The Dramatic Background of the Arguments with Callicles, Euripides’ *Antiope*,
and an Athenian Anti-Intellectualist Argument

*Introduction*

This paper does not aim to establish the ‘dramatic date’ of Plato’s *Gorgias*, nor does it seek to establish with any precision the date at which Euripides’ fragmentary *Antiope* was written. Nor does it aim to show that Athenian anti-intellectualism had some fixed beginning and conclusion rather than persisting, in some fashion, as long as intellectuals frequented its public places. It does, however, have aims that may easily be mistaken for these. While Plato was not too particular about fidelity to a dramatic date, he frequently shows a strong desire to supply an intellectual background for the views that his characters will propound and the debates that follow from them. In the case of dialogues that employ a single interlocutor that certainly tends to produce a reasonably coherent dramatic date, but what matters to Plato is not so much fidelity to history as the appropriate intellectual context. It is not concerned to argue that Euripides’ play *Antiope* was performed at a given festival, but it is very much concerned to demonstrate that its status as a post-412 play rests on flimsy foundations and does not agree with important evidence. And it aims to show that a particular kind of anti-intellectual argument, or anti-intellectual rhetoric, one that finds a place both in Zethus’ criticism of Amphion in the *Antiope* and in Callicles’ criticism of Socrates in the *Gorgias*, did have a place in public debate in the Athens of the late 420s B.C., and for very good reasons.

*i. The Background of Callicles*
Except where it has been an essential part of a wider project, attempts to determine a dramatic date for Plato’s *Gorgias* have not been much in evidence since Dodds’ somewhat satirical dismissal of such exercises in the introduction to his masterful commentary. Yet most of the genuine dialogues do have a reasonably coherent dramatic date, with some late exceptions including the *Philebus* and *Laws* that have none at all, and the *Republic* whose fluctuating indications of dramatic date can easily be explained with reference to its evolution in a number of discrete stages. The *Gorgias* is the third longest dialogue of Plato, and its evolution was in all probability complex. To dismiss hastily issues of dramatic date is to remove a great deal of the ‘evidence’ upon which Athenian prosopography of the late fifth century relies, so that it is best to consider carefully whether even the *Gorgias* can be made to yield a satisfactory degree of consistency. It is true that we shall ultimately be compelled to accept at least one anachronism, the references to Archelaus of Macedon at 470d-471d and 525d1, as long as we insist on reading the work as a unity, and this inconvenient anachronism will need an explanation.

Even so, what I want to focus on is less a matter of dramatic date than of dramatic context. What we cannot fail to notice is that Plato has provided us with quite a detailed context for the colourful figure of Callicles, and that his care here stands in sharp contrast with his apparent lack of interest in supplying a setting for the arguments with Gorgias and Polus. It is the very professional lives of Gorgias and Polus whose purpose is being questioned, and the arguments were relevant just as long as they practised their own particular brands of rhetorical teaching. Plato feels no special need to have them examined in the course of a specific visit to Athens, and such indications of date as are present are there because of the convenience of the subject matter, not because Plato is at pains to supply a context. On the other hand,
obvious anachronisms in the arguments with Callicles, which themselves occupy
significantly more than half the work, would have undermined the setting that Plato
was undoubtedly trying to create. This is especially so during Callicles’ early
exchanges with Socrates, while the context is being developed. Though the arguments
with Gorgias and Polus would have had sufficient purpose at any time when Gorgias,
Polus and Socrates were all in Athens, we shall see that Callicles’ suspicions about
the value of philosophy increased or decreased in credibility according to the actual
performance of highly educated individuals in public life.

Socrates implies, as soon as Callicles intervenes, that his views are ephemeral,
and that his public pronouncements simply reflect the views of the Demos of Athens
at any given period (481d5-482a2) As a result they will change as soon as the views
of the Demos change. Consequently the arguments with Callicles ought to be set at a
time when intellectuals were seen as weak and ineffectual in public life. Besides
rejecting intellectual pursuits beyond a given age, Callicles is most noted for being a
spokesman for the rejection of conventional justice and for the adoption of an
unrestrained egoistic hedonism. Just as there will always be anti-intellectuals, so there
will always be those who feel that conventional justice is an unnatural restraint and
those who advocate self-seeking hedonistic goals. But Thucydides (2.53.1-4, cf. 3.82)
gives us a date when these feelings began to find regular public expression—in the
aftermath of the plague of 430 B.C. Hence, by the ‘Mytilenean Debate’ of 427, his
‘Diodotus’ finds it useful to avoid appealing publicly to the justice of his cause rather
than its expediency, and his ‘Cleon’ warns against listening to his opponents’ words
for the pleasures that they yield. In both cases there is irony present, but we are being
welcomed to the rhetoric of the post-Periclean age, to which all acknowledge that
Callicles’ views belong.8
Callicles is said to come from Acharnae (495d3), though the significance of this is not so clear. From the point of view of chronology it is more relevant that Callicles and Socrates have close relationships with Demus and Alcibiades respectively (481d), and that much seems to fix the conversation in the 420s. By the end of 423, when Aristophanes must have largely written the Wasps and Eupolis the Polets,9 Demus was well known as an object of lovers’ attentions, while the commencement of Socrates’ unconventional relationship with Alcibiades could naturally be dated to around 433.10 Certainly no such relationship had survived until the Lenaea of 416, for it seems plain from the Symposium that they are not in any sense ‘together’; however, some close association is implied by Alcibiades’ account of their roles in the retreat from Delium (424) at Symposium 220e-221e. One may note that such Aristophanic plays as Clouds and Wasps are happy to mock both figures, but they never mock them together, or refer to any relationship between them.11 As the political career of Alcibiades gathered momentum, any closeness to Socrates must have waned—perhaps for reasons offered by the ‘Alcibiades’ of the Symposium (216b3-6). While one can see little evidence of a committed relationship even as far as the mid 420s, one must acknowledge that the Gorgias itself speaks as if this relationship, begun around 433-2, had been in progress for some time; certainly Pericles, Alcibiades’ guardian, is already dead: ‘recently’ so, as Callicles points out at 503c. But the full force of ‘recently’ is blunted by the fact that technically Pericles is here classed as a politician of old.12 So while we may safely assume that the conversation is set within seven or eight years of 429, some gap should perhaps be postulated. Furthermore, Socrates already suspects that he is fighting a losing battle to turn Alcibiades away from a career in the wrong sort of public oratory (519a-b), and
Alcibiades seems not so far removed in age from Callicles, since Socrates has much the same doubts about both of their present public careers.

We do not have an age for Callicles, though we have indications. He is of such an age as to speak publicly, and seemingly regularly, in the Assembly (481c), though he is obviously Socrates’ junior (e.g. 509a3). People considered him well educated (487b), and it was presumably while he was still pursuing what we should call tertiary education that he made with his three close comrades (ἐταυροτατολ, 487d3) and ‘partners in wisdom’ (c2) the decision not to get involved in ‘philosophy’ in detail (ἐἰς ἄκρβειαν, 487c7) or ‘beyond the proper point’. This decision, overheard and noted by Socrates presumably after 429, itself shows a certain involvement in the intellectual debates of Athens. The concept of excessive intellectualism clearly did not prevail in Athens under Pericles, who was well known for his intellectual friends and was still studying with Damon the music theorist in 433 or 432; but it is already a force in 427, when we see the people’s newest leader, Cleon, arguing that it is inclined to deliberate excessively, and to show too great a concern for handsome words than for practical realities. The practical reality of Athenian power was of special concern to him (37.1-2), and any signs of softening on the part of his political friends were viewed as a special worry.

Callicles’ associates were Teisander, Andron, and Nausicydes. It is not essential for my purposes that Callicles should himself have been a historical character, for he has been given contemporaries who clearly were. And if the name is a mask for another figure, what is said about him is likely to conform broadly with that other person’s career. Of his friends, Andron the son of Androtion is generally held to have been born close to 445, and he achieved sufficient prominence by 411 to become one of the Four Hundred. I should in fact be inclined to place his birth
somewhat earlier, given that we find him already among the devotees of Hippias of Elis in the *Protagoras* (315c), whose dramatic date is close to that of the *Alcibiades* I. The conversation in the *Protagoras* is dated by Nails as 333 or early 332, and I doubt that Andron is likely to have been a participant at such a gathering of intellectuals when only twelve years old. Agathon may be little more than that, but he cannot be any younger bearing in mind that Pausanias in the *Symposium* (181d-e) rejects any relationship that begins before the boy’s mind develops, identifying this stage with the sprouting of the beard. He could scarcely risk being seen to condemn his own continuing relationship with Agathon at a party which Agathon hosts. Agathon’s presence may be explained by his accompanying the more mature Pausanias, and his young age does attract comment from Socrates, who calls him a μειρακίον twice, at 315d8 and again at e3.19 It therefore seems probable that we are intended to take Andron there as a few years older than Agathon,20 perhaps around eighteen. That would make him born close to 450. Andron is found in the company of Hippias; if he had studied seriously with Hippias then he, like his friend Callicles, would have acquired some facility in the use of the contrast between law (νόμος) and nature (φύσις), a contrast which Hippias uses himself later in the *Protagoras* (337d).21

Though Hippias is a teacher who (unusually) had some appeal among the Spartans as well,22 I believe that it is unsafe to argue from Andron’s participation in the regime of the 400 in 411 that he had all along been of oligarchic sympathies. There were good practical reasons for parting with the democracy in 411, and it seems implausible that a friend of Callicles should allow too many constitutional scruples to interfere with his opportunities for self-advancement. If we presume that he was the Andron who became the accuser of Antiphon in 410,23 then he was probably something of an opportunist rather than somebody committed to the oligarchic creed.24
Of the other two comrades of Callicles, Teisander is the son of Cephisodorus and comes from Aphidna. His birth is placed by Nails not much earlier than the 445 given for Andron. The remaining companion, Nausicydes may be said to have come from a similarly wealthy background, but his dates are more difficult to fix independently. It is a reasonable bet, though, that he is the wealthy miller mentioned by Aristophanes at *Eccl.* 426, implying that he was still alive (and still regarded as obnoxious) at around 393. If we may date Callicles from the dates of his friends, then I should guess that he too was born at around 450. He already must have had the time to acquire a certain stature, in reputation as well as wealth, since the celebrated Gorgias is a guest at his house and will apparently give a display *if Callicles wishes* (447b7-8). And that stature needs to have been acquired soon after Pericles’ death.

**ii. The Anomaly of the Antiope according to the Scholiast’s Dating**

When Plato has supplied so much detail to set him in a particular context, especially between 481c and 487d, it comes as a surprise to find Callicles in this very section (485e-486c) quoting from a play generally believed, following the only explicit ancient testimony, to have been produced later than 412. This play, the *Antiope* of Euripides, was sufficiently noticed to have given rise to two near-certain vase depictions, and its influence on the *Gorgias* extends to the very fabric of the play, as Nightingale has shown. So this is no casual anachronism, nor one that is likely to have gone unnoticed. If we could (a) trust the scholiast on the *Frogs* who mentions it, along with the *Hypsipyle* and the extant *Phoenissae* as a ‘more recent’ play (than the *Andromeda*), hence 411 or later, and (b) be confident that the scholion has been faithfully preserved, then we should be confronted with a serious anachronism within the very section that strives to create a background, in the 420s, against which
Callicles can be understood. However, since 1985 we have had good reason not to trust the scholion, for it was demonstrated by Cropp and Fick that the extant iambic lines of the play display a low rate of resolved feet, which would, if based on a representative sample, indicate a date of composition between 427 and 419. And such a date is broadly compatible with the other indicators of dramatic date during the arguments with Callicles. If we were to regard the scholion and the traditional stylometric methods of dating Euripides’ plays as of approximately equal value, then it would have to be the *Gorgias* to which one goes for the additional evidence required to determine the date of the play. In fact I consider the stylometry somewhat more reliable as an indication of the date of composition for any play with this many iambic lines extant.

Let us recall some of the basic features of the *Antiope* including those central to Plato’s theme. The young men Amphion and Zethus, whose interests are in music and public affairs respectively, are being brought up in the foothills of Mount Cithaeron by a peasant, after their mother, Antiope, has conceived them by Zeus, given birth to them and abandoned them by the roadside. In an early *agon* Zethus chides Amphion for his womanish musical and intellectual pursuits, which he feels will cause the withering of the noble nature that they are presumed to share. Amphion replies effectively but seems somehow to make a concession. Their mother Antiope arrives, now fleeing Dirce queen of Thebes to whom she is enslaved. Amphion is cautious about accepting the tale she tells, but eventually her status as their mother is revealed. She is rescued, Dirce put to death with help from a rampant bull, and death would also have awaited her husband Lycus but for the intervention of Hermes. Hermes, once the source of Amphion’s lyre, addresses Amphion as Thebes’ ‘King’, and it is to the tune of his lyre that the walls of Thebes will be built.
The play’s plot suits Plato, since Zethus’ sentiments can initially be seen to prevail, explaining why Callicles would cite the play with relish, and yet the figure who ultimately emerges with most stature even within the city of Thebes is Amphion, the musician, intellectual, and reluctant politician. Correspondingly, Socrates, as intellectual and practitioner of the highest muse as the Phaedo would have it (61a1), can take sides with Amphion (506b), and emerge, somewhat improbably, as the only one practising the true political art (521d).31 Here it must be noted that immediately prior to Callicles’ long speech, in which the Antiope is cited, Socrates had affirmed that Callicles, if he leaves philosophy unrefuted, will be in internal disagreement with himself: something worse than one’s lyre or one’s chorus being out of tune and in disagreement. Hence the analogy between philosophy, qua examined life, and music is present in this dialogue too.

The Antiope had indeed been a clever justification for Euripides’ own role as an intellectual exponent of mousikê, since in it the champion of music had been able to shine when decisive action was required from him, and he will still bring about his public achievements through his musical activities. I strongly suspect that Euripides sees himself as potentially an Amphion-like character, able to contribute in his own poetic way to the construction of the metaphorical defence-walls that Athens needed. The lessons of his own plays could be the kind of subtle music upon which the salvation of his own city would rest,32 but those lessons had no more to do with physical walls than the lessons to be learned from the Gorgias.33 As long as the analogy between philosophy and the highest muse held (Phaedo 61a), the Antiope could serve as effective testimony in favour of the life of Socrates.34

iii. Defending the Intellectual and Cultured Life: Comedy and History
We must here consider further the *Antiope*’s role as Euripidean apology. At what stage did Euripides feel such a justification of musical and intellectual life to be desirable? This would presumably have been a time when the musical and intellectual life at Athens had become subject to pressing criticisms, not unlike the kind that Zethus levels against Amphion. Whether or not it was the first period of this sort, we may reliably conclude that these conditions applied while plays were being written and selected for the Dionysia of 423, since Aristophanes’ *Clouds* then ridiculed the intellectuals (with some reference to ‘musical’ types) via the figure of Socrates, and Ameipsias’ *Connus* was presumably aimed more specifically at the intellectual music-theorists. Hence there was significant overlap between sophistic types and musical types in both plays. While the extant (but significantly revised) play makes Euripides the chosen poet of the new learning, the original performance of *Clouds* seems to have referred to Socrates as ‘the one who wrote Euripides’ tragedies for him, the ones full of chatter’. Ameipsias’ play also brought the figure of Socrates and other unmusical intellectuals into the world of sophistic music.

To make either somebody like Socrates or somebody like Connus as the central *kômôdoumenos* of a comic play would appear to be a highly unusual tactic. This prompts one to ask why the comic spotlight suddenly fell upon intellectuals? To put it another way, what had happened to produce two, and quite possibly three plays (the winner was Cratinus’ self-directed *Wineskin* [Pytinen]), which offered few opportunities for criticism of Cleon? Admittedly, the Aristophanic anti-Cleon plays of 424 and 422 were produced at the more domestic Lenaean festival, since Cleon was not a pleasant enemy towards those who ridiculed him (and hence the city) when the allies were there. Yet I do not think that even this is enough to explain why the intellectual world was taking pains to satirize itself in these comedies.
Clearly this was a time when Cleon’s fortunes, after the success at Sphacteria, were riding high, and his opposition to those who wasted time with frivolous pursuits and excessive debating would have had his deeds to back his statements up. Nicias, his political opponent (ἐχθρός, Thuc. 4.27.5) who had, perhaps with a false expectation of Cleon’s failure, ceded his leadership to him, and who was easily associated with the intellectual scene himself to judge from many passages in Plato’s *Laches*, was in a correspondingly difficult situation. In Aristophanes, he and his fellow general Demosthenes compare the blows that they have received from the merciless and barbaric ‘Paphlagonian’ (i.e. Cleon) at *Knights* 1-12, confirming that Cleon’s rivals were in a particularly difficult situation during the years 425-2.

As we have seen above, while Pericles had been associated with intellectuals until late in life (Pl. *Alc.* I 118c), Cleon was easily represented as an anti-intellectual. While we do not need to enter debates about the hostility of Thucydides towards Cleon and the accuracy of his portrait, the very fact that he could represent Cleon as appealing publicly for prudent folly rather than unrestrained cleverness (3.37.3) shows what kind of qualities his opponents could see in him and in all probability what kind of message his supporters could extract from his words. The same passage depicted him as an open opponent of intelligence (σοφοσ, 3.37.2-3, cf. 42.2). Thucydides’ ‘Diodotus’ (3.42.1) seems to be attributing to Cleon and his party haste arising from folly and passionate anger arising from a lack of cultivation (ἀπευφομένα) and a lack of judgement (βραχομαγεύειν γνώμης). So there was obviously a radical divide between Cleon and the intellectuals. However, this does not mean that Cleon drives the anti-intellectual agenda, for Plutarch represents Nicias as vulnerable to the *natural inclination of the masses* to distrust prominent people in intellectual society. Rather we should pay attention to Plato’s *Apology* (18a-e) where Socrates cannot even name
his real ‘old accusers’ of this period, and certainly declines to put all the blame on Aristophanes—whose Clouds was not popular enough to win either first or second prize. If one may take his words with a pinch of seriousness as well as salt, Aristophanes had bargained on an audience with a little more intellectual discernment than he had been treated to. What Cleon had done was to create the right conditions for anti-intellectualism to flourish among the people. Those who watch the politics of western nations today know well that comparatively mild political comment about (e.g.) racially or ethnically based immigrant groups can fuel disastrously ignorant action on the part of ordinary persons whose prejudices the politicians play to, and intellectuals are still occasionally subject to the same kind of prejudices. A little targeted comment about the uselessness of his opponents’ intellectual credentials in practical situations, followed in 425 by Cleon’s own success where they had failed, could have offered an ideal opportunity for the anti-intellectual majority to question the pretensions of the over-educated and to dismiss all fancy learning as at best unhelpful, at worst a serious impediment to their city’s aims. Euripides’ Electra may also briefly use the rather unattractive character of Orestes to reflect upon similar popular anti-intellectual sentiments shortly after the death of Cleon.

I do not now wish to conclude that Cleon is by nature an anti-intellectual. Rather I wish to suggest that there was a period in the late 420s when anti-intellectual came to a head and had a more direct influence upon the public life of Athens. I suggest that Cleon may have been its beneficiary and even its orchestrator. I now turn my attention to the role played by his opponent.

iv. The Debate between the Intellectual and Practical Lives: The Laches
It would scarcely have been credible for Plato to depict Socrates in direct debate with Cleon, and any such exchange could scarcely have lasted longer than the aborted encounter with Anytus in the *Meno*,\(^50\) but in a dialogue perhaps set just before *Clouds* and *Connus*,\(^51\) the contrast between the man of thought and the man of deeds is effected by presenting Cleon’s *bête-noire* Nicias discussing learning and virtue with a milder advocate of the practical life than Cleon, Laches. Laches is well-meaning, and prepared to give the intellectuals a chance just as long as their conversation does not stray far from practical relevance. But he will judge a man by what he achieves in the heat of battle rather than by his words or ideas (181a-b, 182e-4b), and his prejudice shows most when he sneers at what Nicias might have learned from the intellectual music-theorist Damon (197d, 200a-b). And when it comes to what a man says, he will judge its quality from whether or not he lives in agreement with it (188c-d). One imagines that he would share many of Callicles’ suspicions about the debilitating effects of philosophy in excess, particularly if carried on in Phrygian or Lydian mode (cf. 188d7), though he is still unacquainted with Socrates’ mode of philosophy (188e). His practical attitude and disdain for empty words or fancy new subjects without demonstrable practical relevance makes him an ideal contrast to Nicias, who sees himself as a man of culture with a receptivity to modern ideas, and fails to notice how far this has the capacity to detract from his military performance.

Plato detects something of value in the abilities and ideas of both generals in the *Laches*.\(^52\) He brings his dilemma before us by having the conversation prompted by a pretentious new kind of military training in which the rough and tumble of hoplite warfare is virtually choreographed. Among the ‘teachers’ of such niceties are the Platonic characters Euthydemus and Dionysodorus,\(^53\) which should be a clear warning that it bears little relation to the real world. That the *Laches* is set in the wake
of the conflict between Athens and Thebes at Delium, to which Laches refers (181b),
does in a sense help us to appreciate that Athenian refinement may not always
triumph against the unsubtlety of Thebes, and invites us to imagine how the man
trained in hoplite manoeuvres would fare in a battle between Athens and Thebes.\(^{54}\)
Here we may find a parallel with the way in which the *Antiope* constructs its
intellectual space between Thebes and Athens.\(^{55}\) Plato himself predictably indicates
his own ideal through the character of Socrates, who is capable of being admired, and
to some degree followed, by both the generals—by Nicias because of his expertise in
selecting Damon as a tutor for his (Nicias’) sons, but by Laches for his military
fortitude (180d-181b). Following Socrates’ lead, Laches will suppress his inclination
towards anti-intellectualism (which is sorely tested by Nicias) and Nicias will be
prepared to question his own learning. So Plato did in fact craft a conversation set in
the late 420s that reflects both sides of an urgent debate of the age concerning the
merits (the practical merits!) of various kinds of expert studies, and he allows his
Socrates to mediate between supporters of practical and intellectual excellence—as
the *Antiope*’s chorus of Athenians had presumably also done.

v. Nobility Ruined: the Debilitating Effect of too much Culture

Returning to the politics of the time, it is important to note that Cleon’s suspicion of
intellectualism, like that of Callicles at 484c7-e3, seems to have been associated with
the view that excessive study can have a *debilitating* effect, producing people unable
to play the roles usually associated with manhood in the city. To a degree it must have
been popular wisdom that the more intelligent and refined persons were inclined to
show too much pity and hesitation for their own good,\(^{56}\) but such popular wisdom
could turn into a potent weapon for popular politicians when individual opponents
could plausibly be associated not only with learning, but also with excessive humanity and a subsequent tendency to dither. *Good men could ruin their nature.* If Pericles had been able to take pride in the claim that the Athenians’ pursuit of wisdom had not resulted in any *softness* (μαλακία, Th. 2.40.1), Cleon had directly associated excessive reflection with weak responses, and the hesitancy of his opponent Nicias had certainly made such a line more plausible. That Nicias was well used to the stinging charge that too much prudent reflection resulted not just in caution but in weakness (μαλακία) is evident from Thucydides’ account of his advice to his own generation when opposing the Sicilian expedition (Th. 6.13.1). His new opponent, Alcibiades, is in fact insistent that the Athenians should be true to their own nature (6.18.7), but, far from relying on the anti-intellectual claim that *cleverness* is enfeebling, he asserts that it is inactivity itself that will weaken them and secure their downfall, appealing to what one might call neo-Heraclitean theory. Having an intellectual background of his own, Alcibiades is subtler, and we need to look elsewhere for the crude connection between intellectualism and loss of one’s natural aptitude.

Hence it is natural to look to an earlier opponent of Nicias for systematic use of the popular suspicion that too much reflection may be enfeebling. Not only could such theory be used to warn the masses about becoming too keen on debate, but it could also be employed to cast doubt upon the degree of trust that should be placed in those of aristocratic birth, such as the rising Alcibiades himself, or of generally respected characters such as Nicias—particularly if they could be closely linked with the new brand of teachers, sophistic, musical, or rhetorical. Hence Callicles, who is concerned with matters of ‘nature’ in general, holds special fears that even the naturally gifted individual (ἐνόμος, 484c8 and 485d4), who would otherwise have become renowned (ἐνδόκμος, 484d2), is bound to be corrupted by an excess of
philosophic reflection, and ultimately to be no man at all (ἀνανδρος, 485d4). Hence too, while it is of no concern to the low-born Strepsiades, his more pretentious son Pheidippides does seem worried about the corruption symbolized by the pale skin that he will acquire—rightly so, as it happens. Surely Phidippides’ worries about the intellectual corruption of his natural gifts would have been shared by many young men of the time, particularly those who had already had a taste of intellectual life, including Alcibiades as well as the associates of Callicles at Gorgias 487c-d, and those who believed the μαλακία-argument might also hold the same concern for their friends, like that of Zethus for his brother Amphion or Callicles for Socrates. Aristophanes may have had the same general concerns when in the Clouds he highlights the idea of the enfeebling effects of ‘Socratic’ studies by regular jokes at the expense of the pale skinned pupils with a prisoner-of-war physique, especially Chaerephon, yet it cannot be Socrates himself who prompted this worry about intellectual pursuits, since the poet captures faithfully the hardy nature of Socrates, declining to misrepresent the ‘teacher’ himself.

The same worries about the effect of long-term musical (and sophistic) interests are evident in the Antiope of Euripides, perhaps extending beyond Zethus to the chorus and anybody else who may have been present to judge the debate. Surprisingly for somebody raised upon the slopes of Mount Cithaeron, Zethus is conscious of his own noble nature that his brother should in theory share. He objects to any art ‘that will take a man of good nature (εὐφυής) and make him worse’, and that ‘one’s [noble] nature is gone whenever one surrenders to sweet pleasure’. So in a sense Zethus makes the Callicles-like claim that a man must always seek to live up to the full potential of his nature; and somebody in fragment 206.2-3 warns that the most exacting truth is not to be found in arguments of Amphion’s kind but in ‘nature
(ϕόσις) and what is correct’. I assume that this expression has the same meaning as ‘what is correct by nature’, and that in effect it is identifying nature as the proper determinant for human action. So the seeds of Callicles’ ‘laws of nature’ are to be found already somewhere in this play.

So, to sum up this section, one finds Thucydides’ Cleon using what we may call the argument from μαλακία against persons who try to be too clever; we find Thucydides’ Nicias conscious of the damaging potential of the argument from μαλακία. Much the same argument is used by Aristophanes’ Phidippides for refusing to study with the intellectuals, and it is fine-tuned and coupled with the idea of the corruption of one’s noble ϕόσις by both Euripides’ Zethus and Plato’s Callicles.

vi. A Revised Date for the Antiope?

It will appear from this discussion that understanding the Antiope and understanding the views of Callicles and the counter-position of Socrates are very closely related tasks, and it is not just Callicles but also the play that needs to be understood against the background that Plato provides. That background is similar in important respects to that of Clouds, and is in some way linked to the power that Cleon was beginning to exercise over his opponents. Even so, one should not postulate 424-3 as the only possible date for the composition of the Antiope. Eupolis presumably continued to satirize soft intellectuals in his Flatterers two years later, and later still Socrates and Chaerephon get a rather unrevealing mention in Birds (1553-64), but there is no evidence thereafter that the intellectuals were ever given such prominence in Old Comedy as they had been in 423.66 Here I can affirm only that the thought of the Antiope may profitably be examined in relation to the years of Cleon’s dominance,
and that it therefore makes excellent sense from this point of view to give the play a
date where the statistics seem to put it.

What then does this mean for the popular view that the Antiope is not only
late, but a member of the same trilogy as Phoenissae and Hypsipyle? It does indeed
seem to contain plot elements most naturally linked with later plays, but there are
comparatively few early plays in which to find parallels. Arguments based on plot
devices, while attractive, depend upon numerous unknowns, and there always has to
be one play that is first to utilize particular techniques. As for the theory of a trilogy,
not even the scholiast had claimed that much, and the fact that the text lists Antiope
last argues that any such trilogy would not have been in chronological order. At first
sight it would be an attractive prospect to have two pairs of dissimilar brothers being
the salvation of their mothers in Antiope and Hypsipyle, either framing or followed
by a pair of similar brothers with the very same ambition being the cause of their
mother’s downfall in Phoenissae. A more eloquent case for a diversity of talents and
ambitions within the polis is hard to imagine. Such a trilogy would also embrace three
of the four Euripidean plays in which the name of Amphion occurs, the remaining one
being the Suppliant Women. Nevertheless, one has to ask whether there is evidence
for such integrated trilogies at a date anything like as late as this, and to question
whether far too much has not been read into a scholiast’s comment, which may or
may not be backed up by detailed knowledge unavailable to us, and may or may not
be a misunderstood précis of some earlier scholion. The scholiast’s late dating might
in fact have been prompted by a range of occurrences: direct confusion with
Euripides’ Antigone as was suggested by Cropp and Fink, recollection of the
references to Archelaeus’ post-413 Macedonia in the Gorgias, or familiarity with the
thematic references to Amphion in the two other plays. Again, it is just plausible that special circumstances could have seen two productions of the same play.\textsuperscript{73}

One question that I have to ask about the \textit{Antiope} is whether, if the evidence of the scholia had pointed in that direction, Euripidean scholars would have found a similar range of reasons for connecting it with the years 426-19. As we have noted, not only \textit{Phoenissae} and \textit{Hypsipyle}, but also \textit{Suppliant Women} makes reference to Amphion, and Slater has now discussed \textit{Electra} 295, dated by Cropp to c. 420/19, in the context of anti-intellectual currents in Athenian society.\textsuperscript{74} He also finds comparable passages, linking refinement with humanity and a tendency to soften, in \textit{HF} 298-301 and \textit{Heracle}. 458ff. as well as fr. 407, noting that Cropp had included also \textit{Suppl.} 911-12 in this context.\textsuperscript{75} Precisely what kind of human being Euripides is inviting us to approve of in these plays (if any) is hard to fathom, but they do contain characters who show signs of associating culture with indecision and boorishness with the rapid following of self-interest: associations which the \textit{agon} of the \textit{Antiope} appears to make, but which are refuted in the complications of the plot.

The traditional date of the \textit{Antiope} therefore rests upon a thread. So let me offer just two brief arguments against it. First, Robin Osborne has recently written as follows:

The late tragedies of Euripides and Sophocles differ from their earlier work not just technically, in the way the verse is handled, but in their dramatic form and their concerns: plays like Oedipus at Colonus and Phoenician Women constantly revisit the themes of earlier plays re-reading the concerns of those plays in changed circumstances.\textsuperscript{76} While I would not wish to suggest that every late play must do this, the claim would work well if we postulate that \textit{Hypsipyle} and \textit{Phoenissae} both make mention of
Amphion because both wish to rethink relationships between pairs of brothers (along with their effect on the wider household) in a manner that responded in a new way to Euripides’ portrayal of Amphion and Zethus in the Antiope. But, if we adhere to the questionable idea that the Antiope is a late play itself, first we leave it without any obvious earlier play to be rethinking, and second we also deny the Hypsipyle its own obvious theme to revisit.

Second, there is an interesting, if inconclusive, argument from silence. The anti-Platonic tradition in which Athenaeus stands had gone to some lengths to expose chronological absurdities in the philosophers and in Plato in particular, as emerges at 5.215c-218c. Much is made of the chronological impossibility of having ‘Protagoras’ refer to the Agrioi of the comic poet Pherecrates that was produced in 420 (518d), and the attack on the chronological inconsistencies of the Gorgias contrasts the reference to Archelaus at 470d-471d and the alleged reference to Socrates’ office in 406 at 473e with the date just after the death of Pericles suggested by 503c. Though this tradition seemed to be based on an extensive knowledge of performance-dates, no reference is made to any performance date for the Antiope—a better known play—in spite of the fact that a post-412 date would also have clashed with 503c. One may most easily explain the omission by demanding that the Antiope should have been already performed in the mid-420s. Perhaps, then, the rate of resolved feet in the Antiope is not misleading us, and it is the scholiast or the textual corruption of his original marginal note that is at fault. The balance of the evidence, I would maintain, points us in that direction.

Before we leave the date of the Antiope, however, one should offer a response to a possible objection. Whereas I may have offered one seemingly attractive context for the worries about intellectuals that occur in this play, I have not yet examined
what kind of context different dates might have offered. This is not quite correct, for
we have seen that Pericles embraced intellectualism, and numbered the intellectual
music-teacher Damon among his friends.\textsuperscript{77} And we might have pointed out that
neither Nicias nor Alcibiades appear to have been seriously hampered by their
intellectual connections when the leaders for the Sicilian expedition were chosen. Nor
indeed did sophistic expertise soften the Athenian participants in the Melian Debate.

It is rather the period to which the scholiast dates the \textit{Antiope} that we must
assess for suitability, given the prominence of Antiphon of Rhamnous in the
revolution of the Four Hundred in 411. His place on the intellectual scene is evident
from Plato (\textit{Menex}. 236a) as well as from Thucydides 8.68. But there was no
plausibility in the claim that Antiphon’s intellectual activities had rendered him soft
and useless for action, and many democrats would in the end have preferred that he
had been incapacitated in this way. Again, we may seek to infer from Aristophanes’
\textit{Thesmophoriazousae} that Euripides was the victim of anti-intellectualism at this time,
but the play does not show a soft Euripides. His fellow poet Agathon might have been
soft, but for other reasons, and Euripides is depicted here as a cunning rogue. Whereas
anti-intellectualism may have been rife during this period, I find it most unlikely that
it would have taken the line that intellectual and musical activities render one soft,
indecisive, and useless for public life.

\textit{Conclusion}

My conclusion will be that the arguments with Callicles in the \textit{Gorgias}, which taken
as a whole is not necessarily committed to a single dramatic date,\textsuperscript{78} have a setting in
the 420s, probably close to the Dionysia\textsuperscript{79} of 423, and that the stylometric evidence
for the \textit{Antiope} supports that date by placing the play squarely in the context of public
concerns about the effects of intellectual activity that emerged at that time. By taking such a date seriously, and abandoning therefore the one seemingly offered by the scholiast, we are able to see much more clearly the type of anti-intellectualism infecting Athens, and to relate it with at least as much precision as could be expected to the politics of the time—at least as seen through the eyes of the intellectuals who are our sources. The underlying thread of this brand of anti-intellectualism was its belief that a variety of intellectual and cultural pursuits led to a weakening of one’s moral fibre and the inability to take decisive action on the part of either one’s household or one’s city.\(^8^0\) The subsequent actions of intellectually gifted individuals, such as Alcibiades and Antiphon, made such accusations less plausible as time went on.
References


Most obviously the funeral oration of the *Menexenus*, delivered by Socrates, continues the history of Athens for more than a decade beyond his death; more relevant to this paper, once the dramatic setting of the *Protagoras* is already firmly fixed in the late 430s, Plato has no qualms about having ‘Protagoras’ refer to Pherecrates’ play *Agrioi* (over a decade later, Athen. 5.218d) at 327d when that play provides a good illustration of what is being said. When dealing with ‘dramatic dates’ in Plato it is essential to distinguish between the core material that provides a setting and material that is present only to provide a useful illustration.

2 See Nails (2002), 326-7, for an uncharacteristically cursory treatment of the issue in which she affirms that Dodds was ‘so thorough that his discussion can well be called definitive, and his conclusion is that Plato sets the dialogue “in no particular year”.’ In other respects Professor Nails’ book has been an invaluable resource during the preparation of this paper.

3 Dodds (1959), 17-18.

4 So Nails (2002), 324-6; the *Timaeus-Critias* also becomes a problem if one insists (incorrectly) on reading them as close sequels of the *Republic* as we have it.

5 We ought unquestionably to respect its final philosophic unity, but may reasonably postulate a later date for the arguments with Callicles than for those with Gorgias and Polus; see Thesleff (1982), 66-67, who has now treated these issues more thoroughly in (2007); Thesleff postulates an early narrative dialogue that included the arguments with Gorgias and Polus, which is then superceded by a more personal ‘dramatic’ dialogue; on the ‘unpublished’ linguistic argument of Tarrant in favour of a later date for the arguments with Callicles (Thesleff at n.8) compare Tarrant (1994), 118 n.28. Since in narrative dialogues it is ordinarily the narrative itself that supplies the setting, we should notice that Thesleff’s theory would involve the stripping away of the setting of the early arguments along with the narrative. For a good illustration of how problems of consistency may arise from the revision of a work of Plato, see now Sedley (2003), ch. 1, on the *Cratylus*.

6 As Nails (2002), 427, points out, Gorgias visited in 427 and we only know of this one occasion, though other visits may possibly have been made. Olympiodorus, author of the only surviving ancient commentary on the work, assumes that the action occurred in 427 (*in Grg. proem 3*).

7 It is often suggested that 473e6-474a2, when compared with *Apol.* 32b-c, seems to suggest a dramatic date of around 405 B.C., which would indeed agree with the reference to Archelaus at 477d5;
however, the purpose of referring to an occurrence during Socrates’ period of office as a *bouleutēs* is to illustrate something about Socrates’ nature which applied throughout his life, not to fix any definite date. And it seems highly improbable that Gorgias and his pupil would have chosen to be in Athens at this time, when the city was not only in a dangerous situation but also much less wealthy than in previous times, as Aristophanes *Frogs* made apparent.

8 See Ober (1998), 191-2, for the view that the dramatic date of the *Gorgias* (taken as a whole) is simply the upheavals of the post-Periclean age, with 503c and 473e deliberately indicating dates at least twenty years apart. Such a view can only serve to question our traditional assumptions about ‘dramatic dates’.

9 *Wasps* 98; Eupolis fr. 227PCG (= 213K).

10 All dates will be B.C.E. For this date see Denyer (2001), 189; Nails (2002) gives late 433 to early 432.

11 There is also a reference to ‘the son of Cleinias’ as a *euryprōktos* in the *Acharnians* 716, suggesting an inclination towards sexual liberties, though promiscuity on Alcibiades' part would scarcely stop Socrates from thinking of himself as an *erastēs* if he wished to do so.

12 The term ‘recently’, νεότερα, serves to contrast Pericles with others of an earlier generation, Themistocles, Cimon, and Miltiades; hence it would be foolish to think that we must be dealing only with a period of months, as Dodds may seem to imply. Pericles is being offered as an example of one who did care about the inner qualities of the citizens he was leading unlike contemporary politicians, and it is in response to a request for old (*παλαίωτα*) politicians that Callicles sees fit to raise Pericles’ name. While *παλαίωτα* may here mean no more than ‘former’ (as Martin Cropp has suggested to me), there is no sense that the conversation is occurring in Pericles’ shadow.

13 I infer this from the fact that just before Socrates leaves for Thrace in 432 Andron is seen in the company of none of these other three at the house of Callias (in the *Protagoras*); hence they seem to have become close *έταιροι* only after Socrates have returned from Potidaea.

14 *Alcibiades* I, 118c; that Pericles had seen no incompatibility between the more relaxed and cultured life of the Athenians and the need to demonstrate one’s abilities in war and other pressing circumstances is evident from the Funeral Oration (Th. 2.39.1-41.1); note particularly *philosophoumen aneu malakias*, which sounds almost like a direct rebuttal of the connections between philosophy and weakness that Callicles-Zethus make. Given Thucydides’ love of contrasting Pericles and Cleon the
exact terms may owe more to Thucydides’ unhappy experience of Cleon’s politics than to Pericles, though one assumes that there is some substance in his picture of Pericles’ thought.

15 I refer of course to Thuc. 3.37-38.

16 Such softness includes surrender to argument or pity (37.2), to indecision (37.3), and to the pleasures of listening (38.7). I consider Cleon’s speech in Thucydides of general importance for an understanding of Cleon’s stance, since the historian usually employs arguments that the Athenians were well used to hearing from their politicians, not ones purely confined to the specific debate to which they contribute.

17 It may be worth noting that this rules out Antiphon of Rhamnous, who was born around 480, even if he is the nomos-physis theorist of On Truth; however, it will not help to postulate a separate ‘Antiphon the sophist’ as the author, for no sophist could be discouraging advanced education in this way.


19 It may also be significant that Socrates had not known Agathon’s name before this, but both he and the companion to whom he narrates the story could apparently identify Andron without any trouble, presumably because he is already part of the intellectual scene.

20 It is unfortunate that we lack a reliable date for the birth of Agathon too; Nails (2002), 8-9, gives ‘after 447’, and I should be happy with 445.

21 It is possible that Plato chose to place Andron in Hippias’ company here precisely because Andron did utilize that teacher’s stock sophistic themes, including the nomos-physis contrast.

22 See Hippias Major 283b-286b.

23 See Ps.-Plut., Lives of the Ten Orators 833d-f.

24 Professor Nails mentions to me her surprise that she encountered in Plato quite a number of such opportunists (e.g. Clitophon, Anytus), switching their views in accordance with the necessities of the times, rather than being doctrinally committed to a system of government. I am reminded of Aristophanes’ jibe at Theramenes at Frogs 531-41 and 965-70. Relevant details are provided in Nails (2002), 37-38 (Anytus), 102-3 (Clitophon), and 284-7 (Theramenes).

Some caution, however, is warranted when relating the Callicles who performs the role of host in the earlier arguments (like Callias in the Protagoras) to the Callicles who seeks in a sense to surpass the visitors in the remainder.


Cropp and Fick (1985), 70 and 74-76, though Collard (2005), 269, oddly attributes to Cropp and Fick the date of 425-15; in order to explain how the date arrived at could be correct, they suggest (76) that the scholiast may have mistaken this play for the late Antigone, and any use of abbreviations in the tradition could certainly have resulted in a confusion. I have witnessed the confusion of these two titles in personal correspondence. One cannot, however, rule out other explanations, and it is just possible that the play had been re-performed for some reason. What matters here, in order to preserve a consistent context for Callicles, is that it should have been first performed in the 420s.

Hall (2007), 264, offers a timely reminder that after the Medea if 431 B.C. only eight extant tragedies in all, six of them by Euripides, can securely be dated. However, the incidence of resolved feet does offer a reasonably satisfying account of Euripides’ development. This applies for the most part even to the fragmentary plays.

It is interesting to contrast Socrates’ claim to be the only real practising politician at 521d with his more characteristic statement that he is not one of the politicians at 473e6 during the arguments with Polus; so here too there appears to be a telling inconsistency between the two parts of the dialogue.

At the risk of seeming to argue here for a late date, I note that this conforms with the demand for a tragedian who will save the city found at Frogs 1417-50, and with the claims of ‘Euripides’ to be a genuine social engineer working in the interests of democracy, 939-61.

For Socrates walls, harbours and dockyards have no meaning without the qualities of soul that his own music promotes, 519a.

My reading differs from that of Nightingale (1995), 77-92, who sees much more tension between Platonic philosophy and Euripidean tragedy here.

See 333-4, 637-51, 1369-77; note also musical terms and/or metaphors at 318, 357.

See Dover’s classic discussion (1968) intro. lxxx-xeviii.
We are told that his more risqué work had been chosen by the newly educated (and corrupted) Pheidippides for a performance, and Pheidippides argues that his father ought to be beaten for failing to appreciate the tragedian; see 1365-79, and especially Pheidippides at 1377-8.

Fragment 392 PCG; for the frequency of coupling Euripides with Socrates in comedy see Nightingale (1995), 63. See now also Wildberg (2006).

Fragment 9 PCG.

See Sommerstein (1996), 334-5; I am not sure that classing Connus as an ‘idol of the theatre’ is quite correct, and Euripides, Cinesias, and Callipides all had more direct theatrical connections.

See Nails (2002), 212-5 for Nicias, especially for his non-aristocratic family.

On the Laches see below; it may also be relevant that ‘Nicias’ appears to have a liking for Euripidean speech at Ar. Knights 17.

See Plut. Nic. 7-8.

The Sausage-Seller at Knights 358 (whose tactics are largely to go one further than Cleon) promises dire trouble for Nicias, while it is Labes (stand-in for Laches, another military man who could be found in the company of Nicias) who suffers at the hands of the Dog (stand-in for Cleon) at Wasps 894-930.

See here Spence (1995), for a defence of Thucydides on this issue.

See Nic. 6; note the presence of the sophistic music-teacher Damon in Plutarch’s list of those who had suffered from this prejudice, along with Pericles (in his last days), with whom he was associated; the remaining two are Antiphon and Paches (general in 427). The objects of the people’s suspicions are described here as those who have ability in debate (ἐν λόγῳ) and are exceptional in thinking (τῶν ἰδεῶν), while two other terms used here are δεξιότης and φρόνημα. This language is immediately suggestive of the intellectuals in Clouds and elsewhere. So Nicias is represented as having to find ways to avoid a reputation for tricky speaking and tricky thinking, and hence as adopting a policy of avoiding risks and claiming minimal personal credit for his successes. This means that Nicias recognized himself as at least a potential target of intellectualism. Note also that the trends mentioned apply to the fining of Pericles at the end of his life (cf. Th. 2.65.3), to Paches’ suicide after his success in 427, and to the formative stage of Nicias’ career, as well as to an unspecified period of Antiphon’s unpopularity and to the problematic ostracism of Damon. The least that can be said is that it was reportedly current for some years after the waning of Periclean power.
See the parabasis of the extant *Clouds*, 520-27, and also that of *Wasps* 1036-50.

One thing that Cleon shared with Callicles is a complex relationship with the people; at *Knights* 732 Cleon is referred to as the lover of the Demus, something that Connor (1992, 96-8) believes may reflect his own professions to be their lover in a less concrete sense; Callicles is treated by Plato as a lover of both Demus and the demos, 481d, with the latter ‘love’ being in need of considerable explanation, as Kamtekar (2005) shows. She believes that this explanation involves Callicles’ own assimilation to the people.

On *El.* 295 see Slater (2003); the play is dated 420/19 by Cropp (1988).

89e-95a; one might compare an even less successful contribution of ‘Philebus’ to the *Philebus*.

Nails (2002), 312, gives winter 424 as the dramatic date, which may well be correct; Socrates is not yet universally known at Athens, he concludes that he needs a teacher just as the others do, and the teacher given most prominence in the dialogue is Damon, another sophistic music teacher (180d1, 197d, 200b), but the implication is that they require somebody new, and Nicias has already been using Damon. This fits well with Socrates’ appearance as a student of Connus in Ameipsias’ *Connus* the following spring, an experience that he mentions in the *Euthydemus* (272c)—and in a sufficiently comic manner to recall Ameipsias’ play.

This at least is the dominant view today, when interpreters like to see all Platonic characters making a positive contribution to the debate; see Iain Lane’s Introduction to *Laches* in Saunders (1987); if anything it is Nicias who emerges with less credit than Laches, on which deficiency see Benitez (2000), 91-4.

See *Euthd.* 271d.

By way of contrast, Sparta is removed from the ‘map’ around which the *Laches* moves (182e-3b).

See on this Zeitlin (1993).

See here Slater (2003), who speaks of this notion that the wise are susceptible to pity as a deeply ingrained one (22-26). He finds the theme that pity leads to weakness in Cleon’s speech at Th. 3.40.2 (22), and sees Pericles’ insistence that the Athenians do not (like their opponents) dither as a result of their reasoning (2.40.3) as already a response to such popular ‘folk-wisdom’ (26). However, folk-wisdom’s suspicions do not ordinarily lead straight to anti-intellectualism in Athens, since, as
Slater (22) notes: ‘Athenians were prone to attribute to themselves pity (and also, by implication, intelligence, education, and civilization) as a national virtue.’

I emphasize that I find nothing of the language of Callicles here; Alcibiades makes no explicit claim to \textit{phasis}; what I do find interesting here is the final suggestion that the Athenians should stick to their own ways even if they are not the best, which may be linked to Cleon’s claim at 3.37.3 that a city is better off with rigid but inferior laws than it would be with toothless superior ones.

See most obviously Pl. \textit{Tht}. 153b-d for this type of theory; cf. \textit{Crat}. 411a-412c, on the etymologies of intellectual qualities and of \textit{ἀγαθόν}.

See 103, 120, 1112, 1171-4.

See also 184-6, 502-4; Strepsiades is shocked at the thought that he may come to resemble Chaerephon at 504.

See 360-3, and by implication 414-17, which must be designed to say that Strepsiades will become another Socrates; a different version of these lines known from D.L. 2.27 may have been present in the first version, but the argument is complex.

Amphion was certainly no simple musician, but a figure gifted with skills in argument that would have seemed to many to be sophistic. Certainly hearers are apt to distrust his arguments in the play, as fragment 206 reveals. The language of cleverness is particularly well represented; see fragments 186 (\textit{σοφόν}), 188.5 (\textit{τὰ κομψά ταῦτα σοφόσματα}), 200.1 (\textit{γνώμαις}) and 3 (\textit{σοφόν γὰρ ἐν βούλεμα ... ἀμαθία}), and finally 206.5 (\textit{σοφός μὲν ἄλλ ...}). It is this play that preserves the ‘Protagorean’ observation about the availability to the clever speaker of arguments on both sides of the question (fr. 189), whether it is somebody responding to Amphion’s cleverness, or Amphion himself (whose character the fragment would better suit). If Amphion did see reason to become more dynamic at some stage, then he may have wished to claim that there was in fact no inconsistency with his previous arguments.

It is possible that fr. 189 or fr. 206 could be placed in such a context.

See for the first claim fr. 186 = \textit{Grg}. 486b5; Plato shares this fear as far as the sophists are concerned, but only to the extent that they are retailing learning, which Socrates never did (\textit{Prt}. 314b1-4). See for the second fr. 187.5-6. One should not be misled by Callicles’ formal defence of pleasure as the ultimate good into supposing that he would be any more sympathetic to ‘giving into pleasure’ than Zethus. He has no time for any pleasures associated with \textit{ἀνανθρέα} (494c-e, 498b-c).
Given as Antiope (?) by Collard in Collard, Cropp and Gibert (2005), p. 280, but I find it too sophisticated to be a woman’s speech, and would rather attribute this to the chorus-leader acting as arbitrator at the agon.

For Socrates in comedy see Patzer (1994).

See for instance Zeitlin (1993), particularly 174.

See Collard in Collard, Cropp and Gilbert (2004), 268, for a balanced discussion that seems to make most of similarities with the Ion (where I find a similar suspense revolving around the delayed recognition of mother and son, followed perhaps by similar means of recognition, and ultimately by a happy ending) and with Cresphontes. On similarities with Phoenissae and Hypsipyle see below.

There is no agreement about the likely order by the supporters of the trilogy-theory; see Collard (2005), 269, and Mastronade (1994), 11-14, referred to with apparent approval by Cropp (2005), 183. To my mind it is hard to argue from extant fragments that any great stress was laid upon the differences between the brothers in the Hypsipyle; what there is here is just enough to remind the more mature members of the audience of the earlier Antiope, not the clear development of a theme from that play. Others occasionally support the view that the Phoenissae was accompanied by two different plays, Oenomaus and Chrysippus, on the basis of the tentative restoration of a corrupt hypothesis (Zeitlin [1995], 172, n. 49; against this, see Mastronade [1994], 11-14, 36-8). Overall the trilogy theory is no more than mildly attractive, and it raises deep questions about the connections that we could rightly expect between the four plays offered by the tragedians at any post-Aeschylean Dionysia.

The date of this work is usually given as somewhere in the late 420s, and Collard (1975) argued with some force for the Dionysia of 423.

Possibly one that mentioned the Hypsipyle and Phoenissae, and went on to make a plausible connection with the Antiope, leading to an inference by the later scholiast about the Antiope’s date.

(1985), 76; note that Antigone would naturally come third in any trilogy Hypsipyle, Phoenissae, Antigone, and that it would offer the opportunity to study the way that differences between a pair of sisters might impact upon the wider family.

While it is at first sight plausible that it was written around 423 but failed for some reason to be performed, the Gorgias strongly suggests an actual performance (and a high profile one) in the 420s. I should be somewhat less reluctant to consider the notion of a re-performance, probably after
some revision. Here I note that Clouds II remains recognizably the same play up until the parabasis (where the play speaks of what happened to itself earlier), but as a minimum its conclusion changed with the introduction of an arson scene. Euripides was presumably constrained to a degree in what he could change by the myth, but two tragic-sounding lines from Eubulus about the destinies of Amphion and Zethus once used to be thought the words of a deus ex machina in the Antiope before the papyrus proved otherwise. It strikes me as just conceivable that it is from the conclusion of Antiope II, now making an even more explicit connection between the music of Amphion and the culture of Athens.

75 See Cropp (1988), on Electra 295; the thought here is simply that a good education leads to the rather ambiguous quality of aidôs.
76 See Osborne (2007), 5.
77 See n. 12 and associated text.
78 I remain committed to the view that the arguments with Callicles were not part of the original Gorgias. Hence it appears to me unsurprising if Plato’s attempt to create a detailed context applies to the arguments of Callicles only. I acknowledge that Archelaus is again referred to at the close (525d1), but this is beyond the arguments with Callicles, in the myth section in which Plato attempts to tie the whole work together. By this stage it is no longer important to him that we see Callicles in a historical context, and Socrates has already affirmed at 509a that all attempts to argue against his commitment to justice have failed.
79 Normally one would have thought it certain that Euripides would have attempted to produce the play at the Dionysia, but it was also a time when Aristophanes seems to have sought out the Lenaean Festival to stage his most political plays, following his brush with Cleon; scholars who favour the theory of a trilogy, and are reluctant to cast aside the scholiast’s evidence should consider the possibility that Euripides too sought an unconventional venue if he though the play could be seen as in any sense unfavourable to Athens.
80 Particular thanks to Debra Nails and Martin Cropp who have commented on an early draft of this paper. The latter has informed me in a recent communication that he has recently recalculated the date of the Antiope on the basis of the incidence of resolved feet in iambic lines, and that if anything the new calculation would push the date back a further year. Thanks also to referees who have led me to define more accurately the purpose of this study, particularly as far as Plato is concerned.