Chrysippus wrote as if he really expected to be an active therapist of people in the throes of anger' (371). Richard Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 212, demonstrates convincingly and at length the value of Chrysippean therapy and rightly concludes that, '[i]t is on how adults can handle... universal shifts of fortune that Chrysippean therapy has so much to say'.

Despite these reservations, I think that Harris' book is an extraordinary achievement from which philosophers, classicists and all those interested in the history of ideas will benefit greatly.

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Harold Tarrant

The title is self-explanatory, and the readership fairly specialized. The goal is to put some maligned philosophers back on the map. To write a book on the Old Academy is a brave undertaking. Closely linked with this topic are several enormous questions: about what direction Plato’s thought is taking in the hiatus-avoiding dialogues; about the faithfulness of his successors to his philosophy; about the accuracy of Aristotle's representation of Plato, and the manner of his interaction with the Academy; about the origin of Arcesilaus' 'skepticism'; and about the origin of so-called Middle Platonism. The period saw debates between those who had been pupils of Plato, and pupils of those pupils, concerning the meaning of his works. It also produced in Crantor the first commentator on a work of Plato. What it failed to do was to leave us the right kind of evidence to answer such questions satisfactorily. We have tantalizing fragments often without much context, and shadowy biographical details. We have a body of texts in Cicero that purport to offer Old Academic doctrine in general, and reports of what appear to be major differences between individual Old Academics.

To write a book that looks at this period through critical and analytic eyes, examining the difficulties of reconciling the evidence, and rejecting everything that fails to stand the test, will produce a dry and unreadable book. Worse, it will produce an unhelpful one, insofar as it fails to advance the issues and approaches Platonists in an Aristotelian manner. Platonists strive not only for coherence, but for different ways of expressing messages that may be hard to express in the kind
of simple doctrinal manner that a Stoic might demand. Often dialogues continued to be written, presumably with the usual literary and dramatic aspect that could affect considerably the way in which ideas were expressed. Quite apart from such difficulties, there was no requirement that the overall stance of any of these philosophers should be fixed and free from modification. This was Plato's school, founded more on a commitment to in-depth inquiry than to any identifiable body of doctrine such as characterized the Epicureans.

A book, therefore, needs to be synthetic rather than analytic, to build a believable picture from evidence that accords with to eulogon and to pithanon rather than to avail itself of the multitude of ways that any such structure might be undermined. It may therefore attract charges of being speculative, for the answers will never be bound by iron and adamantine argument. John Dillon rightly displays little concern for such charges, being committed rather without absolute proof, and of failing to undermine. It may therefore attract charges of being speculative, than to despair of answers. It is always better to be speculative than to adopt the time-honoured and lazy method of never deviating from the received opinion without absolute proof, and of failing to recognize that the conservative view has often been arrived at on no basis at all: so that adherence to it is in fact speculation of the worst possible kind (according to the Socratic view).

Dillon will be found daring, I believe, in his understanding of the theology of Timaeus and Laws to which much of the material relates; in his willingness to accept unattributed material for individual thinkers; in his notion that the ideas were treated as thoughts of god even in the Old Academy; and perhaps in his reconstruction of Xenocrates' theology. Even so, evaluation of the evidence in a free and impartial manner, the manner which Dillon has long embraced, will find little deviation from to eulogon. I shall offer here some gentle quibbles.

Dillon's views on the first of Plato's successors, Speusippus, seemed broadly in line with his previous publications (e.g., 'Speusippus in Iamblichus', Phronesis 29 [1984], 325-332; 'Speusippus on Pleasure' in K.A. Algra et al. edd. Polyhistor: Studies in the History and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy presented to Jaap Mansfeld [Leiden: Brill, 1996], 99-114). The acceptance of the claimed Speusippean origin of chapter 4 of Iamblichus' De Communi Mathematicae Scientia is crucial for his picture of Speusippus' theory of principles, and the identification of the 'enemies of Philebus' of Philebus 44b with Speusippus contributes to the picture of his ethics. I cannot see why he doubts Diogenes Laertius' report (iv 1) that Speusippus was himself prone to pleasure (31), since Aristotle talks pointedly in EN x 1 of people who (like Speusippus) express anti-hedonist sentiments but are found to be pursuing pleasure themselves. And I feel that Tarán’s argument—that Speusippus would not, if he had thought pleasure nothing but a cessation of pain, have considered it an evil (L. Tarán, Speusippus of Athens [Leiden: Brill, 1981] 78-85)—deserved a crisper rebuttal than it receives at page 68. Aristotle himself says, in dealing with Speusippus' doctrine that freedom from pain is like a mean between two inferior extremes (EN vii 13 = F80a Tarán), that 'he would not say that the pleasure was what was bad'— imply-
ing of course that what is bad is to be in an inferior condition (from which one is recovering), not the recovery itself. A pleasure is like a convalescence, which presupposes a bad condition, so that one would prefer to avoid it altogether. But the pleasurable feeling is not what is bad about the experience, any more than the feeling of recovery is what is bad about convalescence!

I found the treatment of Xenocrates genial, and largely plausible, with slight reservations about the assumption that he was a systematizer (e.g., 98). The sources perhaps suggest this, but this may not mean that Xenocrates was unable to express himself in a confusing variety of ways in different contexts, much like Plutarch who seems attracted to his brand of Platonism. Hence the desire to iron out the wrinkles in our reports of his theology may be mistaken. The controversial case of improving upon evidence occurs at 102-107 in relation to Actius i 7.30, where Dillon proposes a lacuna, so that instead of Xenocrates having a pair of gods, Monad (Zeus, intellect, ruler of heavens) and Dyad (Mother, soul, dominant below the heavens), he has this pair (with Dyad not soul, and not ruling anywhere) plus their offspring, Athena, who is the universal soul and sublunary ruler. A lot of argument has gone into this, but I think it unnecessary. That the domination of the Monad and the Dyad, in the resultant universe, should be seen in the heavens and sublunary world respectively is hardly a problem. That the Dyad should be the universal soul is a problem if one thinks of the ordered Platonic World-Soul, but could it not be that Xenocrates has in some ways anticipated Plutarch’s primeval soul? Or his Isis (Mor. 372e-f, 374e-f, 382e), who is both substrate and soul? To credit Xenocrates with a Mother-God that is not in any sense animate, as Dillon seems to do here, would seem to create as big a problem as he tries to resolve. That he should have had a pair of divinities identified with intellect and soul, considered separately, is unsurprising in the light of Philebus 30d, where both male and female royalty are discovered in the nature of Zeus.

Dillon’s motive here may be connected with his general tendency (e.g., 169) to see the Old Academy (except Speusippus) believing in an active and a passive principle, in which the active principle is the descendent of Plato’s World-Soul and the passive principle is of a material nature. I do not think that there is much wrong with this, except that the Platonic World-Soul is as much Intellect as Soul, and the passive principle may be less literally material than supposed.

The treatment of Polemo is fuller than one might once have expected. This is due to Dillon’s acceptance of David Sedley’s thesis that Antiochus of Ascalon’s reports of the Old Academy can tell us much that is useful about this figure (‘The Origins of the Stoic God’, in M. Frede and A. Laks edd., Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath [Leiden: Brill, 2002], 41-83). This theory still needs further testing, but I suspect that it is broadly correct. On p. 169 Dillon notes that material on ποιότης in Cicero Academica i 29 relates to Theaetetus, and that suggests that material on the active and passive principles (ποιόν and πάχον) at i 24 relates to 156a. Yet he ought surely to have noted that 182a refers back to the earlier passage and appears to be suggesting an etymological link between ποιότης and ποιόν. The importance of the Theaetetus as well as the Timaeus in this system would perhaps help to explain how Arcestias’s ‘skepticism’ arose from an Old Academic background. On page 175 Theaetetus 155d-157c is once again thought influential in the description of the flux of the physical world at Acad. i 31.

‘Minor’ figures treated include Hermocrates, Heraclides, Crates, and Crantor. Arcestias features at the end, but he is not explained quite as much in terms of previous Academic developments as I should have liked. I shall have more to say on this in due course.

I have until now passed over the introductory chapter on the physical structure of the Academy and Plato’s Intellectual Legacy. This is an important part of the whole, because there is no doubt that the whole needs to be considered against this background. I agree with Dillon (16), that while Plato had ‘strong views on many subjects, it was not his purpose to leave to his successors a fixed body of doctrine which they were to defend against all comers’. In these circumstances to look only at doctrines (whether written or unwritten), and to puzzle over the way in which doctrines would seem to have changed since Plato, is to apply a methodology more appropriate to Hellenistic philosophy. For one thing, Plato conceived of his investigations as more of a cooperative project, benefiting from the input of others, so that there is nothing horrific in the well-known tale about Philip of Opus revising the Laws. Dialogues mirrored actual dialectical practices. Platonists are growing increasingly interested in the praxis of his philosophy, and it may well be that it was the praxis rather than the content that was intended to live on. Both comic writers and Aristotle preserve what can evidently be valuable evidence when handled carefully. The findings of chapter 1 are also relevant to the consideration of the lives of the principal Academics, which have generally received due consideration.

The book is sometimes less well referenced and indexed than one might have liked, so that I was occasionally misled on matters of detail. It may be unfortunate that it was too late to take into account Alain Metry, Speusippos: Zahl, Erkenntnis, Sein (Paul Haupt: Bern, Stuttgart, Wien, 2002). The work on Speusippus’ Epistle to King Philip by Tony Natoli of the University of NSW, referred to at 34n13, will appear as no. 176 of the series HISTORIA-Einzelschriften. Any defects are minor in comparison with the book’s value. It is a substantial contribution, and has certainly helped me clarify my own thinking on many of these issues.

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