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**Abstract:**

This article uses data from a study of masculinity and violence in Indonesia to examine men’s views of the police dealing with local violence. It also considers alternatives to police intervention that might be deployed to effectively address the problem of violent conflict between men in local communities. We draw on interviews with 86 Indonesian men in five cities. To achieve our analytical task we use Foucault’s theorising of the deployment of juridical and pastoral power as modes of governmentality.
Indonesian men’s perceptions of the police dealing with local violence

Introduction

After a troubled history of colonisation and authoritarian rule, Indonesia is now a full democracy whose constitution enshrines the rights and protection of its people, in part through the criminal justice system. We might expect, therefore, the nation’s police force to reflect these values in its practice, given that,

Where a government ensures citizen participation and representation, equality in the application of rule of law, protection of human rights, and transparency in governance, one can expect the police, as an extension of the state, to reflect and adhere to such values (Nalla and Mamayek, 2013: 2).

However, the formal tenets of a democratic constitution do not necessarily ensure such adherence. Indonesia has a civil law system that was subject to some reforms in the new era of democracy after 1998. However, it is claimed that “a dysfunctional legal system, symbolically headed by the limp Supreme Court, keeps the democratic rule of law in Indonesia enfeebled”. The result is continued abuse of power, corruption and lack of accountability (Davidson 2009: 301) at all levels, right down to the engagement of police with civilians.

Nalla and Mamayek (2013: 3), using various data sources, ranked 167 countries on measures of democracy including electoral processes and pluralism, political participation, political culture, civil liberties, government effectiveness and corruption control. Indonesia (a ‘flawed democracy’) ranked 60 out of 167, below India, Sri Lanka and Thailand. For Asian countries like Indonesia that were once ruled by colonial powers and/or arose from dictatorships, policing has been slow to make the transition from defence and maintenance of the established rule to service-oriented policing (Nalla and Mamayek, 2013; Nalla, 2009). Cao and Dai (2006: 72) refer to this shift as a move from “high policing” to “low policing” in their study of attitudes to the police in Taiwan. They add that,
Police matter the most in societies experiencing democratic transition, because setbacks and disappointment in the process have a tendency toward violence and extremities, and because the police institution itself needs to adapt to the new model of low policing (Cao and Dai 2006: 80-81).

This point is most relevant to the case of Indonesia.

In Indonesia, authoritarian rule for 30 years depended on the tight control of civilian society by ABRI, the military forces loyal to President Suharto. ABRI practices followed the principle of dwifungsi (dual function). In other words they served as both as a police and a military force. Following the end of the military dictatorship of President Suharto (the New Order) in 1998, ABRI ceased to exist. The functions of police and military were split in 2001 so that the military became formally responsible for defence and the police for internal security,

The National Police Act No. 2/2002 establishes the Police as an instrument of the state responsible for guarding public security and order and tasked to protect, guide, and serve the public as well as uphold the law. Law No. 2/2002 also clearly stipulates that the Police are a civilian force responsible for internal security matters (Sukma 2010: 60).

However, to return to the earlier point made by Nalla and Mamayek (2013), policing in Indonesia has been slow to make the transition from heavy-handed control of the civilian population to service-oriented practice. This is not surprising given the relevantly recent history of its original formation from an authoritarian military force. Old ways die hard, and there remains a strong culture of using or threatening violence in law enforcement. So when it comes to dealing with local violence, heavy-handed police actions can often amplify the level of conflict.

**Masculinity and Local Violence in Indonesia**
Given that is primarily men who conduct violence in Indonesia, there are surprisingly few research investigations that look at the link between masculinity and violence. In fact, studies of masculinity in Indonesia *per se* have not been numerous to date, although there are some well worthy of note (for example, Adian 2001; Clark 2010; Elmhirst 2007, Boellstorff 2004; Harjito 2002; Oetomo 2000; Sunardi 2009; Van Wichelen 2009; Wilson 2012). An even smaller number of studies have considered the link between masculinity and violence (for example, Nilan and Demartoto 2012; Nilan, Demartoto and Wibowo 2011; Wilson 2006, 2012; Elmhirst 2007; Clark 2004; Harjito 2002).

What emerges from this range of studies is a picture of masculine practice of violence organized around cultural discourses of honour, respect and hierarchy, as well as the defence of territory (see Nilan, Demartoto and Wibowo 2011; Wilson 2012). In Indonesia there is a strong cultural understanding of gender as *kodrati* – destined by God, rather than socially constructed. Many people therefore hold the view that violence is inherently part of male nature (Adian, 2001). Since men from lower socioeconomic strata are considered to be in principle much less refined, the perception is that they can explode in violence far more readily (Nilan, Demartoto and Broom, 2013 forthcoming).

It is sometimes said that Indonesia has a violent culture (Collins 2002). However, it is more accurate to say there are cultures of violent practice in Indonesia. These inhere in hierarchical relations between men, shaped and influenced by culture, tradition, history, politics and current global trends. Indonesian cultures of violence lie on a continuum from street fights to the top of the security forces (Schulte Nordholt 2002). Violence was certainly omnipresent during the troubled period of the country’s formation and its long road to full democracy (see McGregor 2009; Welsh 2009; Sidel 2007; Van Klinken 2007; Purdey 2006; Parry 2005; Bertrand 2004; Hüskens and de Jonge 2002; Sciortino and Smyth 2002; Collins 2002; Colombijn 2002; Schulte Nordholt 2002; Robinson 1995; Cribb 1991).

Colombijn (2005: 246) points out the long tradition of violence as a cultural practice in the diverse societies of archipelagic Indonesia, adding that the people (men) who carry it out do not endorse the assumption that “offensive violence is bad”. If someone is defined as an outsider to the actual
or imagined moral community then the use of violence is seen as legitimate – “ordinary people have a whole repertoire of violent behaviour” (Colombijn 2005: 252) to exercise against those deemed outsiders. A cross-national study for the World Bank (Cramer 2010: 2) reports that local cultural constructions of masculinity structure the extent to which violence is practised. In the Indonesian context, violence may thus be understood as a “cultural repertoire” through which men achieve the constitution of authority and status within a historically-mediated hierarchy of masculine power relations (Wilson 2011: 312). Sporadic fighting between men over issues of honour and territory constitutes the most common form of everyday local violence in Indonesia (Tadié 2006; Tadjoeddin and Murshed 2007; Nilan, Demartoto and Wibowo 2011).

**Policing Local Violence**

Violent incidents in Indonesia may be dealt with by either of the two police services depending on the level of conflict and severity of outcomes. The criminal police force *POLRI* has primary responsibility for arrest, detention and investigation in relation to crime. However, its officers are relatively few in number. A report by Amnesty International (2009: 38) estimates one POLRI officer for every 585 people across the country and the force is concentrated in the major cities. A separate police force – *Satpol PP* – deals just with keeping civil order. *Satpol PP* is under the control of local government and the number of personnel is higher than *POLRI*. Under their security brief they carry out identity card checks, evict street vendors, and remove residents from squatter housing (Morrell, Tuerah and Sumarto 2011: 38).

Like *POLRI* they do not shrink from using violence to carry out their operations. There is evidence of continuing corrupt police service brutality in Indonesia, especially directed at “criminal suspects living in poor and marginalized communities” (Amnesty International 2009: 11). Personnel in both police forces are trained in a military fashion but not paid well. There are often demarcation disputes between the two forces, meaning that outbreaks of violence may not be dealt with in a satisfactory way. Moreover, while corruption and bribery among police has always been a problem, it has
become even more prevalent because of the shift of decision-making power away from the capital to regional governments (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 2011: 12).

The situation in Indonesia bears comparison with India. Nalla and Madan (2012: 278) found that “police personnel in India are poorly educated and are notorious for extortion, misbehavior, and poor services to citizens”. Their policing practices are characterised by “poor training, apathy, misconduct, brutality, and corruption”. Moreover, “police are regularly faulted for torturing suspects to extract confessions and for abusing ordinary prisoners, particularly members of the lower status” (Nalla and Madan 2012: 281). Thus “corruption and police in India appear to be synonymous” (Nalla and Madan 2012: 290). This is also true in Indonesia, which is also a country in transition.

**Foucault and Governmentality**

As a conceptual tool to analyse our data we utilise the work of Michel Foucault (1983: 221) on how populations are governed; that is, ways of managing “the conduct of conduct”. We found ordinary Indonesian men had a good understanding of strategies for controlling violence in their communities. Their contrasting comments about the police (external force), and about local mediation approaches (internal guidance), resonate strongly with how Foucault described the operations of juridical and pastoral power respectively. The governed (or attempted governed) subjects here are violent men who threaten the social order of local communities, and ultimately, the Indonesian State.

Foucault was interested in the the connections between what he called technologies of domination, the constitution of human subject and state formations. He sought to interrogate governmentality, the way populations are governed both by techniques which forcibly assure coercion and processes through which the self is shaped and normalised. In line with this emphasis, Foucault (1997) drew attention to the differences between operations of juridical power (external constraint and regulation legitimated by the sovereign state), and pastoral power (the salvation, or shepherd and flock approach).
Foucault drew his model of juridical power from the age of monarchies, when sovereigns ruled by force through explicit operations of constraint, prohibition and law. A nation’s police force is a technology of government designed to achieve the effect of domination and operates within the logic of juridical power; the state-licensed use of law and force. For example, the security police are tasked by the state with the actions of removing and seizing (people and things) to create a spatial and economic landscape that benefits the interests of local government and business. Their operations exemplify the exercise of juridical power sanctioned by the sovereign state: “essentially a right of seizure: of things, time, bodies” (Foucault 1978: 136).

Pastoral power is no less a dimension of governmentality, but operates a different set of power relations,

This form of power is salvation oriented (as opposed to political power). It is obblative (as opposed to the principle of sovereignty); it is individualizing (as opposed to legal power); it is coextensive and continuous with life; it is linked with a production of truth - the truth of the individual himself (Foucault 1983: 213).

In other words, operations of pastoral power attempt to get the individual to change voluntarily, to willingly become a better person in the moral sense. The discourse of pastoral power for maintaining order is represented in Indonesia by community mediation, which uses surveillance, counselling and religious affect to reshape offenders so they come to exist in greater harmony with others. It can be argued that the pastoral power approach is exemplified in the traditional principle of gotong royong. With reference to the work of Clifford Geertz (1983), it has been claimed that gotong royong - “a core tenet of Indonesian philosophy meaning mutual aid or joint bearing of burdens” is a widespread “modality” of social healing in Indonesian communities (Braithwaite 2010: 63).

**Methodology**
For the project on masculinity and violence in Indonesia, semi-structured interviews were conducted by male Indonesian research assistants, in the Indonesian language, with 86 men in the cities of Jakarta, Solo, Pekanbaru, Makassar and Mataram. Men were recruited in these five cities using a snowballing approach. Interviewees were aged between 17 and 67. Most were employed. Occupations ranged from local government ministers to transport drivers and security guards. The interviews lasted between 45 and 60 minutes and were transcribed and coded in Indonesian. The first and second authors translated exemplary quotes into English.

One interview question asked:

_Bisakah anda ceritakan tentang pengalaman anda sehubungan dengan peran polisi dalam mencegah kekerasan?_  
Can you tell me about your experiences in relation to the role of police in preventing violence?

A later question invited an open response about reducing local violence,

_Menurut anda, strategi seperti apa yang bisa efektif dalam mengurangi kekerasan di lingkungan anda?_  
In your opinion, what kind of strategies can be effective in reducing violence in your neighbourhood?

Responses to these two questions are compared in this article because even though they were framed differently in interview, both pertain to the deeper issue of addressing the problem of violence.

Men's Involvement in Local Violence

The most common reported incident of violence was a fight between local men, even there were also accounts of mass riots and extreme violence such as mob hanging. Yet most of the men interviewed did not talk about their own involvement in fights. They preferred to talk about men they knew, or violent
incidents they had witnessed. Analytical comments were commonly made by better-educated men, for example,

Those who do not have work have nothing to do and they become very sensitive about that, about the social gap between themselves and others. So in my opinion, if such men carry out violence then they are pushing the boundaries - maintaining their self-esteem (J4, 45, Public Servant, married, Muslim, Jakarta, August 7, 2010).

Occasionally a manual worker offered a similar critical view but probably from closer at hand, for example,

Unemployment makes them stressed because they can’t get work. So they just sit around in a group drinking, with nothing to do. They become very emotional. A man can see his neighbor working and he asks how come you aren’t unemployed? (S12, 21, Factory Worker, unmarried, Muslim, Solo, July 27, 2009).

One of the ex-prisoners offered an insightful view into male cultures where violence is commonplace, perhaps implying his own situation,

A guy like that is accustomed to behaving that way. The first cause is hard difficulty in his life, such as no money, little education. That forms a hard character early on. So he always feels like he has nothing, and violence is the main way of getting satisfaction (J2, 40, Ex-prisoner, married, Muslim, Jakarta, August 12, 2010).

A different perspective was perhaps inevitably expressed by the policemen we interviewed, for example,

Around here there are certain kinds of men who become street thugs. They most often get involved in violence because they feel they have the authority to control a certain territory, for example the market. Such men are solidly built, they look really fierce, many of them have tattoos and
piercings. The main reason they conduct violence and practice intimidation is so that they will be feared in the local area (R21, 34, Policeman, married, Muslim, Pekanbaru, 3 September, 2010).

Presumably the policeman speaking here must deal with such violent men on occasions. Perhaps he remembers how “fierce” they look, and how much they are “feared”.

**Men’s Views of the Police**

The men we interviewed referred to members of both forces as *polisi* (police), usually without distinguishing between them. Except for a few interviewees who were themselves members of *POLRI, Satpol PP* or the military, interviewees were disdainful of how the police dealt with local violence between men. Positive appraisals were rare, although a student said, “once a week the police come and monitor public activities here. As a result the place is safer and more secure” (SI, 24, University Student, unmarried, Muslim, Solo, 24 July, 2009). A similar sentiment was expressed by an office clerk,

> Usually the criminal police regularly raid the thugs. The civil forces raid the thugs too. Which is good because it diminishes the level of violence (R1, 40, Private Sector Clerk, married, Muslim, Pekanbaru, 3 August 2010).

In Mataram city there was one positive mention of the police getting tough on crime: “police often come down on local conflicts. That can impact where there is intense conflict” (MT4, 30, political activist, Muslim, unmarried, Mataram, 18 June 2010).

For the most part though the men offered negative appraisals of police attempts to deal with violence, for example:

> For preventing violence the police are really ineffective. Take for example what happened in Makassar CBD, the police were part of the
violence that took place (MK9, 32, political party activist, married, Muslim, Makassar, 23 June, 2010).

This comment indicates the police inflamed the violence rather than reducing it.

Elsewhere there was suspicion and fear, even hatred, of the police because of violence. A man recently released from prison described why he was arrested,

I was sentenced under Article 170 (Group Violence against a Person or Property). It was the same gang I was involved with. We beat up a member of the security forces. The reason we were forced to attack him was because he treated me so cruelly. Yeah sure he was a member of the security forces, and I had done wrong. Fine. OK. Slap me around a bit. But no. He crept up without warning and kicked me furiously. Slowly, after a few days, I felt I could not put up with it, I mean the arrogance of that policeman! (J2, 40, Ex-prisoner, married, Muslim, Jakarta, August 12, 2010).

Others also deplored police brutality, for example, “illegal stall-holders were dragged away by the security police in a very cruel way” (S10, 20, university student, unmarried, Muslim, Solo, 27 July, 2009). One man was outraged by treatment of young offenders:

I have seen the police beat up a young drug addict. I absolutely did not agree with what they did. I really couldn’t stand it even though I hate illegal drugs. Yes OK, put him in a cell, but don’t treat him like that, in that harsh way (S7, 50, local Golkar secretary, married, Muslim, Solo, 28 July, 2009).

Interviewees also alluded to police corruption, for example, “not involving the police means avoiding the trouble they make and the local politics too, which inevitably comes back to money having to be paid, so avoid the police as much as you can” (J1, 30, traditional martial arts teacher,
unmarried, Muslim, Jakarta, 5 August, 2010). Others said the police were too slow to respond, for example, “up until now the police have been very slow in dealing with violence” (R17, 31, teacher, Married, Muslim, Pekanbaru, 10 August, 2010), and “they only show up after the action is over, like the police in Bollywood movies” (J17, 36, factory worker, married, Muslim, Jakarta, 4 August, 2010). In short, the men gave negative accounts of the police addressing the problem of violent conflicts between men in their own communities.

**Community Approaches**

When asked the open interview question about strategies that might be effective in reducing violence in their neighbourhoods, the majority made mention of community mediation, or approaches that involved some personal negotiation and guidance. Overall, these accounts were positive. One man said “our local community offers us guidance so we can resolve violent conflicts in a private way so they don’t become criminal” (R19, 41, market trader, married, Muslim, Pekanbaru, 9 August, 2010). In Mataram one man advised “if there’s an ongoing problem we have to resolve it like a family, within the family” (MT6, 45, military district head, Muslim, married, Mataram, 26 June 2010). Even in fast-paced cosmopolitan Jakarta, the community-based approach was still favoured: “usually if there is a local conflict, we try and resolve in a family, consensus way” (J19, 26, journalist, unmarried, Muslim, Jakarta, 4 August, 2010). The following comment from a security police officer indicates widespread endorsement of the community mediation approach as the first option,

If a man has been injured in violence, or is the victim of violence then he will report it to the head man. There are procedures to follow and he must report it to that head man first. It is really up to him as to how he calms the situation and reconciles the warring parties. First of all he will try to deal with it using a family-oriented approach (MK2, 38, security police, married, Muslim, Makassar, 25 June, 2010).
As we see here, the local head man was most frequently named as the senior figure who conducts community mediation,

The head of the neighbourhood organisation must get the perpetrators together and talk to them, meet them early and just talk to them (J8, 52, factory worker, married, Muslim, Jakarta, 5 August, 2010).

In fact, this is part of his job as head man and he is tasked with this responsibility by the state. We noted that while several interviewees praised the father-like figure of the head man who works with offending men so that they want to change their ways, others implied that mediation attempts led by the head man are sometimes ineffectual,

All the neighbourhood organisation leaders [head men] do is offer mediation. Their efforts are not successful and do not resolve the conflicts (S8, 50, PDIP party activist, unmarried, Muslim, Solo, 5 August, 2009).

In other words, doubts were expressed about the effectiveness of community mediation. It emerged that in some cases there were suspicions about the vested interests of those charged to carry it out. For example, some interview accounts in our study mentioned the violent actions of neighbourhood security patrols charged by the head man with keeping order in the community, “our patrol does use violent means from time to time, whether on the orders of the neighbourhood leader or whatever” (R19, 41, market trader, married, Muslim, Pekanbaru, 9 August, 2010). In other words, like the police, sometimes the head man is part of the circular problem of local violence. A man from Makassar implied the involvement of the head man in extortion activities. Describing how a group of young men stopped annoying their own community, he concluded:

In the end they stopped getting drunk every night in front of the local neighbourhood patrol post. Just by chance the command post is in front of the house of the head man. They don’t drink there any more because
they are no longer involved in extortion for him (MK9, 32, political party activist, married, Muslim, Makassar, 23 June, 2010).

In summary, community-based mediation approaches were implied as only as good as the head men who conduct them, given that head men operate at the lowest level of the state-sanctioned authority system. In that sense, this is not a purely pastoral approach because it depends upon the sovereign power of the state to confer on the head man power to adjudicate. Like the police, the community mediation approach is open to abuse by the men entrusted to deal with outbreaks of violence. Yet overall in the interviews there was still far more support for this “pastoral” approach.

Religious Leaders

While a few interviewees mentioned that religious differences or fanaticism could provoke conflict, most emphasis was on religious leaders as effective mediators of violence, for example:

We try and handle the problem of violence by resolving it through mediation. For resolving the problem of ongoing conflict in the long term, usually that happens at the neighbourhood level with local leaders and religious authorities (J1, 30, traditional martial arts enthusiast, unmarried, Muslim, Jakarta, 5 August, 2010).

There were two broad themes in the accounts of how religious leaders could calm local violence between men. The first was guidance, for example: “the best strategy for reducing violence is routine counselling for men like that with a religious theme of ethics and morality” (SI, 24, university student, unmarried, Muslim, Solo, 24 July, 2009). Another man from Solo described an inclusive, consensus approach of working through the mosque:

We have a community organisation of men that meets together when we go to the mosque. In the discussion all men are able to say what they want and we can discuss it in a good way. In those discussions violent
men become aware that they can be very beneficial for the community and that we do not exclude them (S12, 21, factory worker, unmarried, Muslim, Solo, 27 July, 2009).

Religious leaders can use their symbolic authority to reduce violence: “the local religious leaders must set an example. If there is violence then they should take the role of mediators, and be firm in separating the two warring parties” (R17, 31, teacher, married, Muslim, Pekanbaru, 10 August, 2010). There was wide agreement in all five cities about the value of mediation by religious leaders because of the high esteem in which they are held, for example:

After a local gang war erupted, there was a preacher or religious leader who gave a talk or mediated. I think they are more readily listened to because religion has a real force and significance in everyday life (MK7, 30, policeman, married, Muslim, Makassar, 19 June 2010).

The second theme in accounts of how religious leaders might mediate with violent men was to directly instruct them. Strategies included Koranic recitation, Bible reading and religious education: “we … need to raise the level of religious education” (R2, 22, public order officer, single, Muslim, interviewed, Pekanbaru, 6 August, 2010). Religious education was thought to inculcate values of peace, tolerance and forbearance in men,

Sometimes there is some preaching on the issue that happens through the mosque, through invitation. Invitation to speak must go to the office of the head man or to the mosque. They are asked to give counselling to the community on reducing violence (R19, 41, market trader, married, Muslim, Pekanbaru, 9 August, 2010).

However, although there was broad agreement about the value of religious intervention in moderating male violence, some qualifying statements were made. For example, one participant admitted that “sometimes violent local incidents are ignored by those same [religious] leaders” (J12, 23, youth
group member, unmarried, Muslim, Jakarta, 11 August, 2010). Leaders of troublesome local gangs can readily ignore the peace-making efforts of religious leaders, for example:

Those who try to resolve the violence locally are the heads of the neighbourhood and district organisations. They try and bring the bosses of the rival groups into mediation with each other. Religious authorities also try and do that but the results are usually unsatisfactory (J2, 40, ex-prisoner, married, Muslim, Jakarta, 12 August, 2010).

In summary, intervention by religious leaders was often emphasised as important, but not much information was given about precisely how meeting with religious leaders and receiving instruction would actually curb local violence between men. It may be that interviewee explanations on this matter shaded implicitly into the work of local Sharia courts, which also on occasion deal with incidences of violence.

Discussion

Since full constitutional democracy was attained in 2004, Indonesia has experienced strong economic growth and the government has been attempting to implement a stronger rule of law, clean up urban slums, and reduce civil violence (Morrell, Tuerah and Sumarto 2011). The serious crime rate appears to have fallen. Braithwaite (2010: 54) claims the recent Indonesian homicide rate of “probably around 1 per 100,000 is lower than that in most continental European and Anglo Saxon societies, as is the imprisonment rate of 45 per 100,000” (Braithwaite 2010: 54). In short it would seem that “the decline in violence has been remarkably sharp” (Braithwaite 2010: 54). Nonetheless, there is still a problem of low-level everyday conflict in urban areas. Policing initiatives have tried to address male inter-group and inter-personal violence occurring in local communities. This has been hampered by relatively low numbers of police, low pay, and a residual culture of violence and corruption.

The men we interviewed were primarily negative towards the direct
deployment of juridical power through police intervention. It seems the police are not trusted to effectively manage violent situations. Specifically, they are seen as too few in number, too violent, too corrupt and prone to arriving late. Moreover, it was implied that the police can actually increase the level and intensity of local violence. The Indonesian police force carries arms and is regularly reported to use coercion and violence. The interviews indicate that they exercise their mandate to seize, investigate, detain and arrest in relation to disorderly conduct and crime. These technologies of power, as it were, “determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject” (Foucault 1988: 18). The ordinary men who were interviewed mostly feared the police and were dismayed by the dehumanizing attitudes that might be demonstrated towards themselves and other men. In the Indonesian situation arbitrary rough treatment by state security services symbolically renders local men as outsiders (see Colombijn 2005); objectifying and therefore humiliating them.

Interviewees offered the strategy of community mediation as their favoured approach. It was implied as a mutually beneficial means of resolving conflict, especially if religious input was included. A report on justice in Indonesian villages found that “villagers and village leaders preferred to resolve disputes informally” (Woodhouse and Stephens, 2004: iv). Advantages included speed of resolution, preserving group solidarity and fear of external repercussions. It is probable that since most of the men had experienced (or committed) some form of violence themselves, comments on community mediation imply how they and their friends would prefer to be dealt with, as insiders, not outsiders. While the juridical logic of heavy-handed policing works on the logic of punishment and retribution, the community approach encodes the distinctive cultural understanding (also found in China) that men who conduct violence are “treatable”, that offenders can be “deterred” from violent crime and that change can come from education/socialisation (Lambert and Jiang 2006: 40).

The men’s accounts indicate the community mediation approach is admirable in principle because it is inclusive, treating offenders as members of the community; not as outsiders to be treated with force but insiders in need of fatherly and brotherly correction. This resonates with Foucault’s
model of pastoral power in that “the shepherd” assumes responsibility for “the whole flock” (Foucault, 1994: 308). Pastoral power in practice works on the individual, tying them to their own identity through increasing self-knowledge and bringing them back into the “flock” - so as to speak - through self-transformation to better match community norms.

However, it was clear that the head man of a local community is not always someone who can be trusted despite his state-sanctioned role in providing pastoral guidance. The position of the head man was entrenched during the New Order since he carried government authority at the lowest administrative level – the desa (village) or kampung (neighbourhood). Under Dutch colonial rule the head man was elected for life and it was only in 1979 that this was reduced to a maximum of two eight-year terms (Sidel 2004). In that sense then, while the head man holds responsibility for taking an ostensibly pastoral approach to controlling local violence, he does so under the auspices of the sovereign power of the state.

Foucault (2003) suggests that the basis of a relationship of power lies in struggle between vying forces for control of discourse. That is, “the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized” (Foucault 1984: 110). In the Indonesian context the head man is tasked with maintaining local order, and he is paid a sum of money to accomplish it. So he is legitimised in his role by the sovereign power of the state to control the local discourse of violence, and who gets to commit it, even as he might attempt to calm matters between rival gangs in the neighbourhood. In that sense then, the mediation role of the head man may be less an example of pastoral power in operation, and more an instance of “soft policing” at best. At worst, the head man may control the exercise of violence in the community to further his own interests, criminal gang interests, or the interests of a political party to which he owes allegiance.

In Foucault’s (1994) framing, pastoral power resembles the shepherd caring for his flock, keeping it in order and together through guidance and instruction. The pastoral power of the clergy in the medieval church inhered in moral surveillance, personal knowledge of the individual and the community, and the project of salvation. This framing of pastoral power closely resembles the position of the local religious leader in Indonesian communities. There
were very few comments that challenged the view that religious leaders could change the path of violent men.

The idealised role of the religious leader in community mediation to reduce violence and normalise offenders does seem to better match Foucault’s framing of pastoral power in operation. There is a historical precedent here. In giving account of Indonesia’s transition to greater peace post-2004, Braithwaite (2010: 52) praises the ‘remarkable accomplishments of reintegration of combatants from organizations like Laskar Jihad, in which religious leaders showed great leadership for peace’. As the example demonstrates, through the intervention of the powerful local figure of the religious leader, curative “technologies of the self” Foucault (1988: 18) are provided to violent men through religious discourse. Yet there is still a subtle repertoire of violence deployed in religious intervention which some disorderly men might repudiate since becoming morally orderly could be seen to serve someone else’s interests rather than their own (see Guinness 2009).

However, even here religious leaders might encourage some forms of male violence to flourish, while condemning or morally sanctioning other men who engage in fighting. Notably, as Dhume (2008) and Brown and Wilson (2007) both point out, Muslim leaders are sometimes reluctant to condemn, or intervene in, violence ostensibly carried out in the name of Islam. Finally, the problem of corruption kept coming up. ‘Corruption is still a very large problem in Indonesia’ (Braithwaite 2010: 54), although efforts have been made to tackle it.

Conclusion

In our consideration of data from ordinary men in Indonesia about reducing violence between men in local neighbourhoods, we have implied that the two sets of interviewee responses refer to what Foucault termed juridical power and pastoral power respectively. In broad terms, the men had little faith in the police and feared their intervention. Their examples of police provocation, corruption and brutality point to the objectivising and dehumanising practices of police. In contrast they enthusiastically offered the pastoral model of mediation and consensus as an effective strategy for curbing the behaviour of
violent men in the community. Yet even here, many qualified their own assertions, pointing to the head man and even sometimes religious leaders as possibly not trustworthy due to vested interests.

Although a binary division or opposition between juridical and pastoral power models of governing and correcting violent men has been suggested, in fact the two represent dovetailed, complementary levels of intervention and control. As several informants implied, they represent graduated measures for dealing with different levels of violence. Minor violence between men in communities can be dealt with by the community through a mediation approach. The more serious the violence, the greater the likelihood of the police and security services being involved.

From another angle, the insider/outsider dichotomy argued by Colombijn (2005) allows us to see that the category of outsider is identified with control through a juridical model of power exercised by police. Their blunt and brutal technologies of detention and punishment objectify male offenders as outsiders. Conversely, the category of insider (legitimate community member) is constituted by the humane deployment of the pastoral approach. It is only when the man or men carry out unacceptable forms of violence, and thereby act outside community norms, that it is seen as appropriate for them to be dealt with by external agents of control. The question of community norms though, is a moot point, because it takes us back to the authority figures of the head man and religious leaders, who may or may not act in the interests of harmony and order.

It seems the paradigm of juridical power exemplified in the sovereign practices of the New Order regime has left a residue of force, coercion and corruption that can manifest even in the “soft” pastoral approach of community mediation. The local head man and religious leader do not sit separate from the powerful hierarchies of government (in the broadest sense) and the sanctions and rewards that inhere in those structures.

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Indonesian men’s perceptions of the police dealing with local violence

Argyo Demartoto
Lecturer in Sociology, Department of Sociology
Universitas Sebelas Maret
Solo, Indonesia
argyodemartoto@ymail.com

Pam Nilan (corresponding author)
Professor of Sociology, School of Humanities and Social Science
University of Newcastle
Australia
Pamela.Nilan@newcastle.edu.au

Alex Broom
Associate Professor of Sociology, School of Social Sciences
University of Queensland
St Lucia, NSW Australia
a.broom@uq.edu.au

John Germov
Professor of Sociology, School of Humanities and Social Science
University of Newcastle
Australia
John.Germov@newcastle.edu.au