of homicide), combative and slanderous behaviour, καὶ φόνοις ἀθυρήματι τῶν ἐπὶ ἴτους, καὶ μάχαι καὶ λοιπόνα ἀποπλοφορίας.\textsuperscript{76}
Aristotle's fears were based more around the formal, social limits to human sexual relations within the polis. What disturbed him most was the threat of the incestuous relationship, the unnatural, strange or foul sexual relationship (atopos) between father and son or brothers. In a somewhat indignant manner and perhaps with a touch of irony, Aristotle took Plato to task for prohibiting lovers (erōntes) from sexual intercourse on the grounds of the strong pleasure (iskhuras tēs hādonēs) it gave them.

It is significant to note that at this juncture Aristotle's remarks were directed principally to relationships between men. The relations with which he was concerned were those between males, not males to females. However, mothers and the treatment of mothers was an important issue which required a particular mention within this context. Aristotle noted that all of these categories of social relations (in Plato's ideal polis) potentially could have been subjected to acts of impiety (such as matricide) by other members of the polis/familial 'community' (be it accidentally or deliberately, by virtue of their blood relationships) which could have caused physical harm and social strife by breaking a law or culturally acceptable behaviour which had the customary sanction of the gods (osios). If, Aristotle argued, relationships between members of a polis were to be changed to a point where one did not know who was a kin relation and who was not, then not only was the incidence of incestuous relations bound to increase but ritual cleansing or social expiation for this crime against polis custom, and its religious or social values would not have occurred. A new social ignorance of blood relationships would have arisen and had the effect of blanketing these former relations and the customary behaviour that governed them. For Aristotle, the failure to make it possible for the polluted individual to have the customary expiations carried out, ἐνακτά τὰς νομισμοῦσας γίνεσθαι λύσεις, meant that the unnatural or foul, incestuous act (atopos) would have remained unexplained.

Within the Platonic polis, Aristotle argued that with these changes in relations, and the conduct of those relations, there would have been an inevitable erosion of that other basic social act of human bonding and communication within a polis, namely, the need for the continued function and functioning of (philia). This term was both extensive and intensive in its meanings and signified between males that bonding of
emotional, fraternal and socio-political ties which were gathered under the associative term philia, and generically spelt the signification of 'friendship'. The undoing of two sets of relations, of blood and philial association, of kith and kin, had major implications for the conduct of sexual, social and economic roles within a polis and its oikoi. Without the traditional base for the conduct of material transactions - the singular possession of a household - one could not have demonstrated any personal, material generosity to one's friends, guest friends, 'companions' or another household. Reciprocity, the internal political economy and proportionate distributive mechanism of the oikoi, would have been rendered unworkable. However, it is important to avoid any confusion or idealisation of reciprocal modes of distribution of the internal and external 'production' (or accumulation of wealth and goods) undertaken to maintain the existence of the oikoi within any polis.

The desirability of improving a polis' ideal capacity for self-sufficiency, the maintenance of a set of carefully balanced internal relations, depended upon the continuance of flexible social exchange (use-value) relations between oikoi and poleis, not a tightening up of, and making more uniform, all acts of social exchange. Aristotle argued that community of property would lead not to a form of unity within a polis (or peaceful, happy co-existence amongst its citizenry) as was desired by both himself and Plato, but rather, social conflict would have arisen inevitably. This would have occurred through an unequal performance of given work loads or the sharing and division of the socially necessary production within a polis based upon a community of property and possession. However, there remained a way out of this utopian dilemma, and that was to follow a model of polis existence based along the lines of Spartan practice. Aristotle argued that the Spartans solved the problem of the distribution of necessary goods for survival within their ruling class, by allowing the private ownership of property but, in practice, allowed the common use of a property's production.

The basis for Aristotle's reasoning lay in his advocacy of an ideology based upon a belief in the supremacy of a society characterised by 'singularity' or one's own personal possessive value, to borrow from and expand upon a term used later in antiquity for a "private account" and, more commonly, for the official responsible for revenues and
forfeits going directly to the ruling power under Ptolemaic and Roman administration, an idios logos.\textsuperscript{98} Without the continuation of the supremacy of "one's own" (idion), the singular possession of human and material relations and means of production (alongside the right to take part directly in exchange on behalf of one's oikos) would have been threatened and undermined.\textsuperscript{99} The existence of a personal mechanism for distributive reciprocity and status exchange between the citizens who made up the classes, the diverse social groupings of rich and poor, also would have been undermined.\textsuperscript{100} Equally, the position of women in relation to men would have undergone fundamental change. For the position of women ran parallel to (but did not equal) that of men, as expressed abstractly through men's acts of reciprocal exchange. This relationship is manifested in the transfer of use or possession of physical goods and land or the exchange of human property through the giving and taking possession of a woman in marriage.

In other words, social acts of giving and receiving between men defined the parameters in which their relationships to women were both confirmed and controlled.\textsuperscript{101} But, if the forms of action involved in giving and receiving, that is, exchanging, were altered, then the parameters controlling the ideology of a polis and the governing of relations between men and women would have been subject to major alterations.\textsuperscript{102} This would have led to the destruction of one set of social roles and discourse and the growth of a polis quite unlike its predecessors. The place for dispensing a favour, giving assistance and succour,\textsuperscript{103} would have disappeared. Consequently, the power displayed by men according to their status and possession of ('one's own') familial property, and the basis of that power, was made conditional upon the existence and control of one's own private property:
\[ \text{\textsuperscript{104} Σ' γίνεται τὸς κτήτως ἴδιας οὐν.} \]

Of equal moment to Aristotle, was the belief that the roles of women, and men's access to women, would have been transformed by their being in a state of common possession amongst men.\textsuperscript{105} This new relationship would have broken the basis for social and sexual restraint, sōphrosynē.\textsuperscript{106} Without the practice of sōphrosynē, personal or private sexual control by men would not have existed if citizen women were not subjected to the boundary, the limitation of being the possession of particular citizens. Similarly, as we have observed earlier, unencumbered conduct of social
relations (the exchange or use of possessions) between free men would not have had a raison d'être in Aristotle's eyes.\(^{107}\)

In broad outline, Aristotle's critique between 1260b-1271b can be strongly characterized by his concern to regulate or prevent social discord within a polis. A polis, whether it happened to be Plato's ideal attacked by Aristotle or Aristotle's own presentation of Spartan social experience, was generally flawed by either a lack of social foresight, an inability to control events or, simply, unnecessary confusion and unforeseen consequences brought about by poor or misguided planning. Within Aristotle's broadly-based sally, the presence of a strong and curiously revealing sub-theme needs further examination. This can be centred around Aristotle's attitude towards women's potential as sources of socio-sexual discord. Scrutinizing this theme can reveal a great deal about the cultural universe within which Aristotle worked.

One of the most pressing problems which confronted Aristotle was where and how were women to be regulated? For he was deeply concerned by (and even a little excitable around this question) any confusion or breakdown in the sexual division of labour. This was revealed by his questioning of where women would have stood in relation to the maintenance of a household when they were held in common by Plato's farming class of men who possessed in their own right plots of farmland.\(^{108}\) This was, in his eyes, a problem of the first order in a properly constituted polis.\(^{109}\) The outcome for the position of citizen women was of primary importance to Aristotle. First, they amounted to, for all purposes, one half of the polis (to hēmis tēs poleōs).\(^{110}\) Interestingly, his earlier announcement that women were one half of the polis' free population,\(^{111}\) appeared to have been an insightful, even 'progressive' and 'radical' statement in its historical context, to the eye of a twentieth-century historian. Yet, and here lies the irony, his reason for so doing was that women in Spartan society were supposedly out of control and needed to be brought under male authority. Indeed, Aristotle claimed, the Spartan world's problems of survival were, in varying degrees of 'historical' or causal responsibility (aittai),\(^{112}\) the fault of women.\(^{113}\) Second, Aristotle reasoned that unless they were controlled, the polis would be, for all purposes, ruled and controlled by women (gynaikokratia).\(^{114}\) However, the gynaecocracy envisaged in this case was, once again, firmly based on a notion of women's control over
the polis' households, γυναικεῖοι τῷ πείρατε ῥήκερας. Yet, the position of women in Aristotle's account of the Spartan world was neither as cut-and-dried nor so easily unravelled. Women had had direct access to land-based power and influence through rights of inheritance and dowry, to a greater degree than women in most other poleis, during the course of Sparta's history. Within his critique of Spartan society, Aristotle threw in the rhetorical, barbed observation, what difference was there between women's rule or women ruling the rulers:

καὶ τὸ διαφέρει γυναικαὶ ἀρχεῖν ἡ τοῦ ἀρχομαίνεται ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἀρχετεθεῖ... Here lay a veritable mytho-historical minefield in the path of male order and control. At best, this form of reasoning clouded the issues surrounding the real situation of women in Spartan society. However, we need to recall that Aristotle's concern was not focused primarily upon the position of women as an issue in its own right, rather his concern remained with the polity. In so far as women had had an impact upon this social formation, he sought to remedy or advise upon (in theory) their position in relation to the assumed dominance of the male citizen in any polis.

We are faced with the problem of male myth-making, in spite of Aristotle's disclaimer that he was not seeking to pass judgement on Lykourgos or other great figures in early Sparta, one way or the other, τίνι ἐστὶ συγγενεῖ καὶ μὴ ἐστὶ. For whilst the odd position of women in Sparta is not in doubt in its broad outlines, how can one successfully dissect the mythical and historical traditions when they were, at once, so much a part of male literary and historical traditions? Any dissection is more likely to shine light on how men perceived women within a particular historical time. Our evidence is at one remove from the women's worlds we seek to discover. Aristotle, by way of analogy, clearly had assumed a delineation of roles between men and women as essential components (brought together as necessary agents for the reproduction of the species) or discrete elements of an oikos and polis. The assumption this analogy finally rested upon was that if a household was to work and function successfully for the happiness and prosperity (eudaimonia) of a duly constituted polis, the roles of women must be controlled since citizen women formed one half of a polis. Moreover, without this close regulation the polis would have broken down
under the impact of a new set of social relations being set into motion by the unregulated (and hence uncontrolled) actions and practices of women.\textsuperscript{124} Here lay the crux of Aristotle's argument concerning women's place (and roles) within a polis. Whether the notions of how a polis was to be ordered existed in Plato's mind or arose from Aristotle's perception and judgement of Sparta's 'historical' condition,\textsuperscript{125} women clearly had significant roles within any polis but they were to be controlled. Aristotle was highly critical of Plato for his lack of clear guidelines for women, although he noted one exception, namely, Plato's ruling that women of the guardian class were to have the same education as men and serve in war.\textsuperscript{126} What concerned Aristotle was that Plato was not sufficiently precise or clear as to the distinctions which were to be made (excluding the guardians) between two broader groupings of the massed citizenry in his polis, that is, where was the dividing line to be drawn in civic responsibilities and rights between the farmer class and the warrior class?\textsuperscript{127}

What were the principal concerns which urged on Aristotle's questioning the viability and sense behind Plato's polis paradigm? For Aristotle, three prominent objections stood out as symptomatic. First, there is the holding in common of wives/women and children, \( \pi\epsilon\iota\ \tau\iota\gamma\nu\nu\alpha\iota\kappa\omega\nu\ kai\ \tau\epsilon\kappa\nu\nu\ \kappa\omega\iota\mu\nu\iota\kappa\sigma\iota\). Second, there is the holding in common of wives/women and possessions, \( \tau\iota\nu\ \gamma\nu\nu\alpha\iota\kappa\omega\nu\ \kappa\omega\iota\mu\nu\iota\kappa\sigma\iota\ kai\ \tau\iota\nu\ \kappa\iota\eta\zeta\omega\nu\). Third, there is the extension of the Spartan male practice of a collective mess for women, \( \sigma\upsilon\omega\sigma\iota\iota\iota\ kai\ \gamma\nu\nu\alpha\iota\kappa\omega\nu\).\textsuperscript{129} In turn, these concerns were bound up with the interconnections between property relations and the social and sexual divisions of labour. As we have noted earlier, Aristotle was not one who discounted the value and function of private property in a polis. One's own property (land and possessions) played a central role in a citizen's household life and social transactions amongst one's peers. When it came to the planned allocation of property in Plato's utopian polis, Aristotle's criticism fixed on the undesirability of moving towards an equalisation of property through a fixed distribution of equal lots.\textsuperscript{131} Of critical significance to Aristotle was the apparent fact that Plato remained oblivious to the need to restrict the number of children\textsuperscript{132} if the land were to be successfully and sufficiently 'redistributed' (especially given that in
Plato's polis the land involved was to remain indivisible) through the mechanism of inheritance. The question of the relationship between land and its human population, χώραν καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, was crucial to the outcome of a polis' self-sufficiency and happiness. As Aristotle argued, if too many children were produced then the inevitable impact upon the society, if no land division and alienation occurred, would have been disastrous for the polity as a whole. While in contemporary polis formations landed property (ousia) could be divided and alienated, unless the population was controlled, previous historical experience within poleis argued that the result necessarily would have been poverty:

πενίας ἀναγκαίον αἰτίαν γίνεται τῷ πολίταις.

Moreover, in its path came attendant, awesome socio-political problems. As Aristotle expressed it, social conflict between citizens and malicious social behaviour were causally linked to poverty:

ἡ δὲ πενία στάσει εὑρείται καὶ κακουργεῖν.

A potentially restless class of landless, dispossessed citizens' sons would have resulted from Plato's lack of foresight.

Aristotle's reasoning cannot be assumed to have been purely a speculative, disinterested exercise on his part, a theoretical critique of Plato's utopian discourses. His critique continually referred by way of analogy to contemporary and more ancient Greek historical experiences, and searched for the ways in which these contemporary and earlier societies regulated their social existence. Aristotle rejected the literal acceptance of the past, and he regarded the laws of distant antiquity as exceedingly simple and even 'barbaric',

tοὺς γὰρ ἀνθρώπους νόσους λίαν δῆλον εἶναι καὶ ἄνθρωποι.

The terms 'barbaric behaviour' or actions carried within their Greek usage a connotative force which signified strong disapproval, foreignness or otherness and essentially identified such practices as being those of non-Greek customary modes of social conduct. In this case, Aristotle was speaking about those social behaviours which preceded (or were residual elements in) normative Greek social mores.

We can explore further Aristotle's attitudes towards women's position in relation to that of men, within a pervasive ideological framework made available by his discussion of the merits or otherwise of
the Korinthian lawgiver Pheidon and, more importantly, because of the greater detail presented, the proposals of the Khaledonian, Phales.

One unique feature, mentioned earlier, in Aristotle's Politics was that he recognized that women or rather the female citizen population constituted half of the polis. Aristotle acknowledged this fact precisely because he feared the consequences of having an unregulated part of the polity. His reflections upon the power and place of women in Sparta can act as a key to our immediate investigations. Put generally, if the position of women in Sparta were not defined, that is, remained outside the 'lawgiver's' (nomothetés) regulatory social framework (anomothetéton) then the following consequences followed on from this error. First, the problems were interrelated. For, on account of the practices of giving large dowries, ἐὰν τὸ προῖκας ἐπιδόναι, μεγάλας, and the right to alienate a landed estate, ἐπεμενεῖν, καὶ καταλείπειν ἕνωσιν to whomsoever one wished through the employment of the bequest or an act of giving (which involved a dowry or gift), these practices had led steadily to some owning an exceedingly large quantity of landed property, τολμῶν ἄνω ὁμίσιν, while others owned little. The overall result was that the polis' territory (khôra) was concentrated into the few, ἐκ σῶμάς, possessors' hands. In a seemingly inexorable fashion Aristotle's reasoning proceeded onwards to the most remarkable feature of the rise of Sparta's heiresses (epiklēroi) whose accumulation of land helped change or perhaps, more accurately, mirrored the social as well as the demographic history of the Spartiate population. As a result, Aristotle dropped upon the Greek world the numerical estimate and shock revelation that nearly two parts out of five of Sparta's whole territory was owned by women.

Once again, a proximate reasoning process, which involved an act of numerical reckoning, was at work. Its role was not to act as a precise, quantitative measure of the problems caused by Sparta's land ownership and inheritance patterns, rather the purpose behind this numerical conjecture was to indicate the magnitude of the problem to Aristotle's readers.

Aristotle was intent on urging the readers of his critique to avoid the socially disastrous problems which arose for a polis on account of
its having had a small human population, διὰ τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν. Following on from these critical observations, Aristotle was particularly concerned with measures to preserve or increase a polis' men via the 'equalisation', or averaging out the distribution of 'property', τῆς κτήσεως ὑματίαν, (in the general sense of any acquisition or possession) with particular reference to land. The reason for this was expressed clearly by Aristotle earlier in his treatise when he pointed to the active 'political' life of any sizeable polis and its inevitable role in wars inside and outside its own territory. He expected any polis worthy of the description to act both as a jealous custodian of its territory, and potentially to be regarded with fear by its enemies, its geographic neighbours, τοὺς γειτνιῶτας τόσος, whose lands formed the neighbourly or not-so-neighbourly perimeter of another polis 'world', another external environment. Yet, in spite of a pressing need for population, particularly able-bodied, full citizen males, the potential problem of a demand for the division (or sharing) of Spartiates' lands due to the procreation of too many male siblings was equally threatening to Sparta. Whilst to sell (pôlein) one's original family (Spartiate) allotment (klēros) was dishonourable, οὗ καλὸν, the practices of dowry giving and bequests, and the pressures of siblings helped bring poverty into view. Poverty appeared to Aristotle as an unavoidably necessary outcome of such a land tenure order. Poverty spelt a lack of self-supportive capacity in a world based upon what Aristotle enshrined and typified as an ethic of household self-sufficiency. In the Spartiates' case, self-sufficiency or a particular household supportive capacity was extended to the Spartiates' personal capacity to provide contributions of produce, as marks of full citizenship, from their lands to their 'communally' based mess (syssitia). Whether Aristotle was criticizing either Plato for his failure to regulate population in his writings or the legendary Spartan nómothetēs for an overly generous set of provisions for those who produced three or more sons, there was a clear argument that population (human reproduction) should be regulated and hence controlled.

Aristotle's concern with both a controlled population and population control (the regulation of the human dimension of a polis by closer management of the social function of sexual reproduction between male citizens and their wives) made itself felt through three
complementary dimensions of social analysis. First, Aristotle recognised the limited agricultural dimension of a polis' existence, if it were to be ideally regulated, by voicing his concern over Plato's expansion of his ideal polis to a society which encompassed not one thousand possessing hoplite arms (hopla) but five thousand.\textsuperscript{175} As we have noted, internal pressures could be generated by the pursuit of a policy (or rather the lack of a policy) which helped produce an overly large polis population in a given territory.\textsuperscript{176} The size and manageability of a polis' population were critical to its relative prosperity and survival. Second, even when a society's territory possessed the capacity for a large male citizen formation of hoplites and cavalry, as Sparta did,\textsuperscript{177} this was not something which could be automatically realised or maintained through time. Social forces intervened - such as those associated with, in a seemingly tangible form, the alleged damage caused by women's access to landed power and wealth.\textsuperscript{178} Equally important, but far more diffuse and intangible were the workings of social values spawned from the concomitant Greek male myth (as expressed by Aristotle) of the generally and socially corrosive influence of women upon the fabric of Sparta's social formation.\textsuperscript{179} That the Spartan male population base drastically declined\textsuperscript{180} is not so much an issue here; rather the belief that women were somehow at the bottom of, or behind this decline is the issue. Spartan women's direct access to land through inheritance and the giving of dowries appeared to act as a catalyst for this belief.\textsuperscript{181} Women played active rather than passive roles in these processes. They were not solely or merely exchangeable property but had an opportunity to direct the property which came into their hands.\textsuperscript{182} This active role by women attracted convenient censure of them whilst Aristotle simultaneously acknowledged that the inheritance system and dowry giving were problems in themselves precisely because there was an absence of effective social planning and control\textsuperscript{183} by Spartan men over their own world.

Third, Aristotle acknowledged that the indigenous helot population was in itself an ever present, even insurmountable problem.\textsuperscript{184} In turn, Aristotle then acknowledged the particular pressures placed upon the Spartan world (and the odd position this placed women in)\textsuperscript{185} because it was so long pre-occupied by warfare against both external enemies and those who were to be transformed into 'internal' enemies and slaves, the
Messenians. The occurrence of Epaminondas' Theban-led invasion of Lakonia\(^{186}\) (after Sparta's heavy and eventually telling defeat at Leuktra) and its disastrous impact upon Spartan territory, power and control of the helots, allowed Aristotle to launch an ideologically based and retrospective attack on Spartan women's behaviour and their contribution to Sparta's further malaise at the height of its crisis in military and social fortunes. Aristotle had clearly and generally observed the permanent threat an indigenous slave or serf-like population presented to its conquerors and masters, and the pressures helióteia put upon the masters' social organisation.\(^{187}\) The internal and external problems of Sparta's peculiar social formation and its long prominence in the Greek world, presented Aristotle with a unique opportunity (a political and philosophical moment) to catalogue and critically comment upon its errors.

To return to Spartan women's roles in the decline and fall of Sparta's military and political power, Aristotle's critique of Spartan women ended by producing a male mythology (albeit of a fragmentary, sketchy nature) of the disruptive roles women played in the undoing of the Spartan polity's supremacy over Lakonia and Messenia. Aristotle's turn of thought is an interesting example of both finding a scapegoat and then effectively attaching criticism to that scapegoat through a careful moral condemnation, in this case of women's behaviour in various, heavily generalised social contexts. Terms such as akolasia and ἑρφήνια had been placed earlier upon women's behaviour and their portrayal as libidinous voluptuaries was neatly extended by their actions being condemned generally as most harmful ( فلا والن فن) during the Theban invasion crisis.\(^{188}\) Blaming Spartan women for "panic" or "confusion" (θορυβος)\(^{189}\) in the face of an unprecedented invasion of Sparta's heartland (so soon after Leuktra), and the resultant, immediate disorder occasioned by their behaviour, cannot in any way account for the complex, longer-term wane of Spartan politico-military power.\(^{190}\) While Aristotle remained concerned above all with the pivotal roles of land ownership, its distribution, the regulation of citizens' social relations and population, he simultaneously displayed his culturally specific values on women's impact upon a society if they were not closely controlled and regulated.\(^{191}\)

The general theme of a need for the strict regulation or ordering
and management of population and social existence had played a vital part in Aristotle's critique of Plato. It remained a central theme which threaded its way through Aristotle's theory and practice of an ideal polis formation. Equally, it must be said, that for all the differences between Aristotle and Plato, Plato's *Laws* and *Republic* demonstrated (for all their errors in Aristotle's view) a similar, if, in terms of means divergent, concern for the construction and management of a paradigmatic polis existence. Aristotle and Plato both acknowledged the presence of women in polis formations, in itself of no small importance, but they parted company when it came to the roles which women were entitled to practice within society. For not only was Aristotle concerned with the seemingly problematic and apparently burdensome numbers of women and slaves ('attendants') who necessarily would have accompanied Plato's five thousand armed men in the *Laws* (equipped after the hoplite fashion) but also, he was determined to demonstrate that so large a group of men who were not to have engaged in socially (that is agricultural) productive work, would have needed a vast territory, like that of Babylon, to support them. Scale, that is the question of territorial size and the limits to (or limited amount of) arable land available to any polis, was a major force behind Aristotle's remarks. Men and women of a polis worked and lived within understood or accepted and given physical and cultural environments. The essential patterns or customary uses made of lands within polis experience (dry-farming agriculture) as well as the earlier noted deployment of a defensive/offensive military posture which was aimed at the preservation of a polis' territorial integrity which, in turn, had its origins in responses to what may be characterised as poleis' border geopolitics, directly influenced Aristotle's conceptual framework. Hence we should not be surprised or puzzled as to why Aristotle's arguments sought so determinedly to restrict or bring within the bounds of reasoned planning, as he saw it, any scheme to renew or rebuild a polis social formation. Aristotle's critical dissertation should be read or viewed as a document which, through intellectual discourse, sought to improve and preserve extant polis societies. For the practices, the 'reforms' it advocated, were designed to support the polis world, to restore or maintain its prosperity by restricting its population, and thus preserve or stabilise its agricultural base. For the landed world of agriculture
was the ultimate, most prestigious source of social wealth and ideological identity. Ideological identity was spelt out by landed wealth passed on preferably from father to sons, and not too many sons at that.206

Social relations between men and women were an active, practical arena for the maintenance of existing ideological control exerted by men over women. Aristotle's Politics never lost sight of the general context of gender relations in a polis world. He was concerned with their social experience as revealed by his interests in the position of women in Sparta and equally but not separately by their theoretical importance in a polis paradigm. Whilst Aristotle appeared as a defender of extant social/sexual relations, he formulated his view through the advocacy of social regulation. Aristotle's world was one of paradigmatic regulation. This approach to a critique of the polis world could explain why he involved himself in a detailed attack upon Plato's holding women/wives in common.207 For, in Aristotle's eyes, what other theoretical measure could have led to a change in the existing relations of production208 and, in turn, brought about a fundamental change to the structure of the oikos?209 It would appear that Aristotle saw Plato's system as a theoretically threatening and problematic system. For Aristotle, Plato's system stood in theoretical opposition to his own model, shrouded in mystery, due to what he perceived to be a lack of definitive regulations. Plato's system could have produced a situation where potentially no one male familial possessor would have controlled, let alone possessed, a particular household, its human social relations and a distinctive piece or pieces of land.210 When one couples these expressed criticisms of Plato's system with Aristotle's further criticisms of Plato's proposed changes to household management (oikonomia),211 through the structural alteration of the single household complex into two separate hort sites,212 one can demonstrate directly Aristotle's general interest in the workings of male-female socio-sexual relations.

As Aristotle sceptically eyed Plato's vision, if the foundation of polis social relations were to be altered by, for example, the unprecedented introduction for women of a common mess in which they could consume their daily meals, σωστία καὶ γυναικῶν,213 and, as a matter of course, meet and interact, who could have predicted the consequences?214
In turn, this view could well help to account for the degree of doubt Aristotle expressed as to the consequences of a life removed from the necessity of manual labour, καὶ τῶν ἔργων τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἄγωγους κρύον. Even though such a Platonic scheme supported a model-view of the Greek citizen's existence (represented by Aristotle as the "good life", eu zan), Aristotle was wary precisely because such measures were potential steps into an unknown, uncertain social realm. The attendant problems were first, the problem of 'finding', the physical location of such a sizeable piece of countryside for five thousand, idle (argoι), non-tilling armed citizens. A second problem lay in what was to be done with the crowd or mass (okhlos) of accompanying women and slaves.

Aristotle was quite insistent that any lawgiver should have had his eyes clearly fixed upon the problems inherent in the relationship of countryside or territory to human settlement and population, χάριν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. The degree of attention paid to the relationship between these two resources, one physical and the other human, would have determined the outcome of the quality of life and the mode of existence within a polis formation. Within this context Aristotle wished to pre-empt any future set of social relations from developing in an adverse manner detrimental to both the stability and existence of the polis. Whether the relations concerned were drawn from concrete experiences of Sparta's helot system (báliteia), with all its dangers and inherent contradictions, or from the cultural shadows which produced the accounts of unrestrained conduct by unregulated, uncontrolled women, Aristotle was intent upon making a series of generalised observations. For the existence of a manner of conduct without restraint (akolasia) amongst women, was diametrically opposed to the regulated, 'temperate' conduct (σοφροσύνη), socially necessary for the continued rule by men (and the regulation of property and exchange relations) over women. However, this alleged unrestrained conduct by women, in an odd polity, did not convey to us a fuller account of the dowry and inheritance mechanisms through which women apparently did secure access to landed wealth. Aristotle argued that because women's roles were not regulated strictly, women contributed directly to Sparta's breakdown by their 'uncontrollable' behaviour. As if Aristotle were pointing to other social problems beneath the traditional face Sparta presented to the
Greek world, he added that the influence of women further contributed to the rise of an undue friendship or attachment to 'wealth' through what can be characterised as a 'love of money' (tēn philokhrēmatian).  

Greek intellectuals who wrote and reflected upon women's position, intentionally and unintentionally, helped to expose the duality of Greek reason and unreason displayed towards women in polis theory and historical experience. One hypothesis can be advanced for such generalised and loaded judgemental terms having been used to describe women's social relations or conduct in society: namely, that male reason and unreason simultaneously placed themselves, historically and ideologically, at the centre of power within polis existence.  

This very act of social and political distancing (even self-ostracism) by men, at once placed them politically, and experientially, beyond any real understanding of women's social arena. It left women in relation to men's apprehension of them simultaneously incomprehensible, yet, not so paradoxically, firmly fixed within a milieu of oikos-oriented and socially-related roles. Women then were reduced to something approaching purely instinctive and subservient creatures whose processes of reasoning or action were quite unlike those of men. Women were by their trans-historical roles within many societies separated from the male order of the human species. Generally speaking, to the extent that women's roles in historical societies have been relegated to the background (or 'natural order' of things), hidden within or confined to the realm of household social relations, and excluded from many socio-political processes, women can be said to have had trans-historical roles from antiquity to the contemporary world. After having considered ancient Greek evidence around male constrictions of women's place, social roles and behaviour from within both its cultural and paradigmatic formulations, we will turn briefly to a characteristic and salient, but much later, example of men's cultural blindness and unreason towards women. Friedrich Hegel's failure to apprehend women in his work, Philosophy of Right, may represent a trans-historical phenomenon. When Hegel addressed himself to the subject of women's position from a seemingly culturally distant and historically removed environment from that of the Greeks, the value of the comparative history manifests itself:
Women are capable of education, but they are not made for activities which demand a universal faculty such as the more advanced sciences, philosophy, and certain forms of artistic production. Women may have happy ideas, taste, and elegance, but they cannot attain to the ideal. The difference between men and women is like that between animals and plants. Men correspond to animals, while women correspond to plants because their development is more placid and the principle that underlies it is the rather vague unity of feeling. When women hold the helm of government, the state is at once in jeopardy, because women regulate their actions not by the demands of universality but by arbitrary inclinations and opinions. Women are educated - who knows how? - as if it were by breathing in ideas, by living rather than by acquiring knowledge. The status of manhood, on the other hand, is attained only by the stress of thought and much technical exertion.

Leaving aside the historically specific echoes of Hegel's world, it is more than interesting to note that both he and Aristotle would appear to have agreed that, in Hegel's words, "the state is at once in jeopardy" when women were allowed to gain access to their worlds' power bases. There was a clear fear or hostility and even a certain indignation that women should have been allowed to play, directly or indirectly, active political or social roles within their respective formations. For Hegel, women's extension of interests beyond the confines of polite drawing-room behaviour to government was anathema. For Aristotle, women's access to landed wealth, or their ability to cause problems to the polis by 'uncontrolled' behaviour, were situations which needed attention and firm control. It did not matter whether the 'uncontrolled' behaviour arose from a spontaneous, strong emotional response to the aftermath of Leuktra and the Theban invasion or grew from far deeper and longer social processes caused by women's alleged contributions to a generalised unseemliness (apreposeia) in Sparta's social order, and to Sparta's acquiring a known reputation for a love of gain or 'money' and its acquisition (philokhrēmatia).

Generally speaking, whilst male cultural values have often argued for a belief in women's inferiority or the need to regulate women's behaviour by excluding women from political, social or economic power, they have usually given expression to such beliefs in particular, historically specific forms. Nor did these forms exclude broadly common attitudinal features which not only enabled such belief systems to travel equally well across a given historical epoch, such as that which the
polis world inhabited, but which also possessed the ability to mutate and acquire trans-historical characteristics. Aristotle's discussion of sex/gender relations was an integral part of his critical focus upon a citizen-dominated polis world and grew out of this primary quest. The essential nature of male-female relations in literally reproducing a polis' citizens led Aristotle to his most significant observation, namely, that women were half the polis. Whilst his motive for such an observation was social control, the regulation of roles, it was a salient comment which carried its cultural and political potentia beyond Aristotle's particular intentions. These intentions remained the paradigmatic constitution and construction of 'the good life', the 'well' or 'correct' life within a polis.

I recapitulate the principal themes developed in these opening chapters. The visible and invisible dangers of agrarian life and its harshness bred caution. The agrarian world of the polis always had the potential to strike men down. Within this perspective, it is important to appreciate that Aristotle recognised that a scrupulous regulation of sex/gender relations was advantageous to his self-sufficient polis paradigm but that this regulation was only possible within the existing parameters of oikos male-female relationships. Aristotle's model of oikos relationships within a polis avoided and rejected Plato's uncertain world. Aristotle's model sought to manipulate polis social relations from within its cultural and historical experience.
CHAPTER III

MASTER AND SLAVE 1: AN APPROACH

Aristotle's experience of the Greek world and its environs consciously and unconsciously shaped his master-slave discourse in the Politics. Aristotle's Politics was very much an historical outcome of his times. Yet, such a statement need not in any way deprive (or dilute) Aristotle from being credited with a formidable series of contributions to Greek scholarship (and its legacy), rather this statement should draw attention to Aristotle's relative place within a history of Greek antiquity. The need to appreciate the demands, influences and assumptions of a particular historical environment are confused by Vogt who argues, initially wisely, with regard to Plato and Aristotle:

However much Plato opposes the enslaving of Greek prisoners of war, he clearly accepts that certain people are prevented by their nature from being anything other than slaves,...And for Aristotle, as has often been pointed out, the relationship between master and slave is fundamental to human existence.¹

Later in Ancient Slavery and the Ideal of Man, Vogt added a further observation:

Thus we see that the two greatest works of Greek philosophy, Plato's political utopia and Aristotle's practical handbook, are at one in their justification of slavery. It cannot be denied that this acceptance on the part of philosophers, together with their unthinking application of the notion of the imperfectibility of human nature, provided a new support for age-old injustice and suffering.²

Yet, did the Greek practice of slavery and its master-slave relations need "a new support"? Surely, leaving aside Plato, Aristotle provided not "a new support" to a system under challenge (real or imaginary)³ but an openly articulated series of arguments for the theory and practice of slavery. This was an argument which stemmed from an historical world which was confident about its leading place in human existence and slavery's subordinate roles in servicing that existence. We would do far better to follow and expand upon the paths of Westermann and Finley who keenly appraise and examine the historical realm within which Aristotle worked.⁴
Westermann's observations on the intellectual and historical background of Greek socio-political and philosophical theorists can contribute to lifting the fog which still blinds much of the modern debate around ancient slavery and its position in the thought of antiquity. One important confusion has centred around a belief that there was a coherent, perhaps even a fundamental, opposition to ancient slavery as an institution by some of these intellectuals of antiquity. As Westermann observed over thirty years ago:

The assumption is sometimes made, even today, that the Greek political theorists of the fourth century accepted human enslavement as a reality of the economic and political order of their time, but that they felt "uneasy" and "unhappy" about it. The idea is an outcropping of the sentimental attitude toward slave institutions and it is fundamentally misleading when postulated as an attitude characteristic of the fourth century Hellenes.

Regrettably, this position on the ancients being "uneasy" and "unhappy" with the practice of slavery as an institution is entertained by Schlaifer, whose article preceded Westermann's critique, amongst other modern scholars. However, in no way should the above arguments be seen as denying that real social tensions went hand-in-hand with the historical practice of slavery. As Finley succinctly observed:

..., I would argue, there is no problem or practice in any branch of Greek life which was not affected, in some fashion, by the fact that many people in that society, even if not in the specific situation under consideration, were (or had been or might be) slaves. The connection was not always simple or direct, nor was the impact necessarily 'bad' (or 'good').... Certainly the Greek attitudes to it (the institution of slavery) were shot through with ambiguity, and not rarely with tension.

I now turn to an examination of what Aristotle wrote about the master-slave dialectic; with the intention of not only revealing the integral place of slavery within a polis ideology, but of also exposing the extent to which Aristotle's analysis of master-slave relations were premised upon his conscious and unconscious assumptions about the Greek world around him.

The relationship of master and slave can be likened to Aristotle's linking the maintenance of each human being and a settled human experience to the prior nascence of a polis form. There was an ideal,
organic meshing of human necessity to the material and social continuity provided by a polis.\textsuperscript{12} Individually, each person could not be self-sufficient (\textit{autarkēs}).\textsuperscript{13} In other words, there was an interdependency between a Greek's existence and the polis. The mutuality of interests between the model Greek and polis was paralleled by the relationship of the \textit{oikos} to its associative values of 'community', (\textit{koinōnia}).\textsuperscript{14} The \textit{oikos} was, after all, a household-centred expression and paradigm of Greeks' social relations.\textsuperscript{15} The sum total of all these human relations in society was absolutely dependent upon the existence, \textit{a priori}, of the polis.\textsuperscript{16} Aristotle's treatise must be seen and examined within this context of a polis world-view. Taking the polis as a generic characterisation, its historical existences, forms and realms of social conduct, were the organic structures from and within which Aristotle constructed his theory of the relationship of a Greek citizen to his ideal, total life experience within a polis' environs. From the citizen's standpoint survival outside of the polis had no independent validity. A citizen was a social being who was given meaning within the context of a polis. To have stood outside the polis was as much a sign of social estrangement (\textit{apolis}) as it was a recognition of a different order of existence.\textsuperscript{17} As Aristotle expressed it, if such an \textit{autarkē}\textsuperscript{18} being were in existence this could be explained only by the relegation of that being to either the category of a wild animal\textsuperscript{19} or the promotion of that being to the position of a god.\textsuperscript{20} In both cases the status of each, wild beast or god, were categories of life which could be directly associated with the life of a polis but whose existences remained outside of, but nevertheless were bound up with, the social relations within a polis.

The human species was to Aristotle a being utterly defined by a uniquely human attachment to political association, (\textit{politikon ho anthrōpos \_sōn}),\textsuperscript{21} to a greater degree than any other associative animals.\textsuperscript{22} Moreover, human beings, generically speaking, possessed a special form of communication (\textit{logos}).\textsuperscript{23} Nor was that a matter of mere vocalisation (\textit{phōne})\textsuperscript{24} but rather announced and signalled an ability to reckon, reason and put order into one's existence via a discursive analysis and account of human social life.\textsuperscript{25} Speech was much more than mere sound. Speech contained within itself the seeds for the growth of social order and the ability to transmit a morality to the conduct of everyday human life.\textsuperscript{26} Hence one could make distinctions between what
was expedient (sympheron)\textsuperscript{27} in one's relations and what was harmful (blaberon)\textsuperscript{28} to them. Equally, distinctions could be made between 'good' (agathos)\textsuperscript{29} or one who was morally good or socially superior (in an aristocratic or ruling class sense) and its social antithesis bad (kakos)\textsuperscript{30}. Similarly, through the speech act one could distinguish between justice, what was just (dikaion)\textsuperscript{31} and injustice, what was unjust (adikon).\textsuperscript{32}

The human potential to make a distinction between, and an identification of, these forces in social existence meant that a unique community or, more concisely, association (koinônia) between their own kind was possible.\textsuperscript{33} The realisation of the human logos produced an 'association' between humankind, whose logical outcome and expression was to be found in the oikos and the polis.\textsuperscript{34} The use of the term koinônia needs particular qualification and further explication. Aristotle could well have used this term not merely to express a concrete set of human relations within a polis, but as a metaphor whose purpose was to define more broadly and, simultaneously, to encompass the web of human activity in poleis within an organicist paradigm.\textsuperscript{35}

Let us look at several important contexts in which the use of koinônia was central to Aristotle's argument. The two primary associations (koinôniâi) which formed the basis of the household, man-woman and master-slave, in their turn formed the basis (according to nature) for the primary fulfilment of daily needs\textsuperscript{36} and found their institutional expression within the oikos.\textsuperscript{37} However, the key to Aristotle's reasoning here is not to examine koinônia in political, historical or contextual isolation: rather one must acknowledge that for Aristotle this behavioural model of polis associative ties had, in a sense, arisen 'naturally'.\textsuperscript{38} Koinônia, was an enveloping term which meant to draw together, account for, and justify, not only one household's relationship with other households\textsuperscript{39} but, by direct implication, its associative powers covered all human social relations which constituted the sum of a household's existence. Koinônia was the archetypal representative of oikos and polis social relations.\textsuperscript{40} What the term koinônia as employed by Aristotle, sought to achieve was the construction of a culturally plausible intellectual explanation which stood within the social experience of a Greek audience, and accounted or argued for the apparently 'natural', organic occurrence, of a polis
social formation. It needs to be emphasized that audiences who were capable of reading and writing and the writers who wrote for them were generally few in number and closely associated with, dependent upon or drawn from ruling citizen groups, families (or a class) and, in turn, these socially empowered forces provided the socio-economic leisure and ideological opportunity for written expression. However, there was no uniformity in literacy or levels of literacy in ancient Greece. Nor, it needs to be kept in mind, did audiences necessarily follow (write or comprehend) or even receive a writer as that writer intended. Interestingly koinōnia was used to link several types of human relations which were to Aristotle, as we have seen, qualitatively and quantitatively distinct. It was a term designed to encompass the gamut of social existence signified by the presence of the poleis. In that context koinōnia, served as an analogous bonding substance which, in its turn, gave to a polis social formation a seemingly corporeal existence. The ancient social formation and its political forms (whatever variation those social modes of organisation took) were given, through the socio-cultural bonds of koinōnia, an active institutional existence, a political, historical and cultural right to life and a justification for that life to be maintained.

When one is challenged by the task of analysing a giant of the ancient world whose giantism was incorporated into 'Western societies' and their histories in many forms, past and present, the necessity not to divorce social and economic history from its peer, the history of ideas, manifests itself. The diffusion of Aristotle's intellectual corpus in modern times only adds an additional impetus and relevance to an historical investigation of his thought, its contribution to, and impact upon, an understanding of his world and ours. Human history is made by human activity in and on the world (and does not exclude the consequences or influences of the natural world's ecological responses to human activity nor the activities of the Earth's seemingly organic weathering processes), as it is materially and/or otherwise perceived to be formed. To give human activity an historical dimension, however, requires the recorder (whether writing or transmitting orally) to attempt to give human actions and the cultural worlds (institutional, structural or conceptual arenas) within which these actions have taken place some form, order or pattern. The reason for the use of italics when I used the
term 'historical' above is that Aristotle did not think of himself as writing history when he composed the *Politics*. Nor is this unimportant to our inquiry. Aristotle has constructed a world in which two divergent cultures existed, as we have seen, but remained apart from one another. Moreover, there appeared to be contained within Aristotle's construct a separation which entailed visible and invisible divisions between the cultural space and time inhabited by non-Greek speaking cultures (*barbaroi*) and the space and time of their Greek ideal antithesis. The notion that once Greek society's poleis were all under the rule of a *basileus* and that tribes (*ethne*) or political formations of peoples, that is, *barbaroi*, were still in that condition today is an interesting example of a Greek perception of cultural and perhaps historical change. Possibly such a notion contained the germ of a concept of 'development' and 'progress' in terms of a social formation's structure, political change or organic growth and its power relations. An ideal, generalised Greek cultural experience was part and parcel of Greek cultural explanation as well as identity. Within this context, Aristotle argued that the association of a number of households and in turn their association with the village (*kôme*) and that village's association with other villages, led to the formation of the ultimate, completed associative grouping (*koinonia*), the quintessential expression of Greek identity, a polis.

Within this context we need to explore the origins of *koinonia* as a form of social organisation. The agency of *koinonia* owed its genesis to the human speech act. Aristotle's argument explicitly accepted that a distinction could be made between 'good' (*agathos*) and 'bad' (*kakos*); 'just' (*dikaios*) and 'unjust' (*adikos*); 'expedient' (*sympheron*) and 'harmful' (*bliberon*) as we have seen. The corollary of these opposed pairs of social relations was balanced ever so delicately by the manner in which, or through which, humanity's deployment of its birth-given capacity to use its primary weaponry (*hopla*), the human armoury of spoken language (expressed by and through the speech act), endowed humanity with the potentiality for prudent, purposeful thought and excellence (*phronēsis kai arêtē*).

Of equal moment, Aristotle's processes of argumentation were bound closely to a form of paradigmatic as well as allegorical reasoning. In this context, Aristotle manifested a particularly thoughtful interest in
a human being's peculiar capacity for speech and its unique impact upon human social relations.\textsuperscript{63} Speech led to the rise of associative values and practices between human beings\textsuperscript{64} and, in turn, the association of many human beings with each other led to the formation of social existences symbolically as well as ideologically represented by a polis cosmos.\textsuperscript{65} Aristotle openly acknowledged the debt owed to his, as he saw it, first human organiser\textsuperscript{66} or discoverer of speech, who was in his eyes, a conscious agent responsible for the greatest good (megistôn agathôn aitios).\textsuperscript{67}

Aristotle's argument not only accepted that 'someone'\textsuperscript{68} was responsible for the bringing into being of a Greek social formation but that without the constraints and adherence to law (nomos) and justice (dike)\textsuperscript{69} as customarily practised in this world, all social control, the orderly conduct of social relations, could have been broken down.\textsuperscript{70} However, the model human being who first constructed the full koínōnia\textsuperscript{71} integral to a Greek conception of the polis served a dual purpose for Aristotle. First, Aristotle was able to focus upon the two outcomes of man, in the generic sense, as conveyed by the term anthrōpos.\textsuperscript{72} While human existence within an ideal polis was regarded as the best (bæltistos)\textsuperscript{73} in terms of human outcomes, another form of human practice or social outcome existed side by side with the ideal. Here we are confronted by Aristotle's argument in the form of a synchronous dialectic. Within an identical historical space and time man had the potentiality, if put outside the regulated customary behaviour as embodied in the notions of nomos and dike, to become a most difficult and dangerous being.\textsuperscript{74} Indeed, when sundered from the best of associative values, as incorporated in Aristotle's optimal polis, man was most profane (anostatōn),\textsuperscript{75} capable of breaking customary observances and accepted social rituals. His behaviour became most savage or fierce (agristatōn),\textsuperscript{76} that is, he distanced himself from a polis formation,\textsuperscript{77} and lived outside the polis in a direct sense, beyond the fields, villages, and town centre which formed, and characterised the Greeks settled agrarian life, and defined the parameters of their daily existence. The obverse side of this anti-polis social behaviour was to be seen in the increased practice of sexual pleasure or intercourse (aphrodisia),\textsuperscript{78} taking license in corporeal pleasure, including a preoccupation with the act of eating (ēdōē),\textsuperscript{79} so Aristotle argued.
There is more to this argument of Aristotle's than its being simply a statement of moral values which should be practised within an ideal polis based upon the supremacy of a revitalised, aristocratic excellence (aretē). It was an ideological platform from which he sought to propagate his message that a polis social formation needed to be balanced personally by frugal conduct of one's daily life, within the household and, collectively, within a polis framework. Over-eating, as conveyed by the term (eikōdē) was a most unwelcome sign; it was a bodily manifestation of a physically and personally antithetical position, as was the practice of sexual license relayed by the term aphrodisia. Similarly, the social antithesis of correct everyday conduct within a polis was driven clearly home with Aristotle's references to social actions which were most profane (anostiōton) and most savage (agriōstaton), that is, behaviour which was on the borderline or threatened a polis' maintenance of its precarious political balance. The impact of Aristotle's description of what could be called anti-polis behaviour was not only concerned with emphasising the direct link between justice (dikē) and the polis. This clearly was defined as a given condition of one conception of what was the ideal relationship between the ordering of human relations within the political entity. The strongly expressed condemnation of personally outrageous and socially dangerous conduct should be seen within the overall context of Aristotle's treatise and its specific intentions at this critical juncture of his reasoning.

Aristotle's argument rested upon the necessary relationship between each (hekastos) particular thing or person and the whole (holon). However, within Aristotle's acceptance of the whole (as represented by the polis) as having been the antecedent of the part, a deeper current of thought flowed in which other secondary streams of arguments were encompassed by a single theme. The question regarding the general place of self-sufficiency should be placed within the former, primary context. One was not capable of being self-sufficient (autarkēs) outside the polis. A state of self-sufficiency was attained potentially through being incorporated as a part into the wholeness of a polis. If one were, on account of one's self-sufficient status (di' autarkēian) recognised in isolation as such, then, as discussed earlier, one was relegated to one of two categories outside the realm or behaviour of an anthropos and
his habitat, a polis. One was either a creature of the wild or a god - definitely not a member of a social formation bound to a polis for sufficiency. Whether one was sufficient in-one's-self or not served Aristotle's contextual purpose admirably. For this problematic enabled Aristotle to drive home the mutuality of interests between the questions of self-sufficiency (autarkēia) and political association (koinōnia) within a polis formation. If one had no need to share (koinōnein), then clearly one was a form of life outside of the polis not dependent upon it for autarkic existence. Aristotle has used self-sufficiency as a means of giving life, symbolically and metaphorically, to his 'community' of Greeks as defined by their political association with one another and expressed through their social formation. A polis was given an organic existence through the necessary assemblage of human relations (koinōnia) within itself. It is vital to recognise that it was within such a context that Aristotle cast his critique of the master-slave dialectic (as it has come to be known).

Aristotle, was quite capable of placing his master-slave sub-text and its critical exposition within a broader theory of social relations within a polis. Aristotle's Politics 1253b15-1255b stands as a testament to his capacity to develop a theory within a theory, a critique within a critique. It is this segment of Aristotle's treatise that is under question here. Immediately, he plunged into the problem of coming to grips with the practice of mastership (despotesia). For Aristotle acknowledged that some thought that this process of mastership required a form of knowledge, a form of understanding, and a certain professional or practiced skill as expressed by his term epistēmē. However, as hypothetical as his form of investigation appeared at this point, Aristotle argued that despotesia stemmed from and had a direct bearing on everyday necessity and need, ἡνα τὸ τε πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκάσθην χρείαν καὶ ἕμεν. In other words, despotesia resulted from the daily outcome of extracting and securing a living as a citizen, and this process, in terms of its particular epistēmē, was intimately linked to the theory and practice of the master-slave relationship, despotou kai doulou. Within the construction of Aristotle's master-slave dialectic, Aristotle introduced into his critique two contending bodies of opinion. However, we must be wary and not assume that the institution of slavery was in any way at stake. Rather, a matter of the characterisation and
interpretation of the position and roles of the master, who was also the
ruler of his oikos, (and exercised the power of despoteia) was awaiting
further clarification.\textsuperscript{101} Similarly, the existence of the slave, a human
chattel, was not in question. What came under examination were
particular social actions or outcomes through which one became
legitimately and rightly (within the ideology of 'natural' dominance and
subordination), in the eyes of Greeks, a slave.\textsuperscript{102}

Whilst the seeds of a contradiction well might appear to have been
present within Aristotle's argument at this juncture, precisely because
he had introduced two contending views of the master-slave and free-slave
dichotomy, the contradiction was given no sustainable historical
environment in which to germinate.\textsuperscript{103} Yet the very presence of an
inquiring and questioning mind on this subject, at the very least, says
much for Aristotle's singular contribution to the Greek world's
representation of itself. The cultural environment within which
intellectuals were conducting debates and writing discourses, like the
historical arena from and within which they grew, experienced argument
and probing questioning as well as considerable intellectual
acquiscence. However, whilst that world was often prepared to entertain
questioning, it did not expect (in social practice as opposed to
theoretical discourse) to consider seriously the collapse or rejection of
slave ownership, the right by a citizen, ruler or society to buy and sell
slaves. The ownership of slaves and the practice of slavery were taken
as given in an ancient social formation. Only the forms and conditions
of slavery and ownership differed.

Perhaps, given Aristotle's critique of Spartan society, the
master-slave and free-slave argument came to his treatise via a debate
around the fortunes of the Messenian helots (which by then fluctuated
only in philosophical polemic); and their slave or, less clearly,
serf-like standing in Lakedaimonia. Finley rightly points to the
inadequacies of language or, more accurately, classification surrounding
the terms 'slave' and 'helot'\textsuperscript{104} and associated semi-feudal or "exotic
feudalisms"\textsuperscript{105} tacked onto this debate. In this contentious arena,
historians in both the 'West' and the 'East' are equally prone to errors
in methodology, or gross oversimplifications and distortions. Vogt's,
\textit{Ancient Slavery and the Ideal of Man}, will serve as one example. He
grossly over-simplified the position of slaves and masters in fifth-
century Greece:
Fifth-century Greeks, conscious of their superiority, considered slaves as tools, and wherever possible put domestic and industrial work onto their shoulders; they deeply despised them, and treated them decently, not because they saw in them men like themselves, but because they were prudent as owners and magnanimous as masters.\textsuperscript{106}

On the other hand, the Soviet historian, Diakonov's, "Slaves, Helots and Serfs in Early Antiquity", will serve as a second example. Diakonov argues for an all encompassing schema:

It is clear from the foregoing that both categories of involuntary exploited workers of antiquity - the 'genuine' slaves (Type I) and the helots (Type II) - are found equally in Western and Eastern antiquity, which corresponds to the postulate of the Soviet school of historians on the fundamentally identical economic order in the societies of antiquity both in Europe and on all other continents.\textsuperscript{107}

Diakonov obviously supports Semeynov's position that Marxism equals a unilinear view of history.\textsuperscript{108} Farcical distortions and fantasies abound.

Slavery was an institution present simply because of social decree. It was a result of human actions, the citizenry's regulation of their polis in a legal or customary manner (nomos).\textsuperscript{109} Importantly, this occurred, so some argued, solely because of human actions.\textsuperscript{110} Hence, by direct implication, the practice of mastership over another human was 'against nature', the natural order of things (para phusin),\textsuperscript{111} because it was held together by a society's imposition of its nomos upon another human being. This human was employed by the dominant, internal life force of a polis, its citizenry. However this anthropos' own classification was external to that polis' citizenry, yet he/she was needed, defined, given existence, or a new existence by a polis' nomos, which transformed another human being into a living chattel, a slave.

This argument (whose authors and adherents remained silent, anonymous parties) presented within Aristotle's carefully formed discourse, accepted that the recourse to force (blian)\textsuperscript{112} by human beings determined whether one was to be slave or free.\textsuperscript{113} The acting out of conventional governing and lawful procedures (nomos) by the ruling society (or dominant class) meant that force decided the outcome of human roles and therefore, so the argument led, it was not just.\textsuperscript{114}
The context within which the master-slave relationship was to be considered, lay in the realm of household regulation (oikonomia). In conjunction with property (ktōsis), which formed an integral part of a household (oikia) and its overall management (oikonomia), the definitive basis of slavery was to be located. Aristotle, within this critical framework, reinforced his location of slavery as being within and forming an integral part of household management, in its broadest sense. He emphasised this by arguing that life's necessities (anangkaia) must be procured, otherwise to live (ζῆν) let alone, to live the good life (eu ζῆν) would not have been a realisable goal. The construction of reality Aristotle put forward was grounded upon the viability of established household (oikia) relations and, in turn, this reality was grounded upon a peculiarly Greek social framework. Slavery, as an institution, was not unique but the social categorisation of its roles, its typification within a Greek world defined by the citizen's immediate domicile was Aristotle's particular construction. The slave was an instrument (organon) used for the making or doing of a particular material thing. As a formal member of a household's tools (organa) for the production of material existence, a slave was sub-categorised within this household as a member of the class of animate (ta empsukha) tools or instruments. The slave's status then was determined by a further relative division within the group of tools necessary for household production: the slave was a member of the animate, living (empsukha) tools; not the inanimate, lifeless (apsucha) tools. A slave's duties and immediate, peculiar status or standing were determined by his/her place in the equipment of the household and, in turn, this was dependent upon the vicissitudes, whims and decisions each household, or, if the slave was publicly owned, each polis took within a particular Greek formation.

Relations of dominance and dependency characterised Aristotle's analysis of master-slave roles. The household head, who wielded legal and customary overlordship within a household the oikonomikos, viewed a slave as being a kind of tool used in place of (other) tools (hupēretēs) attached to the materially productive and necessary crafts and skills (tekhnaia) whose roles were the servicing of a master's household needs. The analogy through which Aristotle sought to bring home his analysis of a slave's roles in his world made the slave a
subordinate being, albeit a breathing tool or instrument, within a subordinate category whose overall exchange of roles between animate and inanimate instruments was typified by absolute subordination to a master. Just as a household comptroller needed his animate and inanimate tools, so a helmsman/steersman (kubernētēs) needed his inanimate instrument the tiller (oiōx) for direction, and his living instrument for determining the overall safe passage and direction of his vessel, namely, the look-out or man overseeing the bow (proērous) of the vessel.

Whether one was a kind of tool used in place of (other) tools or servant (hupāretēs) to a master craftsman (arхitekton), assisting this person in the conduct of his tasks, or a slave (doulos) who worked and served for a master (despotēs), a complex exchange involving subordination, domination and interdependence on one another was at work. Aristotle emphasised the necessity for the two broad sets of relationships between master craftsman and assistant and between master and slave. He argued that they were bound together because, unlike the self-moving agency (automatos) of Hephaistos' tripods, shuttles (kerkides) and plectrum (πλέκτρα), they needed a living assistant for them to work. Only if they performed their tasks like Hephaistos' tripods would their mode and relations of production have changed and master craftsmen and masters ceased needing assistants or slaves. Now a living assistant was, for Aristotle, a breathing instrument, a living tool. In turn, an article of property (ktēma) served as an acquisition (ktōsia) of a number of tools (πληθος orpanon). This led Aristotle, seemingly inexorably, to the conclusion that a slave could be defined as an animate piece of property. This relationship can be explained as Aristotle's notion of unconscious proportionality, as a master craftsman was to his human instrument, so a master stood in relation to a slave and vice versa. In turn, a clear demarcation line existed between breathing instrumentalities and inanimate tools. Without the animate instrumentalities, such as the craftsman's assistant (hupāretēs), the inanimate tools would not have had a place since their existence was predicated upon the presence of breathing instrumentalities. The closeness of production relations, of assistant and slave, to the shuttle or plectrum was revealed intentionally by Aristotle's wry remarks, but none the less powerful for
all that, on the potential changes which would have taken place in his world if inanimate tools were self-moving.141

Aristotle's example was, and remains, a fascinating projection of the relationships which could have existed, at least in his time, not only in the minds of a philosopher and an epic story-teller but perhaps equally these Olympian relations of production (as represented by Hephaistos' tripods) had a place within the 'popular' imagination. The idea was imaginary, conjured up, but had no place in then existing production relations except to confirm them by its fantastic scenario.142 Its very boldness was, in terms of its conceptualisation, and this should be stressed, dependent upon a direct connection between the god of metals and the seemingly magical ways in which these metals were reduced, moulded, hammered, shaped and ultimately finished, and thus transformed by the men who worked them, through, it must be remembered, the guidance and secret knowledge given to them.143

An essential distinction was being drawn by Aristotle between an assistant to a craftsman and a slave to a master. Hence a hupēretēs was directly associated with instrumentality (organon); his craft determined that relationship:

δ' γάρ ὁμολόγης ἐν δόγματι εἰς τὰς τέχνας ἔστιν.144

Aristotle, having established that a slave was a breathing article of property, argued that a slave had a functionally and qualitatively different set of roles to those of instruments (organon) involved in the initial 'production' (poïētika) of things. Moreover, within the world where things were made another fundamental distinction could be made between them and the world of the slave. The use of a shuttle was entirely ruled by its capacity to bring about or cause something material to be formed, albeit with a human assistant guiding the tool of production.147 But the slave who was a form of living property was an important contributory force to the maintenance of life.148 Aristotle was not speaking in the abstract when he used the noun for life, zōe.149 He was referring to the qualitatively different life of action (praktikon) a slave had in relation to the 'managing' of life in the household for a master. In a household a slave's roles were quite different from those of wearing clothes (esthēs) or having a bed to lie on (klinē).150 Using clothes or a bed only gave the master involved a passive use which produced nothing, unlike the use of tools or
slaves where active processes of use (or production) were undertaken when they were employed.

Clearly the slave Aristotle was referring to was a paradigmatic slave figure directly attached to the household. His definition had attached the slave's roles in the household to the direct implementation of the household’s life. A slave was involved in the use functions of a household. This meant that, in terms of an oikos, a slave was analogously and materially involved, instrumentally located, in the social consumption of animate and inanimate property which reproduced the social life of the household. At this juncture, Aristotle's thought should be located in its specifically fourth-century and predominantly Athenian experience. For, if one were to take Aristotle's paradigmatic slave for a critical moment, and place this character upon an historical stage designed exclusively for polis existence, one would apprehend that a slave did not exist for himself/herself but existed totally for the life of a citizen's domain as portrayed in Aristotle's paradigm.

A slave attached to an oikos was, in a very real sense, a 'bit player' whose role was circumscribed by and revolved around the acting out of the useful, supportive tasks which complemented the principal actor's, the master's, preservation of the household's life. In this secondary sense, a slave could be said to have been a part of the Aristotelian world of action and practice (praxis) as opposed to its dialectical antithesis, the world of making and production (poiāsis). However, a slave was only a part of the citizen's world of praxis, in that a slave was defined in terms of his/her subordinate role and use-oriented function (khrēsis) to the master's world. Equally significant, this function of khrēsis was defined precisely in terms of a slave being specifically located as an 'assistant', a servant devoted explicitly as well as implicitly to the master's universe of action:

\[ \text{\textit{οἰκὸς καὶ ὁ δοῦλος ὑπακούει τῷ πρὸς τῷ ποιῶν}}. \]

In turn, this definition was predicated upon the given master's world whose mode of existence (bios) was determined by a master's control of the active world where a slave was, for all purposes, a living instrument serving the master.

The slave served in a maintenance capacity within the household. In this sense, a slave was manipulated by a master to help provide the oikos with those necessities or needs which contributed to what Aristotle
envisaged as an end in itself, the good life.¹⁵⁹ Hence a slave, a garment or a bed, had a direct use-value within an oikos-oriented world.¹⁶⁰ A slave then was placed in the world of action, of doing (praxis), because he/she directly assisted the master's sphere of human social action. This world was clearly distinguished from that of making and production (poisísis) for the master used the sphere of material fabrication to his own ends. Ideally, it needs to be kept in mind, the leisureed master did not play a direct part in the actual production (poisísis). Aristotle had discerned both a separation of, and a nexus between, the instruments (organa) of material fabrication (poistika) and property (ktēma), animate and inanimate, which belonged to the immediate use-values of the oikos and acted in the capacity of instrumentalities for action (praktikon).¹⁶¹ Aristotle's philosophical distinction between the processes of 'doing' or 'action' (praxis) and 'making' or 'production' (poisísis) was equally bound up with a separation between master and slave.¹⁶² For the former, the master, within the construction of Aristotle's 'community' of citizens, had citizen status (though, of course, this did not exclude non-citizens, such as the metoikoi or xenoi from owning slaves within a real polis world) and the political and economic power that that bestowed upon him.¹⁶³ The citizens, or the politically active, powerful and organised ones amongst them, had control of an ideology which pervaded every polis society.¹⁶⁴ The citizen was the final arbiter of all things within a polis as he was the measure of all things. On the other hand, a slave was dependent¹⁶⁵ while a master was the active force in an oikos and the polis in which it formed a constituent part. Yet, because a master was an agent of 'doing' not 'making', this did not mean that a master did not or could not take a direct part in obtaining the use-values necessary to the continuation of an oikos through participation in farming or trading.¹⁶⁶ Aristotle's polis model was, at once, removed from a real polis world, yet simultaneously, drew upon that historical world for its inspiration. It needs to be remembered and emphasized that Aristotle's construction of master-slave relations were given their theoretical formation within this peculiarly powerful polis model. This model drew its philosophical and political power from what can be described as a sociologically imaginative manipulation of citizen and non-citizen relations within a polis' cultural milieu. For example, whilst Aristotle
preferred that the _banosoi_ be excluded from the best polis,\(^{168}\) he recognized that citizens (if not ideal citizens)\(^ {169}\) as well as foreigners (outsiders) and slaves\(^ {170}\) also formed an essential part of this 'class' or craft-based status group. Moreover, this craft-based social grouping had an historical association with foreigners and slaves.\(^ {171}\) Aristotle's ideal polis found its social shape, its political formation characterized by the following measures:

(i) Political power, in the widest sense of that term, was to be vested in those armed after the hoplite fashion.\(^ {172}\)

(ii) Artisans were to be excluded from citizenship.\(^ {173}\)

(iii) The farmers, that is those who were to carry out directly the physical toil of a polis' agrarian production, also were to be excluded from citizenship and ideally be slaves.\(^ {174}\)

(iv) Last, but most importantly, the citizens were to own land not in common but, in a sense, after a rentier-fashion, based upon a friendly association of land use by the citizenry and for the citizenry's general and particular needs.\(^ {175}\)

Within this model, this ideal construction of a polis, Aristotle's critique of master-slave relations found an ideological (if not historical) rationale. The impact of an ideal form upon Aristotle's writing can be seen here in Aristotle's preference that all agricultural work be carried out by slaves rather than citizen/peasant farmers. This was an essential part of his polis model where the citizen must have leisure for full participation in political life.\(^ {176}\) However, the general argument presented above must not be taken to mean that slavery was an insignificant force in historical polis, rather it should be seen as an argument that slavery was a most significant social practice but not always and everywhere dominant.\(^ {177}\) Aristotle, at this point of the _Politics_, aimed to establish clearly and succinctly a definition of a slave _vis-a-vis_ a master. For not only was a slave a live tool who assisted in the fulfilment of a master's needs within a household but, as a result of a slave's use function, he/she was as much a necessary tool as a living piece of property (_ktôma_)\(^ {178}\) of a master. Within this peculiarly Aristotelian organicist schema of master-slave relations, what Aristotle wished to impress upon the reader's mind was the indissoluble link between any form of property, living or otherwise, to the end it was determined to serve.\(^ {179}\) Property was, as we have seen, within the
context of the ideally limited needs of the oikos and its polis, an instrument which assisted in the active process of complementing the social existence of the master.\textsuperscript{180} Moreover, the role which a slave played in relation to Aristotle's analogy of a part (mòrion)\textsuperscript{181} was that the slave was a part, who found his/her expression not only in being a part of something or someone else (the master's social arena) but, in the last instance, wholly belonged to and was possessed by a master.\textsuperscript{182} In other words, a slave's life and roles in the world of doing (praxis) formed an integral part of a master's life that, in its turn, formed a whole, an organic totality in itself.\textsuperscript{183} Equally important, we should note that a slave's social roles were defined ultimately in terms of an absolute, dependent relationship to a master. The slave, the 'part' at issue, had his/her social existence defined in terms of a contingent relationship to a master, who formed the 'whole' towards which a slave in his/her subordinate capacity as a hupōretēs was a living component in the master's universe of action (praktikon).\textsuperscript{184}

Just what was it that Aristotle was determined to reveal about the slave and the master? The intellectual edifice Aristotle sought to construct was not simply a question of developing a particular view of Greek morality in the fourth-century. Two key words arose in the context of what was the 'nature' of a slave, and how a slave fitted into a class of instruments of action, a piece of living property to be exploited for a master's benefit.\textsuperscript{185} The first of these was the term, dunameis.\textsuperscript{186} This term has been rendered variously as an "essential quality", "capacity" or "functions".\textsuperscript{187} In the context of a slave and his/her role in relation to another human being (anthrōpos), what needs to be stressed is that Aristotle was attempting to delineate the 'social' potentiality (another possible rendering of the term, dunameis)\textsuperscript{188} of a slave and, within the constrictions brought about by slavery, the slave's "capacity" or "function", and hence the slave's "power" or rather powerlessness within that set of social relations. Liddell's, Scott's and Jones' renderings of dunameis as "power" and "capacity", signal that the term dunameis is an abstract concept loaded with general as well as particular significance within the arena of human social relations. For the purpose of this argument, dunameis' conceptual power is bound up in its internal possession of a notion of agency or instrumentality. That dunameis has a notion of agency within itself is conveyed by Liddell's, Scott's and
Jones' significant renderings of *dunamis* as, "absolutely any natural capacity or faculty, that may be improved and may be used for good or ill" and as a "capability of existing or acting, potentiality opp. actuality". A slave's potentiality was bound by that slave's restricted or harnessed (that is subordinate) capacity for action within society and that, in turn, could only find its expression through the actions of a master.

Aristotle had a particular interest in or concern with the relationship between a slave's *dunamis*, (in that he sought to link a slave's potentiality within his/her given relations of powerlessness) and the concept of alienability or separability. The right to alienate privately owned slaves (who were animate property) which, unlike the alienation of land, was taken for granted, and a slave's separability (in the fullest sense of the concept) from a master were both embodied in the term *khôriston*. A slave's separability from a master, which was encapsulated by his or her function as a piece of living property who served a master's sphere of action, needed to be emphasized by Aristotle as an essential component of human social relations within a master-slave ideology. Having already recognised the conventional view of the relationship between slavery and its social origins being located in the use of force and slavery's necessarily intimate position within the context of a household's needs, Aristotle wished to make clear the relationship between a living piece of property (*ktôma ... empsukhon*) and this living property's separability from its owner (*ktôma ... khôriston*). With the introduction of the dual concept of alienability and separability, Aristotle widened and deepened his initial definition of a slave as an instrument of action. He has, in a sense, taken the slave through his/her place in the means of production (which Aristotle located as being not in the realm of production and making but in a subordinate role, as a kind of tool used in place of [other] tools, within the arena of action and doing) to the slave's position in the sphere of the relations of production.

Aristotle's consideration of the alienability, the separation and transfer of property, living property, from the owner/master had involved yet another bold conceptual leap in examining social relations between citizens and slaves. While the slave wholly belonged to a master (as expressed by the term *holôs*) and found a definitive place, and
realised his/her potentiality through a master, a master was only
formally connected to a slave, precisely because the master was a
possessor, an owner. Yet a master stood simultaneously and irrevocably
separated from a slave by his total power, and this was given economic
form and ideological expression through a socio-legal gulf between master
and slave and living property's separability from its owner.199 However,
that slavery had an acknowledged place within the confines of property
relations amongst the Greeks can serve only as a partial explanation for
the form of Aristotle's critique. As the citizen was an all-pervasive
force within the confines of a particular polis world, so a slave was by
his/her total exclusion from a citizen's political life, located on the
bottom rung of polis existence and social recognition.200 A slave's
classification within a world of instrumental action, of living but
subordinate humanity, formed the intellectual and ideological bases for
Aristotle's critique of master-slave relations. As Hegel in The
Philosophy of Right expressed it:

The alleged justification of slavery (by reference to all
its proximate beginnings through physical force, capture in
war, saving and preservation of life, upkeep, education,
philanthropy, the slave's own acquiescence, and so forth),
as well as the justification of a slave-ownership as simple
lordship in general, and all historical views of the justice
of slavery and lordship, depend on regarding man as a
natural entity pure and simple, as an existent not in
conformity with its concept (an existent also to which
arbitrariness is appropriate).201

Although, in general terms, Hegel's argument contained within it an
important observation on Aristotle's account of slavery, it did not take
into account (and it was not intended to) the particular case of
Aristotle's methodology. First, as we have seen, Aristotle had
established that a slave was a living property who served as an
instrument of action (organon praktikon)202 and whose value or
exchangeable usefulness, as a kind of tool used in place of (other)
tools, was alienable or separable from his/her owner/master.203 Having
established that a slave could be separated from an owner/master,
Aristotle accepted that a slave was, in a direct sense, a human commodity
(a living property) who could be exchanged. Aristotle attempted to
account for and justify slavery by recourse to a process which involved
consideration and reflection on the part of a model, (but far from
altruistic) inquiring citizen. One approached this question through a
process whereby one was required to reflect upon and consider (skeíōn)\textsuperscript{204} a problem. Within this intellectual framework, Aristotle sought to employ the processes of speculative or abstract theoretical inquiry (toi logoi theorēsai)\textsuperscript{205} and to gain a thorough knowledge by observation or close examination (ek tôn gignomenôn katamathēin)\textsuperscript{206} of slavery's existence. It is important to stress that Aristotle recognised that a question did exist as to whether slavery as an institutional practice (doulaia)\textsuperscript{207} within a human society, was a just (dikaios) or better (beitios)\textsuperscript{208} practice or against the natural order of things (paraphusin).\textsuperscript{209} Further, of equal significance, one must stress that Aristotle sought to work out this problem by deploying his reasoned version of critical human argument.\textsuperscript{210}

Ultimately, this method was to be overruled and contradicted by the historical circumstances, as Aristotle saw them, of extant Greek ideological practices. Aristotle's intellectual and philosophical resolution of the problem presented by the existence of slavery was, in a sense, stillborn, overwhelmed by the historical force of Greek practices and their social outcome. His criticism was unable to extend beyond or place itself outside the reality of slavery as an everyday practice and commonplace human condition sanctioned within Greek social, and therefore, historical experience. While Aristotle had been able to confront the question of slavery\textsuperscript{211} and even acknowledged, as we have seen, that more than one opinion existed as to whether it was a natural occurrence or otherwise, he himself fell back upon a more conventional (and finally partial and inadequate) explanation for slavery's existence.\textsuperscript{212} We should neither simply condemn Aristotle for this failure nor casually brush aside his attempted examination, account and explanation for slavery as a legally and socially sanctioned institution in his world.\textsuperscript{213}

The critical point was (and it remains, in terms of its importance to the history of slavery as a trans-historical phenomenon) that Aristotle consciously chose to inquire into the realm of relations between master and slave.\textsuperscript{214} Following on from that, we need to carefully consider the method by which Aristotle dealt with the question of slavery's existence and its justification. He put his formal argument within a theoretical framework which succinctly encapsulated the master-slave dialectic. Aristotle posited that the conditions expressed
in the terms to rule (arkhein)\(^{215}\) and to be ruled (arkheisthai)\(^{216}\) were objective universal values. These relations were not only part of the necessary conditions (ou monon tōn anangkaion)\(^{217}\) but also that such a condition or relation was circumstantially given or expedient (alla kai tōn sumpherontōn esti)\(^{218}\) in terms of the maintenance of past and present poleis' social relations.\(^{219}\)

Aristotle's argument was contiguous upon a typology of domination which opposed the relationship of rulers (arkhontes) to that of subjects (arkhomenoi).\(^{220}\) This can be expressed by the following hierarchy of social relations generated from within the broad context of a polis habitat:

(i) The exercise of rulership over a human being (anthrōpos) was a functionally better (beltion)\(^{221}\) activity, and therefore higher, than that which involved the control of a wild animal (thārton).\(^{222}\)

(ii) For Aristotle, the 'natural' outcome of this situation of domination was that as a ruler (arkhon)\(^{223}\) rules (arkhei),\(^{224}\) so a subject\(^{225}\) is (in the process of) being ruled (arkhetai).\(^{226}\)

(iii) These social relations were characteristic of living (breathing) things\(^{227}\) and also applied to non-living things, such as one found expressed in an harmonic scale (holon harmonias)\(^{228}\) through its rule (arkha)\(^{229}\) or 'ruling principle'.

(iv) Further, these social and organic outcomes were determined by the headship of the 'soul' (psukhē)\(^{230}\) or 'conscious self' over the subject 'body' (sōma).\(^{231}\)

(v) The rule of 'soul' over 'body' was predicated upon the realisation and concentration of these conditions in an ideal or model human being who was in the "best overall condition" (ton beltista diakēimenon).\(^{232}\) It was not predicated upon one who was in a conditionally inferior set of circumstances where a reverse set of conditions existed and 'body' ruled over 'soul'.\(^{233}\)

(vi) Aristotle's dialectic was not only based upon an ideological predisposition to set up a dominant set of relations between ruler
and subject (in all its above manifestations) but also was
dependent upon an agrarian arena of social relations. This was
given particular and telling expression by the assertion that
domesticated or 'tame animals' possessed a better nature in
comparison to that of wild animals.234

(vii) The former set of relations between tame and wild animals was the
outcome of practical, everyday experience whereby the tame animals
not only were better served by being ruled by man235 but, by
implication, their better (beltio) position in Aristotle's
hierarchy resulted from their closer relationship to human
beings236 and their usefulness to them. This usefulness of tame
animals to human beings within a generally agrarian polis world
stood in marked contrast to Aristotle's wild creatures living
beyond the tilled fields of the polis in the untilled lands of the
outer countryside, that is, on the periphery of a polis
civilisation.237

(viii) Within the context of Aristotle's anthropocentric hierarchy we
come full circle to his earlier affirmation of that first pair of
primary social relations.238 For within his schema "the male" (to
erren) assumed position, rank and control, a mastery over (to
kreiton) "the female" (to thēlu) who, in turn, was relegated to a
subordinate position (to kheiron) in terms of rank and bodily
strength.239

(ix) Ultimately, Aristotle's hierarchy of social relations was, in terms
of its own theoretical construction, dependent upon, born out of an
archetypal conceptualisation as presented in point v. This
involved Aristotle's paradigmatic human being, on whom speculative
inquiry was centred (anthrōpon theorēton)240 being in the best
possible human condition241 in terms of a physical condition and
conscious self/soul thesis.242

The importance of Aristotle's argument can be exposed under point
(viii). Here, lay the affirmation and conscious realisation on
Aristotle's part that mastery asserted not only its power, through the
use of ideological control and bodily strength or rank and class over a
polis' social relations, but that within the compass of the concepts kreitton and kheiron two sets of social relations were represented. There were intimate links between the term for expressing control over something or someone kreitton and the term kheiron which expressed its social outcome, in the sense of subordinate status, class or rank in a polis society. First a link was established by these terms inter-relatedness. Kreitton, the act of having control over something or someone, meant that one broad social grouping, namely, the male gender, were in a position to relegate another broad social grouping, the female gender, to a subordinate position. This broad, general reasoning base led to the consideration of another set of more specific, yet still generally located, social relations, namely, that the above sexual dichotomy of human relations was the outcome of a ruler-subject ideology.243

It is to an examination of the pervasive nature, the ideology of relations between ruler and subject, particularly Aristotle's excursus into master-slave relations and its characterisation, that we shall now turn.
CHAPTER IV

MASTER AND SLAVE 2: CONTRADICTION AND ARISTOTLE

The 'natural' slave argument was an affirmation of Aristotle's orderly universe just as male-female relations were both natural and a precursor to the oikos and large-scale settled existence within a polis. The master's use of a slave as an animate tool confirmed both the master's superiority and the slave's inferiority. Simultaneously, the master-slave dialectic testified to the usefulness of animate possessions in the acquisition or production of those things necessary to polis existence and its perpetuation. The master-slave relationship was as natural as the polis. The master-slave dialectic was in fact a master-slave cultural outlook upon the world. Aristotle's polis world was ascendant.

By way of summary, it is important to grasp the manner in which Aristotle sought to convey his analysis of the master-slave dialectic. First, he has set up a model where an almost ideal-type\(^1\) characterisation of human relations would appear to have prevailed. Perhaps this was what Aristotle sought to indicate by setting up a theoretical construct, a representative human being,\(^2\) who was to incorporate the best overall condition (ton beltista diakeimenon)\(^3\) with regard to both body and conscious self/soul (kai kata sōma kai kata psykēn).\(^4\) Aristotle argued that those whose qualities did not measure up to the higher standard of the body/conscious self dichotomy should be relegated invetitably to servile status,\(^5\) and that this outcome was, indeed, a better or more fitting (belion)\(^6\) thing for them. Within this argument lay another of Aristotle's basic tenets and ideological values. This was that for people of inferior rank (in terms of the sōma/psykhē dichotomy) to be ruled in this way,\(^7\) was advantageous both to them, the subjects, and to the master, as Aristotle argued earlier.\(^8\)

But beside what could be called, at first sight, a contemporary rationalisation of historical practice, Aristotle realised that the matter of slave and free was not determined so easily.\(^9\) Indeed, the contemporary rationalisation was not so much a rationalisation of the current practice of slavery in Athens as the expression of a full-blooded ideological stance cloaked in the mantle of a serious philosophical
discourse. Aristotle was not being droll when he remarked that one could not in an equal or similar fashion (homoios radion) understand the concept of beauty in relation to the 'soul', that is, to be able to see it in the same manner as one might see the physical beauty (kallos) of a body:

\[ \text{ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἠφείον ἰδεῖν τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος.} \]

Via a simple observation of the eye Aristotle had arrived at a point where a verifiable empirical observation could serve, simultaneously, as the genesis of a contradiction. But what relevance might this have to a history of the ideas contained in Aristotle's Politics, particularly, with regard to the master-slave dialectic and its place in a Greek social formation? Most importantly, even the concept of physical beauty (kallos) was a peculiarly aristocratic concept wedded to the values of ruling-class families within a polis. In other words, not only did Aristotle's Politics serve as a cultural store of knowledge on the means and ends which a polis ideally should serve but it was capable of serving in the role of an ideological advocate of the ideal ruling values of, at the least, one segment of the polis' citizenry. By no means should this argument be construed as meaning that Aristotle actively represented a particular ruling-class, as opposed to being something of a general, part-time intellectual supporter of some of their interests. Aristotle supported, defined and epitomised the Greek world's self-confident ruling ideology. As Heilbroner succinctly put it, even though his attention was very much focused upon a critique of the currently powerful forces grouped behind a world system of supply-side economics and whose interests are, to all appearances, far removed from the polis world-view of Aristotle:

To be sure, all social orders have ideologues, and none could exist without them. Therefore societies never think of their prevailing views as being "ideological", but rather as expressing self-evident or natural truths. As Immanuel Wallerstein has acutely remarked, during most periods of history there is effectively only one class that is conscious of itself, and this dominant class sincerely expresses its own views as representing those of the entire society...all speak with unselfconscious assurance in the name of their societies. None feels itself to be a "privileged" class or thinks its views to be other than universal.
Equally, one should beware of any convenient assumption that because Aristotle was capable of developing contradictions in his writings he necessarily recognised them, or regarded them as intellectual breaks within a particular argument. Indeed, Aristotle's narrative was often discontinuous\textsuperscript{18} and, as much thoughtfully excursive as discursive. Just because Aristotle recognised that slavery in practice often contradicted what he regarded as the 'natural' physical, bodily appearance of a slave in comparison to that of a freeman and citizen, that did not mean that Aristotle rejected or even attempted to write an apologia for slavery, as opposed to an ideological account for slavery's existence. As Finley observed:

The only surviving ancient attempt at an analysis of slavery is in the first book of Aristotle's *Politics*... With Aristotle that became a theory, (the "natural" inferiority of enslaved peoples as a reason for their continued and continuous subjugation\textsuperscript{19} [my explanation in the preceding set of brackets] developed in the first book of the *Politics*, that slavery is a natural institution and therefore "good and just" (1254a18). Inevitably there has been a trend among contemporary classicists to argue this section of the *Politics* away: Aristotle was being tentative, it is said, and was himself dissatisfied and aware of the flaws in his demonstration. The apologia cannot be substantiated: it confines Aristotle's acknowledgement of the obvious fact that some men are incorrectly, unjustly, enslaved with the naturalness of the institution itself, and it ignores the full integration of the doctrine into Aristotle's oeuvre,...\textsuperscript{20}

The depth of Aristotle's "integration" (to use Finley's term) of slavery into the *Politics*, as a 'natural' outcome for conquered, subjugated and 'barbarian' (non-Greek speaking) peoples perhaps can be explained meaningfully by looking closer at Aristotle's ideological value system which surrounded his free and slave roles in a polis. Aristotle argued that it was the intention of nature (phusis)\textsuperscript{21} or the natural order of things to distinguish between the bodies (sōma) of slave and free. Indeed, nature's task should be to make (polein)\textsuperscript{22} a clear distinction between the two worlds of human existence and activity within one political universe, a polis.

The slave's body was intended for an occupation where it was, like any object or thing, used for a necessary service (pros tēn anangkaiain khrēsin).\textsuperscript{24} However, it must be kept clearly in mind that this necessary activity on the part of a slave was bound to the rounds of the physical
maintenance of a citizen and his household. Concomitantly, the slave's very dependence was based upon the continued existence of this arrangement. Yet, and it is important that this be emphasised, Aristotle's concern was the necessary interaction between a slave's useful activity for, and on behalf of a master. To this extent, the daily functioning of either slaves or animals was predicated upon their physically useful service to a citizen/master. By way of contrast, the position or standing of the free was that of diametrical opposition. They were meant to be 'erect' and useless (καὶ ἄκραστα) if put to the 'horizontal' work functions of slaves. Implicit in the terms, ὀρθά and ἄκραστα, (when taken in conjunction) were the significations of dominance by the free, the antithetical inferiority of slaves, and their subjugation (ideologically and physically) to the 'horizontal' activities which served their masters' world. Hence, the free were useless in those tasks (ἐργασία) associated with the world of making.

Once again, Aristotle's objective would appear to have been the placing in apposition of two archetypal human modes of existence. Although the two were juxtaposed within the οἰκός, they were antithetically positioned in terms of power relations and the reproduction of the polis social formation. One must acknowledge that Aristotle's argument has been represented in paradigmatic form and that this argument excluded consideration of the many parallel occupations and workplaces of citizens and slaves. Indeed, the very term Aristotle used to characterise the state of unsuitability of the free citizenry, for work-a-day tasks, ἐργασία, whilst a common term for work of all kinds, could be suggestive of a bee-like working existence. This was not coincidental but rather another step in Aristotle's argument to distance, ideologically and functionally, the social arenas of master and slave. One theren could be faced with a clear delineation of their roles. The slave performed necessary service (τὸν ἀναγκαῖον κηρέων), a useful role in the necessary reproduction of a master's daily needs: while, on the other hand, the freeman was destined for a useful or serviceable (κηρέων) existence, a life in the interests of the political entity (πρὸς πολιτικὸν βίον). Here we can view, in stark contrast, the power relations between the free-masters and their slaves. The free, quite clearly, had absolute and exclusive control over the ideological and political structures of a polis. That this was so was,
and is, not so remarkable in itself. Aristotle divided the socio-political roles of the citizenry into two generalised categories. Political action or direct participation in the political process involved one in two separate, occupational human pursuits: one geared to military service and the second devoted to the practical outcome of peace:

However, Aristotle's argument has a certain congruence about it and, by this alone, the citizen's roles in the political structures of a polis (whether they were the result of war or peace) should be viewed as an outcome of the intricate web of social relations, internal and external to a polis formation. The thematic congruence of polemikê to eirênikê, war to peace, was neatly juxtaposed by Aristotle's use of te ... kai, enclitic particles which simultaneously, acted as a semantological and political mark-stone. Here we have been confronted by Aristotle's clear distinction between the roles and/or social arenas of master and slave. It was not that, in many cases, master and slave did not work alongside one another but that the master and citizen directly participated in, and acted upon, the overall destiny of any one polis by a (or their) potentially active role in the processes involved with the decisions to be made in regard to war or peace. The slave's roles were relegated to the world of necessity, concerned with necessary (anangkasion) activity or essential service. The slave was not, by any means, an exclusive member of the economic arena of a polis society (metics and citizens, men and women, worked in households, on the land, in workshops, temple projects or in the market-place and overseas trade, to say nothing of military employment or obligations and service). But the slave's roles were centred round the social-economic formation, the Grundlagen, in its most functional, and fundamentally, exploitative sense. Only in exceptional wartime emergencies did a slave receive the opportunity to take a direct part in what was a normal citizen duty, the role of defence of the polis and consequently as a slave or as an ideally liberated helot, took a significant role in a polis' politico-military existence, which was normally the exclusive province of the citizen.

What, it remains to be discussed, were the assumptions and values which underlay Aristotle's logic as to the position of master and slave? And, within this context of the history of ideas, how does one account
for Aristotle's argument that it is clear there are by nature some who are free, on the one hand, and others slaves. For Aristotle, the institutional practice of slavery was expedient and just, and an account of Aristotle's argument must grasp this fact. Once again, Aristotle realised that in the real world nothing was perfect or ideal in that slaves could have the bodies of freemen and freemen the 'souls' only. While necessary service should distinguish the body of a slave from that of a freeman, such a clear delineation was not available for the 'soul'. Aristotle recognised that contradiction, and he recognised a further contradiction (in terms of physical appearance or visible empirical observation), as we have discussed, in relation to the beauty of the soul and the body. To make his point more clearly when he spoke about the bodily form (σῶμα), the outward manifestation of the human form, Aristotle chose to contrast, by way of analogy, a state of affairs where one group of human beings (the free) could be distinguished clearly by their physical equivalency to the statues of gods, θεῖαν θεῶν θείκονας. More accurately, if this group resembled the images of the gods, then the question of domination of one group over another and the reduction of the lesser (inferior) group to slavery, would have received social recognition by everyone, so Aristotle argued. Aristotle recognised that the above situation was nothing more than an analogous reasoning from an ideal solution to the outright acceptance of domination. Aristotle could recognise and develop contradiction, consciously and unconsciously. Yet, in this case, he chose not so much to develop his theme, as to state as a fact that one group by nature could and did dominate others, as we have discussed. This was and is important to Aristotle's argument, for he then proceeded not to justify slavery so much as to account for the various means by which one was incorporated into that amorphous group, whose collective position was known as a state of human bondage, slavery (δουλεία). Aristotle closely bound his argument to the connection between a human being who was a servant in the class of instruments of action and, for all purposes, was socially defined as human property which was alienable. But the historical practice of slavery was based around the use of force (βία) and this, of itself, produced controversy in contemporary philosophical discourse.

Force was a key element in the development of Aristotle's argument.
concerned with the occurrence of the human state known as slavery. However, Aristotle wished to distinguish clearly between the theoretical, and ambiguous contextual meanings of the state of slavery (to douluein), the act of being enslaved, and the state of being a slave (ho doulos). For Aristotle had constructed an argument built upon an, archetypal construct of 'natural slavery', slavery which had a natural base in the human condition. Yet, now he was seeking to expand his master-slave dialectic by way of reference to the historical outcome (as we might express it) of hostilities between different and/or similar human societies. The relationship of conventional law (nomos) to the practice of war (polemos) found its grim resolution when the anomalous position of the vanquished participants of a war was settled by the vanquished being redefined and reclassified, (no longer citizens of a rival state, members of a tribal kingdom or subjects of a barbarian empire) as slaves of the victors, the powerful ones (hoi kratoutes), by virtue of the fact that overpowered things belonged to the victors in war.

It needs to be asked, why did Aristotle choose to place his account of the slave's place in a polis not only within a framework abstracted from his worlds of acting and doing, making and producing, polésis and praxis, but also within an arena where the presence of force (bia) and superior power, the use of mightier (kreitton) physical and symbolic force, was acknowledged openly? One answer could well lie in the inter-relationship between the absolute power a citizen ruling class could exercise, and the implicit acceptance that those who possessed the greater might and force in society were not only powerful, symbolically and physically, but justifiably (in their own view) in possession of all that was socially, politically and morally excellent. They were, simultaneously, repositories of, and an expression of, all that was represented in society as capable of excellence (aretê) and in possession of those ruling values represented by the term 'good', agathos. The depth of what could be called this ruling-class self-assurance can be conveyed by an interesting comparison of Aristotle's argument (within this context) to that of Thrasyamkhos, as related in Plato's The Republic. Thrasyamkhos asserted the just (to dikaios) to be nothing other than the expediency of the stronger or mightier (to tou kreittonos xumpheon). But for Aristotle the relationship (between the powerful and the powerless, master and slave)
was not quite so linear. Aristotle did not agree that the issue of slavery and whether it was just (dikaios) or not was a fundamental question.\textsuperscript{70} Indeed, the question of whether a just outcome depended upon the working out of social relations between ruler and ruled, the fundamental division in society (which in turn involved favour or goodwill, eunoia),\textsuperscript{71} or was determined by the simple possession of a stronger or mightier (kreiton)\textsuperscript{72} power were wide of the point in Aristotle's eyes. The third way, the correct way for Aristotle, involved one (that is, the master) being better according to a measure of excellence (to beltios kat' aretein).\textsuperscript{73} On this basis one was able, justifiably, to rule and to be master (arkhein kai despozein).\textsuperscript{74}

Aristotle's emphasis on and solution to the existence of slavery as an historical practice lay in his assertion that those who possessed excellence (aretē) had the right to practice slavery but, ideally, this practice should be the result of the presence of the 'natural slave' (to phusei doulos).\textsuperscript{75} The notion of aretē must have incorporated a general concept which acknowledged the general aura of a politically and socially dominant class or groups of prominent citizen interests.\textsuperscript{76} Equally important, the notion of a human being who could be defined as a 'natural slave' implied that one set of human beings could intervene (on behalf of both their own interests and in the 'interests' of those who were to be enslaved)\textsuperscript{77} in other human social relations. Yet Aristotle realised that the assumed existence of both a 'natural slave' class and one which staked its hegemony in terms of agathos and aretē raised yet another fundamental contradiction.\textsuperscript{78} War, for example, could have an unpredictable outcome, in that, whether it was convention or legal sanction (nomos) which made a law just (dikaios),\textsuperscript{79} it did not necessarily follow that anyone enslaved through war\textsuperscript{80} could be regarded as an inevitable casualty of a just sequence of events.\textsuperscript{81} Just because slavery was an accepted social practice and could be the outcome of being defeated in war,\textsuperscript{82} one could not accept unconditionally that a person who did not deserve to be in a state of slavery could be defined as a slave.\textsuperscript{83} Of course, such a statement was predicated by the implicit reasoning process Aristotle was pursuing. For, he meant that the condition of being enslaved (douleuein)\textsuperscript{84} and of being a slave (doulon einai)\textsuperscript{85} by definition and theory (if not historical practice)\textsuperscript{86} could not be represented accurately as such if the person so described did not
fit deservedly into the social category of one who rightfully should be in a state of slavery.

Here we are faced with one of Aristotle's major and most problematic of contradictions in the master-slave dialectic. Aristotle realised that a fundamental contradiction existed, in that those who were well born, of aristocratic parentage (eugeneia), and had the highest rank or status in terms of a nobility of birth (toous eugenestatou) could be subjected to slavery unless a different ethical code of behaviour existed between Greeks and barbarians. For, it needs to be emphasised, the accepted belief, recognised by custom and legal sanction, that slavery was just according to the outcome of war (tēn kata polemon douleian ... dikaian) contained within itself the seeds of contradiction - a double standard. What, Aristotle realised, this caused was, first, a division between the relative merits of two disparate groups, the Greek-speaking Hellenes, linked by linguistic affinity and political, religious or customary social practices, and second a more amorphous grouping known as barbaroi, linked only by their non-Greek identities. Of themselves, the terms used to differentiate between these two groupings, Greeks and barbaroi, were as much characterised by their fogginess as by their supposed linguistic and socio-political affinities, which irreversibly separated one group from the other. Secondly, this untidy division between Greeks and barbaroi, involved a further higher level obfuscation on the part of a Greek general system of beliefs concerning their own standing in their own societies and in the Mediterranean environment, the world surrounding them.

The marks which signified the social ranking of 'nobility' (eugeneis), literally those born into good (eu-), stock or kin (genos) were different for Greeks and barbaroi. Aristotle argued that for the nobles themselves their marks of distinction extended everywhere (pantakhous), that is, beyond their homeland or immediate territorial control and influence. While on the other hand, the ranks or statuses of barbaroi who were 'noble' in their societies, were confined to their own homelands and households (oikoi). In other words, the marks of distinction, the symbols and significations of power for a 'barbarian' noble did not extend outside that noble's domain, let alone into lands of the Greeks. The Greeks were privileged by an inverse ideological ordering of power relations in comparison to those of the
barbaroi. This sense of superiority was spawned from a belief system whose simplicity made some (non-Greeks) slaves everywhere, and others (Greeks) nowhere (oudamou). Also, as we have seen, a similar situation applied in regard to the belief system of the Greeks when it came to the position of Greek and non-Greek nobility. Aristotle recognised this contradiction, and the existence (in terms of the logic of this value system) of a twofold system of "nobility" and "freedom" (eugenes kai eleutheron).

The third point which needs to be stressed is that this reasoning process was not for Aristotle an adequate account of the master-slave relation. For a person holding to this belief system had to fall back upon only a single distinction between personal or moral qualities of excellence (aretē) and badness (kakia), to distinguish between slave and free, and also between those born well (the mark of nobility) and the low-born (the mark of common, mean or unlucky background, kai tous eugeneis kai tous dusegeneis).

Importantly, within the notions of eugenes and eugeneia, an assumption had been present that those who possessed these marks of hereditary (and/or plutocratic) distinction could be distinguished from, visibly and socially, their opposite numbers, who were gathered collectively under the derogatory term which signified social inferiors, kakoi. Aristotle recognised the simple dichotomy that was presented as an account of social relations within a polis. Excellence (aretē), a loaded term, attached to the well-born who usually composed the ruling strata (or class) within a polis, was opposed to its socio-political antithesis, kakia. In terms such as kakia, and kakos which carried within them an aura of evil, of wickedness, or the like, and a mean inferiority in comparison to social betters, an automatic ideological supremacy was conveyed internally within the very semiotics of Aristotle's language. The terms carried, simultaneously, objective and subjective levels of meaning; the moral was political and the political was moral, they were bound inseparably. Aristotle was concerned (and his argument could well indicate) that by relying upon the terms aretē and kakia to distinguish between slave (doulon) and free (eleutheron), and well born (eugenes) and meanly born (dusegenes), one might have reduced (according to whether aretē or kakia was manifested) the distinctions between these social conditions to a philosophical Arcady.
The logical extension of such a value and reasoning system led to a predictability which Aristotle did not believe existed, at least, in this account of human social relations and the stratification of those relations.\textsuperscript{111} For Aristotle, whatever 'nature' (phusis) often wishes to, (bouletai...polein),\textsuperscript{112} it is nevertheless not able (ou mentoi dunatai)\textsuperscript{113} to achieve the end intended. Two interesting matters are raised here in the Politics. First, there is Aristotle's assertion of, or belief in the naturalness of nature's intentions. This was recognised by the argument that nature ideally wished to bring about a situation whereby (− in analogous form −) from a human being, a human being (hex anthrōpou anthrōpon)\textsuperscript{114} and from a wild animal, a wild animal (hek thērōn...thērōn),\textsuperscript{115} and finally, from good (aen, understood), good, (houto kai hex agathōn agathon) sprung.\textsuperscript{116} Second, that Aristotle's supposed intentions of phusis did not, in spite of phusis often (pollakis)\textsuperscript{117} trying, come about. What is interesting and pertinent here, is not only Aristotle's statement that things do not work out in practice as they might have been intended in theory (nature) but his belief that phusis wishes (bouletai) to achieve such a result even if it was not able or allowed to achieve its desired ends.\textsuperscript{118} Hence, while Aristotle has refuted effectively the simple arguments which stemmed from the aretē versus kakis debate, he did not resolve the second and deeper level of values and contradictions implicit in such a dichotomy.

What impelled Aristotle to agree that some reason (tina logon)\textsuperscript{119} lay behind the difference of opinion over who should be a slave and who free, was his position that not all slaves or freemen were, by nature's action, in that state naturally.\textsuperscript{120} In other words, his position was predetermined by an organicist ideology. Yet, simultaneously, his organicist stand was tempered by the recognition that human social outcomes were not always the result of natural occurrences. Nor did this tempering of his argument prevent him from asserting that two sharply contrasting (yet, in his world, complementary and concurrent) states of existence could be 'naturally' present whereby it was expedient\textsuperscript{121} for one to be a slave and another to be a master.\textsuperscript{122} Moreover, as we have seen, this 'natural' order was a just outcome, as was the exercise of power incorporated by a master. For the master had a right to rule (arkhein) and a slave's rights stood in an inverse relationship to those of a master, in that he or she was to be ruled (arkhesthai).\textsuperscript{123}
That the elements of an organic theory of slavery were present here is one thing. However, whether one can extend this rudimentary construction of Aristotle's and develop it into a thoroughgoing ancient ideology of organicist racism is another question. Was Aristotle really putting forward an argument for, or claiming the existence of, an ideology based upon a notion of an organic form of racism. Could an interpretation of his argument lead, logically and reasonably, to such a conclusion or interpretation?

The problems with a concept of racism in the ancient world stem not directly from the ancients themselves, rather they find their origins in modernising tendencies which seek to equate or approximate ancient and modern social formations which are removed in historical time and philosophical space. This is not to deny the importance of substantial historical links that we have with the ancients. For example, one need only look to the connections between Aristotelian thought which had undergone many modifications and transmutations (via the progress of Christianity and the articulation of its ideology), and its impact upon the Medieval social formation.\textsuperscript{124} Here one can find evidence for a form of historical continuity and, simultaneously, yet interestingly and paradoxically, the mutability of ideas through human agency in the history of human societies.\textsuperscript{125} One must bear in mind, as we discussed earlier,\textsuperscript{126} the problematical status of terms such as \textit{genos}, the mistranslations, and historical confusion that had and has arisen over historians' assuming or equating that term to the concept of "race".\textsuperscript{127} Similarly, terms which shared a common linguistic affinity, a semiotic base, such as \textit{eugenes} or \textit{genaios} had more to do with familial or clan lineage.\textsuperscript{128} These terms are associated with and attached to one's status or position on a social (class) ladder which acknowledged the socio-political superiority of the aristocratic ruling families, the best ones (\textit{aristoi}).\textsuperscript{129} The \textit{aristoi}, (or to employ the rather less paradigmatic, more emphatic, politically charged, and mostly flattering Athenian terms denoting 'ruling class' and/or approval) \textit{gnorimoi, khrēstoi, genaioi or plousiōi}, it must be remembered, did not achieve this politically supremely confident, dominant position without opposition, or eventual controls and obligations being placed upon them. In Athens, the antithesis of the \textit{khrēstoi}, that is those who can be
collectively assembled under the terms demos, plēthos, ponēroi or penētes, had played, over the course of more than two centuries (by Aristotle's time), an active role in a complex political see-saw struggle which had involved both stasis and serious internal rivalry between ruling familial or clan circles, with far-reaching consequences for the demos' place in the course of Athenian history.\textsuperscript{130}

Any systematic analysis of Aristotle, and, in particular, a critique of his Politics I with the aim of revealing, in a more delineated form, the contradictions and the historical make-up of a Greek social formation must venture into the deep waters surrounding the history of ideas. Aristotle developed an organic theory of 'nature' (physis) and incorporated within this theory a dialectical juxtaposition of mind and soul to the body. Within this theory lay a further grouping of theoretical sub-strata which placed the human chattel in a synchronic relation to his/her master. Here, the slave was defined in relationship to the master's power,\textsuperscript{131} control over the means of production\textsuperscript{132} and ultimately within the slave mode of production; in that the slave was defined by Aristotle as belonging to the animate, breathing world of tools,\textsuperscript{133} as opposed to the inanimate tools,\textsuperscript{134} which were at the service of the master. Moreover, these relations were inseparable from, and defined by the historical concurrence of master-slave relations as Aristotle perceived them.\textsuperscript{135}

It is easy to agree with Finley that "the only surviving ancient attempt at an analysis of slavery is in the first book of Aristotle's Politics."\textsuperscript{136} This is particularly fair if we leave aside, for the moment, a consideration of Dio of Prusa's contribution to such an inquiry and its value to an investigation of an ancient social formation, and acknowledge the primacy of Aristotle's attempt at a systematic exploration of master-slave relations. Yet there is a demonstrable need for firmer and more developed arguments than the omnipresence of "fear"\textsuperscript{137} and an anachronistic argument based upon an insistence by Finley of the appropriateness and existence of, racism, a term I insist on despite the absence of the skin-colour stigma; despite the variety of peoples who made up the ancient slave populations; despite the frequency of manumission and its peculiar consequences\textsuperscript{138}, to explain Aristotle's account of slavery. This is not to say that one should doubt that fear played an important part in the response of any
ruling class to a threat, real or imagined, to that ruling group's power base. To take one brutal example from Thucydides, one need only recall the Spartan public declaration, in the form of a proclamation (proeipon)\textsuperscript{139} to the helots. Those helots who had served Sparta most effectively in war were urged to come forward and present themselves.\textsuperscript{140} Ultimately, about two thousand helots presented themselves, in the belief that they were to be given their freedom and, after due ceremony, they disappeared, and no-one could discover how they were each ruthlessly, swiftly and secretly eliminated.\textsuperscript{141}

Without entering into a debate over the differences between a Spartan formation based on helotry and other Greek formations based upon slavery, Thucydides argued that the basis of the Spartans' fear\textsuperscript{142} lay in the fact that they were frightened by the Helots' youth (recklessness or freshness, that expressed itself in their boldness and, one must assume, capacity for resistance)\textsuperscript{143} and their superior strength, in terms of numbers (τὰς νεοτήτας καὶ τὸ πλῆθος).\textsuperscript{144} Yet, it must be noted, that the basis of this fear did not stem so much from the position of helots, or for that matter slaves, being on the outside of their respective poleis. Rather, the presence of fear stemmed especially from the particular historical situation of the slaves or helots having been present within the dominant human aggregation which composed each polis.\textsuperscript{145} For not only did they come from the outside, in either a physical and geographical sense (as was the general case of all non-household born slaves) or from the outside, in the sense that a subjugated population, such as the helots, were seen as being on the 'outside' of the mainstream, ruling culture of the Spartiates, but they were also in the case of the helots or of slaves in Republican Rome of the late second and the first centuries B.C., menacingly present.\textsuperscript{146}

Moreover, those societies (including Athens) were unimaginable without either helots or slaves. Their masters took for granted their live chattels' necessary presence in the general reproduction of their particular formations, and their specific roles in the production of use-value and/or exchange-value for their masters' households, farms, workshops or sundry trading activities.\textsuperscript{147} Though it needs to be recalled that free peasant and craft-based labour proceeded in tandem with slave labour.\textsuperscript{148} The very tenacity of the peasantry within the various social formations and their ubiquitous capacity for survival,
even continuity, could well have contributed to their significance being rather ignored, played down, until recently. However, a spectrum of ideological positions has succeeded consciously and unconsciously in the obsfuscation of the position of free labour in the polis. In turn, this has led to a distortion of the position of slavery in the classical Athenian polis' social formation, to say nothing about other Greek poleis or Republican Rome.

We need look no further than Anderson's synthesis of the position of the "slave mode of production". Here, in Anderson's overview of classical Greece, late Republican Rome, and the first two centuries of the Roman Empire, we can see that more problems are raised than solved by arguing, quite reasonably, that a slave mode of production existed across this range of historical constituencies and experiences of Greco-Roman antiquity:

But the dominant mode of production in classical Greece, which governed the complex articulation of each local economy and gave its imprint to the whole civilisation of the city-state, was that of slavery. This was to be true of Rome as well. The Ancient World as a whole was never continuously or ubiquitously marked by the predominance of slave-labour. But its great classical epochs, when the civilisation of Antiquity flowered ... were those in which slavery was massive and general, amidst other labour systems.

Let us conclude our earlier, necessarily brief, concern with the place of "fear" in classical antiquity's social relations with helots or slaves. Greek societies of that period, perhaps because of a generally smaller scale of deployment of slaves (with the exception of mining at Laureion), and the slaves' physically active association with the work places of their owners, well could have accounted for the, once again, generally quiescent state of slavery in classical Greece. Yet the strength of slaves or helots, in terms of their numbers or youth, did lead to fear but it must be remembered that the Spartan practice of helotry (and possibly Thessaly and Crete) was an exception rather than the rule in ancient Greece. However, in other poleis, particularly as examined in Aristotle's Politics, slaves were not so much feared as taken for granted. They were accepted as natural human tools, living and working for citizens within a polis.

Additionally, we need to draw further attention to the material reality of slave and free relations as well as to their most
demonstrative ideology. Aristotle's open acknowledgement of slavery's presence and usefulness in his two broadly diverging social systems and social existences, in terms of their respective ends or goals, has played a major role (via an analysis of master-slave relations) in leading us to an unravelling of Aristotle's attitudes to goods, wealth, and their purposes within a polis in chapters VI and VII. Before proceeding to these sections of an inquiry into an ancient social formation, light will be shed in chapter V upon the broad cultural domain of Greek-speaking and -thinking civilisation, in which Aristotle's reasoning was formed, with the use of comparative evidence drawn principally from Dio of Prusa and Thucydides. They will be used to complement Aristotle and will open for us the cultural paths, ideological processes or filters through which meaning and definition was given (or can be given) to the classical Athenian polis.

Now however, to return to our principal theme. Aristotle's exercise in delineating a polis world order of master and slave, in relation to the household, was predicated upon both an organic conception of the roles of master and slave, and upon an instrumental set of relations where the slave was not only an article of property, but was also classified as an animate (empsukhon: 'breathing' or 'live') tool (organon) as opposed to being an inanimate, material object, a lifeless (apsukhon) tool. One must perforce tread carefully, unlike Finley, when he stated that:

The issue is not of a concept of 'race' acceptable to modern biologists or of a properly defined and consistently held concept, but of the view commonly taken in ordinary discourse, then as now.

Finley would appear to have wanted to take one of several guesses at just what was an ancient notion of 'race'. An intellectual 'punt' is all very well, but one cannot assume that "ordinary discourse" in the classical Greek world was based upon any set of criteria that Aristotle developed in his critique. Equally, one would be unwise to assume that "ordinary discourse" had or has one simple, unifying thread running through it. Similarly, the contemporary equivalent of so-called "ordinary discourse" on race and racism is permeated by many strands of opinion and owes its crude power to a complex set of historical forces from the Old World/New World colonial past and present.

Let us turn briefly to examine two broad examples of the historical
forces and movements at work in the modern and contemporary engagement over race and racism. For these forces have had a major impact upon the understanding and interpretation of the ancient Greek world's history. Christianity as an historical legacy has bequeathed a far from unified body of sources, thought and teaching on this question. However, it has had and has a major continuing role in the philosophical, political, moral, economic and social battlegrounds within which the encounter over race and racism has been centred and remains as an urgently contemporary and developing issue.\textsuperscript{158} Secondly, when we come to the problem of the conscious and unconscious spread of values or belief systems (whether pseudo-scientific or worse)\textsuperscript{159} we need look no further than the tragic and perilous distortion of Darwin's work on a theory of evolution as classically elaborated in his \textit{Origin of Species}.\textsuperscript{160} His work, whilst standing firmly on its own merits and open to enrichment through modification, variation and expansion of the original thesis, has often been subjected to a process of transmogrification. This has occurred largely outside the intellectual universe directly involved in study and research around evolution's place in the history and philosophy of science. The distortion took place with the rise and fall of Social Darwinism, which, in concert with the once fashionable and then not so pop-intellectual pseudo-science of racial types, eugenics,\textsuperscript{161} meant that a coherent notion of "ordinary discourse", on this arena of human relations, remained as an ephemeral (yet, paradoxically, as fixed as a belief in race) gathering ground of supremacist ideology.\textsuperscript{162}

Whether one can simply label ancient slavery as a stage in the later development of colonial and modern racism by equating its practices with a term such as organic racism, to extend Finley's insistence on the existence of racism in the ancient world, remains open to question. Where does it get one? The ancients had no need to disguise the roles of slavery (as Finley himself argued, a little earlier in \textit{Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology}) within a complex veneer which sought to hide the exploitation of a slave, and his or her value to a master, because for the ancients:

\begin{quote}
Ideological openness was facilitated by the nakedness of the oppression and exploitation: no 'false consciousness' was necessary or possible.\textsuperscript{163}
\end{quote}

Finley's argument would appear to have turned on itself. For the
ancients the value of a slave was measured not by any precise quantifiable means (nor is Finley arguing for that position); but by the slave's immediate instrumental value (the rule-of-thumb 'principle') in extracting (or contributing to the extraction of) a living for a master. A slave was an exploitable, breathing instrument but no mathematically precise value could be placed upon an ancient slave's usefulness (in the process of exploitation and extraction of a slave's labour) to a master. However, this in no way hindered the cultural, ideological, political and economic acceptance or necessity for slavery. The usefulness of slaves and slavery was a normative value in the ancient world. This was quite unlike the valuation which could be placed upon a slave in an emergent capitalist world. In the colonial New World accounting procedures were well in place for the measurement of a slave's utilitarian, commercial worth or otherwise productive output and cost. This is not to say that slavery under colonial or early modern capitalism was always economic or profitable, or needed to be, and had no other ideological reasons for its existence.

Within the world of Aristotle and, indeed, within Aristotle's mind, as far as he expressed his thoughts consciously, slaves assumed a position of social and human inferiority precisely because of their state of servitude. This was not to say that all those enslaved, as we have seen in Aristotle's estimation, deserved to be there. Finley is right to paraphrase the paradigmatic folklore of the Scythians, in relation to their reaction to an internal change in their social system due to their prolonged absence through warfare in the land of the Medes, as relayed to us by Herodotos. As a result of the Scythian warriors' long absence, the Scythians' women took up sexual relations with their slaves, and a new generation from this association then grew up. The new generation of men born from the sexual liaison of convenience between Scythians' slaves and their owners' former women (wives and daughters, one must assume), at first, successfully resisted by force of arms and other stratagems the return of their Scythian warrior masters. Significantly, this successful armed resistance collapsed when the Scythians dropped the use of conventional arms and resorted to using their horsewhips (mastiges). The reason for this collapse of the will to resist was that the former Scythian slaves' sons recognised in that symbol of mastery, the horsewhip (hē mastix) that they were not the
equals (hoi homoioi) or the sons of men with equivalent class, rank and peer standing, so Herodotos' narration of the story went. This didactic line, as conveyed by Herodotos, could well have been an apocryphal tale in the sense that its purpose was to relay through a comprehensible Greek cultural lens, a shadow play of the social experience of the 'Scythians', their ideological response to the practice of slavery, and their absolute acceptance of the organic servility of a slave. However, it could have been equally a mythological and cultural reconstruction and interpretation of Scythian social history. More pertinently, within the story's structure as conveyed to us, (the resolution of the Scythians' slaves real position and rank in that world) this mytho-historical-cultural piece served as a vehicle in which Herodotos' own ideological glasses refracted something of the light and direction of then current Greek thinking about both the 'Scythians' and their own experience of slavery. Indeed, the belief in the inherent servility of those branded slave was so strong as to lead Aristotle to state that there existed a set of 'rules' or 'laws' within Greek formations which determined the naturalness of slavery. For some human beings were no more than animate tools and live property, organically inferior, and destined to be ruled by a master. While the question itself took a speculative form and induced Aristotle to enquire into the master-slave relationship, there was nothing speculative about the outcome of the inquiry. Aristotle's views were rooted in a world where the paternalism of master-slave relations, along with the generalised power and force a master could exercise whenever he chose, were essential elements of a whole system of subordination which included the gamut of relations between men and women within polis formations. One way to characterize, in general terms, the form ancient slavery took and, in particular, the base upon which it was predicated, would be to consider the formulation of Genovese, in his path-finding work on American slavery:

But slavery as a system of class rule predated racism and racial subordination in world history and once existed without them. Whether one examines Aristotle's analysis of his contemporaries' dialogue on the institution, practice and place of slavery, or his own formulation of an organicist basis for the institutional practice of slavery, all
these views manifested themselves regardless of their differing accounts of slavery (and however piecemeal the attention Aristotle gave them) in a common ideological base of Greek paternalism.

We need to look further at the deployment of terms such as arête and kakia, for their presence was one manifestation of the ideological form Greek paternalism could take. For Aristotle, however flimsy a distinction (or dividing line) it was to equate the positions of the slave and the free (let alone the well born and the meanly born) to the relationships of arête and kakia, it is important to look closely at these terms as moral indicators of an ideological belief system held by a ruling class within a Greek social formation. The words arête and kakia were but two key terms in a frequently-invoked Athenian socio-cultural litany. They constituted a litany in the sense that they were used in a ritualistic manner, as a political formula, whose task it was to characterize the polarities and struggles between two generally opposed groups in the citizen body of Athens in particular. The semiotic intent was in then contemporary literature, such as the Politics or Pseudo-Aristotle's Constitution of the Athenians, to signify the distance between the minority of citizen 'haves' (whether they were the aristocratic ruling families or other wealthier sections of the citizen body, including the more substantial members of the hoplite citizenry) from the citizen 'have-nots'.

The implicitly favourable overtones of a term such as arête bestowed a degree of 'goodness' or 'excellence' and hence political approval on that class or person possessed of these qualities. While obversely, the term kakia levelled a blast of opprobrium, a degree of 'badness' upon its political target. These terms can be seen as but a part of a substantial armoury of politically encoded words whose task it was to signify approval (or disapproval). Similarly, the term krīstos could be taken to mean political approval or ideological correctness in that the person or persons (krīstoi) referred to were useful, good or worthy. Further, the term aristos not only could be taken as a mark of one's birth and/or position but also could be taken as generally referring to the 'best' in a moral or political sense, and to the finest or bravest. In other words, these terms were ideologically codified to signal the favour, backing or approval of ruling or dissenting aristocratic or oligarchic factions. On the other hand, terms such as
kakia or kakos were the antonyms of aretē and conveyed strong disapproval or opposition in terms of the 'badness' of a person's moral or political position, or standing and place within a citizen body. A term such as ponēros which conveyed with equal force a sense of socio-political inferiority or worthlessness (like the terms above), if not always powerlessness, also contained within its socio-cultural usage a heavy-handed brush of political opposition to the citizen body and the active members of that body who politically supported the rule of the citizen body, the demos. These terms, as represented in the ancient sources, were the weaponry of the literate, anti-demos ('anti-democratic') minority, and they were given their classical form and exposition in Athenian literature.

An extension of the ideological juxtaposition of political forces as expressed by the apparent struggle of political values, explicitly and implicitly contained in the terms aretē and kakia to the arena of master-slave relations for the purpose of making a distinction between slave and free (diorizousi to doulon kai eleutheron) was, in itself and by itself, questionable. This criticism, meted out by Aristotle, should not be taken as an idle or pedantic disagreement amongst philosophers. Nor should his criticism be seen as only directed at a possibly 'popular' ruling class ideological justification of their position. For the proposition can be put forward that, in Aristotle's eyes, this was a misuse of then current socio-political language used to typify conflict between rival forces or classes within the citizen body. Further, that this was a demeaning exercise for any citizen master and was based upon an incorrect reasoning process. This was especially the case when that same political terminology was extended to the arena of master-slave relations and deployed to characterize those relations. For slaves and slavery, although they were an integral part of Athenian existence and were owned and controlled by the citizenry as a particular and separate mode of production (though this did not preclude citizens and metic from working alongside slaves), remained outside the citizens' world of action, and the language used to form the written account of this exclusive political discourse and struggle.

A salient argument in Aristotle's critique of the master-slave relationship was that a slave was a part of the master (ho de doulos meros ti tou despotou). The slave was a breathing, animate
(aspsukhos\textsuperscript{195}) but separate part (kekhrismenon neros)\textsuperscript{196} of the master's body. Given this assessment of the master-slave dialectic, we must recognise that Aristotle regarded this set of social relations as being both expedient or useful (sumpheron)\textsuperscript{197} and capable of generating friendship (philia),\textsuperscript{198} in the sense that a socially advantageous and mutually beneficial relationship could have existed between master and slave. However, most importantly, these social relations were dependent upon a paradigm where phusis\textsuperscript{199} ('nature'), the natural outcome of things, was allowed to work its course. These social relations were otherwise (opposite or contrary, toumanion) when man-made custom or law, in conjunction with the use of force, was allowed to intrude.\textsuperscript{200} One must be careful not to confuse this statement of Aristotle's with a rejection of slavery or of the necessity for the master-slave relation. Rather, he was arguing for a set of conditions which realised for his philosophical critique and political position an optimal situation whereby his theory harmonised to the maximum extent the relationship between a 'natural' master and a 'natural' slave.\textsuperscript{201}

Above all we need to recognise Aristotle's focus upon the attached status of a slave to a master.\textsuperscript{202} Whether a slave was determined by the outcome of arbitrary forces of historical chance and circumstance as embodied in the practices of war, conquest or the generalised use of force, and its customary sanction by the ancient world, or by Aristotle's equally arbitrary assertion of a natural basis for slavery, these statements clearly meant that the existence of slavery was never in question.\textsuperscript{203} Rather, the question remained who could be typified as a slave, and how could one theoretically account for and define what a slave was in relation to a slave's master? As we have examined the typification of certain people as slaves involved the conscious and unconscious presence of a deeply embedded form of paternalism. Hence, as Aristotle argued, so long as one was a slave (as a result of a 'natural suitability': phusis), relations of mutual advantageousness and expediency (sumpheron) and even a form of socially benevolent or paternal, friendly association (philia) could have existed between master and slave.\textsuperscript{204}

Aristotle grappled with the master-slave relationship and attempted to define and state in more explicit terms the meaning of these relations of production (and dominance) in the citizen's polis world. The slave's
position was not just relative to that of his comptroller, in terms of purely moral or ethical considerations which stemmed from the ruling citizens' ideological belief in their own innate superiority, but equally was given meaning by, and bound up with, a definition of the relations of production between master and slave. Aristotle rested his critical excursus into the world of master-slave relations upon a relationship of instrumental action and its translation through the master's knowledge (epistēmē) into a useful or serviceable thing (khrestikē). However, this epistēmē had no great importance. This particular episteme lacked in itself redeeming qualities or prestige, and was best left in the hands of an overseer (epitropos).

Underpinning these views, we should recall that the slave was regarded as an animate possession, a breathing property. The slave was an assistant (hupēretēς) and one of the tools (organē) in the world of action (tēn pros tēn praxin), because a slave as property (a possession [ktēma] from the useful world of acquisition [ktēsis]) was an extension of the main body of tools (plēthos organēn). The world of action was, predictably, the realm of the masters, and slaves' roles were those of animate instruments who served the rulers who, in turn, acted upon that world. The slave was located with some care by this master theoretician of the Greek world, squarely within the category of things useful (khrestikē) to the master. The slave's value to a master was a functional one, potentially associated with either use-value or exchange-value (or both). These particular concepts of value will be discussed later within the context of Aristotle's formulation of a theory of wealth-getting (khrestatistikē).

To resume our main theme, the position of a slave was ideologically covered by the paternal mantle of phusis. This view should not be taken to mean that Aristotle was at all anxious to apologise for or justify slavery (a point which cannot be emphasised too strongly) and its fundamental place in Greek societies. That problem had not occurred to him, and it would be anachronistic to attribute it to him. For Aristotle slavery was not a problematic institution, universally condemned and regarded with loathing as an inhuman practice, degrading both to slave and master. The slave was involved in an intimate set of production relations where (not unlike Aristotle's example of the relationships between a steersman [kubernētēs] and his inanimate tool the rudder,
[oiak], and his animate tool, the sailor-in-charge at the bow, prōreus\textsuperscript{216} his or her roles were circumscribed by the web of the master's social relations. As the roles of an oiak, and a prōreus were inconceivable without the steersman, so the roles of a slave, as a tool and animate possession were only conceivable within a world where the master's acknowledged belief in his superiority and excellence, translated itself into a belief in a natural ascendency, an hegemony over those who were in the possession and power of a master. Moreover, it is important to stress that, within the context of Aristotle's discussion of master-slave relations, the slave remained a dumb participant in the master's world of action. A slave did not possess volition, unlike his Southern American plantation successor. Yet the slave was recognised still, in white popular consciousness, if not in law, as an animate chattel, as wryly observed in Styron's writing: \textquote{The point is that you are animate chattel and animate chattel is capable of craft and connivery and wily stealth. You ain't a wagon, Reverend, but chattel that possesses moral choice and spiritual volition.}\textsuperscript{217}

Within a world where a strict hierarchy of commanding and subordinate relations prevailed and were encoded by nature,\textsuperscript{218} the slave's and master's roles were legitimated as given social positions by an ideologue from the very same master-citizenry. It is not surprising that Aristotle developed, however cursorily, an idea which could be called a theory of predatory relations of dominance between masters and slaves. Nor should this concept of a predatory set of relations between masters and slaves be mistaken as some form of primordial or unconscious pseudo-Darwinism (yet again) on the part of the writer, let alone, Aristotle. Rather, the art or act of acquiring property (ktōtikē), the animate property represented by the possession of slaves, was akin to the pursuit or art of war (polemikē) or hunting (thēreutikē).\textsuperscript{219} This argument represented a linear extension of the chase for wild prey to the arena of human social relations between and within poleis.

It is not by accident that Aristotle turned his final remarks upon master and slave to the practices or arts of warfare and hunting. These citizen pursuits must be seen within the particular context of the acquisition (ktōsia) and art of getting property (ktōtikē) for the household (oikos).\textsuperscript{220} For Aristotle's remarks upon master-slave
relations were construed from within these general boundaries of his social theory and practice. Hunting can be related directly to an aristocratic notion that the useful pursuit of leisure aided the martial needs of a polis through the practice of hunting sports.221 In particular, the combative element of involvement in the chase of the quarry, contributed directly to preparation of a soldier-citizen for warfare through the hunter's active display and development of aggressive virtues, a sharpening of sensory instincts and of the capacity for physical endurance.222

For Aristotle, the links between hunting, warfare and slavery were not arbitrary. Slavery was bound up with the world of kratike and in turn the methods used were, in a sense, 'naturally' based. They had a naturalness about their practice in that, not only were they linked to age-old practices of human existence, but that the very mode of human habitation instrumentally reflected the means by which this particular form of human existence was maintained.223 The different forms of food, or the many kinds of foods (eide polla tropyes)224 available for sustenance, provided an environment for many forms of life or existence (bioi polloi)225 for animals and human beings. Aristotle recognised that the largest social group or division (to pleiston genos)226 of human beings, within the above context of his generalisation about the known world, lived on the land and went about the procurement of their cultivated produce (hemeron karpon)227 from the cultivation of that land.

Within this generalised context of the cultivator being the representative of the dominant mode of existence and, specifically, production (though this needs careful qualification, in the case of Athens),228 one must turn to examine further the layers and interweaving of meanings attached to the terms and roles ascribed to slavery and slaves. For it is vitally important to recognise that these layers of meaning surrounding the terms slavery and slaves, were given by those whose world was especially defined by notions of freedom as enshrined in the ideological purview of a polis citizenry.

This inquiry will be carried out in relation to the parameters of Aristotle's two paradigms which were concerned intimately with divergent, philosophical (theoretical) positions and their relationship to historical practices. The first paradigm can be defined as that given by a set of social circumstances (of the ideal type) which can be
characterised as a process of agreed, associative decisions taken by citizens, where a polis was based around a concept of autarkeia. The second paradigm was presented as a distortion of the first and was placed in opposition, with a divergent set of goals, to that of autarkeia.
CHAPTER V

AUTARKEIA AS PARADIGM: PROBLEMS AND ASSUMPTIONS

Intertwined with the concepts of autarkeia and khrēmatistikē were the separate, yet simultaneously overlapping spheres of freedom (eũtheria) and slavery (doulos). The worlds of slave and free, master and slave, stood in relation to one another like two circles or spheres in a Venn diagram. Divergent political power relations within a polis which separated utterly citizen from slave (politically powerful from politically powerless), led to a convergent set of social relations in terms of the arenas for material production, and the human discourse involved in the total reproduction of a polis as a cultural entity. So while the citizen/master complex could be represented by Sphere A, and be seen as separate from the slaves and animate tools of Sphere B, both were defined by and in relation to the interaction between spheres A and B. In turn, the totality of social relations led to not just the conjunction of the spheres A and B, but to the particular delineation of a social formation, the sum of which was not simply the interaction and separation of A and B but the social outcome of an historical world C.

Before we turn to the particularities involved in Aristotle’s first paradigm we need to probe a little further into the specific socio-historical surroundings and uses made of the terms freedom and slavery within the orbit of the Greek speaking world. This must be done in order that the depth of the dichotomy between master and slave will be seen to be more than that of a surface rhetoric employed by a literate elite close to, or involved in, the centres of Greek political power and knowledge. To do this we must venture into a brief but intensive investigation of two principal Greek writers. Although Thucydides and Dio of Prusa were separated by the better part of five centuries they both, in fundamentally different ways, touched upon the ideological omnipresence of slavery. This omnipresence was not given its definitive character by the question of the aggregate numbers of slaves in a polis. Rather, the seemingly perennial importance of slavery and freedom, and free and slave, were bound up in the power relations between poleis (or an emergent poleis’ dominance and rule [arkhē] over other formerly autonomous poleis) and the internal relations between free and slaves in
a polis.

It cannot be emphasised too strongly that the particular investigations of Aristotle, Dio, and Thucydides on and around these historical and philosophical arenas, should in no way be imagined as signalling that their historical worlds were in turmoil over the historical contradictions involved in 'individual' free and slave classification and 'free' and 'slave' political classification amongst the poleis. Rather, the presence of the language of slavery mediated by the human experience of these writers over historical time should harness our attention.

Let us begin with Thucydides, II.63. This speech of Perikles was designed to convince the Athenians, after the second incursion by the Peloponnesians into Attic territory, to hold to his original advice to go to war, regardless of the impact of plague and the effects of the war thus far upon the Athenian people.¹ The particular section of this defensive Periclean speech with which we are concerned rivets one's attention on the interconnections between freedom and slavery. For here free men, citizens, so Perikles argued, were waging war not just over a question of slavery instead of freedom (douleias ant' oleutherias)² but also at stake was the vital question of arkhē, the maintenance of Athenian power.³ This challenge to the Athenians was phrased in such a way by Thucydides (since he did not pretend to have been reporting Perikles' exact words and phraseology, rather the intent and general sense)⁴ so as to crystallise for the Athenians their geopolitical position in the Aegean. Simultaneously, we have received an ideological message reflected from the depths of an Athenian value-system.

For the Athenians, arkhē was not only connected intimately with the question of freedom and slavery but, indeed, conceptualised itself in terms of a ruling polis⁵ where the historical outcome of circumstance, chance or expediency (xumpherei)⁶ had coincided, in terms of survival, to rule out the impossible or unacceptable option of subject status for Athens and its consequent reduction to a "state of slavery".⁷ Thucydides' Perikles spelt out the telling but, perhaps, doom-laden message that a ruling polis' survival depended on its determination to hold on to that rule, come what may.⁸ Regardless of whether the Athenians' arkhē was a form of tyranny and unjust,⁹ there was simply too much danger¹⁰ involved in releasing the reins of rule. Equally
important, one must note that those who might have urged some change to Athenian policy, if allowed to set up their own autonomous settlement (sphôn autôn autonomoi oikēseian)\textsuperscript{11} would have undone polis existence — in Athens or wherever they constructed their new habitat\textsuperscript{12} according to Perikles' Athenian Realpolitik.

Here we have two sets of values in conflict; the juxtaposition of the worlds of inaction or passivity (appagmos) and activity (dрастários).\textsuperscript{13} This argument, as presented by Thucydides, put forward a theory of social survival based upon a dynamic of action. Moreover this action involved the conspicuous expenditure of bodies, of human lives, and labour on war.\textsuperscript{14} It was an aggressive theory for polis existence, and the maintenance of rule. Significantly, the views propounded by Perikles were bound around a theory of action and inaction and turned upon a world which not only had resulted from action or inaction but which was given its ideological boundaries through the language of freedom and slavery. This language, perhaps because of its ability to rouse opposition and cause disgust amongst citizens, can be found around many issues directly concerned with polis autonomy. Indeed, it was axiomatic that a polis should be autonomous and be able to function in that political mould.\textsuperscript{15} Without entering into the complexities of how one polis, Athens, assumed leadership (the position of overall chieftaincy, hæmonia)\textsuperscript{16} over many poleis who believed that they were, and expected to remain, autonomous allies,\textsuperscript{17} it is important to realise the place defeat in war or revolt played in the loss of a polis' autonomy. Its subsequent reduction in socio-political stature (annihilated, as was Melos)\textsuperscript{18} was symbolised by the rhetorical and descriptive power of the language of slavery. Naxos was reduced to a state of 'enslavement' (a loss of autonomy)\textsuperscript{19}, the Lakedaimonians demanded that Athens should give Aigina its autonomy (kaî Aiginan autonomon aphiēnai)\textsuperscript{20} and, in general, that the Greeks under the Athenian archê should be given their autonomy. As the Spartans put it in their final delegation sent to the Athenians:

The Lakedaimonians ardently desire to be at peace, and peace is still possible if you give the Hellenes autonomy.\textsuperscript{21}

This position enabled the Spartans to score political points, to make inroads on Athens' political standing as hæmos by simultaneously binding the question of peace to that of the Greeks' autonomy within the
Athenian arkhē.

To place the issue in a sharper focus we must turn to Brasidas' employment of the terms 'freedom' and 'slavery'. He deployed the political aura and political realities of freedom and slavery, which encompassed the ideological space of autonomous power relations between poleis to great effect at Akanthos. However, Brasidas bound his actions not only to the desirability of freedom for all Greeks but also to deny to the Athenians one economic resource - the money derived from tribute. Of course, Brasidas, we can surmise safely, was well aware that his aim was to break the power, the rule, of the Athenians. Indeed, he claimed that the Lakedaimonians were not seeking after ruling power (archē) rather their aim was to stifle such forces. Given that Brasidas was aware of his isolated but adventurous military and political position in Northern Greece, and that the recourse to political sloganeering was not only inevitable but necessary, we need to look closely at the ideological guise which Brasidas' dual military and political campaign assumed. One must not dissociate Brasidas' particular ideological ploys and his tone from the socio-political space defined by the term autonomia. The potency of his language was given its ultimate expression by his attaching the realisation of this ideal polis model to the outcome of the struggle between 'freedom' (éléuthería) and 'slavery' (douleia) amongst warring poleis. At this moment, Brasidas was the visible military exponent and propagandist for the Lakedaimonian and Peloponnesian public articulation of their aims in the war against Athenian arkhē. However, while the Akanthioi were influenced or enticed by Brasidas' ideological turn of phrase, concern and fear for the outcome of the harvest or the first fruits (peri tou karpou phóbō) impelled them to change sides and accept, as a result of Brasidas' personal pledge as to the veracity of the Lakedaimonians' oaths, their new status of self-laving or governing allies (xumakhous autonomous).

Two observations should be made at this point. First, that a polis responded rapidly to any major threat to its agrarian base, an obvious but important truth demonstrated by Thucydides' record of Brasidas' none-too-subtle argument contained at the end of his overtures to the Akanthioi. Second, that the presence and use of force (bia) was accepted as a preferable method of social action to those involving deceitfulness (apatē) or disgrace and shame (asiskhos) in one's
conduct. Of considerable significance to the value systems underpinning a polis' conceptualisation of itself, and a history of its ideas in action, was the presentation of the terms, iskhues, representing strength of body, might and power, and tukhē, chance and good fortune. Force (bia) was viewed as a mere assertion of strength and power (iskhues) and, in turn, this was seen as virtually a natural, or rather, organic working out of one's individual and collective good fortune. Tukhē, exerting extra-human agency or blind force upon the individual and collective outcomes of human actions, would appear to have had the correct input of phantasmagorical qualities to make it a potent force in Greek value systems. For, unlike conduct which involved dishonour amongst one's peers, (such as actions which led to, or involved, deceitfulness and shame, apate and aiskhos), one could have appealed to the apparently unforseen and mysterious workings of tukhē to account for one's use of force in an historical arena. Bia and its twin iskhues represented the legitimization of socially sanctioned superior force with their appeal to illusory, unknown or undiluted powers which conferred their 'material strength' or opportunism on an individual or polis by virtue of one or the other of these historical actors appropriation of tukhē. Significantly, one should note that the social legitimization of actions involving the use of bia and iskhues were given a near equivalent of carte blanche by the belief that such powers derived from non-human agency, chance or good fortune. Hence, in situations where force was deployed against other human groups or poleis, the use of force found its justification, or rather sanction, in a system of organic outcomes or exigencies, apparently to Greek eyes, at one remove from human foresight and therefore control. While, on the other hand, human actions associated with 'deceitfulness' and 'shame' (apate and aiskhos), were sheeted home to immediate human apprehension or responsibility by their being associated directly with human judgement (gnoses) and the conscious processes involved in one intriguing or making designs against another (epiboulē). This in turn meant that such human actions were viewed as unjust (adikos), against the interests of others and deserved social opprobrium.

When we turn to Aristotle, once more we can glean further insights into the underside of classical polis values; in particular those of Athens, as reflected in and around the literary output surrounding the
Athenian and wider Greek experience. For, as we have seen earlier, Aristotle recognised that variant views concerning the existence and use of force in master-slave relations were known and acknowledged in theoretical discourse.\(^{39}\) However, the recognition of a contradiction did not mean that Aristotle either was sympathetic to such a view, in any shape or form, or was capable of resolving such a contradiction. The acceptance of force, and the right to employ such force by those who possessed that mark of ruling authority or symbol of social esteem (aretē) was acknowledged.\(^{40}\) The connections of bia with the mysterious workings of tukhē and its extension by Aristotle to the socio-political alchemy of aretē which transformed a master or a polis into, individually or collectively, one who possessed the most power, or strength to use force (biasthai dunatai malista) needs to be recognised clearly.\(^{41}\) Aristotle did not argue, like the unnamed protagonists he put forward for the reader's consideration,\(^{42}\) that one's power simply depended upon an assertion of one's justice (to dikaion)\(^{43}\) or that the ability to rule, exercised by the stronger, was by virtue of that strength (to ton krettona arkein).\(^{44}\) Indeed, Aristotle disagreed,\(^{45}\) and clung tenaciously to his belief that the best in excellence should be in a position to rule and to be master,\(^{46}\) by implying that those arguments presented against him would lead to a logical position where it was not necessary for the best in excellence to rule and to be master.

In Aristotle's schema of things directly concerned with the social relations of a citizen's life (politikon bion),\(^{47}\) the division of a freeborn man's activities into those concerning war and peace,\(^{48}\) had an immediate bearing upon, and was a reflection of, polis ideology. While Aristotle's argument was concerned with the development of a coherent organic theory to account for master-slave relations and their perpetuation, one 'popular' strain of argument appeared to point, in no uncertain terms, to an organic theory for the place of force in determining social relations.\(^{49}\) However, we need to remind ourselves that in Aristotle's view, the advocates of an overly deterministic force-thesis were on the wrong track.\(^{50}\) Here, faced with an antithesis to Aristotle's nature-slave organicism (to phusei doulon),\(^{51}\) which expressed itself in the contrary thesis that the ability of the stronger to rule,\(^{52}\) and therefore to subjugate others, came about by virtue of that strength, we need to widen our inquiry if we are to search for the ideological
basis, the values or belief systems which underlay the ancients' construction of a polis existence. It was not that Aristotle rejected the use of force or its power to compel an alien society to another society's will. Rather, he sought to develop a thesis which accounted for the position of 'individuals', peoples or societies outside the Greek world who were regarded as slaves within the Greek world (if captured in war or sold to Greeks) and, more importantly, why Greeks could never be regarded as slaves regardless of historical circumstances. Yet what Aristotle was to uncover were the ideological foundations of an historical practice. Nature-slave organicism sought to confer on the getting, use and rule of slaves by their masters an ideological framework whose construction came about from those self-same ideal 'logical processes' of Aristotelian epistemology.

If we turn to Dio of Prusa we can enlist the valuable and sometimes quite unique arguments developed in Dio's Fifteenth and, to a lesser extent, Fourteenth Discourse. Within the discourses of Dio and Aristotle, separated by time and argument, some glimpse can be had of the value system advocated across historical time with regard to the place of slavery and freedom in Greek theories of the polis. Two keys to the workings of at least two Greek minds can be explored by first recognising that, for Aristotle, the nature-slave organicist theory replaced for him, however inadequately, an inherent contradiction whereby Greeks could never be regarded as slaves. This belief-system ensured for the Greeks a comfortable ideology of blindness. However, we have to look to Dio for an insight into the depth and strength of the position held by the concept of force through its practice in piracy, raiding or war (hypo lâstelias ã polemou) on a Greek social formation. For Dio developed an argument which not only challenged any nature-slave theory of slavery; indeed, it challenged the basis for the existence of slavery in a theoretical and, in some ways, an extra-historical discourse. Whilst this discourse has an 'historical place' and date for its proximate composition, its historical setting can be described as fluid but, most importantly, the argument between the two antagonists was conducted in the private not public arena. The argument encompasses a general interpretation of the Greek experience via a form of Plato's Socratic dialectic dressed in Stoic garb.

At the heart of ancient social relations lay one fundamental
question which Dio developed beyond Aristotle's questioning of just and unjust human situations - this was concerned directly with the political economy of a polis or what constituted a ratification of ownership or possession (to kurion tēs ktēsēs). For within a household or a set of human power relations within a polis, a human being's position as a slave or free person could have been determined by one of the oldest methods, or first in importance (presbutatos), the outcome of war or raiding. Dio went much further than Aristotle on the relationship between war and slavery. He allowed an argument in his discourse which openly asserted that slaves had not existed a priori in human relations: indeed the first slaves were not likely to have been born from slaves. With such an argument it must be emphasized that this discourse took place within a real or imagined private sphere of philosophical disputation whose boundary was confined to one household, presumably owned by one of the antagonists or his friends. At one blow, a vital element of ancient acquisition or possession (ktēsis) was open to question - the process of acquisition itself (tēs ktēsēs), in relation to one's possession of slaves, was open to doubt.

The recognition by Dio and his interlocutor that the origins of slavery, the earliest way or manner (ho palaiotatos tropos) of acquiring slaves eminated from one human being becoming a captive (aiakhmalōtos) through warfare or raiding, was made possible by the interlocutor's unwillingness to accept that the status of people as free or chattel was given for all time and without reference to historical circumstances. First, he cast doubt on the likelihood that his parents, (those of the interlocutor) let alone, more importantly, their parents from the very beginning (ex arkhēs) of time with their kin were always slaves. What grouping of the human family (ti genos anthrōpōn), so he reasoned, throughout all eternal time (ek tou pantos aiónos), did not have an infinity (apeiroi) of freemen, and no smaller a number (ouk elattous) of slaves amongst it? The collective experiences of the human species (en anthrōpois), from tyrants (tyrannoi) to branded slaves (stigmatisai) and cobblers (skutotomoi), were all bound together by work or occupation (ergasia), fortune (tukhē) and circumstance or chance (sumphora). Secondly, the historical experience of a polis like Athens was tempered by the individual and collective arenas in which citizens found and placed themselves in. The outcome of the Sicilian expedition
by the Athenians was for Dio's purposes an important case in point. Here, citizens, although recognised by fellow Greeks as freemen, regardless of a change in historical circumstance or fortunes of war, and not subject to the same set of ideologically given laws which bound non-Greeks to slave status if they were defeated and taken captive in war, were transformed into slaves in Sicily and the Peloponnese. This transmutation of social position from one who held citizenship and, axiomatically, was free, to one who, while still entitled to that citizenship, was subject to a master needs further exploration. We are entitled to ask what ramifications did the transmutation of a citizen to captive and/or slave have on the value systems of a polis and its citizen body?

Of course, we cannot expect any definitive answer to the above inquiry but the question should be allowed to stand because of the tantalizing discussion contained within Dio Chrysostom's Fifteenth Discourse. While Dio's concern was to demonstrate through his actors' arguments that one's original or first status within human social organisation might not accord necessarily with one's present designation, he also recognised that one's status (or class position, as expressed in the relationship slave-slave owner or master-slave) could be transformed by a state emergency. One only has to turn to a crisis which required the immediate expansion of the armed strength of a polis, as witnessed by the Athenian reaction to the aftermath of the battle of Kallirhoe and Hyperides' proposal to free slaves (to make xenoi and metoikoi Athenian citizens and to restore the privileges and rights [spitimoi] of disenfranchised citizens [atimoi]) in order that the Athenian polis could have effectively mobilised and maximised these groups' aid in the war against Philip. Such a reaction by the Athenian polis was, of course, a response to a dire emergency but it was not without a precedent of sorts in the history of Athens. The much earlier role of slaves in the battle of Arginusai during the Peloponnesian war was a case in point. Whether the slaves involved came from the household category of slave-servants (oiketai), presumably, in this case, regular assistants to the master or his sons on military campaigns or were public slaves, who belonged to the citizenry of the polis (demosia), it was a general (unsuccessfully impeachable) proposal rather than an individual gesture on the part of a master which
determined this potentially exceptional emancipation of a most probably diverse group of human beings gathered under the generic category of slaves. Another collective or organised response, rather than individual whim or reward, which could transform the individual or collective status of a social group, was a rebellion by a vassal people, as in Cyrus' case. Because of the unusual or exceptional conditions which produced such responses from the citizenry, these acts (real or potential) should be seen as a concrete manifestation of a polis' social survival mechanisms rather than harbouring the seeds for a potential mass transformation of the citizen body. One last but not insignificant means of collective transformation of a human group's social position was an effective intervention by outside forces and the restoration of age-old rights of a subjugated people, such as the Messenians.

Now, however, we must turn to the less optimistic side of any personal or collective transformation of one's individual position, class or group status brought about by warfare and the vanquishing of one's enemies. The outcome for the Athenians taken as captives (ai̇kmalōtoi) in Sicily or, for that matter, the many battles and sea-raids conducted by both sides must have had a considerable impact upon human relations within these tightly knit poleis. These situations would have been especially traumatic, in the cases of both the Athenians and other Greek citizens who were unable to find friends, supporters, kin or family who would have been capable of paying a ransom. It was a not uncommon practice, as Dio acknowledged, to pay a ransom (lutra) to one's enemies in warfare (polemōi) or to pirates (lēstai). Many men have paid silver coin or, in its generic sense, money (polloi ... katabebleikasin argurion) for ransom, but again, others for many reasons had endured slave status.

However, when the process of ransoming captives taken in war-cum-privateering ventures broke down, as it would appear occurred during the opening years of the Peloponnesian war, vengeance, in the form of reciprocal summary execution of captives, was practiced by the Athenians as a form of retributive justice for the trauma caused by the Spartan execution of Athenian, 'allied' and 'neutral' traders and merchants caught sailing around the Peloponnese. Thucydides' account of Alkidas' 'about face' on the summary execution of prisoners taken on his abortive, and apparently reluctant, mission to aid Mytilene is especially
relevant in this context. Clearly Alkidas' indiscriminate behaviour towards his prisoners\textsuperscript{87} not only caused great trauma amongst fellow citizens and Greeks, as witnessed by the intervention of the Samians from Aegina\textsuperscript{88} but was inimical to the ideological line of the freeing of Hellas (tēn Helladā eλuθeρouμ)\textsuperscript{89} by the Spartans and the Peloponnesians from Athenian hegemony. Alkidas recognised the validity of the Samians' argument, that he was only bringing about an adverse reaction towards his task force and the Peloponnesian cause.\textsuperscript{90} No doubt one could rest content with this clear recognition of his change of heart but by taking this position one would have overlooked another important consideration. Indiscriminate behaviour did bring about equally traumatic and ruthless action on the part of the Athenians. Aristeus, his three Lakedaimonian envoys, plus one ally from Tegea and one 'associate' from Argos\textsuperscript{91} were subject to the brutal reciprocity of immediate execution.\textsuperscript{92} This was occasioned by the temporary breakdown of understood social practices, such as ransoming prisoners not acquired on the battlefield, particularly when those prisoners were prominent citizens representing their poleis or an important grouping within a poleis, as in the case of the Argive envoy.\textsuperscript{93} In as much as these actions by either the Spartans or the Athenians were generated by fear of the ever present danger such prisoners, especially in this case Aristeus, posed and could have posed should they have escaped,\textsuperscript{94} we should keep in mind that the reasons for such extreme actions were not only those of tactical advantage but also reflected something of the social trauma and breakdown of customary behaviour involved in a war which threatened, by virtue of its scale and the spread of the rival alliances, to encompass the totality of Greek relations.

A further distinction should be made between the fates of prominent and powerful citizens and the mass of the male citizen population as a result of defeat in war. In turn, this line will compel one to consider the amorphous positions of male citizens, women and children, and that of their slaves or indigenous subjects. Prominent citizens possessed considerable political and economic leverage and they traded in favours. Nikias' attested friendly support for the early release of the Spartiates captured on Spakteria was a prominent example of the depth and extent of reciprocal behaviour amongst power elites.\textsuperscript{95} However, it should be noted that prominent though he was, Demosthenes was disliked intensely by the
Spartans for his major role in their defeats at Pylos and on Sphakteria, and no doubt equally, by the Syracusans for his later role in delivering Athenian reinforcements to the beleaguered first expedition. Only the Korinthians' wariness of Nikias' personal fortune, and the power this wealth could command, let alone the damage he could do politically to them if he escaped, combined with some Syracusans' fears of what Nikias could do by way of personal intelligence against them, led to his execution, in spite of Gylippos and the Lakedaimonians' favourable disposition towards him. The terms Thucydides used to express the Lakedaimonian's warm feelings towards Nikias were, firstly, the strong superlative epitdeictaton, which indicated a most friendly disposition and, secondly, the use of the term prophileis was either an indication of favourable political friendship ties with Nikias, or of reciprocal obligations owed to Nikias personally for his past kindness to the Spartiates. While, on the other hand, both considerations of propaganda and strategic advantage impelled the Athenians to preserve the lives of two hundred and ninety two hoplites, and, of critical importance, the one hundred and twenty Spartiates from that number, no such fate awaited the helots (the Messenian 'servants') who accompanied them. They perished presumably, and were swept aside in the general comment that the remainder of the four hundred and forty hoplite force were killed in action. Thucydides made no mention that these helots were allowed to join their Messenian brothers from Naupaktos in raids from their base at Pylos and, from this problematic argument from silence, one could argue that no helots survived or were allowed to survive the battle on Sphakteria. As to their numbers one can speculate that either each hoplite had at least one helot 'servant'-in-arms with him or that, at the very least, each of the Spartiates had one 'servant'

An important ideological boundary which defined a Greek appreciation of a polis habitat was the conscious relegation of free women, free children and slaves, regardless of sex and age, to a state of collective anonymity. In order that one may get closer to the autarkic paradigm, and the manner in which it shaped a theory of a polis social formation, we need to turn to a further appreciation of the roles Greek numerical and general reckoning played in the confirmation of anonymous status. Further illustrations of the workings of this mechanism for
social stratification and isolation can be found in Thucydides. All the examples concerned were set within a war psychology and should be viewed as time capsules whose historical matter directly reflected the daily practice of human social relations within a polis and between rival poleis.

Before this analysis is commenced, a further observation on the relevance of Dio of Prusa and Thucydides to this research must be made. The particular importance of Dio of Prusa and Thucydides to an investigation of Aristotle's theory of society is precisely that they can add further theoretical depth and provide comparative, often highly detailed, historical background to underlying social practices from within a polis context. By seeking to identify particular instances of either the master-slave ideology, or by an examination of the manner in which Dio or Thucydides gave form to this ideology, through detailing the manifest differences in the standing and treatment of free men, women, children and slaves in their work, we can look behind and uncover the general and peculiar features which characterised considerable portions of polis social thought and behaviour in various historical contexts. Significantly, they both touched upon the social margins, the boundaries where relations between different social groups or classes overlapped.

This analysis can then be taken yet deeper by a further examination of the cultural values which underpinned polis actions. In turn, the complexity of Aristotle's views on polis behaviour can be identified more effectively by seeking examples from specific moments in polis history. This approach can be particularly valuable when these examples were produced either under conditions of war stress or social pressures which brought underlying values and beliefs to the surface. These incidents provided Dio and Thucydides, consciously and unconsciously, with moments of theoretical and social insight born out of philosophical dispute in Dio's case or enquiry and research in Thucydides'.

First, let us look at the siege of Plataia. Here, one can find ample evidence for differentiation of status between free women and slave women, and further evidence of the seemingly paradoxical character of slaves relations with their masters' polis. Women, whether slave or free, were referred to in a generalised sense. They were part of the initial, spontaneous, hastily improvised defence of Plataia from the nearly successful infiltration of the Thebans. Yet later, the wives were...
withdrawn along with the children, and the oldest as well as the most unserviceable or least useful men. They represented that element of the total human population in Plataia which was defined and categorised as the useless crowd of the population, or at least, the least useful in siege war (πλήθος ἀκραίων τῶν ἀνθρώπων). However, at the same time as this particular component of the population was labelled and separated from the male soldier citizens of Athens and Plataia who were to defend Plataia, one must recognise that this major part of the Plataian free population had a high kin, familial, and personal value to the Plataians. For their withdrawal, one can safely assume, signalled both a process of unencumbered defence and the vital importance of the Plataian elders, wives and children's survival to the polis' future. Hence, one can understand more readily Aristotle's equally generalised but significant remark that women (the male citizens' wives) formed half the free population and the children had a direct part to play in the human conduct of the polis, in its politeia. While Aristotle was concerned with the paradigmatic conception of a polis, it must be emphasised that his experience, like that of Thucydides, derived from living not only within the Athenian polis, but also from having experienced and observed life in other poleis.

To resume our theme of Plataia as a select study for the observation of the impact of war stress upon a polis' human fabric. It must be recognised that the position of slaves could have involved them, simultaneously, in acts of 'voluntary', spontaneous defence of the polis and its oikoi, and compulsory service. One only has to look at the roles that not only women but household slaves (many of whom were certainly women, perhaps the majority) played in the initial defence of Plataia. Their noise, the psychological impact of the yelling and screaming (κραγὼ τε καὶ ολολιφ) upon the Thebans, in addition to their hurling of stones and tiles (λιθοὶ τε καὶ κεραμεῖον) contributed directly to the panic and defeat of the Thebans.

On the other hand, there is a much more direct and ungeneralised account of the position of women slaves and their support role in the provisioning of the Plataian and Athenian defenders. Here, one hundred and ten women (γυναῖκες δε δεκα καὶ εκατόν) were employed compulsorily in the preparation of the cereal diet (σιτοποιεῖ) of the garrison. Since the wives had been withdrawn previously to Athens, one must
conclude that the women left behind as cooks were slaves. Here one had a direct reference to the specific function and number of a group of women, and the delineation of their role. This at once differentiated them within the structure of the Platian polis and, moreover, their role separated them from the position of free women. A process of social stratification had occurred and was visible in all its wartime immediacy.

However, as a rule, generality was the primary characteristic which governed references to the roles and reckoning of the numbers of women and slaves. Still within a war setting, Thucydides' account of Pericles' "Funeral Oration" brought out one important code of behaviour in the social relations between free men and women. In Pericles' reference to the state of widowhood (khēreia) one gains a clear view of the usually invisible social and sexual relations between free men and free women without husbands, but only, it must be stressed, from the active, vocal world of the male citizen. Here, women's social excellence (aretē) and its magnitude (megalē) was measured, in terms of the least opinion (hē doxa...elakhiston), either for excellence (aretē) or opprobrium (papos) received by way of rumour or report (kleos). In other words, if Pericles were the archetypal spokesman of contemporary Athenian ideology, his position (as reported by Thucydides) was that women's place should be formed in a private, separate world from the public arena of men. Their social-sexual relations should not visibly intrude into the public discourse which was men's sphere.

Women and slaves were not mutually exclusive classes or social groups. They often overlapped in gender and status categorisation and were swept up inexorably in the working out of the collective fates of their particular poleis. Indeed, it is important to grasp the interchangeable roles of women, slaves and children when a polis suffered total defeat in war (as in the case of Platiai) and the threat, or the reality of near annihilation, as in the cases of Mytilene and Melos. In the case of Platiai many of the male population were killed. Of the four hundred Platians not less than two hundred were executed after Platiai's surrender. Over half the garrison was killed or executed when one considers that the earlier breakout of Platians and Athenians included at most (malista) a combined total of two hundred and twenty, of whom two hundred and twelve finally escaped successfully from a proximately larger number (apo pleionōn). One must remember that of the original
eighty Athenians in Plataia\textsuperscript{124} twenty five were executed after the surrender\textsuperscript{125} and that it was most unlikely that all the other Athenians can be included safely within the total number of Athenians and Plataians who escaped during the critical phase of the siege. That the remainder of the Athenian garrison at Plataia, fifty-five men, escaped earlier, stretches credibility. It requires the historian to assume that of the remaining garrison of approximately two hundred and sixty, after accounting for the escape of approximately two hundred and twenty, that the unaccounted for "thirty-five" were all Plataian. In other words, the Athenian garrison did not suffer one casualty during the siege warfare or after the escape, give or take approximately eight 'casualties'\textsuperscript{126} amongst the breakout force during the escape. Whilst it was pointed out by Thucydides that the Plataians took a leading part in the breakout vanguard,\textsuperscript{127} no indication was given whether the few casualties were Plataians, Athenians or both.\textsuperscript{128}

These proximate numbers hold significance firstly in themselves, and, secondly, for the implications that can be extracted directly and indirectly from them. Thucydides' figures, with all of the attendant qualifications which must be given to their proximate deployment, do provide a numerical outline and account of Plataian and Athenian combat strengths, dispositions and casualties in this siege. However qualified these and other figures of Thucydides are, there is a qualitative difference between those numbers concerned with manpower and matériel strengths (such as the number of Athenian and allied triremes in action during a particular Thucydidean year) and those methods of reckoning and accounting for the women, children and slaves in a particular polis, or, for that matter the size of a 'barbarian' army.

When one turns to a consideration of the collective fate of women and children, an entirely different measurement process prevailed. It is (and was) a cultural reckoning. The destruction or threatened destruction of a polis and the attendant execution of the male citizen population spelt personal, familial and political oblivion for the formerly free women and children. This was the case for the women and children of Mytilene and Melos. Bondage was their inexorable fate. The stock expressions used to convey the political reality of a transformation in status, that is, the destruction of their place in the free polis culture, were identical, apart from minor variations in verb form:
The terms ἀνδραπόδαις and ἀνδραποδισαῖς signalled the presence of two elemental realities which deeply affected a polis' intellectual construction of itself and the form of its social existence or culture. These two elemental realities found their expression in the following etymological associations. First, the term ἄνδραποδόν denoted one who was taken captive in war, and, regardless of previous status, sold or put into a state of slavery. Second, the term ὄπισθος (from the verb ὄπισθεν) denoted the process of binding or tying the feet. The first term acknowledged the reality of status upheaval, while the second conveyed the concrete, physical bonds or conditions of submission. More particularly, the latter term expressed the ideological realities of enslavement: namely, that a person who was categorized as being in this condition was potentially bound and hobbled in physical terms and actually bound to a master in social existence. This state of existence was the figurative, legal and objective antithesis to that of a citizen.

It is important that we recognise that while the male citizen survivors of the Plataean siege faced immediate execution after having been starved into surrender, the women slaves who served as cooks were passed on into slavery yet again. In other words, without commenting on the silence of our source as to the existence of any social-sexual support role (perhaps it was taken for granted) in addition to their formal role in food preparation, the women slave-cooks were simply resold. Their obscurity lay in the expression of their value as so much potentially exchangeable, living property. They incorporated in themselves, simultaneously, use-values for a household or larger social unit's maintenance and/or served as a source of exchange-value.

However, for a polis the source of social trauma did not rest with the impersonal fate of slaves, rather it rested with the deeply personal outcome of a polis' near annihilation through war. The expression of any disaster of such a magnitude was collective. Yet the numbers, or some proximate reckoning of male casualties usually were given, as in the case of Plataea. However, the fates of women, free and slave, plus their dependants, were not only collective but anonymous. The differences in the reporting and expression of loss can convey to us the dominant male citizen paradigm which was more often than not aristocratic and, in terms
of the voice of history, articulate. For the depth of this trauma, as seen through Thucydides' eyes, we need look no further than the disaster of the citizen army of the Amprakiot, as dramatically recalled through his account of the Amprakiot herald's experience.\textsuperscript{135}

In general, Thucydides' account of the Amprakiot disaster will provide a primary reference point for an examination of those social behaviours and cultural values which can be seen especially to characterize a polis form. However, for its sheer "immediacy" as Gomme put it,\textsuperscript{136} the exchange between the Amprakiot's herald and an unidentified Akarnanian combatant can highlight significant aspects of human responses to a crisis from within polis experience.\textsuperscript{137} Thucydides carefully crafted this experience of crisis. It was a stylised and effective look at the psychological impact of war stress or shock upon a polis whose herald represented and momentarily intensified Amprakia's fate through his internalisation of the scene which, in a real sense, lay waiting in ambush for him. It was further highlighted by the historian's report being delivered with an acute sense of dramatic timeliness and fleshed out through the medium of direct speech. The herald went from a person carrying out a customary practice of recovering one's known war dead to that of a deeply shocked witness to the shattering of his native polis' military formation. This was evidenced graphically by the quantity of arms (\textit{ta hopla}) stripped from the dead and gathered by his enemies.\textsuperscript{138}

It was the dramatic intensity and peculiar immediacy (in the case of the encounter with the Amprakiot's herald) with which Thucydides presented this campaign in Western Greece, and the special features of the Greek-dialect speaking peoples, which should focus our attention upon these events as a model of reasoning born out of a polis experience. The particular conduct of the campaign by both sides is not by any means unimportant but its features have formed the usual foci for historians' attention.\textsuperscript{139} However, Thucydides' detail went well beyond the strategic and tactical disposition of the opposing forces. Thucydides carefully noted the military dispositions of those under the respective overall command of Demosthenes with his regional allied \textit{stratēgoi}\textsuperscript{140} and, secondly, those gathered around a Peloponnesian command headed by the Spartiate Eurylokhos who was accompanied by two fellow Spartiates, Makarios and Menedaios.\textsuperscript{141} Eurylokhos was subsequently killed in the
engagement near Olpai along with Makarios and the Spartiate survivor Menelaos assumed an emergency command.\textsuperscript{142} His aim was simply that of the survival and hasty extraction of key elements of the Peloponnesian forces, amongst whom were numbered the most influential (\textit{axiologótaoi}) or prominent and leading citizens.\textsuperscript{143}

Within the general and particular military conduct of this campaign another finer and more intimate portraiture of polis cultural norms remains to be recognised. Nor should this finer detail be seen as entirely separate from the respective sides' military actions and behaviour in the field. These details, opinions and observations recorded by Thucydides were to some extent complementary to his narrative, yet they went beyond the arena of combat and presented (or can present) the reader with a mosaic of cultural values, social practices in daily life, and given ideological norms.\textsuperscript{144} Two exemplars can be used to categorize and illustrate the overlapping meanings contained within Thucydides' text. They can demonstrate both the value and relevance of Thucydides' work for an examination of the underlying and discreet values and behaviours which give particular identity to, and understanding of a polis formation.

Thucydides carefully noted the particular features of different peoples' conduct of warfare. The light armed troops (\textit{peiloí}) of the Aitoloi tribal groupings\textsuperscript{145} complemented the topography over which military actions were fought.\textsuperscript{146} Skirmishing, hit-and-run, and ambush were tactics which suited the terrain as well as the weaponry of the local combatants.\textsuperscript{147} However, not all the Western Greek peoples were lightly armed, nor was one outsider, as Demosthenes clearly was, incapable of adapting himself to new conditions and tactics, albeit after learning from bitter experience.\textsuperscript{148} Thucydides demonstrated the all embracing pressures of war by focussing upon the Amprakiots' contribution to Eurylochos' remaining in Aitolia for winter.\textsuperscript{149} They committed three thousand hoplites to a winter campaign against Amphiklokhian Argos,\textsuperscript{150} if these numbers can be taken as being entirely separate from the original Peloponnesian hoplite force sent to aid the Aitoloi.\textsuperscript{151} Amprakia's large military forces, certainly over three thousand hoplites, made it a large polis by Greek standards.\textsuperscript{152} Whilst these details underlined the comparative strength of Amprakia, they in no way took away from Thucydides' analysis the objective fraility of a polis when subjected to
the hammer blows of war. A polis formation was a frail, and especially
close institution, regardless of its comparative strengths or weaknesses
in numerical terms, and highly vulnerable if its hoplite or fighting
formations were overwhelmed suddenly and destroyed in the field.

Here in this first exemplar, the totality of a polis' commitments
to active campaigning was revealed by Thucydides' increasing focus upon
Amprakia's tactical responses and strategic movements. Nor did
Thucydides confine himself to a description of the general manoeuvres
carried out by the combatants, rather he widened his focus by detailing
the specifics of success or disaster. Demosthenes' losses suffered in
his first campaign against the Aitoloi are a prime example of Thucydides'
inter-weaving of finer detail within a general narrative form. The
obvious concern displayed over Demosthenes' losses during his expedition
against the Aitoloi deserve further examination.

Whilst Gomme has succinctly covered many of the major problems
presented by Thucydides' remarks on the loss of around, or not more than
one hundred and twenty Athenian hoplites, further discussion on
Thucydides' comments is warranted. Thucydides' qualifications, as
signified by his use of peri and melista, are not in dispute, nor is
this loss of approximately one hundred and twenty hoplites out of an
Athenian force of three hundred epibatai being questioned. This loss
as a proportion of the three hundred hoplite armed marines was manifestly
high. However, Thucydides' evident concern that so many of this main
body, in terms of numbers (tosoutoi...to plathos) had been killed,
rested on his employment of two expressions: first, hēlikia hē autē, and
then, oitoi belistoi de andres. Thucydides' reference to the "same
military age grouping" of the hoplites should be noted carefully as it
could well have signalled both their comparative youthfulness and their
proximate association by age. When Thucydides' argument is
interpreted in this light, perhaps it would be fairer not to see
exclusively in his use of the term belistoi a covert reference to
their superior ideological standing and familial position within the
Athenian polis. Rather, attention needs to be drawn to both the impact
of their deaths upon "contiguous age-groups" and perhaps, more
importantly, the waste of young citizens in what was a regional military
sideshow. For no matter how grand Demosthenes' original aims
appeared, as made evident by his elaborate plan of an overland attack
against Boiotia,164 the regional preoccupations, hates and fears of his allies165 made any real chance of success for such a strategy ever being viable in political or military terms extremely remote.

Importantly, within this context, we should not lose sight of the relative fragility of any polis in terms of its reactions to the loss of citizens through warfare. Demosthenes clearly was afraid (phoboumenos)166 of the Athenian reaction to the death of these citizens under his command. He remained in Western Greece after his Aitolian disaster and only considered his return home from quasi-exile (kathodos) in a more fearless fashion (adeestera)167 after his completion of a successful military campaign, in terms of tactical success in the field, if not in the achievement of his original and rather grandiose strategy. Even in as large a polis as Athens, one could not avoid the social and political consequences of military disasters. A polis was too tight a social organism, its social relations too interlinked, to ever consider safely ignoring military disaster or misfortune.

When we turn to Demosthenes' successful engagement near Olpai, we can glean more information on polis citizens' behaviour under extreme duress. This will contribute further intelligence on the construction of at least one model of polis behaviour by accounting for the reasoning processes put forward by writers from within the broad historical range of the poleis to explain the general and particular forms their world assumed.

The defeat of the combined force of Peloponnesians, Asprakiots and a large, heterogenous body of mercenaries168 and the subsequent clandestine manoeuvres by Menelaios revealed not just the general movements of military actions but the particular details of military survival. The revelation that a political deal was not only consistent with, but a necessary feature of, Menelaios' policy of opportunistic military survival provided no surprise by itself.169 Nor should the agreement of Demosthenes and the Akarnanian generals to this piece of military skullduggery come as any surprise. Demosthenes and the Akarnanian stratēgoi were as capable of grasping a military and political opportunity at the expense of the general reputation of the Lakedaionians and Peloponnesians as Menelaios was capable of seeking survival through an act of military expediency and betrayal.170

Significantly, Thucydides did not halt his account at this point
with a phrase or two about the resultant confusion involved in the escape of selected elements of Menedaios' forces. Thucydides' account of the combatants and their movements extended itself to an account of the intimate moves and ruses involved in the general conduct of warfare. Under the pretext of gathering firewood and edible herbs, the Mantineans and other Peloponnesians made their far-from-undetected flight. Secretiveness and betrayal contributed heavily to the pregnant atmosphere detailed by Thucydides. The scene for secretiveness and betrayal had been laid out previously by Thucydides. The actions and reactions of all parties involved, regardless of whether they had been privy to the original deal between Demosthenes, the Akarnanian stratēgoi and Menedaios, unfolded according to the inevitable confusion which manifested itself because of the very conspiratorial nature of the agreement reached between the above three parties.

These were the small but essential features of daily life that added vitality and substance to Thucydides' polis world at war. In turn, these details can add significantly to the further intimate detailing of internal polis behaviours from the perspective of their citizenry's military formations, as epitomised by the foraging ruse of the Mantineans and other select Peloponnesians. The logistical face of war assumed a particular as well as a general form in Thucydides' narrative. The immediacy, the very closeness of Thucydides portrayal of the Amprakiot disaster, opens the reader's eyes to the active processes, the historical realm of the life and death of a polis. Thucydides turned his attention to an historical reconstruction through an act of literary conjuring up of the atmosphere of Amprakiot misfortune, as well as simultaneously having undertaken a concerted effort to establish, as best as he could, the concrete details of these events.

The second examplar which can serve the purpose of helping to reveal further the human face of polis actions was sketched by the cultural domain from within which Thucydides wrote. The Amprakiot herald can be seen as a prime representative, a concentrated human expression of a polis' cultural unity and identity as well as its vulnerability. It is from within this perspective that we need to examine further the dramatic moment when the Amprakiot's herald was confronted by the arms and armour (ta hopla) collected from the Amprakiot dead by his enemies. His initial response was characterised by
astonishment, he simply marvelled at their quantity ( ἀθαυμάσσει τῷ πλήθῳ). After initial confusion by the herald who had no knowledge of a subsequent defeat of the Amprakiot reinforcements, an enemy, most probably an Akarnanian who had helped collect and gather the Amprakiots' arms (that is, when the Akarnanians stripped the arms and armour from the dead and set up victory trophies, τροπαίοι), observed that these arms were those of more than a thousand (πλεον ἢ χιλίοι) combatants. The herald realised that another battle (as pointed out to him by his informant), with awesome consequences for Amprakia, had been fought with his countrymen and, at that moment, he became a victim overwhelmed by grief and shock. For the herald's own force had suffered earlier, at most, around two hundred casualties (διακοσίους μαλίστα) and these were the dead Amprakiots he had expected to find and recover from the possession of Demosthenes' victorious forces. These particular casualties had been inflicted subsequent to the first battle fought with the Peloponnesians under Eurylokhos against Demosthenes' forces. These known Amprakiot losses had occurred as a result of the confusion caused by Menelaos' secret escape agreement with Demosthenes' and his regional strategoi.

The extent of this unknown and shockingly revealed Amprakiot tragedy and its impact upon its polis was singled out by Thucydides as a social calamity of the highest order. A polis was shattered by this brief but ferocious experience of war. That this was the case, was frozen and impressed into one's memory by Thucydides' description of the herald's reaction to the news. The herald's shock and grief was such that he forgot entirely his function as a herald - a protected and recognised messenger by custom - and left the scene without asking for the dead to be recovered under a truce. The herald not only internalised the slaughter of Amprakia's male citizenry, he confirmed it. At this moment of confirmation, the customary behaviour of the herald broke down. The processes by which the herald accepted his duties and obligations to his polis' citizenry had departed in the face of the deaths of so many fellow citizens. The customary behaviour and the values associated with a herald's function in war disappeared and in their place the herald assumed the role of distraught mourner.

The impact of this disaster upon Amprakia was driven home by Thucydides' remark that he did not record the number (arithmon οὐκ
of casualties. He made no attempt to write down these figures, or more accurately estimates, for the multitude or mass of casualties was incredible (παριστάνεται πλθος) in relation to the magnitude of the polis formation (ὅσο προς τὸ μέγαρον τῆς πόλεως). Of course, one consideration which prevented Thucydides from recording the casualties was their sheer number in relation to what he knew about the Amprakiot. Whether Thucydides' method of reckoning numerical estimates of military formations played some part in his reluctance to accept, or at least record, a more precise 'figure' for the Amprakiot dead must remain open. However, given that he did record not only seemingly 'hard' commitments of naval forces, and of particular land forces, but also indulged in speculations about the size of Sitalces' barbarian army, and the size of the runaway live property of the Athenians during the Dekelean phase of the Peloponnesian war, other considerations well could have been more important in the reasons for his silence. The dramatic impact of the herald's exchange with Demosthenes' combined force of Akarnanians, Amphilokhians and Messenians should stand as a principal reason on its own.

When we put this Amprakiot incident into a wider perspective of Demosthenes' campaigns in Western Greece, further light may be shed on the socio-cultural perspectives from within which writing on any history or political theory of a polis took place. Here, we have been presented with an extreme embodiment of the polis in conflict. Juxtaposed with the lands and tribal divisions of the Aitolians, where people lived in unwalled villages (κόμας αὐτοκτονίων), spoke a most unintelligible Greek dialect or indigenous tongue (ἀγνωστότατοι γλῶσσαι) and where, it was said, people were raw flesh- (raw or uncooked meat) eaters (ὁμοφάγοι ἐστίν) was the account of the Amprakiot's fate. Thucydides sketched an outline of Aitolia's physical living conditions and what he could discover about their dialects and customs. This did not mean necessarily that he accepted all he discovered at its face value. In the case of the "raw flesh-eaters", he merely acknowledged what was said or reported about the Eurytane who numerically constituted the greatest division of the Aitolian tribal groupings or peoples. On this real and imaginary frontier, topographically and culturally speaking, between Greek and archaic practices and customs, (to use Thucydides notion of what was old and in the Greek past)
captured, in one historical moment of intensity, the frailty of a polis formation when, as emphasised earlier, it was subjected to the hammer blows of war. The Amphakiot polis lay stunted and distorted demographically. The adult male citizen population was shattered within days of its taking to the field. That smallness remained a quintessential characteristic of a polis formation, generally speaking, was conveyed tellingly here. As if to underline the message in bold type, Thucydides had recalled earlier, that a not-too-distant people, the Hyaions, had a village known by the name, Polis (κοίμων Polin onoma).¹⁹⁹ The abstract concept polis found its concrete expression here in village guise or rather in the village citadel - the original fortified polis. Emphasis needs to be placed on the argument that the notion of smallness is not in any meaningful way made redundant by reference to the relatively large population of the Amphakiot polis.²⁰⁰ Rather the significance of the term smallness turns upon, refers to, and reflects upon the close links, the fine networks of social relations at the levels of oikos, κόμη and astu. In turn, smallness can be taken as a figurative expression for the architecture of human social relations within a polis as well as providing a thematic approach to the interpretation of these social relations.

Within this context we need to appreciate how deeply the notion of smallness, or the imperative of local association, exerted its influence upon Greek life and thought in general. When we take up the interesting and particular example of the evacuation of the Athenians from the Attic countryside,²⁰¹ some insight can be gained not only into the reactions of ordinary citizens to their being uprooted and displaced (not for the first time)²⁰², as reported in reasonable detail by Thucydides, but also as to the historical perspectives and practices which informed, and indeed, formed a critical background to the environment in which Greek writers wrote during this and the next century. I do not suggest that the ancients, in particular Thucydides, and, of primary concern in the following chapter, Aristotle, were incapable of discerning the historical pull of these early, associative groupings on the formation of the Attic polis. On the contrary, Thucydides would not have given what can be called an almost organic account of the early development of Greek social formations,²⁰³ if he did not discern how strong were the complex forces which (in comparison to his own times, as he was aware)²⁰⁴ restricted the
size and power of these archaic human structures.205 To mention only one salient example, Thucydides recognised the logistical significance of an organised set of (what we can term) exchange-values rather than an exclusive dependence upon a purely necessary exchange of one good for another without the mediating power of a third force - money. 'Otherwise, regardless of the distance Thucydides' historical imagination had travelled in his speculations upon 'Homerica' and post-Homeric systems, his reference to those times suffering not so much from a lack of human power (oliganthrēsia)206 but from an absence of or being without money (akhreōmatia)207 would make no sense. However, he advanced no theory on how or why such socio-economic relations arose later in the Mediterranean. Thucydides saw the absence of money as being instrumental in the relative powerlessness of these early Greek formations when they were involved in any large-scale undertaking.208 For Thucydides saw that the absence of money led to a major logistical problem, a lack of food or supplies (trophēs aporia),209 which in turn restricted the size of any predatory undertaking.210

It was precisely this capacity of Thucydides to explore the shaky historical-cum-mythological memories and traditions that led him to perceive some of the continuities between the Athenian past and present. The Attic countryside, at the opening of the Peloponnesian war, is a case in point. The picture which Thucydides gave was that of a people who held firmly not only to their ancestral homes and lands but also to local customs and attachments which went back to the lineage of their ancient political configuration (to arkhaiōn politeias patria).211 The Attic country dwellers were held by a universe of autonomous social relations.212 They were accustomed to living in the country - this was the usual pattern of habitation for most of the people.213 While these relations were shattered (at least in terms of geographic cultural specificity) with the opening years of the Peloponnesian war, and military incursions and the threat of intermittent invasion by Peloponnesian land forces214 kept the countryside in a state of suspended habitation,215 one cannot assert that long established domiciliary customs were broken down irretrievably. The length of the war, broken by the peaceful interregnum afforded to the Athenians as a result of the capture of the Spartan at Spakteria and the Peace of Nikias,216 was doubly severe when one considers the suffering and loss of life caused by
the plague (nousos), which hit Athens shortly after the war opened in
earnest, and the massive impact upon the conduct of Attic agrarian life
which was brought about by the Peloponnesians' establishment of a
permanent fortified garrison at Dekeleia.

Given this perspective on the impact of the war, for which evidence
has been provided for us by Thucydides, it is not unreasonable to
postulate that given the close orbit of household relations in the Attic
countryside and their hitherto permanent character, war trauma could
well have wreaked its familial and psychological toll as effectively as
death from disease or battle. In terms of this argument, the war trauma
hypothesis should preclude any mistaken assumption in relation to notions
of completely separable 'town' and 'country'. For Thucydides was not
attempting to argue that the 'economic' as opposed to socio-cultural life
of an Attic country dweller was qualitatively or quantitatively different
to that of a dweller in and around the astu. Thucydides, as stated
above, wished to stress its historically permanent character. An
entirely separable notion of gregarious existence was not entertained by
Thucydides or anyone else at the time. Moreover, what Thucydides
attempted to explain was not an urban-versus-agrarian binary opposition
amongst the citizens but rather that the essential practices of the Attic
country people's daily lives were given normative expression by being
formed within, shaped and surrounded by local, customary habitations and
celebrations.

Thucydides made it clear that the notion of what was the polis had
changed since the distant joining together of all the scattered and
separate 'tiny poleis' as represented by the celebration of the
Xunoikia. To make this point unambiguously he pointed to the
Akropolis and identified it as "the polis" before the Xunoikia took
place. The Akropolis, and a small area below it facing southward
(pros noton) was the polis - a focal point for Athenian occupation
which incorporated long-practiced religious and ceremonial customs.
It was, in Athenian eyes, a place of singularly ancient human
settlement. It was their polis because it symbolised their first
sense and scene of, and was a focal point for organised social
existence. However that change, symbolised by the broad concert of
the Xunoikia did not wash away strong local attachments to specific land
occupancy, ancestral sites for households and ritual. These remained
essentially intact over time, regardless of whether the folk (popular) memories of that earlier time were enshrined in mytho-historical remembrance. What Thucydides wished to stress was the qualitative degree of displacement of these many Athenians (who lived outside the confines of 'Athens' walls in and around Attica's surrounding villages) from their ancestral habitats.

The unique circumstances in which Attica had been coalesced politically, (expressed by the term Κυνοκλία) and developed its political centre in Athens, did not preclude the continuation of long established local practices and customary living patterns. The strength of a limited and particularly localised autonomy, remarked upon by Thucydides, when he sought to express the magnitude of the upheaval faced by these citizens in evacuating what were, quite literally, their homelands, has more implications for a study of the ideas bound up with the Athenian polis (and its conceptions of itself) than is generally realised. The observations of Thucydides were not meant to be taken as an incidental portrait of archaism in the outlying regions of Attica. Here we have a glimpse of how a people's lives and thoughts were shaped by the human architecture of their social existence. Households and birthplaces were bound together (γενομενοὶ τὸ καὶ οἰκῆσαντες) as were their dwellings and temples (οἰκίας...καὶ θυσίας) and, in turn, all the above were associated with, attached to, and reflected the aura or residual presence of their ancient political organisation (ἀρχαῖαν πολιτείαν πατρία). This point needs to be stressed by way of a further argument. Any immediate change of historical circumstances in Attic land dwelling patterns was subject to the even stronger and longer reaches of an attachment to ancestral memories, values and mythological ties to the locale, to the Athenian autochthonous sense of belonging and existing. The importance of Thucydides' observation that the Attic country dwellers, the Athenian peasantry, had only just rebuilt their local infrastructure, lay not only in determined recovery from the devastation of the Persian war but, more particularly, in the pressing note of restoration rather than change that was recorded here. However brutal and abrupt or subtle a process of change was at work in the fifth-century, its seemingly gradualist legacy (but not in any way linear or uniform development) reached over into the fourth-century and helped produce Aristotle's excursus into 'means and ends'. Confronted by clear
signs of change with the rise and development of the practice of "wealth-making" (khrēmatistikē). Aristotle simultaneously sought to defend and advocate the maintenance of an archetypal form of autarkic household and polis social relations, whilst he attempted to construct a theory of the social practice of khrēmatistikē with his self-sufficient paradigm held firmly before his mind's eye.

A fuller comprehension of Aristotle's ideal world, and the place khrēmatistikē played in that world and its antithesis, can be revealed by a general recapitulation of the significance of an exploration and discovery of the cultural world-view which helped shape Aristotle's Politics and the historical outlook of his polis world. The polis was undoubtedly the citadel of the citizenry. Simultaneously, the world of the free citizen and soldier (or sailor for that matter) was a fragile universe. It was open to the unexpected blows and misfortunes of war which had the potential to destroy, individually and collectively, that world. Additionally, identity only came with attachment to a particular polis and the destruction of that polis spelt the end of that identity. This polis world was circumscribed and defined by its own concentration upon continuity, preservation and self-renewal. All philosophical debate and inquiry as well as political and military action occurred within these parameters.
CHAPTER VI

THE GREED POLIS THESIS: THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

As for homo religiosus, homo oeconomicus, homo politicus and all that rigmarole of Latinised men, the list of which we could string out indefinitely, there is grave danger of mistaking them for something else than they really are: phantoms which are convenient providing they do not become nuisances. The man of flesh and bone, reuniting them all simultaneously, is the only real being.


Aristotle wrote his important digression on the process of acquisition and wealth making (ktōseos kai khρēmatistikēs)\(^1\) from a position which recognised and asserted the primacy of an agrarian way of life. The systematic cultivation of the earth and the direct raising of produce from it was the occupation of most human beings.\(^2\) Most human beings (pleiston genos tōn anthropōn)\(^3\) were in this gregarious category of social reproduction. Moreover his own position was made explicit through his categorisation of migratory, nomadic life as "most idle" (argotatoi nomades eisin).\(^4\) That description was tempered by Aristotle's careful depiction of nomadic life being likened to husbanding the resources of a living farm (hōper geōrgian zōsan geōrgountes)\(^5\) as though nomads were living a mobile agrarian mode of existence by herding, moving along with, and living off their domesticated life-support system.

When Aristotle approached the question of acquisition and wealth-making, he went out of his way to distinguish between those life activities, those modes of social existence which were defined by and arose out of their natural conditions, (ge autophuton)\(^6\) and those who maintained their human formations through processes of barter (allagēs), the earliest form of exchange, and local trading (kapōleia).\(^7\) Of course, Aristotle stretched the purity of his model of nomadic life or that of piratical life (lēstrikon)\(^8\) when he excluded any reference to their engaging in trading and exchanging activities. This in itself should cause no surprise for Aristotle was at pains to establish an organic notion of social existence for those human beings who gained their living from hunting, fishing, herding, husbandry and 'piracy'. In the sense that all that they required for immediate sufficiency was already present - all that was required was for the particular human group to take or
harness the living resources, and so define their modes of life in direct relation to the surrounding or natural resources appropriated by them. By delineating the life practices of nomadic fishing and hunting peoples, and then contrasting them to the life of the largest grouping, those associated with agrarian activities, Aristotle had ventured upon the beginnings of a cultural and social anthropological method in his descriptions of, and theorising upon, material relations and modes of human settlement. Whilst he had excluded those who practiced non-agrarian modes of existence from the worlds of *allagē* and *kapēleia*, perhaps for the sake of a clear and neat, if over-simplified model, Aristotle accepted that non-agrarian peoples' modes of existence could and did overlap in a quest for the maintenance of a self-sufficient mode, to *autarkē*. Diversity played a necessary role in an autonomous existence outside the agrarian mainstream. Aristotle recognised that need travelled, as it were, in company with necessity.

By way of analogy Aristotle sought to demonstrate a connection between the many modes of existence (*bioi polloi*) practised by animals and humans and the differences of food or sources of sustenance and nourishment (*haires diaphorai tēs trophēs*). Just as animals could be divided into those which were carnivorous (*aërophage*), living on 'fruit' or graminivorous (*karpophage*) and omnivorous (*panphage*), their patterns of sustaining existence could differ between and within these broad classifications. Wild animals existed in groups, 'communities' based on herds (*agelai*) and others lived a more singular or scattered existence (*sporadika*) according to circumstances determined by the search for food. Similarly, the human species could be divided according to the ways in which human groupings practised different modes of existence as we have seen. Aristotle had established a duality between the many food resources and modes of existence practised by animals and humans.

In conjunction with this analogous reasoning process, Aristotle sought to establish that animals also have a form of in-built, self-contained sufficiency at birth in that their food supply either comes with them or is supplied to them. For him this essential survival relationship extended itself into the relations not just within a particular grouping or species but between the worlds of animals and plants. In turn this hierarchy of relations where plants existed for
animals extended to the human world where most animals served useful purposes for them.\textsuperscript{23} Aristotle was at pains to lay down the functional coordinates between animals and humans. He established the use-values and food functions of domesticated animals\textsuperscript{24} and the roles of wild or non-domesticated animals in the provision of food, clothing and tools or useful materials (tás trophás...kai esthēs kai alla organa).\textsuperscript{25}

At the centre of Aristotle's textual reasoning processes two fundamental concerns presented themselves. First, the notion of a boundary or a limit presented itself in its premier guise of the self-sufficient mode of existence (to autarkēs).\textsuperscript{26} Second, the acquisitive process, being skilled in getting (ktōtikē)\textsuperscript{27} lay at the heart of human activity. We need to enquire into what were the processes, the motivating forces which gave form to Aristotle's ideology. The ordering of his universe, the close ranking and relationship of things, plant and animal, have their origins in a confident agrarian world-view. It is given its distinctive value by Aristotle's differentiation of functions: plants had a linear destiny in relation to animals - their purpose served the interests of animals. However, human beings introduced a certain complexity into this scene, for not only did they consume animals for food in turn, but they had a use-value relationship to them also. The term khrēsis\textsuperscript{28} spelt an association which went far beyond one of the getting of food and its consumption to maintain existence. Khrēsis contained a transformative value whereby humans shaped the use made of a thing or its employment to their own needs.

In this sense, the making of war for Aristotle took on the characteristics of an acquisitive process, indeed, it had a naturalistic basis: διὰ καὶ ἡ φύσις ἑξήκοντα κατά τινι δέ ἐστιν.\textsuperscript{29} As we have seen earlier, warfare because of its predatory form had, not surprisingly, hunting attached to it (hē gar thērētikē meros autēs).\textsuperscript{30} However, we need to consider further the intellectual sleight of hand by which Aristotle extended his argument from using hunting against wild animals (ta thēria)\textsuperscript{31} to waging war on those humans whom, much as a result of the order of nature (hosoi pephukses),\textsuperscript{32} it was by nature just (phusel dikaion)\textsuperscript{33} to wage war against and to rule even though they refused to accept this bonded condition.\textsuperscript{34} In a very real sense, the process of acquisition through warfare took on an extended form but one analogous to
that of a nomadic force moving along and taking advantage of whatever came across its path, much in the manner of those who practised piracy or banditry (lēstrikon) or a combination of these survivalist pursuits, as Aristotle had acknowledged earlier.\textsuperscript{35} Indeed, Aristotle's intellectual construction and the world from which he came revealed itself here. The equation of nomadic life to that of a mobile agrarian formation,\textsuperscript{36} the images of warfare and hunting as forms of ktētikē\textsuperscript{37} sweeping up or reaping whatever material, animal or human resources which the farmers of opportunity, the hunter/warriors, came across or tracked down, identified the agrarian and martial elements of any Greek ideology.

When Aristotle turned his mind to an analysis of the correct functions of the household art, the maintenance of the household (oikonomikē),\textsuperscript{38} we find that his primary concern was to spell out in careful terms the precise role of ktētikē, the skill of getting, the acquisitive art, and to delineate further its boundaries within this social arena. From the beginning, this world of the oikos and the skills used for its benefit and that of its polis (koinōnìa)\textsuperscript{39} had an idealised form: a fixed identity in an ideal-type world. Household management skills demanded that there must be ready to hand or be in reserve (huparkhein)\textsuperscript{40} the technical ability to procure (porizein)\textsuperscript{41} a store or treasure (thēsaurismos khrēmatōn: Aristotle's specific usage)\textsuperscript{42} of those goods or property necessary for life and especially useful for the association of polis and oikos.\textsuperscript{43} Aristotle was engaged in a cause which involved the deployment of all his powers of intellectual advocacy in the defence of a polis ideology which had limits to what was necessary for life (pros zōēn anangkaiōn).\textsuperscript{44} The need for things had an in-built level of self-sufficiency (ktēseōs autarkēs)\textsuperscript{45} if one were for the good life (pros agathēn zōēn).\textsuperscript{46}

However, in no way should one regard Aristotle as being incapable of perceiving another and antithetical social theory and practice. This is the crux of his discourse, the juncture at which a theoretical struggle was joined. For Aristotle had picked in Solon an opponent in whom knowledge was sage; a figure of mytho-historical proportions.\textsuperscript{47} Two views of wealth and riches (ploutos) stood juxtaposed.\textsuperscript{48} The reasons he chose Solon are apparent: a well known, larger-than-life character from a comparatively distant time\textsuperscript{49} who had made a statement in direct opposition to Aristotle's theory of oikos/polis existence.
The argument was cast in the form of a dialectic: the thesis from Aristotle's position was clearly that riches or wealth (ploutos), the things or goods needed for self-sufficiency were not limitless (ouk apeiros). The Solonian challenge (the antithesis) was that no one or not one limit (outhen termas) had been disclosed or made known to men on the qualitative or quantitative level of wealth that in theory could "be laid up" or kept "in store" (pephasmenon andrası keitai). Aristotle argued that the number and size of any tool were not limitless as any art (tekhne) had a fixed end and, in particular, ploutos was defined, in this context, as a collection or quantity of tools for oikos and polis management - the political economy of domestic and civil authority. It needs to be kept constantly in mind that this Aristotelian universe of the self-contained or limited polis was an archetypal domestic and civil maintenance system, which functioned at an optimal but limited level, and indeed, seemingly paradoxically, continued to exist in a self-perpetuating form. Even within the limited polis, the acquisitive process (ktōtika) had extended itself to accept (as a 'given' or understood practice of the polis), as a natural set of preconditions, the use of warfare for the subjection of a part of humanity. This was regarded by nature as just (phusi dikaion).

To this extent, ktōtika had developed well beyond some thoroughly localised solution to the needs required by a polis/oikos social formation: the practice of war and the trading of captured, kidnapped and other disposable peoples saw to that. Nor does such a view need to be accompanied by an argument to the effect that slavery, at least, was the dominant work and labour practice in a polis. Evidence for the escape of slaves and the transformation from free to slave status (which we have examined previously), the undeniably widespread use of slaves and slavery's impact upon a polis' ideology, need not mean that slavery was, in itself, the predominant feature of a polis' social landscape. Rather, the practice of slavery and the symbolic uses made of slavery's terminology must signal to us that the significant and continuous presence of slavery's existence in the polis world was fundamental to, and acknowledged openly in Aristotle's formulation of a polis' ideology.

Alongside ktōtika another but separate historical practice had grown up. A divergent social force, wealth-getting (khrēmatistikē) had confused the distinction between itself and ktōtika. The notion of a
"limit" (peras) had been blurred. The idea of no limit to each process of wealth and acquisition (ploutou kai ktēseis) had arisen. However, the proximity of ktētikē to khrēmatistikē needed clarification, and investigation. For Aristotle, they needed close analysis and eventual separation. One practice of ktētikē (by clear inference) was regarded as natural and the other was not. One had an organic function and purpose, the other was an acquired or learnt skill or art (tekhnē). The perception that for every possession there existed a twofold purpose for the use of a thing was of itself an important piece of reasoning which, simultaneously, involved social observation with intellectual construction and explanation. This notion that a dual purpose (ditē) was contained within any piece of property, and that this purpose rested upon the particular use (khrēsis) made of a thing meant that the use made of a thing would determine the form of value that a thing had to a person living in or running an oikos and, in turn, its significance or otherwise to the definition of a polis formation.

For the sake of clarity Aristotle chose an elementary article used everyday, everywhere within a polis - the sandal (upodēma). At its most essential, a thing had a use-value in itself; in this case both the putting on of a sandal for one's personal use, and its use or value in the transfer process of exchange (metablētikē). Aristotle realised that even if one exchanged a sandal in return for money or food (anti nomismatos e trophē) this was not the intrinsic use of that thing. The sandal itself was not made for barter (allagē), the first form of transaction between human beings. The exchange process was innately present, in that human beings had more than a sufficient number of some things and less than a sufficient number of others. Exchange existed potentially within any good made by or required by human beings since it was only by this continuous process that they acquired or maintained a supply or source of those things. Importantly, if we accept the extension sensibly proposed by Bernays and substitute metablētikēs for khrēmatistikēs, we can understand why Aristotle excluded retail, local trading (kapēlikē) as not by nature a part of exchange (metablētikē). For, by direct implication exchange itself was only necessary (ansangkaion) to the extent that it can make barter (allagē) possible, that is, to help provide what was sufficient for them. A simple regulatory mechanism (metablētikē) served the household through
barter in the first or primal association of humans (ἐν πρωτῷ κοινωνίᾳ), which was the household, Aristotle's oikia. Only the growth in numbers of an association changed this essential relationship. Aristotle drew on what he regarded as the characteristic formation of the early household unit and compared it in theoretical terms to the 'anthropological' experiences which lay around him when he pointed to the sharing practices of 'barbarian peoples' (barbarikōn ethnōn), non-Greek speaking tribal peoples. They shared their goods within and outside of their social groupings by using the barter system. This gave them access to other goods from other peoples who possessed them, and it was based upon an exchange system which gave useful things (τὰ κρησίμα) for useful things. In a very real sense, Aristotle used this contemporary example of non-Greek speaking tribal peoples to create a sense of a continuum of quasi-historical experiences in the changing process encapsulated in the phenomenon of exchange. From here he argued effortlessly that exchange which involved, as in his example given earlier, the swapping or bartering of wine for grain, was not against nature (παρὰ φυσιν) nor was it the kind of species-form (εἶδος) identified in wealth-getting (κρηστικῆ). Any social formation which sought to reproduce itself, to maintain its form and nothing more, acted in accord with natural self-sufficiency (κατὰ φυσιν αὐτοκειμᾶς). Yet from this seemingly self-contained world a new thesis (λόγος) arose.

Once the social formation had to "bring in" (ἐλασγηθαι) or import and, in turn "to send out" (ἐκπεπειν) or export according to the imperatives of "necessity", anangkē or surplus, a new practice to facilitate this change came about. New social customs were incorporated and standardised within the concept, the abstract force expressed by the term nomisma. Usage of more complex exchange mechanisms over time had brought about the use (κρησίς) of money. A force, both abstract and concrete, incorporated within itself the symbolic forms of exchange between two or more groups bringing in necessities or taking out surplus goods and mediated the exchange process. Of critical significance to an understanding of Aristotle's concepts of limit and self-sufficiency was his observation that the natural necessities (φυσιν ἀναγκαῖον) things absolutely essential or necessary for social existence, were not in each case easy to carry (εὐβαστάκον ἐκαστόν) that is, easy to move
and hence readily portable. Within Aristotle's schema, for the purposes of barter (pros tas allagases) a need existed for a set of serviceable and useful mediating values (tôn khreisiston) manageable for social existence (eumetakheiston pros to sên). Aristotle recognised the change from an exchange system based purely on the size (quantity) and weight (megalhei kai stathosoi) of iron and silver involved in a concrete 'monetary' exchange to an exchange process which was based upon abstraction of money by impressing upon a metal a stamped value (kharaktéra epiballon) to obviate the process of measurement (tês metrēseōs). Aristotle realised that this involved a certain logical finality, the termination (teletaion) of a trading process into one which used metal with socially sanctioned markings, and incorporated abstract values as an accepted form of mediation: this was the primal movement of coined money as a recognised mediator which ensured and made easier the flow and exchange of goods, Aristotle's useful things.

Nor should the importance or the magnitude of the changes Aristotle outlined be underestimated. However, it would be a careless act of gross over-modernisation to imagine that the historical implication of this gradual change was the ushering in of some form of "primitive capitalism". Aristotle was not a supporter of khrēmatistikē as an end in itself: he was an arch opponent of this practice. Yet, simultaneously, Aristotle was the first articulate exponent of the workings of khrēmatistikē and saw that its formation (its development and growth) stemmed from earlier times, changing social conditions and the sources from which humans-as-social-beings obtained their needs. The origins of the growth of khrēmatistikē can be located in the 'bringing in' and 'sending out' of things and the facilitation of this process by first, the use of metals as currency by virtue of the weight and type of precious metal, and then by the introduction of stamped metals with abstract (symbolic) as well as concrete values.

Nor should we, following our earlier theme, overdramatise the extent of, and implications of these changes. Clearly, Aristotle saw that the straight-forward exchange of necessities between social groups fulfilled a set of critical use-values. The arrival of nomisma brought with it (contained within its very form) another set of values not necessarily related to the function of obtaining easily useful and necessary items for social existence. The presence of money meant that a
useful thing, a former necessity, could carry two sets of values: one, immediately useful to oikos and polis; the other, an exchange-value related to a quantity of money that could be garnered from its sale as an end-in-itself. The act of forming abstract values within particular monetary (coin-based) forms finally arrived with the appearance of a 'physical stamp', the visible expression of money's kharaakter, its stamped value, which gave it a token form, a mark by which it could be distinguished (smeion), a sign which gave it a recognised value-in-exchange between people. Aristotle realised that this was a dynamic form: he characterised it and identified the new formation of wealth-getting with the arrival of nomisma and the beginnings of local, exchange-based trading (to kapalikon).

The arrival of khrēmatistikē did not mean any birth of a systematic process to accumulate a form of primitive capital which was to be in turn invested in ways designed to build upon this accumulative process. Even exchange-based trade faced the obstacle of money currencies, individually produced by each polis and, of course, from non-Greek societies and their exchange-values did not by any means readily coincide. Moreover, the accumulation of a surplus in the form of metal currency did not mean that this surplus or rather treasure-store of wealth was spent on the further accumulation of money-based wealth. Wealth gained from military and political alliances, raiding expeditions and trading associations was spent on land, gift exchanges or, in the case of a polis, such as Athens (which had accumulated a unique and vast store of wealth via the imposition of tribute, phoros), on warfare. Aristotle's acceptance of warfare and slavery as given led to the recognition that slaves' roles as living-use-values could be extended to any household or polis through the process of acquisition or warfare. They were a part of the old system of acquisition (ktētikē) and an integral part of the new one (khrēmatistikē). Like any other useful thing, slaves contained a dual purpose; one related specifically to their 'natural' destiny as a living useful tools, and the other was their capacity to serve in the process of wealth-getting through becoming a part of the exchange-value world.

The origins of wealth-getting's inseparable partner, to kapalikon, were, in their first becoming, simple but already a dynamic was at work which in league with experience (espeiria) and more skillful (teknikēteron) usage or practice there grew up a social practice
which could realise the most material gain.\textsuperscript{131} The transformative effect of this experience and skill acquired through the practice of producing something was little short of remarkable in the eyes of Aristotle.\textsuperscript{132} From some place and somehow (pothen kai pōs),\textsuperscript{133} this newly acquired art (or learnt skill) had the capacity to transform itself or be thrown into a different position which could be turned suddenly, (as Aristotle's use of the participle metabalomenon\textsuperscript{134} of the verb, metabalō, indicated) and quickly, to the gain process (kerdos).\textsuperscript{135} Hence the direct association, it seemed to Aristotle, of wealth-getting being most concerned with (naiista peri)\textsuperscript{136} coined money (nomisma).\textsuperscript{137} Its purpose or work was its being capable of making (poiētikē)\textsuperscript{138} wealth and goods (ploutou kai khrōmatōn).\textsuperscript{139} The production of a store, a treasure-house of money, had redefined the concept of wealth; its abstract and concrete purposes had changed with the arrival of coined money. Wealth (ploutos) stood in its new guise, for the most part, as a measure, a quantity of money (nomismatos plōthos).\textsuperscript{140} However, money had assumed not just a new guise but had taken on another form around which were grouped wealth-getting and 'retail trading' in its localised generic sense.\textsuperscript{141}

It was no frivolous act which led Aristotle from here to consider the problem that nomisma appeared also as a nonsense, something useless but with a certain power for display, a futile thing (lēros).\textsuperscript{142} Here, was a manifestation of the distance Aristotle had travelled in search of the peculiar characteristics which made nomisma what it was in theory and practice. For although money had visible, concrete form and roles it also had an ephemeral form. Its character was given by customary usage (through social sanction, nomos);\textsuperscript{143} but to nature it was nothing.\textsuperscript{144} Nomisma was both artifice and artifact, and like all things, formed and made by human hand and head, it could cease to be useful just as easily.\textsuperscript{145} A change in its form (a significant currency alteration, through the abolishment of a particular coin, the debasement of a metal currency or some shift in the political control of minting)\textsuperscript{146} placed one on the other side of wealth-making and money, for that person could not (in spite of possessing monied wealth, nomismatos ploutōn,)\textsuperscript{147} obtain what was necessary\textsuperscript{148} and that was the essential food,\textsuperscript{149} the sustenance required for existence-in-society. The realm of mythology was brought into Aristotle's discourse to reinforce and extend his views towards money and the process of pursuing solely metal-based wealth. For him the
importance of the apocryphal tale of Midas lay not so much in any cruel, moral irony but in the social outcome of that king's insatiate desire (aplēstia) for gold. He had, in a real sense, internalised the alchemist's dream and was surrounded by gold but unable to eat because of the Janus-headed gift he had received through his supplication. Hence Aristotle's point that possession of such a form of wealth did not prevent one from dying of hunger. For Aristotle a philosophical and social dilemma was at once exposed: the revelation that a metal possessed with a prime exchange-value could not under certain circumstances (as an outcome of being cut off socially, in physical or political terms, and hence unable to use the accepted exchange mechanisms) obtain the use-values essential for existence. The ephemeral characteristics of khrēmatistikē and ploutos were open to view.

However, Aristotle was not only seeking to deliver a moral lesson—that is a surface appearance and not the primary aim of this highly-concentrated, densely-argued passage on the impact of khrēmatistikē. Once again Aristotle juxtaposed the world of wealth-getting and riches to its natural, organic opponent. The difference this time lay in the fact that Aristotle used identical terms when writing about the two with the exception of attaching phusis to the organic forms of khrēmatistikē and ploutos. Clearly this was love with intent. The purpose was to clarify the argument by laying bare the dichotomy between wealth-getting and the maintenance of regulation of a household (oikonomikē) in archetypal form. The particular form of khrēmatistikē under discussion was given its distinct form and defined by its being capable of making goods (politeikē khrēmatōn); and this arm of wealth-getting with the generic title of trade (kapēlikē) accomplished this not in all manner of ways but by the specific mediation which occurred through the exchange of goods (dia khrēmatōn metabolēs). The role of nomisma, of a socially sanctioned metal currency, was encapsulated by Aristotle's precise language and its imagery. The fundamental principle which gave nomisma, like the gnomon of a sundial, its measured form (stoikheion) and "limit" (perae) was exchange in the general sense of buying and selling, as conveyed in the term allagē.

The very convenience, the readily available exchange mechanisms provided by the transformative nomisma led to the intellectual formation, the crystallisation of a concept of limitlessness (apeiros) to
characterise its practice through the amassing of riches via wealth-getting. In searching for a comparative and analogous example of the workings of this tekhnē Aristotle set his mind upon medicine. One reason for his reaching out to the beginnings of medical science (iatrikē) and its concern for one's body to be in good health (hugiainein) was that its end (telos) remained without a boundary (apeiros). However, there was a deeper reason. When medicine as practice was not conceived in customary, ancestral and hereditary terms (parateria) or not according to the traditional path of one's fathers, through its having been put into motion, that is, stirred from its old form, like other systems of knowledge (tōn allōn epistēmōn), it also benefited from this change like all the skills and crafts (holēs hai tekhnai) in company with one's intellectual faculties and potentialities (hai dunaseis). Here Aristotle had grasped and accepted some process of change, a significant departure from tradition which had its distinguishing mark, its sign (sēmeion) in a change from the old laws, the accepted practices and respect for customary laws, and what was now thought to be "too simple and barbarous" (iān haplous einai kai barbarikous) conventions of times past. To some extent Aristotle's analogous linkage of khrēmatistikē and iatrikē demonstrated the very limited but critical intellectual diffusion occasioned by the impact of the Hippocratic medical movement upon the practices and processes of at least two of the finest Greek writers and thinkers. Before looking at Aristotle's ideal, limited role of medicine as an analogous tool and social good, we shall pursue his examination of khrēmatistikē. Wealth-getting which did not aim for household maintenance ran on a radically different course. The ideal of khrēmatistikē and its end were altogether bound up in its limit. However, the means towards that end (telos) was in this case disposed towards deploying the skill of acquirement or the skill of receiving (ktēsis) antithetically - exclusively for wealth and goods. Another world whose end and limit were its very limitlessness, its endless acquisition of wealth and goods (khrēmatistikē), had been born and stood in stark opposition to Aristotle's polis paradigm. Aristotle, confronted by this clash of ideas and practices, attempted to resolve them by looking further into the role of wealth-getting in household maintenance. Here a limit (paras) appeared to be both necessary
and obvious. The existence of a limit to all riches was not apparent in the conduct of wealth-getting, in relations based upon exchange. Those who entered this wealth-getting process aimed to expand their nomisma without limit (apeiro). This spelt a new order of social relations for a polis formation, one where (unlike the physical space of a polis) the spatial relations of exchange involved a conceptual formulation of limitlessness. The proximity of these two, estranged formal practices of wealth-getting (they acquired the same things) was the cause for their being seen to be near to hand (suneggus) and viewed as a near synonymous set of relations. Each of the two forces involved in wealth-getting employed the use of the same acquisition. One had an end, a limited use in view, whilst the other aimed for its growth (auxesis). The spatial dynamic involved here was the movement implicit in the term auxesis. A near-static or permanent view of human existence-in-society, the fixed world of oikos maintenance, was blurred and threatened by the pressure to keep or increase one's property in money terms to a limitless extent. The term for one's substance (ousia) conveyed within itself the primacy of property-in-itself as a definition of social substance.

Aristotle suggested that this set of preoccupations had arisen and found their cause (ation) in people arranging the disposition of their interests (tás diatheseís) in order that they can pursue earnestly the course set around life in its generic, material sense but not the 'good life', ἡ τὰς ἔκ τοῦ ζήν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸ ἐὰν ζήν. What perspectives underlay Aristotle's argument? That he argued for a more self-contained relationship in oikos/polis existence has become obvious. Whilst Aristotle argued for a universe governed by limit and need, he viewed and began to describe and analyse the rise of an antithetical ideology and practice to that encapsulated in his ideal form, autarkia. The rise of new acquisitive forces in a polis, the extension of wealth-getting, brought about what Aristotle regarded as the development of a desire (epithumia) which possessed a theoretically limitless capability of making and producing things desired (tòn poliškón apeiron epithumousin). The Greeks desired material possessions and wealth acquired through the employment of money in wealth-getting. A new measure of social substance found its form in the identification of even the 'good life' with the enjoyments and advantages provided for corporeal
(σωματικά) enjoyment. The shape of the 'good life' (εὐ ζῶν) had been altered in practice from the ideal form Aristotle advocated. This was openly acknowledged in that even those who professed support for the 'good life' had redefined it in material terms. The acquisition and possession process appeared to be not just in existence but rather it was an activity that demanded one to be devoted wholly to the serious occupation (where one was wearing away time, διατριβή) concerned with wealth-getting for one's personal gain (peri ton khrēmatismon).

From these social practices and their extension into the daily pursuits of oikos/polis life came the other specific form (heteron eidos), the second manifestation of wealth-getting. Aristotle argued that the orientation towards producing enjoyment (απολαυστική), one's devotion to enjoyment, to the act of enjoying and its fruition (απολαυσία) in excess (ἐν ὑπερβολῇ) brought about a transformation of the useful arts and skills, and indeed, the purposes which they served. In the quest to furnish oneself through khrēmatistikē, an inversion of one's abilities and capacities occurred, and this was "not according to nature". Aristotle's archetype involved set roles and functions for human beings and the skills they used to live in society. Whilst he continued to probe the world of wealth-getting, he asserted the ideal primacy of a holistic cosmos.

The world of goods and property had reached into what Aristotle argued were separate spheres of activity and it was the presence of this new end, of khrēmata, which compelled him to argue, almost rhetorically, that an abstract force such as a notion of manliness or masculine spirit (ανδρεία) existed not for the purpose of producing khrēmata but for bringing about courage (θαρσος), an ideal quality for a citizen-soldier. To drive home his point, Aristotle chose for the purpose of illustration the social practices of medicine (ιατρική) and military command (στρατηγική). Their original purposes, the human designs for these particular skills were clear. The practice of generalship was intended to produce victory (νίκη) for the polis, and medical practice was aimed at producing a state of health (ὑγεία). These were the primary purposes of military command and medicine, yet they had been inverted to serve another interest. Aristotle had not excluded the possibility that these skills had the capability to produce more than they were developed for, rather he saw that their original
purposes had been turned aside and that they had become an integral part of the social processes which served in wealth-getting. That khrēmatiκῆ had become the end (to telos) towards which everything was driven ran counter to both Aristotle’s theory of a polis, its household relations and the epistemological base upon which his reasoning stood. The concept that informed so much of his thinking was a characteristic product of the settled form, the very shape and structure of a polis’ existence. It is one thing to assert that Aristotle worked within a demonstrably teleological epistemology, and accept that as explanation enough in itself for his exploration of the purposes and functions of ktistikē and khrēmatiκῆ. However the key to such a teleological epistemology, is to reveal its methodological base and historical form.

Aristotle’s argument was informed by two concerns. First, wealth-getting which aimed to produce what was necessary (anangkaiα), that is, to obtain the necessities which one was in need of (en khreisai) for the fulfilment of social existence. This need was attached to, and based around, a concern for maintaining nourishment (peri ten trophēn). It was based upon a generic concern for the provisioning of oikos and polis. The active pursuit of food was, in terms of the daily regulation of household affairs, in accordance with nature (oikonomikē de kata phusin). The world of oikonomikē was not limitless (aspeiros) and in terms of Aristotle’s assertion of the ideal primacy of autarkia, it was contained by a defined set of needs.

The preferred order of household relations for Aristotle was characterised by the singularly important presence of a second interest and social practice. That was concerned with the relationships of oikos and polis to the simultaneously abstract and concrete notion of a boundary, horos. It is this term, with its wide-ranging fields of meaning, which encapsulated the social limits to a polis’ territory. It signalled the existence of an inherent notion of a set of physical and symbolic markers which gave definition and place to one’s household needs or territorial claims and their limits. Boundaries were part of the conceptual and physical universe of a polis. By way of the symbolic power of a boundary, a paradigmatic polis was given both a geographically specific landmark and metaphorically bound like a mortgage marker-stone to Aristotle’s socio-political preference for an autarkic world-view.
Horos as an embodiment of the boundary concept gave further intellectual clarity and definition to Aristotle's treatise and in conjunction with autarkeia provided the physical as well as symbolic parameters of khrēia. Aristotle in his search for the role of khrēmatistikē in the regulation of a household and a polis' citizens, argued that, like the art of political management, the regulation of citizens through the exercise of political skill did not make human beings. Indeed, human beings preceded these social practices and came from nature (para tō̂s phusēōs) and these later practices or skills developed from those given conditions. Nature was expected to provide the means of provisioning (the means for the realization of a primarily subsistence mode of existence) in its manifestation as land, sea or another primal resource for human use. In turn, the controller of the oikos was meant to take advantage of this situation and take control of what had been provided or was ready to one's hand. In essence this was an argument which accepted a boundary whose limits were naturally given and whose preconditions lay in the steps for provisioning which phusis had taken previously. Aristotle accepted here a definition of human existence which can be presented as recognising that human beings are organically attached to nature's powers and its gift of providing resources to human beings. What they had to do was use what had been provided. Let us take one example. In the art of weaving (huphantikos) they did not have to make the wool; rather they had to shape it to their purposes.

Nor was Aristotle indulging in a little moralising when he continued his comments upon wool and one's knowing how to distinguish between useful qualities and their obverse. Whilst his analogy was taken from oikos-based crafts and the ever-practical presence of domestic household work in any polis world, he turned well-tried terms to political advantage. Here again, one had to make a clear distinction between what was a given resource and its conditional use. A process of separation, an ordering of what was socially good and socially bad was required. For Aristotle, one needed to know what was serviceable, useful and 'good' in its own right (khrēston) and made for a specific purpose, capable of being adapted to and suitable for (epitēdeion) a particular human need or goal. Similarly, one had to know what was not of use and be able to recognise its 'mean' or 'bad' (phaulon) form or
quality, and with regard to persons or things, recognise what was unserviceable or unfit (ανεπιτέλειον) for their use.

Aristotle was concerned with making clear choices within the limits contained in a natural order of things. However his choice of direction was not unconsciously taken but consciously held. Aristotle was not engaged in a facile moral critique (a little moralising philosophy for its own sake) but a political critique whose terminology was at once meshed in an ideological form which can be mistaken for a 'home-spun' morality when, quite reasonably, it can be identified as expressing a series of straightforward political statements concerned with the theory and practice of a preferred, idealised conduct of everyday life.

Within the critique of wealth-getting's acquisitive role two forces went hand-in-hand. First, the political function of the oikonomos within an oikos-based polis, and second, the moral primacy of an oikonomos whose role was to oversee the physical health and material well-being of an oikos. However, the oikos comptroller and ruler, did not have to directly carry out these functions via his personal intervention. There was, in a sense, a mediation of responsibilities. In matters concerned with health and the practice of medical skills, it was the function of the physician to restore health. Hence the oikonomos located the general need or problem and then set in motion those measures needed to effect a cure or restore the oikos to its health. For Aristotle the oikonomos had the primary role within a necessary hierarchy of needs to delegate the maintenance of an oikos to subordinate human functionaries like the physician, if its inhabitants' health was endangered, or, in matters which were concerned with material goods and property (περὶ τῶν χρηματῶν), to allow the functioning of a subordinate and serviceable material art (ὑπερετική) to obtain those needs. Aristotle argued that it was necessary for phusis ideally to have preceded and already set in existence those material preconditions which enabled one to provide or furnish one's needs. Hence, if everything gained sustenance from whatever gave it birth, it was only an extension to nature's ordering of things that led Aristotle to argue that the acquisitive skill of wealth-getting was according to nature only when engaged in an orbit governed by, and concerned with, provisioning from, the agrarian world of the earth's cultivated fruits and domesticated animals.
Aristotle took his analogy of the correct practice of \textit{khrēmatistikē} in the company of an organic process associated with birth and a sense of social renewal,\textsuperscript{240} and extended it further again into the realm of metaphor.\textsuperscript{241} The moral tone of his attack upon those practices not devoted to the exclusive maintenance of the \textit{oikoi}, served as a critical lever with which he sought to pry open and expose the emergent forces gathered around, dependent upon and growing from \textit{khrēmatistikē}.

Aristotle had constructed a taxonomy of socially useful values.\textsuperscript{242} The arrival and practice of \textit{kapēlikē} not associated with the direct maintenance of household norms (\textit{oikonomikē}) and the use of an exchange process (\textit{metablētiκē} and \textit{khrēmatistikē})\textsuperscript{243} as ends in themselves, challenged or threatened Aristotle's normative \textit{oikonomikē}. A counter taxonomy had appeared alongside Aristotle's preferred social conduct of a polis. The significance of such a development lay not in any supposed dissolution of long-held traditions in Athens, social, religious or political, and their practice. The very existence of this counter taxonomy or social organisation and its practice, presented Aristotle with a duality of material conduct within the one polis formation. This in itself posed a theoretical challenge and formed a potential threat to Aristotle's idealised classificatory system, his taxonomy of values and their social usefulness within a polis which aimed for the reproduction of self-sufficiency.

However, Aristotle did not draw back from this new practice which put itself in an antithetical position to that of \textit{oikos/polis autarky, he sought to account for it.}\textsuperscript{244} The theoretical form in which he attempted to set down his explanations for the growth and spread of this new form of \textit{khrēmatistikē} assumed a metaphorical guise. This guise took on an association with the process of reproduction, of birth, and hence incorporated within itself a metaphor of growth.\textsuperscript{245} The key term which figured prominently in this metaphor is \textit{tokos}.\textsuperscript{246} The association of \textit{tokos} with childbirth and the production of offspring, lent itself effortlessly to a reproductive image which dynamically illustrated the process of coin money being produced out of coin money (\textit{monisma ek nomismatos}).\textsuperscript{247} In tandem with Aristotle's carefully crafted image of coined money having reached a position where it could reproduce itself through interest, went a moral taxonomy of values. This classificatory system reinforced Aristotle's taxonomy of useful social values and the
correct use of those mechanisms needed to obtain socially necessary goods or needs. Hence one will find the term _epainoumen_ for _something praiseworthy, attached to social or economic practices designed to make available what was deemed necessary_ ( _anangkai_ ) to the process of household maintenance ( _oikonomik_ ). Conversely, the practice of _metabolistik_ for its own sake was an entirely unacceptable trading function which in Aristotle's eyes justly received blame and censure as conveyed by the term _psephomen_ . This practice was not according to nature but involved a process whereby one was directly associated in what we would call social and economic activities which appropriated one's substance, or as Aristotle put it, took "all away from one another" ( _all' ap' all dik_ ).

In the centre of this new practice lay the trade in money-changing, the weighing of _oboloi_ generically characterised by the term _obolostatik_ , the practice of exchanging and dealing in coined money. This came under attack from Aristotle precisely because it was seen to be bound up with acquisition from coined money itself. This social practice, most reasonably ( _eulogostata_ ) was hated in Aristotle's eyes, precisely because it (coined money) was not acting according to its originally contrived role ( _ouk eph' hoper eporisth_ ). This role was not to make money from the exchange of coined money but rather to act solely as a conduit for the working of exchange ( _metabol_ ). The break with a socially regulated and limited system was encapsulated in the term _tokos_. _Tokos_ marked a dynamic point of departure, in that, it symbolized the mechanisms which, in theory, could reproduce coined or monied wealth in its own right and seemingly in a limitless fashion. This, of course, was only possible in association with the formation of, and the ever so-gradual and uneven development of, an exchange process which had reached a point where, with the use of coined money ( _nomisma_ ), human ingenuity had brought about an abstraction of the exchange process through the introduction of a socially recognised and valued mediator— _nomisma_. Hence the reproduction of money through _tokos_ was condemned by Aristotle as the wealth-getting process, gain-seeking action, most contrary to 'nature'.

Such a line of reasoning prompts a further question and its exploration. Why was this form of _khrēstatistik_ most contrary to nature ( _malista para phusin_ )? The key to unravelling such a problem must
centre around Aristotle's use of the term phusis. For the 'nature',
natural form, order or conduct of things, Aristotle referred to, was
clearly formed by, and within, that speculative paradigm which
represented or stood for his theory and practice of useful and socially
renewing values, as mirrored by the politically charged archetype,
autarkelia. It was for this reason that Aristotle so strongly attacked
those practices antithetical to his model polis formation. The 'new'
acquisitive process of khrematistikē, embodied the Solonian challenge of
a social practice which recognised no limit or boundary to wealth that
could be stored up.263 However, Solon's vision264 of ploutos (not that
either Solon or, more importantly and concretely, in historical terms,
Aristotle, separated or apparently thought that 'social' and 'economic'
forces, and/or behaviours, and their motives, should be separated from
one another) was fleshe out by Aristotle's analysis and attack upon the
use of metabolistikē and tokos, which, in league with trade in its generic
sense, had formed a quantitatively and qualitatively different set of
social practices in opposition to those presented in his model of polis
household maintenance.

Here one can find justification for calling Aristotle's
antithetical polis formation a 'greed' polis. Aristotle realised in a
determinedly argued series of passages that there was an antithesis to
his preferred polis existence, and he saw in it a moral order or conduct
which meshed itself within a fundamentally different orbit of social,
political and economic behaviour. Hence we can put forward an
explanation for Aristotle's taxonomy of socially useful values and the
significance of his system. It informed itself through the eyes of a
political morality which wholeheartedly approved of autarkelia as the goal
of a polis. Aristotle had built into the writing of the Politics a code
of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. We need only recall the more
recently discussed terms: khrēston, epitēdeion, phaulon, anepitēdeion,
epainovenē and psegeomē, to realise that this was not just or only a
moral code but that it represented for Aristotle a political ideal.
These terms simultaneously reflected and appropriated aspects of
aristocratic and oligarchic ruling-class values, as expressed for example
in the term khrēston,265 and transcended those political positions to the
extent that any ideal goal reflected a need for a different construction
of human social existence. Nor should Aristotle's attachment to an
ideal, ideological expression of aristocratic or oligarchic ruling-class behaviour, as found in his use of political terminology be allowed to cloud the boldness and originality of his ideas. For it was his struggle to grasp the relationships between different forms of social behaviour and its regulation that led him to explore and question the bases for material relationships and transactions between human beings within a polis world-view.

I re-emphasize that Aristotle asserted the ideal primacy of a holistic cosmos. He did this because he recognized that his ideal polis was confronted by divergent social practices grouped around the use of khrēmatistikē which departed from the limited, purely functional, role of khrēmatistikē in a world which aimed for self-sufficiency. Aristotle's model polis world and its moral order was faced with its antithesis. Aristotle's critique of wealth-getting as an end in itself rested upon an analysis which sprung from the cultural context of a polis world. Aristotle's taxonomy of socially useful values derived its morality from his carefully crafted, autarkic universe which, in turn, found its roots in polis culture and history.
CHAPTER VII

ARISTOTLE'S ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE
LIGHT OF ETHICA NICOMACHEA 1129a - 1134a

When we turn to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics we can find further evidence for the development of his taxonomy of socially useful values which underpinned his political ideals and formed a base for his critique of then existing social practices. In Aristotle's quest for the particular set of conditions or behaviour which he sought to analyse, he had recourse to a method which demanded that the general parameters be set first within which his dialectical method could be pursued. In this case, the broad grounds for argument were given by the opposition of two abstract concepts which represented justice (dikaiosynē) and injustice (adikia).1 When he approached the general notion of someone who was considered to be adikos,2 a person who, in a generic sense, incorporated the state of being unjust and somehow was involved in wrongdoing or simply unrighteous, Aristotle was transforming a generalised notion or condition into an intellectual tool for a critique of a particular set of social practices. Alongside adikos stood another generalised term and social condition which involved one being paranomos.3 Aristotle carefully employed this morally loaded value term which expressed a set of values in opposition to those practices which bound one to a polis and its customary conduct. For here one who was paranomos was in a state which placed one in a position against the polis' law, contrary to its laws and customs and potentially outside of the existing social order.

By bringing forward the notion of paranomos Aristotle was increasing the force of his argument and, by quite deliberately introducing paranomos at this point, he ensured that a clash of ideologically opposed value systems would be at the centre of his critique of changing social values within a polis. A fundamental opposition existed between the social conduct of someone outside the social order or practicing existence outside customary and hence defined social borders of conduct, and one who stood by long held or given boundaries for acceptable practices which by themselves defined orderly social conduct. Alongside paranomos came another and, for our purposes, highly significant form of unjust conduct. Its state was given by the
expression *pleonktēs,*4 which, once again, was a generalised term for one who conducted himself in a manner which produced or claimed for that person more than his share. *Pleonktēs* was a term for the embodiment of greedy, grasping behaviour which expressed itself through an emphasis upon material gain.5 The result of these conditions, these general states of behaviour, was that it involved one in a form of inequality (*anisos).*6 In turn, when one was associated with practices which denoted social behaviour which involved *anisos,* one was acting in an unfair or unequally divided fashion. Similarly, a just position (*dikaios)*7 involved a series of generalised beliefs and practices centred on conduct which adhered to the social conventions by which a polis was held together as a socio-political entity. Aristotle emphasised this point by reference to the practice of human conduct which observed customary behaviour (*prōmos)*8 of lawful, social conduct within an ordered social existence. Moreover, this conduct involved the further practice of a form of *isos*9 whereby one stood in relation to others on the basis of some equality in rights, size, strength and the process by which these were distributed or divided in society. In other words, *isos* involved a social mechanism which acted in theory to distribute on the basis of a notion of 'fair measure'.

These ideas associated with *isos* could well have their basis in a notion of the primacy of a citizen in a polis social formation.10 An ingrained set of values which assumed the inter-relatedness of obligations and actions was at the core of Aristotle's reasoning. This form of reasoning was implicit within his dialectic where, to take one example, *paranomos* was ranged against its antithesis, *nomos.*11 It was this generalised sense of the inter-relatedness of things and people and human actions in social existence which led Aristotle to the particular consideration of a *pleonktēs.*12

For Aristotle the term *pleonktēs* carried within itself both a moral and a political imperative. One who acted like a *pleonktēs* displayed a rapacious set of values or social behaviour. In a literal sense a *pleonktēs* claimed more than was his share of a society's goods, and by definition was 'grasping'. A *pleonktēs' political morality defined what we can term his political economy. The driving force of a *pleonktēs* was focused upon material outcome which centred around goods (*peri tagathai).*13 These goods were those directly associated with a
productive process which turned out material goods (tagatha), so-called
goods of fortune and wealth. These 'goods' were not 'goods' in a
non-material sense but were specifically concerned with a social
outcome which had the potential to produce prosperity or success
(eutukhis) and its converse, ill-fortune (atukhia) where one failed
to obtain the desired material outcome. Indeed, Aristotle recognised
that human beings, in the generic sense of the term anthrōpoς,17 prayed
for and sought after these material ends.18

When one examines Aristotle's previous statement, the language in
which he expressed these desires is both striking and evocative. A
scene, albeit of an allegorical nature, has been conjured up where
Aristotle has borrowed directly from religious or votive behaviour where
the anthrōpoς of a polis were seen to pray for themselves (eukhonta) in order that these material goods would come their way. However, they
did not employ prayer only to achieve their material goals but they
pursued actively (diskousin) these ends. The language of a hunt or a
pursuit has been deployed to capture dramatically the active nature, the
all-engrossing and-consuming behaviour of those involved in pleonexia.21
The drive of a person (or persons) engaged in this grasping
material-goods-centred-activity brought about a reorientation of what was
thought to be good, and altered the basis of a sense of distributing the
'good' and 'bad' within a polis.22

The context within which Aristotle was writing this work needs to
be kept constantly in view. Regardless of whether this work was highly
theoretical in its nature, many of the simple analogies and examples used
to illustrate a point were taken from daily life. Whilst the work was
theoretical, its concern was with the operation of a polis social
formation and the impact of different social practices upon its fabric.
Its very polis centrality was expressed by the legal boundaries,
nomothetikēs nosima,23 the preoccupation with, and the focussing of
social life around, a system of law-given existence. In his efforts to
demonstrate the delicate balance between the laws of a polis and the
actions of its citizen members upon that social system, Aristotle was at
pains to distinguish between different systems acting for different
groups or classes within a social formation.24 He recognised that laws
could act in an expedient manner to favour the citizenry, the aristoi, or
those in power and authority.25 He realised that justice was relative to
the extent that any notion of what was just, and behaviour according to established custom or rule (dikaia) was measured by an index of happiness (eudaimonia). Happiness was imparted by those productive acts and their 'preservative power' (ta politeika kai phulaktika) on those elements or parts which composed a polis formation (politike koinonia).

Aristotle then turned from this theoretical analysis of polis social relations and picked upon a series of straightforward or everyday exemplars to extend his analysis. The emphasis rested upon a male citizen carrying out certain actions and conducting himself in such a fashion that would not have endangered the fabric of a polis on a personal or social level. This of itself put his analysis in historical perspective and set his ideas not on some imaginary plane but firmly within the orbit of classical Greek reasoning and, particularly, Athens as an intellectual gathering place. Aristotle sought to demonstrate the relationship of small acts to the larger picture of social existence. Hence he related the characteristics of a man who carried out brave deeds (ta tou andreou erga) and he located these acts (whether they were concerned with holding one's given or assigned position [taxis], not fleeing from battle, or throwing away the heavy arms of a hoplite) within the customary, legal, potential obligations and duties of a male citizen.

This first set of referential points served to illustrate how small acts were related to the outcome of an external situation to which the polis had to respond collectively. The second set of references Aristotle dealt with were drawn from the internal conduct of daily life by a male citizen. Whilst some of these are general pointers to correct social behaviour at the level of the oikos, this does not mean that one should discard them. Aristotle's theory of polis social relations clearly held that general and particular conduct in society had an immediate or direct bearing upon daily relations within a polis. Aristotle held human relations as well as their material relations up to his gaze. When he addressed the need for one to exercise control over one's sensual desires (sophron) or not to behave in a wanton or riotous manner (hubristein), Aristotle was not delivering a didactic lesson on moral virtue: rather he was arguing for the observance of customary behaviour codes. This did not mean that there was no element of morality
involved in such an argument - there clearly was a moral attitude being conveyed here. However, the morality of that argument rested upon a set of values which had at their head the maintenance of given social controls over general behaviour within a polis.

When Aristotle spoke of more specific codes of behaviour, such as observing that nomos directs one not to commit adultery (moikheuein), not to beat or strike (tuptein), or to speak ill of someone (kakigorein), he was speaking within a general context of citizen relationships. The relationships between household and broader social contacts were of direct concern to Aristotle. He recognized that different codes of behaviour existed (or could exist) between the two spheres of social existence. His recognition of the close and delicate nature of social relations within a polis and between citizens, was conveyed by the reciprocal conduct exercised by a model friend towards himself as well as others. Whilst the reverse - the worst behaviour (pakistos) was performed by a person who disadvantaged both himself and his friends within the broad context of dikaiosune. The importance placed upon the outcome of relations between oneself and one's friends (philot) conveyed something of the social and political significance of friendship. 'Friendship' as such at this personal and localised level was but one step in a network of associative (koinonia) based influences and contacts. The role of an arkhon and the general association (koinonia) of citizens who constituted a polis' given political form, were acknowledged readily by Aristotle as being in a state of fundamental co-existence. Their very existence was given by their association.

Step by careful step, Aristotle built up a critical theory of behaviour within a polis. He distinguished between two broad forms of damaging and unacceptable or socially questionable (and sometimes illegal) behaviour. Those forms of behaviour which occurred as a result of human and personal foible of a sexual or sensual nature (akolasia) were labelled generally as a vice or a bad condition (mokthoeria or ponia). The second set of damaging social behaviour arose as a result of a different human motive, and this found its mainspring in the quest to gain advantage or derive profit (kerdainein), to achieve a material gain (kerdos). Here pleasure was quite literally the outcome of a material gain; it was derived from and on account of it. When adultery or some other damaging or illegal act was committed for the
purpose of gain, or had as its motive to gain a material advantage, such an act was seen as unjust \(( \text{adikia} ) \).\(^{52}\) Aristotle has been quite deliberate in his process of distinguishing between and separating patterns of social conduct. He attempted to classify them by purpose or motive and intention. It is this methodology which took him further along the path towards an enquiry into the conduct and purposes of exchange mechanisms and relations.

By carefully separating and distinguishing between different modes of conduct within society, Aristotle moved closer to developing an analysis of, and attempting to account for, the historically recent and different well-springs of such social conduct. In opposition to these practices in society lay the foil of his archetypal citizen who incorporated within his social existence a different order of social conduct, a moral good \(( \text{spoudaios} ) \),\(^{53}\) a moral earnestness or seriousness of purpose which was qualitatively removed from unjust behaviour associated with a preoccupation for \( \text{time} \), \( \text{krēmata} \) or \( \text{sōtēria} \).\(^{54}\) Through his selection of \( \text{time} \),\(^{55}\) Aristotle at once established that his critique was aimed at unjust behaviour \(( \text{adikia} ) \) within the very construction of polis life. Here, the pursuit of honours and rewards in a generic sense or the worth of things for their own sake were anathema and by definition linked to \( \text{hēdonē} \), sensual pleasure and \( \text{kerdos} \), to a material outcome and gain.\(^{56}\) He then extended and, at once, specified what forms of social behaviour were regarded in his eyes as the agents of injustice. The drive for goods or property, material possessions \(( \text{krēmata} ) \),\(^{57}\) constituted a particular material base of unjust behaviour or practices. The orientation of unjust behaviour around \( \text{time} \) and \( \text{krēmata} \) was extended to include the association of \( \text{sōtēria} \) with these practices.\(^{58}\) \( \text{Sōtēria} \) within this context would appear to have been a reactive position aimed at securing not a social good but an ideological position which secured safety for one's personal or familial position. It may well reflect the beginnings of a particularist position within Aristotle's critique or diagnosis of a polis' social, political and economic relations as opposed to a more generalist view of polis human interaction. This should not be construed as the birth of individualism but rather as a qualitative (as well as quantitative) re-ordering of social relations within a polis.\(^{59}\) Aristotle's critique remained wholly within a polis world-view. It stood amongst those human relations and reflected upon those ideals (as he saw
them), traditions and practices of daily life.

The combination of these three forces reflected a range of human motivations: timē displayed concern for status or class as well as a certain psycho-pathology of gaining or valuing one's position. Khrosēna indicated the material value of goods and property, whilst sōtēria signalled the active process, the consolidation of this particular position. Aristotle recognised that such changes as were occurring took place within a polis' legal construction of its social existence. However, this did not mean that one could develop an account of these relations purely within terms of what was valued as human behaviour within the bounds of customary law and usage (nomism) or its converse, human conduct outside of, or contrary to, customary law (peranomos) and therefore pitted against the social values or order such laws and customary practices reflected.

In order to probe into his world, Aristotle needed new categories to explain human relations in a meaningful rather than a narrow, or simply, legalistic sense. He turned to the concepts of anison and ison. The term anison carried a broader and more general sense of unequal or uneven behaviour than a concept which condemned social actions which went against a particular set of laws and traditional conduct. Whilst, on the other hand, ison went beyond social actions which were in accord with customary behaviour and hence defined as lawful conduct. Ison stood generally (and in a pure sense) for a fundamental equality in terms of size, strength or number and represented a concept which expressed a desire for a division or distribution based upon an equality of rights. If Aristotle were to attempt, to any real extent, a successful analysis of social practices associated with exchange relations then he needed to develop a means and a method of analysis which reached beyond notions of 'lawful' and 'unlawful' conduct. The reason for such an approach lay simply in the realisation that exchange relations per se were not unlawful. Indeed, from within the perspective of Athens, and its practice of exchange relations from which Aristotle (most probably) drew on his model of the theory and practice of exchange relations, such practices had existed for a considerable time and were incorporated within the dubious memory of quasi-legal dictums and 'popular' lore.

Aristotle's need for a pair of terms which could take his analysis
beyond lawful and unlawful or lawless behaviour (outside of what was regarded as nomimon or paranomon), led him to what could be termed a consideration of the relativity of unequal and equal conduct of social relations within a polis formation. Anison and ison, expressed within themselves a political morality (an order of social conduct in society) at one remove from more conventionally based terms such as nomimon or paranomon. Aristotle was looking for an approach which expressed his desired or preferred order of social relations within a polis and, simultaneously, a set of terms which were capable of leading to an unravelling of the conduct of daily exchange relations within a polis.

Aristotle's moral and political archetype, aner agathos, the "good man", the well-born, well-connected citizen in an ascendant class position in his society, was contrasted with the 'reality' of just being involved in the daily life of a citizen within his polity. His analysis of the modes of social exchange and the implications of these exchanges went beyond the idealised conduct of his aner agathos. First, he identified that a part of justice (meros dikaiosunē) was intimately associated with customary behaviour (dikaioi), conduct acknowledged as just in social existence.

This species-form (eidos) was divided into social practices linked to, in the first instance, a form of distribution (dianomē). The form a particular distribution took depended upon what was being given or exchanged. One could have acquired tīmē, honour or respect, and this mark endowed one with prestige, reverence, and acknowledged position within the given polis whose members had recognised the person's tīmē. The process of dianomē shared another path which found its expression mediated by a tangible exchange. The distribution of 'goods' (khrōmeta) took the citizen into a material expression of exchange relations within a polis. For Aristotle made it abundantly clear that dianomē was a form of conduct accorded to and reserved for the association of a polis' citizenry (tōis koinōnous tēs politeias). The emphasis remained on the acts of dianomē, rather than the exchanges per se, and on their capacity to be divided (merista).

Within such social relations Aristotle argued that the unequal and the equal were seen to be related one to the other. He recognised by his use of anison and ison that citizens' relationships to one another were not based upon some form of abstract, let alone concrete, equality.
With this point clearly in view, Aristotle was able to proceed further into the workings of exchange relations within a polis framework of reference.

The second arm of dikaiosunē manifested itself in behaviour which corresponded to "a corrective process" (diorthōtikon) in the conduct of dealings or transactions related to notions of exchange-based activities (sunallagmai diorthōtikon). These actions were either of a voluntary or involuntary kind (hekousia or akousia). Once Aristotle had arranged these corrective actions or processes involved with exchange-related transactions into two distinct categories, he proceeded to name what were or were not voluntary relations-in-exchange. He accepted the following as generally voluntary actions when conducted openly: prasia, sale; daneîmos, money lending; eggei, a pledge or surety; khrēσis, lending; parakatathēkē, a deposit of money or property for which one takes responsibility through mutual agreement, and lastly, misthōsis, letting something for hire. A "transaction" (sunallagma) of this kind was accepted as hekousia, precisely because its origin (arkhē) was based around actions of a voluntary form.

In order to reveal the social bases for actions within a polis, Aristotle needed to delineate particular forms of transactional behaviour and decide whether or not they accorded with a basic form of agreed conduct in social existence. Any actions which involved behaviour classified as "involuntary" (akousia) were firstly classified in general terms as conduct intimately associated with secretive, underhand, treacherous or clandestine manoeuvres (lathraia). The following were regarded by Aristotle as fitting into a taxonomy of clandestine, treacherous human actions in polis life: kloptē, generally theft of all kinds; ekheia, adultery; pharmakeia, poisoning and perhaps the employment of drugs or potions without a person's knowledge or with the intention of committing harm to that person's life.

Pharmakeia, by its very definition, was a term concerned with the practices associated with the prescription, use and administration of drugs and potions. Within the broad meaning of lathraia, the forms pharmakeia took here had a negative bearing upon one's health. Indeed, lathraia, placed the particular forms pharmakeia was to assume here firmly within life-threatening, evil contexts. The hidden actions carried out by people through the preparation or mixing and dispensing
of pharmaka, given as poisons or evil charms and spells, were an omnipresent concern. In other words, when attached to lethrai, the administration of pharmaka by another took the control of a person's actions outside that person's direct supervision and placed one under the authority or power of another. Then Aristotle moved to actions such as, proagogeia, "procuring", perhaps with a particular emphasis (though it remained unstated by Aristotle) on such activities involving the use or employment of citizens in prostitution.\textsuperscript{83} Aristotle's intentions here could well have been located in a firm aim to prevent any blurring of the class, status and distinction, the very ideological position of a citizen to outsiders (the metoikoi) for example, let alone slaves.

Of equal importance to citizens within one polis or relationships between citizens of different poleis, was the prevention of human poaching between citizens who were also (or potentially) slaves' masters. This act of human poaching or enticement of slaves from their legal masters and owners, doulapatie,\textsuperscript{84} was yet another underhand involuntary activity singled out by Aristotle. Doulapatie, incorporating as it did the process of enticement, presented a double-edged threat to a polis. First, it threatened the fundamental base of a citizen's identity, namely, the primary attachment to property and the power or rather ideology represented by a small, close and enclosed property-owning morality. Second, the centrality of a polis world's "hands-off" property-owning morality, meant that doulapatie also incorporated the potentiality of a threat to a citizen's control and manipulation of human relations within the realm of his oikos. In an interesting remark Hippokrates' oath touched upon a not unrelated subject which exposed the raw nerves of oikos socio-sexual relations. The physician was expected to refrain from taking advantage of his ready access to a household and using his privileged position to gain sexual access to women or men (whether free or slave)\textsuperscript{85} after that physician had been invited to enter and treat a person or persons within a particular household. At stake here was not the question of whether slaves should be sexually abused or not, rather the question was the prevention of access to another's live and optional sexual property.\textsuperscript{86}

Yet slaves, even women slaves, did have access to the other world outside the oikos.\textsuperscript{87} To resume our principal theme, the normative reasoning of Aristotle recognised doulapatie as a threat to a polis
citizen's property rights and therefore as a clandestine or treacherous attack upon a principal source of a citizen's material and ideological power. In this sense, doulapatia qualified as one of the unwelcome social actions which readily fitted into the general category of clandestine manoeuvres (lathraia). However, one suspects that the reason Aristotle regarded doulapatia as akousia, was not because a slave wittingly or otherwise became a party to such an action. One should look back to the term lathraia and see in it that such "clandestine" or rather "subversive behaviours" as practiced by those engaged in doulapatia threatened the living property of other citizens and their legal possession of such property. Here was a situation which threatened, or at least questioned, the ideological supremacy of citizens qua citizens and took from one citizen (or groups of citizens) a part of their property rights.

Doulapatia attacked inter- and intra-citizen relations and potentially encroached upon one's economic power and/or social standing amongst other citizens to the extent that one could afford or not afford to lose the use- and/or exchange-value of a slave or slaves.88 Such an argument should not be taken as an assertion that all citizens of a polis (Athens serving for a moment as our paradigmatic polis) owned slaves as opposed to jokes and fantasies about the roles or uses of slaves to citizens.89 The very existence of a particular concern over the practice, the very subversiveness of doulapatia signalled the ideological importance of slavery and the political significance of the control, protection and exercise of live property rights.90

Within the classification of behaviours considered as akousia and within its first sub-division of those classed specifically as lathraia, two more social practices remained. Dolophonia,91 the act of killing by treachery or plotting someone's death, was included amongst those practices considered as "subversive" or "secretive", precisely because of its treacherous, disguised or hidden intent. Finally, pseudomarturia,92 acting as a false witness, was included because of the slyness of its purpose and its potentially damaging underhandedness.

The second sub-division of akousia was to be located in human behaviour which involved overtly rather than covertly violent actions. These physically forcible acts (biaia)93 expressed themselves in a direct and/or life threatening manner. Aikia,94 in its generic sense, referred
to a range of assaults from insulting treatment to outrageous behaviour towards one, through to torture and other physical torments. Desmos, the act of chaining or putting into bondage involved, for the 'imprisoned' person/s part, force through seizure or arrest and a loss of freedom of movement within a citizen's own polis. Listed with these overtly violent actions were thanatos, harpagē and pérōsis. Violent death (thanatos, as opposed to natural death), rape and seizure (harpagē), and maiming (pérōsis), were all directly associated with gross forms of direct physical violence. Such actions were social invasions of one's person, that is, they were interventions or involuntary exchanges based upon different degrees and forms of violence between citizens. I stress between citizens at this juncture in Aristotle's inquiry into the functioning of a polis; for Aristotle had made it explicit in his introduction to this section that a part of justice involved with dianosē was concerned with the distributive process in the context of the polis' associative constituency. Similarly, there is no reason to believe that his discussion of "the corrective process", diorthotikon, in its "voluntary" and "involuntary" senses, remained outside of the parameters he set for a discussion of dianosē. For the two general notions, voluntary and involuntary, and the social practices they incorporated under their general typology of social behaviour, stood firmly within a polis experience.

Of equal importance to the above forms of overt violence (biais) but in what could be seen as a sub-division within a sub-division, were social actions which expressed themselves and literally communicated themselves through acts of "verbal violence". The terms kakēgoria and propēlakismos, simultaneously held within themselves a range of socio-political, violently verbal behaviours. Kakēgoria, abusive behaviour which involved speaking ill of or abuse and slander, stood alongside of propēlakismos, which signified scornful, haughtily insolent or disrespectful behaviour, as almost a separate category, and especially as a social practice amongst contending members of a polis. Yet Aristotle's linking these terms to the others within his second sub-division of behaviour classed as akousia most probably meant that he intended and saw kakēgoria and propēlakismos as an integral part of "the violent behaviours" (ta biaia). If this is a fair assessment of Aristotle's reason for having attached kakēgoria and propēlakismos to his list of
violent behaviours, then it is not unreasonable to consider these two terms as possibly having constituted an extension of his range of most harmful human actions. Moreover, kakēgoria and propēlakismos could well have manifested themselves in directly or indirectly physically violent outcomes. Verbal behaviour in a polis with this degree of hostility present in its very act of expression, could in turn have served as an incitement to violence within a polis and between groups of opposed citizens.99

Within Aristotle's densely argued text, we have examined earlier the passage and roles of moral language as political critique, as a political expression of human values in social action.100 Once again, Aristotle had given it both form and context by placing terms such as kakēgoria and propēlakismos within the general classification of "involuntary actions". Aristotle, by taking, anison and ison, as a starting place for an ideal set of behaviours and as a moral form upon which he developed and extended a political critique, had opened all forms of exchange within a polis world to general and particular observations. He had recognised that human communication (in the sense that one communicated whenever an exchange took place) occurred within two broadly separate categories but always took place within or around one's political environs, and was the result of an "voluntary" or "involuntary" act. Within the bounds of such a methodology it should come as no surprise that Aristotle's world of 'exchange' did not simply reveal the roles of dianomē or notions of exchange-based activities (sunallagmasi diorthōtikon) in an immediately material sense. His critique gained its strength not just from a grasp of the material power of an exchange of goods between citizens (or others within a polis for that matter); but by a realisation that all transactions involved social relations which existed or co-existed upon what he perceived as a "voluntary" or "involuntary" basis. Hence Aristotle peeled away and labelled social actions in a polis as having a general character and a discreet form in social existence.

Whilst the general reasoning of EN 1131a10 - 1131b24 was based upon 'mathematical logic',101 its philosophical aim was to use this form of reason as an analogous tool with which one could extend the range of anison/on and ison, as an intellectual vanguard for a critique of polis social relations. Having recognised that the unjust man or act was
inherently unequal, he argued that a balance, a midway point (meson), nevertheless existed. It was this 'point', this philosophical mean, which Aristotle defined as a neutral junction for an 'equality' of division and distribution. The term ison embodied a sense of fair measure and was based upon a sense of an equality of rights. This concept owed its existence to the primacy of a citizen within an ideal distributive polis. In turn, a sense of what was defined as dikaios, was given by its sense of ison. Hence Aristotle saw ison as finding its form through the realisation of a "mean" (meson) and, in turn, argued that what could have been called "just" (dikaios) was in itself expressed through a "mean".

Aristotle's analytical method was bound by and designed for a moral language of critical enquiry. Ison and dikaios were intimately related to the realisation of a meson. However, these terms were not socially or politically neutral; nor did Aristotle intend them to be so. The relationships between persons and things were formed by and around a set of relations which involved a balance between "more" and "less" (pleion kai elatton). To locate his critique of social relations within both a polis and ideal polis context Aristotle recognised and argued that two forces were involved. In turn these two forces involved at least four relationships. First two persons we can designate as A and B and second, two objects or things. Their relationships to one another were dependent upon their "proportionate standing" (isotēs), their ratio of equality in a logical and political sense. If the relations of A to B and a to b (to take these relations in their most essential forms) were not based upon the concept of isotēs, then political and personal troubles arose. Aristotle's terms for such political, in a general sense, and personal troubles were not readily divisible but rather were expressed by the use of the terms, ἱξ μακχαί and τὰ ἐγκλήματα. The term makhai perhaps incorporated struggles on a general political plane whilst the term eγκλήματα was a general notation for personal clashes which involved mutual complaints, disputes and accusations.

The process of establishing what relationship one person or thing stood in towards another person or thing, was made manifest in its axia, value, worth or merit. The problem of determining what was dikaios in the distributive process was located in disentangling the particular
form of *axía* involved. This was to be found in and defined by the specific form of 'political organisation', and its ideology.

Aristotle identified three separate 'states' of social organisation and hence political behaviour which accorded to three different forms of *axía*.

First, there is that based upon demokratikoi, or a situation which defined itself by the actions of a male citizenry whose open preferences for their own political constituency, the démos, were manifest. The possession of eleutheria, the freedom enacted by citizenship, defined their ideology which was concerned with a mutuality of interests inside and outside a polis. It must be emphasised that whilst this body of male citizens formed the bulk of the male citizen population, it was neither contingent nor necessary that these citizens possessed power equally. Nor did they constitute the majority of a polis' population, but they were the focus and source of political power.

Second, those who favoured or practiced oligarchy (oligarkhikoi) clearly interpreted (in theory and practice) *axía* in terms separable from the demokratikoi. Their position on "the distributive process" was formed by and around what constituted an oligarchic political formation. The two criteria were ploutos and eugeneia. As categories for the recognition of practices, oligarkhikoi, ploutos and eugeneia, were not necessarily mutually exclusive. The acquisition of wealth and material riches (ploutos) and/or the possession of well-born (eugeneia) credentials stressed, through wealth or birth, the membership of an exclusive family. Exclusivity lay at the heart of a polis' construction, and the oligarkhikoi practiced it at a level far above the demokratikoi if they were given political opportunity or circumstance.

When we turn to Aristotle's last 'state' of social organisation and political behaviour the aristokratikoi, the preference for rule by and from the 'best ones', we have moved outside the conventional political opposition and struggle between demokratikoi and oligarkhikoi, as reflected in Athenian history and its influence upon other poleis. Aristotle's analysis has stepped back from, but not outside, his polis world-view. In Aristotle's quest for an intermediate value a balance (meon) between what was unfair or equal, he turned to the possession of aretē, excellence or marks of distinction. Here, *axía* was given
meaning by recognised 'distinction' in social existence. Aristotle had taken care of any simple parallel between his aretē, and that of a historically-given aristocratic society, by his association of conventional aristocratic signs and values such as ploutos and, more particularly, eugeneia, with those of the oligarkhikoi. Once again, he had in an imaginative sense created an ideal notion with which he could extend his speculative method of enquiry. In his search for the mechanics of any "distributive process" and the values upon which it was based, the concept of dikaios, remained an integral part of that search. For bound up with what was dikaios, was the concept of "proportion" (analogos). In turn, the language of mathematical logic was brought to bear in the playing out of Aristotle's argument. For as he saw the proportional relationship of things to one another, as expressed in the term analogia, so he argued for their 'logical', general equality when he employed the term isotes. The concept of dikaios was intimately connected to such a proportionate set of relations and, in turn, a "distributive process" based upon dikaios led to this act of dikaios being considered meson, an intermediate position, in a real sense, what could be called Aristotle's "just mean". Hence an "unjust act" (adikon) was against proportionate (analogos) values. As the "just" or "lawful", customary act (dikaios) was regarded as meson, so the proportionate was, in turn, identified with meson, and thus dikaios became analogos.

Aristotle recognised that in practice social relations worked in an inverse manner where one who acted in an unjust way gained more (pleon) and the person unjustly treated (adikoumenos) gained less of the good in question. He then engaged in a little didactic moralising. By contrasting the position when kakon was involved, Aristotle argued that a lesser degree of kakon, what was "bad or evil", was a form of good in comparison with "a greater evil" (to meson kakon). This argument is an integral part of Aristotle's method. With this signal of his view of the world clearly in one's mind, Aristotle passed on to consider in more detail the "corrective process" (diorthōtikon). He recognised (as discussed earlier) that exchange-based activities involved voluntary or involuntary behaviour. Unlike the proportionate behaviour of dianos, what was just in sunallagmata worked within another set of social relations where its
form of equality or measure was given by its relationship to an
arithmetical contingency.\textsuperscript{144}

Aristotle's reasoning lay firmly embedded in a particular language
of political morality. This is brought to the fore by his contrasting
the positions of the "reasonable" or "good" (epieikēs)\textsuperscript{145} man with that
of his opposite number, the "mean" or "low" (phaulos)\textsuperscript{146} man, in terms of
social position or class. Yet Aristotle went far beyond taking a simple
stand on the side of the 'reasonable man'. Regardless of who inflicted
injury or wrong\textsuperscript{147} he held to a belief, an ideal, that a person who acted
in the capacity of a "judge" (dikastēs) was there to correct, to make
equal or balance (isaein) the unjust act which by definition produced an
unequal situation.\textsuperscript{148} Aristotle perceived the dikastēs' role as a form
of balancing, a process which aimed to make equal the loss incurred
through a deduction, a taking away of the other party's gain.\textsuperscript{149}
Regardless of the inappropriate use made of the terms "gain" (kerdos)
and "loss" (sēmia),\textsuperscript{150} gain and loss were, at any rate, capable of being
measured and this led to their being so called.\textsuperscript{151}

Aristotle viewed these relations between kerdos and sēmia as a
delicate balance. The notion of "the equal" (ison) as a mediating
position, a balance (meson) was an outcome of whether one had more of the
"good" and less of the "bad".\textsuperscript{152} This position led to a position which
could be defined in turn as a situation called kerdos.\textsuperscript{153} The opposite
position was a state of sēmia.\textsuperscript{154} Hence "gain" stood in the position of
"the more" and "loss" in the position of "the less";\textsuperscript{155} they were
opposite\textsuperscript{156} sides (and outcomes) of a pair of social relations. For
Aristotle the corrective or restorative process of justice (to
epanorthētikon dikaiōn)\textsuperscript{157} meant that a mid-way position (meson) be
established between sēmia and kerdos.\textsuperscript{158} It cannot be stressed too
strongly that the centrality of the dikastēs' position only served to
reinforce his attachment to nomos.\textsuperscript{159} The dikastēs incorporated in his
person the notion of "justice".\textsuperscript{160} Further, the dikastēs was viewed as
"animate justice" (dikaiōn empukhon).\textsuperscript{161} He was seen as being in a
mediating position (mesidios)\textsuperscript{162} and therefore, as the notion of justice
was in itself a mid-way position, so was the ultimate function of the
dikastēs.\textsuperscript{163} The dikastēs represented Aristotle's anthropocentric and
paradigmatic incarnation of nomos. Here one is given a view of a polis
world where balance in human relations and their material outcomes was of
paramount importance. Aristotle by insisting upon the critical maintenance of a balance of equitable relations between citizens in society was, simultaneously, seeking to understand the social mechanisms which could balance or transform material relations within a polis.

A recognition that material relations between persons could result in "gain" or "loss" was demonstrated by Aristotle's manipulations of three lines AA', BB', and CC' which were equal to begin with. Any of these lines (which represented a simple but effective model for elementary human transactions) could be transformed by the addition of a section or sections of another, or by the subtraction of a section of a line. Aristotle realised that the names for both these terms "gain" and "loss" originally came from voluntary acts of exchange (ek tēs hekousiou allagēs). Here he argued that these processes of "gain" and "loss" held their meaning by, on the one hand, a process where one was able to have more (pleon ekhein) was to gain (kerdainein) and to have less (kataton) from one's original transaction (ex arkhēs) was seen to be losing (zēmiousthai). In a simple and clear manner Aristotle characterised a process of exchange where one could either gain a greater share of a good or goods than one commenced a transaction with, or have a lesser share at the conclusion of such an act of exchange. The actions "to buy" (oneithai) and "to sell" (polein) were the primary agents which technically activated such a set of social relations. They were accepted by and received the sanction of human law (and hence customary and conventional standing) within a polis. However, Aristotle held tenaciously to the opinion that (in spite of the above socially sanctioned practices) justice was to be located as a midway position between some gain and loss and against such voluntary acts, (which produced gain and loss) insofar as it aimed to have an equal standing for each of the parties involved in such actions both before and after an exchange. The emphasis upon dikaios being defined as a meson reinforced Aristotle's emphasis upon ison as a constituent element of his preferred behaviour between parties engaged in voluntary exchange-related activities within an "ideal" or model polis. In his search for a balance, an equitable basis for one's cultural and material relations, Aristotle developed his critique and theory of social relations based upon forms of exchange within a polis world. The notion of analogon reflected both his preference for one form of
mathematically-based reasoning and its power as a metaphor for the social interplay of exchange relations.

This was painstakingly developed in Aristotle's critique of antipeponthos, reciprocity and allaktikos, the social process, the conduct of exchange relations. He realised that the practice of antipeponthos and its theory remained outside the realm of "distributive justice" (to neōtikon dikaion) and the "corrective process" (to diorthōtikon). The corollary to this assessment was that there was an equally great divide between a voluntary and an involuntary action. When one approaches Aristotle's analysis of the associative field of exchange (tai koinōnias tais allaktikais) one enters further into the strata of his argument. Here the practice of exchange relations within the boundaries of a polis acted as bonding agents; they held together a particular human aggregation. Dikaion found its expression through a particular form of antipeponthos which expressed itself in terms of a proportion (analogia) in its general sense, and not according to an equality of ratios or proportion (kat' isotēta). For unlike the Pythagoreans, Aristotle held that antipeponthos was not to be defined within an absolute (haplōs) framework as "justice" without qualification equals reciprocity.

It needs to be emphasised that, in spite of Aristotle's manifest interest in the "theory" of polis social relations, his work was set within that world and reflected it. His elaboration of just or correct procedures in exchange relations based upon mutual agreement found their theoretical raison d'être in his definition of antipeponthos. His work, whilst reflecting upon his world, did not stand outside of it but rather stood engaged within and with that world. One only need turn to the term koinōnia for both a theoretical and practical illustration of Aristotle's near exclusive concern with the world of the polis. Other societies served either as contrasts to the polis experience or as backward looking sources of analogous information. Whether it is in his Politics or Nicomachean Ethics, the associative or binding as well as bonding values of koainōnia reflected not just his ideal construction of the inter-relatedness of human beings within a polis but also the historical smallness and proximity of all members of a citizen body to one another. Koinōnia was both a theoretical construct and a valid historical description, intended to encapsulate the
expression of exchange relations amongst members of a polis. Such an argument should not be taken as meaning that Aristotle did not recognise social relations which went against his preferred order of social existence. Not only did Aristotle clearly recognise such emergent social relations, he set out to investigate them. These emergent social forces were the genesis of an inquiry and their attempted elaboration the result.

Again, when we turn to the term Kharites and its representation of "graces" or, more accurately, favours received and returned, we have historical practice and theoretical construct or critical reason simultaneously displayed. The physical representation of favours or exchange procedures which most probably predated nomisma-based transactions was symbolised for Aristotle in a temple of the favours (Khariton hieron). The giving and receiving of favours and kindnesses were seen to be reciprocal activities of social existence. Within this orbit of social conduct one could return to kaks or to eu. If one were unable to deliver what was considered socially bad or evil (kaks) in return for similar treatment, one's position, by implication, was thought to have been undermined, to be in a state of douleia. Clearly, the notion of douleia was meant as an ideological signal of a citizen's expectation to return either kaks or eu, as that citizen chose. If this could not occur an exchange, or gift-for-gift act (metadosis) did not take place. They (the citizens) were held or kept together by the material and symbolic acts of exchange. Whether such an exchange was based upon a pre- or non-monetary form of giving and receiving or the mediator, nomisma, Aristotle used his short observations upon the Kharites to lead on to a further detailed consideration of the giving-in-return exchange process (antidosis) according to analoqia. Perhaps the ability of Aristotle to cut backwards and forwards to develop an argument led Polanyi to freeze the sense of metadosis as "gift act" or as he put it, "giving a share". Polanyi did not perceive that Aristotle used both the Kharites and metadosis, as a backwards-looking analogy with which he continued to probe the long history of exchange processes in social action. However, Polanyi was more than right to attack the, "marketing bias of latter-day translators." This bias was one critical source of ahistorical reasoning and has caused (and still causes) the blindness of many historians of ideas who have come to the
opinion that, "his teachings are judged inadequate by the leading spirits of the time to the point of irrelevance". 202

Aristotle's concern was to balance or equate different social activities such as those of a builder (oikodamos) and a leather-worker or shoemaker (skutotomos) and the material product, πίκα or ὑποδήμα (dwellings or sandal) which they produced. 203 Aristotle was not attempting an analysis remotely comparable to contemporary market relations in a model capitalist economy. He was dealing with and within the cultural milieu of a polis. His concern with both a form of proportionate equality (analogian ison) and reciprocity 204 mark not his 'economics' but rather the cultural outlook which developed his political morality and economy. Aristotle's concern to indicate or identify the existence of antirepontos in human social relations is based upon his interest in how different 'products' in kind or quality are exchanged by different members (with different skills or crafts) of a polis. 205 When he employed the terms ergon 206 and kriton, 207 he was not interested in some merely economic outcome of the 'product' or result of work (ergon) and whether one work of labour was stronger or better (kriton) than another. Aristotle was concerned with the gamut of social relations. After having established the need for equalising or balancing the transactional relations between different people and their work, 208 Aristotle recognised that an associative relationship or dealing (koinonía) 209 did not occur between identical activities and the results of their work. This was established clearly with his example of two physicians 210 where 'like' had no need for such a transactional relationship, rather wholly different occupations whose 'product' was not equal, such as an histros and a georgos 211 needed this form of koinonia.

When Aristotle attempted to encapsulate this relationship, he turned to the term sumblēta. 212 This plural form of sumblēton symbolised the social mechanisms whereby things were made comparable or capable of being compared with another. In this sense it is a term which described the notion of something being commensurable. In the process of allāgē a measuring device or standard was needed. 213 This was more than an enquiry after the 'mechanics' of such exchange-based transactions. The term sumblēta was not an expression of mechanical relationships but the active representation of a polis' exchange relations process. Within sumblēta stood a totality of social relations, moral, social, economic.
Their political form, their 'political economy' was dependent upon the outcome of their koinōnia and allēgiē. The notions of balance or proportionate equality and antipepthonos stood out in Aristotle's inquiry into the social basis for exchange relations. Finley is right to draw our attention to the following:

(i) Antipepthonos is a term that has a technical mathematical sense, but it also has a general sense.214

and

(ii) Aristotle has been thinking aloud, so to speak, as he often does in his writings as they have come down to us, about a particular nuance or a tangential question that is troublesome; he is indulging in a highly abstract exercise, analogous to the passages in the Politics on the application of geometric proportion to public affairs.215

Aristotle's depth of analysis, his inventiveness, owes an important part of its critical energy to the strength of the intellectual culture which preceded him. The Pythagoreans' concept of reciprocity (which Aristotle did not accept), and the debate surrounding this notion, stand as a testimony to the transmission of ideas in and through a particular culture.216

The cultural milieu which gave birth to a series of notions about wealth (ploutos), its limits or otherwise,217 lived amongst the historical practices which Aristotle sought to investigate. However, the particular critical method was Aristotle's. The examples he chose were, quite literally, essential. Two aspects of physical and social well-being are incorporated in his physician's and farmer's connection through koinōnia.218 To illustrate the power of exchange relations, Aristotle chose basic conditions of settled existence to demonstrate the social base of its workings. The exchange standing between sandals (hupódēma), a dwelling (oikia) and food or sustenance (trophē), mirrored the relationships between leather-craftsman (skutotomos), builder (oikodomos) and, by association, that of the peasant farmer (geōrgos).219 The problems of ison,220 of equality or more accurately equivalency, and then the need to have these relations measured out (metreisthai)221 stood awaiting an explanation. The recognition that
dissimilar services (as Aristotle clearly viewed them) needed to be measured out spelt Aristotle's identification of different (and useful) activities within a polis and, simultaneously, the rejection of the mere appearance of such difference. He argued that in truth (alētheia) the concept of need (khreia) bound social beings together. The choice of alētheia to precede khreia, was no idle use of language; rather alētheia was intended to convey the powerful insight, the argumentative force, of a "truth" or "reality" as Aristotle saw it, as opposed to the "mere appearance" of a particular set of social relations.

Aristotle's recognition of khreia held the key to why allagē and koinōnia took place between skutotomos, oikodomos or georgos. They stood as corollaries within the daily workings of a polis formation. It is in this generic sense of proportionate, reciprocal relations that a better appreciation of Aristotle's thought can be put forward. Perhaps such a proposition can shed a little light on Finley's puzzlement over Aristotle's intentions when he deployed a form of mathematical-cum-geometrical reasoning to the practice of allagē:

I must confess that....I do not understand what the ratios between the producers can mean, but I do not rule out that 'as a builder is to a shoemaker' is somehow to be taken literally.

Aristotle had realised the significance of things being somehow (pōs) comparable for exchange to take place. He went one step further by also recognising that nomisma acted as the agent of exchange and that, once again, somehow (pōs) it acted as a mid-way point between transactions, that is, as an intermediary which performed a mediating (mason) role. Nomisma's role in 'measuring' (meτετρα) both the excess (huperokhē) and the deficiency (elleipsis) in allagē owes a deal of its power to Aristotle's earlier use of mason as an indicator of his taxonomy of values and his preferred order of balanced moral conduct in human social relations.

His examination of the forms of just and unjust conduct in polis relations led Aristotle, in terms of methodology, to consider the role nomisma played as an exchangeable agency (hupallagma) of socially given need (khreia). It arose according to agreement (kata sunthēkēn), human convention, and was given legal form and customary force through human, not natural, agency. Change was, quite literally, nomisma's determining characteristic. The act of allagē was bound by social
necessity. The very existence of organised human relations within a social framework bound the members of that system to one another. To the extent that Aristotle recognised that nomisma gained its unique place by human convention, and its usefulness or otherwise from decisions made by those within the world from which it arose, who could render or suddenly alter nomisma (metaōlein) or make (polēai) it useless (akhrēston), he was working firmly within a critical historical perspective. In his search to find the basis for antipeponthos he recognised that to ergon, 'the product' or rather the result of work of a geōrgos and skutotomos must be brought into a mutually accountable framework. Once again, Aristotle drew on everyday human endeavour, the work of leather worker and peasant farmer in his quest to explain their apparent need for commensurability (summetria). The clarity of his examples lay in their everyday resemblance to a basic set of social relations. The critique was based upon, and grew out of, observations and analyses of his own world. As Scott Meikle observed, in accounting for the confusion which surrounds Aristotle's critique and exploration of the workings of human social relations as peculiarly found in the Politics and Ethics:

Since Marx wrote, orthodox anti-Marxist thought has, in various ways ..., abstracted 'economics' from the historical and social to create it a discrete specialism, with the effect that market society and its categories no longer appear as products of historical development but as 'natural', timeless and ahistorical. It is, at bottom, this comforting tendency that has made Aristotle's chapters so imperspicuous in recent times, and it accounts in large part for the vagary and poverty that has characterised contemporary literature on them.

Aristotle's 'category', koinōnia, has misled historians of ideas who delved into the question of Aristotle's place in any history of the origins of economic thought. The associative relationship contained within the term koinōnia would not have continued between peasant farmer with his food or produce (trophē) and a leather worker with his "crafted product" (ergon), without these social relations finding a basis for agreed exchange within, as Aristotle viewed it, the realm of reciprocity. In seeking to explain what we call "the social and economic forces at work", Aristotle reached out for the term khreia. He recognised that any process of exchange was dependent upon a basis of agreement; otherwise those concerned do not take for themselves one thing in exchange for another (ouk allattontai). Whilst need (khreia)
did not account for the inner equation of human transactions, it did point towards both basic use-based exchange between people and the larger exchange of food as a necessary commodity for human social existence as given in Aristotle's direct exchange swap of wine for grain.\textsuperscript{243} Perhaps the very association of wine for grain signalled for Aristotle a particular identification and image of gregarious human existence; where local, basic exchanges, as well as larger exchanges, equally found symbolic representation and material expression in the need-based acquisition of agrarian commodities produced from dry farming agriculture, namely, cereals and wine, the staple food and drink necessary for, and representative of, a polis' daily life.\textsuperscript{244}

Here lay part of a simple and lucid model of direct exchange relations and within this model a further glimpse of Aristotle's ideology can be gleaned. The reduction of human exchange relations to a set of directly mediated exchanges enabled Aristotle to attempt two things. First, he revealed what can be called an essentialist position by his recognition that complex social relations exist to obtain apparently simple yet vital needs. To the extent that he has done this throughout this segment of the \textit{Ethics}, Aristotle has revealed his 'morality', his ideologically given moral taxonomy of values. This was not a case of what Meikle termed Finley's reduction of Aristotle's analysis to one where Aristotle was only "doing morals".\textsuperscript{245} Rather, Aristotle had a moral position, a morality, but he expressed that morality and gave it its form through an analysis which allowed him neither to divorce his moral position nor his critical analysis of the social bases for exchange relations from one another. In turning firstly to the role of \textit{khreia} and then hammering the importance of \textit{nomisma} in facilitating exchange relations (\textit{allagê})\textsuperscript{246} Aristotle had advanced his argument to the point where he was capable of a wide-ranging conceptualisation of the workings of his world.\textsuperscript{247} This was the second achievement of Aristotle's seemingly neat model of directly mediated exchange relations whose pursuit was, simply and essentially, motivated by \textit{khreia}. Exchange held Aristotle's attention and he, at the very least, realised that the imperative of a citizenry's association (\textit{koinônia}), as expressed through their human social organisation, was a function of their associative support of their social grouping and that this in turn was expressed through the practice of \textit{allagê}.\textsuperscript{248} Aristotle reached even further into
the workings of his world when he argued that _nomisma_ mediated exchange through its socially given and recognised measuring function (_metron_) and that within this relationship the process of making things commensurable (_summetra_) and establishing their commensurability (_summetria_) with one another took place. However the inner workings of _allegrē_ were dependent upon a notion of equality (_isotēs_) in practice, and in turn this _isotēs_ was dependent upon commensurability.

Whilst Aristotle did not appear to have been satisfied with his explanation of _summetria_ because, as he viewed it, he was faced with the perplexing problem of the impossibility of so many things with differences of degree and in kind being commensurable (_summetra_), he had developed his critique to the point where an abstract picture, a theoretical vision of his world was possible. It did not have to be complete, in terms of either a polished view or, at least, an internally coherent set of explanations, for Aristotle to have been engaged in a process of conceptualisation. Meikle carefully argued that "Finley's misreading of Aristotle is one to which he is driven by his adoption of the orthodox canon". By "orthodox canon" Meikle identified two general intellectual currents which have gained normative status in their relationship with the Western capitalist world in which they arose. The two principal "twentieth-century orthodoxies in the social sciences" at which Meikle aimed his critique were:

(i) the attractiveness that the Weberian conceptual framework can come to exercise, and has come to exercise on Finley and Polanyi.

(ii) (Economic analysis and theory whose) object was to make economics a mathematically 'exact' science and to disregard any qualitative content in economic phenomena.

This approach to economics (and its implications for the analysis of economies in history) was embodied "in the work of Joseph Schumpeter" and his position that, "the essence of economic relations lay simply in a relation 'between economic quantities'."

Finley's conscious adoption of, and preference for, a Weberian socio-historical method, his conscious and unconscious adoption of market-centred economics and analysis led him to declare from the vantage point of his Weltanschauung:
I would be prepared to argue that without the concept of relevant 'laws' (or 'statistical uniformities' if one prefers) it is not possible to have a concept of 'the economy'. However, I shall be content here merely to insist that the ancients did not (rather than could not) have the concept, and to suggest where the explanation lies.258

Finley's argument has effectively avoided and obfuscated Aristotle's conceptually peculiar (or unique) examination of a polis social formation. This is to be regretted especially because of Finley's enormous contributions to social and economic history and especially the history of ideas in Greco-Roman antiquity. Finley has been in the vanguard of an intellectual struggle to comprehend Greek and Roman societies within their own historical environment and, equally significantly, in dissecting contributions by 'modern' and contemporary scholars of these worlds. Yet, Finley passed by the discovery of use-value and exchange-value relations within polis experience precisely because Aristotle's critique was based upon an historically particular, as well as an idealised, moral view of his world's social ordering: not a set of seemingly timeless "relevant 'laws'" or "statistical uniformities". Aristotle's critique remained incomplete. Yet, its intellectual audacity should not be passed by or dismissed as curiously incomprehensible and puzzling. Aristotle's picture of what constituted a series of 'social' and 'economic' relations and the manner in which they found or expressed their ideological form was dependent upon (and a result of) the moral beliefs and values which arose from a Greek culture. Aristotle's conceptual appreciation of his world necessarily arose from the perceptive environment of 'classical' Greek experience. Aristotle's ideas were not so much the result of an autochthonous intellectual at work, rather his 'political economy' emerged from a fiercely autonomous critique sprung from a deep sense of intellectual autarky.

Aristotle accepted that, in terms of his own category (khereia), its imperative force impelled the existence of adequately or sufficiently (hikanôs) purposeful social relations of exchange.259 This was a simple recognition of basic exchange relations in terms of a model based upon direct daily exchange-related actions. By grasping the open role of nomisma in social relations (whose role was directly facilitated by the use of coined money), Aristotle also recognised and accepted the symbolic
power of nomisma in the process of its helping make something commensurable. To the extent that Aristotle recognised the symbolic equation of exchangeable things through the measuring capacity of money, Aristotle was thinking aloud in a moral as well as a logical-analogical, philosophical sense. It is this particular form of reasoning which was infused simultaneously with a moral position and a logical form for this attempted exploration of social relations, which was peculiarly Aristotle's. Hence the form of Aristotle's reasoning should not appear so surprising to the eyes of an historian of ideas. Given that the problem of measuring, in the sense of arriving at a balance and an understanding of exchange-related phenomena, was in the forefront of Aristotle's reasoning, we need to ask why. Aristotle's critique has stated carefully that dikaios was to be found as an intermediate position (meson) between gain and loss. This moral and philosophical position was carried over into his critique of the workings of the active process of exchange (allaktikos) but it was carefully qualified. The particular form of reciprocity for exchange-based relations was given definition by reference to a proportional set of relations (analogia): not one arrived at by reference to an equality of ratios or proportion (isotes).

Aristotle's attempt to explore the problem of summetria ultimately fell back onto the stark and seemingly literal equation of letting "a" be an oikia, "b" mna deka and "c" a klinai, and thus his argument established that allagê could be facilitated by, and understood in terms of, coined money value or a direct barter equivalency.

This conclusion marked the extent, the limit of Aristotle's understanding of the problem of things being commensurable (summetra) and consequently of the social actions which established that commensurability. Aristotle had rather grasped the facility with which nomisma moved into and subsequently continued and extended the movement of the allagê paradigm. Whilst the problem of summetria had (in theoretical terms) run aground, he switched his attention to the surface mechanisms which helped equate the exchange of one thing for another. Aristotle clearly accepted that exchange mechanisms which incorporated direct use-value predated nomisma-based exchange. Aristotle's analogy of an oikia, mna deka and a klinai represented (Commodity - Money - Commodity) exchange based upon nomisma at a most basic level. The only
simpler model left was that of direct barter where use-value was exchanged for use-value (Commodity - Commodity) or one thing for another.\textsuperscript{269}

Aristotle's use of his \textit{oikia}, \textit{mnaï deka} and \textit{klinē} analogy constituted not only a switch in theoretical exploration but also reasserted the paradigmatic force of his \textit{oikos}-centred and \textit{koinōnia}-based polis formation. By looking at the relationship of an \textit{oikia} to \textit{mnaï deka} and a \textit{klinē}, Aristotle was attempting to unravel the conduct of daily exchange relations through an analysis of the standing of surface phenomena to one another. No longer able to progress with \textit{summetria} he reverted to the apparent primacy of daily exchange relations. Aristotle had appreciated that exchange relations were conducted on a strict basis not of \textit{isotēs} but \textit{analogia},\textsuperscript{270} and to this end that the worth (\textit{axia}) of a thing, such as a dwelling (\textit{oikia}) or a dual-purpose bed or couch (\textit{klinē}), was determined by a material value placed upon that useful article for human existence.\textsuperscript{271} This is the key to understanding the general force of his particular statement that an \textit{oikia}'s \textit{axia} was given as half of \textit{mnaï deka} and hence was 'equal' or formed an equivalent measure (\textit{ison}) to the value of five \textit{mnaï}.\textsuperscript{272} In turn, Aristotle postulated from that premise that a \textit{klinē} was a tenth part of 'b' (ten \textit{mnaï}), that is, one \textit{mne}, and that its equivalence to an \textit{oikia} was represented by five \textit{klinai}.\textsuperscript{273} This position of Aristotle's was in no way related to a theory of prices; nor was that its purpose.\textsuperscript{274} At stake here was a simple expression of the workings of \textit{allagē} with or without the presence of \textit{nomisma}.

In the end Aristotle has returned to the logical and moral imperatives expressed by his organic or idealised, archetypal 'nature'-based approach to the question of a polis social formation. His argument that the polis was held together proportionately by conducting one's associative exchange relations\textsuperscript{275} according to the principle and practice of \textit{antipolein},\textsuperscript{276} was an affirmation of cultural unity within a polis. In this sense, Aristotle stood firmly within a world which asserted the cultural supremacy of polis forms of human social existence.\textsuperscript{277} The particular social character of a polis was given normative ideological expression by Aristotle when he made it quite clear that his exploration of \textit{antipepeonhos} and \textit{to dikaión} was not conducted within a political vacuum. This was carefully spelt out by Aristotle's drawing our
attention to the purpose of his investigation. Aristotle reminded the reader that it was necessary not to allow it to escape one's attention,278 that the process or rather the matter of inquiry and question in hand (to ἀπουσίαν)279 was not only concerned with the question of absolute justice, or justice without qualification (to ἡπλῆς dikaios).280 Aristotle had a particular focus upon to politikon dikaios,281 or justice within the political boundaries of one's citizenry. In this specific sense, Aristotle had a general 'historical' perspective in that his attention was directed towards a polis formation, and his theoretical explorations were not historically timeless.282 In this sense also Aristotle had a moral position, an approach to a polis formation which, as well as being very much a painstaking creation of his own, remained firmly within the conceptual orbit of a polis world. This was clearly spelt out in his argument that to politikon dikaios was given expression when it based itself upon an associative life (eip koinonon biou) which in turn aimed towards self-sufficiency (pros to einai autarkian).283

Aristotle was thinking from, and writing very much within, the experiential field provided by the polis world. There was no question of discarding or looking outside polis forms. At question here was not just any associative principle in the conduct of polis life; rather the social bases for living were being defined or rather carefully redefined around the thesis of autarkia. Between the twin concepts, epi koinonon biou and autarkia, a host of necessary activities or practices for social existence have been characterised. Within the range of these twin concepts were practices which incorporated elements of what we can describe as social, political, economic and ideological behaviour. Aristotle had placed dikaios in a specific, if broad, context and argued that its model form was to be located within a gamut of social relations, whose aim was self-sufficiency. Aristotle's moral, argumentative power, the method of his critique, was powerfully expressed and given its unique form through the particular and creative manner in which words and phrases were deployed when he aired his ideas.

It is within this context where cultural and historical experience and understanding walk hand-in-hand that both Finley and Meikle's argument over what Aristotle was attempting to do in these sections of the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics need to be partially applied if a
fuller understanding of Aristotle's critical method, his intellectual path, is to be more effectively grasped and better mapped. Aristotle's moral taxonomy of values, his ideological attachment to a model polis form, clearly coloured his critique. However, the colouring produced by his especial use of language did not necessarily mean that Aristotle's aim was solely or simply that of moral criticism. For Aristotle moral or rather ideologically-influenced judgements, often but far from always of a normative kind, were an integral part and a function of his critical method. His analysis ultimately turned upon the standing of citizens to each other and citizens qua citizens only became comprehensible when their social relations with their oikos/polis world were laid bare. The emphasis placed upon a 'free' ideology and generic equal standing (eleutherōn kai iaśn),²⁸⁴ whether these social relations were based upon values expressed in terms of proportion and progression or on a purely arithmetic social formula,²⁸⁵ made the primacy of Aristotle's citizens abundantly clear. The centrality of a polis citizen and the universe of a polis mode of life were never in doubt but rather were subjected to investigation, analysis and criticism. The basic forms of polis life, in so far as they were identified by a set of social relations which were capable of being equated to either those based upon a set of qualitative relations or a set of quantitative relations, as epitomised by the terms analogia and arithmos,²⁸⁶ formed the outer limits to Aristotle's inquiry. Aristotle's polis paradigm was very much the intellectual and cultural outcome of his historical world.
APPENDIX I

The roles of barley and wheat in the ancient Mediterranean world and the controversy surrounding ancient cereal production is discussed by Naum Jasny, To Live Long Enough: The Memoirs of Naum Jasny. Scientific Analyst, edited, with Biographical Commentaries by Betty A. Laird and Roy D. Laird (University Press of Kansas, 1976). Jasny was impressed by Zimmern's general outlook on life in ancient Athens, pp.97-98 and acknowledged that his primary concern was the physical, material conditions of life in the ancient Mediterranean. Hence it is not surprising that Jasny admired A. Zimmern's The Greek Commonwealth: Politics and Economics in Fifth-Century Athens (O.U.P., 1st edition 1917, 4th ed., 1951, reprinted 1969), especially sentiments such as 'the incredible poverty of the world (that is, Athens) in which we shall be moving.' (p.214)

Jasny saw himself as a scientist who worked towards forming a more realistic picture of ancient Mediterranean existence:

'A reviewer of my The Wheats of Classical Antiquity emphasised the most general point which can be made on the basis of my work. He said that the book was a step forward in bringing realism into history. If my memory does not fail me, he spoke of elimination of romanticism from history.' (p.95).

Jasny then added, by way of footnote:

'What a pity to have misplaced the most favourable review of any of my books, I do not even remember the name of the reviewer or the journal in which the review was published.'

See also, pp.84-106 of the above work. For Jasny's scientific work in the ancient Mediterranean see, "The Wheats of Classical Antiquity", The John Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, ser. 52, No. 3 (1942).

On the debate over barley, wheat and their agrarian spread, forms of cereal consumption, and agrarian conditions generally see the following sample of literature.


(ii) N. Jasny, "The Daily Bread of the Ancient Greeks and Romans", Osiris (1950), pp.227-253


Jasny's significance to a history of cereal agriculture in Greco-Roman antiquity rests in his carefully argued scholarship which demonstrates that barley played a dominant role in ancient Greece's cereal production. Jasny argued that this was an outcome of specific environmental conditions as well as human constraints born out of local agrarian (peasant farming) survival. Wheat of the emmer group (with the interesting exceptions of Egypt and Italy) remained, generally speaking, in second place of importance throughout classical antiquity and certainly was most highly regarded by both Greeks and Romans: N. Jasny, "The Daily Bread of the Ancient Greeks and Romans", pp. 230-233; N. Jasny, "Competition Among Grains in Classical Antiquity", pp. 749-758; N. Jasny, *The Wheats of Classical Antiquity*, pp. 26-37.

Jasny saw that environmental conditions were intimately linked to daily cereal production practices. To write a history of Greco-Roman cereal agriculture an historian must recognize the interrelationships of environment, land use, culture and technology. As a valuable step forward in this quest, Jasny aimed to provide an effective dash of agrarian realism by placing Greco-Roman cereal agriculture within its own peculiar environmental-cum-historical milieu: N. Jasny, "The Daily Bread of the Ancient Greeks and Romans", supra.
APPENDIX II

Autarkia: Further notes on its cultural and historical context

The concept of self-sufficiency in Greece during the fifth- and fourth-centuries B.C. has an integral place within Greek thought and its cultural world-view. When Solonian wisdom argued, as reported by Herodotos, that no one was sufficient (autarkēs) in oneself (Hdt.I.32.8-9), it was not a concept that was to disappear from Greek experience. For its logical but far more conceptually developed successor was Aristotle's notion of autarkia. Self-sufficiency represented for Aristotle not the capacity of a self-supporting individual but the relationship of oikoi and polis and their material potential to harness the means by which their society could necessarily renew itself (Arist.Pol.,1256b26-31). However, there was a limit to the amount of useful property that was needed to provide the necessary level of self-sufficiency for Aristotle's good life (Arist.Pol.,1256b 31-34ff) within a polis.

Aristotle's concept of self-sufficiency could only be given an adequate explanation if Aristotle's reader was made aware of the limited world of goods and property required to achieve a self-sufficient social ideal. The argument was as much the product of an ethical outlook on the roles of the citizenry and their oikoi within a polis as it was an argument for a preferred conduct of political life in the fullest sense of that term. Aristotle did not reject the material world which constituted his polis cosmos. Rather, in his critique, he sought to realign his polis world by presenting it with a model for its continual renewal. Wealth-getting (khrōmatistikē: Arist.Pol.,1256b(0-1257a1) and a man's acquisitive, grasping behaviour, as represented by the term pleonektēs (Arist.EN129b1-4ff), were rejected as desirable social ends in themselves. In this spirit of intellectual antipathy, autarkia became a model concept which stood in the vanguard of Aristotle's critique of polis existence. Autarkia was, at once, the central and the ideal representative of Aristotle's venture into the social engineering of the polis formation.

What then, were the general and peculiar origins of autarkia which, by dint of Aristotle's deployment of this term, spelt a self-contained cosmos? Autarkia grew from within a cultural and
historical environment which, whilst often intellectually adventurous, was characterized by the caution inherent in daily life within an agrarian world. This particular agrarian world was in turn circumscribed by its physical and cultural borders, the boundaries which formed the limits of a polis. That is, these boundaries formed the physical and psychological limits to, and defences of, intellectual and practical actions which emerged from a polis world-view. As Bloch succinctly observed in *The Historian's Craft* (p.80):

Above and beyond the peculiarities of individuals of every age, there are states of mind which were formerly common, yet which appear peculiar to us because we no longer share them.

For an insight into the intellectual milieu which gave birth to the notion of *autarkia* an enquirer would be well-advised to turn to the folkloric traditions which were represented by and associated themselves with the name of Solon.

Solonian wisdom, as generally represented by Herodotos and Aristotle (Hdt.I.30-32; *Arist.Pol.*,1256b33-34), is concerned with the conflict between limited and limitless wealth and its relationship to the maintenance of human well-being and happiness within the boundaries of a polis. This simultaneously moral and philosophical outlook found its logical centre and cultural heart expressed within Aristotle's use of *autarkia*. For Aristotle, self-sufficiency was an ideal expression of a whole, and therefore, complete universe of human relationships (*Arist.Pol.*,1252b27-1253a1; *Arist.EN*1097b6-8ff).

Of equal importance, Aristotle recognised the centrality of agrarian production in daily life (*Arist.Pol.*,1256a38-40) but he did not disassociate this everyday productive activity from its immediate and broad human social environments, the *oikos* and polis (note the general argument and context of *Arist.Pol.*,1256a-1258a38). In this sense, there is a cultural and historical continuum between the agrarian outlooks and moral world-views of Hesiod and Aristotle. Hesiod's wisdom or, rather, astute peasant observations on agrarian survival, found agreeable philosophical companionship with Aristotle's critique of the Solonian view of *ploutos* in Aristotle's *Politics*. It is worth noting the intellectual symmetry of *Arist.Pol.*,1252b9-14 and *Arist.Pol.*,1256b26-34. For Aristotle, both these sources of Greek wisdom and traditional
values spelt not only an association with the continuity of Greek cultural experience but also signalled his belief that the world of limited needs was to be upheld as the model for polis existence (Arist.Pol., 1256b26-34).

Whilst Aristotle recognized that the pursuit of material wealth as an end in itself certainly existed within his own world (Arist.Pol., 1256b40-1257a1), he held to an autarkic peasant world-view. Yet, of course, this world-view did not prevent Aristotle from commencing a formative analysis and critique of this 'new' phenomenon. However, continuity rather than change, limits rather than limitlessness, characterized his model of oikos and polis harmony. Nor was this philosophical and political belief system sprung from a naïve view of the social and historical character of internal and external polis history.

Aristotle well understood the general historical environment within which a polis sought to maintain its existence. The principal forces which characterized this historical environment had a direct impact upon Aristotle's polis world-view which, in turn, was intimately associated with his support for an autarkic polis.

I turn to a consideration of the relationships of these forces to Aristotle's development of autarkia. Warfare between poleis was an everyday reality of Greek historical life and its ever-present menace bred a certain bellicose resilience in Aristotle's view of his own world. To take one example. Whilst the martial outlook of polis societies can be accepted as given and readily finds explicit support in Arist.Pol., 1254b30-32; 1256b23-26; 1265a20-28; 1327a40-1327b6, it is but one of three primary, contributory factors to Aristotle's ideas of self-sufficiency.

The second contributory factor resides in the notion of territorialism. In this context, territorialism can be defined simply as the defence of a polis' borders from disputes over boundaries or external threats of encroachment from a neighbouring (but not necessarily benign) polis or combination of poleis. Aristotle's discussion of territorialism was closely associated with the historical experiences of the polis. A significant reminder of the impact of these experiences upon a polis' historical fortunes can be found in a prime example of border politics-as-territorialism as recorded by Thucydides, I.103.4. Here Thucydides reported upon the impact of a boundary dispute between Corinth and Megara.
and how Athens' intervention in support of Megara was, whilst timely for Megara, a long-burning fuse attached to Corinth's animosity towards the Athenian polis. However, the notion of territorialism did not reside exclusively in the realm of historical incidents. Territorialism was given a theoretical dimension in the philosophical and political writings of Aristotle and Plato (Arist.Pol., 1265a10-20; Plato, Rep., 422-423, and note 373). Of course, as the previous references indicate, this did not mean that Plato and Aristotle were as one on the subject of polis and territory. In terms of Plato's schema of a model polis, Aristotle argued against Plato along the following lines: a large population and that population's need for a large territorial space carried within itself very intellectual conception potentially insuperable problems of scale. The Mediterranean polis was a limited, known world governed by agrarian routine and tradition rather than a ready harbinger of social experimentation. In an elemental sense, historical experience and theoretical inquiry were the intellectual mentors of autarkeia.

The third factor which contributed to the notion of autarkeia was land. Every polis and its oikoi needed land and a preferably well-regulated land tenure and inheritance structure if it hoped to perpetuate itself successfully. Without this socio-legal balance, a polis and its oikoi, and hence, its citizen manpower, were directly endangered. (Note Arist.Pol., 1265a18-20; 1270a15-39 and see earlier re Sparta, Aristotle and the demise of the Spartiate population base pp.46-52).

Aristotle's advocacy of autarkeia as an ideal polis form of existence was premised not on any supposed but anachronistic notions of 'conservatism'. Rather, his preference for an autarkic model of social existence arose from his moral view of the world. That this can be called 'conservative' misses the point or obscures the fact that his idea of self-sufficiency arose from a notion of the polis as a model for citizen life which sought renewal rather than expansion. This was a view of the polis which was philosophically coloured by the notion of the polis as a continuum in Greek social experience. It should be remembered that our contemporary notions of 'conservatism' and, for that matter, 'radicalism' still have a concept of progress inherent within them. Aristotle's morality arose from his view that material relations should serve as a means to an end, namely, the reproduction of the oikos and the polis, not as ends in themselves.
Aristotle's morality was inseparable from his intellectual advocacy of balanced and harmonious decisions which reproduced a preferred ideal polis formation (Arist.Pol., 1256b26-39; the polis itself was an ideal form: 1252b27-30). Aristotle's use of the term autarkeia reflected an intellectual capacity to incorporate with seeming ease a preferred moral order of the world within a carefully structured critique of the polis. Yet, Aristotle's model polis was not the work of a dispassionate philosopher; it was the product of an intellectual commitment.

Aristotle's model polis was an autarkic ideal which was dependent upon the culture of its polis citizen environment and cannot be extricated from it. Without that environment self-sufficiency would have been a nonsense. The drive for self-sufficiency could only be perceived within a context which accepted that human beings were social beings who were self-defined within the political orbit of a polis world (Arist.Pol., 1252b30-1253a3; EN 1097b6-11). In other words, notions of self-sufficiency were not expressions of a singular, isolated existence (Arist.Pol., 1253a3-4ff; 1253a25-29; EN Ibid.); they were only germane to a gregarious existence within a polis. Within this context, it must be clearly recognized that Aristotle's ideal world was connected by the dual carriage-way which existed between a self-sufficient existence in society and its relationship to the realisation-in-society of prosperity and happiness, eudaimonia (Arist.EN 1097b6-21). Eudaimonia found its fulfilment in its accomplishment of a self-sufficient standing. Further, a self-sufficient life could only be understood within the context of the full social life of a citizen. In turn, a citizen's life, by definition, included the gamut of relationships within the citizen's own oikos as well as his external household relationships with those citizens with whom he had formed close personal and political associations, his philoi (Arist.EN 1097b8-11). These relationships constituted the cultural realm of the polis and the social world within which autarkeia was given place and meaning within a particular historical time.

The polis represented the pinnacle of a structured series of social relations-in-society which aimed to make its citizenry more self-sufficient (Arist.Pol., 1261b11-15). To the extent that this was achieved,
qualitatively and quantitatively, a polis was described as being in a more independent or self-reliant mode of existence (Arist. Pol., 1261b12-13 and note 1252b27-1253a2). Aristotle's concept of self-sufficiency was formed by a combination of moral and economic (and hence political) behaviours which sought to realize a philosophical ideal within the cultural context of Greek social existence, the polis. In this sense, whilst self-sufficiency remained an ideal goal as well as a paradigm, it never put aside or over-turned the world of necessary relations of exchange (Arist. Pol., 1257a28-30). Aristotle's critique of the polis world did not reject the need for useful goods and property in daily life; it viewed them as tools or means to an end. The parameters of human, that is, citizen happiness, were given by the polis as a self-sufficient, gregarious entity. Aristotle's model polis world was as much constrained by cultural and intellectual boundaries as it was restrained by the physical borders and scale of any given historical polis.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

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2. Hdt. I. 1-2. Roth and Wittich's edition of Weber's contribution to "the sociological imagination" (p.xxxiii), Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, 2 vols., edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (University of California Press, 1978), can add to our understanding of a history of sex and gender relations. For instance, Weber argued, vol.1, p.357, "Of all the relationships arising from sexual intercourse, only the mother-child relationship is 'natural', because it is a biologically based household unit that lasts until the child is able to search for means of subsistence on his own." Male authority and sexual dominance were (and are) closely related phenomena and, while Weber was examining the household, his remarks are relevant to the question of the relationship of authority and violence: vol.1, pp.363-364, "The earliest substantial inroads into unmitigated communist house authority proceed not directly from economic motives but apparently from the development of exclusive sexual claims of the male over women subjected to their authority."

3. Hdt. I.1-2


5. Ibid.


7. Hdt. I.2ff. However, fear of women's sexuality and male sexual violence towards women have many origins and played a prominent part in the ancients' social imagination. See Peter Walcot, "Herodotus On Rape", Archaia, vol.11 (1978), pp.137-147. In Herodotus I.2ff, we are dealing with an anthropology of the ancient intellect as well as the beginnings of an historical interpretation of ancient 'Mediterranean' societies. See Claude Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, trans. Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf (Great Britain, 1st pub., 1963, 1977). As Lévi-Strauss put it in his introductory chapter, "History and Anthropology", p.17:

Moreover, what does the historian do when he studies documents if not to surround himself with the testimony of amateur ethnographers, who were often as far removed from the culture they described as is the modern investigator from the Polynesians or Pygmies? Would the historian of ancient Europe have made less progress if Herodotus, Diodorus, Plutarch, Saxo Grammaticus and Nestorius had been professional
ethnographers, familiar with the difficulties of field-work and trained in objective observation. Far from distrusting ethnographers, the historian concerned about the future of his discipline should heartily welcome them.


8. Hdt. I.1-4. The complexity of the exchange of women and women's roles in "the economy of reproduction" deserve closer analysis in studies of the ancient world. As Claude Meillassoux put it, p.163,

Genetic reproduction is inadequate to fit the reproduction and growth of a functional agricultural community: communities derive from agricultural relations and not the reverse. Genetics ensure the natural reproduction of the population on a large scale, not the structural reproduction of the limited functional unit. Natural reproduction must be corrected ceaselessly through co-option of members born outside the community. Adoption of children, of war captives, clientage, sometimes the gift of a spouse are means to correct an unfavourable balance.

Social reproduction of the community is consequently a political endeavour and not a natural process. It favours on all counts the authority of the senior.


14. K.J. Dover, Greek Homosexuality (London, 1978), p.2 makes it quite clear in his important work on Greek homosexuality that: all Greek art, literature and archival material, with the exception of a little poetry surviving only in fragments and citations, was the work of males, and the evidence bearing upon female sexuality of any kind is exiguous by comparison with the superabundant evidence for male homosexuality. See also, Dover's small (for reasons of evidence) but prescient section devoted to the subject of "Women and Homosexuality", pp.171-184.

15. Walcot, p.141.

16. Hesiod, Malsampeia, fr.3 trans. Hugh G. Evelyn-White (Loeb ed.), pp.262-265. Melampodeia, fr.3 can be located in the authoritative Fragmenta Hesiodea, ed. R. Merkelbach and M.L. West (O.U.P., 1967), Melangepia, 275. Hereafter referred to as Merkelbach and West, Fragmenta Hesiodea. Hereafter all works and fragments attributed to Hesiod will be referred to by their abbreviated titles (after initial citation) as given in H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford, 1940, revised edition; reprinted with a supplement 1968; 1973). P. Walcot, op. cit., pp.141; 147. Note 5, should be given credit for his analysis of Teiresias' statement on the male-female sexual dichotomy. However, Walcot did not need to reduce the Greek to a percentage (90%). A simple translation which expressed itself by using terms such as 'parts', 'portions' or a 'scale' of pleasure, would have more accurately reflected Teiresias' assessment of woman's pleasure in sexual intercourse in comparison to that of man's.


18. See Hdt. I.1.3-4; I.2.1; I.5.1-2; I.5.3.

19. Hdt. VII.152.3. For another less direct example, I.5.3. Ste. Croix, "Herodotos", not only singled out Herodotos' role in the birth of an historical methodology, he also acknowledged Herodotos' contribution to the beginnings of a scientific method, pp.130-137. Of equal importance is Ste. Croix's perceptive examination of Herodotos' religious outlook which was, in a sense, the ideological framework from and within which he thought and wrote, pp.138ff.


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22. Hdt. I.1.1-4, made it clear that only one ship was involved in this incident.


27. Ibid.

28. Ibid. Glover rightly criticised Gomperz when he observed that Herodotus' Io story had many levels of meaning to it; he (Herodotus) uses myth to widen the historical horizon but in a petty style, as the Io story shows; so says Gomperz, but perhaps the Io story shows something else, if you look at it again.


35. Ibid.

36. Hes. *Th.*, 590-612. Hesiod's cosmogony was vitally concerned with the antagonism of man and woman. Marylin B. Arthur, "Early Greece: The Origins of the Western Attitude Toward Women", *Arethusa*, Vol.6.1 (1973), pp.7-58; on Hesiod, pp.19-27. However, Arthur should steer clear of unfortunate, unnecessary and misplaced analogies to our own world and its Western concepts of a nuclear family and aggressive individualism, as well as using terms such as "middle class" and "bourgeois", p.23. See also Arthur's note 59b.
37. Hes. Th., 603-607.

38. Hes. Th., 610. The problem of hereditary succession and the division of property were constants in a landed peasant's existence. The necessity for a wife, children and a household remained, for Hesiod, an omnipresent, albeit mixed blessing, Hes. 600-612.

39. The dispute between Hesiod and Perses is a case in point: Hes. Works and Days, 10ff; 27ff; 213ff; 274ff; 286ff; 299ff; 397ff.


41. Hes. Th., 459ff.

42. Hes. Th., 411-428.

43. David M. Schaps, Economic Rights of Women in Ancient Greece (Edinburgh U.P., 1979), p.48. Schaps has provided classical studies with a fundamental social and economic history. Greek women are given particular historical contexts and they are seen to have played important visible roles in ancient Greek societies. The legal, political and economic roles of women in inheritance/dowry and property relations become a part of a comparative history of Greek daily life.

44. Hes. Th., 426-438.

45. Hes. Th., 442-443. Whether this reference was meant to be interpreted as a more generalised moral lesson or, more immediately, as a fishermen's image - the catch within the grasp of their nets, yet it still managed to elude them - the final result was of a prize escaping the competitive resources of men because the goddess wished it so. Hekate could just as easily give and take away favours.

46. Hes. Th., 444-452.


48. David M. Schaps, pp.85-86; 88; 90. Of course, while the Greeks systematised and regulated (that is attempted to rationalise) their world by the application of laws to govern a particular society (Schaps, p.90), this did not mean that polis formations were worlds without more irrational and mysterious sides to their behaviour. See E.R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (University of California Press, 1951 1st edition, 1973).

50. Hdt. I.31.1


52. Hdt. I.31.2.


55. Hdt. I.31.5.


59. Hdt. I.30.4-5.

60. Hdt. I.30.5.

61. Ibid.

62. Hdt. I.31.2-5; I.30.4-5.

63. Hdt. I.32. On the roles of *sumphora*, chance, circumstance and one's 'lot' or 'fortune' see Ste. Croix, "Herodotos", pp.140-141ff; Lateiner, *op. cit*.

64. J. Lawrence Angel, "Ecology and Population in the Eastern Mediterranean", *World Archaeology* 4 (1972), pp.88-105. In Table 28 (pp.94-95) he suggested that the life-span (longevity) of an adult in classical Greece was on average for a man 44.5 years and for a woman 34.6 years. Interestingly, the male figure is a higher average than that of the male in Hellenistic (42.6) or Imperial Roman times (40.2). Women, on the other hand increased their average age in Hellenistic times (36.6) and then during the Imperial Roman period declined to a little less than that prevailing in classical times (34.3). However caution is warranted, as Angel pointed out, in regard to population density guesstimations (p.96) and estimates of female mortality in the younger (middle) age groups (15-29 years) because of particular social practices, such as the erection of tombstones in memoriam. See Sarah B. Pomeroy, p.169 and pp.68ff for discussion of Angel's and her own demographic speculation.
Notes to pages 11-14

65. Hdt. I.32.4-8ff.
66. Hdt. I.32.5-6.
67. Hdt. I.32.5.
68. Ibid. H.R. Immerwahr, Form and Thought in Herodotus (Western Reserve University, 1966), pp. 154-161, on Herodotos' Solon-Kroisos episode as parable.
70. G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, "Greek and Roman Accounting", in A.C. Littleton, and F.S. Yamey Studies in the History of Accounting (London, 1956), pp. 14-74. Here, Ste. Croix outlined in some detail the problems associated with Greco-Roman accounting and mathematical notation. The ancients' complicated (and repetitive) systems of acrophonic and alphabetic numeral notation, the absence of place-value and their impact upon ancient numbering systems and their ordering are closely examined, pp. 50-61. Ste. Croix has commenced a general enquiry into the 'numerical' or rather 'number' ordering processes involved in Greco-Roman social and economic life.
72. Hdt. I.32.3.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. Hdt. I.32.4.
76. Hdt. I.32.5.
77. Hdt. I.32.6.
78. Ibid.
79. Hdt. I.32.5.
Notes to pages 14-15

(i) "Objectivity" in Social Science and Social Policy"
(ii) "Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences"
(iii) "The Meaning of 'Ethical Neutrality' in Sociology and Economics".

Max Weber's contributions to the study of history and sociology warrant much further elaboration but this is not the place for such a voyage. However, one further glimpse of his preoccupation with the method or approach by which one seeks to apprehend history deserves our attention:

Whoever accepts the proposition that the knowledge of historical reality can or should be a 'presuppositionless' copy of 'objective' facts, will deny the value of the ideal-type....The construction of abstract ideal-types recommends itself not as an end but as a means. Every conscientious examination of the conceptual elements of historical exposition shows however that the historian as soon as he attempts to go beyond the bare establishment of concrete relationships and to determine the cultural significance of even the simplest individual event in order to 'characterize' it, must use concepts which are precisely and unambiguously definable only in the form of ideal types. Or are concepts such as 'individualism', 'imperialism', 'feudalism', 'mercantilism', 'conventional', etc., and innumerable concepts of like character by means of which we seek analytically and empathically to understand reality constructed substantively by the 'presuppositionless' description of some concrete phenomenon or through the abstract synthesis of those traits which are common to numerous concrete phenomena? (p.92).

Weber was an intellectual "mandarin" who displayed not only formidable scholarship but also actively confronted and operated from within very late nineteenth-and early twentieth-century German political and academic arenas. See introduction to Weber's Economy and Society, op. cit., by Guenther Roth, pp.xxxiii-cx and John Torrance, "Max Weber: methods and the man", Archives: Européennes De Sociologie, vol.xv, No.1 (1974), pp.127-165.

84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. Hdt. I.32.9.
87. Ibid.
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89. Hes. Th., 453, ἡκίν ἡς ἐν ἡμέριον ἱόν.
90. Hes. Th., 453-467; 467-506.
91. Hes. Th., 511-514.
92. Hes. Th., 512.
93. Ibid.
94. See Appendix I.
95. N. Jasny, To Live Long Enough, pp.95-96; see also p.93.
96. Ibid., pp.96-99ff.
97. Ibid., pp.95-96. An extensive quotation from N. Jasny's memoirs will repay the reader's efforts many times over. Jasny's straightforward style and his ability to relay clearly specialized knowledge, has helped to add considerable depth to any new attempts at writing a cultural, social or economic history of the Greeks or Romans within an ancient Mediterranean environmental context. When one is trying to uncover the cultural and material world within which the ideas or values behind an ancient social formation arose, Jasny's contribution has the value of being concrete. He gave a specific description of the ancients' agrarian world and provided a coherent and general picture of the environmental conditions which governed the ancients' cereal production. Jasny wrote as follows (p.97):

> The maza, of which the sources seem to leave any doubt that it was the standard food from grain in Athens in the time of its glory and that it was made from unshifted barley meal, must have been a very poor foodstuff....

(p.97) The food made from grain was considerably better in Rome than in Greece. A large part of it was made from wheat. Shortly before the time of Pliny a shift had been made to leavened bread. But white bread was a rarity even then .... Bread was made in Rome also from bran (Panis furfureus) and by no means for dietetic reasons.

(p.99) Barley or wheat. Of specified problems of the type described, (sic) the competition between wheat and barley was given considerable attention in my work. Barley may be preferred to wheat as feed for animals in spite of the higher nutritive value of the latter. As food for humans, barley is definitely inferior to wheat, especially in competition with fermented wheat bread. If barley is grown for food in quantity , it is because the
people cannot afford the burden of the inferiority of wheat as a farm crop as compared with barley. Barley has a shorter growing period than wheat, and moreover, it makes a much faster start immediately after seeding, when moisture is normally more plentiful. This is the reason why barley may completely escape the effect of a midsummer drought which would ruin a wheat crop. Even in terms of weight the yield of barley per acre is therefore normally larger or much larger than that of wheat. The competition of barley with wheat is particularly strong in areas of Mediterranean climate, due largely to the seasonal distribution of precipitation but also because barley thrives more than wheat in alkaline, neutral, or only slightly acid soils, the typical soils of the areas of Mediterranean climate. Lighter soils, widespread in the Mediterranean region, also are better adapted to barley than wheat.

In this context, Gomez's figures for barley and wheat production in Attica, his figures and conclusions drawn from evidence of Greek agrarian conditions in the early 1920's and his study of imports of 'corn' (emmer) must be considered warily, A.W. Comme, The Population of Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C. (Oxford, 1933, reprinted 1967), pp.24-35.

Gomez's agrarian exploration and population inquiries deserve a fresh scholarly investigation in their own right with an eye to the methods and context, the environment in which Gomez composed his study of the populousness (to borrow from Hume) of ancient Athens.

98. Jasny, To Live Long Enough, pp.99; 100-101; 101-102; 103-105. Jasny criticised (i) Tenney Frank's An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome (Vol.3, 1937, reprinted 1959, p.176) for lack of an examination of barley production in the economy of Roman Spain; (ii) the mistaken translation and belief of Leonard R. Palmer, Mycenaeans and Minoans: Aegean Prehistory in the Light of the Linear B Tablets (New York, 1963), p.102, that wheat prevailed in the Mycenaeans' and Minoans' worlds; (iii) R.G. Collingwood's assumption in T. Frank's, An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome, Vol.3, reprinted 1959, p.78, that "The normal crop was common wheat" in Roman Britain; (iv) and last, delivered a gentle chiding to L.A. Moritz, Grain Mills and Flour in Classical Antiquity (O.U.P., 1958) for assuming (pp.158-159; 178) that the Romans, in particular, practiced repeated grinding and hence produced very fine flour – the reverse was closer to the truth. In fairness to Moritz, repeated grinding of wheat appears to have an historical basis in both the literary evidence of Seneca (p.157) and from careful reconstruction of Roman grinding processes (via experiment) based upon ancient literary, and importantly, archaeological evidence (pp.178-180ff). The question of repeated grinding remains an interesting problem.

"History, as I understand it, is concerned with the study, not of a series of past events, but of the life of society..."

Tawney further argued, p.56,

"I will only say that the view on which interesting, if sometimes, perhaps, needlessly portentous, works have been written - the view that the subject-matter of history precludes generalisation - is not one which I share."

Significantly, Tawney observed, simply and succinctly, p.58,

"But research is a means, not an end, and it is less important to discover new materials than to see the meaning of old."

100. Hez. Op. 82; Th. 512; Katalogoi Gymaikon, Boeii, fr.14 (Loeb ed.) equals fr.73 in Merkelbach and West, Fragmenta Hesiodea, pp.46-47. Note also fr.195, Soutum 29 (Loeb, Shield of Heracles [Aspis] 29), p.95 and fr.211, line 12, p.107 (Loeb fr.58). The much earlier work of J. Paulson, Index Hesiodeus (Hildesheim, 1962, 1st ed., 1890) must be acknowledged as an original, helpful guide. The reality of agrarian toil (given expression here) was starkly contrasted with an ideal (original) agrarian world which was characterised by a spontaneous generation of cereal produce: Op., 117-118 (Op., 106-120). Interestingly, the Cyclopes' world echoed aspects of this utopian vision: Homer, Odyssey, IX.105-115. These sketches portrayed an 'agrarian' universe marked by the desire or dream of no human toil in the fields. The world of cereal culture worked of its own accord. See also notes 101-106.


103. Hes. Op., 90-95ff. Epimetheus' athenomous relationship to Prometheus was more than one of a simple (guileless) brotherly rivalry; it was absolutely necessary to (and convenient for) the preservation of Prometheus' 'original' reputation for cleverness and "forethought": West, Works and Days, p.166, and West, Theogony, supra. The Prometheus-Pandora myth is one of two disparate accounts by Hesiod for man's loss of his original utopian existence: see West, Works and Days, supra, and, in the same work, "The Myth of Ages", pp.172-177. Pandora (Pandoras) resemble a complex genealogical forest rather than a tree: M.L. West, The Hesiodic Catalogue of Women: Its Nature, Structure and Origins (O.U.P., 1985), pp.50-53. Jean-Pierre Vernant, Myth and Society in Ancient Greece, trans. by Janet Lloyd (Great Britain, 1980, 1st. pub., 1974), pp.168-185, examines the Prometheus myth and Hesiod's treatment of it. See his careful examination (pp.174-177) of the visible and invisible struggles between the worlds of gods and men and the contrast between a utopian past and the ever-present challenges and dangers embodied in the human realities of agrarian life, labour and its reproduction. The tussle, according to Vernant (pp.182-183), was centred around the world of agrarian humanity which was marked by cultivated, cooked food and the world of the uncooked and raw (the realm of the beasts or 'primitive' outside) which lay beyond an agrarian worldview and its practise. However one views Hesiod's world it was in no way a benign universe.

104. Merkelbach and West, Fragmenta Hesiodea, Katalogoi Gynaikon. Boiai, fr.73, pp.46-47; West, Theogony, p.310, notes the power of alpheteisin, and kindred terms in serving as an epithet of andres. See also West, Works and Days, p.167. This epithet for 'man' must be remembered as one in which barly-eating, toiling men were represented as the given image of agrarian and human social reality. They were most emphatically not "bread" eaters. Jasny, "Competition Among Grains in Classical Antiquity", pp.748-751, 753ff, made the significance of barley to a Greek diet quite clear. "Bread' is a term too easily confused and many peasant peoples' historical experiences demonstrate that many poorer or more easily produced cereals or far less expensive grains dominated their dietary needs: Fernand Braudel, Capitalism and Material Life 1400-1800, trans. Miriam Kochan (Great Britain, 1973, 1st pub., 1967), p.68, pp.92-93,

(i) "Secondary cereals make up the main part of the peasants food...." (p.92)
(ii) "Bread was sometimes bread in name alone." (p.93)
105. The world of Hesiod and Hesiodic verse was characterised by formulaic language and formulaic epithets: G.P. Edwards, The Language of Hesiod in its Traditional Context (Oxford, 1977), pp.42-45ff. This was a world where oral or sub-oral forms of literature (and its composition) were dominant; Edwards, pp.190-193. The world of oral verse used its formulae for technical as well as didactic purposes nor were these two arms of formulaic expression necessarily consistent with one another. However, Hesiod worked firmly within the realm of oral composition: Richard Janko, Homer, Hesiod and the Hymns: Diachronic development in epic diction (C.U.P., 1982), pp.18-20ff; 28-24. On oral composition and its use of formulae note Janko, pp.188-192ff. Necessity as well as convenience, tradition and originality were the mothers of oral composition and its formulaic character. The epithetic and formulaic qualities inherent in the use of the terms alkhēstai and alkhēstain add to the image of the inevitability of toil (as well as its near-omnipresence) within an agrarian world.

106. For an introduction to the growth of Utopias and Utopian thinking in the ancient world, see John Ferguson, Utopias of the Classical World (London, 1975), Chapters two and three open up an interesting area for debate. For the other side of the coin, work in the ancient Greek world, Claude Mosse, The Ancient World at Work, trans. by Janet Lloyd (London, 1969, 1st pub., 1965), pp.49ff. Mosse ascribed the yearning for some form of agrarian Utopia as having stemmed from the fact that:

In antiquity, too, men had invented their Golden Age. But instead of projecting it into the future they mourned for it as a bygone past. And labour, for them, appeared as a sentence to which no redeeming value was attached. This explains it lack of importance in the eyes of writers and thinkers, and the lowly position to which society relegated its workers. Idleness was not a vice, but an ideal to which every gentleman aspired, and which was praised by wise men too. (p.1)

Whilst one should feel some discomfort with the all-too-convenient anachronistic use of the term "gentleman"; it is most unwise to simply characterise the ancients attitude to 'work' in general as essentially negative, see P.A. Brunt, "Aspects of the Social Thought of Dio Chrysostom and of the Stoics", Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, No.199 (1973), pp.9-32.

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remains around a concept of 'earn/earners/earning': Chantraine, supra; Hofinger, supra, and around sea-going ventures as the above argue. See also H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, p.74 on alphabet and alphabets.

108. Hes. Th., 590-591. The Loeb edition's translation by Evelyn-White is translation "a" and the Penguin edition's translation by Dorothea Wender is translation "b".

109. Hes. Th., 590-591. The historical authenticity of line 591 has been singled out for special attention. Its philological-cum-historical pedigree (its place in Hesiod's literary genealogy) has been called seriously into question: West, Theogony, pp.329-330. It is as an example of what Bloch (The Historian's Craft, p.80) referred to as "states of mind" that our interest in these two lines of the Theogony (or lines associated with the Theogony) will be focussed upon.

110. P. Chantraine's, pp.221-222, "famille", "generation", "naissance" are more accurate and preferable to Chantraine's other rendering of genos as "race". However this use of "race" is by no means uncommon in dictionaries and lexicons but nevertheless inaccurate, distorting and anachronistic for all that, Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon (O.U.P., 1973, ninth edition), p.344 where "race" is listed as the first translation of genos; West, Theogony, p.330 argues for "broad" as a reasonable rendering of genos in this context. The host of meanings, ancient and modern, associated with the concept of genos are thoroughly explored by the fundamental and massive work of Felix Bourriot, Recherches Sur La Nature Du Genos: Étude D'Histoire Sociale Athenienne – Periodes Archaïque Et Classique, 2 vols. (Lille, 1976). For example, I,pp.1-27, surveys the scholarly terrain of genos. Notions of family, birth (the notion of generations and their continuity), clan and broad tribal associations are all present in this term. An interesting and unusual notion of "une 'grande famille'" is specially found in the use of genos and Athens (I, p.26). See I, pp.199-235 for the vast semantic range of genos. Genos is a term which has parental associations, in the broadest sense of that adjective, with human beings, their mythology and gods (I, pp.218-219ff). There are many categories and types to which genos can be attached as a concept (or concepts) which helped structure human beings in social existence. Some of these categories or types can be characterised under the following broad headings (See I, pp.199-209ff, and on Hesiod, I, pp.264-267):

(i) the human family or species
(ii) 'family' (genus and genus)
(iii) sex/gender
(iv) ethnic origins
(v) geography
(vi) castes
It must be remembered after Bourriot (I, p.205): "En fait, genos" est un terme très banal de la langue grecque." (but note I, p.234).

Genos can be characterized by its functions as a diverse familial archetype, its roles in classifying or categorising the social relations of Greeks, their gods and goddesses through historical and mythological time.

* My transliteration above.

111. 'Gilded' is an appropriate description of Pandora-as-maiden when the collective impact of her "shimmering veil" (καλυττόν διασχιάζον: Hes. Th., 574-575), silver-shining/silver-white clothing (ἀνυψηθέν εσθήτα: Hes. Th., 574), "gold headband" (στεφάνιν χρυσήν κεφαλαίαν: Hes. Th., 578), "attractiveness" or rather alluring appearance (χαρίς: Hes. Th., 583) and "beautiful evil" (καλῶν κακῶν: Hes. Th., 585), are taken into consideration. See the detailed commentaries provided in West, Theogony, pp.326-329 and West, Works and Days, pp.158-162 (particularly on Hes. Op., 65 and 73) and also note Vernant, Myth and Society in Ancient Greece, p.178. Pandora was a formidable doloq, equipped with a "shimmering veil" and divine khara.


113. Hes. Th., 602-612. Hesiod was making a broad observation which should be interpreted as arguing that social relations are generally fraught with seen and unseen social consequences which determine one's material and social happiness and prosperity (or otherwise) within human society and its familial or kin based structures.

114. Stephen Jay Gould's arguments are a telling and devastating commentary upon the dangers of terms associated with 'race', and a belief in race or one's 'racial' superiority over another people or gender of the human species. See Stephen Jay Gould, Ontogeny and Phylogeny (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977), pp.126-135; his books explore the tortured history of terms such as race, their peculiar late eighteenth-nineteenth- and twentieth-century origins and implications for a history of slavery, and African slavery in particular; see p.438, point 9; The Mismeasure of Man (New York, 1981), pp.30-72; see also Deborah Smith on Gould's ideas in "The Instant Man Theory", The National Times, March 29-April 6 (1985), pp.18-19.

115. Gould, The Mismeasure of Man, pp.61-64 for the absurd quests of race supremacists and polygenists and the seriousness with which the work of one of their number, Samuel George Morton (pp.50ff) was treated, and the wide acceptance of such ideas within their own dominant, white culture(s) and their ideological and political domains.

117. Genealogical traditions (as relayed or composed) and their oral and sub-oral communication provided structure, meaning, identity and entertainment: West, *The Hesiodic Catalogue of Women*, p.125-131. A coherent view of the then existing world is made possible (or aided) via the skilful poet's use and manipulation of genealogical traditions: West, p.125; note also pp.3-11. Genealogies actively reflected and projected their worlds, regions or aristocratic clans' views. They were complex instruments for communication with dynamic roles which had their origins in local identities and regional traditions and led beyond them: West, p.11; 164-171.


119. For example, see *Op.*, 213ff; 274ff; 286ff; 393ff.


125. Ibid.


128. West, *Works and Days*, pp.250-251. It is to West's credit that he has drawn together the evidence and arguments surrounding the socio-sexual significance of behaviour referred to as pygeatos. Here was an example of a particular, culturally derived behaviour in action in daily historical life. This was cultural behaviour (dress and display by a woman) which focussed a peasant farmer's attention or distraction upon a particular woman's buttocks: West, p.251. This behaviour, from the woman's perspective, well could have been (or can be interpreted as) a defensive stratagem.


133. Hes. Op., 376-378ff. Unfortunately, Hesiod's Works and Days is easily caricatured but this does not bring about better understanding. Reductionism and poor analysis lead to embarrassingly deterministic or anachronistic arguments as in Linda S. Sussman, "Workers and Drones; Labour, Idleness and Gender Definition in Hesiod's Beehive", Arethusa, Vol.11, No.1 (1978), pp.27-41, in particular, p.37: "His (Hesiod's) injunction to have one son obviously bears out the hypothesis that he is writing in or of a period of rapid population growth..."

Sussman ignores Hes. Op., 379-380ff, which recognised that in line with having more than one son (376-378) the ideal situation was not necessarily realised in social practice. Hesiod acknowledged this by writing that Zeus supported the larger family and its 'advantages' in terms of what can be generally called agrarian 'field care', and potential to help increase familial prosperity.


138. Whilst one must not exaggerate the roles of slaves in Greek agricultural production (A.H.M. Jones, "Slavery in the Ancient World", in M.I. Finley, Slavery in Classical Antiquity: Views and Controversies [London, 1960; 1968], pp.186-187) they clearly played an important surplus generating role in direct production and were expected to be exploited for specific agricultural tasks, Hes. Op., 405-406. Acknowledging slavery's complex roles and fundamental place in Greek formations need not exclude or obscure the citizens' roles in agriculture and polis existence generally. Indeed, looking at the two as integral components of polis social organisation (in economic, ideological and political terms) can enhance our understanding of the polis world: Michael H. Jameson, "Agriculture and Slavery in Classical Athens", The Classical Journal, Vol.73, No.2 (December/January 1977-78), pp.122-125; F.E.H. de Ste. Croix, "Slavery", The Classical Review, Vol.71 (1977), pp.54-59, a review of W.L. Westermann's, The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity, which makes quite clear the link between a citizenry's surplus, which was not evenly spread amongst a polis' citizenry, and slave exploitation.


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143. Redfield, op. cit.; Jean-Pierre Vernant, "Marriage" in Myth and Society in Ancient Greece, trans. by Janet Lloyd (Great Britain, 1980, 1st pub., 1974), pp. 45-70. Marriage signified exchange, built power bases or prestige and is one of history's remarkable social mirrors.

144. Hes. Op., 698. The idea of reckoning a young woman's preferred, marriageable age from puberty has a long, complex history in antiquity. Note the commentary on line 698 in West, Works and Days, p. 327.

145. Hes. Op., 699. This virginal state of the wife-to-be was the strict preserve and responsibility of her parents. Note the commentary on line 699 in West, supra, pp. 327-328. Aristotle (Politics, 1335a 22-24) regarded marriage when a woman was older as a direct way to control and tame a young woman's sexuality and youthful ardour: West, supra.

146. Hes. Op., 699. The young woman-as-wife was to be the socio-sexual preserve of her husband and was to be trained accordingly: West, supra, p. 328. Note the pre-marital ritual and preoccupations of the unmarried girl: Hes. Op., 519-523; West, supra, p. 288 for his commentary on 519-523.


148. Hes. Op., 376-382. Desirable outcomes, such as having only one son, were not the only reality of agrarian life, labour and inheritance. By not dying until one reached old age (an ideal, preferred situation) a father directly contributed to the household's potential to accrue wealth or greater prosperity over time. Many strategies were adopted by archaic and modern Greek peasant households to safeguard land, wealth or inheritance and not always with success. A father's longevity or survival as head of household prevented the early disintegration of familial bonds and material possessions through disputation of one's share of the family estate. Marriage and a son's 'new' in-laws posed potential familial and inter-familial problems. P. Walout, Greek Peasants, Ancient and Modern: A Comparison of Social and Moral Values (Manchester University Press, 1970), pp. 45-53ff.
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149. Hes. Op., 695-703ff recognised not only the planned necessity for a male citizen to have a wife but acknowledged bluntly, for better or worse, a wife’s immediate impact upon personal household life and local neighbourhood association. The household and the village represented for the peasant farmer different social relations but intimately related levels of gregarious behaviour.


152. Alison Burford Cooper, "The family Farm in Greece", The Classical Journal, vol.73, no.2 (1977/78), p.169. See also chapter II, note 201 on farms, farm-size and farming.

153. Those markets which existed (or existed in later classical antiquity) for trading any agricultural surplus produced were pre-capitalist and bore no commercial resemblance to the workings of Adam Smith’s metaphorical and magical invisible hand of mercantile capitalism. Equally clearly, cereal marketing existed but this by no means dominated farm and peasant life throughout the Mediterranean world – it had specific geographic (and regional) reasons for its existence. Whether a surplus arose through the exploitation of slave or indigenous labour, both sources of surplus-producing agrarian life were elemental features of varied ancient agrarian peasant situations: Jan Pečírka, "Homestead Farms in Classical and Hellenistic Hellas", in Problèmes De La Terre En Grèce Ancienne, edited by M.I. Finley (Paris, 1973), pp.119-122.

Note (p.121) the traditional face of ancient farming and popular 'modernist' views of Greek agriculture (pp.119-121).

154. See V.N. Andreyev, "Some Aspects of Agrarian Conditions in Attika in the Fifth to Third Centuries B.C.", Eirene, vol.XII (1974), pp.5-46 and particularly note pages 22-Ziff on peasant stability and the role of "non-market" forces (p.23). Within the comparative (and Classical) perspective of this reference to Andreyev, it is worth observing that if Calhoun had maintained a lower, less didactic perspective on ancient Athens and eschewed the false comparison with American business life in the first quarter of the twentieth century (pp.vi ff) and instead pursued his household/neighbour theme of archaic Greece, pp.18-19ff, he would not have idealised Athens' historical course as: "...developing in so short a time from a village, the center of an easy-going agricultural community, into an industrial metropolis,...": George M. Calhoun, The Business Life of Ancient Athens (New York, 1926; reprint, 1968), p.38.


156. Hes. Op., 448-457. Work or rather the labour and agrarian toil necessary for a landed citizen's existence was recognised and accepted as was the importance of controlling one's material
destiny, or put another way, familial survival and prosperity. Land, landownership and labour were given and did not preclude the use of chattel labour. See C. Bradford Welles, "Hesiod's Attitude Toward Labor", Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, Vol. 8.1 (1967), pp. 5-23, though Welles could have done more to stress the tension between Hesiod's work and attitudes towards agrarian life and labour in contrast to much later aristocratic and philosophical (ideal) antagonism towards poleis constructions of agrarian cum political existence. The realm of work not only involved the landed citizen but also provided a living continuity between the citizen's religious cosmos and all levels or forms of agrarian work, G. Nussbaum, "Labour and Status in the Works and Days", Classical Quarterly, Vol. LIV, No. 1 (1960), pp. 213-220; particularly, pp. 216-217ff. Whether Hesiod's Works and Days was a response to an agrarian crisis or not, Marcel Béthune, "Crise agraire et attitude religieuse chez Hésiode", Collection Latomus, Vol. LVIII (1963), pp. 32-63 certainly presents Hesiod as being concerned not only with one particular human experience (that of Perses) but, more generally, with "le travail de la terre", p. 33.

157. Hes. Op., 407-413ff; 448-457. Clearly the peasant farmer was an expert on the level of the farm. However, this expertise contained itself within the boundaries of immediate agrarian production. Work of other kinds, (metal working, Hes. Op., 493-494) was the province of other expert, or specially skilled people. If expert or skill is understood in the sense of special skill or craft rather than as a 'specialisation' which aimed solely at a non-existent (and anachronistic) notion of economic efficiency or streamlined productivity, a clearer appreciation of Greek attitudes towards work and skill can be gained. See the comparative evidence in P. Walcot, "The Specialisation of Labour in Early Greek Society", Revue Des Études Grecques, Vol. 80 (1967), pp. 60-67.


159. Hes. Op., 342-351, while Hesiod argued strongly for self-reliance, he was also most conscious of the tangible value of good neighbourliness and, conversely, of the disadvantages of its opposite.

160. Hes. Op., 342-351; 448-457; 695-701ff. Neighbours were both a blessing, and an outcome of peasant farming practices. However, neighbours were not, in any sense, associations of altruistic peasant-citizens or powerful citizens. Hesiod's comments must be seen in that light. Such a perspective can account for his most cautious attitude towards marriage and the roles of a wife within this close, even intense associative environment. Hesiod's "drones", Th., 590-610 expresses a deep and complex ambivalence rather than simply hostility towards women. Such views must be interpreted within the fragile worldview of a Greek peasantry. By way of contrast see Linda S. Sussman, "Workers and Drones", pp. 27-30ff; John D. McLaughlin, "Who is Hesiod's Pandora?", op. cit.; P. Walcot, Greek Peasants, pp. 45-46. Neighbours are (and
were) an integral part of peasant social organisation. The peasant's world was incomplete without the presence of neighbours, Henry Habib Ayrout, "The Village and the Peasant Group", in Peasants and Peasant Societies, edited by Teodor Shanin (Great Britain, 1971; 1975 reprint), p.49. Pomeroy, p.52 whilst perhaps treating archaic literary evidence on women rather too briefly (and all-too-summarily) does not notice that even Semonides took the problem of neighbours and the maintenance of one's social standing and face amongst them (male and female) very seriously indeed, p.52. The power of gossip, rumour and accusation often determined reputation.

163. Ibid.
168. In Hippocrates, vol.I, tr. W.H.S. Jones, Airs Waters Places, X (Loeb, 1923, 1972 reprint) the state of being 'moist' (hugros) was associated directly with women, and women's physical condition. Women's visible reproductive roles as manifested by pregnancy, childbirth and lactation made their relationship to nature and nature's seasonal forces almost inevitable and inexorable to many observers in different historical societies, Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800 (Great Britain, 1983), p.43.
169. Ablution, cleansing or ritual washing is another general term which describes many specific acts which have varied seasons for their genesis and different, if not unrelated, social histories: Patricia Jeffery, Frogs in a Well: Indian Women in Purdah (London, 1979), pp.110-114.
171. The need for men to keep clear of a woman's presence, particularly that of menstruating women, is a social practice which separates sex/gender behaviour within specific cultural and historical environments and social formations; see the now, in research terms, old but enlightening and formative study of Margaret Mead, Male and Female: A Study of the Sexes in a Changing World (London, 1950), pp.160-167.
172. Hes. Op., 753-755. In Herodotos I.198, a ritual cleansing process (σέπτονα) is described as having occurred in Babylonian society after a husband and wife had had sexual intercourse. This ritual "washing" involved incense, or used incense as a ritual cleansing or fumigating agent. It is another interesting example of clean/unclean categorising. Good and malign powers and forces were contending inside women's bodies: Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, pp.186-191ff. Women's contact with water and their potential to cause ritual pollution have culturally diverse origins, meanings and results as presented in Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (Paris, 1962, trans. 1966), p.91:

At the beginning of time the Mavilak sisters set off on foot towards the sea, naming places, animals and plants as they went. One of them was pregnant and the other carried her child. Before their departure they had both indeed had incestuous relations with men of their own moiety.

After the birth of the younger sister's child, they continued their journey and one day stopped near a water hole where the great snake Yurlunggur lived who was the totem of the Dua moiety to which the sisters belonged. The older sister polluted the water with menstrual blood. The outraged python came out, caused a deluge of rain and a general flood and then swallowed the women and their children. When the snake raised himself the waters covered the entire earth and its vegetation. When he lay down again the flood receded.

Levi-Strauss' interpretation of this dream-tine Australian cosmogony can be found on pp.91-96.


174. David M. Schaps, op. cit., women as property and women's property in Greek poleis took many legal guises and practices were by no means uniform, pp.4-7; 13-14ff; 17-24; 25ff; 48ff; 77ff. However the political outcome, in the widest sense of that term, meant that in no polis were women in the ascendant.

175. Ibid., pp.48-60. Guardianship went hand-in-hand with selection and control. Hes. Op., 695-705, made it quite clear that a wife must be selected and chosen carefully if a citizen-farmer wished to avoid problems with the neighbours (who formed an outer set of social boundaries in his household's fortunes) and household-based marital problems (problems brought on by the exercise of poor control or choice made in the structuring of his inner social existence).
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176. Hes. Op., 405-6; 373-375; 519-521 provides a wintry archetype of the Hesiodic wife and an expression of the nubile as well as sensual potentiality of one's daughter - a positive assessment from Hesiod's point of view.
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4. Paul Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History 1300-362 B.C. (London, 1979), p.379, notes that after Leuktra the next severe blow Sparta received to its military, territorial and political standing was delivered by Philip II of Macedon in 338 B.C. For Sparta after Leuktra and the long term social and economic pressures which eroded Sparta's power before Leuktra see Ephraim David, Sparta Between Empire and Revolution (404-243 B.C.): Internal Problems and their Impact on Contemporary Greek Consciousness (New York, 1961), pp.43-105. Sparta's problems after Leuktra and in the time of Philip and Alexander are neatly summarised by Ephraim's title for Chapter Four of this work: "Sparta in Eclipse and Her Attempts at Recovery", pp.106-141.

5. For the vital place of Sparta in then contemporary Classical Greek thought: E. David, pp.30-65. Note also the monumental research contribution to this above arena and Sparta's place in the thought of later antiquity presented in E.H. Tregestad, The Legend of Sparta in Classical Antiquity, 2 vols. (Sweden, 1965, 1974).

liberal outlook (p.1):

moreover, they [Aristotle and his intellectual following] were witnesses of the extinction of freedom in Hellenes, and of the rise of the Macedonian kingdom out of comparative nulity to the highest pinnacle of supremacy and mastership. Under the successors of Alexander, this extraneous supremacy, intermeddling and dictatorial, not only overruled the political movements of the Greeks, but also influenced powerfully the position and working of their philosophers; and would have become at once equally intermeddling even earlier, under Alexander himself, had not his whole time and personal energy been absorbed by insatiable thirst for eastern conquest, ending with an untimely death.


* My explanation in brackets.

7. This is not to deny, in any way, Aristotle's acute interest in the world around him; rather the intention is to focus upon the cultural environment which influenced Aristotle's particular intellectual strength and gave to this intellectual's formation a most significant and peculiarly Greek expression. See the work of E. Zeller, Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, trans. from Zeller's "Philosophy of the Greeks", by B.F.C. Costelloe and J.H. Muirhead, vol. 1 (London, 1897), pp.1-47, particularly, pp.21-26ff, though we need not accept Zeller's blindingly idealistic assessment (p.23) of Alexander's place in world history and Aristotle's contribution to his princely education. See also, Ingemar Düring, Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition (Goteborg, 1957), for sources on Aristotle's relations with Philip and Alexander, pp.264ff, and, more importantly, the sources for Aristotle's portraiture in the ancient world, pp.249-283; his intellectual disposition pp.366-377. On Aristotle see also R.G. Mulgan, Aristotle's Political Theory: An Introduction for Students of Political Theory (O.U.P., 1977); C.J. Rowe, "Aims and Methods in Aristotle's Politics", Classical Quarterly, vol. XXVII, No.1 (1977), pp.159-172.


9. Method can reveal more about a particular thinker's formation of ideas and the interpretation of the world around that person than the writer-as-intellectual intended or set out to demonstrate: Paul Feyerabend, Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge (London, 1975), pp.224-225.


20. Arist. Pol., 1253b14-1255b. Under no circumstances should Aristotle be regarded as a simple apologist for slavery. Neither slavery's existence nor its abolition was in question, rather its 'natural' occurrence and, therefore inevitable functions, and roles within a given polis and the delineation of these roles needed both clarification and affirmation within the context of the historical 'naturalness' of a polis formation. It is important to signal here that Aristotle's opponents (1255a3-12ff; 1255a21-22ff) were not arguing for an end to slavery; rather they were tinkering with the moral niceties (from a culturally given perspective) of whether (as Aristotle viewed it) Greeks could be regarded as slaves if they were taken prisoner in war (1255a21-29). In other words, contrary to Robert Schlaifer, "Greek Theories of Slavery from Homer to Aristotle", Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, 47 (1936), pp.165-204, especially, pp.196-199, this was an ethnocentric argument over slavery's right to exist when, at some time, a particular person had been a polis citizen, a Greek, rather than a non-Greek. This explains (amongst other political and military motives) why the Messenians were freed by the Thebans. Schlaifer's argument on this point follows (p.200) a false trail. Further, to view this question and the "pro" and "contra" arguments over slavery's standing in Aristotle's Politics from within a perspective where Aristotle's arguments are viewed as "a case of a liberal philosophy entombed and devoured by dialectical mastication" is both philosophically anachronistic and unreasonable when attempting to examine Aristotle's Politics in terms of its own historical milieu: Eric A. Havelock, The Liberal
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Temper in Greek Politics (London, 1957), p.350. It needs to be remembered that the institution of slavery was prevalent amongst both Greeks and barbaroi, and that neither its prevalence nor its institutional integrity to those worlds was in question. The gulf between slave and free was a fundamental feature of the ancient world. As Dover observed: "...and in respect of shame, indignation and moral reactions in general the distinction between freeborn people and slaves was most profound...": K.J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle (Oxford, 1974), p.284.

26. Ibid.
28. K.J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle, pp.83-84ff, notes not only the unfailing sense of moral superiority which Greeks believed they possessed in comparison with barbaroi, but also notes an Athenian penchant (Isokrates, XV.293) for a hierarchical taxonomy which placed them (not surprisingly) at the head of this classification. The processes by which Greeks and other humans were differentiated from one another occurred over historical time and have their roots in historical, ideological, geographical and cultural forces which included the natural (taken-for-granted) acceptance of slavery within a polis. Slavery imposed its difference or otherness upon foreign peoples and stereotyped the masters' views of slaves and their foreign character. Cultural contact could be peaceful or violent; it was a double-edged experience. On this complex question see the following discussions in Fondation Hardt: Entretiens, VIII: Hans Schwabl, Das Bild der Fremden Welt bei den Frühen Griechen", Fondation Hardt: Entretiens, VIII (1962), titled: Greco Et Barbaros, pp.27-31; Hans Diller, "Die Halben-Barben-Antithese im Zeitalter der Perserkriege", pp.74-75 and H.C. Baldry, "The Idea of the Unity of Mankind", pp.176-177. See further the comments on Aristotle's classification of his world and the character of those relationships which were defined as free and slave, and note their intimate connection with the Greek and non-Greek ('barbarian' or foreign) dichotomy in H.C. Baldry, The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought (C.U.P., 1965), pp.96-101.
29. An interesting example of cultural distance in social behaviour and understanding was reported by Thucydides III.94.5. The Buryatian tribe of the Aitolians were said to have a 'language' or, more
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accurately, a Greek dialect which was virtually unintelligible (αγνώστοι ... γλώσσαν) and they were reportedly raw flesh eaters (βιονομοί). Thucydides' account of Western Greece and Demosthenes' campaign there will play a prominent part in a later detailed comparative exploration of cultural values which characterized and gave form to polis citizens' perceptions of themselves and their social relations with the world around them.


31. Philip D. Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade In World History (C.U.P., 1984), pp.1-14; 72-81, puts trade in a cultural context and establishes far more diverse (and diffuse) causal processes for trade between different peoples occurring within a Mediterranean context. The seasonal nature of trade, its opportunistic conduct and favourable geography in Greece must be borne in mind when one considers Greek relations with other Greeks or foreigners; H. Bolkestein, Economic Life in Greece's Golden Age (Leiden, 1958), pp.5-6; 150. See further recent works: Trade in the Ancient Economy, edited by Peter Garnsey, Keith Hopkins & C.R. Whittaker (London, 1983); Lionel Casson, Ancient Trade and Society (Wayne State University Press, 1984).

32. The term culture is given meaning by a concept which accepts specific as well as general boundaries to social behaviour which, in turn, can define and refine relations within and without a given social formation; R.F. Newbold, "Boundaries and Bodies in Late Antiquity", Arthusa, vol.12, no.1 (1979), pp.93-114.

33. Ideological control found expression in a concept of hierarchy, a taxonomy of relations where progressive layers of a Greek culture were identified by signs or levels of superiority or inferiority; see Page du Bois, "On the Invention of Hierarchy", Arthusa, vol.15 (1982), pp.203-219.

34. Kinship relations were the familial threads of a polis' social organisation, see R.J. Littman, "Kinship in Athens", Ancient Society, vol.10 (1979), pp.5-31.

35. Arist. Pol., 1252a26-1252b7; 1253b4-12. Aristotle wished to establish the separability of women's roles within Greek societies in contrast with the Greek ideological perception that 'barbarian' free women's condition or station (taxis - class position or rank status) could be associated directly with the position of slaves in the non-Greek world of the barbaroi. Moreover, within the context of the household, Aristotle expressed an intention to delineate the functions, powers and roles of the members of an oikos: master and slave, male and female spouse and father and children, ὀικεῖος καὶ ὄνομα, καὶ τόιος καὶ ὄνομα, καὶ πατίρ καὶ τέκνα. Even though Aristotle did not live up to his intention to explore all three of these social arenas, his very acknowledgement of the need to explore these particular social relations is in itself worth the attention of social historians; Arist. Pol., 1260b8-13ff.
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38. For example compare *Arist. Pol.*, 1253b14-23 with his comment on the veracity of Plato's Socratic discourses, 1265a10-13.


44. *Arist. Pol.*, 1261b2-4ff; for "equality among 'peers'" see the remarks in Hdt.1.134.1 on the Persians' ranking men according to their standing to one another: ranging from a kiss on the lips for an equal to prostration for those who were decidedly unequal in status, social rank or class.


50. *Ibid*.


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61. Ibid.

62. This Greek world was not cast in Aristotle's image, yet Aristotle's imprint upon it fundamentally characterised his social formation's existences and perceptions of existence. Aristotle's method, his bases for reasoning out human manipulations of the world around him (as well as interpreting phenomena presented in nature's world) meant that: "What came into existence here is the capacity of conceptual reasoning in terms of abstract universals, a capacity which established full intellectual independence from manual labour," Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Intellectual and Manual Labour: A Critique of Epistemology (Great Britain, 1978), p.90.

This did not mean that all things had specific causes for their occurrence and that there was no place for the impact of coincidence in Aristotle's intellectual reckoning of his world: see Richard Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory (London, 1980), pp.3-25. Aristotle's thought processes, whilst often highly original, bold and insightful (a product of a peculiarly powerful mind in active debate with the world around him) were bound to that world's (the polis world) environment and its framework, its values and confident, even arrogant, ideological face. See the perceptive commentary on Aristotle's intellectual process in Abraham Edel, Aristotle and his Philosophy (The University of North Carolina Press, 1982), pp.30-38.


64. Arist. Pol., 1262a3; 1261b38-1262a9.


70. Ibid.

71. Thinking through the conceptual framework of the paradigm was a fundamental characteristic of the intellectual structure and process of Aristotle's thought, as cogently expressed by Clark: "Here we are clearly faced by the Greek preference of the ideal to the individual, rationalism over empirical investigation," Stephen R.L. Clark, Aristotle's Man: Speculations upon Aristotelian Anthropology (O.U.P., 1975), p.131.
Aristotle's method must not be given an ahistorical character. Regardless of whether or not Aristotle sometimes pondered along historical rather than more universal 'poetical', philosophical and political lines, his ideas, and an understanding of his place in a history of ideas, must be located, in the final analysis, within a polis historical environment. This is, in a real sense, the birthplace of Aristotle's relative value: see A.F. Chalmers, What is this thing called Science? An Assessment of the Nature and Status of Science and Its Methods (University of Queensland Press, 1982, second edition), pp.101-103.

75. Arist. Pol., 1263a37-1263b8. The general tenor of this section pointed towards Aristotle's defense of the existing order, albeit modified but not changed out of recognition.
77. Arist. Pol., 1262a32; 37.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
88. The roles of philia and philoi were inextricably linked to the realm of political activity. Personal or familial based relationships went hand in hand with political association or alliance.

Connor wryly observed that:

89. Arist. Pol., 1263b5-14ff.

90. Arist. Pol., 1263a37-1263b14ff. Indeed Aristotle's argument was premised on the value of a close attachment to the singular worth of one's own (idion) property in its widest sense and, in turn, its internal (moral and philosophical) connection to a 'natural' love of oneself:

... ἀλλ' ἐστι τὸν ὕπατον τοῦτον φωσικόν. τὸ δὲ φίλαυτον εἶναι ἡγετεῖ δικαιώς .


These two forces, one an ideological expression of support for the inherent worth of the singular possession of one's material world, and the other, a moral and psychological explanation and justification (not inseparable from the former view) for individual human conduct, were meant to complement one another. They were the circumstances, the sine qua non and justification for the naturalness and maintenance of a then extant social formation, based upon the supremacy of one's own material and personal existence.

91. For a survey of ancient agrarian life in its social context, its scale of operation and the value framework within which its social relations were conducted see notes to Chapter I, Nos. 152-154.


93. Arist. Pol., 1263a8-30. Aristotle was most concerned with Plato's general system of ownership and its associative or communal social division of produce and labour would have wrought damage or brought about social divisiveness within a polis where the traditionally singular possessive rights of ownership of one's own land and produce would have been uprooted. Aristotle believed in the instinctively 'natural' (physikos, 1263b1) and 'pleasurable' social position (bádon, 1263a60), that is, the pleasure a citizen derived from "one's own" material possessions and the singular allocation (or extraction) of one's household needs from them.

94. Arist. Pol., 1261a16-1262b10, note also the implications of 1263a8-16ff; Plato, Republic, 420 B-C.
95. Arist. Pol., 1263a11-15, this remark was not directed so much towards Plato rather it was meant to be taken as Aristotle's philosophical projection and forecast of how social relations would have developed if this adverse course of production relations were followed. However, Aristotle's attack on Plato (Arist. Pol., 1264a26-36, Plato, Republic, 455-457, Guardians, Guardian women and 'education') was redoubled for his giving social education and training (paideia) only to the Guardians. Moreover, the gulf between Plato's Guardians and the Farmers (the polis' peasant tillers of the soil) would have been a greater problem than those contemporaneously encountered by the existence of variant forms of slavery vs 'serfdom':

άλλα τούτο μάλλον εἰσὶν ἐκεῖνοι καὶ φοινικάτων πλῆθεις, καὶ τὰς παρ' ἐνεστίσ εἰσὶν εἰς καὶ τενεστίας καὶ δουλείας,

Arist. Pol., 1264a34-36.


97. Arist. Pol., 1261b34ff; 1262a13ff; 1263a31-41; 1263b5-7 are a few examples of Aristotle's concern for and defence of singular values, that is, one's own property. The term property encompassed a broad range of possessions not just land and household, that is, substantial, propriety, immovable wealth (ousia) Arist. Pol., 1263b20; see also 1263b15-29, the gamut of human familial relations and the land's produce.


100. Arist. Pol., 1261a30-31 should be attached to the paradigm of social relations and their day-to-day conduct between 'individually' properied male citizens which Aristotle detailed and speculated upon later in his treatise 1263b5-14.

101. Note Arist. Pol., 1261b24ff; 1262a25-32; 1263b7-11ff. The world of land and money exchanges which were the preserves of male citizens in Athens, M.I. Finley, Studies in Land and Credit in Ancient Athens, pp.77-78, certainly responded to social and traditional pressures as well as economic motives (formed from political or social desires, that is, class and status pressures amongst citizen peers) in the exchange of women through marriage and dowry giving, pp.79-80; 47-50ff.

102. This was the direct implication of Arist. Pol., 1263b5-14. The old order would not have had a base from which it could continue its existence. Its tapestry of social relations would have been undone.

103. Arist. Pol., 1263b5-6, τὸ γαρίσσαι καὶ σωθέσαι...

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105. Arist. op. cit., note 98.


108. Arist. Pol., 1260b13-20; 1269b12-19ff. Regulation of women and keeping them under control by men was essential, Aristotle argued. On women, the oikos and the sexual division of labour see Arist. Pol., 1264a30-1264b3.


111. Arist. Pol., 1260b18-19 αἱ μὲν γάρ γυναικεῖς μὴν μέσος τῶν ἀλογίαν...


115. Ibid.

116. Arist. Pol., 1269b31-32. The question of women and land or, more particularly, women's right to a direct role in the control of land through the processes of dowry and the rights of heiresses, most probably produced Aristotle's notion of women's rule, gymnokratia, in the Spartan household. Aristotle also accepted the long historical role of Sparta's militarised external and internal conduct towards outside and indigenous Greek societies and the impact this had upon women's social position, their material power and influence within Sparta, Arist. Pol., 1269b39-1270a3ff. The structure of wealth, landed wealth and the mechanics of its distribution (or lack of distribution and concentration into a few hands) lay at the heart of Aristotle's inquiry into the workings and problems of the Spartan polis, James Redfield, "The Women of Sparta", The Classical Journal, vol.73, no.2 (1977/78), pp.146-161 generally, and particularly pp.158-161, though one must doubt whether the tendency that "the rich marry the rich" within a Spartan formation had anything to do with being "a corollary of the law of marginal utility" (p.159). See further P. Cartledge, "Spartan Wives: Liberation or Licence?", Classical Quarterly, 31 (1981), pp.84-105.

Sarah B. Pomeroy, Goddess, Whores, Wives, and Slaves, p.38, is hardly helpful when she observed: "By the fourth century B.C. they (women) controlled by means of their dowries and inheritances two-fifths of the land and property in Sparta, and some spent their money on expensive racehorses and fancy clothing."
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119. Another historical time which seeks to explore another culture's attitude towards women (when the overwhelming bulk of literary evidence was composed by Greek men) must always work at several removes from the subject of their inquiries and painstakingly peel away the culturally given and expressed values towards women's position. Historical evidence is not a neutral force. Interpretation for the most part of incidental 'histories' or comments upon women's roles in society or attitudes expressed about women generally, decides or indicates the directions that scholarship is pursuing but by no means concludes debate and historical exploration: Mary R. Lefkowitz, *Hermione and Hysterics* (London, 1981), pp.viii-ix; 22-25; 26-29ff.


...in this world (Athenian society), it seems, women 'speak' and share the centre of attention with men. But this is a mirage: we can have no direct access to the model of Athenian society *(or that of Spartan society)* to which women subscribed, even as it might have been expressed in the dominant language of men.

*my remarks and clarification in brackets.

122. Investigation of patterns of human social organisation, social relations, their politics, class and ideological standing within the polis world (even a facile division of 'barbarian' social relations) was one thing for Aristotle, Pol., 1252a24-1252b12 but Aristotle's critique could not accept the fundamental role changes proposed in Plato's schema. Aristotle rejected Plato's 'new' socio-sexual control of women. The common ownership of women/wives by men who possessed their fields in their own right as private property was perceived as a social contradiction of the first order: Pol., 1264a40-1264b6ff.

123. Arist. Pol., 1264b15-22 but this passage must be read within the context of a critique by Aristotle of Plato's Republic and the place, euðaimonia, had in his construction of social relations between the Guardians (phyliakës), the artisans (tekhnitai), and what Aristotle characterised as the general mass of the people (plethos), (that is for Aristotle the majority of the non-leisured population of Plato's polis), who worked 'manually' (hýmænæs) within the polis for their livelihood.

124. Arist. Pol., 1260b13-24. The uncodified roles of women in Sparta, the question of the alienability of property, were sources of great concern to Aristotle. His concerns centred round land ownership (who owned what and how much), modes of social conduct (this section also concerned itself with the breakdown of women's social control and conduct which led to practices which went against an implied norm which involved the acceptance of social and sexual 'moderation' rather than the pursuit of pleasure, luxury or an undue love of money as ends in themselves) and the maintenance, the availability of a viable male warrior population supply: Arist. Pol., 1296b12-23ff; 1296b39-1270a34ff.

125. Arist. Pol., 1269a29-1271b19. Possibly, the Spartan experience could be said to have served as a highly influential "ideal type" model around which much of Aristotle's speculations upon poleis' practices were based. The faults which Aristotle alleged in relation to women's conduct in Sparta added rhetorical force to his argument for the close legal and social regulation of women in Greek societies generally. Clark drew attention to Aristotle's preference for an 'ideal' approach to his inquiries, op. cit., p.131 (see my note 71) and Donald McIntosh, "The Objective Bases of Max Weber's Ideal Types", History and Theory, vol.XVI (1977), p.279, interestingly and relevantly observes that:

For Weber, traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal systems face the same underlying situation. They depend on the inner force of ideal interests for their very existence. But in the process of the institutionalisation of these ideal interests, two tensions emerge. First there are tensions at the level of meaning within the ideal interests. Second there are tensions at the level of action between the ideal interests and the
material interests which of necessity must be mobilised in
the process of institutionalisation. The interplay of
these two tensions provides a central dynamic, perhaps the
central dynamic, in the historical development of
civilisations.

Leaving aside the grander claims of McIntosh for Weber’s "ideal
type", the notion of the inner force (and tensions inherent in such
forces) of ideal interests is arresting when one considers such an
idea within the framework of Aristotle’s Politics.

132. Ibid.
136. Ibid.
139. Arist. Pol., 1265b6-7ff.
142. Aristotle’s starting point in Book II was certainly Plato’s
Republic (Arist. Pol., 1260b-1261a9ff) but he did not hesitate to
include lawgivers’ historical experiences as evidenced by his
inquiries into Pheidon the Korinthian, Arist. Pol., 1265b12ff and
Phaeas the Khalkedonian, Arist. Pol., 1265a39ff. More
significantly, he drew constantly upon the Spartan historical
experience as a critical paradigm (in this case) on the debate
between the merits of private ownership of one’s own property,
holding property in common, and the use of property in common
while, concurrently, having a singular (private) possession of such
143. A rejection of a literal acceptance of the past was both explicit and implicit in Aristotle's statements on his method and approach to his discourse in the *Politis*, 1252a17-26. His critical disposition, at the beginning of Book II, towards his quest for the best mode of polis associative existence, περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς πολιτικῆς κρατίστης Arist. *Pol.*, 1260b27-28 was a further demonstration of his method Arist. *Pol.*, 1260b27-36. Similarly, Aristotle's insistence that laws, written and unwritten, or bearing their ancestors' patriarchal stature (their traditional authority and its sanction), οὐς κατάπυκτος νόμουs Arist. *Pol.*, 1268b28 could be altered profitably, should well serve as further evidence of Aristotle's critical method Arist. *Pol.*, 1268b25-1269a13 which utilised speculative inquiry and examination (*skopeia*), Arist. *Pol.*, 1268b26. However, as always, Aristotle tempered such innovation (the potential alteration of extant laws) with a solid cautionary note Arist. *Pol.*, 1269a13-27 and then dodged this thorny problematic to concentrate on the particularities of Kretan and Spartan social organisation Arist. *Pol.*, 1269a27ff; 1271b20ff.


145. Just as nations have imagined boundaries or borders outside of which lie other nations so the notion of 'barbarians' both defines the insides of a particular broad culture (the Hellenes) and stereotypes the external world which was located beyond a culture's known world, its familiar and acceptable organisation of gregarious existence. See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, 1983), pp.14-16. Things or persons called and classified as 'barbarians' have outsider distinguishing marks (and separateness) placed upon them: M.I. Finley, *Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology* (London, 1980), p.118, with reference to Greek culture and ideology and their interplay; Page du Bois, "On Horse/Men, Amazons, and Endogamy", *Arethusa*, vol.12, no.1 (1979), p.46, observed that, "Women must be protected, like culture itself, from the barbarian outside."


147. See note 142.

148. Ibid.


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158. Ibid.

If women can inherit property in their right they will, in a society where marriage is patrilocal and inheritance patrilineal, remove it from their father's family into their husband's; and of course a father who has (in default of sons) an heiress daughter will naturally, if he is able to give her in marriage outside his kin, find her the richest husband he can, for her own protection. At Sparta, the fact that daughters could inherit in their own right and that the patrouchoi (the Spartan equivalent of the Athenian epiklēros) did not have to marry the next-of-kin must have played a major part in bringing about the concentration of property in a few hands...

162. For a more detailed discussion of such reckoning and reasoning processes see Chapter II, note 177.
163. Arist. Pol., 1270a34.
164. Arist. Pol., 1270a37-39. Aristotle had noted earlier Plato's interest in the 'equalisation' of possessions and property, 1265a38-1265b7, as well as his inattention to other vital limitations which needed to be put in place if an equitable, strife free polis was his goal.
166. Arist. Pol., 1265a26-27, ὅπως οὐδὲν ἐπίτου ἐστὶν φωτεροίς εἶναι τὸν τολμήσει.

168. For Aristotle, the social dimensions of Sparta's lack of adult males of military age stood as an historical (an experiential) testament to the need to maintain 'equalised' landed property, and thus help ensure a balanced citizenry based upon a regulated share of the polis' arable land, Arist. Pol., 1270a29-39.

169. For Aristotle's views with regard to what he had to say about Plato's land tenure system and its citizen population's lack of regulation see Arist. Pol., 1265a38-1265b12, and with reference to Aristotle's parallel observations on the Spartan polis, Arist. Pol., 1270a39-1270b6. The historical course of much later changes to Sparta's land ownership system and its redistribution can be found in Plutarch, Agis, viii-ixff and Plutarch, Kleomenes, x-xi.

170. Arist. Pol., 1270a18-21ff. The Spartan klēros, its foggy history and impact upon the course of Spartan history is not under direct examination but the evidence, scholarly debate or speculation (and their speculative evidentiary sources) have been gathered by P. Cartledge, Sparta and Leukonía, pp.165-168ff; 308-309. The critical thing to note was the pervasive importance of land and its elemental relationship to household prosperity (or otherwise), polis continuity and stability. On "land tenure" see Pavel Oliva, Sparta and Her Social Problems (Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prague, 1971), pp.32-38.

171. Arist. Pol., 1265b10-12 as well as 1270a39-1270b6. The very unevenness of land inheritance, gift and/or dowry giving would have placed considerable strains on any polis formation's imperative need to maintain, at the very least, its 'original' male citizen strength; its premier military (hoplite) backbone. Aristotle's point was general (the Spartan reference was given for reasons of particular emphasis): poverty, land tenure and inheritance were emphatically linked, they found historical form in the general demographic fate of a polis' male citizenry and, in turn, the play between the forces of land, human demography, inheritance and tenure helped determine a polis' subsequent socio-military fortunes.

172. Arist. Pol., 1271a26-37. Once again, Aristotle recognised the importance of land as a physical expression of the citizen's everyday existence. The Spartiates' syssitia doubly conveyed this imperative; it expressed or celebrated the physical as well as psychological bonding of the citizenry. The syssitia were extensive amongst the Spartiate ruling class and exclusive. Regardless of Xenophon's open idealisation of Spartan life, his comments on the common mess system emphasised its social bonding roles, Xenophon, Lac. Pol. V. On the other hand, Aristotle never lost sight of the social impact of institutional structures: Arist. Pol., 1271a32-37; 1271b10-17 and their unforeseen consequences.
173. As contained and contested in the general argument of Arist. Pol., 1265a38-1265b12 on whether it was wise to regulate property rather than the number of children.


176. Arist. Pol., 1265a9-1265b12. Aristotle was quick to recognise the theoretical dangers of unregulated population pressures in Plato's ideal polis construction.

177. Arist. Pol., 1270a29-31. τοιγορόφιν δυνατέστες τής χώρας χιλίους ἑπετίς τρόφειν καὶ πεντακοσίων καὶ ἑπτακοσίων, οὐδὲ χίλιοι τῶν πλάθων ἔσον. However, as always, we need to be extremely careful whenever the ancients venture into the realm of numerical conjectures. 'Numbers' carry cultural value and meaning as well as numerical sense. Aristotle's numbers were, in this case, proximate guides ("three ten thousands") intended to impress by their 'potential' numerical size and act as proximate demographic and especially cultural guides to the former (as opposed to the then contemporary) power, that is manpower of Lakedaimonia. The grim reality in the later fourth century was, so Aristotle claimed, that the Spartiates as a body of heavily armed hoplite citizens did not even (oude) amount to a thousand. At Sparta's height, in manpower terms, and Aristotle was careful not to accept the reliability of such 'numbers', Arist. Pol., 1270a37-38, the armed numerical strength of the Spartiates approximated "at one time" or "at some time" (pote) ten thousand, καὶ φασίν εἶναι τῶν ἐπσταταί τοῖς ἑπτακοσίων καὶ ἑπτακοσίων. Arist. Pol., 1270a36-37. (Murius was as much '10,000' as it was a loose literary figure or guide). Aristotle acknowledged that whether this 'figure' was true or not, that is, had a basis in reliable truth or otherwise, sensible regulatory measures were needed for property distribution and the procreation of sons needed to be balanced by the available landed wealth (and its 'equalised' distribution), Arist. Pol., 1270a37-1270b6.

178. Arist. Pol., 1270a16-29ff. D. Schaps, Economic Rights of Women in Ancient Greece, makes it quite clear that a rich epiklēres carried considerable fortunes (material and social) vested in her person, pp.43-44; Spartan women possessed doweries in their own right, pp.57; 88 and hence possessed some real power within their own polis.
179. Arist. Pol., 1269b12-1270b6 is worth considering in its entirety for Aristotle's opinion on the impact of women upon Spartan society in the following areas:

(i) social impact of women's rights (customary or legal) in the fields of land and inheritance;
(ii) citizen women's reproductive role;
(iii) the articulation of a male mythology of women's rule;
(iv) the negative influence of women's sexuality or social conduct upon the Spartan formation.

180. P. Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, pp.307-318 assembles the evidence and looks for not only demographic factors for Sparta's 'oliganthropia' but especially points to socio-economic forces ("conditions") at work. However, to separate demography from its cultural conditions is, to some extent, like separating the chicken from the egg. 'Oliganthropia' had by the first quarter of the fourth century become an intellectual commonplace, Xen. Lac. Pol. I.1, see G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War (Great Britain, 1972), pp.331-332. For an interesting and detailed commentary upon Arist. Pol., 1269b12-1270b6 see the pathfinding work of W.L. Newman, The Politics of Aristotle, vol.II (O.U.P., 1897, reprinted, 1973, Arno Press), pp.316-332 and note Arist. Pol., 1278a29-32ff; see also Newman, Vol.III, pp.179-180. Land and its distribution was the issue and dowry size was associated directly with the concentration of landed wealth. In Sparta's case land was not the problem, its concentration and manipulation by Spartiate citizens was the problem. Nevertheless its worth keeping in mind Toynbee's observation:

Greece offers her inhabitants the choice of Malthusianism, emigration or starvation. You pass at one step from deep soil to naked limestone, and when you have divided the plain into the maximum number of minimum allotments, there is not room for one farm more.


181. Arist. Pol., 1269b31-34 as outbursts go, can be explained by 1270a23-25ff but not completely explained away.

182. Arist. Pol., 1269b39-1270a8; 1270a23-25 point to women's direct involvement with their socio-economic environment and their roles as influential actors as well as bearers (transferees) of landed wealth and its power. David Schaps, op. cit., pp.43-44 carefully qualifies the position of women in the epicleire and draws attention to the role of the kings in such matters, Hdt. 6.57. However shrouded by mytho-history, land and inheritance and the roles of men and women within this social and economic arena remained immersed in conflict, immortalised in Greek tradition and stereo-typed or caricatured in historical-cum-moral didactic
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183. Arist. *Pol.*, 1269b12-34; as evidenced by Aristotle's (as he viewed it) reasonable suggestions and observations; 1270a8-11ff; 1270a25-26; 1270a37-39.


185. Ibid., see also 1269b39-1270a3ff.


189. Arist. *Pol.*, 1269b37-39. Cartledge, *op. cit.*, pp.297-298. The loss of Spartiates and general dislocation caused by Sparta's defeat by Thebes, combined with the invasion of Lakonia by Epameinondas, must have caused unprecedented social stress within the Spartan population. However, whether one should accept that Spartan women, as a collective entity, were most harmful and the principal source of panic and confusion at this time is another question. If this were the case, such behaviour signalled the dissolution as well as the dislocation of an ideal set of Spartan social mores.

190. Aristotle's remarks (Arist. *Pol.*, 1269b34-39) must be seen within both a comparative perspective as well as Aristotle's immediate context of women's preferred behaviour in times of military crisis. Significantly, both Plutarch, *Agesilaos*, xxxi.1-4 and Xenophon, *Hellenica*, vi.5.28 recognised the psychological impact of the invasion, burning and plunder of Sparta's heartland upon Spartan women. This was a new and devastating experience for Spartan women. Fear can be a double-edged weapon in any historical society; Preston H. Epps, "Fear in Spartan Character", *Classical Philology*, vol.28 (1933), pp.12-29. However, against Epps (p.27), these women had never seen a foreign enemy (as opposed to Helots or Messenians in revolt) in their homelands before: Xen. *Hell.* supra. Note also the cultural values, social behaviours and belief structures (read ideology) which directly contributed to, and characterized, ancient portraits of women's place (particularly citizen women) in a polis world: David Schaps, "The Women in Greece in Wartime", *Classical Philology*, vol.77, no.3 (July, 1982), pp.193-213 and see further on the invasion of Sparta, p.211; David Harvey, "Women in Thucydides", *Aretusa*, vol.18 (1985), pp.67-90 and note also on the invasion of Sparta, p.83. See also P. Cartledge, "Spartan Wives: Liberation or Licence", pp.87-88. See further Plato, *Laws*, 806A-C; 814A-C and his remarks on women and their potential roles in an emergency brought on by war. For Plato, the question of women's general lack of social, military and
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psychological preparedness for such events was worthy both of philosophical consideration and thorough social regulation. Sparta's approach to women was, at best, a half-measure, an incomplete model: Plato, Laws, 806c. E. David, Sparta Between Empire and Revolution, (404-243 B.C.), p.85, led the author to the reference on Epp.s, supra.

191. Ibid., see also notes 181 and 183. Aristotle accepted that Spartan order had developed from particular military commitments and social struggles between rival or competing territorial 'powers' Arist. Pol.,1269b39-1270a3ff and that their women were put in an uniquely independent position as a result of the long absences of Spartan men. That is, men did not directly regulate or oversee their daily lives to the point where women were reduced to powerlessness.

192. The general tenor of Arist. Pol., 1266a11-1265b12 and, in particular, 1264b28-31ff is at the centre of Aristotle's critique of Plato's regulation of his polis as represented in the Republic and the Laws.

193. One cannot forget that, "Population policies make up a large part of what goes under the name 'human engineering' - a field of endeavour to which the writings of Plato and Aristotle made the first substantive contributions in Western literature." Martin P. Golding and Naomi H. Golding, "Population Policy in Plato and Aristotle: Some Value Issues", Arethusa, vol.8, no.2 (1975), p.345; see also pages 352-353ff. What passed for planning and population control in Plato or Aristotle must be seen as contending and contemporary responses to their own world not mere reflections or echoes of that world. This should be a truism of any historical enquiry into Aristotle's and Plato's ideas and their inspirational well-springs: see John J. Mulhern, "Population and Plato's Republic", Arethusa, vol.8, no.2 (1975), pp.278-279.

194. For example, the central sections of Plato, Republic, 449a-466d; Arist. Pol., 1260b13-20; 1269b12-19; and, most interestingly and revealingly, Plato, Laws, 780d-781d.

195. Ibid., however interpretation is all, especially when the literature on Plato and women is surveyed: see the well worked arguments of Dorothea Wender, "Plato: Misogynist, Paedophile, and Feminist", Arethusa, vol.6, no.1 (1973), pp.75-90. Leaving aside Lacey's somewhat light and sometimes oversimplified views of women's position (social roles, powers or powerlessness) in very different historical environments (p.176), Lacey wisely drew attention to Plato's concept of human immortality through reproduction (p.178), carefully surveyed Plato's ideal and the sources of that paradigm, and linked Plato's and Aristotle's philosophical and political writings to a critique of the Spartan formation's internal and external decline: W.K. Lacey, The Family in Classical Greece (Great Britain, 1968), pp.179-196. However, Plato's and Aristotle's critiques remained models or ideal types.
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197. Arist. Pol., 1265a8-10

198. Arist. Pol., 1265a9-10. The ideal need for more citizen hoplites (rather than large numbers of other poorer citizens or resident aliens and slaves) was always a concern, Arist. Pol., 1326a16-25; see also 1326b2-6ff.

199. Arist. Pol., 1265a9-17. Aristotle also observed that Plato envisaged a dual society when it came to the delineation of 'agricultural' and household labour and their production relations in his ideal polis. Aristotle emphasised that Plato remained vague about these matters - indeed he had failed to elaborate upon his ideas (for example, the farmers' and craftsmen's place in the 'defence' of the polis) and thus did not give his philosophical model some effective regulatory and, one suspects, in Aristotle's eyes, some practical parameters, 1264b31-37.


201. V.N. Andreyev, "Some Aspect of Agrarian Conditions in Attika in the Fifth to Third Centuries B.C.", Eirene, vol.xii (1974), pp.14ff; 22ff, notes the small size of peasant citizen holdings and the general (or very limited) lack of concentration of land in Attika. G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, "The Estate of Phaeinippus (Ps. Dem., xiii)" in Ancient Society and Institutions: Studies presented to Victor Ehrenberg on his 75th Birthday (Oxford, 1966), pp.109-114, has put paid to a belief in the existence of large-scale landed estates, at least, in Attika. The scale and size (as well as general agricultural production) of the "family farm" is outlined by Alison Burford Cooper, "The Family Farm in Greece", The Classical Journal, vol.73, no.2 (1977/78), pp.162-175 and, once again, smallness is a characteristic feature of 'the farm'. Even more important was the possession of some land, however small that plot might be, pp.170-171. Finley, Land and Credit in Ancient Athens, leaving aside Phainippos' not-so-large Farm, p.58, noted the smallness of land-holdings, 60 plethra or 14 acres approximately and recognised the significance of such smallness of scale to an understanding of Athens in particular, pp.58-59. See also notes to Chapter 1, Nos.152-154.

202. On "the traditional crops of the Mediterranean, wheat, barley, olives, figs and grapes", see Michael H. Jameson, "Agriculture and Slavery in Classical Athens", The Classical Journal, vol.73, no.2 (1977/78), pp.126-131ff; Naum Jasny's works; note Burford-Cooper, op. cit., p.171 for patterns and extent of cultivation in Attica and A. Jarde, Les céréales dans l'antiquité grecque (Paris, 1925). See also the highly detailed environmental explorations of John L. Sintcliff, Natural Environment and Human Settlement in Prehistoric Greece, British Archaeological Reports 528 (1977); note especially the patterns of 'traditional' cereal cultivation and gathering before polis culture and the importance of barley as a staple
cereal, pp.104-105; on the roles of ritual and cult and the ways in which they shape a particular human culture and its social organisation, see, "Ritual Aspects of Settlement", pp.145ff; the 'economics' of human settlement are (and were) as opportunistic as they were subtle, pp.111-116ff and they not surprisingly involved social and political decisions in 'pre' as well as ancient historical times, pp.132-135ff.


204. Arist. Pol., 1265a17-18ff. Aristotle set some ideal limits upon the extent of a polis' population. Its ultimate boundaries were set by the limits to a polis' self-sufficiency (autarkēia), 1326b7-32ff. However, apart from a desire to control and monitor closely the roles of foreigners (xenoi), resident aliens (metoikoi) and 'foreign trade' relations and its actors, 1326b20-25; 1326b3ff; 1327a11-40, Aristotle's remarks remained just that. Aristotle's views constituted an outline of a political economy of a polis. These remarks formed the elements of an inquiry, its beginnings and its theoretical parameters rather than having formed some absolute philosophical resolution or end to debate about the form and particular details of a paradigmatic polis.

205. Aristotle's influence took the form of a series of gradual movements, sometimes direct, sometimes indirect, which moved like long, slow, wave-like formations across the cultural and historical experiences (and those worlds' ideological, political, socio-religious and economic forms and relations) of Europe and beyond. On Aristotle's pervasive but often as not unconscious, as well as conscious, intellectual influence, Kurt von Fritz, "Aristotle's Contribution to the Practice and Theory of Historiography", University of California Publications in Philosophy, 28 (1958), Howison Lecture for 1957, pp.113-137; see the obvious but necessary remarks on p.114; the practical and theoretical concerns of his Politics on, p.125; and the valuable summation of Aristotle's work and influence on pp.134-137. Grote, Aristotle, in spite of a somewhat too favourable assessment of Aristotle's early influence upon Alexander and, particularly, Alexander's likely conscious assessment of it, p.9, rightly points to Aristotle's critical spirit of independence, pp.9ff and his philosophical career in a volatile and highly political (politised) Athens, pp.9-26.

206. The most straightforward example given by Aristotle concerned Spartan society and the potential surfeit of sons that could be procreated by a mistaken law designed to encourage the procreation of Spartiatai, Arist. Pol., 1270a37-1270b6.


209. Ibid.
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212. Ibid.
214. It was the unreality of such a proposition and its attendant demographic confusions which most concerned Aristotle, Pol, 1265a17-18, especially, 1265a17-18.
217. Arist. Pol., 1265a15ff; see also 1265a9-10.
221. Arist. Pol., 1269b7-12.
226. Arist. Pol., 1269b12-1270b6. In these passages Aristotle presented long and short-term factors which led to a breakdown in Spartan society as evidenced by the following summary:

(i) women's panic after Leuktra;
(ii) the impact of dowries and inheritance practices on land ownership;
(iii) the ever decreasing Spartan population (male Spartiates) and lack of control over women;
(iv) the ever present menace or threat and challenge that the helots presented to the Spartan world which had forcibly incorporated the helots' Messenia;
(v) this distant historical event was a fact never far from the helot's present memory (and their shared generational memories and conscious historical experience) and its social expression via dissent and revolt.

227. Arist. Pol., 1270a11-15. Women's possession of real material wealth added to Sparta's acquisitiveness but Lacey, The Family in
228. The exercise of power relations within any society can be based upon necessary or conditional social relations which mirror the workings of a particular world and/or act as social, material or political conveyors (and signs) of those very same power relations. Whether these actions are rational or irrational (based upon reason or unreason) depends upon where one stands in relation to the exercise of power in a particular human social existence. See the original and powerful anthropological (and historical) explorations of Claude Meillassoux, "The Economy" in Agricultural Self-Sustaining Societies: A Preliminary Analysis", in David Seddon, Relations of Production: Marxist Approaches to Economic Anthropology (Great Britain, 1978), pp.140-144; 127-157 and his "The Social Organisation of the Peasantry: The Economic Basis of Kinship", pp.159-169; Maurice Godelier, Rationality and Irrationality in Economics, trans. Brian Pearce (New York and London, 1972), p.xxxix, and generally pp.xxxiii-xiii.


232. Women as subject and object, desired, revered and despised, is explored by Marylin B. Arthur, "Early Greece: The Origins of the Western Attitude toward Women", Arethusa, vol.6, no.1 (1973), pp.7-58. Most unfortunate anachronisms in the form of such expressions as "bourgeois" and "emerging middle class" or "rising middle class", pp.37; 45; 23 (and even 'nuclear family' p.11), have been adopted at the cost of historical accuracy and portraiture in an otherwise interesting and most useful exploration. Note also the logical unfolding of the hierarchy in Arist.Pol., 1254a13-19ff, and the dominant position of master/ruler/ male in comparison to the position of women (free women), slaves, domesticated animals and wild animals.
233. Trans-historical roles and supra-historical explanations present both a challenge and problematic, Sarah B. Pomeroy, "A Classical Scholar's Perspective on Matriarchy", in Liberating Women's History: Theoretical and Critical Essays, edited by Serenice A.B. Carroll (University of Illinois Press, 1976), pp.217-223. Specific historical explorations need general historical themes and comparative perspectives (from within and across historical time) to deepen and broaden their local historical character. As a guide to such a combination see A.W. Gomme, "The Position of Women in Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C." See also notes to Chapter II, nos.119-121.


236. Ibid., see also the more telling 'origins' of Sparta's problems with money (ta khrēmata), which clearly had more to do initially with war and conquest (and its material benefits and benefactors) than women, Plutarch, Lysander, XVI-XVII and Hdt. IX. 83-84.
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2. Ibid., p.34.


5. Within the context of Euripides' plays, the so-called criticism of slavery is a product of dramatic action and characterisation not philosophy or ethics. However, for a contrary view see Katerina Synodinou, On the Concept of Slavery in Euripides (Iaonnina, 1977), pp.106-109. Characters speak through the pen of their authors but Synodinou argues otherwise: pp.88-94. Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology, p.120, note 105 (p.178) drew the writer's attention to Synodinou's work.

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7. An example of this normative but misplaced line of argument can be
found in R. Schlaifer, "Greek Theories of Slavery from Homer to
Aristotle", pp.199-201. See also note 3.

8. W.I. Westermann, The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity,
p.26, and generally, pp.22-27. Piracy and warfare could and did
undermine the precarious freedom of many citizens: M. Rostovtzeff,
The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World, vol.1

9. M.I. Finley, "Was Greek Civilization Based on Slave Labour?",
pp.112-113.

10. Finley openly argues for the proposition "that slavery was a basic
element in Greek civilisation" but cautions that this is the
beginning not the end of the argument: "Was Greek Civilization
Based on Slave Labour?", pp.111-112.

11. Arist. Pol., 1253a18-26. Aristotle, and it is a necessary truism,
from within a polis form of human organisation about the
characterisations of the polis form and about human existence
within the paradigmatic boundaries of polis experience: see
William J. Booth, "Politics and the Household. A Commentary on
Aristotle's Politics Book One", History of Political Thought,


15. Ibid.

16. See note 1. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (The University of
Chicago Press, 1958), pp.28-38 grasped the importance of household
life to political activity, in its broadest sense, within a polis.
The qualitative association of household to polis remained both
vital and ideal and, not surprisingly, later found a reflection in
(and reflected) Arendt's ideals.

17. Arist. Pol., 1253a3-7; 1253a27-29. There was a fundamental
tension between the worlds of social meaning symbolised by the
immediate polis agrarian world, the borders of the polis, and the
citizen 'hunter' and the world, the 'wild' or dangerous environs
beyond one's polis, P. Vidal-Naquet, "The Black Hunter and the
Origin of the Athenian Ephelia", Proceedings of the Cambridge
"A considerably revised version" of this article appears in Myth,
Religion and Society: Structuralist essays by M. Detienne, L.
Gernet, J.-P. Vernant and P. Vidal-Naquet, edited by R.L. Gordon

19. Ibid.


21. Arist. Pol., 1253a7-8. This, to Aristotle's mind, was a 'natural' outcome, a given cultural expression of the constituency of human social relations, 1253a 1-3.


26. Ibid.


32. Ibid.


34. Ibid.

35. Koinônia embodied Aristotle's theoretical construct of a set of historically living, (and working) organised human experiences, namely, those of the polis world. Koinônia possessed a notion of continuity and associability, it conveyed the process of social organisation and it could be held up as a force for forming or


38. The structural concepts inherent in the terms, at once abstract and concrete, *koīnōnía* and *polis*, were characterised by (or expressed through) a mutuality of interests. The gregariousness of most human beings and a polis formation as the preferred order of Greek social relations were viewed as given in Aristotle’s theory of human associativeness: Arist. *Pol.*, 1253a25-30.


42. Athens provided (in terms of a history of literacy in Greece) another radically different and critical perspective, a unique case: P.D. Harvey, "Literacy in the Athenian Democracy", *Revue Des Études Grecques*, vol.79 (1966), pp.585-635. Harvey’s work is an intensive model of social history.


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46. The distinctive character of particular examples of a broadly defined cultural form such as the polis need not exclude comparison. Note the introduction, "Comparative sociological Study", in Max Weber, Economy and Society, particularly Weber's quoted remarks p.xxxvii:

A genuinely critical comparison of the developmental stages of the ancient polis and the medieval city ... would be rewarding and fruitful - but only if such a comparison does not chase after 'analogies' and 'parallels' in the manner of the presently fashionable general schemes of development; in other words, it should be concerned with the distinctiveness of each of the two developments that were finally so different, and the purpose of the comparison must be the causal explanation of the difference.

Nor should an eye to comparative detail exclude the particular production mode(s) and human character a social formation has acquired which gave it both historical expression and specific form. Marx observed:

...In short, that the economic structure of society, is the real basis on which the juridical and political superstructure is raised, and to which definite social forms of thought correspond; that the mode of production determines the character of the social, political, and intellectual life generally, all this is very true for our own times, in which material interests preponderate, but not for the middle ages, in which Catholicism, nor for Athens and Rome, where politics, reigned supreme. In the first place it strikes one as an odd thing for any one to suppose that these well-worn phrases about the middle ages and the ancient world are unknown to anyone else. This much, however, is clear, that the middle ages could not live on Catholicism, nor the ancient world on politics. On the contrary, it is the mode in which they gained a livelihood that explains why here politics, and there Catholicism, played the chief part.


47. It must be acknowledged that Aristotle was preceded by much venturing of speculative and bold ideas. A truism but, once again,

48. The reception of such patterning processes, whether welcome or unwelcome, precarious or mutating, is yet another consideration: Arnaldo Momigliano, "Greek Historiography", History and Theory, vol. xvi, no.1 (1978), pp.1-28.

49. However, we need not exclude an appreciation of the historical dimension of existence from Aristotle's discourses. Such a position would be both foolish and foolishhardy: S.R.L. Clark, Aristotle's Man, pp.130-144, see especially pp.130-132; Kurt von Fritz, "Aristotle's Contribution to the Practice and Theory of Historiography". Aristotle's preference for paradigmatic explanation could well explain why he said: διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφότατον καὶ ψυχαλλότατον τοιούτως φιλοσόφανταί
S.R.L. Clark, p.131, made the observation that:

"Here we are clearly faced by the Greek preference of the ideal to the individual, rationalism over empirical investigation."


50. Arist. Pol., 1252b5-9 serves as a prime example of the social and cultural distance between Greeks and their perceptions of the barbari. Here social relations were, once again, portrayed not only as expressions of set roles but also as relations of dominance and subordination.


52. Ibid. This view was reflected by Thucydides earlier: Thuc. I. vi. 7-2, 5-6.

53. See M.I. Finley, "Generalisations in Ancient History", in The Use and Abuse of History, pp.60-74, on the necessary presence of generalisation in the writing of history.
Notes to pages 61-62

55. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. In this sense, the Greeks had a general material and conceptual framework in which they expressed their culture's experiences. Ancient notions of cultural separateness or distinctiveness have often been confused with or distorted by specific twentieth century historical experiences such as nationalism, or Nazism's impact upon German historiography and "German Hellenism": see M.I. Finley, "The Historical Tradition", in The Use and Abuse of History, pp.75-86, particularly, pp.76-81; and further E. Will, Doriens et Ioniens: Essai sur la valeur du critère ethnique appliqué à l'étude de l'histoire et de la civilisation grecques (Paris, 1956), pp.9-16. Will discusses the origins and course of nationalist or racist distortions of Greek society and their impact upon and identification with an emergent German-Prussian state.
67. Ibid.
72. The generic standing of anthrōpos was stated explicitly amongst other usages and secondary forms, by Pierre Chantraire, Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Grecque, pp.90-91; Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, pp.141-142.


76. Ibid.

77. Arist. Pol., 1253a3-7; 1253a35-37.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.


82. Ibid. Thuc.III.81, provides concrete examples of such behaviour.


84. Ibid. Aristotle's ideas of political existence did not originate as a benign imitation of existing poleis structures. Law was an integral, long-range weapon and concept (Fritz and Kapp, p.133), not an expedient or opportune social arrangement: E. von Fritz and E. Kapp, "The Development of Aristotle's Political Philosophy and the Concept of Nature", Articles on Aristotle 2. Ethics and Politics, edited by Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield and Richard Sorabji (Great Britain, 1977), pp.113-134.


86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

Notes to pages 63-65


90. See notes 19 and 20 of this chapter.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid.


94. Arist. Pol., 1253b1-15ff. Pinley’s introduction to master/slave relations, the roles of force, routine torture and punishment, the psychology of master-slave relations is sketched in some detail in Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology (London, 1980), pp.93-105ff. See also G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, pp.26-27, paragraph 57, master-slave dialectic; also note the additions 56, Paragraph 57, p.122, and 57, Paragraph 58, p.122.

95. Arist. Pol., 1253b12-14, signalled Aristotle’s interest in coming to grips with the unchartered arena of social relations represented by the theory and practice of khṛmatistikō, and its relationship to kōtikō, with a justifiable and natural basis as signalled by Aristotle’s concept phusis, and its converse set of social relations based upon exchange for exchange’s (and acquisition’s) sake. On phusis see K. von Fritz and E. Kapp op. cit. note 70, pp.113-118.


100. Arist. Pol., 1253b18-23. One body of opinion argued that despotēia was an epistēmē like, or the same as oikonomía, politikē, and basilikē. The other saw force as the ultimate arbiter in making one man a slave and another free and nomos as merely a conventional, legal process which recognised and accepted this division. In reality the slave-free dichotomy was against ‘nature’ (phusis) because there was no ‘natural’ difference between the two persons as opposed to their human conditions.


102. Arist. Pol., 1253b20-23ff. The contrary opinion put forward by unknown thinkers was not one Aristotle shared. However, he did choose to bring it forward for the purposes of his critique and therefore shed light on one dissenting opinion in the classical Greek world. Aristotle brought forward this dissenting opinion on the standing of the slave-free classification and its validity with regard to the concepts of phusis and blasion, ‘nature’ and ‘violent action’, not because he possessed some form of intellectual
altruism but precisely for the specific purpose of his master-slave critique. G.E.M. de Ste Croix, "Slavery", pp.54-59, particular on p.55, notes that debate on slavery and forensic exchanges by citizens on the standing and position of slaves and slavery did not, by any stretch of the scholarly imagination, mean that anyone present at this real or conjured-up exchange accepted or advocated the abolition of slavery as an integral part of polis existence.

103. Ibid.

104. M.I. Finley, "Generalizations in Ancient History", pp.63-64.

105. M.I. Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology, p.70. See also pp.69-71ff.


109. Arist. Pol., 1253b20-23 so this argument went, recognised the social and political (and/or military and physical) force behind the application of nomos.

110. Ibid.


114. Ibid.

115. Arist. Pol., 1253b23-33ff. Aristotle structured his text, at this point, around the social form known as the oikos and explained social relations and, indeed, relations of production with its ideal needs and aims in view as William J. Booth made clear: "Politics and the Household. A Commentary on Aristotle's Politics Book One", especially, pp.219-224. However, this did not mean that Aristotle failed to see challenges or other orders of reality confronting his ideal, as we shall examine in chapters V, VI and VII. The master-slave relation was spread throughout polis labouring life, if not concentrated in every activity.
Notes to pages 67-68


117. Ibid.


119. Households, of course, existed (and exist) in many forms throughout the course of history and, that is the point. Generalisations need to be made (and are unavoidable) but, ultimately, we must search for variety or particularity rather than some supposed uniformity. Specific study and the use of generalisation are linked in this quest: M.I. Finley, "Generalisations in Ancient History", pp.60-74, especially pp.67-73.

120. Arist. Pol., 1253b23ff derived its impressive argumentative power from its clear association of the slave with household tools or the instruments used for the maintenance of the primary social, economic and political human association within a polis world.


123. Ibid.

124. Ibid.


131. Ibid.
132. Ibid.


135. Ibid.


138. Ibid.

139. (i) That Aristotle thought about and appreciated notions of proportionality and discussed their relationship to his world can be seen clearly in the Nicomachean Ethics. Chapter VII will examine N.E. 1129a-1134a.

(ii) What we are dealing with here are analogous relations of dependency, their social utility and instrumental classification within a free (citizen) ideology amongst the Greeks. The historical patterns of this ideology's practice clearly varied but the given hierarchy of a citizen ideology with its readily apparent assumption of a citizen's 'natural' supremacy within a polis stood out clearly.

140. Arist. Pol., 1253b27-1254a1. Whilst there is a wonderful hint of automation in this way comment of Aristotle's, craftsmen and masters clearly needed their animate instruments' contributions to a polis' daily relations of production.


143. Hephaistos carried out or represented, like other gods, separate roles, tasks or duties, not a narrow specialised economic interest: G.S. Kirk, Myth: Its Meaning and Function in Ancient and Other Cultures (C.U.P., 1970; 1971), pp.174; 229-230. Economic activity was not excluded: rather such activity was inclusive, interwoven with cultural, religious and social layers of activity and meaning.


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152. Arist. Pol., *op. cit.*

153. See note 148.

154. Arist. Pol., 1254a7. This is a classic statement by Aristotle on the master's active, direct and directive roles in polis social existence. Of critical significance was the slave's existence and definition (as well as necessary functions or usefulness to a master) being placed in an unambiguously supportive capacity.


156. Arist. Pol., 1253b23ff. Acknowledging the use functions of a slave does not detract from the slave's definition as a live, breathing property. Such a definition acknowledges the roles a slave as living property was intended to perform.


158. Arist. Pol., 1254a7. The master's life (*bios*) found its expression in the Realm of *Praxis*.


160. The notion of use-value was given direct meaning and reference through the concept of tools (*organa*) and their direct utility to the maintenance of an *oikos* world, Arist. Pol., 1253b23-31ff. Marx, *Capital*, vol.1, discusses both the forms of, and purposes of, use- and exchange-value, pp.43-48 and Aristotle's seminal contribution to the 'value' debate, pp.64-66.


163. One aspect of this power was exposed by Aristotle's description of a slave's relationship to a master. A slave's existence was entirely dependent upon and vested in the master's authority and possession, Arist. Pol., 1254a11-13ff.


166. This was accepted implicitly by Aristotle in a broad social context, Arist. Pol., 1253b23ff; 1256a38-40; 1256b26-39. That free and dependent 'free' labour were common, and took many forms in Hellenic, Hellenistic and Greco-Roman Republican and Imperial Antiquity, has been demonstrated by the venturesome exploration of M.I. Finley, "Was Greek Civilization Based on Slave Labour", in Slavery in Classical Antiquity: Views and Controversies, edited by M.I. Finley (England, 1960; 1964; 1968 reprinted and supplement added), pp.53-72, first published in Historia, vol.8 (1959), pp.145-164. Finley expressed his opinion simply and eloquently:

Two generalizations may be made at the outset. First: at all times and in all places the Greek world relied on some form (or forms) of dependent labour to meet its needs, both public and private.

(p.53) and then he added a significant reminder,

...with the rarest of exceptions, there were always substantial numbers of free men engaged in productive labour. (p.53)

Finley did not lose sight of chattel (and other forms of slavery) slavery's critical roles:

With little exception, there was no activity, productive or unproductive, public or private, pleasant or unpleasant, which was not performed by slaves at some times and in some places in the Greek world. (p.55)
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171. Ibid.


174. Arist. Pol., 1328b37-1329a2; 1329a24-26; 1329b36-38; 1330a25-31. Note the general distancing of all toilers within this polis from the citizens and the non-toiling citizenry's monopoly of military and legal power: 1329a34-39. Aristotle's master-slave relations assumed an ideal form rather than an historical one. Aristotle's preference for agricultural work being carried out by slaves is stated again at: 1330a25-30.

175. Arist. Pol., 1329b39-1330a2ff. Aristotle's rentier ideal was a corrective measure aimed at avoiding the disastrous experience of Spartan land ownership as well as being part of his critique of Plato's ideal polis. See Chapter II, notes 168-206 and their text for an examination of Aristotle's views on the critical importance of land ownership and the preservation of a stable pattern of land-holding through careful social regulation.


177. This was particularly the case in Athenian agriculture. For slavery's role in this agricultural system, the enlightening arguments of Melikin's Wood are well worth the reader's time: Ellen Meiksins Wood, "Agricultural Slavery in Classical Athens", American Journal of Ancient History, vol.8, no.1 (1983) [Appeared June, 1988], pp.1-47; especially, pp.6-13; 16-26; 39-42ff.


180. Ibid.

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183. Ibid., and as given in Aristotle's general theory of a polis formation's existence, 1253a18-29ff.


188. Liddell, Scott & Jones, Ibid. The master-slave ideology defined a slave's potentiality within an orbit of subordinate, dependent, instrumental relations.

189. Ibid.


197. Ibid. When one speaks of a mode or modes of production or relations of production one is never far from questions of ideology, class and exploitation. For a discussion around these subjects and Marxist scholarship see R.I. Frank, "Marxism and Ancient History", Arethusa, vol.8, no.1 (1975), especially pp.43-50; Paul Cartledge, "Towards the Spartan Revolution", Ibid.

200. Arist. Pol., 1253b32ff; 1254a8ff demonstrated the living, breathing usefulness of a slave to a citizen. A slave was an active agent of a citizen's life's needs - nothing more, nothing less.
203. Ibid.
208. Ibid.
209. Ibid.
210. Aristotle's open expression of a need for critical inquiry was made manifest in his Politics. It was a given condition, a driving force of his work and made itself apparent at many points in his work, Arist. Pol., 1252a24-26; 1253b14-18ff; 1254a17ff. For Aristotle a scientific approach was inseparable from questions of what constituted knowledge and its apprehension: Takakura Ando, Aristotle's Theory of Practical Cognition (The Hague, Netherlands, 1958 1st ed.; 1971, 3rd ed.), pp.165-213ff.
216. Ibid.

217. Ibid., line 22.

218. Ibid.

219. The *Politics* drew on Greek social and historical experiences as seen by numerous discussions of various polis formations such as the Spartan polity, 1269a29ff, as well as being based upon archetypal forms of reasoning for critical method. Aristotle's use of models, his ideal and organic conceptualisations of the polis world, simultaneously embraced a wide field of Greek cultural, political and social experiences. Aristotle's views arose within the context of a volatile fourth century Greek world and reflected (and reflected upon) the experiences, past and present, which formed that world, H. Kelsen, "Aristotle and Hellenic-Macedonian Policy", in *Articles on Aristotle 2, Ethics and Politics*, edited by Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield and Richard Scrabji (London, 1977), pp.170-194; G.E.M. De Ste. Croix, "Aristotle, Marx and Greek démokratia", a paper delivered to Greek Political Thought Conference, 23 March, 1982; revised paper, 1984, gratefully acknowledged by this writer.


222. Ibid.


224. Ibid.

225. Ibid.

226. Ibid.


229. Ibid.


231. Ibid.


234. Arist. *Pol.*, 1254b10-11; agrarian people and agrarian activity with its seemingly enclosed rounds of work to furnish a livelihood was a preferable base for an ideal démokratia, 1318b9-11.
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236. Ibid. The use of the term sōtēria signified the close relationship, the usefulness of domesticated, farm animals and animal power to the polis. Sōtēria was an explicit guarantee, an expression of the need for these animals well-being, safety and security. The need for the, soteria, of domesticated animals stood by itself as a direct link, a representation of a polis' need for domesticated animals, and their usefulness to such a world. Sōtēria acknowledged an ultimate concern to ensure the continuity of the relationship between human beings and domesticated animals. Sōtēria spelt preservation.

237. Signs of Aristotle's agrarian perceptions and perspectives can be found by his recognition of agriculture being the occupation of most human beings, Arist. Pol., 1256a38-40. Similarly, his characterisation of 'nomadic' life-styles, 1256a31, as argrotatoi, reflected something of an agrarian world's view of a non-ploughing, non-intensive world and culture.


NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

Notes to Pages 80-81

1. One does not need to have accepted the validity or historical usefulness of all Max Weber's conceptual explorations before one notices the usefulness of his "ideal types" to an exploration of Aristotle's Politics and Nicomachean Ethics. A useful summary of Weber's "ideal types" can be found in Donald McIntosh, "The Objective Bases of Max Weber's Ideal Types", History and Theory, vol.XVI (1977), pp.265-279. The writing of history can be enriched by sociological studies and the value of comparative history and what has been called "historical sociology" must not be overlooked. For the state of the art see Victoria E. Bonnell, "The Uses of Theory, Concepts and Comparison in Historical Sociology", Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol.22, no.2 (April, 1980), pp.156-173; Philip Abrams, "History, Sociology, Historical Sociology", Past and Present, vol.87 (May, 1980), pp.3-16. See also M.I. Finley, Ancient History: Evidence and Models (London, 1985), pp.7-26.


6. Arist. Pol., 125b19, heltōn conveys a sense of convenience and "natural" place for the specific location of a dependent or subordinate relationship, 125b17-13.


10. Arist. Pol., 125b27-125a2. The contrast between the ideal characteristics of free and slave and the reality of this not being, by any means, the general case, as Aristotle observed, needed to be accounted for. Hence the introduction of phusis as an ideological weapon in his intellectual armourry and an equally powerful emphasis upon psukhē combined to affirm the consciously superior position of the free citizen/master to that of a slave.

11. Arist. Pol., 125b38-39. The external appearance of some slaves was put aside for the internal reality of the power which resided in the citizen/master's (the freeman's) consciousness of his position within a polis: 125b32-33ff; 125b27ff.
12. The contemporary debate surrounding the concepts of body/soul reflects the tangled undergrowth into which scholarship has plunged in search for clarification of Aristotle's body/soul, body/mind, or body/form dichotomy or, for that matter, supposed dichotomy: Richard Sorabji, "Body and Soul in Aristotle", in Articles on Aristotle: Psychology and Aesthetics, edited by J. Barnes, M. Schofield and R. Sorabji (London, 1979), pp.42-64; J.L. Ackrill, "Aristotle's Definitions of psyche", Ibid., pp.65-75. It must be remembered (note 11) that Aristotle's particular concern here was with external and internal realities or perceptions and their ideal manifestations (and imperfect reflections) in defining the gulf between free and slave.

13. Terms of approval or disapproval which reflected political division and class struggle between a polis' citizenry are manifest in classical literature. G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, "The Character of the Athenian Empire", Historia, 3 (1954/1955), pp.22-25ff, particularly, pp.24-25 makes clear the character of social division in Athenian polis life and its sarcastically fulsome expression and characterisation in the work of the Old Oligarch. See further note 130 of this chapter. W.R. Connor, The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens (Princeton University Press, 1977), pp.86-89ff, 171-180ff, examines divisions within the Athenian polis, the essential bases for political divisions and the internal turmoil this caused amongst ruling-friendship groupings and families. G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, "Aristotle, Marx and Greek demokratia", recognises that some terms used to describe opposing forces within Athens, "have a moral flavour" (p.7). Note K.J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality, pp.41-48; 69-73, for the most confident tone and power of kalos and kalos-related terminology. At the very least, it was a favourable social label. Dover and Ste. Croix disagree as to whether kalos and related terms constitute a "class label" (pp.43-48). A far stronger case for the general impact of moral language upon Aristotle's thought will be put forward in chapters VI and VII.

14. The aristoi were an ideal formation in Aristotle's thought and the Nicomachean Ethics, 1131a24-29 reflected this in its scale of meritorious behaviour or social value as perceived by different political groupings.

15. Regardless of his educational role undertaken on behalf of Philip's Macedonian monarchy, one must not assume Aristotle directly influenced Alexander's future, or that the political archetypes set up in the Politics only reflected (or were mere copies) of then existing historical societies. Aristotle's work was more than critical commentary; it was critical theory. G.E.R. Lloyd, Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of His Thought (C.U.P., 1968), pp.4-9; 204-267; H. Kelsen, "Aristotle and Hellenic - Macedonian Policy", pp.170-194.

17. The end of Arist. Pol., 1258b8ff is an interesting example.
18. A further example: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1132b1-1134a26ff.
20. M.I. Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology, p.117; 119.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
31. On the elite, the ruling class were truly "men of leisure" completely free of all physical or manual labour rather than, "free from any preoccupation with economic matters": M.I. Finley, "Was Greek Civilization Based on Slave Labour", p.69 and generally; A.H.M. Jones, "Slavery in the Ancient World", in M.I. Finley, Slavery in Classical Antiquity, p.3, note 5, "those who can, buy slaves so as to have fellow workers. Xen.Mem.II.iii.3." The relationships between free and slave quite clearly involved exploitation (extraction of a surplus, agricultural or otherwise) of the latter group or class by the former class, and this could be carried out by direct or indirect means, on an individual or collective level or basis: G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World, pp.42-44ff; and, of course, class struggle and exploitation took place between rich and poor citizens and other categories of "independent producers", 'free' and 'unfree' labour: pp.49-69; 205-208ff; see also, Peter Garnsey, Non-Slave Labour in the Greco-Roman World, pp.1-25.
33. Note Aristotle, *Historia Animalium* 553b20-27; 554a1-17; 625b24. Bees' activity was synonymous with incessant work-oriented activity.


36. Arist. *Pol.*, 1254b30-32. This was spelt out clearly in the citizen's preoccupation with the political process as expressed in the practical outcomes of *polemikē* and *eirēnikē*.

37. Ibid.

38. 'Citizen' and 'hoplite' were originally (or, at least, conceptually) two aspects of polis politics. The hoplite 'band' became the external (defensive or aggressive) arm of a polis. Weber admitted that these 'types', for example, 'hoplite polis' and 'citizen polis':

...seldom existed in complete isolation. They are 'pure types', concepts to be used in classifying individual states. They simply allow us to ask whether a particular state at a particular time more or less approximated to one or another of these pure types. More than an 'approximation' cannot be expected, for actual state structures in the most important phases of history are too complex to be comprehended by so simple a classification as the one used here.


40. Ibid.

41. The term 'economic arena' is used precisely because 'economic base' conjures up an altogether too simplistic or mechanistic view of the roles of economic activity in any social formation. In Karl Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, trans. Jack Cohen, edited with an introduction by E.J. Hobsbawm (London, 1964; 1st pub. in full, 1939-1941) Cohen's translation and Hobsbawm's introduction do away with unilinear approaches to history and with deterministic economism. Slavery was integral to the ancient world but cannot be simply viewed as an absolute economic or technological brake (pp.38-39); the ancient world was defined by, and preoccupied with, a fundamentally different structuring of human existence; pp.71ff; 73-74; 77-78; 84-85, this last reference 84-85 refers as much to a polis citizen as it does to Marx's own ideals as well as European and Victorian ideals, of human growth and happiness. Whilst the size of the slave population at Athens varied greatly, slavery has been a source of a most considerable body of scholarship - see Augustus Boeckh, The Public Economy of Athens; to which is added, A Dissertation on the Silver Mines of Lauron, trans. by George Cornwall Lewis (London, 1822, 2nd edition; 1st pub. 1817, Berlin), pp.35-37ff; N. Wallon, Histoire de L'Esclavage Dans L'Antiquité, 3 vols. (Paris, 1879, 1st pub. 1847) especially vol.1, De L'Esclavage En Orient Et En Grèce, chapters III; V and VIII; William L. Westermann, The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity (Philadelphia, 1955); see Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology, pp.11-17 and his comments on the impact of Hume's Of the Populouensness of Ancient Nations, pp.30-34ff on the course of the slavery debate; Rachel Louise Sargent, The Size of the Slave Population at Athens during the Fifth and Fourth Centuries before Christ (University of Illinois, the social sciences III, 3, 1925), especially, pp.13-43; and finally the careful survey of the evidence, claims of the ancients and classical scholars in A.W. Gomme, The Population of Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C. (Oxford, 1933; 1967 reprint, Glasgow University Publications); note his generally cautious and questioning approach, pp.20-35. As stated earlier, Chapter I, note 97, wariness, or a "softly, softly" approach to such evidence, is required to bring out the best it has to offer.

say the least) the interpretations proffered on 'trade' (emperos) and traders in the works of R. Knorrings, *Emporos: Data on trade and trader in Greek literature from Homer to Aristotle* (Amsterdam, 1926); H. Bolkestein, *Economic Life in Greece's Golden Age* (Leiden, 1958). The title says much about the author. However, his discussions on agriculture in its ancient context, slavery and economic activity or activities with economic and other purposes or goals are well worth the reader's time. His rejection of capitalism as a meaningful statement or description of economic activity and motivation in ancient Greece is both necessary and commendable given the state of debate at the time, pp.148-149ff.

43. The *Grundlagen* is best defined by the following broad characterisation provided by Perry Anderson:

In Marxist usage, the purport of the concept of social formation is precisely to underline the plurality and heterogeneity of possible modes of production within any given historical and social totality. Uncritical repetition of the term 'society', conversely, all too often conveys the assumption of an inherent unity of economy, polity or culture within a historical ensemble, when in fact this simple unity and identity does not exist. Social formations, unless specified otherwise, are thus here always concrete combinations of different modes of production, organised under the dominance of one of them.


44. Two interesting examples of such situations Thuc. IV.26; Xen. HG I.6.24.

45. Arist. Pol., 1255a1-2, δι' ἅν τοίνυν εἰσὶν σύνετα τινὲς οἱ μὲν ἐλέεσθαι οἱ δὲ δουλεῖν, φανερὸν...


47. Arist. Pol., 1254b33-34.


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52. Arist. Pol., 1254b27-34ff, made this very clear, and the term toumation spelt out his recognition of an opposite or contrary position to that of his ideal (phuesis).

53. Arist. Pol., 1254a13ff displayed Aristotle's belief that some by nature belonged to a state of douleia. The problem associated with a definition (or definitions) of slavery and other forms of involuntary labour are well surveyed by M.I. Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology, pp.68-73. Finley makes the salient and essential observation that, in the end, (p.73): "As a commodity, the slave is property".


ο γάρ μη υμών φύσι , ἄλλον ἀνθρώπος ἔστιν, ὅπου δ' ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος δ' αὖ κτίσμα ή ἄνθρωπος ἔστιν, κτίσμα δὲ διὸν οὐκ εἰρήνη καὶ χαριστικά.


58. Arist. Pol., 1255a4-5.


61. Ibid.

62. Ibid. ἕστι γάρ τις καὶ κατὰ νόμον δοῦλος καὶ δουλεύων. ο γάρ νόμος διδάσκει τις ἔστιν ἐν ἃ τὰ κατὰ τόλμων κρατάμενα τῶν κρατώντων εἶναι φαιν. (note 57).


64. Ibid.


66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.

68. Plato, Republic, I. 338c.

69. Ibid. ουδέ γὰρ ἐναὶ τὸ δίκαιον σωκάλλο τι ή τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος Σωκέρον.


72. Ibid.


74. Ibid.


77. Arist. Pol., 1254a13-17ff; 1255a1-2; 1255a28-29.


81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid.


86. Arist. Pol., 1255a26-28ff. Clearly this passage demonstrated that Greeks were sold as a result of defeat in war but Aristotle argued that they must not be recognised as slaves within the terms of his ideology and philosophical discourse. In the eyes of Greeks (as Aristotle pointed out) they remained free, 1255a 26-36. The Sicilian expedition remained a large-scale example of Greeks having been sold as slaves after a complete military defeat Thuc. VII.85; VII.87.


89. Arist. Pol., 1255a28-29 revealed the gulf between Greek attitudes on slavery for Greek speaking peoples and barbarians, non-Greek speaking peoples who did not observe similar customs and traditions.


92. The 'Aristotelian' ideal of 'natural slavery' should be seen as a peculiar philosophical (and ideological) response of Aristotle's to the widespread practice of slavery throughout his geographical world. It was an attempt to systematise theoretically historical practices and confirm Greek cultural confidence and its prejudices; see G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World, pp.416-418, on "the theory of 'natural slavery'".

93. Questions of linguistic affinity or cultural attachment gradually emerged into questions of class or exploiter-exploited relations in the Hellenistic kingdoms. The Greek-barbaroi, Greek-'native' dichotomy existed in geography, culture and class: Ste. Croix, Ibid., pp.16-17.

94. Arist. Pol., 1255a26-34.


96. Ibid.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid.


100. Arist. Pol., op. cit.


102. Ibid.

103. Ibid.


105. Ibid.

106. It is worth speculating that Aristotle's aretē-kakia and eugenē-
dusgenē found some inspiration from "man as the measure" - the head of Aristotle's "biological continuum": S.R.L. Clarke, Aristotle's Man, pp.28-30ff.

108. Ibid.

109. Semiotics is the 'science' of signs; see also note 39 above. According to Roland Barthes, A Barthes Reader, edited and introduced by Susan Sontag (U.S.A., 1982), "Inaugural Lecture, College de France", (p.469) "the sciences (at least those in which I have done any reading at all) are not eternal; they are values which rise and fall on an Exchange - the Exchange of History". Aristotle's language is inseparable from his historical world - the exchange of values and ideas born in polis experience.


112. Ibid.

113. Ibid.

114. Ibid.

115. Ibid.

116. Ibid.

117. Ibid.

118. Ibid.


120. Arist. Pol., 1255b4-7ff.

121. Arist. Pol., 1255a1-2; 1255b4-7.

122. Ibid.


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125. Ideas were as easily frozen or distorted for ideological or political reasons as they were intentional (or unintentional) vehicles for change or the dissolution of long-held belief systems: L. Febvre and H.J. Martin, *Ibid.*, "The Book as a Force for Change", pp.216ff; S. Sambursky, *The Physical World of the Greeks*, "The Limits of Greek Science", pp.222-224.

126. See notes 94 and 95 for textual references and also notes to chapter I, 110, 114 and 115.

127. For a range of meanings and terms associated with *genos* see P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Grecque*, pp.221-222. Descent rather than 'race' is a more meaningful concept. Frank M. Snowden, Jr., *Blacks in Antiquity: Ethiopians in the Greco-Roman Experience* (Harvard University Press, 1970), tellingly observed after W. den. Boer's criticisms of A. Dihle:

...that, as far as...observations on skin-color are concerned, modern views have vitiated the interpretation and have attributed anachronistically to antiquity a nonexistent racial discrimination. Further, some scholars have interpreted as caricature or as evidence of a penchant for the ugly the portrayal of Negroes which obviously reflected either the aesthetic interest of the artist or the scientific curiosity of the period.

I have no intention of investigating here the ancients views of blacks or Africans in classical or Greco-Roman history, however, see the admirably thorough investigation in Snowden, particularly pp.viii-x; "Greek and Roman Descriptions of Ethiopians: The color of the skin", pp.2-5; and see the illustrations, pp.33ff, and his interesting chapter "Greco-Roman Attitude toward Ethiopians - Theory and Practice", pp.169-195.


129. Of course, it needs to be remembered that Aristotle had a model image of the *aristoi* which found expression in N.Z. 1131a24-29; see note 76, chapter 4. Aristotle's paradigm is just that; however, Ellen Meiksins Wood and Neal Wood *Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory: Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle in Social Context* (Oxford, 1978), pp.223-226 are in too much of a hurry to conflate and dismiss Aristotle as essentially, (p.210) "a worthy political successor of Socrates and Plato, sharing their fundamental anti-democratic and authoritarian perspective," to dissect effectively and carefully Aristotle's 'aristocratic' paradigm, pp.223-226.
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130. For the terminology of political struggle note the following: Ps.Xen. Ath. Pol. ('The Old Oligarch') reflected the Athenian political climate in which the démos had the upper hand in the struggle with the kratostoi and plousiotes, albeit in an often rhetorical (but far from simply sensational) and colourful manner see Ps.Xen. Ath. Pol. I.1-5 (especially 4-5) and note carefully I.10-13; III.7-12; III.10-11. See note 13. Also consult Pseudo-Aristotle's Ath. Pol. 2; 5ff; 24; note early political struggles 13-15; 19-20; and later political developments (23-26; 27-28) which changed the character (if not all the faces) of political power; once again, see St. Crock, 'The Character of the Athenian Empire'; "Aristotle, Marx and Greek démokratia"; W.R. Connor, pp.127ff and the most interesting section on wealth and political activism, pp.151-158.

131. Arist. Pol., 1255b6-8ff is but one example out of many others we have noted earlier.

132. All forms of activity and property which were needed to maintain the oikos came within the master's control. All the means or tools used to reproduce the oikos came within the master's control. Aristotle recognised the significance of the master's/citizen's roles in this arena: Arist. Pol., 1253b23 - 1254a17; 1255b30-40.

133. Arist. Pol., 1253b23 - 1254a8; see particularly 1253b25-32.

134. Ibid.

135. Ibid.

136. M.I. Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology, p.117.

137. Ibid.

138. Ibid., p.118. See notes 158-162. Finley's three "despites" certainly thin out his case for racism in the ancient world. Where, for one, were the laws against miscegenation? However, see the careful evaluation of Greco-Roman values and behaviour towards 'Ethiopians' in Snowden, Blacks in Antiquity, pp.186-193.

139. Thuc. IV.80.3-4.

140. Ibid.

141. Ibid. A.W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary On Thucydides (O.U.P., 1956), vol.III, p.548 made the observation: "Grote's dislike of fraud and cruelty, his belief in the efficacy of public discussion, seem old-fashioned": Grote's contempt for "perfidious", "murderous" and "barbarous" behaviour certainly came from his own mind and heart, and whether "old-fashioned" or not, his opinion stands as a kind of nineteenth-century reminder (an icon) of the numbing impact that wars of attrition, annihilation and extermination have had upon twentieth-century conscience and consciousness. Gomme, one suspects, would have agreed.
This "fear" or caution on the part of the Spartan formation explained itself, as Thucydides argued, when the Spartans readily agreed to send a largely helot force under the command of the spartiate Brasidas to Northern Greece. The Spartans had both pressing domestic and foreign reasons for sending this expedition, Thuc. IV.80.1-3; IV.80.5. The historical experience of Sparta was tempered by the resistance of her indigenous subject people, the helots.

Thuc. IV.80.2-3.

Thuc. IV.80.3. The resistance of the Messenians was emboldened by the strength of their population, its determination and its memories of freedom.

This is borne out by Thucydides reference to the increased possibilities of revolt (in the Spartans eyes) by the helots because Pylos was not under their effective control and was located inside their political and territorial domain, Thuc. IV.80.2ff; IV.41.2-3. Not surprisingly, the Messenians regarded this area as part of their homeland. This feeling was roused by the presence of the Messenians from Naupaktos who were themselves the 'survivors', in a general sense, in that they were the direct descendants of a major Messenian revolt which finally had centred itself around Mount Ithome, Thuc. I.101-103.

Finley makes it quite plain how the masters' state responded to a slave revolt which potentially menaced it rather than one owner's property, animate and inanimate: Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology, pp.98-99, or to the murder of a citizen (albeit a most prominent one, Pedanius Secundus, prefect of Rome) by one of his slaves, pp.102-103. The law was ruthless in preserving the 'state' and slave masters' interests.

That slaves' necessary presence in an oikos' working existence was taken as axiomatic was borne out by Arist. Pol., 1253b23-32ff. A complex trade existed for slaves, M.I. Finley, "The Slave Trade In Antiquity: The Black Sea and Danubian Regions", in Economy and Society in Ancient Greece, pp.167-175. Part of the reason for an organised trade stemmed from a need for more slaves than the masters' own households, let alone work places, could probably supply; M.I. Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology, pp.130-131.

See notes 41 and 42. Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World, op. cit., pp.52-53ff; p.209ff, amongst other places, recognises the dual patterns of slave and free labour (as well as other categories of unfree labour) in the Greco-Roman world.

Ste. Croix, Ibid., provides a most detailed study of the sources and a coherent theoretical account of, "Forms of Exploitation in the Ancient Greek World, and the Small Independent Producer", pp.205-275; see Daniel Thorner, "Peasant Economy as a Category in
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150. P. Anderson, Passages From Antiquity to Feudalism, p.22.


152. William Linn Westermann, "Slavery and the Elements of Freedom in Ancient Greece", in Slavery in Classical Antiquity, pp.17-32 looks to factors such as (p.31) "the economic organization of the Greek world was on the whole an expanding one in the fifth and fourth centuries". Such highly debatable notions avoid questions of the scale of Greek (or Athenian) slavery and its structural dispersal. Even Westermann's "Athenaeus and the Slaves of Athens", pp.73-92, which commendably examined Athenaeus YI.272-273a, still avoided the complex spread of slavery (rather than absolute or supposed totals of slaves in any one polis at any one time) and its ideology, which Finley, "Was Greek Civilization Based on Slave Labour?" p.61 characterised as, "the inability of the ancient world to imagine that there could be a civilised society without slaves." Greek culture and ideology were not only mutually supportive, they were interchangeable on the general principle of the naturalness of slavery and its presence in their world. Of course, slaves never remained absolutely quiet (as opposed to the near silence, the imposed silence of their world) or content - see Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology, pp.112-114ff. Major revolts by slaves were not the general means of protest or rebellion. Fugitive patterns of survival and banditry were common features of Greco-Roman social history.

153. Arist. Pol., 1253b23 - 1254a17. On the other hand, indigenous slave/bondage systems (heiloteia or penestea) were of another order of magnitude 1269a36 - 1269b12.


156. Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology, p.118.

157. 'Ordinary discourse' is (except for archaeological evidence) beyond our view for the most part. It is altogether too vague a formulation of such a question. Once again, see Snowden, Blacks in Antiquity, note 127.


161. Many leading intellectuals were attracted by the Eugenics movement, indeed, they set it up. For the roles of Francis Galton and Maynard Keynes and many others in this movement see Geoffrey Fisherburn, "Keynes and the Age of Eugenics: The pseudo-science of race", The Age Monthly Review, vol.3, no.2 (June, 1983), pp.3-5; see also the restrained overview, Bentley Glass, "Evolution and Heredity in the Nineteenth Century", in Medicine, science and culture: Historical essays in honour of Owhi Tomkin, edited by Lloyd G. Stevenson and Robert F. Multhauf (Baltimore, J. Hopkins Press, 1968), pp.209-216.

162. Ibid., ancient history did not escape this 'intellectual' new wave. See the period piece, frozen for us by Allen G. Roper, Ancient Eugenics (The Arnold Prize Essay for 1913; Oxford, 1913).

163. Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology, p.117.

164. M.I. Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology, p.92.

165. Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World, pp.35-40; 52-55 makes it quite clear that slaves and slavery were tools of exploitation used arbitrarily for the extraction of a 'surplus' which enabled the leisured, property class (the ruling class) of a polis to not only live but to construct the form of political and social environment in which a Greek citizenry acted out its historical existence.
166. This is not to say that the ancients did not attempt to keep accounts, just that these accounts were, for the most part, rough "rule-of-thumb" or "house-keeping lists" not accounting sheets and entries. G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, "Greek and Roman Accounting," in A.C. Littleton and B.S. Yamey, Studies in the History of Accounting (London, 1956), pp. 14-74, the notational environment (the absence of place-value) was quite different, and account keeping was in its infancy; pp. 33-37. See also the paper which preceded Ste. Croix's (which he openly acknowledged and praised, p. 37), G. Mickwitz, "Economic Rationalism in Graeco-Roman Agriculture", The English Historical Review, vol. LII (1937), pp. 577-589. The historical flavours of Graeco-Roman 'accounting' are eloquently captured in Richard H. Macve, "Some Glosses on 'Greek and Roman Accounting'", Crux: Essays Presented to G.E.M. de Ste. Croix on his 75th Birthday, edited by P. Cartledge and P.D. Harvey, History of Political Thought, vol. VI, Issue 1-2 (1985), pp. 233-264.

167. For New World slavery's (the Old South's) "unique kind of paternalist society", its peculiar "aristocratic ethos" and attitudes towards work see Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll, pp. 3-5 ff; 295-298ff; 311-315ff. Historical schools of thought, attitudes towards historiography, reveal themselves most powerfully in slave history (the history of slavery). See the contemporary debate in David Brian Davis, "Slavery and the Post- World War II Historians", Daedalus, vol. 103 (1974), pp. 1-16; Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology, "Slavery and Humanity", pp. 93-122.

168. Arist. Pol., 125a13-17ff. Both a slave's "natural" propensity to belong to another and his/her standing as property, reduced that person to a position of a live chattel best owned and directed (ruled and absolutely controlled in the last instance, even if the slave worked independently) by a citizen/master.

169. Arist. Pol., 1255a21-26ff. Clearly there were contending opinions over the legal and moral (read philosophical) position of Greeks taken prisoner in war and sold. The outcome of a war was apt to be messy and in practice did not conform to the Greek ideal that one who was a Greek and eugenos always should be seen and recognised as a free person regardless of circumstances, precisely because of that person's dual possession of eugenos standing and Greek culture. See note 86.


173. Ibid.
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175. Ibid.

176. Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology, pp.118-119 is right to draw attention to this tale representing "an attitude, a frame of mind".

177. Arist. Pol., 1254a13-17, a human being who was a "thing possessed" (ktēma), a possession who was no more than an instrumental functionary (organon praktikon) and alienable (khōriston) property was by phusis, a live chattel, a slave. See also 1254b16-26.

178. Ibid. 1253b32ff.


182. Ibid.


185. The kaloi kagathoi, for example: see Finley, p.123 and Aristotle's definitions or characterisations of oligarchic tending aristokratia, Pol., 1293b33-42.

186. The political and polemical character of Athenian political (and philosophical) discourse must never be underestimated, W.R. Connor The New Politicians of Fifth Century Athens, pp.88-89ff; 103-104ff.

187. Ibid. Political language and political meaning in a political world (the highly politicised Athenian world) was directly reflected upon by Ps. Xen. Anth. Pol. II.19.

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189. Clearly political classification and behaviour were categorised by both sides of the Athenian polis: Ps. Xen. Ath. Pol. II.19-20.


191. This did not necessarily mean that all such opponents were committed to the overthrow of dēmokratia, Ps. Xen. Ath. Pol., I.1-3; II.19-20. However, generally speaking, the best (beltiston) were opposed to dēmokratia, I.5, and pitted themselves against the worst (paktiston III.10).

192. See the 'Old Oligarch' generally Ps. Xen. Ath. Pol. and preceding notes in chapter 4 and see Thuc. III.36.6; V.36.1 and VII.86.5, for Kison and Nikias as political opponents and socio-political stereotype-s or representatives of political opposition.


201. Arist. Pol., 1255b4-15. Aristotle made a clear distinction here between his ideal natural slave and a set of relations based on the outcome of law and the use of force. Aristotle's analysis was concerned with the question and definition of an ideal set of master-slave relations which he characterised by the use of the term phusis 1254a17-24ff, and he had no doubt that the processes of ruling and being ruled were inherent conditions of existence.


204. Arist. Pol., 1255b6-14. The repeated use of either sumphereštai or κοινοὶ ἔστι made obvious Aristotle's belief that a set of advantageous or expedient relations could have existed between the ideal master-slave relationship.


206. Ibid.
207. Arist. Pol., 1255b33-34.
208. Ibid.
211. Arist. Pol., 1254a8; 1253b23-1254a8.
212. Ibid.
213. Ibid.
214. Ibid.
217. As quoted in Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll, p.28. However as one untangles elementary but vital definitional characteristics of slave society, one must agree with (amongst other points) Finley that: "The first question that must be asked before trying to discover what an author is saying is, What were the traditions and the social and intellectual context in which he was writing?" M.I. Finley, "Problems of Slave Society: Some Reflections on the Debate", OPUS, vol.I (1982), p.202; 201-211. On how the ancients perceived slavery see (though I reject notions such as "Hellenic Nationalism") R. Schlafer, "Greek Theories of Slavery From Homer to Aristotel", Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, 47 (1936), pp.165-204; Pierre Vidal-Naquet, "Refléxions Sur L'Historiographie Grecque De L'Esclavage", Centre De Recherches D'Histoire Ancienne, vol.6, Actes Du Colloque Sur L'Esclavage (1971), pp.25-44.
222. Ibid.
223. Arist. Pol., 1256b20-26 tied the practices of warfare (polemikê) and hunting (thēreutikê) firmly to the process of kttôstikê. The art of getting property, including slaves, was a naturally based and necessary activity for the maintenance of the household. 1256b 20-26 helps then to shed light on 1255b37-40 by its identifying the active and aggressive means of acquiring property. Moreover these actions were given moral and ideological sanction as conveyed by the term dikaion.


227. Ibid.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V
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1. Thuc. II.59.
2. Thuc. II.63.1.
3. Thuc. II.63.
5. Thuc. II.63.3.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Thuc. II.63ff.
9. Thuc. II.63.2.
11. Thuc. II.63.3.
12. Ibid., A.W. Gomme, A. Historical Commentary on Thucydides, vol. II (O.U.P., 1956), pp.177-178 and 173-176. Whether the end of II.63.3 was referring to a particular group or a particular attitude or both, the hard-edged realism is hard to ignore. This passage II.63 has been constructed at the general level of the clash between Athens (and her archē) and her enemies. However the implications of such power and the struggle to retain it have an inherent logic and power of their own which compel Athens and the Athenians not to waver in a general or particular sense. M. Amit, Great and Small Poleis: A Study in the Relations Between the Great Powers and the Small Cities in Ancient Greece, Collection Latomus, Vol.134 (1973), pp.44-45, rightly points to the tough 'great power' behaviour of Athens as demonstrated by the Athenian action against the Aeginetans' polis. A.G. Woodhead, Thucydides on the Nature of Power (Harvard University Press, 1970), pp.49-50, notes Perikles' hard-nosed attitude on power and the exercise of power within an empire. Note also, M. Oatwald, Autonomy: Its Genesis and Early History, American Classical Studies, No.11 (1982), pp.1-9, for the place of autonomy as a restraining force against the arbitrary use of force by the Athenian archē.
13. Thuc. II.63.3.
14. Thuc. II.64.3, τι κέιτα α ὑδόκυτα καὶ τόναυς ἀνηλυσκόναι πολέμω,...
15. Thuc. I.97.1. Signalled the state of autonomy which characterised polis relations just before the rise of the Athenian (archē) and the transformation of the Delian 'revenge-and-raiding' alliance.

17. Thuc. I.97.1. Ste. Croix's, "The Character of the Athenian Empire", pp.37-38, recognised that (after the Old Oligarch) the poor citizens of the allied poleis had much to gain (as did the Athenian populace) from an archē administered through the processes of Athenian dēmokratia. Protection from local oligarchies being one important example.


21. Thuc. I.139.3. Ακεχασιώνης ἐπούλωσεν τὴν εἰρήνην εἶναι, εἰ ἦσ' ἄν, εἰ τοὺς ἐξαλλὸς αὐτοῦμοσ ἀσειτε. Jocquele De Romilly, Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism, trans. P. Thody (Oxford, 1963), pp.82-84. "question of race", pp.82-84), noted the political potency of autonomy or freedom (political freedom) and Brasidas' later manoeuvres under this banner.

22. Thuc. IV.84-88. Brasidas played a clever role here. He was potentially both a notional liberator and/or oppressor, see Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, vol.III, pp.552-556. See Gomme's comments on Grote's History of Greece (vol.5, 318) and its contribution to (albeit ideally) an understanding of the processes dēmokratia outside Athens. It must be remembered that Akanthos was under great pressure - centred round collective and personal, as well as immediate agrarian, questions of (economic) survival, IV.88.

23. Thuc. IV.85.1-2; 85.5-6; 86.1; 86.4; 87.

24. Thuc. IV.87.3.

26. Thuc. IV.87.5.

27. Thuc. IV.88.1.

28. Ibid. The twin forces of Brasidas' political enticement (backed by military persuasion if needed IV.87.2-3ff) and agrarian necessity weighed upon the Akanthians. They were the critical reasons which persuaded the Akanthians to side with Brasidas.

29. Ibid. Gomme, p.557 acknowledged Grote's view of a Greek citizenry's democratic proceedings but still drew attention to and placed emphasis upon Brasidas' physically threatening presence.

30. Ibid.

31. Thuc. IV.87.2ff.

32. Thuc. IV.86.6.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. This view does not accord with F.M. Cornford's view of tukhē, Thucydides Mythistoricus (Great Britain, 1907; 1965 reprint), p.105ff; however, Cornford was right to contrast it with human gnōsa. Tukhē acted in unforeseen ways with the twin human and visibly material expressions of power represented in the terms, iskhos and bia.

37. Thuc. IV.86.6.

38. Ibid.


42. Arist. Pol., 1255a3-21ff.


46. Ibid. For Aristotle the position of his 'opponents' was untenable: 1255a21ff.
49. Arist. Pol., 1255a3-19. W.L. Newman, The Politics of Aristotle, vol. I (First published by O.U.P., 1887-1902; reprinted 1973), pp.139-144ff, surveys Aristotle's opinions and those of his protagonists as Aristotle has presented them to us. Newman also considers other schools of thought, for example, the Cynics, Dio Chrysostom, Xenophon and Plato. Although Newman observed (p.144) that:

The necessity of slavery to ancient society has perhaps been somewhat overrated...

he wisely observed that:

The submissiveness of the 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' was the important thing.... If they were not submissive, we know from a variety of instances that the status of slavery was but a poor security for their obedience or tranquility.

57. Dio 15.1.
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Greek World, p.141 or not, he was certainly capable of "perverse ingenuity", ibid., p.419. Though this opinion does not do justice to Dio’s Fourteenth and Fifteenth Discourses, it does reveal something of Ste. Croix’s dry wit. One must explore Dio.


60. Dio 15.25; see H. Bolkestein, Economic Life in Greece’s Golden Age (Leiden, 1958), pp.78-81; and For the trade in slaves and ancient armies’ roles in slave procurement: Finley, “The Slave Trade in Antiquity”, pp.173-175.

61. Dio 15.25: ὁδὸς γὰρ τρόπους γενομένους δουλους οὐκ εἶχε ἐκ δούλων γίνεται τὴν ἀρχήν....


64. Dio 15.25.

65. Dio 15.11.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Dio 15.16.

70. Dio 15.13; 16.

71. Dio 15.14; see note 86, Chapter 4.


74. Xen. HG I.6.24 with note 73 and also note Sargent, Ibid., Pausanias and Marathon, pp.208-211.

75. Dio 15.21.

76. Ibid.
Notes to pages 115-116

77. For a survey of the range of slaves or those classified as "bound", "dominated" and "possessed", "unfree bodies" or "human footed stock" (andrapoda), see V. Ehrenberg, The People of Aristophanes (New York, 1962 edition), "The Slaves", pp.165-191; see also Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology, p.99 and P. Chantraine, Dictionnaire Etymologique, pp.87-88.

78. Dio 15.22.


82. Dio 14.11.
83. Ibid.

85. Thuc. II.67.4. This behaviour had its logical and brutal conclusion in Lysander's retributive actions after the battle of Aigospotamoi, Xen. HG II.1.31-32. On this see Plu. Lysander 13.1-2 and Paus. ix.32.9. Trade certainly went on during war between poleis and hence 'neutrality' as such was a tricky problem in a fluid or opportunistic trading climate: see Brian R. MacDonald, "The Import of Attic Pottery to Corinth and the Question of Trade During the Peloponnesian War", Journal of Hellenic Studies, vol.cii (1982), pp.113-123.

87. Thuc. III.32.1.
88. Thuc. III.32.2. Is such behaviour "perverse" (after Gomme, vol.II., p.294) or also a manifestation of the psychopathology of war?
89. Ibid.
90. Thuc. III.32.2-3.
91. Thuc. II.67.1.
92. Thuc. II.67.2-4.
93. Thuc. op. cit. The fact that these envoys were going to the Great King (Thuc. II.67.1) to seek money and his active intervention in the prosecution of war against Athens would not have endeared them to an already highly sensitive and nervous Athens (II.67.4).

94. Thuc. II.67.4. Of course, fear of being sighted or reported could have been another motive for Alkidas' initial behaviour towards his prisoners, III.30-32, and his wish to return to the Peloponnesse without the Athenians intercepting his force, III.31. Similarly, the Athenians eliminated Aristeus because he had posed a direct threat to their hold on Potidaea and the surrounding region, and they did not wish to give him any opportunity to harm their interests in the future, II.67.4. It was a vicious and ruthless tit-for-tat situation between the major protagonists. The only justification lay in a "pay back" philosophy of reciprocity where revenge was perceived as a legitimate tool and psychological weapon in war:

θετόντως τοῖς θυγοίς ἀμφίκης ἀγορές καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὑπὲρ ... , II.67.4.

95. Thuc. VII.86.3-4.

96. Thuc. VII.86.3.

97. Thuc. VII.86.4.

98. Ibid.

99. Thuc. VII.86.3.

100. Thuc. VII.86.4.

101. Thuc. IV.38.3-41.

102. Thuc. IV.8.9.


104. Thuc. IV.38.5.

105. Thuc. IV.41.2.

106. Thuc. IV.16.1 made it quite plain that helot servants were present. This was spelt out clearly during the truce in the terms under which provisions were allowed to be transported to each hoplite and helot servant on Pylos. Hoplites were allowed as a personal ration, two Attic choinikes of barley, two kotulaei of wine, and meat (threae) while servants were to receive half as much (hēmiaea). Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, vol. III, p.453 recognised barley as the Spartan staple cereal and noted that other foods were later smuggled in IV.26.5-9.


109. Thuc. II.78.3. Old age and the elderly were held in high familial regard but one suspects there were few King Agesilaus' or none in the siege of Plataia: see M.I. Finley, "The Elderly in Classical Antiquity", Greece and Rome, vol.XXVIII, no.2 (October, 1981), pp.156-171; see pp.166-168.

110. Thuc. II.6.4; 78.3-4.


112. Thuc. II.4.2.

113. Ibid.


115. Thuc. II.78.3-4. Gomme, vol.II, p.212 agrees but qualifies his agreement in the light of Thucydides, καὶ ἁλκός οὖν ἡ ἐν τῇ τείχει ὀβεροῦσα δοῦλος ἐκεῖδες. Thuc. II.78.4. See also, Gomme, Ibid., p.397 on women sitopoi. The sitopoi of the Sicilian expedition were planned while those of Plataia were the product of emergency and local necessity. Moreover, the sitopoi of the Sicilian expedition were probably free men not slaves: see Gomme, Ibid.

116. Thuc. II.78.4.

117. Thuc. II.78.3. Adding to the subject of the status of the one hundred and ten women see note 130.


119. Ibid.

120. Gomme, "The Position of Women", pp.103ff. It is to Gomme's lasting credit that he drew attention to paradox, ambivalence and ambiguity in the ancients' opinions on, and interpretations (ancient and modern) of women's roles within a polis. See also J.P. Gould, "Law, Custom and Myth: Aspects of the Social Position of Women in Classical Athens", pp.39-40; contra Gomme, and see also pp.52-59. See also D. Schaps, "The Women Least Mentioned: Etiquette and Women's Names", Classical Quarterly, Vol.27 (1977), pp.323-330; S.C. Humphreys, The family, women and death: Comparative Studies (London, 1983), pp.33-57. On the complexity of interpreting the social arenas in which women moved and social values generally (for example, attitudes to private and public sexuality) see Martin
Notes to pages 120-122

Kilmer, "Genital Phobia and Depilation", *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 102 (1982), pp.104-112, particularly pp.110ff. The discrete (dare one say 'charming?') involved in the private sphere of personal sexual relations is conveyed, as Kilmer (p.110) observes, by the classical Shuvalov Painter and can be readily viewed in K.J. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality* (London, 1978), vase reproduction, R970 in Dover's illustrations and list on p.222. Was Pericles' statement as formally discrete (a representative ideal view) as this couple's consenting sexuality was totally and privately discrete?

121. Thuc. II.78.3; III.68.3.

122. Thuc. III.20.2, ἕν δὲ ἄνδρας διακοσίων καὶ εἰκοσι χίλιον μᾶλις...

123. Thuc. III.24.2 See Gomme, Vol.II, p.287, for his notes on the escape and Thucydides narrative of this incident. Numbers bear peculiarly cultural as well as qualified meanings. For the elements of such an inquiry, particularly with regard to qualification of meaning, see Catherine Reid Rubincam, "Qualification of Numerals in Thucydides", *American Journal of Ancient History*, vol.4 (1979), pp.77-95.

124. Thuc. II.78.3.

125. Thuc. III.68.3.

126. Thuc. III.24.2, here two hundred and twelve from a proximately larger number had escaped. The original total was at most two hundred and twenty, III.20.2. The eight 'casualties' comprised one archer taken prisoner and the remainder presumably turned back, III.24.2; note Gomme, Vol.II, p.286. Note also Gomme, pp.356-357 for his estimate of forty deaths during the siege, and that these deaths had occurred mostly early on in the siege.

127. Thuc. III.22.1; III.23.1.

128. Siege warfare was a very gradual (and often uneventful) process. It was full of frustration as well as pause: Gomme, vol.II, pp.5-6; 211-212; see also Gomme, vol.I, pp.16-18; and periods of frantic activity: Gomme, vol.II, 206-211; pp.280-287 on Thuc. II. 75-77; III.20-22.

129. Thuc. III.36.2.

130. Thus. V.116.4; whilst slaves, including women slaves, were simply resold as slaves, III.68.3.

131. See note 77, chapter V. Note the discussion on "slave terminology" in Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World*, pp.138-139. After Finley, *Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology*, p.99 and Ste. Croix, p.141, an *andrapiédon* (like any other slave) was entirely subject to his master. This was a relationship of
absolute dependency and such a relationship was, not surprisingly, given a contemptuous (generally collective title, andrapoda) description which took for granted a slave's (or slaves') dependent, animal-like existence and definition as living property. Whilst the animal and the slave by nature differed in terms of the latter's possession of reason their uses tended to merge when it came to serving their masters' needs: Note Arist. Pol., 1254b20-26.

132. Thuc. III.68.2-3.

133. Thuc. III.52.1. Declining food supplies had impelled the earlier breakout of nearly half the Plataian and Athenian defenders of besieged Plataia, III.20.1.


"The detail of the conversation between the herald and the Akarnanian, an episode so foreign to Thucydides' normal manner of writing..."; he went on to observe that:

"the conversation has point mainly from its immediacy."

137. Thuc. III.113.3-4ff.

138. Thuc. III.113.2-4.

139. Gomme, vol.II, remains the classical exponent of Western Greece's experience of the Peloponnesian war, pp.399-413; 415-430. However one should not forget the detailed and particular topographical as well as geographical efforts of W.G.L. Hammond, "The Campaigns in Amphilochia During the Archidamian War", Annual of the British School at Athens, no. XXXVII (1936/37), pp.128-140: note Hammond's assessment that Demosthenes had "ample time" (p.138) for his moves against the Amprakiot relief force and that the Amprakiot had failed to take adequate precautions against surprise attack, pp.138-139.

140. Thuc. III.94.1-3; 95.2; 102.3-4; 105.2-3; 107.1-2.

141. Thuc. III.100.1-2ff; 102.5-7; 105.1; 106.1.

142. Thuc. III.108.1; 109.1.

144. In this sense, one can approach the realm of culturally based ideas and reflections in Thucydides. This is the culturally defined world in which Thucydides worked and it can be more easily understood within this broad historical (ideas) framework, rather than through the medium of Althusser's and Balibar's ahistorical readings of Capital, trans. by B. Brewster (London, 1970; 2nd edition, 1977; 1st published, Paris, 1968). Virginia V. Hunter, Past and Process in Herodotus and Thucydides (Princeton University Press, 1982), pp.281-282ff appears to be unaware of this (namely, Althusser's ahistorical) problematic. For a contrary view to that of Althusser and Hunter, see the argumentative and polemical discussion presented by E.P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays (London, 1978), pp.354-380. See also, Henry Abelove's review essay of The Poverty of Theory, History and Theory, vol. XII, no.1 (1982), pp.132-142.

145. Thuc. III.97.3 – 98.3.

146. Ibid., Demosthenes had the support of the Osolian Lokrians, 95.3, who were light armed like the Aitolians but he failed to wait for them, 97.1-2.

147. Ibid., Thuc. III.97.3 – 98.3.

148. Thuc. III.102.3-4, the Akrarnanians certainly had hoplites as did the Amprakiotas, Thuc. III.105.1. Demosthenes' bitter experience, 97.3 – 98.3, impelled him to adopt more astute, guerrilla tactics, 107.3 – 108.1; 112.3-5.

149. Thuc. III.102.6-7; 105.1.

150. Ibid.

151. Thuc. III.100.2. The coincidence of the number "three thousand" (100.2; 105.1) is just that. In 100.2, a Peloponnesian force was assembled while in 105.1 an Amprakioton force separate from the Peloponnesians was committed to the field.

152. Thuc. III.105.1; 105.4. These two references alone imply that Amprakia possessed well over 3,000 troops. Comme, vol.II, p.478 argued that on the balance of the information this could have made Amprakia, "one of the larger Greek cities" in this region.

153. Thuc. III.105.1; 105.4; 110.1; 112.1ff.

154. Thuc. III.96-98; 94.3-4 is an integral part of Thucydides' account of Demosthenes' campaign against the Aitolians. It served the purpose of setting the cultural environment into which Demosthenes, a strategist of the eastern Athenian archon, was about to venture with his punitive expeditionary forces, 94.3; 95.2-3.
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155. Thuc. III.98.4 καὶ αὐτῶν Ἀθηναίων ὅπλαιται περὶ εἰκοσι μάλιστα καὶ ἐκείνου.

156. Ibid.

157. Thuc. III.95.2.

158. Thuc. III.98.4. Gomme, vol.II, p.404, rightly pointed out the military risks Demosthenes’ campaign entailed. The epibatai were effectively transferred to land duties. Regardless of speculation as to their level of training or experience in land warfare, this move speaks volumes about Athenian confidence in their naval supremacy.

159. Thuc. III.98.4.


163. Gomme, op. cit., Diodoros captured the regional character of the Aitolian expedition and its punitive flavour by his references to Demosthenes having plundered, ravaged or destroyed many Aitolian villages, ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀιτωλίαν καὶ πολλὰ αὐτῶν κάμια ἔποιησεν , XII. 60.1. Whether Diodoros’ reference to adequate or sufficient troops (soldiers) καὶ στρατιῶτων ἔκανεν , XII.60.1, was a reference to additional forces in Demosthenes’ Athenian contingent or a confused reference to his epibatai and their qualitative military value must remain a matter for speculation.

164. Thuc. III.95.1.

165. Thuc. III.95.2. On the petty but ferocious hates by regional Greeks and their desire to enlist Demosthenes’ help, see Thuc. III.94.

166. Thuc. III.98.5.


168. Thuc. III.109.2. The mention made of mercenaries, a large body of them, μισθόφορον ἄλοχον , whilst to some extent a surprising revelation, (see Gomme, p.422) adds to, rather than detracting from, the detail of Thucydides account.


170. Ibid.

171. Thuc. III.111.1. These ‘wild’ foods could be approximated to contemporary Italian peasant practises in the Tuscan countryside.
where they gather uncultivated or, at least, not intentionally
grown wild foods, wild young vegetables and plants for salads,
'field salad', insalata di campo, see Elizabeth Romer, The Tuscan
Year: Life and Food in an Italian Valley (London, 1984),
pp.30-31. The range of wild foods gathered from ancient to
contemporary times was (and is) a complex function of need,
nutrition, flavour, variety, geography and climate, see Mary Clark
Forbes, "The Pursuit of Wild Edibles, Present and Past", Expedition

172. Thuc. III.111.2ff.
174. Thuc. III.111. Gomme, pp.423-4 not only commented on the reasons
for the confusion that arose but also raised doubts as to whether a
more generalised Peloponnesian force escaped (111.3) rather than
the more select force agreed to in 109.2.
175. Thuc. III.113.2.
177. Thuc. III.112.8.
178. Thuc. III.113.4.
179. Thuc. III.113.5.
181. Thuc. III.111.3-4. The Anapakiots had suffered casualties in the
first battle along with other forces on their side. Note
Thucydides' use of the term polloi, III.108.3, and the first
recovery of the dead III.109.1-2 under cover of which Menedaicos
arrived at his escape deal for select elements of his forces with
Demosthenes. Moreover evidence for more than one thousand
casualties subsequent to this incident was more than confirmed by
Thucydides recording the fact that Demosthenes received three
hundred panoplies in his own right, 114.1, see Gomme, p.425ff and
the Athenians a 'third part' (triton meros) of the booty (skulēn).
182. Thuc. III.113.6 and 113 generally. Note ambush preparations by
Demosthenes' forces, 110, and its results, 112.
183. Thuc. III.113.5.
184. Thuc. III.113.6, Gomme, pp.425-426; 428. Even the gift of three
hundred panoplies (triakosiai panopliai) III.114.1 added weight to
Thucydides' reasons for not recording the number of casualties
whilst he recorded a loss of more than one thousand via the
herald's interlocutor. Thucydides' approach to the estimating of
numbers was guided generally by caution, the cloak of military
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secrecy in the case of the Spartans, and a keen perception of 'human nature': Thuc.V.68.1-2; note also V.74.2.

185. Ibid.

186. Ibid.

187. Ibid., this is only Thucydides' caution at work. The magnitude of the disaster (if not its precise numbering) brought home the scale of this human drama, see Gomme, vol.II, pp.425-426, yet again.

188. To take just a few examples: Thuc. VI.25 and II.56. Without entering into another major research area, a few observations are relevant. Where Thucydides' numbers lack specificity two reasons can be advanced for this. The first is concerned with information (or lack of it) and the second is that the ancients not only just 'rounded off' figures (see C.R. Rubincan "Qualification of Numerals in Thucydides", pp.84-87; 92-95) but also added a host of cultural values or judgements to the perception of the size, number or scale of something.

189. To take just a few examples: Thuc. VI.43; II.56; II.58. One reason for Thucydides' providing (in the Amprakiot's case) only information such as the arms of "more than a thousand" or three hundred panoplies for Demosthenes was that Thucydides did not record the number (III.113.6) of their casualties precisely; because whilst the Amprakiotas were in fact geographically proximate to the Aitolians, they were a long way from the region familiar to Thucydides and they were separated from them by the Amphilokhian Argives and different to the Aitolians in military equipment (heavy arms) and polis social structure (III.105.1; 105.4; 110.1) - they were not part of a mainstream 'Peloponnesian' contingent (see also I.47). The Amprakiotas were not normally part of a mainstream Peloponnesian force for the following reasons. They were a distant polis and seemingly until now, like Aitolia, removed from the Athens/Sparta confrontation. All this had changed as a result of opportunistic military decisions and considerations taken in tandem with border feuds: III.94.2-5; 100.1-2; 102.6-7; 105.1.

190. Thuc. II.98. Here not less than ὁκ Ἑλλάδος πέντε καὶ ἕκα μυριάδα. Whilst II.98.4 is a most qualified passage, the numbers as such seem to reflect power (II.96-98ff) distance, size and culture. Cultural differences and distance (material and attitudinal) influence outlook and estimation. Thucydides was not 'grubbing' for facts he was reflecting upon views (or concepts) of 'barbarian' outside worlds, see the exploratory article by David Whitehead, "Thucydides: Fact-Gruber or Philosopher", Greece and Rome, vol. XXVII, no.2 (October, 1980), pp.158-165. Gomme, vol.II, op. cit., p.226 was right to argue that the figure was "not guaranteed by Thucydides"!

191. Thuc. VII.27.5 with Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World, p.506 "more than two myriads". A proximate, reckoning device for an ultimately imprecise number of runaway slaves.
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192. Thuc. III.113.1-5.

193. Thuc. III.94.3-5.

194. Thuc. III.94.4.

195. Thuc. III.94.5.

196. Ibid.

197. Ibid., the information is vague and the territory imprecise: Gomme, vol. II, pp.400-401. In a real sense, this was a land where there were boundaries but so much was different or unknown — culturally distant.

198. Thuc. I.2-3.3 and note the polemical reference to Sparta’s archaism when compared to the Athenian polis, I.71.2-3.

199. Thuc. III.101.2.

200. It had at least three thousand hoplites, Thuc. III.105.1, see Gomme, Vol.II, p.418.

201. Thuc. II.14ff.

202. Thuc. II.16. The Persian war and invasion had caused a major though temporary displacement of the Attic country population. Now this deliberate evacuation policy placed enormous personal stress (of family, kin and place) on all those who lived in the country which surrounded (enveloped) the astu. See Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology, op. cit., p.89.


205. Thuc. Ibid.


207. Ibid.

208. Ibid.

209. Ibid.


211. Thuc. II.16.2.

212. Thuc. II.16.

213. Thuc. II.14.
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214. Thuc. II.18-23 should be consulted for a preliminary account of the scale and impact of the Peloponnesian incursions upon Attica.

215. Thuc. VII.27.

216. Thuc. IV.36.3-41; V.25.

217. Thuc. II.47-57; III.87. However one views the plague, in general terms, II.47-3-4, or the plague deaths of the one thousand and fifty hoplites out of four thousand hoplites under Hagnon's and Kleopompos' command (II. 58-59 — size of force given in II.56) or the later grand plague death totals of not less than (oxi ódous ) III.87.3 four thousand four hundred hoplites and three hundred horsemen (enrolment classes), these military losses from amongst the general citizenry and populace were far from complete, III.87.3 or calculable. No one knew how many�, or metics, let alone, women, children and slaves died. The ochlos III.87.3 remained silent apart from II.48.2 and suffered en masse, II.52. All that was heard and seen were their agonies, II.47.3-4; 49.5-6ff and the help of (or lack of) friends II.51.4-5 affected morale according to the plague's seemingly whimsical capacity for death-dealing, II.51.6. Whether one accepts the 13,000 hoplite total of II.13.6 or the 16,000 other troops (13.6-7) or the cavalry (horsemen) total of 1,200 (13.8) as guides to measure plague losses against, the losses appear to be ranged between one quarter to one third of all hoplites and cavalry. The losses amongst the general population of Athens must have approached these percentages or worse, 47.3; 52; III.87.3. See Gomme, vol.II, pp.145-162; 388-389; Gomme, The Population of Athens, pp.6-7, re casualties and Diodorus, III.58.7. Without entering into the debate between P.J. Rhodes and E. Ruskenebusch which is centred around who served as ephēbi in fourth-century Athens and the implications this has for the fourth-century population of Athens, Rhodes and another scholar, J.M. Williams, who also entered this debate, add their support to emphasis on the human cost of the Peloponnesian War, particularly with regard to the manpower losses amongst the Athenian citizenry: P.J. Rhodes, "Ephēbi, Bouleutai And The Population of Athens", Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik, 38 (1980), pp.191-201, but note especially, p.196; J.M. Williams, "Solon's Class System, The Manning of Athens' Fleet, And The Number of Athenian Thetes In The Late Fourth Century", Z.P.E. 52 (1983), pp.241-245, and again, p.245. For the contra case see initially E. Ruskenebusch, "Die soziale Herkunft der Ephelen um 330", Z.P.E. 35 (1979), pp.173-176; "Die soziale Zusammensetzung des Rates der 500 im A. Jn." Z.P.E. 35 (1979), pp.177-180. Note also the dialogue between these two scholars cited in Ruskenebusch, "Ephēben, Bolzeutai und die Bürgerschaft von Athen um 330 v. Chr." Z.P.E. 41 (1981), p.105.

218. Thuc. VII.27-28, including the loss of Laureion and its silver production and the impact of this blow on Athens' prestige, VI.91-6.7.

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220. Thuc. II.16.

221. Thuc. II.15.1-2.

222. Thuc. II.15.3.

223. Ibid. See Gomme’s, vol.II, pp.48-61 sceptical survey of Thuc. II.15.

224. Thuc. II.15.4-6.

225. Note Thuc. II.15.4. καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἐν λίμναις διονύσου, ἐπὶ τὸ ἀρχαίτερα διουσίαν and also II.15.6 καλεῖται δὲ δὲ ἐν τῇ κοιλαίᾳ ταύτῃ καταίκησιν καὶ ἡ ἀκρόπολις μέχρι τοῦ ἄπι 

226. Thuc. II.15.3-6.

227. Ibid.

228. Thuc. II.16.1.

229. Thuc. II.16.2.

230. Ibid.

231. Thuc. II.16.1. Restoration is the key here. Permanence rather than impermanence is a characteristic feature of peasant dwelling patterns. Life may be short, hard and perilous but the area in which you dwell is forever. J.V.A. Fine, Horoi: Studies in Mortgage, Real Security and Land Tenure in Ancient Athens, Hesperia, Supplement No.9 (1951), pp.200-202, totally misunderstood what Thucydides was saying in II.16.
NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

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   τὸ δὲ πιείστον γένος τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς εὖ καὶ τῶν ἡμέρων 
   κασπῶν.


11. Arist. Pol., 1256b6-7. ὃς ἄν ἡ χρεία συναναγάγη, ...


15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.


18. Ibid.


41. Ibid.
42. Arist. Pol., 1256b28-29.
44. Arist. Pol., 1256b29ff.

49. Aristotle was concerned about Solon's statement, and Solon's persona and his past lent force to his argument. The debate was not about Solon's historical credibility, it was about his ideas on wealth and its seeming limitlessness. Finley, "Myth, Memory and History" (note 47, above). Aristotle was concerned with a general proposition: see S.R.L. Clark, Aristotle's Man, pp.130-131ff; on the problems of myth and history, and the interpretation of Aristotle see Clark, Ibid., and the opposed views expressed in Finley, "Myth, Memory and History", Ibid., and G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, "Aristotle on History and Poetry (Poetics 9, 1451a36-51)"; in The Ancient Historian and his Materials: Essays in Honour of C.B. Stevens on his Seventieth Birthday, edited by Barbara Levick (Great Britain, 1976), pp.43-48; in addition the careful, broad study by Kurt von Fritz, "Aristotle's Contribution to the Practice and Theory of Historiography", pp.113-137.


51. Ibid.

52. Arist. Pol., 1256b32.


59. Ibid.

60. Trade and war had established a near permanent pool of slaves, Finley, "The Slave Trade in Antiquity", op. cit.; Karl Marx, Capital, p.65; H. Bolkestein, Economic Life in Greece's Golden Age, pp.78-81, trade and war went hand-in-hand on many occasions. See note 60 in my Chapter Five.

61. The numerical presence of slaves was not the most important feature (as we have seen); it was the exploitative presence of slavery (the absolute power of an owner) and the force a master could bring to bear upon another who existed through the master. Exploitation (surplus generation) and coercion were elemental: Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World, pp.39-40. Unfree labour existed across a spectrum of polis employments. See also Finley, "Was Greek Civilization Based on Slave Labour?"; Garnsey, Non-Slave Labour in the Greco-Roman World.
62. See note 191, Chapter Five; note 86, Chapter Four.

63. Aristotle gave it its classical definitional form, its material and ideological base, Arist. Pol., 1256b20-28 and see note 223, Chapter Four.

64. Slavery had foundational exploitative roles and coercive faces. It had material as well as symbolic forms. In this sense, it can be said that, after Marx, "Greek society was founded upon slavery, and had, therefore, for its natural basis, the inequality of men and of their labour-powers". Marx, Capital, p.65.

65. Slavery as an expression of human social relations (or human beings as the instrumental, live tools of their owners) was elemental rather than predominant. In this sense, Ellen Wood, "Marxism and Ancient Greece", History Workshop, vol.II (1981), pp.3-22, especially, pp.17-18ff and notes 20-36, is right to question Anderson's view of slavery and his "slave mode of production", pp.16-20.

66. Arist. Pol., 1256b40-1257a3. After Finley, "Aristotle and Economic Analysis", p.15 and note 52 (hereafter this article will be referred to as AAEA), Aristotle formulated not only new ideas but a vocabulary to express these ideas. As P. Chantraire, La Formation Des Noms En Grec Ancien (Paris, 1933), p.390, section XCVI.327 observed:

Dans la prose scientifique et philosophique d'Aristote, puis dans la οἰκεία le suffixe a connu un grand développement. Aristote fournit environ sept cents exemples de dérivés en -ικός dont une bonne part doit être constituée par des formations nouvelles.

See also, my chapter VII, note 197.

67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Arist. Pol., 1257a3-6ff.
71. Ibid.
73. Arist. Pol., 1257a3-5.
75. Ibid.
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103. *Arist. Pol.*, 1257a31-34.

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid. Karl Polanyi, "Aristotle Discovers the Economy", in *Trade and Market in the Early Empires: Economy in History and Theory*, edited by K. Polanyi, Conrad M. Arensberg and Harry W. Pearson (New York, 1957), pp.64-94, is right to draw attention to Aristotle's pioneering efforts and to castigate then neo-Classical and Keynesian economists and the way in which contemporary views of Western capitalism have been projected backwards onto Aristotle's exploration of the roles of exchange, the uses of money, and wealth. Yet Polanyi still accepted (p.87) a conventional (post-Adam Smith) notion that (in spite of the absence of capitalism and its all important measuring, accounting procedures):

Not before the third century B.C., was the working of a supply-demand-price mechanism in international trade noticeable.

Yet, for all this, Polanyi's notes on exchange, "trade" and "exchange of equivalencies" (83-91) were purposeful, exploratory steps. Polanyi was right to observe Aristotle's "Sociological Bent" (80-83) and his preference for oikos and polis paradigmatic self-sufficiency.

106. It is not surprising that Aristotle saw the real and symbolic power of money and the facility with which it could be employed in exchanging goods. Finley, *AAEA, Past and Present*, 47 (1970), pp.15-16 draws attention to the limited universe of Aristotle's preferred acquisition processes and the confrontation with another order of khrēmatistikē. Georges Dupre and Pierre-Philippe Rey, "Reflections on the pertinence of a theory of the history of exchange", in The Articulation of Modes of Production: Essays from Economy and Society, edited by Harold Wolpe (London, 1980), pp.128-180, especially pp.135-141, also take Polanyi to task for the invention of demand/supply market economies. ("Not before the third century B.C." see Polanyi, p.87) and the unnecessary division or chasms created by notions of non-market/market economies. S.C. Humphreys, "History, economics and anthropology: the work of Karl Polanyi", in Anthropology and the Greeks (Great Britain, 1978), pp.31-75 and, for notes, pp.275-283, surveys Polanyi's corpus whilst noting that Polanyi's "Modernist" tendencies (p.279), do not (pp.46-47) go much beyond the concepts of embedded (non-market) and disembedded (market) economies but Humphreys critically notes: (p.46)

Given Polanyi's deep-rooted opposition to the old idea that man has 'an innate tendency to truck, barter and exchange one thing for another', the existence of markets in comparatively primitive economies was bound to be a problem to him.
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One could agree with the first statement but what kind of markets? Exchange, in the sense of use- and exchange-values remain central to Aristotle. Why is an ancient social formation suddenly plunged into a far more amorphous world of "comparatively primitive economies"? This was a world where (if not everywhere and in everytime) money was being used to facilitate exchange within and between poleis, amongst other Mediterranean human aggregations.

108. Ibid.

117. Whether so-called capitalism in the Greco-Roman world rears its head on behalf of Classical, Neo-Classical, post-Keynesian market economics (let 'the market' rule - a contemporary version of laissez-faire economics) or Socialist 'economic' theory, such views are plainly wrong-headed and anachronistic. Bolkestein, Economic Life in Greece's Golden Age, op. cit., pp.148-149, took Eduard Meyer's (Kleine Schriften I, pp.79 sqq.) opinion to task. Meyer argued:

Athen steht im 5ten und 4ten Jahrhundert ebenso sehr unter dem Zeichen des Capitalismus wie England seit dem 18ten und Deutschland seit dem 19ten Jahrhundert

Bolkestein's translation follows:

Athens in the 5th and 4th centuries stands as much in the sign of capitalism as England has stood since the 18th and Germany since the 19th century.

Then Bolkestein added:

This idea can only be sustained as long as we neglect to give a description of the term capitalism which by mentioning the principal characteristics of this conception enables us to judge about its appropriateness in a certain case.
See Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology, pp.45-46 on Meyer's 'modernism' or "mirror imaging" of the ancient and modern worlds, and for similar problems with other scholars especially Wason, see Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World, p.41.


120. Arist. Pol., 1257a30-34ff; 1257b5-10.


122. Arist. Pol., 1257a44.


125. Finley, The Ancient Economy (London, 1973; 1975), p.157 notes that Philip II conducted an invasion of Scythia and its immediate and "sole" objective was to acquire instant wealth. Thuc. I. 100.2-101 is an example of expeditionary (naval) power and the opportunistic acquisition or forcible seizure of valuable resources of potential precious metal based wealth as well as the opportunistic imposition of instant surrender payments and tribute. Nor should one lose sight of the Dorian League's reasons for being, Thuc. I.96.1. The seizure of wealth or booty was a constant feature of the Greek classical world (amongst others), see the detailed figures and sources presented in "Specific Figures for Booty", in W. Kendrick Fritchett, Ancient Greek Military Practices, Part I (University of California Press, 1977), pp.75-76. Booty and wealth obtained through warfare or raiding of course included captives, prisoners and slaves. Marx, Capital, pp.85-86 noted with regard to the significance of booty and military action:
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But when people plunder for centuries, there must always be something at hand for them to seize; the objects of plunder must be continually reproduced. It would thus appear that even Greeks and Romans had some process of production, consequently, an economy, which just as much constituted the material basis of their world, as bourgeois economy constitutes that of our modern world.

126. Thucydides carefully noted the material implications of phoros and its direct contribution to Athenian power after the Persian invasions, Thuc. I.96; 99.3; and Athens' general wealth (its stored wealth) was acknowledged as formidable; Thuc. II.13.2-6. Also note Archidamus' assessment of Athens' phoros based wealth and its general strength in terms of khrēmata (Thuc. I.83). Athens also had the seemingly (no pun intended) endless silver resources of Laureion, Xen. Poroi, IV.1-3.

129. Ibid.
132. Ibid.
134. Ibid.
144. Ibid.
Notes to Pages 144-146


146. To take one major example, coinage changed because of dire circumstances such as war and pressing socio-economic necessity see J.H. Kroll, "Aristophanes' voumā χαλκία: A Reply", Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, vol.17, no.4 (1976), pp.129-34]; and note Finley's incisive comments on Athens and the strong mixture of polis pride, as well as political power, involved in the spread and consolidation of Athenian silver coinage, "Classical Greece", in Second International Conference of Economic History (1962), pp.11-35 and in particular, pp.22-24.


150. Arist. Pol., 1257b16; 14-17.


156. Ibid.


160. Ibid.


162. Ibid.


166. Arist. Pol., 1268b34.

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168. Ibid.


178. Arist. Pol., 1257b31-34.

179. Ibid.

180. Ibid.


188. Arist. Pol., 1257b41-1258a1.

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193. Ibid.
195. Ibid.
198. Ibid.
208. Ibid.
214. The boundary or marker stone signalled limits (in the sense of a debt) on a particular piece of property. A boundary stone was a symbol of one's debt to another - the creditor's name appeared on the horos. It displayed the social relations of debt and security and the limits these socio-economic relations imposed upon one's
ownership of land. See Finley, Land and Credit in Ancient Athens, pp.3–27 for the functional meanings of horoi and the social, legal and economic relations potentially gathered round these security markers.

215. Although Newbold's, "Boundaries and Bodies in Late Antiquity", is concerned with late antiquity, its discussion of boundaries as symbols or metaphors is most valuable and deserves an extension to the polis world. See the useful introduction on polis and chōra in Finley, Problèmes de la terre en Grèce ancienne, pp.9–12.


223. As we have seen via Connor's New Politicians of Fifth Century Athens, and Sté. Croix's work, especially, "The Character of the Athenian Empire", the characterisation of political terminology must be seen as having incorporated political approval and disapproval within a simultaneously and peculiarly expressive moral vocabulary.


226. Ibid.

227. Ibid.


229. Ibid.


231. Ibid.


234. Arist. Pol., 1258a34-35. Note, von Fritz and Kapp, "The Development of Aristotle's Political Philosophy and the Concept of Nature", pp. 116-117. Here, phusis was acting 'by nature' rather than by some convention. In Aristotle's eyes, human beings (the oikos' inhabitants) were expected to respond to nature's provisioning process in a normative 'gathering' fashion.


238. Ibid.

239. Ibid. The polis world was viewed from within an agrarian world view. Note J.P. Vernant, "Remarks on the Class Struggle in Ancient Greece", trans. by R. Archer and S.C. Humphreys, Critique of Anthropology, 7 (1976), pp. 67-81, note particularly p. 77, re oikonomia and its opposite number, khrēmatistikē.


242. One important source of inspiration must be acknowledged - Lloyd's "The Development of zoological taxonomy", in Science, Folklore and Ideology, pp. 7-57. Lloyd's work on zoological taxonomy led me to consider whether or not other forms of classification or taxonomy existed in Aristotle's Politics and Nicomachean Ethics.


246. Arist. Pol., 1258b4-7. Money had entered a new phase in its history. It was no longer simply an elementary "measure between commodities" or "a substitute in the mechanism of exchange", that is, a mediator; Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (Great Britain, 1970; 1974), p. 169.


249. Ibid.

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253. Ibid.


256. Ibid. (1258b3) διὰ τὸ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ νομίσματος εἶναι τὴν κτῆσιν···


259. Arist. Pol., 1258b4. Exchange relations were intended to reflect and, of course, perpetuate orderly social relations which ranged from an oikos to its polis constituency. In this precise sense, exchange relations (based on oikonomikē) had a social morality, an ethically defined social purpose, note the more general claims in Finley, AAAA, p.8. Finley also acknowledged Edouard Will, "De L'Aspect Ethique Des Origines Grecques De La Monnaie", Revue Historique, vol.212 (1954), pp.209-231, particularly p.215, note ↑ on kolonía; note also Will's diagrammatic representation of Aristotle's "Monnaie" (p.220). Will defined it as: (p.220) "la monnaie est, pour Aristotle, l'instrument d' évaluation d'une justice social rétributive."

260. Arist. Pol., op. cit. It is important to recall after Foucault, pp.189-195, that money is an abstraction which had established (within and/or between societies), "a system of signs and designation between kinds of wealth". Foucault poses that statement in the form of a question which he discusses (pp.189-195) and answers in the affirmative. Nomisma was operating in a diverse and qualitatively as well as quantitatively different exchange atmosphere to either the realms of barter/exchange or Aristotle's model of oikonomikē, and he recognised this reality: Scott Meikle, "Aristotle and the Political Economy of the Polis", Journal of Hellenic Studies, vol.XCIX (1979), p.61, section III (hereafter referred to as APEP).


262. Ibid.

263. Arist. Pol., 1256b31-34.

264. See notes 47 and 49 in chapter VI.

"The word is cognate with the verb *chraomai*, meaning, *inter alia*, 'use'. Its range extends from 'useful' to 'good' or 'desirable'."

The *khrēstoi* were ready and willing to be virtuously and politically useful to their own *agathoi*, their *philoi* and their interests.
The following texts and translations have been used:


3. Arist. EN 1129a32ff.
4. Ibid.
7. Arist. EN 1129a33-34.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Notions of equality have a direct history in Athenian (and Greek ideas of), *demoskratía*, see generally, F.D. Harvey, "Two Kinds of Equality", *Classica et Mediaevalia*, vol. xxvi (1965), pp. 101-146, particularly note, pp. 101-120 and pp. 117-120, where Harvey examines Aristotle's careful qualifications of the roles of equality and inequality where (p. 118) "Equality was the watchword of democrats, and inequality of oligarchs."
11. Arist. EN 1129a32-34; 1129b11.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
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18. Ibid. οί δ' αὐθεὶνοι ταῦτα εὑχονται καὶ διόκουσιν.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
32. The world of the oikos and the oikonomos were fundamental socio-political and intellectual features of Greek self-conceptualisation. In a real sense, oikos, oikonomos and oikonomia formed the immediate material and symbolic boundaries for polis social relations. See the very limited but interesting and adventurous exploration in K. Singer, "Oikonomia: An Inquiry into Beginnings of Economic Thought and Language", Kyklos, 11 (1958), pp.29-54. Its limitations stem from an inadequate grasp of the history of ideas which surrounds work on the origins of political economy and, in particular, Aristotle's seminal contributions to this debate.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.


40. Ibid. Aristotle had recognised the need for khrēia based exchanges and these, of course, involved social contact, see Booth, "Politics and the Household," pp.221-222; note Aristotle's qualified acceptance of household-based khrēmatistikē as opposed to trade and exchange for their own sake and the money they will bring to the trader, Neikle, APEP, p.61-63.


42. Arist. EN 1130a1-5.


44. Ibid., once again correct behaviour towards one's philoi was an elementary rule for personal and social conduct.

45. Ibid.

46. Arist. EN 1130a1-2.

47. Arist. EN 1130a14-1130b5.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.


52. Arist. op. cit.


55. Ibid.

56. Arist. EN 1130b3-4.

57. Arist. EN 1130b2.

58. Ibid.
59. The poleis as such remained the characteristic human units of Greeks and, as such, defined and reflected their socio-political, material and symbolic social relations. The picture(s) of these poleis is by no means uniform nor are our views of this social formation by any means uniform in modern and contemporary historiography and historical sociology: see M.I. Finley, "The Ancient City: From Fustel de Coulanges to Max Weber and Beyond", Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol.19 (1977), pp.305-327, reprinted in Finley, Economy and Society in Ancient Greece, edited by B.D. Shaw & R.F. Saller (New York, 1982), pp.3-23. Note also the fine and, far from unrelated, study by Moniglano and its following formal discussion, A. Moniglano, "The Place of Ancient Historiography in Modern Historiography", Fondation Hardt, Entretiens, vol.XXVI (1979/80), Les Études Classiques Aux XIXÈ Et XXÈ Siècles: Leur Place Dans L'Histoire Des Idées, pp.127-157.

60. Arist. EN 1129a34-1129b1.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. 'The Graces', Aristotle's Kharites, EN 1133a3-4, and generally 1132b30-1133a5, were perhaps more symbolic or representational in Aristotle's thought, to extend Meikle's, APEP, p.72 reflection on Finley's observation on the Kharites (the 'giver' and 'receiver', the representation and celebration of favours, gifts and kindesses):

Maybe Aristotle is saying that exchanges should be seen somewhat in the 'spirit of gift and counter gift, of the Charities'.

Finley, AAE, takes a much more committed line initially (p.8) but finds himself in a difficult, confusing position (pp.9-13) after H.S. Joachim (p.9) on Aristotle's ratios and exchange theory. Note also Finley's brief comment on the Kharites, "Debt-Bondage and the Problem of Slavery", in Economy and Society in Ancient Greece, pp.151-152; Polanyi, "Aristotle Discovers the Economy", pp.87-94 takes Aristotle, at first, in his own spirit, pp.79-80 and then mistakes his thought as that (p.88), "of providing a formula by which 'the price was to be set'".

64. Arist. Pol., 1256b32-34 on Solon and, after Finley AAE, p.21 and Meikle, APEP, p.72, Herodotos I.152-153 on exchanges, oaths and cheating.

65. Arist. EN 1130b27.
68. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Arist. EN 1130b30-33. τὸς δὲ κατὰ μέσον δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ καὶ αὐτὸν δικαίου ἐν μὲν ἔστιν εἶδος τὸ ἐν τοῖς δικαιοσύνης πινακίδα τὸν κρατάτων τῶν θάλαμων δια μεριστὰ τοῖς κυριωτοῖς τῇ πολιτείᾳ (ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἐστι καὶ κύριον ἔχειν καὶ τοῦ ἐπεφαίνειν ἐπίδεικνυσθαι,)...  
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. Arist. EN 1130b32-33.
76. Arist. EN 1130b33-34.
77. Ibid.
78. Arist. EN 1131a1-3ff.
79. Arist. EN 1131a3-4.
80. Arist. EN 1131a4-5. Voluntary actions expressed (if not "freedom of the individual", as this concept has evolved from Early Modern Europe: see Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. by Talcott Parsons [London, 1930; 1st pub. Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, 1904; 1920], pp.104-105ff and 222, note 22; see also the foreword by R.H. Tawney, pp.[a]-11), an essential freedom from duress within the constraints of a citizen's socio-cultural world. Aristotle was aware of choice (citizens making choices) but these choices were made either within a fourth-century polis or a fourth century paradigm grown from a polis world, see Donald J. Allan, "Individual and State in the Ethics and Politics", Fondation Hardt: Esthétiques, vol.XI (1964/65), La 'Politique' D'Aristote, pp.55-85, and formal discussion, pp.86-96, note pp.55-57ff; 67-85 (and my comments in Chapter VII from note 33ff) 71-72; 82-85, though (p.85) his concluding statement on Christianity and "the dignity of the individual human" is far too general and benign. Fustel De Coulanges also added his rather more dramatic and general comments on the absence of "individual liberty" in the ancient world. Fustel De Coulanges noted the power, the centrality of a city and a
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citizen's subordination to it. As he polemically put it:

The citizen was subordinate in everything, and without any reserve, to the city; he belonged to it body and soul....There was nothing independent in man; his body belonged to the state, and was devoted to its defence.


81. Arist. EN 1131a5-6ff.

82. Arist. EN 1131a6-7. It is worth noting that ethical attitudes concerning medical conduct, and particularly, the use of pharmaka, were probably in a state of flux. Medical ethics were dependent upon the view(s) of the person(s) who mixed and administered a particular potion. The eventually standard but most probably very gradually evolved doctrine of medical and collegiate ethics contained in Hippokrates' Oath bound the person who swore by the Hippokratian practitioner's or physician's nomos, to act correctly in regard to another's health and life. At this point, we can pass on from the Oath after noting its regard for the privacy and sacrosanctity of human relations within an oikia or a physician's non-interference in the internal social and property relations of a particular oikia.

Pharmakeia, in terms of its being a direct representation of the practices associated with the administering of pharmaka, was on the fringe of many social practices. It incorporated a mixture of magic and herbalism, and hence moved amongst charms, spells and potions. It was associated simultaneously with magical beliefs and popular herbalist medical practices. It touched upon strong and not necessarily separate beliefs and traditions which had grown out of direct associations with magic, myth and religion. For an interesting mytho-historical formulation of healing practices associated with pharmakeia, see the account of Aeneas' cure from wounds in Virgil's Aeneid, 12.383-429.

83. Arist. EN 1131a7. Or did such activities potentially involve the blurring of lines between citizen and slave? See Demosthenes, Against Neaira, LIX.16-20 for a beginning, and the social and sexual chaos such beyond-the-pale behaviour caused for xenoi, 41-42, and the Athenian citizen Phrastor, 49-52.

84. Ibid.

85. Hippokrates, Oath, 1124-28ff. On the complex motives for a Pythagorean-influenced Oath cautioning personal and sexual restraint on the part of a physician with his patients in their

86. There were philosophical questions at stake also. The "equal standing" of human beings in the eyes of Pythagoreans and especially with regard to sexuality and sexual conduct should be recognised as having influenced the Oath, see C.Temkin and C. Lilian Temkin, pp.33-35.

87. For the access of slave women to sacred or religious occasions and rites outside the oikos see Xenophon, Against Neaira, LIX.85.


89. Attention should be paid to Ste. Croix's and Finley's careful remarks on slaves, their ownership patterns and slaves' physical, ideological and psychological contributions to the material and symbolic construction and representation of the 'Greek world' in its broadest sense; Finley, "Was Greek Civilization Based on Slave Labour?"; Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World, pp.37-40; 140-147; 171-173. Especially see, Ehrenberg, The People of Aristophanes, pp.170-173.

90. Ibid.

91. Arist. EN 1131a7. Premeditated actions such as dolaphonia were met by the death sentence at Athens if a citizen rather than a slave was the victim, see A.R.W. Harrison, The Law of Athens: The Family and Property (O.U.P., 1968), pp.166-171, particularly, 169-170.

92. Ibid.

93. Arist. EN 1131a8.

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid. Once again Xen. HG II.1.31-32 provides evidence, this time for resistance to and abhorrence of potential acts of deliberate mutilation of citizens captured in war. However revenge remained a most powerful weapon, Ibid., for real acts of merciless violence shown towards vanquished citizen enemies.
97. Arist. EN 1130b30-33ff.


100. See especially the preceding sections between Chapters VI, note 222 and Chapter VII, note 96.

101. That Aristotle was thinking along lines whose origins stem in part from mathematical reasoning was made clear by his use of a series of analogies based upon arithmetic and geometric proportion, Arist. EN 1131a29-1131b17ff. This mathematical reasoning was concerned with social outcomes and based firmly upon an ideal distribution of social and material goods within a polis, EN 1131b16-24ff.

102. Arist. EN 1131b9-12ff.

103. Ibid.


108. Ibid.


111. Ibid.


115. Ibid.

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118. One need only regard Gomme's aggregate figures for the human population of Attica as guides (The Population of Ancient Athens, p.28, Table I) to recognize the basis for such a statement. Note also the keen observations of the 'Old Oligarch' 1.2-4.


120. Ibid.

121. Without fully entering into the problems associated with the 'numbers' represented by the oligarchic bodies of "four hundred" (Thuc. VIII.67) and "five thousand" their very formation signalled a smaller, far more exclusive political organisation. The "five thousand" were at first a phantom extension of the "four hundred" or rather a ruse, a device for adding psychological and physical as well as political depth to their bid for power, Thuc. VIII.72.1. Note Thuc. VIII.65 and 65.3 and contrast [Aristotle], Ath. Pol., 29.5 for the problems in the character of "the five thousand". The "five thousand" added power, mystique and psychological force (if not concrete, material force) to the "four hundred". See the pithy observation by Hignett on the hidden strength, the psychology behind the so-called "five thousand", G. Hignett, A History of the Athenian Constitution to the end of the Fifth Century B.C. (O.U.P.,1952; 1970 reprint), p.274. Also note, A.W. Gomme, A. Andrews and K.J. Dover, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, vol.V. (O.U.P., 1981), p.162. The "four hundred's" overt physical power was expressed by their one hundred and twenty young (oligarchic) bully-boys, Thuc. VIII.69.4. Also note Plato, Epistle VII.324-325A, especially 324D. For additional evidence and argument on the problems in the so-called constitution of the five thousand, Ste. Croix, "The Constitution of the Five Thousand", Historia, 5 (1956), pp.1-23. One should keep in mind that the very promotion of the "five thousand" signalled, at the very least, 'formal' political limitations and controls.


123. Ibid.

124. Arist. op. cit.

125. Arist. EN 1131a29.

126. Ibid.


128. Ibid.

129. Ibid.
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130. Arist. EN 1131b9-12.
131. Ibid.
132. Ibid.
133. Arist. EN 1131b10-11.
134. Ibid.
135. Ibid.
136. Arist. op. cit.
137. Arist. EN 1131b17-19ff.
143. Ibid.
144. Ibid.
145. Arist. EN 1132a2-4.
146. Ibid.
147. Arist. EN 1132a4-6.
148. Arist. EN 1132a6-7. H.H. Joachim, Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics: A Commentary, edited by D.A. Rees (O.U.P., 1951), pp.144-145. Unfortunately careful argument is spoilt by all too tidy expressions such as "ledger". Aristotle was working as much with metaphorical meaning as he was working with a model of justice in its social context.
149. Arist. EN 1132a9-10.
151. Ibid.
152. Arist. EN 1132a14-18. ἢ τοῦ μὲν ἐλεήμονος καὶ ἐλάττονος τὸ ἱσοῦ μέσον, τὸ δὲ κέρδος καὶ ἡ σμία τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δὲ ἐλάττον ἐναντίως, τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλέον τοῦ κακοῦ δὲ ἐλάττον κέρδος, τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον ἐσμία. ἢν δὲ μέσον τὸ ἱσοῦ, ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι ἐλίκαιον.
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153. Ibid.
154. Ibid.
155. Arist. EN 1132a16-17.
156. Ibid. Arist. EN 1132a14-17.
158. Ibid.
159. Arist. EN 1132a19-25ff; 1132a4-6; 1132a6-7.
163. Arist. EN 1132a24.
164. Arist. EN 1132a29-1132b6ff.
166. Arist. EN 1132b11-16.
167. Ibid. For examples of behaviour based upon the concept of bekouios: 1131a1-5.
170. Ibid.
171. Ibid.
172. Ibid.
173. Arist. EN 1132b15. W.P.R. Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory (O.U.P., 1980 second edition; 1st pub., 1968), noted this relationship's force in the actual world of exchange relations (p.194) but later confused these relations with an anachronistic (in the sense of modernising) search for, "the prices at which products of industry are bought and sold" (pp.195-196).
175. Arist. EN 1132b16-20.
176. Ibid.
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177. Ibid.


179. Arist. EN 1131a29-31ff; 1131b10-13; 1131b16-17ff; 1131b27-1132a2.

180. Arist. EN 1132b21-34. Antip腠hos is often confused with concepts of "demand", see especially Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory, pp. 198-200.

181. Arist. EN 1132b24-25.


183. Arist. EN 1132b31-32.

184. Arist. EN 1132b33-34. Aristotle was now (1132b31ff) concerned with "voluntary transactions of exchange of goods", Meikle, APEP, p. 59.

185. Arist. EN 1132b31-33.


188. Finley, AAEA, pp. 20-21 notes the peculiar conceptual position of 'barbarian' and Greek societies to one another and the way in which (as in Thucydides, I.6.6) in ancient times the Greek world lived like the 'barbarian world' today. See also, my chapter V from the end of note 189 to 198 on the cultural significance of comparative as well as 'distant' (and distancing) socio-historical experiences and the ways in which the interpretation of such experiences reflected upon the 'world view' of Greek writers and revealed significant socio-cultural values of that world. See also, A. Monigliano, "Greek Historiography", History and Theory, vol. XVII, no. 1 (1978), pp. 4-6 and Monigliano, "Time in Ancient Historiography", History and Theory, Beih. 6 (1966), pp. 10-12; Clark, Aristotle's Mag, pp. 134-138ff.

189. As evidenced by Arist. EN 1133a16-18; 1134a24-28; Arist. Pol., 1252a1-7; 1256b26-30ff. Κοινόνια also referred to the broad social relations which helped form a social and political entity, a gregarious human habitation.

Arist. EN 1132b31-1133a5.


Arist. EN 1133a3.

Arist. op. cit.

Arist. EN 1132b34-1133a1.

Ibid.

Arist. EN 1133a1-2.

Arist. op. cit.

Arist. EN 1133a5-7.

Karl Polanyi, "Aristotle Discovers the Economy", in Trade and Market in the Early Empires: Economies in History and Theory, edited by Karl Polanyi, Conrad M. Arensberg and Harry W. Pearson (New York, 1957), p.93. The important thing to realise about the term metadosis is not its (by the fourth century B.C.) somewhat distant associations with pre-money-or non-money-based exchange relations, rather its role as an illustrative tool for different social and economic practices. Aristotle's reference to the Kharites is a powerful example of his intellectual thought processes at work. By seizing upon long-standing social practice, Aristotle simultaneously employed the customary force of 'archaic' institutionalised practices which recognised the transfer of socio-material favours within the framework of Greek society and then transformed metadosis analogously to introduce the contemporary world of allage, its social processes as embodied in the term allaktikos and the role of nomisma performed in conducting this 'new' arena of human social relations: Arist. EN 1132b31-1133a31. Polanyi's intellectual strength lay in his recognition of Aristotle's deft, inventive and original use of language. This recognition reopened Aristotle's Politics and Nicomachean Ethics to a consideration of his salient contribution to the birth of political economy. Polanyi astutely and amusingly observed (p.92):

Aristotle enjoyed inventing words, and his humour, if any, was Shavian.

Ibid. p.93.

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Society, vol.xxvi (1952), p.75 provides an unwitting example of his scholarly-cum-philosophical blindness by the following exclusive observation:

Furthermore, Aristotle looked at goods not merely as media of want satisfaction but as products of human skill as well — as aspect which has given rise to so many misunderstandings of his thoughts. The modern economist neglects purposely this aspect as it is apt to lead him into a labor theory of value; the partiality of the modern economist at once simplifies his task and lends greater consistency to his theorising.

203. Arist. EN 1133a5-10ff.
204. Arist. EN 1133a10-11ff.
207. Ibid.
210. Ibid.
211. Ibid.

212. Arist. EN 1133a19. The search for a dimension in which different 'products' are commensurable voluntarily drove Aristotle into uncharted territory. The problem of commensurability remained unsolved yet in Maclle's words APEF, p.59 Aristotle's thoughtful struggle remained "fertile yet contradictory." See also pp.66-67ff. Finley, AAEA, pp.8-13, although aware of Schumpeter's dismissal of Aristotle's "economic analysis", in the end went even further and dismissed altogether (p.13ff) Aristotle's economic thought because it did not fit his model of "the economy" (p.22). Rigid adherence to given ideas (or values accepted as given) of what constitutes 'economic' analysis and its historical apprehension can be both self-fulfilling and self-defeating. Unfortunately, Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (O.U.P., 1954; 1955 printing), pp.57-65 proved to be such a case-study. See especially pp.57 and 64.

215. Ibid., p.9.
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217. Arist. Pol., 1256b26-1257a1ff. It is important always to recall that Solon's remarks and his mytho-historical status acted as a focus for Aristotle's inquiry into the roles and limits (or otherwise) of ploutos. Solon's remarks in verse served the purpose of providing for Aristotle a well-known basis, a departure point for Aristotle's investigation of the recent appearance of "new" social attitudes and practices gathered round the general term for wealth and riches. See Chapter VI notes 47 and 49.

218. Arist. EN 1133a16-18. Κοινόνια must be viewed within its intensively associative sense (rather than as a generic 'catch-all' term "community") but unlike Finley, AEA, pp.9ff; 74-15, this need not exclude its use in the formation of an economic and moral anthropology nor its roles as a model and symbolic representative of human exchange relations.

219. Arist. EN 1133a7-10ff; 1133a19-24ff.

220. Arist. EN 1133a10-14ff.


222. Arist. EN 1133a26-27.

223. Ibid., Finley, AEA, p.8, note 22 and Meikle, APEP, pp.59-61 with notes 6, 7, 8 and 9, are quite right to stress the critical importance of translating χρεία as "need" rather than "demand". The concept of need avoids the modernising and anachronistic implications of uncritically and/or unconsciously inviting capitalist market economics and its explanatory apparatus into antiquity. This strategy can help one avoid finding a mirror (if smaller) image of our own world. Putting aside Meikle's assessment of Rackham's and Ross' mistranslations of χρεία other scholars fell into the same trap, namely, John Warrington, Aristotle: Ethics (Everyman's Library, London, 1963; 1975 reprint), pp.102-103; H.H. Joachim, Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics, edited by D.A. Rees (O.U.P., 1957), p.150, the commentary on section 1133a19-31. Note the later history of Aristotle's "discovery of the economy", to borrow from the title of Polanyi's famous scholarly sally in Odd Langhols, Wealth and Money in the Aristotelian Tradition: A Study in Scholastic Economic Sources (Universitetsforlaget, 1983). Although published in 1984, this work mentions only Finley's AEA and not Meikle's APEP.

224. Arist. EN 1133a26-1133b10. The problems of any human society first identifying "need" (as Aristotle succeeded in doing) and then socially measuring or equating different material needs led
Aristotle inexorably, if not naturally, to consider social relations or associative relations amongst human beings (koinōnia) from the citizen's perspective and the processes through which any "exchange" (allagē) was mediated.

225. Finley, AASA, p.13. Aristotle's search for commensurability, a "commensurable dimension" Meikle, APEP, p.60 was the reason for Aristotle's speculative relational 'equations'.


228. Ibid.


230. Ibid.


232. Ibid.


236. Arist. EN 1133a31-1133b4.

237. Arist. EN 1133a31-1133b18.

238. Meikle, APEP, p.68.

239. Koinōnia was a potent model and representative of polis social relations. It was not reduced to solely a moral dimension (after Finley, AASA, pp.7-8; 16-18; 22ff). On the other hand, an analysis of koinōnia need not (must not) exclude a consideration of its social and symbolic roles in helping Aristotle comprehend his own material polis world (after Meikle, APEP, pp.71-73).

240. Arist. EN 1133b4-6.


242. Arist. EN 1133b8 and its general context 1133b6-10.

243. Ibid.

244. This statement in no way intends to exclude the dominant world of immediate production for home-based consumption, as Bolkestein observed, Economic Life in Greece's Golden Age, p.29:
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By far the greater part of the land-owners in Attica and other regions was composed of small farmers, who tilled the little fertile soil with their own hands with or without the help of hired labourers or slaves.

245. Meikle, APEP, p.64.

246. Arist. EN 1133a28-31; 1133b10-16.

247. 'Morals' and politics were not separate arenas in Aristotle's thought. They were an integral part of Aristotle's culturally centred evaluation of a polis' paradigmatic good life. The fusion of 'morals' and politics has been examined in a general way by T.H. Irwin, "Moral Science and Political Theory in Aristotle", in Crux: Essays Presented to G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, pp.150-168. However Irwin's article when speaking about the dēmos refers to them vaguely as "the lower classes" (pp.164-165), or "mental classes" (p.166) and has an equal penchant for the term "upper classes" (p.166).

248. Arist. EN 1133a16-1133b17ff.

249. Arist. EN 1133b16-18. This is yet another example of Aristotle's capacity for grappling with a world's practical, daily conduct and then giving it a tentative (not absolute) theoretical raison d'être. That his critique was tentative, and indeed, not entirely satisfactory (in his mind's view) can be seen by his careful qualifications on the conduct of allagē, 1133a19, and the role of nomisma as a mediating, balancing value, 1133a19-20.

250. Ibid.

251. Ibid.


253. Meikle, APEP, p.68.

254. APEP, p.57.

255. Ibid., note the connection between Finley and Polanyi in terms of a shared "Weberian" style or approach and perspectives on historical
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sociology in Humphreys, "History, economics and anthropology: the work of Karl Polanyi," in Anthropology and the Greeks, pp.74-75. For Finley's early preference for the term "status-situation" (ständische Lage) and a critique of its history see G.B.M. de Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World, op. cit., pp.91-93 and generally 81-98; see also pp.57-58ff; G.B.M. de Ste. Croix, "Karl Marx and the Interpretation of Ancient and Modern History" pp.13-14ff; 18-19ff; and see especially note 39. These pages' numbers are those of Ste. Croix's original paper, a copy of which was given generously to the writer and gratefully received and acknowledged. This paper can now be found in Marx en Perspective = Actes du colloque organisé par l'Ecole des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris, December 1983, ed. B. Chavanne (Paris, 1985), pp.159-187. Finley's views on status, order, Weber, and class - his classificatory spectrum's roles in history can be found in The Ancient Economy, pp.44-45; 50-51; 67-68.

256. APEP, p.58.

257. Ibid.

258. M.I. Finley, AAEA, p.22.


260. Arist. EN 1133b10-28. Raymond Firth, "The Sceptical Anthropologist: Social Anthropology and Marxist Views on Society", Inaugural Radcliffe-Brown Lecture in Social Anthropology, From the Proceedings of the British Academy, vol.LVIII (1972), pp.3-39. The importance of the term 'symbol' and of symbolic form or representation not only helps deepen an analysis of human behaviour within particular historical and cultural environments but also prevents the turning of concepts, theories and their social practices into absolute forms or an intellectual cul-de-sac: see Firth, pp.20-21. Browning, Review Article, "The Class Struggle in Ancient Greece", is right to argue that Athens from 507 to 322/1 B.C. "saw both an economic and an intellectual and artistic evolution without parallel in history." (p.153) Yet much exploration remains to be done on the patterns and forms of Athens historical experience - the comparative force of its experience to that of other poleis.

261. Arist. EN 1133b16-17.

262. Arist. EN 1133a19-26ff; 1133b16-17.

263. Arist. EN 1132b18-19.

264. Arist. EN 1132b31-33ff.

265. Arist. EN 1132b21-1133b34.

266. Arist. EN 1132b32-33.
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268. Ibid. That allage existed before nomisma was introduced and hence exchange or barter relations (and indeed gift relations) were conducted by non-'money' means was made clear by 1133b26-28.

269. This barter relationship (as well as a basic nomisma-based exchange) was explained by Aristotle's analogous explanation of (literally) household-based commodity relations: Arist. EN 1133b20-28. The intellectual history of limited exchange relations is neatly summarised in G.A. Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence (O.U.P., 1978; reprinted and corrected, 1979), pp.302-303.

270. Arist. EN 1132b31-33.


272. Ibid.

273. Ibid.

274. Pinley, AAEA, is right to reject notions of a theory of prices in Aristotle pp.6-7; 10-14, although, once again, the presence of an ahistorical and seemingly timeless market economics reveals itself in Pinley's dismissal of a price theory of Aristotle (p.14):

Therefore he [Aristotle] was not seeking a theory of market prices;

and earlier (p.13) in the textbook expression:

He (Aristotle) also knew perfectly well that prices sometimes responded to variations in supply and demand.

See also, Meikle, APEP, p.64.

275. Arist. EN 1132b31-34.

276. Ibid.

277. This confident view found general expression in Greek anthropocentrism and its cultural forms which could be termed polis anthropocentrism. Yet it should be kept in mind that even with man as a generic model in Aristotle's zoology, "In botany there is no clear-cut supreme species." See Lloyd, Science, Folklore and Ideology, p.43, and generally pp.26-43. See for a reflective overview of Greek attitudes towards human self-centredness Renehan, "The Greek Anthropocentric View of Man".

279. Ibid.

280. Ibid.

281. Ibid.

282. Aristotle's language and its ideals of oikos-based exchange relations was very much based upon his own world and its time. Yet, such a preoccupation did not preclude a theoretical approach; it demanded it. See Clark, Aristotle's Man, pp.130-131ff. Barker's, The Politics of Aristotle, p.lifi, reasonable and commensical observation, cast, in legal guise, is worth noting:

But ideals will also serve as judges and measuring-rods for the actual. The Greek states of the fourth century came to judgement before the bar of Plato's and Aristotle's ideals.


284. Arist. EN 1134a27-28,
έλευθερον καὶ ἵσων ἡ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν ἡ κατ’ ἀριθμόν.

285. Ibid.

286. Ibid.


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