Defamation and Vilification: Rights to Reputation, Free Speech and Freedom of Religion at Common Law and under Human Rights Laws

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Laws prohibiting religious vilification (or religious ‘hate speech’) are controversial and often criticised. On the one hand, it seems obviously wrong that someone should be insulted and humiliated on the basis of his or her religious commitments. But how far should the law go in putting controls on freedom of speech? Critics charge that religious vilification laws amount to an undue restriction of freedom of speech, and in fact may generate, rather than reduce, acrimonious religious debate in multicultural and multi-faith societies.

This chapter is sympathetic to those critiques. But the particular angle it addresses is this: are religious vilification laws really necessary? The common law has dealt with verbal attacks on others for many years through the law of the tort of defamation. I suggest that many of the aims of those who propose religious vilification laws can be met by noting the remedies that are available under the ordinary law of defamation. In addition, I suggest that some of the concerns raised by opponents of the laws are met by the various defences and qualifications that have developed in the defamation area.

This chapter serves as a preliminary study, but I hope that it may at least open the way for further research on a topic that will become increasingly contentious. At the very least, I hope that the chapter illustrates that the adoption of further protection for human rights in Australia, including for freedom of religion, does not assume
the adoption of religious vilification laws, and indeed, may be a further reason not to introduce such laws.¹

**Overview of laws on religious vilification**

There are now a number of important overviews of the developing law of ‘religious vilification’ or ‘religious hate speech’, to which this chapter is indebted.² Here, I offer a brief summary. Gerber and Stone offer a good working definition of the type of law at issue here, sometimes referred to as ‘hate speech’:

> Hate speech is speech or expression which is capable of instilling or inciting hatred of, or prejudice towards, a person or group of people on a specified ground …³

In particular, religious vilification laws aim to prohibit certain types of speech, which attack others based on their religion.

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³ Gelber and Stone, above n 2, xiii.
In Australia, three jurisdictions have introduced such laws: Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria.4 There is an important ‘defence’ provision in the Victorian legislation:

11. Exceptions-public conduct

(1) A person does not contravene section 7 or 8 if the person establishes that the person’s conduct was engaged in reasonably and in good faith-

(a) in the performance, exhibition or distribution of an artistic work; or

(b) in the course of any statement, publication, discussion or debate made or held, or any other conduct engaged in, for—

(i) any genuine academic, artistic, religious or scientific purpose; or

(ii) any purpose that is in the public interest; or

(c) in making or publishing a fair and accurate report of any event or matter of public interest.

(2) For the purpose of subsection (1)(b)(i), a religious purpose includes, but is not limited to, conveying or teaching a religion or proselytising.5

In *Deen v Lamb* [2001] QADT 20, publication of a pamphlet inferring that all Muslims were obliged to disobey the law of Australia, which would otherwise have contravened the section, was said to have been allowable under the exception in s 124A(2)(c) as it was done ‘in good faith’ for political purposes.

The most controversial application of these laws so far, however, was in the litigation involving the ‘Catch the Fire’ organisation.6 McNamara, Ahdar, Blake and Parkinson all offer cogent critiques of the way that the original decision finding the organisation guilty of vilification was made, and comment on the overturning of the decision by the Victorian Court of Appeal.7 A brief summary, however, may be appropriate.

The original decision was *Islamic Council of Victoria v Catch the Fire Ministries Inc* [2004] VCAT 2510. In short, a Christian religious group advertised to a Christian

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4 See for an overview McNamara, above n 2, 146. The provisions are the *Anti-Discrimination Act 1991* (Qld) s 124A, the *Anti-Discrimination Act 1998* (Tas) ss 19, 55, and s 8 of the *Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001* (Vic).

5 Ss (2) was added to the Act in 2006 partly in response to the *Catch the Fire* litigation discussed below.

6 See also the other main case decided under the Victorian provisions, *Fletcher v Salvation Army Australia* [2005] VCAT 1523 (discussed in Blake, above n 2, 396–7).

7 See the articles noted in above n 2.
audience that it was proposing to run a seminar that would critique Islam and help its listeners understand how to reach out to Muslims. Representatives of the Islamic Council of Victoria knew the nature of the seminar, chose to attend, and then took action against the group on the basis of statements that were made critiquing Islam. While some untrue and unhelpful statements may have been made in the course of the lengthy seminar (and in some related material published on a website), most of the comments made were sourced from multiple Islamic authors. Initially, the court found the pastors involved to be guilty of vilification and ordered them to publish retractions. On appeal the Victorian Court of Appeal in *Catch the Fire Ministries Inc & Ors v Islamic Council of Victoria Inc* [2006] VSCA 284 overturned the Tribunal's findings of vilification. The matter was referred back to the Tribunal, but the parties entered into a settlement of the proceedings that affirmed their mutual right to 'criticise the religious beliefs of another, in a free, open and democratic society'.

Nettle JA, in particular, in the Court of Appeal noted that the Tribunal had failed to distinguish between criticisms of the *doctrines* of Islam and 'incitement to hatred' of persons:

s.8 does not prohibit statements about religious beliefs per se or even statements which are critical or destructive of religious beliefs. Nor does it prohibit statements concerning the religious beliefs of a person or group of persons simply because they may offend or insult the person or group of persons. The proscription is limited to that which incites hatred or other relevant emotion and s.8 must be applied so as to give it that effect.

While to some extent the decision of the Court of Appeal draws an appropriate line, the fact remains that the Victorian legislation seems to have been used in a way unintended by the framers of the legislation. In general it seems far preferable for debate about religion to be 'untrammelled' by fear of legal intervention.

The UK has also introduced legislation prohibiting religious vilification. There, the *Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006* (UK) added Part 3A to the *Public Order Act 1986* (headed 'Hatred against persons on religious grounds'), which now prohibits what in Australia would be called 'religious vilification'. Consistent with the comments of Nettle JA above, the UK prohibition on stirring up 'religious hatred'

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8 See, eg, the summary in Ahdar, above n 2, 305.
9 [2006] VSCA 284, [15].
10 And Ahdar, above n 2, in his perceptive analysis of the judgments in the Court of Appeal, points out how many uncertainties still remain, due not least to failure to agree on some issues among the judges in the Court of Appeal.
can only be breached by acts that stir up hatred against believers, rather than by attacks on beliefs.11

Addison, in a very useful study of the UK law, sums up the history of these provisions.12 He notes that the offences apply to words that are ‘threatening’ (not simply insulting or abusive, as commentators had suggested about a previous version of the legislation), and that the offender has to ‘intend’ to stir up religious hatred. Interestingly, he notes that the Government’s original proposals to make the offences wider were partly defeated in the House of Lords because of concerns that the UK law would end up like the law in Victoria that gave rise to the Catch the Fire litigation.13

In addition, there is a general provision protecting freedom of speech in s 29J of the Public Order Act 1986:

**29J Protection of freedom of expression**

Nothing in this Part shall be read or given effect in a way which prohibits or restricts discussion, criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular religions or the beliefs or practices of their adherents, or of any other belief system or the beliefs or practices of its adherents, or proselytising or urging adherents of a different religion or belief system to cease practising their religion or belief system.

This is a vital safeguard if this sort of legislation is to be introduced. It recognises among other things the importance of freedom of speech and freedom of religion, and the right noted under Art 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), ‘freedom to change his religion or belief’ (as freedom to change clearly involves the freedom to hear the arguments for change).

**Problems with religious vilification laws**

The commentators previously cited have also noted the problems with such laws. Perhaps the most obvious and major problem is that these provisions amount to a severe restriction on freedom of speech. The right of freedom of speech, of course, is a right protected by international human rights instruments such as the UDHR, Art 19. But it is perhaps not so commonly noticed that, even in a jurisdiction such as Australia where there is currently no formal, broad-reaching protection of freedom of speech, the courts have regularly noted that the common law itself provides such a protection as a fundamental value.

13. Addison, above n 12, 140.
In the High Court of Australia decision in *Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill* (2006) 227 CLR 57, the Court was wrestling with, among other things, the right of a person who was a convicted prisoner to prevent the broadcast of allegations that he had committed other crimes. In refusing to authorise the ‘prior restraint’ of publication, the majority in the High Court referred to the ‘public interest in free communication of information and opinion’.14

Another example of the strength of the common law protection of freedom of speech is in the litigation generated by the ‘World Youth Day’ event in Sydney in 2008. In *Evans v NSW* [2008] FCAFC 130 a major ground for overturning restrictive regulations that had prohibited the ‘annoying’ of WYD participants was that they interfered (without explicit Parliamentary authority) with the fundamental common law right of freedom of speech.

In the Full Court of the Federal Court French, Branson and Stone JJ commented:


> In its 1988 decision in *Davis v Commonwealth* (1988) 166 CLR 79, the High Court applied a principle supporting freedom of expression to the process of constitutional characterisation of a Commonwealth law. … In their joint judgment Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ (Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ agreeing) said (at 100):

> Here the framework of regulation … reaches far beyond the legitimate objects sought to be achieved and impinges on freedom of expression by enabling the Authority to regulate the use of common expressions and by making unauthorised use a criminal offence. Although the statutory regime may be related to a constitutionally legitimate end, the provisions in question reach too far. This extraordinary intrusion into freedom of expression is not reasonably and appropriately adapted to achieve the ends that lie within the limits of constitutional power …

> The present case is not about characterisation of a law for the purpose of assessing its validity under the Constitution of the Commonwealth. The judgments in *Davis* 166 CLR 79 however support the general proposition that freedom of expression in Australia is a powerful consideration favouring restraint in the construction of broad statutory power when the terms in which that power is conferred so allow.15 [emphases added]

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15 *Evans v NSW* [2008] FCAFC 130, [74–8].
The evidence in that case disclosed that Evans and other members of the public were planning to demonstrate against what they perceived to be bad policies and doctrines taught by the Roman Catholic Church. The challenged regulations would have restricted their right to do so by requiring them not to ‘annoy’ participants. The Federal Court held that these regulations should be struck down on the principle that the head legislation enacted by the NSW Parliament should not be interpreted, in the absence of express words, as allowing regulations to be made which interfered with this fundamental common law right.

The Court also incidentally referred to the fact that ‘another important freedom generally accepted in Australian society is freedom of religious belief and expression’, supporting this by reference to the general terms of s 116 of the Constitution, and to Art 18 of the UDHR. This is a reminder that another problem with laws prohibiting religious vilification is that, where there is a danger that they may be interpreted as hampering the liberty to say that one’s own religion is right and that others are wrong, then they also constitute impairment of the speaker’s freedom of religion.

When these factors are coupled with pragmatic considerations concerning the enforcement of such laws, the case against the laws is particularly strong. A law that on its face seems designed to protect freedom of religious choice, may allow abuse of the law to attack others who are seeking to express their religion. Indeed, as Parkinson has pointed out, not only the precise terms of the legislation are important, but also the way that they are perceived:

The law that impacts upon people’s lives is not the law as enacted by parliaments, and not even the law as interpreted by the courts. What matters is the law as people believe it to be. This ‘folklaw’ may have only a tenuous connection with the law as enacted or applied in the courts. There is often a distorted effect as the perceived meaning of laws is spread through general communities of people who may not have a copy of the law itself or know the outcomes of cases they have heard are going through the courts.

If speakers think that any public speech criticising other religious views is in danger of being prosecuted, then they will effectively ‘self-censor’, and public debate about important religious issues will shrink. Such debate, in the end, may be ‘forced underground’, where the lack of light being shone from the glare of publicity may end up entrenching prejudice and ignorance.

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16 Ibid [79].
17 Parkinson, above n 2, 960.
There are a number of important philosophical questions about laws that impose restrictions on freedom of speech, as any law that prohibits certain types of speech will do. Some speech can clearly be regulated and penalised — classic examples include someone who shouts ‘Fire!’ in a crowded hall or someone who tells a lie that attacks an individual’s reputation. But should the law go further and address speech that attacks others’ beliefs?

The arguments of those who state that it would be best not to have anti-vilification laws based on religion at all are persuasive. Religion, unlike race or sex, is a matter that is fundamentally based on a person’s acceptance of certain propositions about the universe. (The view that religious matters, being questions of ‘faith’, are beyond rational debate, is clearly wrong. Anyone who puts forward such a view needs to spend some time in dialogue with representatives of actual religions, which almost all argue that there are good reasons to adopt their position as opposed to others. This is certainly the case with religions such as Christianity and Islam.) In any serious religious debate there will be a challenge to the worldview of the hearers. To penalise speech connected with religion runs the grave risk that rational debate on religious matters will be ‘driven underground’, and hence that where there are disagreements they will be resolved in less rational ways.18

But is there any way of preventing those who would insult and verbally attack others on the basis of their religion? One possibility not often considered in the literature on this area is the tort of defamation.

**Overview of the law of defamation**

The law of defamation protects a person’s reputation — in short, the interest that a person has in the views that others have of him or her. It has a long and chequered history, and has been the subject of lengthy development at common law, as well as various attempts over the years to codify or modify it by statute.19
Currently, after a long period of debate, Australia has something resembling a uniform law of defamation after agreement by the various States. This (mostly) uniform legislation has generally been in operation since the beginning of 2006. Here, I refer mainly to the NSW version, the *Defamation Act 2005* (NSW). The law of defamation is complex and controversial; it seeks to strike a balance between interests that are often competing: freedom of speech and protection of reputation. International human rights instruments recognise the importance of reputation and privacy, and of freedom of expression (for example, in Articles 17 and 19 of the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (ICCPR)).

The tort of defamation, then, gives people a right of action when their reputation has been diminished. However, some of the defences to the tort support freedom of speech, for those defences can override the plaintiff’s claim of diminished reputation. The appropriate balance between these competing interests is not easy to achieve:

> If the balance is tilted too far in favour of protecting personal reputation, the danger is that the dissemination of information and public discourse will be stifled to an unhealthy degree. Conversely, if it is tilted too far in favour of freedom of expression there will be little to constrain people from lying, or exaggerating and distorting facts, and causing irreparable harm to the reputations of individuals.

Interestingly, Gillooly argues that there is a ‘third man’ involved in cases where the defendant has made a statement to someone else about the plaintiff, whose interests also need to be considered: the recipient or potential recipient of the alleged defamatory statement. He suggests to subsume the interests of recipients into the overall heading of ‘public interest’ is confusing, as the specifically intended recipient may have interests that weigh more than the ‘general public’.

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20 For a brief overview of the changes made by the uniform legislation see Richard Potter, ‘Defamation law goes national’ (2006) 44 (1) (February) *Law Society Journal* 70.

21 Note however that the Act is not a complete ‘code’; a number of areas are left to be decided under principles developed by the courts at common law. These include, eg, what amounts to ‘publication’; whether a meaning is conveyed by that publication; what constitutes defamatory character in a meaning. In addition, some defences available at common law may be relied upon by a defendant, although some are supplemented by provisions of the legislation, and the common law in relation to damages also remains largely applicable.


The tort of defamation, like other tort actions, is defined by certain elements that need to be made out by the plaintiff to show a *prima facie* claim. In common with other actions, the law also provides a number of specific defences, the onus of establishing which lie on the defendant. Unlike many other torts, however, in defamation actions the defences are often the main point of dispute in the case.

This is because the elements of a *prima facie* case in defamation are in many cases not difficult to make out. Essentially, there are usually acknowledged to be three elements in a claim: that the plaintiff has been *defamed*, in the sense that their reputation has been attacked, that the plaintiff was *identified* clearly as the target of the attack, and that the defamatory material was *published* by the defendant, in the sense of it having been made available to someone else other than the plaintiff.  

Many of these areas raise complex issues that this chapter cannot address. But it is worth noting what makes a statement ‘defamatory’ at common law. Many members of the community are familiar with the test developed in *Parmiter v Coupland* (1840) 6 M&W 105 at 108; 151 ER 340 at 342 that published matter is defamatory if it exposes the plaintiff to ‘hatred, contempt or ridicule’.

More recently, however, it is common to refer to a statement made by Jordan CJ in *Consolidated Trust Co Ltd v Browne* (1948) 49 SR (NSW) 86 at 88:

> In NSW as a general rule it is illegal, under the law of defamation, to publish about a person anything which is likely to cause ordinary decent folk in the community, taken in general, to think the less of him.

The common law test that has evolved now provides greater protection for people when disparaging statements are made about them. It is clearly easier to prove that published matter causes ordinary reasonable people to think less of the plaintiff, or to shun or avoid him or her, than it is to prove that the plaintiff is the victim of hatred, contempt or ridicule.

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24 For example, see C Sappideen and P Vines (eds) *Fleming’s Law of Torts* (10th ed, 2011) [25.160]: ‘If a plaintiff establishes that defamatory matter has been published about him or her, he or she has established a prima facie claim for defamation.’

25 For a recent detailed analysis of the notion of ‘reputation’ in defamation law, see L McNamara, *Reputation and Defamation* (2007).

26 See also Beaumont J in the more recent decision of *Random House Australia Pty Ltd v Abbott* [1999] FCA 1538, (1999) 94 FCR 296, [22].

27 Old cases establish that the ‘shunning’ effect may be relevant even if no-one would cast personal blame on the subject of the statement — eg, *Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Ltd* (1934) 50 TLR 581 where it was defamatory to say that the plaintiff had been raped, as at that stage it would have led to her being ‘shunned’ by others.
Defamation and Vilification

It is not entirely clear whether simply exposing someone to ‘ridicule’ is defamatory or not.28 One principle often cited is that words that are simply ‘vulgar abuse’ will not normally be defamatory. To make outrageously insulting remarks that no one listening to would take seriously, will usually not be defamatory, however much they may hurt someone’s feelings.29

In the UK in the case of Berkoff v Burchill and anor [1997] EMLR 139 it was held to be defamatory to state that an actor was ‘horrendously ugly’, but there has been much debate about whether this decision was correct or not. However, some cases in Australia have suggested that exposing someone to ridicule (for example, by publishing an embarrassing photograph of them)30 may be defamatory, so the question may still be open.

If the above three elements of the tort have been made out, it is then up to the defendant to make out one of the defences that are provided by the law. In broad terms, and simplifying somewhat, the main defences that can be relied on today under the uniform legislation are:

1. **truth**: that the matter which was published is either wholly or substantially true31

2. **honest opinion**: that the matter was the honest expression of opinion by the defendant, not a statement of fact32

3. **privilege**: that the matter was published either in a forum where the law provides complete protection of free speech (under **absolute privilege**, such as in Parliament or a court room) or was published in circumstances where the law recognises what is called a **qualified** privilege. Such a privilege arises either where the defendant had a duty to make a statement for some reason, and

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28 For a detailed analysis see McNamara, above n 25, ch 7.
29 See Mundey v Askin [1982] 2 NSWLR 369, where the plaintiffs were called ‘vermin’, and comments by Bryson JA on the issue of ‘vulgar abuse’ in Bennette v Cohen (2005) 64 NSWLR 81, [46–56]. As noted there, words ‘might injure a man’s pride without injuring his reputation’.
30 See Ettingshausen v Australian Consolidated Press (1991) 23 NSWLR 443, where the court accepted that a photograph of the plaintiff football player which showed him naked could be regarded as defamatory on the basis that it had exposed him to ridicule; the case was followed in Obermann v ACP Publishing Pty Limited [2001] NSWSC 1022.
31 See Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 25. There is also a related defence of ‘contextual truth’ in s 26, where statements which are made on the same occasion as those complained of are true, and given their truth the statements that are complained of do no further harm to the plaintiff’s reputation.
32 See Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 31. The defence was previously called ‘fair comment’. It will be defeated if the statement in context would be understood as a statement of fact, rather than an expression of opinion; if it is not on a matter of ‘public interest’; if it is not based on ‘proper material’; or if it is shown not to be an opinion honestly held by the defendant.
the recipients had a duty or interest to hear it; or under statutory provisions, where the recipients had an ‘interest’ in receiving the communication, and it was published ‘reasonably’. In addition, under current Australian law there is a further situation where ‘qualified privilege’ arises, where the communication is on a matter of political interest.

(4) *triviality*: that the matter in the context in which it was published is not likely to have caused any harm (where, for example, it was a statement made in a private social context to a small group of people).

In addition to these formal defences, the legislation now contains a provision whereby a defendant may avoid liability by an appropriately speedy ‘offer to make amends’, which will usually include some sort of published correction or apology.

**Defamation on the basis of religion**

The above commentary is only a superficial overview of the law of defamation, but it deals with a number of issues that are mentioned by the vilification provisions referred to previously. The similarities and differences between the provisions are worth noting.

**Defamation and religious vilification compared**

Areas of similarity between the two are that both are concerned with words that ‘inspire hatred or contempt’. The classic definition of ‘defamation’, as noted above, refers to ‘hatred, contempt or ridicule’. The Australian legislative provisions refer to ‘hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of’ persons (the Victorian provisions add ‘revulsion’, which seems not to be very different from the other concepts).

In fact, the law of civil defamation sets a lower barrier than the vilification provisions. Requiring more recently that a statement simply ‘cause ordinary decent folk in the community, taken in general, to think the less of’ the plaintiff allows a wider range of speech acts to be taken into account. The addition of words like ‘serious’ and ‘severe’ in the legislation seems to clearly signal that it will be harder to make out a case of vilification than it will be to succeed in a defamation action.

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33 See *Defamation Act 2005 (NSW)* s 30.
34 Implementing the implied freedom of political communication spelled out by the High Court in *Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation* (1997) 189 CLR 520.
35 See *Defamation Act 2005 (NSW)* s 33.
36 See *Defamation Act 2005 (NSW)* Pt 3, Div 1.
37 See the legislation noted at above n 4.
Another similarity is that both the common law of defamation and the statutory provisions about religious vilification provide a civil legal remedy to someone who is the subject of remarks by a defendant. A civil remedy allows the award of damages. The amount of damages, and the basis on which damages are assessed, may not be the same, but usually some amount of money can be ordered by the court to be paid by the defendant, an order that will not only provide some material compensation for the harm suffered but will also mark the community’s disapproval of the defendant’s behaviour.

There are, however, a number of important differences between the action for defamation and an action for religious vilification. One that I have noted already is that an action for defamation will be available in relation to a range of what might be called ‘less offensive’ speech than the vilification action.

But the most obvious difference is that, in an action for defamation, the plaintiff must be able to demonstrate that he or she, in particular, was identified as the subject of the defamatory statement. By contrast, an action for religious vilification seems to be available to anyone who belongs to a particular ‘class of persons’ or ‘group of persons’. Each of these aspects of the two actions warrants further examination.

In Australia the High Court laid down the following some years ago about a statement that does not specifically name someone, in David Syme & Co v Canavan (1918) 25 CLR 234:

The test of whether words that do not specifically name the respondent refer to him or not is this: Are they such as reasonably in the circumstances would lead persons acquainted with the plaintiff to believe he was the person referred to?

The decision of the House of Lords in Knupffer v London Express Newspaper, Ltd [1944] AC 116 held that a plaintiff who was a member of a ‘Young Russia’ group could not sue for defamation in relation to a newspaper article that referred generally to the group around the world. In that case the class was so large that it was not possible for the particular plaintiff to claim that he personally had been defamed. However, the House of Lords was careful to say that there was no general rule about ‘defamation of a class’ — it was a question in each case, as Lord Atkin in particular emphasised, whether ‘the defamatory words must be understood to be published of and concerning the plaintiff’ (at 121). If the words were spoken ‘of a large or indeterminate number of persons described by some general name’, then it will usually be difficult to show that they refer to the plaintiff (at 122). But there may be cases where even words spoken of a large number might sufficiently identify the plaintiff. There is a fascinating aside by Lord Porter near the end of his judgment:

38 David Syme & Co v Canavan (1918) 25 CLR 234, 238.
In deciding this question the size of the class, the generality of the charge and the extravagance of the accusation may all be elements to be taken into consideration, but none of them is conclusive. Each case must be considered according to its own circumstances. I can imagine it being said that each member of a body, however large, was defamed where the libel consisted in the assertion that no one of the members of a community was elected as a member unless he had committed a murder.39

It is interesting to speculate on what makes the difference in this last example. Is it the seriousness of the allegation? The judgment gives no further guidance.

Other cases based on defamation of a large group have failed for this reason of failing to ‘identify’ the specific plaintiff. In Mann v Medicine Group Pty Ltd (1992) 38 FCR 400, an attack on ‘all bulk-billing doctors’ was found not to be specific enough to be sued on by one doctor. The case is interesting for its careful discussion of the principles relating to defamation of a group, and for the strong dissent in the Full Court of the Federal Court by Miles J. But it illustrates that the principles spelled out in Knupffer are still applied in Australia.

In Gauthier v Toronto Star Daily Newspapers Ltd (2004) 245 D.L.R. (4th) 169, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld a trial judge’s striking out of a defamation action brought by members of the Toronto Police Force in response to newspaper articles referring to ‘Toronto police’ as ‘racist’. The articles were general in nature and could not be read as referring to any individual member of the force.

But in other cases, actions by unnamed group members have succeeded. In Jackson v TCN Channel 9 [2001] NSWCA 108, a statement that referred to ‘outlaw motorcycle gangs’ was held to be actionable at the instance of a member of the ‘Rebels’ motorcycle club, where it was broadcast on television accompanied by a picture of the plaintiff. This seems to be a clear example of the principle that a plaintiff may sue where specifically identified. But it is interesting to note the further comments of Handley JA, on the common example given in the cases that the statement ‘all lawyers are thieves’ would not be actionable by any one lawyer:

While ‘all lawyers’ are members of the same profession, they are not members of a cohesive and disciplined group with a command structure such as a gang. The statement about ‘all lawyers’ is an obvious over-generalisation which no reasonable reader or listener would understand applied or was intended to apply literally to every single member of the group.

On the other hand outlaw bikie gangs of the type described in the programme would only attract and retain members who accepted and were willing to conform to the prevailing culture and ethos of the gang. In my judgment the statements made in this programme are akin to statements about organised groups such as the SS, the Klu Klux Klan or the Mafia, rather than statements such as: ‘all lawyers are thieves’. It would be well open to a jury to conclude that general statements made about groups such as those applied, and would be understood to apply, to every member of those groups.\textsuperscript{40}

The question, in other words, may be resolved in favour of a member of a group being able to sue if the nature of the group is such that one would expect all members to strictly conform to some standard said to apply to the group as a whole. It must be said, however, that other members of the Court did not specifically adopt these views.

The application of these general principles to members of a religious group can be seen in the Canadian decision of \textit{Bai v Sing Tao Daily Ltd} (2003) 226 DLR (4th) 477. In that case, a defamation action brought by a number of members of the ‘Falun Gong’ religious group failed, where the newspaper articles in question did not refer to them individually. McMurty CJO in the Ontario Court of Appeal commented:

There is nothing to distinguish the appellants from the class of all Falun Gong practitioners throughout the world. In this context, I am of the view that, the succinct endorsement of Justice Zuber in \textit{Sun Tanner’s Image v. White} (September 12, 2000), Doc. Windsor 00-GD-4893 (Ont. S.C.J.), affirmed at (Ont. C.A.), provides a helpful approach:

‘It is necessary that the plaintiffs show that they are identified or singled out. The words clearly do not identify the plaintiffs. Further it is not pleaded that the class is so small that the plaintiffs are necessarily identified and would lead one to believe that the plaintiffs are the target of the words. As a result this action must fail and the claim is dismissed.’\textsuperscript{41}

This may be seen, then, as an example of a ‘gap’ in the law that the law of religious vilification may fill. But the fundamental question is whether there is indeed such a gap.

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Jackson v TCN Channel 9} [2001] NSWCA 108, 23–4.
\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Bai v Sing Tao Daily Ltd} (2003) 226 DLR (4th) 477, 14.
When an individual’s reputation is attacked, then it seems perfectly fair that they should have an action to defend themselves, and to seek damages. But where an attack is made on a wide group, then the ‘sting’ of the attack is dissipated across that group. The question that needs to be asked is whether, given that there are strong competing values of freedom of speech involved, the harm that is occasioned in such a weakened form is one that the law should provide a remedy for?

The ancient Romans used to attack Christians on the basis that they committed incest (as they said that they ‘loved’ those they called ‘brother’ and ‘sister’), or that they were guilty of cannibalism (in that they participated in meetings where Jesus’ words about ‘eating my body’ and ‘drinking my blood’ were repeated). If such an attack occurred today, should a Christian have a remedy?

I would support a criminal remedy where a speaker got up in a public square and said ‘Neilus Fosterius is a follower of the Nazarene, is a cannibal and we should go to his house and kill him now!’ That, under Australian law, would be an unlawful incitement to violence. I would support the availability of an action for defamation where the speaker simply said, ‘Neilus Fosterius is a follower of the Nazarene, and is a cannibal’, because I could demonstrate that the allegation of cannibalism (which would be untrue) would lead my Roman neighbours to ‘think less of me’ at the very least, and because the attack is targeted at me alone.

But if a speaker in a public square said ‘All followers of the Nazarene are cannibals’, I do not think I ought to have a legal remedy. I will then be able to go into the same public square and argue against him, and I will have the support of my fellow believers. And the opportunity for dialogue will hopefully provide an opportunity for proclamation of the gospel about Jesus.

The only qualification one might want to add is that it would perhaps be best if there were a legal remedy when the religious group was very small, with very little opportunity or resources to respond to insult or denigration. But it is interesting to note that in the cases on ‘defamation of a group’ the courts continue to assert that there is no ‘bright line’ rule, and that the size of a group is one of the relevant factors. The principle is simply that there is a defamatory statement about the plaintiff where the words are be ‘published of and concerning the plaintiff’ (Knupffer), and where there are only a few members of a group, and the plaintiff is known to be one of the members, then an allegation (particularly a highly damaging allegation) concerning the whole group, could not unreasonably be seen specifically to apply to the plaintiff for the purposes of the law of defamation.

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It is also interesting to compare the defences that are available in the two causes of action. Perhaps the most glaring difference, and the most objectionable, is that there is no defence of ‘truth’ available under the vilification legislation. Neave JA commented in the Catch the Fire appeal that:

Section 11 of the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act … does not provide that the fact that words are true takes them outside s.8 of the Act.43

Under the vilification legislation, the available defences (which differ between the States) may be summarised as ‘fair report’, ‘absolute privilege’, ‘public interest discussion’, or ‘artistic exhibition’:

- ‘publication of a fair report of a public act’ (Qld, s 124A(2)(a)); ‘fair report of a public act’ (Tas, s 55(a)); something done ‘reasonably and in good faith’, ‘in making or publishing a fair and accurate report of any event or matter of public interest’ (Vic, s 11(1)(c))
- ‘publication of material in circumstances in which the publication would be subject to a defence of absolute privilege in proceedings for defamation’ (Qld, s 124A(2)(b)); ‘a communication or dissemination of a matter that is subject to a defence of absolute privilege in proceedings for defamation’ (Tas, s 55(b))
- a ‘public act, done reasonably and in good faith, for academic, artistic, scientific or research purposes or for other purposes in the public interest, including public discussion or debate about, and expositions of, any act or matter’ (Qld, s 124A(2)(c)); ‘a public act done in good faith for – (i) academic, artistic, scientific or research purposes; or (ii) any purpose in the public interest’ (Tas, s 55(c)); something done ‘reasonably and in good faith’, ‘in the course of any statement, publication, discussion or debate made or held, or any other conduct engaged in, for – (i) any genuine academic, artistic, religious or scientific purpose; or (ii) any purpose that is in the public interest (Vic, s 11(1)(b))
- something done ‘reasonably and in good faith’, ‘in the performance, exhibition or distribution of an artistic work’ (Vic, s 11(1)(a)).

Note the obvious point that at least some of these defences are merely a repetition of those available under the law of defamation — those relating to occasions of ‘absolute privilege’, for example (where statements are made in parliament or before certain courts and tribunals). The defence of ‘fair report’ also parallels very closely the defence available under the uniform defamation legislation that allows a defence of a ‘fair report

43 [2006] VSCA 284, [178].
The vilification defence is actually wider than that available under the defamation laws; the ‘public act’ that can be the subject of a ‘fair report’ in Queensland and Tasmania seems to be the act which itself incites hatred, and so on. So it seems, though there are no cases on the matter, that a speaker at a rally who says vilificatory words can be sued, but the newspaper or TV station that repeats those words the next day cannot be sued. Indeed, it would seem that another speaker who prefaced their remarks by ‘this is what was said yesterday’ could also avoid liability.

Victoria also has a specific defence relating to artistic works. It seems likely that this reflects the sensitivities involved by the exhibition of a controversial exhibition in Victoria, and action that was taken to stop the exhibition. The result, however, is an interesting illustration of the weighing of public values by the Victorian Parliament. A believer may have hatred, serious contempt, revulsion or ridicule incited against them or their group without legal recourse, so long as it is done in the name of ‘art’. For some reason, freedom of speech applies to artists, but not to authors, preachers, or public speakers.

The final broad category of defence in all the jurisdictions almost defies summary. Common themes are that the purposes that are seen as legitimate include academic and scientific ‘research’— and ‘research’ generally. But they extend to ‘other purposes in the public interest’, or ‘public discussion or debate about, and expositions of, any act or matter’. The Queensland provision in particular is so broad that it seems hard to find any occasion for speech or writing that will not fall within the defence. For this reason, the important operative words in all the provisions seem to be ‘reasonably and in good faith’.

But the Catch the Fire litigation illustrates the difficulty with such a broad discretion being left to the courts. Is it acting ‘reasonably and in good faith’ for a religious speaker, when urging the truth of their own beliefs, to present an ‘unbalanced’ account of another faith? Does a speaker depart from this standard when in some other context they have exaggerated their own qualifications or the extent of their publications? As Ahdar notes, these matters counted against the pastor in that case and led the original tribunal to find that the comments made in the seminar were not made ‘in good faith’. Ahdar comments:

> It is troubling that a preacher’s misleading characterisation of works he had authored should somehow lead to the conclusion that his beliefs about a religion were not his real beliefs. Even more disquieting is a secular tribunal’s determination that where a religious leader had misconstrued and misrepresented another religion’s sacred writings,
this also indicated an absence of honest belief. A wrong interpretation of scripture does not necessarily point to dishonest intent and, moreover, a secular body ought not to be trying to rule on what are correct and honest representations of sacred writings.46

In short, this defence and others like it are so unclear, and so difficult to interpret in advance of litigation, that they will have the effect of ‘chilling’ religious speech in many cases.

Examples of defamation and religion cases

It is worth noting briefly that the law of defamation is already used in the context of religious bodies and persons. Where a plaintiff has been clearly identified and attacked in a way that causes other persons to think less of them, then they have a chance to sue for damages. In response, the defendant has an opportunity to argue that what they said was true, or that it was legitimate expression of an honest opinion, or that it was made on an occasion where free speech should be encouraged because there is a duty to speak, or that one of the other available defences is applicable. Just by way of illustration, and without any necessary comment on whether or not these decisions are correct, I cite three recent cases.

Plenty v Dickson [2009] SASC 9 (19 January 2009) was part of the most recent stage of long-lasting litigation generated by the ‘disfellowshipping’ of Mr and Mrs Plenty from their Seventh Day Adventist congregation in 1979. These proceedings were the conclusion of defamation proceedings, where the court awarded the Plentys $10,000 in damages based on a letter published in a newspaper referring to the events. The letter referred to ‘continuing attitudes and actions which were felt contrary to church standards of behaviour’. The judge concluded that this was defamatory:

Members of the church are committed to a strict code of behaviour and the plaintiffs were disfellowshipped for an alleged failure to abide by that code. However, Mr Dickson’s letter has to be judged from the position of the average reasonable reader. To such a reader, the phrase ‘continuing attitudes and actions which were felt contrary to church standards of behaviour’ could well imply conduct more serious than the allegations that led to the disfellowshipping. It is relevant to take into account the circulation of the newspaper and the effect that the publication appears to have had on the plaintiffs.47

46 Ahdar, above n 2, 313.
The Court of Appeal rejected appeals against the amount of damages made by the Plentys, holding that the amount of damages awarded was reasonable.

In *Ayan v Islamic Co-ordinating Council of Victoria Pty Ltd and ors* [2009] VSC 119 (3 April 2009), the ICCV were involved in ‘halal’ certification of abattoirs (that animals had been killed in accordance with Islamic law), and were in dispute with the plaintiff. They published a letter to various abattoirs alleging that Mr Ayan was claiming to be authorised by the Australian Quarantine Service to provide Halal certificates. In fact, the plaintiff was authorised to carry out various procedures but did not claim to be authorised by AQIS.

The Court ruled that the letters were defamatory, that no defence of truth was available, and that no defence of qualified privilege was available. The defendants relied on the defence of ‘qualified privilege’ partly on the basis that their aim was to communicate the results of an independent report into the Halal industry. But in fact, the report did not support the claims in the letter, and Beach J commented that:

> It is well settled that an occasion of qualified privilege must not be used for some purpose or motive foreign to the interest that protects the making of the statement. Further, there must be a significant connection between the defamatory material and the privileged occasion.48

Perhaps the issues being discussed here are raised most sharply in *Trad v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd* [2009] NSWSC 750. The plaintiff, who had been seen as a spokesman for the Muslim community in Sydney at some stages, sued the proprietors of radio station 2GB for comments made about him on a talkback radio show. The comments arose out of a ‘peace rally’ that the plaintiff had addressed following the infamous ‘Cronulla riots’, which, as McClellan CJ noted, ‘were perceived by many people as a confrontation between adherents to the Muslim faith and persons of Caucasian heritage’.49 Part of the thrust of the remarks made by the plaintiff was an attack on 2GB as in part responsible for stirring up ill feeling against Muslims and contributing to the violence. The comments upon which the plaintiffs sued were made in response to that general attack, and partly in response to the fact that when a 2GB reporter was present at the rally, there was what seemed a very direct attempt to incite the crowd to ill feeling against 2GB.

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49 *Trad v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd* [2009] NSWSC 750, [6].
The judgment is lengthy and raises a number of important issues. Briefly, a jury had been impanelled under the then-applicable procedure in NSW, and had found that the comments of the announcer had contained imputations that the plaintiff was guilty of a number of things (including ‘inciting people to acts of violence’ and ‘inciting people to have racist attitudes’), and also that ‘the plaintiff [was] a dangerous individual’ and ‘a disgraceful individual’.

The defence of truth used by the defendant meant that the court had to assess the truth or otherwise of the comment that the plaintiff was ‘disgraceful’. McClellan CJ noted that this raised issues of ‘some complexity’. His Honour ruled that this required him to apply ‘general community standards’ to the proved behaviour of the plaintiff. However, he also noted that he could take into account legislation prohibiting discrimination and racism in determining the content of those community standards.

His Honour then referred to a number of matters that had been brought forward by the defendant to support their allegation that the plaintiff was ‘disgraceful’ by community standards. Many of those matters were not related to the specific words that had been uttered at the rally, but were drawn from statements made by the plaintiff on other occasions in the past, and in particular from statements made by Sheikh Taj el-Din al-Hilali who had held the position of ‘Mufti of Australia’, and whose spokesman the plaintiff had been for some years. In effect, his Honour noted a number of highly controversial statements made by Sheikh al-Hilali, and the fact that the plaintiff had associated himself with, or not dissociated himself from, those statements was taken into account. Statements made by the Sheikh of this sort included comments associating unveiled women with ‘cat’s meat’ (and implying that some women bear responsibility for their own rape), statements arguably expressing support for the stoning of a woman for adultery in Nigeria, and statements made in a sermon at a mosque in Lebanon arguably supporting the September 11 2001 attacks and the use of children as martyrs in the cause of Islam. Material either referred to with approval on the plaintiff’s website, or directly written by him, was

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50 Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) s 7A (applicable because the events occurred before the commencement of the uniform legislation). While this specific procedure is no longer applicable, on the whole the law as to what amounts to defamation, and the relevant defences, has not changed from that being considered by the judge.
51 Trad v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 750, [2].
52 Ibid [13].
53 See ibid [16–17].
54 Ibid [20].
55 See ibid [27–42].
56 See ibid [43–51].
57 See ibid [52–58].
also used by the court. In the end, the court ruled that most of the imputations made against the plaintiff by 2GB, including that of being a ‘disgraceful’ and ‘dangerous’ individual, were proven to be true.

The court found some of the imputations made were untrue (such as the specific claim that ‘the plaintiff stirred up hatred against a 2GB reporter’ or ‘the plaintiff is widely perceived as a pest’). But the court found that the defence of ‘contextual truth’ applied, so that even though these remarks were not true, given that they were made in a context where much more serious allegations were made out, they did not further harm the plaintiff’s reputation.58

While not necessary given the success of the other defences, the court also held that the defendant would have been able to make out a defence of ‘qualified privilege’, which applies when someone is responding to a prior attack that has been made by the plaintiff.59

On later appeal, in Trad v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 61 (22 March 2011) the Court of Appeal (Tobias, McColl & Basten JJA) overturned the lower findings on a number of points. The main point they relied on was that even if Mr Trad held views that many other Australians would disagree with, the judge had not asked whether ‘a right-thinking member of the Australian community’ would consider him to be ‘disgraceful’ or the other terms that were applied.60

Nevertheless, the case illustrates the common law courts are able, when required, to enter the arena of robust comment about religious issues. None of the issues in the case precisely raise the question of vilification on the grounds of religion — indeed, the radio commentator was very careful to say that Mr Trad in his view was not representative of the Muslim community and was responsible for ‘misinformation about the Islamic community’. But the court was able to deal with, and make reasoned judgments on, specific claims about someone who spoke on religious issues.61

58 See discussion, ibid [125-30]. The defence of contextual truth is also available under s 26 of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW).
59 See [132-47], also holding that the defence was not defeated by any allegation of ‘malice’. A further defence of ‘fair comment’ was upheld but with more hesitation.
60 See, eg, [2011] NSWCA 61, [84].
61 For a more recent decision raising important issues about the law of defamation and religious communities, see Haddon v Forsythe [2011] NSWSC 123 (8 March 2011), where a defence of ‘qualified privilege’ was upheld in relation to an email sent by the rector of a church (and copied in to other church leaders) asking a member of the congregation not to continue harassing female members of the church, based on past patterns of behaviour.
Conclusion

This chapter has only been able to raise the issues here in a limited way. It would be worthwhile, for example, to conduct further research on other situations that are analogous to religious vilification that have come before courts in defamation actions in the past.

But I hope that it has at least raised the possibility that what is seen as a ‘gap’ in the legal protection of rights may not be as broad as some have suggested. Where speech is aimed at producing violence it ought to be punished by the criminal law. Where speech attacks the reputation of individuals and can be shown to do so falsely and without the protection provided by the law of defamation for free speech, then an action should lie. But I argue that further protection of ‘religious sensibilities’ by the enactment of general ‘religious vilification’ laws is not only unnecessary, but may positively impair both freedom of speech and freedom of religion.