Understanding Adoption, Implementation and Outcomes of New Public Management Reforms in Developing Countries: A Case Study of Botswana

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Statement of Originality

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text. I give consent to this copy of my thesis, when deposited in the University Library, being made available for loan and photocopying subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968.

Signed ..........................................................

Kaelo Molefhe August 2011
New Public Management (NPM) reforms came to prominence in the 1980s in developed countries introducing market principles in the running of the public sector organisations. In the specific case of developing countries, the drive towards such reforms emerged towards the late 1980s/early 1990s, often under coercion from external actors, as prescription to many of the problems afflicting their bureaucracies and the economy in general. This thesis investigates application of such reforms in developing countries. It does so by looking at the adoption, implementation and outcomes of NPM-type of reforms within one developing country; namely, Botswana. The specific reform measures considered in this study are Work Improvement Teams (WITs) and Performance Management System (PMS).

Since the early 1990s into the 2000s, the Botswana government grappled with issues of low productivity and performance within its public services that threatened specifically the capacity for effective public sector management and broadly the post-independence impressive socio-economic gains of the country and, thus, proved a strong imperative towards public sector reforms. Consequently, various reform efforts, including NPM ones, were applied across the public service to improve its efficiency and effectiveness. Among the NPM ones WITs and PMS were introduced.

Two government departments namely, DPSM and CTO were investigated using a case study research methodology to better understand application of WITs and PMS. The study findings indicated that both reform measures were adopted voluntarily by the government of Botswana through DPSM. However, in other ministries and departments across the public service including CTO, the adoption of the schemes was imposed. Regarding implementation of both schemes, structures and process were put in place to guide their success. Various challenges, however, were also identified. For instance, in the case of WITs in both study organisations lack of support for the scheme at senior levels was identified. For PMS, the scheme failed to attract support especially among industrial class employees in DPSM. Despite few systematic evaluation efforts
undertaken, empirical evidence for both PMS and WITs pointed towards improved performance in the two study organisations.
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To my colleagues at the University of Newcastle, thank you for offering me support at crucial times. I also wish to acknowledge and thank the University of Botswana – my employers – for sponsoring me to come and do this research.

I dedicate this thesis to my family. My Wife Oneh and son Atang Molefhe your constant support and love inspired me and made the journey worthwhile despite my absence from home. They paid the price for living without me for such a long time. Mr. Selebogo, the insightful discussions we had proved valuable.
Last, this is for my mother Setshego Molefhe – she believed in the value of education.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AED</td>
<td>Academy for Educational Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDP</td>
<td>Botswana Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIAC</td>
<td>Botswana Institute of Accountancy and Commerce</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIDPA</td>
<td>Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNPC</td>
<td>Botswana National Productivity Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTO</td>
<td>Central Transport Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSR</td>
<td>Civil Service reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCEC</td>
<td>Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPIC</td>
<td>Departmental Productivity Improvement Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPSM</td>
<td>Directorate of Public Sector Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECC</td>
<td>Economic Committee of Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLCC</td>
<td>High Level Consultative Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI</td>
<td>Key Performance Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFDP</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance and Development Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINI PIC-FORCE</td>
<td>Ministerial Productivity Improvement for the Civil Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPM</td>
<td>New Public Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIC-FORCE</td>
<td>Productivity Improvement Committee for the Civil Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMS</td>
<td>Performance Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSRU</td>
<td>Public Service Reforms Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>TGLP</td>
<td>Tribal Grazing Land Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WITs</td>
<td>Work Improvement Teams</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction

Since the 1970s, especially in developed countries, public sector organisations have become subject to more frequent calls for greater efficiency and effectiveness (Barzelay, 1992; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; OECD, 1995; Osborne & Plastrik, 1997; Hughes 1998; Kettl, 2000). As a result, many countries of the West, particularly the Anglo-Saxon ones, embarked on reform efforts that sought to transform the organisation and management of their public sectors by employing market-based principles and practices. These changes are part of the New Public Management (NPM) model.

The perceived success of NPM model in advanced economies led to its transfer from advanced economies to many developing countries (OECD, 1995). This came in two main ‘generations.’ The first ‘generation’ of reforms, mostly from the 1980s, emphasised stabilisation of macro-economic crisis. To achieve that end, ‘the focus was on shedding state functions and personnel and tended to proceed swiftly’ (Schneider & Heredia, 2003: 4). The effects of these efforts, however, were often devastating. In particular, state capacity was severely eroded, producing, according to one commentator, a ‘disintegrated state’ (Nelson, 1994 cited in Schneider & Heredia, 2003) that could barely perform the basic tasks it was created to perform (Bale & Dale, 1998). The second ‘generation’ reforms, mostly from the 1990s onwards, were in response to perceived failures of the first ones, and emphasised building or rebuilding institutional and administrative capacity and good governance, as a way of improving the quality of the state in pursuit of socio-economic development in many developing countries (World Bank, 1997; Owusu, 2005; Olowu, 2002; Schneider & Heredia, 2003; Ayee, 2008).

This thesis seeks to better understand the adoption, implementation and outcomes of NPM-type reforms within one developing country; namely, Botswana. Specifically, it investigates two examples of NPM reforms: Performance Management System (PMS) and Work Improvement Teams.
The topic of this thesis, which is defined and explained in more detail in Chapter 2, is the study of public sector reforms in developing countries, with a special focus on New Public Management reforms in Botswana. Consequently, the broad research question is:

- How can the adoption, implementation and outcomes of NPM-type reforms in developing countries be explained?

To assist in exploring the major research objective, the following specific research questions are identified and investigated:

- Why are NPM reforms adopted by developing countries?
- What form do NPM reforms take?
- Why do NPM reforms take that form?
- How are NPM reforms implemented in developing countries?
- Are the stated objectives of these NPM reforms achieved in developing countries?
This topic is a very important one, in terms of both theory and practice. With respect to theory, it is important to remedy three main theoretical weaknesses in the existing literature on NPM reforms. First, Chapter 2 will show that some aspects of NPM reforms have been studied extensively in developed countries, especially in Anglophone countries (Clark, 2000; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000), but accounts of developing countries are less common. To that end, Manning (2001 cited in Olowu, 2002) bemoans the ‘thinness of evidence of how NPM type-reforms actually work in practise in countries outside the industrialised countries of the Commonwealth and the OECD.’ As a result, there is much that is yet to be described, explained and evaluated about the experiences of developing countries. McCourt (2002: 228 - 229) emphasises this point:

‘Nor is there much independent academic research going on. There are few of us publishing on developing country public management, and our interests are somewhat distorted by the fact that much of our research and consultancy income derives from donors. Calling for research is the great academic cop-out, but call for it I do.’

Despite McCourt’s insistence on the need for research work on public sector management in developing countries, nothing much has been achieved. For instance, the Oxford Handbook of Public Management (Ferlie et al., 2005: 2 editors) made it clear that the aim of the volume was ‘to provide wide-ranging, authoritative, and internationally focused overview of major themes and key debates within the current field(s) of public management and administration.’ Of note, however, the editors chose to omit discussions on developing countries from this volume. The experience of developing countries remains an important topic that has been neglected.

Second, the limited literature on the experiences of developing countries tends to provide relatively narrow and fragmented analyses of the NPM reform process. Many works, for example, focus on specific phases of the reform process: on the adoption or the implementation of the reforms, and few studies pay any attention at all to their evaluation. In this sense, existing works rarely
incorporate entire phases of the reform process (i.e. adoption, implementation and evaluation). The tendency to discuss in isolation these various aspects/stages of the reform process is not only a weakness in itself but it also obscures the important links between these phases of reform. The adoption of an inappropriate reform model, for example, may be the real reason why implementation fails. Similarly, a failure to effectively evaluate the reforms may hide the reasons for inadequate implementation or allow the repeat adoption of flawed and inappropriate models. It is, then, important to develop a holistic account of all phases of reform and to understand how they relate and, therefore, have an impact on each other.

Third, uncritical works, based on the asserted benefits of reform, dominate discussion of NPM in developing countries. The emphasis in the literature is mainly on the content of such reform initiatives, which are often seen as universal in their applicability, with little acknowledgment of the importance of context in the reform efforts. The omission of context, to some extent, is encouraged by the existing works that show a tenacious belief in reform as a broadly rational process, linking problems and solutions in a straightforward cause-and-effect way. These reforms have therefore been proposed and understood in instrumental terms – that is, imposing technical rationality and market mechanisms is seen as a solution to almost all perceived problems (World Bank, 1997). This has attracted criticism. As Haruna (2004: 187) observes, ‘the reform measures assume, incorrectly, that reforms can be implemented in a political, economic, and socio-cultural vacuum’. The problems flow from research and theory that neglects context – which assumes that developed countries are the same as developing countries, and that all developing countries are the same.

These theoretical weaknesses have far reaching practical implications, for several reasons. First, there is a growing consensus on the importance of the state on economic development of developing countries, where governments are faced with colossal challenges to improve living standards of the general population (Owusu, 2005; Schneider & Heredia, 2003; World Bank, 1997). Indeed, the state in general and the public sector in particular are far more
important in developing countries than in developed countries. An ineffective public sector can be seriously counterproductive towards development efforts; as Bale & Dale (1998: 113) contend: ‘it is not difficult to understand how dysfunctional public sector agencies impair development and perpetuates poverty’ in these countries. The neglect in research of public sector in developing countries therefore has potentially disastrous practical implications because an effective state is so important for such countries. Correspondingly, research on developing countries that enhances the understanding of the public sector may assist in formulating and implementing better policies, which improve the role of the public sector in development.

What is true for developing countries in general is also true for Botswana. The public sector plays a particularly critical role in the socio-economic development of Botswana. From independence in 1966 until the late 1980s, Botswana’s public service was described as one the most effective in sub-Saharan Africa (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Hope, 1999; Raphaeli et al., 1984; Wescott, 1994). However, the period of the 1990s and 2000s presented challenges with far reaching implications for the economy and society at large. In particular, declining public sector productivity and service delivery combined with well-publicised episodes of corruption threatened the capacity for effective public sector management (Good, 1994; Nordas & Gergis, 2000). In response to these challenges, the Botswana public service adopted and implemented a series of NPM reform initiatives to restore quality in its public sector.

Similarly, understanding the full cycle of public sector reform, including adoption, implementation and evaluation, and the links between the separate phases, is not only important theoretically, but it has major practical implications. It is not sufficient for developing countries to adopt good reform models – they must also know how to implement effectively and be conscious of the need to evaluate them. There is no point in expending scarce resources in trying to implement reforms that are doomed from the beginning, or in adopting reforms which are never evaluated. In this sense, practice mirrors theory.
Finally, the neglect of context in theory also has significant practical consequences if key instigators of change, like international agencies who impose reform on developing countries, uncritically accept universal prescriptions based on the experience of developed countries. The World Bank, as the chief sponsor of these reforms, has partially recognised this problem: ‘Technical administrative fixes have been applied to fundamental problems of political economy. And even on the technical side the focus has been narrow, ignoring crucial links with other parts of the larger system’ (World Bank, 1999). It is, however, vital for more effective practice that context-specific studies of public sector reforms in developing countries analyse more deeply past experience in order to inform future practice.

Beyond the broad theoretical and practical importance of the topic, the motivation to study this topic comes from my personal experiences as an employee of both the University of Botswana and the Botswana Government. Through my current job at the University of Botswana, I have been privileged to participate in various fora (i.e. workshops and meetings, among many others), both in Botswana and other countries in the Southern African region, focusing on development challenges. A common message emanating from those fora was a general disappointment with the efforts of governments in the region at improving the socio-economic lives of citizens through measures such as public sector reforms. In most of these countries, foreign influence, often coercion, was a key driver of these reform initiatives. This raised my curiosity about why the reforms failed and whether the failures were linked to the origins of the ideas.

Moreover, having worked as a human resource practitioner within the Botswana public service, specifically in the Central Transport Organisation, I participated in a number of preparatory sessions and in the actual implementation of some of the NPM reform initiatives. However, after leaving government employment in the early 2000s, I continued to hear voices of discontent and disappointment by various stakeholders in the reform process. This developed my interest in
better understanding the ways in which such reform measures could be applied in Botswana, and beyond.

1.3 The Contribution of the Thesis

This study aims to contribute to both the theory and the practice of public sector reform in developing countries generally, and Botswana specifically. The contributions it hopes to make correspond closely with the theoretical and practical issues that make the topic so important. First, the thesis offers a detailed analysis of NPM reforms in a developing country. In this way, it makes a contribution to theory – by at least partially filling a significant empirical gap in a research literature dominated by studies of developed countries. This has a potential contribution to practice in that it is only by understanding the achievements and failures of past experience that better practice can be effected in the future.

Second, by offering a more holistic analysis of NPM reforms in one developing country – i.e. investigating the adoption, implementation and evaluation of the reforms – the thesis aims to improve on previous studies and advance practice.

Third, the thesis aims to develop an analysis of NPM reforms in Botswana that is more sensitive to context. This not only means acknowledging and exploring the implications of Botswana as a developing country, in contrast to the preoccupation in the existing literature with developed countries, but it also means recognising the specific characteristics that separate Botswana from other developing countries. For example, much of the existing literature on NPM in developing countries focuses on countries that embarked on these reforms against a backdrop of considerable socio-economic, administrative and political crisis and, often, under duress from the international financial and donor agencies. Botswana is not one of those countries and the exceptional nature of Botswana amongst developing – especially sub-Saharan African – countries is an important part of any explanation of its experiences with NPM reforms. In other words, this thesis seeks to make a theoretical contribution by going
beyond existing studies which have paid insufficient attention to the specific context that generated different discourses, including different diagnoses of the problems that governments were using NPM-type of reforms to solve (Flynn, 2002; Haruna, 2004; Thomas, 1993).

Offering a more context-specific analysis also promises advantages, which might improve the practice of public sector reform in Botswana and, by implication, in other developing countries.
1.4 Methodology

Although the research methodology is described and justified in some detail in Chapter 3, a brief introduction is provided here to anticipate how the main research questions will be addressed.

NPM reforms are complex phenomena embedded in, and highly influenced by, context (see, for example, Pollitt, 2003). For this reason, the case study approach is used as the overall research design (Yin, 2003). Case studies contribute to our knowledge of individual, group, organisational, social, political, and related phenomena. For Yin (2003: 1), ‘in all these situations, the distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena.’ In doing so, the case study allows the researcher to investigate phenomena in its real-life context (Descombe, 1998; Stake, 1995; VanWynsberghe & Khan, 2007).

In this study, the unit of analysis is an instance of NPM reform. The two case examples are the Performance Management System (PMS) and Work Improvement Teams (WITs). These two reform initiatives will be investigated in two different, information-rich public sector organisations (Benbasat et al., 1987; Patton, 1990). Both will also serve practical research needs such as access, convenience, cost minimisation, and time maximisation (Obasi, 1999). The two organisations are also chosen to maximise contrast (Creswell, 2007) and to increase the likelihood of research findings reflecting differences or different viewpoints: an ideal in qualitative research strategy. The two organisations are the Directorate of Public Service Management (DPSM) (the central agency) and Central Transport Organisation (CTO) (a service delivery organisation). Both organisations have implemented PMS and WITs.

Major data collection techniques are semi-structured interviews and document reviews. Data analysis for this study follows a general analysis procedure (Creswell 2007; Miles & Huberman 1994) that consists of: (i) data management, involving reduction of bulky and voluminous data into meaningful segments, (ii)
identifying themes and categories, and (iii) data displaying. Limited quantitative analysis of performance/productivity data will be conducted. From here, the study adopts an explanation-building and chronological analysis strategy. In addition, as the study employs multiple-case method, cross-case analysis is also conducted.

1.5 Structure of the Thesis

Following this chapter, the thesis is divided into a further seven chapters. The remaining chapters provide the following structure for the thesis:

Chapter 2: This chapter reviews the literature on NPM, which informs the empirical story of Botswana public sector reforms. This begins with some definitions and the historical development of NPM – as theory, ideology and practice – in developed countries. The chapter then reviews the far more modest literature analysing the experience of developing countries with NPM-type of reforms. This review demonstrates three key weaknesses in the extant literature which this thesis seeks to address - 1). Neglect of developing countries experience with NPM reforms 2). Narrow and fragmented analysis of NPM reform process and 3). The neglect of ‘context’ in explanations for the adoption, implementation and fate of NPM reforms.

Chapter 3: This chapter details and justifies the research methodology employed in this study, the case study approach. The thesis is concerned with the explanation of a phenomenon – i.e. adoption, implementation and fate of public sector reforms – within an environment in which it occurs. These reforms are complex phenomena, embedded in and highly influenced by context. The chapter is divided into four main sections. First, the research design/strategy of multiple qualitative case studies is shown to be appropriate for the research questions of the study. Second, the combination of semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis is shown to be appropriate for the collection of data in such a project. Third, data analysis methods are discussed. Fourth, issues of ethics for this study are considered.
Chapter 4: This chapter locates the case study organisations within their national economic, political and historical contexts. It does so by paying particular attention to the development trajectory of public administration in Botswana, by looking at British colonial legacy and how, since independence, the state machinery has come to play a central role in the economy. It is shown that despite inheriting very little in terms of socio-economic infrastructure from the colonial administration, the post-independence state has managed to facilitate impressive social developments – mainly due to discovery of diamonds and prudent financial management by the public service in the years from the 1960s until the 1990s. Despite this remarkable performance, however, the Botswana public sector experienced challenges during the 1990s and 2000s that threatened to undermine these gains and proved a strong imperative towards NPM reforms. Overall, this chapter provides detailed background information on Botswana and its public sector that is common to all case studies and provides the beginning of the contextual explanation for the adoption, implementation and fate of NPM reforms in Botswana.

Chapter 5: This chapter explores the adoption of NPM reforms at the central government level. The Botswana public service, as the context for two specific NPM reform initiatives under investigation in this thesis, is the focus of this chapter. Although the public service comprises both the central and local government levels, particular attention is paid to the workings of the central government. The chapter outlines the structure of the public service, in terms of how it is organised and managed. Furthermore, the chapter will explore in detail how the decision to embrace NPM reforms was made. It will describe the range of NPM reforms that were introduced in the period 1993 to 2008. These include the two NPM reforms, which will be the focus in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. The role of both DPSM and Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) in the policy formulation within the public service will be outlined. Overall this chapter focuses on the policy-making process by paying attention on the workings of the bureaucrats, politicians and other stakeholders in the reform process in Botswana.
Chapter 6: This chapter describes and analyses the implementation and fate of the WITs initiative in CTO and DPSM. The general implementation framework and strategies meant to guide the process across the public service are provided. Following that, implementation in the specific context of both study organisations is offered. It is shown here that in the case of CTO, WITs implementation attracted support and participation of the majority of employees, particularly the so-called industrial class employees. This level of participation was not the case in DPSM. Evaluation of the scheme reveals it to have been beneficial in both departments, although there were unintended consequences in CTO.

Chapter 7: In a similar way to Chapter 6, this chapter provides an empirical evidence of, and analyses, the implementation and evaluation of PMS in both case study organisations. The implementation framework and strategies, which guided implementation process across the public service, are described before more specific attention is paid to the experiences in CTO and DPSM. Last, an evaluation of the scheme is provided. Here, it is shown that, in both organisations, the impact of PMS was mixed. There were both positive and negative consequences that followed implementation of the scheme.

Chapter 8: This chapter sets out the thesis conclusions as measured against the research aims and objectives and the broader context of the literature on NPM reforms. Furthermore, the policy implications of the study are provided.

1.6 Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the key questions this thesis seeks to address. It has provided an overview of the area of research and justified the research problem. The case study methodology adopted in this study has been briefly introduced, with its related data collection methods of interviews and document analysis. The structure of the proceeding thesis was outlined. Thus, Chapter 1 establishes the basis on which this thesis is framed.
Notably, this chapter has identified aspects of the research on NPM-type reforms that have been inadequately addressed in the limited literature focusing on developing countries, such as insensitivity to contextual realities of those countries and technocratic nature of these reforms, among others. It was also proposed that prior research on NPM-type of reforms concentrated on advanced economies at the expense of their developing counterparts. The following chapter develops these themes by presenting a review of literature applicable to the key research question posed in section 1.2 above.
Chapter 2

Literature Review
2.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the body of literature that informs this study and, in turn, on which the study seeks to build. The literature examined in this chapter is presented and discussed in three substantive parts.

The first part offers definitional issues to make sense of New Public Management reforms (hereafter NPM). Primarily, the literature surrounding NPM is explored to understand its theoretical anchoring which informs the various dimensions of change common in NPM model.

The second part offers a general overview of the literature on NPM in economically advanced countries. This is done because it is in these countries where the original conceptualisation and application of NPM model began, and to set a suitable backdrop for the third part of this chapter. Section 2.3.1 offers an historical overview of uptake of NPM in developed economies. Next in section 2.3.2 a discussion on the adoption of NPM-type of initiatives is offered. The focus here is on tracing factors that gave rise to the use of such reform measures. Section 2.3.3 pays particular attention on implementation process of these measures in these countries. The section concludes with assessment of impact of these reform measures across developed economies in 2.3.4.

The third part of this chapter reviews aspects of the literature on NPM model within a broader international context, with specific focus on the experiences of developing countries. In doing so, section 2.4.1 discusses global transfer of NPM to developing countries, in order to understand the adoption process of this reform model. In section 2.4.2, the implementation phase of NPM is considered. Next, in section 2.4.3, focus is placed on evaluation of NPM measures in these countries, thereby on assessing the impact of such reform measures against purported benefit as claimed by NPM proponents. Finally, a conclusion is offered that summaries the key themes of the chapter in section 2.5.
2.2 NPM Model: Definitional Issues

That something called NPM exists is not disputed in the literature. However, what remains to be agreed is the actual meaning of NPM (see for example, Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 1995; OECD, 1995). Emphasising this point, Schedler & Proeller (2002: 163) maintain that ‘it’s no secret that there exists no such thing as one NPM reform model’. NPM is a generic term conceptualised differently in the literature by different scholars (Barzelay, 2001; Dunleavy et al., 2005). This has led Manning (2001) to conclude that NPM is a ‘slippery’ term.

Despite the difficulty with finding a common understanding of NPM, there is however some agreement by scholars on its theoretical and ideological origins. NPM rests on the twin doctrine of removing the differences between the public and private sectors, and shifting ‘ways of doing business’ in public organisations away from ‘complying with procedural rules’ towards ‘getting results’ (Cope et al., 1997). In this way, NPM asserts the superiority of the market over the state; reflecting the New Right movement’s way of managing public sector through reorganising public bodies to bring their management, reporting and accounting methods closer to the methods of the private sector. Thus, NPM is said to maximise productive and allocative efficiencies that are claimed to be hampered by the traditional bureaucratic arrangements dominant in public sector organisations by looking at the market for solutions.

The diverse aspects of NPM have been stressed in different countries and by different commentators and advocates aimed at making government work better (Ferlie et al., 1996; Hood, 1991 & 1995; Kaliboolian, 1998; Pollitt, 1993; OECD, 1995). Despite these differences, it is evident that the characteristic elements of NPM are founded on a set of shared principles. Hood (1991: 4-5) provides the best approach by identifying the following ‘doctrinal components’ of NPM. They are:

- hands-on professional management;
- explicit standards and measures of performance;
• greater emphasis on output controls;
• a shift to disaggregation of units in the public sector;
• a shift to greater competition;
• a stress on private sector styles of management practice; and
• more stress on more discipline and frugality in resource use.

These ‘doctrinal components’ of NPM can be further described as follows. First, public managers have autonomy to manage both personnel and financial resources with accountability. In this sense, public service managers are given operational discretion and, in doing so, maintain hands-off relations with elected officials (Christensen & Laegreid, 2006). Second, emphasis is placed on measuring performance in the public service through use of goals, targets and indicators that can be quantitatively measured. In this way, emphasis is placed on the reporting of results in government organisations and, in turn, using this data to give rewards or penalties. Third, control over output is enhanced. Here, emphasis is on results achieved as opposed to process involved. Fourth, a clear distinction is drawn between a purchaser and provider, achieved through separation of functions into a quasi-market. This distinction can be within government or can be between government and the private sector. This practice entails unbundling large government departments to create smaller units with clearer missions (i.e. single-purpose agencies). These units would be independent from central control but held responsible for results by elected officials (Graham & Roberts, 2004). Fifth, emphasis is placed on enhancing competition between public agencies through tendering processes. A competitive environment, accordingly, is designed to help lower costs and improve standards. Sixth, prominence is given to private sector management techniques and practices such as performance management systems, which are meant to enhance managerial capacity and capability in the public sector. Last, prudence of resource use is emphasised within government organisations in a drive to do more with less.

The fact that the aggregate list of claimed NPM principles is both long and wide-ranging creates problems in terms of what exactly falls within the definitional
scope of NPM. In this thesis it is argued that the WITs initiative, despite its origins in Asian countries such as Japan and Singapore, is part of the NPM movement. Like many NPM reforms, WITs had its origins in the private sector; in this instance the highly influential Total Quality Management/Japanese management literature which sought to explain the extraordinary success of Japanese manufacturing in the 1970s and 1980 (Armstrong 1998). The fundamental principle of WITs is highly consistent with NPM rhetoric, that is, the emphasis on devolving decision-making power/authority to people at the level where a service is delivered so that organisations can be more responsive to changing needs of the 'customers'.

As will be shown in Chapter 3, WITs is a variant of TQM movement which was originally designed for the private sector but was subsequently adopted in the public sector settings to enhance quality in service delivery. As such TQM - in line with NPM principles - is very much concerned with transforming the culture of service in public sector organisations. Teicher et al., (2002: 386) highlight this point noting that ‘by its nature NPM is concerned with TQM: it is a contemporary, customer-focused approach, which aims at improving the delivery of public service quality.’ Furthermore, Scharitzer and Korunk (2000 cited in Stringham 2004) find TQM nicely dovetailing with NPM’s focus on the customer and its need to perform in a more citizen-oriented way. Examples are offered in the extant literature of WITs being adopted as an NPM measure. Quah (1996 cited in Lam 1997: 407), for instance, shows that in its implementation of NPM, Singapore:

‘adopted the zero-growth strategy and financial capping to minimize redundancy management. Efficiency has become the sole criterion for retaining senior civil servants, and work improvement teams have been introduced in the Singapore civil service to allow staff from various levels to discuss problems and solutions.’
To this end, Hur, (2009: 847) argues that TQM has more recently been considered to be a significant theoretical and practical basis for administrative reforms after the emergence of NPM in the 1980s and now is positioned as a leading innovation engine for NPM practices. In this way, WITs can be justified as an NPM reform measure meant to enhance quality in public service delivery through adoption of business-like practices in the way government is managed, despite its origins outside the Western developed economies. Its use in the public sector is consistent with NPM doctrinal components of making government administration more efficient and customer focused.

NPM has attracted a lot of criticism at both theoretical and practical levels. At the theoretical level, critics argue that despite being presented as a marriage of converging ideas – specifically new institutional economics and managerialism – the union is not a completely happy marriage free from tensions (Vabø, 2009: 4). In a similar vein, Aucoin (1990) suggests that these two sets of ideas are in sharp tension: on one hand, managerialism requires a politics/administration dichotomy while, on the other end, public choice repudiates it. To others, this tension signifies the weak theoretical foundation on which NPM builds (see Ingraham, 1996; Olsen, 1996 & 1997; Christensen & Laegreid, 1999). Accordingly, Christensen & Laegreid (1999: 169) regard NPM as a rather incoherent reform wave, comprising a combination of ideological and instrumental elements that are partly inconsistent and contradictory. In this view, NPM concepts are depicted as a loose and multifaceted offering, a kind of ‘shopping basket’ of different elements for reform of public administrations (Pollitt, 1995). Consequently, the contradictory elements within NPM create tension between different parts of NPM package, with the potential to negatively impact on the overall success of the NPM reforms in practice (Christensen & Laegreid, 2002; Pollitt, 1995).

NPM is also criticised for making economic value paramount for public organisations. The importation of business values into the public sector, such as functional rationality, cost effectiveness and productivity, is therefore perceived to be in sharp contrast to traditional values of public administration.
Pollitt (2003), for example, argues that NPM with its emphasis on efficiency tends to undermine other important traditional public administration values such as trust, fairness, impartiality, predictability, honesty, equity, continuity, security, due process, and political control. Others maintain that bringing business values in government has led to the erosion of public service values such as professionalism, neutral competence, and public interest, posing a threat to value-oriented public service (Skalen, 2004; Haque, 2007). These values, it can be said, traditionally set apart public administration from private/business management.

Moreover, although the rise of NPM has been presented by its proponents as an inevitable historical shift from one paradigm to another or even a new administrative orthodoxy in public management (Barzelay, 1992; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; OECD, 1995; Olsen, 1997; Osborne & Plastrik, 1997; Hughes 1998; Kettl, 2000), critics maintain that there is nothing ‘new’ about the NPM model. Instead, to them, many of the NPM innovations seem to be a delayed response to ideas, developed in the 1960s or even earlier, which were not readily applied to the public service during that time (Dunleavy & Hood, 1994; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000; Box et al., 2001) Similarly, Hood (1991) questions the novelty of NPM trend, ultimately dismissing its core principles as ‘old wine in new bottles’, in reference to their similarity to those of earlier classical business management.

Overall, NPM can be regarded as a loose term with varying elements. Despite such diversity, however, there have been elements that have been given prominence and consistency in the literature. In particular, the ‘doctrinal components’ highlighted by Hood is adopted in this thesis as it shares broad agreement on the content of NPM reforms package. In an effort to modernize their public services, many governments across the world since the 1980s embraced NPM-type of reforms, which underscored supremacy of business practices over bureaucratic arrangements that have guided public sector management over many decades.
2.3 NPM in the Developed Economies

Although this thesis is concerned with understanding the application and subsequent impact of NPM-type of reforms in a developing country, the NPM movement began in developed countries and the theoretical analysis of this movement is most extensive in developed countries. So, as James & Manning (1996) contend:

‘Any consideration of NPM in developing countries must commence unashamedly with some assessment of what it claimed to offer in its home territory of the OECD, and very particularly Commonwealth OECD, countries’ (cited in Manning, 2001: 298).

Thus, experiences of developed countries represent an invaluable point of departure. The section first explores history of NPM reforms in 2.3.1. Next, in section 2.3.2, the focus is placed on adoption of these reform measures among developed countries. Section 2.2.3 proceeds with discussion of the implementation of these reform efforts in developed economies. Section 2.2.4 offers an assessment of such reforms measures.

2.3.1 History of NPM

Barzelay (2000: 1) argues that for the better part of the 20th century, the once contested political and policy question about the role and structure of bureaucracy was settled. For him, this happened in the post war period (the ‘progressive era’ marked by increased interventionist government model), in which public administration and management were relegated to the background while attention was focused on other policy issues such as national security, economic performance and social security. Over this time, especially in the developed world, there was a surge of investment in infrastructure and an expansion of services by governments to provide for the much-needed reconstruction in the aftermath of WWII. Notably, the prevailing policy discourse accepted the necessity of government in the provision of many services in the
economy, while a reliance on private investment supply was cautioned because it could lead to some form of market failure. In Australia, for example, there was broad consensus that governments were more effective funding infrastructural and service development though Treasury loans than by the private sector (Wilenski, 1986 cited in Stephens, 2005). This strong interventionist character of government continued well into the 1960s, expanding into almost all sectors of the economy (Sarker, 2006: 180). The government, in this view, would therefore meet all the needs of its citizens ‘from cradle to grave’ (Osborne & McLaughlin, 2002). Effectively, public administration and management, during the course of the progressive era, was mainly seen as a process through which policies were formulated, resources allocated, and programs implemented, rather than representing a policy issue on its own (Barzelay, 2001).

However, this dominant discourse (i.e. interventionist model) came under increasing attack from the 1970s onwards in many of the developed countries (see Ramesh & Araral, 2010). A significant shift in policy circles challenged this expanded role of government in the economy and the way the public sector was organised and managed; for instance, to Bartley & Larbi (2004: 2):

‘The latter part of the twentieth century and early twenty-first century have seen the emergence of a more porous view of the nation state, and changed views of the role of government: it would perform fewer functions on its own and more in partnership with other actors. Associated with this change in public policy about what the state was to do was a consequential change in how it was to act.’

Thus, there was a new perspective in the role of government in the nation’s development efforts and this shift brought changes in the way traditional public administration acted in pursuit of its mandate. The result was the emergence of works by critics deriding government bureaucracy. The mobilisation of anti-bureaucratic sentiments or bureaucracy bashing, although nothing new1, gained

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Gay (2000: 62) indicates that anti-bureaucratic sentiments have been a pervasive but not uniform part of political discourse for over a century in many of the advanced economies.
prominence in the 1980s, with politicians such as Ronald Regan and Margaret Thatcher in the US and UK respectively, leading the campaign (see, for example, Light, 1999). Elsewhere, other stakeholders in the reform process such as ‘policy entrepreneurs’/management consultants (Hood & Jackson, 1991; Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Saint–Martin, 1998; Fyson, 2009) played an increasingly visible role in defining the boundaries of reform debate. In particular, Osborne & Gaebler’s influential work, Reinventing Government (1992), called for change in the way bureaucracy operated through adoption of an ‘entrepreneurial government’ model. The rally against bureaucracy assumed different terminologies such as ‘market-based public administration’ (Lan & Rosenbloom, 1992), ‘post-bureaucratic’ model (Barzelay, 1992) and ‘managerialism’ (Pollitt, 1990), but a common idea among these models was the need to turn back the pervasive role played by government in the economy and, in so doing, a reassessment of the tasks and functions of government, including the adoption of new approaches to organising and managing public services. All these changes are aspects of new public management (NPM).

NPM embodied several intellectual foundations (Gruening, 2003; Hughes, 1998; Kaboolian, 1998). Hood (1991), who probably coined the term NPM, summarised the ideas behind NPM as a marriage of opposites: on one hand, Hood identified the new institutional economics, especially public-choice theory and principal-agent theory, derived from Arrow (1963) and Niskanen’s work, Representative Government and Bureaucracy (1971), as foundational point of reference for NPM. In particular, Niskanen’s work captured the central debate on governance. In this perspective, bureaucrats in pursuit of their own interests largely undermined representative government. In this context, bureaucrats remained in a much stronger position than elected officials and, for that reason, mechanisms were needed to reassert the primacy of the elected officials over bureaucrats with respect to both budgets and policy. In a more general sense, these perspectives cast the problem of bureaucracy as one of ‘control’ and, as a result, the apparent crisis in representative governance in modern administrative state was to be restored by, among other things, giving elected representatives power to tame the autonomy of bureaucrats (Aucoin, 1990;
Peters, 1996; Gay, 2000). Importantly, new institutional economics placed particular emphasis on the use of market-like arrangements (such as purchaser-provider split, service specification and contracts) in government. This was supposed to make governments pay less attention to direct service provision and more on ensuring that things are done; that is, ‘steering not rowing’ (Vabø, 2009: 3).

On the other hand, Hood also recognised managerialism as another theoretical foundation in the emergence of NPM. The ideology of managerialism held that better management offers societies the best chance of material success. Managerialism, in this way, underscored the supremacy of private sector or business administration over traditional public administration in advancing societal welfare. In this view, bureaucracies were perceived as limited in managing modern complex organisations. The managerialists problematised the defects of bureaucracy in terms of its failure to work more like a commercial enterprise (Ingraham, 1996; Gay, 2000; Flynn, 2000). Managerialism, therefore, represented a shift in bureaucratic ideas of public administration towards market-based structures and procedures.

Taken together, new institutional economics ideas and managerialism have had a significant impact on the ways in which public sector were to be organised for the purpose of improved governance and management of public affairs (Aucoin, 1990).

2.3.2 Adoption of NPM

NPM has its roots in certain Anglo-Saxon countries. The first movers were the United Kingdom and the United States of America, followed by national governments of commonwealth countries, particularly New Zealand and Australia. While the scope and extent of reforms varied among advanced economies, Anglo-Saxon countries were leaders in uptake of NPM as they undertook radical reforms in their public services. Another group of countries that was less radical, preferring a slow uptake in these measures, included
France, Holland and Canada. A third group, comprising the so called laggards, that have been quite reluctant or cautious adopters of NPM, includes countries such as Germany and Japan (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2003; Peters, 2001).

In general, uptake of NPM among developed countries was distinguished by a high degree of commitment from both political and bureaucratic leaders that something must be done to address perceived problems in government. This remarkable degree of consensus among political leadership in the West therefore provided much needed support for adoption of NPM measures as solutions to identified challenges faced by governments (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000).

Equally important in adoption of NPM ideas and practices in advanced economies were for-profit private consultants. Saint-Martin (1998: 546) noted that in the UK, for example, firms such as Peat Marwick organized seminars for civil servants and consultants and published books advocating for adoption of NPM reforms.

In comparative terms, another key factor was that reform in these developed countries was conditioned by choices of public service leaders with less pressure from outside/external bodies such as IMF or World Bank. The implication of such choice was a significant variation in terms of strategies adopted to address context-specific challenges each nation faced. In that sense, path-dependency best describes adoption of NPM in much of the advanced economies (Christensen & Laegreid, 2004).

The discussion below focuses on the factors that gave rise to uptake of NPM among developed countries and also highlights the significance of context. In other words, the different circumstances in each of the individual economies led to the emergence, in practice, of cross-national variation, thereby lacking the common identity intended by many NPM reformers (see, for example, Mathiasen, 1999).
NPM emerged in response to common pressures and opportunities that swept through many of the developed countries from the 1970s onwards. In particular, four such factors have received wider attention in the literature: economic, institutional, political and ideological changes (OECD, 1995; Polidano, 1999; Borins, 2001: 2002; Wise, 2002; Kettl, 2005; Lee & Haque, 2006). The four factors are briefly discussed below.

First, most of the economies of the West experienced fiscal and economic pressures in the aftermath of the 1970s recession that brought various challenges, including increased unemployment and high inflation, often culminating with higher taxes. Against such a background, many economies began to stall in the face of international competition that was compounded by a worldwide recession. In such an environment, public sectors across much of the developed world became a convenient scapegoat for challenges afflicting their economies. As Hays & Kearney (1997: 15) noted:

‘The nation’s inability to compete effectively in the international marketplace was blamed, at least in part, on “excessive regulation” and other manifestations of big government.’

Much of the developed world therefore launched NPM reforms primarily to escape economic stagnation and in turn facilitate economic growth. This was to be achieved through cuts on excess waste in the public service and minimising the scope and extent of state involvement in the economy, among many other measures.

Second, there were profound social and technological changes in the 1970s onwards that altered institutional landscape in most of these countries. For example, demographic changes meant that societies in the West were getting older and with that changes in the way government provided services had to change to meet the needs of the new constituents. At the same time, changes in technology brought significant changes in the way society at large conducted
business. Thus, these changes involved altering underlying assumptions, attitudes and expectations on government services (OECD, 1998).

Third, developed countries experienced profound changes in the 1970s and 1980s in their political and ideological contexts. In particular, many experienced a radical shift away from Welfarism that had proved to be the dominant model of social provision in the post-war period. This significant shift was largely driven by New Right political forces and ideologies marked by anti-Welfarism and anti-statism sentiments (Clarke, Gewirtz & McLaughlin, 2000; Clark, 2000). The underlying concern of this movement was that an interventionist state was not good for the economy as it suffocated private investment. As a solution they sought to trim the state and liberate the market forces through such measures as privatization and deregulation, and monetary and fiscal policy. At the same time market concepts and incentives were imported into the public sector itself (Clark, 2000). Pollitt (1993: 44) sums up the logic of this movement as one of ‘…cutting the size of public sector and increasing the efficiency of what was left’.

Fourth, the traditional administration system became a subject of considerable debate in the 1970s. This followed sustained poor performance of public sector organisations leading to an increased sense of insecurity and loss of confidence in government in many of these countries. Here, public sectors traditionally played an expanded role in provision of social and public services to citizens. In New Zealand, for example, the authorities believed that improved performance of the general economy was hampered by the large public sector. Describing the state of affairs, Bale & Dale (1998: 104) noted:

‘Government departments were viewed as bloated, inefficient, and poorly managed. The bureaucracy behaved in ways that stereotypically undermined the capability of any government and service delivery was poor. Departments habitually exceeded their budgets; unused balances were spent in end-of-year shopping spree; creative accounting was used
to give the appearance of good performance; and the management of asserts and cash was haphazard.’

These developments resulted in increased attacks on bureaucracy and crystallised growing concerns about the quality of provision of social services and failure to meet citizens’ expectations (Bach & Kessler, 2007; Common, 1998; Minogue, 1998; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; OECD, 1998). Consequently, the expectations of citizens for these services tended to run ahead of what government organizations were able to achieve (OECD, 1998; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). The weakness of the state bureaucracy therefore led to the search for alternative ways of organizing and managing public services and a redefining of the state to give more prominence to markets and competition (Bartley & Larbi, 2004: 31).

In light of the above, NPM-type of reforms can be seen as broadly common response to common problems and opportunities identified in developed countries. However, the form that NPM reforms took in different developed countries varied.

As was discussed in sections 2.2 above, various NPM strategies were shaped in reaction to perceived problems. Figure 2.1 below illustrates this understanding of NPM strategies in the context of developed countries. NPM, on one hand, delivers a supply-driven concept that culminated with a ‘NPM toolbox.’ Individual governments demand remedies against particular problems they faced. Notably, the supply of instruments through NPM and the demand to counteract specific problems are matched by varying the priorities of certain NPM elements within local reform agenda. In this way, NPM elements that are suitable to counteract identified problems are given greater prominence (Schedler & Proeller, 2002). Hence, governments vary in what they take from the bundle of NPM elements (see, for example, Hood, 1996; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000; Wise, 2002) and researchers have demonstrated the transformation in both the meaning and content of these elements from one country to another (Christensen et al., 2002; Bouckaert & Pollitt, 2000).
Christensen & Laegreid (1999), for example, showed how adoption of NPM in the Scandinavian countries assumed distinctly national features. Using the case of NPM in Continental Europe, Schedler & Proeller (2002) suggest that though inspired by developments elsewhere, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries, European nations developed their own response measures from NPM ‘shopping list’ and adapted them to suit their own specific environments. Expressing similar sentiments, Kickert (2002: 1472) in his study of small continental European nations of Netherlands, Belgium and Austria, had this to say:

‘The assertion that administrative reforms in Western countries converge towards one common ‘new public management’ is too simple. Managerial reforms may be inevitable because of the underlying budgetary stress, but the national circumstances do matter, do exert influence, and do differ.’

Overall, it can be concluded that adoption of NPM in developed countries has varied from country to country. When the NPM-related reform ideas and
elements reach new contexts, they are therefore transformed to meet domestic socio-economic, cultural and political landscape.

### 2.3.3 Implementation of NPM

As was indicated in earlier sections of this chapter, NPM ideas sought comprehensive transformation of public services. Primarily, the intent was to break from established traditional ways of organising and managing public services by bringing in new arrangements from the private sector. Translating such ideas into practice, however, required presence/availability of key elements/factors. This section examines efforts in developed countries towards translating NPM ideas in practice and factors that impeded or facilitated implementation of NPM reforms.

There were various features that characterised NPM implementation process in developed countries, but five that facilitated successful implementation of NPM initiatives are highlighted here.

First, the process was state-led and primarily top-down directed. Key institutional arrangements were therefore established or existing ones mandated to take charge of this process. In New Zealand, for example, the powerful Treasury was at the forefront of designing and implementing these reforms. The same applied in other countries like Denmark and Finland, where Ministries of Finance took charge of the process. At the same time, top officials played an instrumental role in guiding these changes across government (see Gregory & Christensen, 2004; Scott *et al.*, 1997). In this way, the political leadership and senior bureaucrats internally drove implementation of these reforms. Here, there was little influence from external actors (i.e. IMF or World Bank) in the process, meaning that governments, at their own pace and scale, directed the process as they deemed fit. Thus, individual governments internally directed management of these changes.
Second, and related to the first, implementation of these reforms amongst developed countries was marked by active involvement by senior political leadership. In this way, the process was characterised by high level of political commitment and sense of ownership by reforming governments. In the UK, for instance, successive governments from the Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher to Labour under Tony Blair played an instrumental role in ensuring that the NPM initiatives were vigorously implemented (Minogue, 2001; Polidano, 2001). Elsewhere in New Zealand and Australia, which are widely presented as exemplary case of successful reformers, the political leadership were also in the forefront of implementation process. Effectively, a strong sense of ‘ownership’ of these change efforts by the political leadership proved crucial in providing and sustaining high level of political commitment towards implementation of these initiatives (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000).

Third, although the language of these reforms promoted large-scale and comprehensive changes in public services, governments in developed countries proceeded with gradual changes. To Polidano (2001), the general trend amongst economically advanced Commonwealth countries (except in the case of New Zealand) witnessed an incremental approach towards implementing these changes. In this way, these countries avoided the danger of comprehensive overhaul of their public service by limiting themselves to what they could adequately handle. Over-ambitious reform efforts were therefore avoided in favour of gradual process.

Fourth, implementation of civil service reforms in developed countries manifested within well-defined institutional frameworks. Two key issues defined the institutional framework in these countries. First, the competency of public sector leaders meant that the institutional ‘capacity’ within the public service was strong enough, in terms of requisite skill and experience, to undertake reforms of such magnitude. Bale & Dale (1998), for example, showed that a relatively competent civil service with little concern about corruption and nepotism marked the institutional context within which these reforms evolved in New Zealand. Second, the legal/political authority was given to public sector
leaders to manage the reform process. For example, at departmental levels, Chief Executive Officers were primarily in charge of driving the implementation process. To facilitate such development, departmental CEOs were granted powers comparable to those of their counterparts in the private sector, thereby allowing them to make necessary decisions to bring about successful change (Scott et al., 1997).

Fifth, implementation of these reforms was largely pursued within a well-defined strategy. For instance, Minogue (2001) writes of a well-articulated strategy on the basis of a systematic blueprint guiding implementation of the reforms in New Zealand. Even in the case of UK, where there was no formal strategy, it was clear that implementation was not undertaken haphazardly. In this way, coherent and clear strategy marked implementation process.

Although implementation of NPM amongst most of the advanced economies was undertaken within a favourable environment and well articulated strategies, there were still challenges encountered in the process. In some countries political support for NPM initiatives was lacking. In Canada, for example, political leaders did not show the same enthusiasm as in other developed economies such as UK and New Zealand (Peters & Savoie, 1994). This lack of support on the part of political leaders meant that public service reforms were not pursued with vigour.

Additionally, the pervasive role played by for-profit private consultants in the entire NPM reform process, including the implementation phase, attracted a lot of criticism in some of the developed countries. In the UK, for example, opposition Labour MPs from the early 1990s began questioning the increasing sums of money spent on consultants for work that some of the MPs thought could have been done in-house by civil servants (Milward, 1990 cited in Saint-Martin, 1998: 546). The role played by consultants in this sense marginalised bureaucrats in the reform process and was seen as costly. This was especially evident in UK under Thatcher administration where consultants associations penetrated the public policy process. Consequently, the growing use of for-profit
consultants led to issues of decline in morale and conflict between senior bureaucrats and their political masters (Osborne & McLaughlin, 2002).

In sum, the implementation of NPM reforms amongst developed nations was generally pursued with much consideration given to contextual peculiarities obtaining in each jurisdiction. Importantly, the implementation process was internally and top-down directed by committed political leadership and empowered managerial cadre. Not only was there able and committed leadership guiding implementation process, the administrative capacity within these countries was generally well developed to deal with changes of such magnitude. An effective strategy was also put in place to ensure successful implementation of the initiatives. In this way, the context within which these reforms were implemented across developed countries was sufficiently sound to effect purported changes in public services.

2.3.4 Success of NPM

Evaluation of NPM reforms is presented generally as a difficult endeavour in the literature (this concern is detailed in section 2.4.3 of this chapter). Despite these difficulties, it is widely agreed that the reforms should be evaluated in order to assess their effects on the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of public services (Pollitt, 1995; Broadbent & Laughlin, 1997; Boston, 2001; Jones & Kettl, 2003; Holkeri & Summa, undated paper), especially given the strong emphasis in the NPM model on performance and result assessment. Emphasising this point, Holkeri & Summa (undated: 1) rightly point out, 'it is natural that the reform programmes themselves should be evaluated'.

Evaluation comes in two forms: the assessment initiated by stakeholders in the reform process and academic studies. Before an overview of the academic literature is offered, a brief discussion will be presented of existing evaluation efforts by stakeholders in the reform process (i.e. consultants, research agency of supranational institutions, and public sector leaders (i.e. senior bureaucrats and politicians).
The role played by consultants in the evaluation of NPM has been significant. In many of the advanced economies, the role of consultants in the NPM reform process goes beyond just providing advice to cover the whole phase of the project and includes evaluation. Indeed, there have been a number of substantial reports produced by consultancy firms assessing NPM reforms. In Switzerland, for example, Rieder & Lehmann (2002: 27) offer the following observation:

‘Evaluations of NPM reforms have been carried out for over four years. Most of these were done by private firms and commissioned by project management of the respective public management reform projects.’

There has also been internal evaluation of NPM in developed countries. In particular, senior bureaucrats and politicians were at the forefront providing (mostly positive) assessments of such initiatives. Despite the large number of in-house evaluation works in most public services of developed economies, however, they were reportedly not far reaching. Broadbent & McLaughlin (1997: 498), in reference to Next Step and other initiatives in UK, concluded:

‘Neither these nor any other of the reports engaged in a wide-ranging evaluatory discourse with all stakeholders to explore the real effectiveness of these changes.’

The absence of detailed, evidence-based evaluation work on NPM reforms has given way to unsubstantiated claims by public sector leaders, and particularly politicians, purporting positive benefits following the implementation of these reform measures. In other words, there has been more rhetoric about the usefulness of NPM by public sector leaders than substantive evidence.

Another stakeholder purporting to engage in the evaluation of NPM reforms is supranational institutions, such as the OECD. Especially though its meetings and publications (i.e. Public Management Committee (PUMA)), OECD monitors
NPM developments, including their impact, among member states (Jones & Kettl, 2003). These evaluations have generally lauded the success of NPM reforms. This strong support, however, is not based on systematic research, even in OECD member countries. The Finnish Finance Ministry, for example, undertook a study that raised pertinent questions about evaluation of such reform initiatives. The project found that no thorough evaluation of public management reforms was made and it suggested that such endeavour should be prioritised. Unfortunately, it took many more years before a programme was started for this purpose (Holkeri & Summa, undated: 1).

There is, however, a growing body of work by scholars assessing the NPM reforms in advanced economies. In particular, a lot of work is often focused on one or a few countries, for example, Switzerland, UK and Finland (Rieder & Lehmann, 2002; Broadbent & Laughlin, 1997; Holkeri & Summa, undated paper). Cross-country studies are also available but limited. Pollitt & Bouckaert (2000) however provides a comprehensive comparative analysis of ten Western nations across three continents to assess these reform measures.

The picture emerging from the literature on the results of these initiatives is complex. Two positions are expressed. First, there are those who argue that these reforms have been largely unsuccessful. To them, the rhetoric of reform has far exceeded the substance (OECD, 2005). For example, Levy (2004: 166) observed that ‘the desired end state is an ideal to be realised.’ He further states:

‘Even under the most favourable circumstances, transforming traditional bureaucracies into the dynamic, customer friendly, market facing, innovative, financially accountable and decentralised organisations iconised by NPM zealots is by definition a utopian undertaking. The larger the scope of the reform, the less attainable it is and change becomes a process without end.’
The message therefore is that the reality of NPM reform has not lived up to its rhetoric.

Second, there are those who have taken a much more measured approach, arguing that these reform efforts have produced mixed results across these countries, with both positive and negative impacts.

On a positive note, success was realised in terms of cutting spending in government expenditure in most of the developed countries through extensive reductions in government staffing levels. Halligan (1997 cited in Minogue, 2001: 37) indicated that radical changes in New Zealand brought about 60 per cent reduction in the size of the public service. Reductions in staff complements were also realised in other countries, including Australia and UK. The result was a reduction of government outlays as a percentage of GDP (Halligan, 2001).

Moreover, others have argued that the implementation of these reforms inculcated a new culture of management in the public services focused on results instead of processes. Managers were empowered to take decisions in their respective areas of responsibility, which ensured that delays were minimised in service delivery. With increased accountability placed on managers, better management achieved reductions in wastage. Accordingly, Schick (1996) concluded that New Zealand was better managed than was previously the case as a result of implementing these measures.

Less sanguine assessments have, however, suggested that the initial cuts to government outlays were sometimes subsequently reversed. Instead of delivering on its central claims, especially of lowering costs in the public service, nothing concrete was achieved in the long run (Hood, 1995). While the experiences of early adopters such as New Zealand and Australia were encouraging in the initial stages of public sector reforming, results were not encouraging as the reforms continued. For example, there has been expansion in the middle levels of the bureaucracy to deal with new reporting and accounting systems, thereby increasing costs (Schick, 2001).
Furthermore, rather than reducing government agencies through structural changes, NPM has in fact resulted in an increase in smaller separate central agencies. New Zealand, lauded by many as pioneer and success case of NPM, ended with well over three hundred separate central agencies and forty tiny ministries servicing a population of 3.5 million people (Dunleavy et al., 2005). The same breakup of agencies was repeated in many other parts of the developed world (Ferlie et al., 1996). In this way, critics argue that NPM increased administrative fragmentation in these countries and, as a result, brought to the surface costly duplication of similar functions by these separate agencies. In addition, such autonomous bodies brought even more challenges of coordination and control across the public services (Schick, 2001).

Claims of better management in the public service as a result of implementing these reforms have also been challenged. Critics argue that NPM has actually brought more confusion in the way public services are managed. For instance, in their study of administrative reforms in Norway, Laegreid et al. (2005 cited in Christensen & Laegreid, 2006: 117) found that responsibility for hospitals was in 2002 transferred from counties to central government but new management principles for the hospitals based on decentralised enterprise were set up. Furthermore, the hospitals changed their organisational form from public administration bodies to health enterprises. They concluded:

‘The reform thus implied centralisation, decentralisation, and commercialisation at the same time.’

Critics also claim that the promised empowerment of managers has not been achieved. In particular, control by the politicians instead of empowerment has often proved to be the case. In New Zealand, for example, it has been shown that central government control over schools have been strengthened through implementation of these measures. Tooley (2001 cited in Jones & Kettl, 2003: 6) argues that the changes have turned school principals into managers instead of skilled leaders and, ultimately, wrestled control over education from
educators into the control of politicians. To Schick (2001: 2), ‘managers had a narrow view of their work’ as a result of NPM.

There have also been unintended consequences following implementation of NPM reforms. Halligan (1997), for example, argues that in New Zealand NPM reforms brought about a plethora of challenges for society. This included high social costs, high unemployment, high inequality, growing distrust towards political responsibility and integrity, and declining income security, to mention but a few. Hence, implementation of these changes arguably brought more harm to communities than was intended to be the case.

Finally, there have been concerns raised about the tendency of NPM reforms to undermine other important public sector ethos or values which had previously marked a clear difference between the public and private sectors in terms of how they discharge their functions. Christensen & Laegreid (2002: 2006), for example, suggested that implementing these reforms (i.e. performance management system in the Norwegian public service) helped create an environment that largely undermined trust.

Overall, it is suggested that NPM reforms at best produced mixed results in many developed countries. Stacey & Norman (1997 cited in Norman, 2003: 15) note that ‘successes were most evident in the ‘hard’, visible areas of organizational life, while the greatest problems lay in ‘soft’, people-related issues such as the management of change’. The emerging picture has been that the positive outcomes of these measures have been exaggerated. This lack of success implies that the heyday of NPM may have passed, and the debate has shifted to other reform models in ‘leading edge’ countries of the West (Dunleavy et al., 2005).

While the efficacy of NPM increasingly is questioned in developed countries, however, in other parts of the world there has been a drive towards uptake of these measures - albeit with strong reservations raised about their appropriateness amongst these countries (Bale & Dale, 1998; Schick, 1998).
The next section considers experiences of developing countries with NPM model.

2.4 NPM in Developing Economies

This section reviews the literature on application of NPM-type of reforms in the context of developing countries. Consistent with that aim, the section is organised in three parts. The first part addresses the adoption of NPM-type reforms in developing countries. It begins with the transfer and subsequent adoption of such reform initiatives from developed economies to their less developed counterparts in section 2.4.1. In section 2.4.2, attention focuses on implementation of these reform measures in developing countries. Finally, section 2.4.3 addresses the outcomes of these reform measures amongst these countries.

2.4.1 Adoption of NPM

As was shown in sections 2.2 above, NPM has been characterised by claims of scientific status and global ambitions (Hood, 1995; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Haque, 2001; Jones & Kettl, 2003). Although NPM scientific claims have been disputed, there appears to be considerable agreement in the literature, by both advocates and critics, on the universal application of NPM\(^2\). Supporters of NPM claim that the advent of entrepreneurial government is both global and inevitable (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Hughes, 1998). Even many critics accept NPM has evolved into a new universal administrative orthodoxy, transcending specific national circumstances and government cultures (Borins, 2001; Olsen, 1997).

The ascendancy of NPM in developing countries comes in the wake of this reform model losing appeal in economically advanced countries (see, for

\(^2\) Turner (2002) also questions the universal applicability of NPM. He shows in his study that uptake of NPM by different countries was different ranging from enthusiastic adopters such as Singapore and at the other extreme end, Laos and Cambodia which did not show any signs of NPM uptake.
example, Dunleavy et al., 2005). Despite moving into the shadow of history in much of the developed world, Haque (2007; 179), admitted that NPM results are still with us in the legacy of practical reforms. This he attributes primarily to the lag in transferring administrative knowledge and techniques from the developed world to developing regions, with many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America still in the process of pursuing its remaining elements. Undoubtedly, many developing countries are experimenting with NPM ideas and practices to reform their ailing public services (Polidano & Hulme, 1999; Pollitt & Talbot, 2004). Moreover, McCourt (2002) provides an exhaustive list of countries, spanning Brazil, Jordan, Malaysia and Zambia among many others, which introduced NPM-type of reforms from the 1980s onwards. To him, this process followed on models introduced in key reforms in the developed countries like UK, Australia and New Zealand.

To NPM proponents, its global effect has been the homogenisation of administrative structures and processes. Others doubt the convergence claim; rather advancing divergence as the most likely outcome of the global diffusion process as countries choose what they preferred and found suitable for their specific context. In that sense, governments vary in terms of what they select from the NPM ‘shopping list’ and do transform in meaning and content selected elements to meet their individual experiences (Schick, 1998; Polidano, 1999; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000; Turner, 2002; Wise, 2002). In the specific context of developing countries, Common (1999; 429), captures this view, indicating that if examined on country-by-country basis, considerable variations emerge. He reached this conclusion after investigating uptake of NPM by bureaucracies in Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore. To him, despite sharing similar historical institutional arrangements, individual experiences in these countries with NPM did not bring about any uniformity in their bureaucracies. Yet still, as Pollitt (2001: 932) has found, the convergence claim persists despite scholarly evidence pointing towards global diversity.

To the extent to which there has been an international diffusion of NPM from developed to developing countries, one important analytical issue is the
mechanism through which such ideas and practices travel. Scholars underscore the importance of both internal and external mechanisms in the diffusion/transfer of NPM reforms. Internally, the list of transfer mechanisms includes the roles of the various actors such as elected officials, bureaucrats and academics. Externally, the list of identified key actors include policy entrepreneurs/consultants and supra-national/intergovernmental institutions (Boston, 1994; Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; Wright, 1997). Although both internal and external actors are acknowledged in the transfer process, the literature on developing countries pays more attention on external actors, especially international financial institutions and other donor agencies (Conteh & Ohemeng, 2009).

The World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other donor institutions dominate as transfer mechanisms for NPM in the case of developing countries. It is suggested that success of NPM reforms in the core reforming countries of the West got on the agenda of supranational institutions, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank and the IMF, all of which played a role in subsequently spreading NPM around the world (Christensen & Laegreid, 2006; Gruening, 2003). As noted by Dolowitz & Marsh (2000) these bodies influence national policy-makers both directly and indirectly.

This pervasive role played by external institutions/actors in the public sector reforms in developing countries is well documented in the literature (van de Walle, 2001; Owusu, 2005; McCourt, 2006: 2008). In particular, scholars suggest that these external institutions have in effect come to define the boundaries and process of public service reform agenda amongst many developing countries since the 1980s. Within NPM reforms in developing countries, donor agencies are presented as wielding too much power in the reform process (Polidano, 2001). Although donor agencies have a long history in development activities of less-developed countries, their involvement, especially the World Bank, in public management reforms activities is relatively new. Nunberg & Nellis (1995) maintain that before the 1980s the World Bank’s
involvement in civil service reforms was limited – with just occasional reports on public administration issues or support for staff training to strengthen local institutions. This changed, however, in the 1990s as increased need for structural adjustment policies (SAPs) drove the World Bank deeper into civil service reforms in these countries. Specifically, recognition of the worsening economic and fiscal state of these governments – posed by large government wage bills – provided the main reason for inclusion of the civil service reforms in Bank’s adjustment programs.

Arising out of the above and other factors, the 1980s and 1990s saw increasing use of policy conditionality attached to aid, especially that by World Bank and IMF to developing countries (Batley, 1999; Olowu, 2001). In the context of Africa alone, van de Walle (2001: 7 cited from Lockwood, 2005) captured the magnitude of this development, stating that:

‘Along with associated bilateral support, estimates are that, of aid going to Africa in 1990s, one third to a half was explicitly tied to policy reform that also covered the civil service.’ [My emphasis]

Other scholars observed similar trend in use of aid conditionality in public service reforms in Africa (Therkildsen, 2000; Bwalya, 2005; van de Walle, 2001). Beyond the confines of the African continent a similar picture emerges. For instance, Turkey’s reliance on foreign loans in post-war period meant that these bodies came to enjoy substantial influence upon its economic and political policies. Notably, subsequent reports by the OECD and the World Bank against failed European Union (EU) membership pointed to the need for Turkey to ‘foster internationalised best practise.’ The suggested way to foster such practices was the need to introduce NPM reforms (see, Sozen & Shaw, 2002: 478).

Donors therefore provided funding which, in turn, has assured them substantial leverage to direct the reform process in many countries of the South. In this process, they have not only strengthened their roles but also led to increasing
marginalisation of central state decision-making bodies to the benefit of ad hoc, donor-funded, parallel institutions (van de Walle, 2001: 61). This dominance of donor institutions helped undermine active involvement of local decision-makers in reform processes. For instance, a survey of African public services found that bureaucrats felt that they were not responsible for formulating policies, as Bretton Woods institutions (i.e. WB & IMF) have increasingly taken over this role. Hence, in comparison to their counterparts in Asia and Latin America, African bureaucrats did not themselves initiate many policies related to reforming their public services (Olowu, 2001: 119).

To this end, van de Walle (2001: 61) argued that the donors' role in the initiation of NPM reform process among these countries came to be accepted and institutionalised. Underscoring the dominance of these bodies in these reforms, Peters (1997: 72) concluded:

'What is notable ... about developing countries is that much of diffusion to these countries is done through donor agencies, so that the adoptions could hardly be seen as autonomous choices by governments; simply stated, the position of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund has been: no reform, no money.'

Echoing similar sentiments, Ayeni (2002: 1) stressed that:

'...particularly in the case of developing countries, international creditors and donor institutions have greatly contributed to the pressure on countries to fall in line with popular changes.'

In effect, developing countries had limited say in terms of the reform process as a result of the overextended roles played by donor agencies. In this sense, these governments are unlikely to reject such initiatives when they are put forward by donors which are providing important development assistance. In Malawi, for instance, civil servants consciously avoid raising objections to donor-financed initiatives in order not to be seen as 'a person who is blocking
aid’ (Hirschmann 1993: 126 cited in Polidano, 2001). Thus, through measures such as imposition of aid conditions to ailing economies in developing countries, such bodies are able to directly influence national policy-makers to adopt NPM initiatives; employing a carrot and stick approach, where those countries that comply are rewarded and those failing to do so are punished by being denied financial assistance.

In an indirect fashion these external bodies influence uptake of these measures through information sharing evident in their publications (i.e. PUMA publications) and conferences. For instance, the World Bank held civil service reform (CSR) workshops where participants were told to reform their public service in line with global trends. One commentator contends, ‘such trends, of course, called for key elements of NPM.’ Shand, from the OECD, is quoted informing delegates at the same workshop that, ‘NPM was not just another passing fad’ (Shand, 1996 cited in Marobela, 2008). Thus, the centrality of these international bodies in uptake of NPM across developing countries cannot be overemphasized (Sarker, 2006; Ohemeng, 2009).

Besides coercion, other transfer mechanisms, for example, mimetic process and policy learning have also played part in uptake of NPM initiatives in the context of developing nations (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). In the case of mimetic process, developing countries feel the urge to follow the latest international ‘best practice’ based on perceived success of leading reforming nations. In addition, policy learning by officials from developing countries has been important in uptake of NPM reforms (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). Highlighting this process, Boston (2001; 103) observed:

‘since the 1980s a steady stream of, if not a flood, of ministers, government officials, academics and consultants from many different parts of the world have made the long trek to the distant islands of New Zealand, and more specifically to its capital, Wellington, to examine first-hand the radical policy changes that have transformed that country’s system of public management.’
In a similar vein, Laking & Norman (2007) highlighted diverse forums, often convened by international agencies, which facilitate policy-learning process for NPM transfer to developing countries. These included the Commonwealth Advanced Seminar, jointly sponsored by the Commonwealth Secretariat and the New Zealand government, which has hosted since 1996 well over 400 public officials from across the Commonwealth countries and beyond. As well as offering an opportunity for participants to learn about New Zealand experience with NPM, it also provides a platform for reformers to share experiences about their domestic issues of reform.

Manning & Agere (2002) also emphasised the normative aspect of transmitting knowledge about these reforms. Different countries, as members of various international organisations, meet periodically to discuss topical issues such as governance practices. For instance, the 1991 Commonwealth meeting held in Harare, Zimbabwe highlighted the need for improved public sector management in the general development drive amongst member countries. Against that background, a declaration agreed by Heads of States and other senior government officials from member states was reached giving support and focus on public sector reforms.

Effectively, uptake of NPM reforms amongst developing countries was largely externally driven. Despite the predominance of coercion, other mechanisms of transfer such as explicit learning from NPM trendsetters such as UK and New Zealand were also visible (Lakin & Norman, 2007). Implications of this dominance by external institutions on implementation of these reform measures will be detailed in section 2.4.

The transfer of NPM ideas and practices to developing countries was meant to address perceived problems confronting their public services. In this way, the adoption of NPM reforms in these countries, as was the case with their economically advanced counterparts, also related to internal economic, political, ideological and administrative considerations.
Economically, most of the developing world endured increasing economic difficulties, especially from the late 1970s to well into the 1990s, culminating in widespread poverty and other socio-economic challenges. For instance, the sense of euphoria and hope that marked the transfer to self-rule in the 1960s, especially in sub-Saharan countries, was quickly replaced by a heightened sense of doubt and despair in much of these countries. An economic crisis, rooted in development policies adopted in preceding decades, was precipitated in the 1980s by various factors including a sharp fall in international commodity prices. The result was the emergence of unfavourable terms of trade, escalating budget deficits and increased foreign debt among many developing nations (Grindle, 1996; Mazur, 2000). Highlighting the severity of the impact of this crisis, many concluded that the period of the 1980s marked the ‘lost decade’ in these countries in general and those of sub-Saharan Africa in particular (van de Walle, 2001; Ayee, 2008).

The 1990s also brought economic challenges to many parts of developing world (Cheung, 2005). In Asia, economic difficulties in the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis have been advanced as highlighting the need for public sector reform measures. For example, the World Bank (2000; 8) described the situation in East Asia as follows:

‘Before the recent economic crisis that swept through the East Asia and Pacific Region, public institutions were largely thought to be working well, credited with the many virtues associated with the ‘Asian Miracle’...This view has changed in the wake of the past few years’ political and economic turmoil...’ (Cited in Cheung, 2002)

Furthermore, political and ideological considerations compelled many of these countries to adopt NPM reforms. In a more general sense, following attainment of self-rule, many developing countries (especially in Africa) embraced the idea of a strong state under one-party rule. There were different reasons for the consolidation of power by the centre, such as consideration for national unity.
and strong influence of socialist ideology (Tangri, 1999). However, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 signalled the triumph of capitalism over socialism and this had far reaching implications for countries of the South. In the aftermath of capitalist victory a wave of democratisation swept across in many of these countries in the 1990s onwards. In Africa, for instance, this period signalled an end to one-party politics and, in its place, brought in multi-party competitive democracies in places like Zambia, Tanzania and Malawi, to mention but a few (Bwalya, 2005). In this way, political and ideological changes provided stimuli for state reconfiguration, including its public services (ECA, 2003).

There were also problems associated with traditional public administration amongst many developing countries. In particular, three factors challenged the traditional bureaucratic models in these countries.

First, public services in developing countries were inherited from departing colonial powers rather than unfolding in their local circumstances. There is wide discussion elsewhere in the literature about the role of the public service during the colonial period, the common message being that public services were primarily crafted to serve the interests of the few colonisers at the expense of the local majority populace, especially in Africa. More specifically, the focus of colonial administration was on maintenance of law and order, with little investment in social services undertaken to serve the needs of local communities (Nkomo, 1986; Dia, 1993; Young, 1998).

Second, following self-rule, many public services in developing countries underwent a transformation that was meant to reorient them towards a new role in nation’s development drive (this issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5). This transformation was largely driven by the perception that there was no substantial difference in the behaviour of the new crop of bureaucrats compared to their colonial predecessors. Consequently, nationalist leadership called for a complete break from the past by establishment of new institutional arrangements under the banner of ‘indigenisation’ or ‘Africanisation’ in the public services (Amsden, 1971; Dia, 1993; Lange, 2009). In Africa, Amilcar
Cabral (1976 cited in Young, 1998: 101) clearly captures the intent of this movement, declaring:

‘We are not interested in the preservation of any of the structures of colonial state. It is our opinion that it is necessary to totally destroy, to break, and to reduce to ash all aspects of the colonial state in our country to make everything possible for our people.’

In many other countries the message was heeded. In Uganda under the Obote regime, for example, Africanisation efforts catapulted young officers to very senior positions of responsibilities without requisite qualifications and experience (Olowu, 2001). This was repeated elsewhere in the continent, and beyond, with far reaching consequences for the capacities and capability of public services (Nkomo, 1986).

Third, as was indicated above, arrangements in public services were often based on models of the West (i.e. Westminster system) that were comparable with circumstances where there was well-developed institutional capacity. Unfortunately, these circumstances were often absent in many developing countries. Public services of these countries were therefore characterised by inadequate capacity, in terms of human, finance and other resources. Scholars agree that many civil services in developing countries, especially in Africa, displayed a good performance record in early days following self-rule. Unfortunately, this was short lived as performance in these countries’ bureaucracies declined from the 1970s onwards (Olowu, 2001; Haruna, 2004; Bana & McCourt, 2006; Ayee, 2008). Mengesha & Common (2007: 369) highlight this problem of weak institutional capacity in their investigation of the Ethiopian public service system:

‘Following the consolidation of power, the Government also acknowledged the deep institutional constraints on basic functions such as policymaking, service delivery and regulation. Core public management systems at the federal and regional levels were hampered
by outdated civil service legislation and working systems; the absence of a medium-term planning and budgeting framework; ineffective financial and personnel management controls; inadequate civil service wages and inappropriate grading systems; poor capacity for strategic and cabinet-level decision-making; and insufficient focus on modern managerial approaches to service delivery.’

Additional problems befell many public services in much of the developing world that included patrimonialism, mismanagement and corruption (Therkildsen, 2001; Olowu, 1999: 2001; Bale & Dale, 1998; Schick, 1998; Lakin & Norman, 2007; Ayeni, 2002). In addition, overstuffed public services created more problems instead of providing much needed solutions. In other words, many public services were well equipped in terms of quantity but fell short in terms of quality in their institutional make-up. For instance, in its Africa adjustment report, the World Bank alluded to this problem:

‘Civil services are larger than countries need, more costly than they can afford, and less effective and productive than they should be.’ (World Bank 1994; 121 cited in Rodrik, 2000)

Against this background, NPM reforms were prescribed as possible solutions to many of the problems afflicting the bureaucracies of many developing countries. As was detailed in section 2.2 of this chapter, this meant streamlining in terms of size and scope of activity to improve their performance. Corruption and mismanagement were also to be addressed through introduction of managerial/business processes and practices.

Having outlined impetus for reforms in both developed and developing countries it is evident that the various factors identified exerted pressure differently across these country groups. The relative importance of pressure for reform in both developed and developing countries is summarised in Table 2.1 below. Economic (fiscal) considerations were important in both developed and developing countries, but other factors impacted differently. For example,
citizens demanded better services from public services in economically advanced economies but rarely in the case in developing countries, while pressure for reform from donor agencies has been much more significant in developing countries than in more affluent Western nations.
### Table 2.1: Pressure for reform by country group

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<tr>
<th>Pressure for reform</th>
<th>Developed countries</th>
<th>Developing countries</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal pressure</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen pressure</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary adoption</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>low/medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External pressure</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Adapted from James & Manning (1996)

Underpinning all this, however, was the assumption that public organisations were inefficient and, therefore, changes were needed to improve the performance of public services in developing countries through adoption and subsequent implementation of NPM (Owusu, 2005). This assumption was strongly held by the donor agencies that came to dominate the reform process in developing countries. This dominance meant that these bodies extended their involvement in the reform process by diffusing, designing, financing, and even managing the implementation and evaluation of the NPM initiatives. The involvement of local actors in the adoption phase of these reforms was severely undermined by such dominance. Of course, national governments have a strong stake in these initiatives, and this had significant consequences for the implementation of NPM reforms in developing countries.

#### 2.4.2 Implementation of NPM

The literature has paid much attention to the benefits of reforming public sectors in developing countries. To these scholars, the decision to adopt NPM initiatives seem to be inevitable and, thus, the tendency has been to neglect the circumstances under which these initiatives are implemented. In that sense, attention has been on the content of these policies, thereby neglecting the actors involved in the policy reforms (both at international and national levels), the processes contingent on developing and implementing these reform initiatives and the context within which the policy reforms are applied (Walt &
Gilson, 1994; Conteh & Ohemeng, 2009; Whitfield, 2006). This section reviews the relatively modest literature on implementation of NPM reforms in developing countries.

The preceding section 2.4.1 elaborated on the role of external actors in defining the contours of public management reforms in developing countries; indeed, it was suggested that NPM reform initiatives were often externally driven. By funding these initiatives, external institutions have taken the centre stage, not only in the adoption but also in the implementation phase of these programmes. In light of that, the NPM implementation process in many of these countries is not state-led but directed and controlled by external actors. Thus, compliance best describes the implementation of these initiatives given the lack of input on the part of local governments in many of these countries.

Once NPM reforms were formally adopted in developing countries – albeit with reservations in some - they were poorly implemented (Batley, 2004). Various factors account for this, but it is the institutional context within which these initiatives were implemented that raised the most serious challenges to their successful implementation. In other words, despite a recognition in the literature of the competing factors driving NPM reforms in developing countries, and how closely they intertwine with the complex local environmental elements (i.e. culture, politics and economy), there has been failure to apply context-specific solutions to deal with identified problems (see, for example, Haruna, 2004). Instead, what has emerged through NPM has been ‘institutional monocropping’ in which uniform institutional blueprints are imposed on developing countries based on idealised versions of Anglo-American institutions (Evans, 2004). Other scholars talk of ‘one best way’ (Rodrik, 2000) or ‘one-size-fit-all’ (Mkandawire, 2006) institutional models. Thus, transfer of NPM to developing countries has often involved the imposition in developing countries of what was considered ‘best practice’ in the developed world but, not surprisingly, stripped of its historical origins and devoid of context specificity.
The ‘institutional monocropping’ evident in much of the developing countries contrasts sharply with developments in developed countries, as was shown in earlier sections of this chapter, where each country developed its own reform concept in accordance with national peculiarities and defined its own strategies to guide the implementation process (Schedler & Proeller, 2002). The implications of this ‘institutional monocropping’ manifested in many ways, but four in particular are raised widely in the literature.

First, it is argued that the implementation of NPM initiatives failed to gain the necessary local support of both political leaders and senior bureaucrats. The dominant role played by external institutions resulted with what Therkildsen (2000: 61) referred to as a ‘fragile domestic political support’ for the reforms. Nunberg (1997) also identifies lack of political commitment and ownership by reforming governments as a key impediment to successful implementation of these measures, as did Quaresi (1998):

‘Apart from occasional official pro-reform statements by leading politicians, it is difficult to identify substantial political support for the reform package. For example, at an international gathering on civil service reform the Tanzanian minister responsible for public sector reform at the time stated that since no efficiency improvements from reforms had been achieved so far, there is a real problem in sustaining support for the reform agenda.’ (Cited in Therkildsen, 2000: 63)

Thus, the political will to engage in vigorous implementation of the reforms barely existed except where there were clear political benefits of the reforms to the national leaders. At the same time, lack of political support has been accentuated by lack of local ownership of the program given the role played by donor agencies in the process. For instance, in the 1990s the intense involvement by external financial institutions in Ethiopia created problems in the implementation of these reforms. In particular, a poor relationship marked the interaction between state officials and those of the funding institutions as a result of negative perception held by Fund officials about the country
(Mengesha & Common, 2007). As a result, the implementation process in these countries suffered from poor bank-country dialogue (Nunberg, 1997).

Second, some scholars suggest that poor implementation of NPM reforms is because they represent an inappropriate reform model for developing countries. The lack of context sensitivity of the NPM prescription offered by World Bank on the basis of perceived success of key reformers like New Zealand, for example, has raised concern from scholars who point to an absence of key precondition elements within developing countries (Bale & Dale, 1998; Therkildsen, 2000; Polidano, 2001; Sozen & Shaw, 2002; Santiso, 2004). Some, like Schick (1998), go as far as advising that developing countries should not implement these measures, because they did not have sufficient institutional capacity. Sarker (2006) underscored the necessity of institutional capacity in the implementation of NPM reforms in his study of Singapore and Bangladesh. In the case of Singapore, with strong institutional capacity within its public service, the implementation of these reform initiatives was impressive. However, Bangladesh with an insufficient capacity within its bureaucracy experienced difficulties implementing NPM measures.

Third, some critics argue that public management reforms in developing countries failed because they were too ambitious in the way they were implemented. In this sense, a grand approach seeking to address too many objectives simultaneously dominated, instead of an incremental approach (see, for example, Therkildensen, 2000). Klitgaard (1997: 497 cited in Polidano, 2001) makes this point in reference to performance incentives, ‘the idea of designing an incentive master-plan for every part of the civil service at once is misguided.’ Consequently, the implementation strategy failed to take into consideration the capacities of developing countries, in terms of their civil service and the available resources in pursuing comprehensive approach.

Fourth, flawed project design is seen by some commentators as having adversely affected the implementation of NPM reforms in many developing countries. For instance, in the case of Mauritius there was no clearly defined
implementation plan (McCourt, 2006). To him, although mission statements were produced, they lacked operational detail. In this way, reform efforts were undertaken in piecemeal fashion lacking integration and a holistic approach. Thus, implementation of these measures was pursued without a detailed strategic focus. This is not necessarily a contradiction with the third point raised above (i.e. having a comprehensive strategy does not mean doing everything at once).

All the above points suggest that implementation of NPM in developing countries was pursued with little consideration of specific contextual challenges faced by many developing countries. This has been encouraged by erroneous assumptions underpinning adoption of such reforms (see, for example, Owusu, 2005; Rosenbloom, 2002). In this way, the appropriateness of such reforms largely remained unquestioned by the reformers. Therkildensen (2000: 62) provides a good summary, which brings together the elements of the argument:

'It is in this context of economic and political liberalization, modest economic growth, severe budgetary constraints, poor public sector performance and substantial donor dependency that the paradox of public sector reform occurs. Multiple changes in the public sector are pursued despite fragile domestic political support for the reform package as a whole and despite few service delivery improvements on the ground.'

2.4.3 Assessment of results

This section explores the extant literature on the impact of NPM-type of reforms in the context of developing countries. Before this can be done, however, it is important to highlight the complexity of assessing NPM reforms both at the theoretical and practical levels. Conceptually, the exercise is primarily hampered by an absence of common methodological tools. For example, various scholars acknowledge the difficulty in establishing measurement for public sector productivity amongst nations (Hope, 1995; van de Walle, 2009).
Emphasising this point, van de Walle (2009) argues that although it is possible to label bureaucratic public sectors as efficient or poor, sound international comparative empirical evidence is generally not available and, compounding this difficulty, the indicators that do exist are often not reliable or are conceptually flawed. Pollitt (2002: 279) succinctly sums up this challenge:

‘Those that have been conducted [evaluations of NPM reforms] tend to suffer from some fairly fundamental conceptual and methodological limitations (which have sometimes been acknowledged, and on other occasions not).’

Furthermore, the shifting in conceptualisation of evaluation has also created difficulties for both researchers and practitioners. In particular, meaning of evaluation as a concept has expanded to incorporate changes reflected in the broader [i.e. development and organisational development] literature (Jackson & Kassam, 1998; Ingram, 2005). These changes have been more visible in the context of developing countries - with ubiquitous donor presence – where a shift in evaluation techniques away from the narrow technical focus towards a much broader and an all-inclusive model occurred (i.e. participatory evaluation). At the centre of this shift has been the conviction that evaluation should and can be used to empower local citizens to analyse and solve their own problems. In this way, there have been changes in meaning to better understand evaluation not just as a mere technical top-down exercise often professionally controlled by donors but as a critical element in the reform process, which recognises the need to incorporate other stakeholders in the development process. Thus, as views about development changes so too have we witnessed changes on views about evaluation (Ingram, 2005).

On a practical level, evaluation is, or should be, an integral aspect of NPM reform themselves; In other words, evaluation is usually incorporated in the performance management system (PMS) which is part of NPM reforms to enable systematic comparisons of individual and organisational performance in
the provision of public services. In reality, however, this has rarely occurred as frequently or comprehensively as might be expected:

‘However, a careful examination of the facts shows that, in most countries, evaluation has thus far been used in a relatively limited and occasionally sporadic way that has often proved disappointing.’ (Thoenig, 2000: 217)

Jones & Kettl (2003: 1) make a similar point, noting that despite the importance of understanding the short- and long-term outcomes of these reform measures, it is almost impossible. There are a number of factors that contribute to this state of affairs. First, there is an apparent weakness in evaluation capacity, especially in developing countries where audit, inspection and control functions, just to mention but a few, tend to be poorly developed. The result has been a proliferation of informal, ad hoc approaches to evaluation in many of these countries, or what Thoenig (cited in Wollmann, 2003) refers to it as ‘quasi-evaluation.’

Second, because of the reforms’ historical association with development assistance, especially in developing countries, much of the evaluation of these initiatives has been undertaken by external institutions, such as the World Bank, IMF or Commonwealth Secretariat (Leinert & Modi, 1997). Consequently, the emphasis has been on whether such initiatives met their stated objectives rather than on capturing their intended and unintended impacts on the sector of the country as a whole (Girishankar, 2001). In this way, the evaluations have been narrow in scope and have thus failed to capture the broader impact of these measures.

Third, evaluating the effects of these reforms in the civil service is difficult because NPM measures are often introduced simultaneously with other non-NPM related reforms (Pollitt, 1995; Polidano, 1999). This situation is further compounded by the fact that usually there is a long time lag - especially in large-scale reform efforts - between adoption and outcome. Consequently, it
may take several years before a clear picture emerges of the true effects of an initiative. This applies even more in the context of developing countries where, as McCourt (2002) suggests, NPM is still in its early stages.

Overall, assessing the results for NPM reforms – whether in the context of developed or developing countries - is by no means a straightforward exercise. In light of this difficulty, there has not been much work by either scholars or practitioners on this aspect of the reforms (Pollitt, 2002; Wollmann, 2003; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000: 2003; Jones & Kettl, 2003; Hood & Peters, 2004), especially in the case of developing countries. The following discussion attempts to draw together the modest literature.

As was indicated in the earlier sections of this chapter, the intention of NPM initiatives in developing countries was to strengthen the institutional capacity of the public service to deliver in a cost-effective and efficient manner public goods and services to the citizenry. Despite some successes, the effects of NPM reforms have at best been mixed. For example, the chief sponsor of these reforms, the World Bank, acknowledged that the reforms have not been effective (Girishankar, 2001). Moreover, most scholars argue that the record to date has been full of failures and disappointments in these countries (Schacter, 2000; Polidano & Hulme, 1999). For African nations in particular, Olowu (1999; 2), concluded that evaluation of NPM reforms presents a gloomy picture.

On a positive note, the intended fiscal discipline of NPM reforms was often achieved, measured by cost reductions in the public service. This proved to be especially the case, with the so-called ‘first generation’ reforms that focused on cost reduction and stabilization efforts within the economy in general and public service in particular. For instance, Ghana managed to reduce its government wage bill to 4.5 per cent of GDP in the 1990s following successful downsizing of civil servants from 301,000 in 1986 to 260,000 in 1990. The same was achieved in terms of reducing staffing levels in Uganda where staffing numbers in government fell from 320,000 in 1990 to 147,000 in 1997 (Mutahaba & Kiragu, 2002; Polidano & Hulme, 1999). The result of this decline in public service
staffing saw sub-Saharan Africa record the lowest ratio of civil servants to population of any group in the world, translating to 1 per cent by the mid-1990s as opposed to 3 per cent for other developing countries (Ayee, 2008: 60).

Thus, savings were recorded in the public expenditure against these massive cuts in government wages. Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya experienced different impacts depending on their levels of uptake of these reforms. Note that both Uganda and Tanzania recorded positive outcomes whereas Kenya – a reluctant reformer - fared badly in wages reductions and workforce numbers (Table 2.2).

Table 2.2: Relative size and remuneration of civil servants (1995)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population (mil.)</th>
<th>Govt. workforce ('000)</th>
<th>Ratio of workforce to population</th>
<th>Govt exp. As % of GDP</th>
<th>Gov wage bill as % of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Clarke & Wood (2001)

There have also been instances where the streamlining of government institutions resulting from NPM reforms have proved important in focusing departmental activities to meet demands of citizens. In the case of Vanuatu, the reorganisation of government institutions resulted with ministries reduced from 28 to 9 with further internal restructuring (O'Donnell & Turner, 2005). Elsewhere, Ghana managed to reduce ministries from 38 to 21 (Olowu, 1999). The restructuring was not only beneficial in terms of focusing government activities but proved also important as far as a cost containment exercise in most of these countries, at least in the formative years following implementation of these initiatives. In this way, restructuring and reorganisation of numerous and often large government departments brought clarity and accountability within newly established government institutions in pursuit of their mandate.
Despite the gains reported in these cases, there have also been many negative assessments of these programs.

First, reductions in personnel across governments failed to bring about intended cost reductions in many public services in developing countries, especially in the longer term. Thus, the initial gains in cutting costs in the public services of some countries were later reversed. For example, the intended downsizing of the public sector by almost half (almost 4 million) in China ended with more instead of fewer employees (Burns, 2003 cited in McCourt, 2008: 469). This experience was repeated elsewhere, including some developing countries that were presented as leaders in terms of downsizing their administrations, like Ghana and Tanzania (McCourt, 1998). These increases in staffing levels brought about increases in government expenditure chiefly because of rises in wages and salary bills (Nunberg & Nellis, 1995; van de Walle, 2001).

Second, many have argued that NPM reforms have worsened, rather than strengthened, the institutional capacity of the public service in many developing countries (Heredia & Schneider, 2003; Olowu, 1999; Mutahaba & Kigaru, 2002). The result of implementing these initiatives was a ‘disintegrated state…with demoralised and barely functioning state agencies’ (Nelson, 1994 cited in Heredia & Schneider, 2003: 1). In many African countries the consequences were demoralised and unmotivated personnel, largely incapable of performing basic functions (Owusu, 2006; Mutahaba & Kiragu, 2002). In addition, the erosion of public sector wages vis-à-vis the private sector following implementation of these reforms culminated in an exodus of skilled personnel from the public employment to the private sector (Owusu, 2005). Beyond Africa, McCourt observed an increased incidence of patronage in public appointments following administrative devolution in Nepal (2001). Cumulatively, these problems weakened institutional capacity of government institutions in developing countries. Against this background, Olowu (1999: 2) argued:
Many African countries do not today have such civil services that can support the development process. Their civil services have eroded in capacity over time as a result of misdirected economic policies as well as poorly targeted civil service reforms (CSRs).

The World Bank, as the chief sponsor of the civil service reforms amongst developing countries from the 1980s, acknowledged this problem in the 1990s by calling for reassessment of state institutions – especially the civil service – in development efforts of these countries. Consequently, a shift away from focusing on measures such as downsizing towards capacity-building initiatives was emphasised (World Bank, 1997). Through this move, the Bank and other stakeholders in the reform process conceded that so called ‘first generation’ reforms had failed to enhance institutional capacity and, thus, the effectiveness of civil service of developing countries to manage development process (McCourt, 2003; Ayee, 2008; Schneider & Heredia, 2003).

Third, some commentators have argued that the implementation of NPM initiatives has actually heightened the centralisation of power rather than empowerment of civil service managers. In particular, introduction of performance-oriented schemes, which were meant to allow managers take control in their respective areas of duty, has not turned out to be the case. Rather, a tightening of central control has taken place in many of these countries. In the case of Uganda, for example, downsizing efforts actually recentralised the recruitment of temporary and non-pensionable staff as political leaders deemed the process to be wide open to abuse by public service managers at departmental levels (Wangolo, 1995 cited in Polidano, 1999).

Overall, assessments of NPM-type of reforms in developing countries reveal only modest achievements, especially in the ‘first generation’ of reform in the 1980s. The emphasis on cutting costs proved beneficial in terms of reducing government wage bills, at least at the initial stages of the reform efforts. This encouraging development, however, failed to be sustainable, as evidenced by reversals of staffing levels in public services. More significant, the focus on
cutting expenditure levels through massive downsizing brought more challenges than answers. State capacity in general and public service effectiveness in particular was seriously eroded by these initiatives. Referring to the state of affairs amongst these countries, others talk of disintegrated state that could barely perform its basic task among these countries (see, for example, Nelson, 1994 cited in Schneider & Heredia, 2003; Bale & Dale, 1998). Santiso (2004: 271), concluded:

‘...After almost two decades of reform, results are mixed and largely disappointing. The reform impetus inspired by the Washington consensus has stalled and given way to doubt.’

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the literature on NPM-type of reforms. The literature was reviewed to better understand adoption, implementation and evaluation of NPM-type of reforms within the context of developing countries. In doing so, NPM experience of advanced economies was offered to set a suitable backdrop for further exploration of NPM amongst developing economies.

In the main, empirical evidence from the literature on developing countries reveals that uptake of NPM reforms were not primarily guided by specific contextual demands in each country; rather, ‘one size fit all’ universal prescription model (i.e. ‘best practice’ approach) preferred by international financial institutions and donor agencies dominates the decision towards adoption of NPM in developing countries, thus, denying complexities and differences of national context among these countries (see, for example, Peters, 1997; World Bank, 1997).

Thus, transfer of NPM ideas and practices to developing countries was ‘misfounded’ (Rosenbloom, 2002). In particular, reformers within the international financial institutions and other donor agencies imposed NPM reforms amongst developing countries on at least three mistaken assumptions.
First, all public services were considered inefficient (Owusu, 2005). Second, public sector management was disconnected from politics. For instance, Heredia (2002) underscores a common mistake in Latin America’s excessively technocratic approach to these reforms that tended to ignore the politics of the civil service. Similarly, the World Bank also recognised such failures (1999). The third mistaken assumption was that NPM ideas and practices were easily transferable from one context to another; the ‘transferability assumption’, to borrow a better term from Rosenbloom (2002). Taken together, these three assumptions have hampered diagnosis of administrative problems, the prescription of solutions and, as a result, the viability of such reform efforts. Hence, outcome of these reform efforts amongst developing countries has seen few gains; but much of the little progress achieved appears vulnerable to reversal and manipulation by state elites (see, for example, van de Walle, 2001).

The next chapter elaborates the methodology and methods employed in the study.
Chapter 3
Research Methodology
3.1 Introduction

As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the uptake of NPM-type reforms amongst developing countries is inadequately explained in the extant literature. For instance, although the literature depicts public services across developing countries as ineffective and, therefore, in need of transformation, it ignores variations in performances of bureaucracies across these countries (Owusu, 2005). Furthermore, the focus in the literature has been on benefits of these reform initiatives for these countries and, in doing so, omitted discussion on the role of internal/local policy makers in the reform process as scholars seems to regard that process as an inevitable one driven largely by external donor agencies (Conteh & Ohemeng, 2009). Providing in-depth explanation of these neglected issues in the literature requires research strategies that take into consideration contextual realities amongst developing countries.

Consistent with that aim, the main purpose of this chapter is to explain and defend the choice of research approach and techniques adopted in this study. The chapter is arranged in the following way: section 3.2, compares quantitative and qualitative research approaches and justifies the use of qualitative approach for this study. Section 3.3 describes the research design and outlines the appropriateness of case study methodology adopted for this study. Section 3.4 discusses data-gathering techniques used in this study. The next section, Section 3.5, presents data analysis strategies and techniques. Section 3.6 addresses ethical considerations for this study. Finally, the chapter concludes, in Section 3.8, with a summary of the principal methodological issues and their implication for this thesis.

3.2 Methodological Approach

Two main approaches are commonly identified in the literature informing the design of research projects, namely quantitative and qualitative. The two approaches operate with divergent principles regarding what constitutes
knowledge about the social world and how it can legitimately be produced (Bryman, 1992).

Quantitative research is underpinned by a positivist philosophy – which emphasises the primacy of natural science as the model of rational inquiry and knowledge. Here research is treated as rational and logical (i.e. an objective endeavour), where all elements of subjectivity are eliminated; for example, the researcher is separated from the object of research in an effort to understand objective reality. In this perspective, there is an objective truth ‘out there’ that can only be uncovered through structured and rigorous – mostly quantitative - methods. In doing so, the approach encourages a concern for an objective form of knowledge that specifies the precise nature of laws, regularities, and relationships among phenomena measured in terms of social facts (Gabrielian 1999). In striving to be objective, quantitative research excludes questions of a moral or ethical nature that cannot be settled by an appeal to facts (Tribe 2001). Overall, quantitative researchers advocate the application of the methods of natural sciences to the study of social reality and beyond (Mouton & Marais 1988; Hammersley 1995). To critics, however, quantitative approach ignores the differences between natural and social world by failing to understand the ‘meanings’ that are brought to social life (Silverman, 2000).

On the other hand, there is the qualitative approach to research. Creswell (1998: 15) defines qualitative research in the following way:

‘an inquiry process of understanding based on distinct methodological traditions of inquiry that explores a social or human problem, based on a complex, holistic picture, formed with words, reporting detailed views of informants, and conducted in a natural setting.’

In this perspective, research is treated as subjective and the researcher plays a key role in the process. The participant’s role in the process is also significant. Emphasising this point, Creswell (2007: 39) indicated:
‘...the researchers keep a focus on learning the meaning that the participants hold about the problem or issue, not the meaning that the researchers bring to the research or writes from the literature.’

Qualitative research therefore employs people’s words, action and records instead of mathematical analysis in trying to gain understanding of a phenomenon. Hence, Punch (1998) argued that qualitative approach offered more diversity in trying to explore and understand the true phenomena. Qualitative research is therefore about discovering how individuals construct meanings in their contextual settings. Here the researcher ‘sees through the eyes of people being studied’ (Bryman, 2001) in an attempt to uncover phenomena beneath its surface appearance.

In spite of this, however, there is debate in the literature concerning the validity of qualitative research methods. For example, in qualitative research there is a focus upon a very limited sample when compared to the large numbers of subjects that can be associated with quantitative projects. Despite this, however, proponents of qualitative research, such as Patton (1990: 165), maintain that ‘a major trade-off between quantitative and qualitative methods is a trade off between breadth and depth.’

There is growing acknowledgement that neither approach has inherent privilege over the other. In light of that, advocacy for combination of both quantitative and qualitative methods in social research has emerged (Creswell, 2007). Patton (1990: 39 cited in Hoepfl, 1997), for example, insists that there is no need to pit these two paradigms against one another in a competing stance; rather, he advocates a ‘paradigm of choice’ that seeks ‘methodological appropriateness as the primary criteria for judging methodological quality.’ Towards that end, researchers have to decide on the research approach that best suits their investigation. As Gabrielian (1999: 178) expressed, concrete requirements of the situation should decide the application of particular research methods and techniques. Thus, qualitative or quantitative approaches should be treated as of equal value to be used as and when appropriate depending upon the focus,
purposes and circumstances of the research (Bryman, 1998; Creswell, 2003; Creswell & Clark, 2007; Hammersley, 1996; Mouton & Marais, 1988).

3.2.1 Rationale for choice of approach

The literature discusses in detail considerations that can help researchers determine an appropriate research approach in a study (Creswell, 2003; Miles & Huberman, 1994). Creswell (2003), for example, identifies three considerations: the research problem, the personal experience of the researcher, and the audience for whom the report will be written. As was demonstrated in Chapter 2, the existing literature on NPM-type reforms is largely restricted to providing descriptions on content of reform measures with little attention paid to the context within which such initiatives are applied. In that way, the literature viewed NPM as foreground – or the significant point of change and the practice environment as the background – or as only the incidental element in the whole process of reform. NPM reforms, however, are complex phenomena embedded in, and highly influenced by, context and, therefore, any effort towards detailed understanding of such reform efforts should take consideration of the context within which they are applied.

When we need a complex, detailed understanding of an issue, this rich information is best gathered by being sensitive to people and places under investigation, that is, talking directly with them, going to their places, and allowing them to tell their stories. In doing so, the actual context within which the phenomenon occurs is also highlighted as a crucial element in the reform process.

The limitations in the extant NPM literature in terms of addressing the research question can be addressed through qualitative research design. Where information on the research topic is limited and explanation is an important aim of the study, Sarantakos (2005) suggests the use of qualitative approach. The qualitative research is suited to capture contextual conditions that are pertinent to the phenomenon under study. The reasons behind adoption and fate of NPM
reforms certainly involve complex processes, and the research questions are explicitly explanatory. The characteristics of qualitative research are therefore consistent with the aims of this study: gaining a clearer picture and explanation of public sector management reforms.

In sum, the research issues identified in Chapters 1 and 2 are most suited to the characteristics of qualitative approach: words instead of numbers were considered as the main elements of data. Again, the totality of the situation had to be taken into account and understood. The research, therefore, tends to be inductive with emphasis on theory generation relying on subjective information from multiple viewpoints gathered through multiple methods. As such, the proposed study would adopt the qualitative research approach.

### 3.3 Research Design

The importance in research of design cannot be overstated. To Yin (2003: 20):

‘...the design is the logical sequence that connects the empirical data to a study's initial questions and, ultimately, to its conclusions.’

For Creswell (2007), research design is the entire process of research from conceptualising a problem to writing research questions, and on to data collection, analysis, interpretation, and report writing. Echoing similar sentiments, Bryman (1989: 28) says research designs should be viewed as the overall structure and orientation of an investigation. This structure provides a framework within which data are collected and analysed.

While particular designs tend to be associated with particular methods of data collection, Bryman (1989) caution that a distinction between the designs and data collection methods is important because one does not necessarily imply the other. Methods are instruments of data collection. Any research design can therefore potentially use any type of data collection method and can use either quantitative or qualitative data.
Yin (2003) suggests that before a researcher chooses a specific research strategy they should be familiar with the basic types of research strategies or methods. Various approaches to research design have been identified in social science research, but, they are generally classified under three traditional research strategies: experiment, survey and case study. These approaches to research design are briefly discussed below.

**3.3.1 Experimental design**

Experiments are defined as ways of assessing causal relationships, by randomly allocating ‘subjects’ to two groups and then comparing one (the ‘control group’) in which no changes are made, with the other (the ‘test group’) who are subjected to some manipulation or stimulus (Payne & Payne 2004: 84). Thus, experimental designs are seen as a basis for establishing cause-effect relationships between variables and its variables have to be measured. Typically, experimental design involves selection of samples of individuals from known populations, subjection of samples to experimental conditions, introduction of planned change on one or more variables, measurement on a small number of variables, control of other variables, and involves hypothesis testing. Experiments are commonly associated with quantitative research.

According to Bryman (1989), experimental designs are strongly suited to findings that exhibit cause-and-effect relationship. This is the case because the investigator is able to establish a high degree of internal validity by controlling for alternative explanations of a posited causal relationship. However, in social research, unlike natural sciences, the researchers are unlikely to have a free hand in setting up experimental arrangements that they can have control upon in the laboratory. As a result, many field experiments are not ‘true’ experiments. Consequently, a distinction is often drawn between experiments and ‘quasi-experiments’, the latter referring to experiments in which the researcher is unable to fulfil all of the requirements of a true experimental study.
Despite being suited to providing clear-cut demonstrations of causality (internal validity), experimental designs are regarded as less helpful in establishing the generalisability of findings (external validity). Again, experimental designs have been criticised because of the limited extent to which identified relationships exist in the real world because of oversimplification of the experimental situation and the isolation of such situations from most of the variables that are found in the real world (Bryman 1989; Galliers 1991).

For this study, experimental design is deemed unsuitable. Yin (2003: 8) says experiments are done when a researcher can manipulate behaviour directly, precisely, and systematically. To him, this can occur in a laboratory setting, where the researcher has the ‘control’ for few isolated variables under investigation. In this study, the research does not lend itself to control or manipulation of variables to understand the phenomenon under investigation. Rather, as the phenomenon occurs within an environment that cannot be controlled and manipulated to satisfy the experimental design’s requirement for replication, the study requires a research design that takes into consideration actual context within which the phenomenon occurs. To advance understanding of social life requires context-specific attention to be paid to the situation. Thus, experimental design was deemed not suitable for this study.

### 3.3.2 Survey design

Survey has different meanings in social research, but Punch (1998) observes that survey is sometimes used to describe any research that collects data (quantitative or qualitative) from a sample of people. It thus involves collection of information in standardised forms from groups of people. Surveys include cross-sectional and longitudinal studies employing questionnaires or structured interviews for data collection, with the aim of generalising from a sample to a population (Creswell, 2003). Typical features of surveys include selection of samples of individuals from known populations, and relatively small amounts of data is collected in standardise form from each individual.
Bryman (1989) noted that survey research is always conducted in order to provide quantitative picture of units in question. As such, surveys are widely associated with quantitative research. However, unlike experimental design, the survey practitioner does not manipulate what is deemed to be the independent variable and then observe the consequential effects on the dependent variable. Survey researchers can only establish that people vary in relation to a number of attributes on which data have been collected and analyse the co-variation that exists between pairs of variables. Surveys include cross-sectional and longitudinal studies employing questionnaires or structured interviews for data collection, with the aim of generalising from a sample to a population (Creswell, 2003).

Among its advantages, surveys tend to produce data based on real-world observations - that is, getting information ‘straight from the horse’ mouth’ - unlike in experimental design where there is subjection of samples to experimental conditions. Here, the search for data is conducted in a purposeful and structured manner. Furthermore, implied in the notion of survey is the idea that research should have a wide coverage. Thus, surveys should take a panoramic view and ‘take it all in’ (Denscombe, 1998: 6). Surveys are easily associated with large numbers of cases employed in an investigation of a phenomenon, which in turn enhances the representativeness of the sample. In that way, the findings from good surveys excel in terms of generalisability. Importantly, Yin (1994) observes that survey is advantageous dealing with what he calls ‘what’ type of research questions. With ‘what’ questions, the research goal is to describe the incidence or prevalence of a phenomenon or to be *predictive* about certain outcomes. In other words, surveys is theory-driven research that lends itself to testing lots of existing theories and propositions mainly using statistical inferences.

Despite its advantages, there are at least two common criticisms levelled against survey design. 1). Notable, is the difficulty in providing insights into the causes of or processes involved in the phenomenon under investigation. The inability of survey researchers to manipulate any of the variables of interest
imposes important constraints in regard to their ability to generate findings from which definitive causal statements can be derived (Bryman, 1989: 107). The breath of coverage also means that surveys get associated with large-scale research. As a result, data that are produced are likely to lack detail or depth on the issue under investigation (Denscombe, 1998).

As already indicated, the aim of this study is to gain in-depth and insightful understanding of public sector reforms; in other words, it is more concerned with what Yin (1994) refers to as ‘how’ and ‘why’ research questions rather than ‘what’ questions. This study focuses more on the depth and not breadth of data that can best illuminate on the subject under investigation. To achieve that, the research design has to make room for observations of process, agency, context, and multiple meanings of reality. In other words, it has to take into account interaction that is posited to occur within and between organisations and the wider environment during adoption and implementation of the reform initiatives. The survey design was therefore deemed not appropriate to fulfil this demand. Consequently, the survey study seems not suitable for this study.

3.3.3 Case study design

The case study as a research strategy is widely utilised in social sciences to contribute to our knowledge of individual, group, organisational, social, political, and related phenomena. For Yin (2003: 1), ‘in all these situations, the distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena.’ Case study allows researchers to retain holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events.

Yin (2003: 13) defined a case study as ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’ and in which multiple sources of evidence are used. For Tharenou et al., (2007: 78) a case study is not just a story or description; it is a theoretically based attempt to understand and explain complex phenomenon, embedded in context. In this
sense, the case study design promotes the study of particularities and complexities of a system.

Case study design involves the development of detailed knowledge about a single ‘case’ or of a small number of related ‘cases.’ Typically, organisations or departments within organisations are taken as ‘the case’, although the ‘case’ can also mean events and activities and also people. A detailed knowledge of the case is gained by studying it in its context, with information on the case gathered through a range of data collection techniques, including interviews, observations, and documentary analysis (Yin, 2003). The case study approach is usually associated with qualitative research.

In undertaking case study research, the emphasis is on understanding the phenomenon within its natural environment. The aim of case study is not only to describe a situation but also to assess the conditions surrounding the phenomenon, to build a plausible explanation or to discover a causal relationship that links the antecedents to results (Tharenou et al., 2007: 77). Within social settings, various conditions exist that can have an impact on a phenomenon under investigation: relationships and processes tend to be interconnected and interrelated. In other words, to understand one thing it is necessary to understand others and how the various parts are linked. Thus, case study design tends to emphasise detailed workings of the relationships and social processes, instead of restricting attention to isolated factors or variables.

Furthermore, the case study design concentrates efforts on one or few instances rather than many to understand complex situations. The aim is to illuminate the general by looking at the particular. Focusing on one or few cases, as indicated by Denscombe (1998: 39), enables the researcher to deal with relationships and social processes in a way that is denied to the survey approach. To gain in-depth knowledge on the subject under investigation, cases study things in detail and require a much smaller sample size than survey research. Attempts to perform broad analyses with large numbers of
participants reduce the effectiveness of the case study, as it might compromise detailed description of the phenomenon (Denscombe, 1998; VanWynsberghe & Khan, 2007).

The case study is also advantageous where the researcher has little control over events. Denscombe (1998: 40) contends that, because the case study is concerned with studying phenomena as they naturally occur, there is no pressure on the researcher to impose controls or change circumstances to understand a particular phenomenon.

Despite the advantages, limitations have been attributed to case studies. Chiefly, case studies are commonly criticised for limited generalisability. In a broader sense, unlike in quantitative research, where the general aim is generalisability - normally achieved by statistical sampling procedures - generalisability in qualitative research is a contested issue (Bryman, 1992; Silverman, 2000). Some researchers, for instance Stake (1994 cited in Silverman, 2000), consider qualitative research as purely descriptive and therefore maintain that generalisation is not possible. However, other researchers insist generalisation within qualitative research is both possible and important. Mason (1996 cited in Silverman, 2000: 103), for example, insists that qualitative researchers should produce explanations which are generalisable in some way or which have wider resonance.

Clearly, generalisation from case studies does not rest on the representativeness of the case. Rather, it can be achieved in a number of ways. For instance, Yin (2003) proposes ‘analytical generalisation’ as a means to address this limitation. Analytical generalisation involves generalising empirical data to theoretical propositions. In this approach, theoretical propositions are developed prior to empirical data gathering. The propositions are then employed as a template with which to compare empirical results. The objective is to gather evidence that supports a plausible explanation (theory) of the phenomena. In case study, the use of theory is important. As Tharenou et al., (2007: 77) noted, ‘the theory allows the explanation of what is of general
relevance and interest. Without a theory, a case would be a little more than a story about a unique situation.’ In this way, the theory allows for the case not just to be descriptive, but to have wider meaning.

Case studies are also criticised for lack both external and internal reliability. In other investigations some case studies occur after the fact, and as such, respondents are recalling events. Unfortunately as Sommer & Sommer (1991) puts it ‘memories are not infallible and, consequently, recollections are likely to be distorted’ (cited from Tharenou et al., 2007). Again, there is an identified problem of internal validity with case study research. This problem arises as a result of the researcher’s interpretations of the case data. The interpretation of these case data may be influenced by the researcher’s own biases and assumptions. To address this problems (i.e., increasing reliability), different methods for measuring the same construct and applying multiple sources of information gathering and verification can be used. (They are discussed in section 3.6 of this chapter.)

### 3.3.4 Suggested research design

According to Denscombe (1998: 3), putting together a good piece of research is not something that can be done slavishly. Rather, the researcher confronts a variety of options and alternatives and must make strategic decisions about which to choose. Each choice has its own merits and problems and its own set of assumptions about the social world. Although there is no one right strategy to choose, some strategies are better suited than others for addressing specific issues. In this way, approaches are selected because they are appropriate for specific aspects of the investigation and specific kinds of problems.

To judge the usefulness of any of the research designs, various considerations have been developed (Yin, 2003). Table 3.1 outlines three conditions for determining the selection of an appropriate research design: the type of research question posed, the extent of control an investigator has over actual
behavioural events and the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical event.

**Table 3.1: Relevant situations for determining the appropriate type of research design**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research design</th>
<th>Form of research question</th>
<th>Requires control over behavioural events?</th>
<th>Focuses on contemporary events?</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experiment</td>
<td>how, why</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>who, what, where, how many, how much</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case study</td>
<td>how, why</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Yin (2003)

In relation to the first outlined condition, Yin (2003) concluded that ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are likely to favour case studies while, ‘what’, ‘who’, and ‘where’ questions are likely to favour quantitative research approaches such as the survey. In other words, surveys are especially preferred when the research goal is to describe the incidence or prevalence of a phenomenon or when it is to be predictive about certain outcomes. In contrast, ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are more explanatory. He argues that this is because such questions deal with operational links needing to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence. The research question for this study poses ‘how’ and ‘why’ types of questions in trying to better understand adoption and fate of public sector reforms in developing countries. As such, case study approach is the most appropriate strategy for this study.

On the second and third considerations, Yin (2003) stated that if ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are to be the focus of the study – as is the case in the current study - histories are preferred method when there is virtually no access or control, while experimental method is most suitable when investigator can control behaviour.
Case study approach is preferable in examining contemporary events, but when relevant behaviours cannot be manipulated. In light of this, case study is the preferred approach for the proposed study as it does not seek to control or manipulate behavioural events and also it focuses on contemporary events.

Within case study design there are a number of options. Yin (2003) distinguishes between two fundamental case study types: holistic and embedded. Within these, a study can either be single-case or multiple-case depending on the requirements. A holistic case study is useful when no logical sub-units can be identified or when the relevant theory underlying the case study is itself of a holistic nature. In this sense, it would be used where the study sought a broad understanding, i.e., looking at an organisation as a whole, rather than at different sub-units in that particular organisation. Yin (2003) cautioned that the use of holistic case studies might lead to the case being applied at abstract level and therefore prevents the researcher from properly examining the phenomenon under investigation. Embedded case studies occur where a study aimed at understanding the organisation’s sub-units, that is, its embedded units. For Yin (2003), an embedded case study helps to maintain the focus of the study by offering the specific attention and sensitivity on sub-units within the institution. However, too much focus on one of organisational sub-units might lose of sight of the need to locate these within the bigger organisational context.

Yin (2003) suggests single-case (as opposed to multiple-case) as appropriate if: it is the only one that meets all the conditions of the theory, the case is unique or rare as such finding other cases is so unlikely that research on the case would never be done if the single case was not investigated, or the case provides unusual access for academic research. Single-case studies may still incorporate sub-units of analyses, so that a more complex-or-embedded-design is developed. The sub-units can often add significant opportunities for extensive analysis, enhancing the insights into the single case.
Yin (2003) makes no broad distinction between single-case and multiple-case designs: rather both are considered to be variants within the same methodological framework. Unlike the single-case design, evidence from multiple-case design is often considered more compelling and, therefore, the multiple-case is regarded as more robust. Again, multiple-case allows cross-case analysis, a necessary feature for the generalisation of theories. However, on the downside, multiple-case design is considered expensive in terms of resources and time. In sum, both single-case and multiple-case are suited to theory generation.

3.3.5 The Unit of Analysis and Selection of Cases

In a more general sense, a case study’s unit of analysis is the phenomenon under study. Although this definition appears to be straightforward, the units of analysis can be deceiving or problematic in case study research (Yin, 2003; Van Wynsberghe & Khan, 2007; Lee, 1999). This difficulty arises because finding the focus of a case study is a difficult undertaking. To resolve this difficulty, the researcher must determine the unit of analysis most appropriate for the study: will the study focus on individuals, groups, organisation, event, or decision? In other words, the researcher has to define in clear terms his or her case. In making this determination, the researcher is often guided by various important considerations.

Among critical considerations in determining the unit of analysis in case study research is the research questions (Benbasat, Goldstein, & Mead, 1987). Yin (2003: 24) suggests that clearly specified research questions help simplify selection of appropriate unit of analysis. He adds ‘if your questions do not lead to the favouring of one unit of analysis over another, your questions are probably too vague or too numerous.’ In that sense, then, selection of appropriate unit of analysis depends on accurately specifying research questions. With specific questions developed, the researcher can then begin collection of evidence. As evidence continues to be collected, the unit of analysis is further delineated and the case becomes more refined. In that
sense, it is this delineation that serves an important function of clarifying what this is a case of (VanWynsberghe & Khan, 2007).

For this study, the research questions specified in Chapter 1 helped specify the unit of analysis. Instances of public sector reforms [i.e. Performance Management System (PMS) and Work Improvement Teams (WITs)] are the units of analysis of this study. The research questions, as outlined in Chapter 1, aim to understand the adoption, implementation and fate of these NPM reform initiatives in the context of the Botswana public sector form the 1990s until 2000s.

Selection of a case(s) also leads to a selection of a site to undertake proposed research. For Benbasat, Goldstein & Mead (1987: 373), site selection should be carefully thought out rather than opportunistic. To that end, the researcher should be guided by both theoretical and practical considerations. At a more theoretical level, it is advisable for researchers to begin site selection by considering the nature of their topic. In this way, research questions impact heavily on the choice of research site. The proposed study seeks to understand adoption and fate of NPM reforms in the context of Botswana public sector. This research examines an organisational-level phenomenon and, as such, site selection should be based on characteristics of a particular setting that best addresses the research topic and questions. In this case, Botswana public sector organisations provide appropriate sites for the proposed study in light of the nature of the research topic and questions.

Also at a more theoretical level, Benbasat, Goldstein & Mead (1987) indicate that in the single-case study, factors that dictate its design also determine site selection. However, if multiple-cases are to be employed, as is the case in this study, then choices of site(s) have to be made. Making a choice of site(s) or case(s) in qualitative research is different from sampling technique employed in quantitative studies. For this study, purposeful sampling would be used. With purposeful sampling, the researcher selects sites for the study because they can inform an understanding of the research problem and central phenomenon.
in the study: it is based on selection of information-rich cases for in-depth and insightful study (Patton, 1990). In addition, purposeful sampling is meant to serve practical research purposes such as access, convenience, cost minimisation, and time maximisation (Obasi, 1999).

Furthermore, in determining the most appropriate sites, this study employs maximum variation sampling strategy. Here, the researcher determines in advance criteria that differentiate the sites and then chooses those that are quite different on the specified criteria. The underlying assumption is that when a researcher maximises differences that increases likelihood of research findings reflecting differences or different viewpoints: an ideal in qualitative research. Thus, maximum variation strategy can yield detailed descriptions of each case, in addition to identifying shared patterns that cut across cases (Creswell, 2007).

There is agreement in the literature that sample size is not a crucial criterion for the selection and size of cases. Rather, case selection and size depends upon the purpose of the research and what will be drawn from the research. In qualitative research, as Patton (1990) indicates, the validity, meaningfulness and insights generated have more to do with the information-richness of the cases selected and the analytical capabilities of the researcher rather than the number of cases. As such, information-richness issue is crucial when deciding on the number of cases rather than size. Thus, well-selected and analysed cases are useful in answering research questions: the number of cases is not critical but the selection of cases.

As research questions are related to public sector reforms in Botswana, local embedded cases were selected. These embedded cases assist with extensive analysis, thus, enhancing insights to other public sector organisations in Botswana. Directorate of Public Service Management (DPSM) and Central Transport Organisation (CTO) have been identified as embedded sites or cases to undertake this study.
Since the focus of most of the NPM reform measures adopted in Botswana has been on personnel management issues (such as productivity, performance, and pay) and the aim of the reforms were on raising the overall performance of the public service, DPSM is deemed an ideal [sub-unit] department to undertake this type of research. The department is centrally located as the main body within central government charged with overall provision of management of the whole government human resources. DPSM achieves this end by developing and facilitating implementation of human resource policies to cover the whole public service. In this sense, it is where public sector reforms with particular emphasis on personnel matters originate. The department is therefore a significant setting for adoption and implementation of public sector reforms, as it posses the knowledge, exposure and networks necessary for such undertakings.

Employing the maximum variation strategy, CTO is also served as a site for this study. It is a service department charged with provision and maintaining government fleet used by all ministries and departments. Unlike DPSM, CTO is a highly technical department guided in its operations by issues such as quality, reliability, safety, and economy. Although it has Depot stations all around the country, its Headquarters in the capital city Gaborone has the overall responsibility of ensuring that implementation of specific public sector reforms materialise in all other stations around the country.

In both departments, focus was on senior and middle level management to gain deeper analysis of the reform process in the public service. The underlying explanation for that decision is that NPM reforms emphasises managerialism. Here, focus is on management and organisational reforms paying attention on issues such as measuring results, feedback, operationalisation of goals, and changing the organisational structure. In all these, senior managers occupy and play a central role in the reform process in the context of Botswana public service.
Additionally, issues of access and accessibility proved significant in the selection of the two case study organisations. Both departments are located in Gaborone, where the researcher lives, and, as such, it saved a lot of costs that could have been incurred should other departments outside Gaborone selected. Also, having worked for the CTO department over a number of years, I expected to have easy access to undertake research at this department.

Background information on DPSM and CTO is provided below in sections, 3.3.5.1 and 3.3.5.2 respectively.

### 3.3.5.1 Directorate of Public Service Management (DPSM)

The predecessors of DPSM date back as far as the colonial period in the form of the Public Service Commission (PSC), led by the Establishment Register which directly reported to the Resident Commissioner in the capital of the protectorate in Mafikeng (see Chapter 4). In the post-independence period (i.e., after 1966), the PSC transferred to the new capital in Gaborone and was given more executive powers over appointments, promotions, transfers and disciplinary matters. A reorganisation of the PSC, however, subsequently resulted in the creation of two separate bodies namely, the PSC and the Establishment Division.

In 1969, the Establishment Division came to be the Directorate of Personnel, under the leadership of the Director of Personnel. As for the PSC, it was relegated to a de facto Appeals Body that dealt with complaints against decisions made by the Directorate on personnel matters, such as dismissals and discipline matters. The Directorate of Personnel then became DPSM in 1986.

Like its counterpart in the colonial period, the Directorate stood at the centre of a heavily centralised system in which it had heavy involvement in direct service delivery of personnel/human resource at the central government level (local
government level institutions enjoyed autonomy in terms of their HR activities). In that arrangement, the role of other departments and ministries was relatively peripheral, limited to referrals of personnel-related matters to DPSM. This continued well into the 1990s, when some moves towards decentralisation were introduced, for example, the decentralisation of human resource management initiative of 1998 sought to empower permanent secretaries at line ministries to recruit, appoint, promote, demote, discipline and dismiss employees in their ministries up to the deputy departmental head level (i.e. D1 post and below). Thus, DPSM has over time lost some of its powers (Morapedi, 2003; Marobela, 2008).

Despite these modest decentralisation efforts, the new Public Service Act of 2008 represented a move back towards re-centralisation in which several areas of the public service – which had previously been covered by separate legislation – were brought under a single umbrella, with DPSM acting as ‘the employer.’ DPSM, since introduction of the new Act, has assumed control over personnel/human resource matters across the public service at both central and local levels with other departments playing a lesser role (Botswana Government, 2008).

DPSM has transformed into a modern administrative department, building sound institutional capacity that has earned the country’s public service accolades for its ability to develop sound policies and prudent management. This department sharply contrasts with its colonial era precursor, which was perceived as inward looking and, insensitive to the demands of the populace. In this way, DPSM subsequently developed into a fairly sophisticated HR organisation, which contributed to Botswana’s strong reputation for good management (see Somolekae, 1998; Hope, 1995: 1998; Mpabanga, 2004; Washington & Hacker, 2005; Dzimbiri, 2008). Reflecting on the historical trajectory of the department, Mackinson (1994; 5) concluded:

‘...process, and the present organisation structure, reflect the transition from a colonial, regulatory, routine ‘personnel’ function to one embracing
most if not all, the factors needed to energise and maximise human
endeavour in the public service.’

Within the general structure of government, DPSM falls directly under the all-
powerful Ministry of State President. This ministry houses the state President
who, among his/her many duties, assumes the primary political responsibility for
the effective functioning of the public service. However, the administrative
responsibility for ensuring effective functioning of the public service is held by
the Permanent Secretary to the President (PSP) at the Office of the President
(OP). Within this structure, DPSM is primarily charged with overall management
of the public service (Corkery et al., 1998).

DPSM is therefore the central government’s human resource agency. It
manages and coordinates human resource activities across all ministries and
departments in accordance with the Public Service Act (Cap 26:01), which
confers statutory powers on it to provide public service policy and leadership.
The department has various units, but as far as policy and research issues are
concerned it is the Management Services Division and the Reforms Unit that
have played a significant role in public sector reform. More recently, the
Business Process Re-engineering Division was established in 2006 with a
mandate to set and monitor public service performance standards.

DPSM developed both vision and mission statements in 1998 that were used to
guide the efforts of the organization towards achievement of its mandate
(www.dpsm.gov.bw). Both the vision and mission statements stressed the
desire to be a customer-driven organisation with a culture of excellence in
delivering innovative human resources management policies and productivity
initiatives that empower the public service to make consistent, informed and
effective decisions. In an effort to achieve its vision and mission, the department
is guided by the following business strategic goals:

- to develop and facilitate the implementation of attractive human
  resources management policies in the public service;
• to provide responsive human resource processes and procedures;
• to continuously improve service delivery in the public service;
• to implement human resource management service delivery strategy
  which meets customer expectations;
• to foster harmonious relationships between DPSM and its customers;
  and
• to implement improved operational strategies in the following areas:
  o resource management
  o staff welfare
  o simplified method and procedures
  o service delivery.

Relative to the public service employment numbers, DPSM has a small
workforce that has since 2004 increased its share of so-called permanent and
pensionable employees (P&Ps). P&P employees in general are skilled in their
respective areas of engagement. The industrial class group (IC), on the other
hand, comprises the majority of the departmental workforce, although numbers
have declined since the mid 2000s when restructuring of the department, in line
with its mission, began to be emphasised. Table 3.2 below summarises DPSM
staffing levels according to employment categorisation.

Table 3.2: DPSM’s Number of employees by category of employment

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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P&amp;P</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Establishment Register
As was indicated above in section 3.3.5 DPSM is seen as an appropriate as a case in this thesis primarily it acts as both a policy-maker (i.e. adoption of NPM reforms) and a policy implementer (i.e. applies NPM reforms to its employees).

3.3.5.2 Central Transport Organisation (CTO)

The Central Transport Organisation is one of the many departments established in the first decade after Independence that were mainly aimed at enhancing the capacity of the public service to undertake its immediate and pressing role of facilitating socio-economic development of the nation. It began its operations in 1972 with its headquarters in Gaborone. It falls under the auspices of the Ministry of Works and Transport and is responsible for providing transport services to other government departments and ministries (Parson, 1984; Somolekae, 1998).

The department’s more specific responsibilities include planning, acquiring, allocating, managing, maintaining, repairing and disposing of Government vehicles and mobile plant. To effectively undertake these multiple functions it has various divisions, including:

a) mechanical – which oversees the vehicle maintenance,
b) transport – charged with acquisition and distribution of vehicles amongst government departments,
c) supplies – responsible for sourcing and storage of supplies, and
d) personnel – concerned with the human resources functions of the department (www.cto.gov.bw).

The CTO has been important in the country’s development. The transport sector, particularly road and rail, has since Independence provided the principal means of getting services closer to citizens in different parts of the country. With no access to the sea, limited air transport, and a single railway line that runs along the eastern part of the country, the significance of road transport in facilitating development is obvious (Kaboyakgos, 2003). With such limited access to other modes of transport, the government through the Ministry of
Works and Transport developed road networks that extended to all parts of the country. With improvements in road infrastructure, CTO has extended its offices to many parts of the country to provide a support role to other government departments in their endeavour to meet their statutory mandates.

Statutorily, the department is headed by a General Manager, who together with his/her deputy, is appointed from the mechanical division. In this way, the department has emphasized the technical or, more specifically, the mechanical unit as the most dominant of all sections. Other divisions (such as personnel, supplies and accounts) played more peripheral roles as support services and officers from these divisions were mainly viewed as seconded staff members from other departments (i.e. DPSM, Department of Supplies and MFDP, respectively). In terms of staffing, CTO has a large workforce that is mainly composed of industrial class (IC) employees. These employees in general are non-skilled or semi-skilled in their areas of engagement. The majority of these employees are working as technicians i.e. drivers and mechanics. The permanent and pensionable employees (P&Ps) constitutes almost a third of their industrial class counterparts (www.cto.gov.bw). Table 3.3 below summarises CTO staffing levels according to employment categorisation.

Table 3. 3: CTO’s Number of employees by category of employment

<table>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P&amp;P</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>1892</td>
<td>1856</td>
<td>1835</td>
<td>1843</td>
<td>1851</td>
<td>1801</td>
<td>1808</td>
<td>1826</td>
<td>1856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2483</td>
<td>2446</td>
<td>2406</td>
<td>2443</td>
<td>2463</td>
<td>2421</td>
<td>2453</td>
<td>2494</td>
<td>2557</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Establishment Register

In a similar way to other departments and ministries, CTO is guided in its operations by vision and mission towards achievement of its mandate, which was developed in 1998. The vision statement stresses the desire of the department to be a provider of quality mechanical transport services of
international standards to other government departments and ministries. The mission statement extends this theme by emphasizing the manner in which the department will provide its services: reliable, environmentally sound, safe, economical, efficient and effective manner. The following values guide the department achieves its vision and mission:

- Botho (humane)
- Accountability
- Transparency
- Teamwork
- Gender sensitivity and equality
- Customer focus
- Communication
- Human resource welfare and development
- Quality
- Responsiveness

The crafting of vision, mission and values were undertaken in the late 1990s in line with requirements of the Performance Management Systems (PMS) initiative. A detailed discussion will be presented in Chapter 7, which pays particular attention to the PMS initiative in the Botswana public service.

As was indicated above in section 3.3.5 CTO is seen as an appropriate as a case in this thesis because it acts as a policy implementer (i.e. applies NPM reforms to its employees).

### 3.4 Data Gathering Methods

Research data for this study was collected from multiple sources in each case. Doing so allowed for triangulation of data sources (Yin, 2003; Patton, 2002) to confirm, or disconfirm, answers to research questions. The literature shows that various ways of data collection in case study research includes interviews, documents, questionaries and observation methods. In this study, interviews
and documents were the principal methods employed to gather data for the nominated unit of analysis. These two data collection methods are discussed in detail below.

### 3.4.1 Interviews

Interviewing is one of the most common and powerful ways in which researchers try to understand other people. In the words of May (1997: 109), ‘interviews represent a cornerstone of social science research, yielding rich insights into people’s experiences.’ Interviewing takes a wide variety of forms with multiple uses. To Fontana & Frey (2003), the common form of interviewing involves individual, face-to-face verbal interchange but it can also take the form of face-to-face group interchange, mailed or self-administered questionnaires, and use of telephone. In terms of usage, both qualitative and quantitative researchers tend to rely on interviews as the basic method of gathering data. To this end, interviews can be used for the purpose of measurement or to obtain a rich and in-depth insight into a topic, drawing on information provided by few informants. Specifically for case study research, interviews are one of the most important sources of information (Yin, 2003).

There are many different types of interviews. Punch (1998), identifies three main types of interviews: structured, semi-structured, and unstructured. For him, the main dimensions of this variation are the degree of structure in interview, how deep the interview tries to go, and the degree to which the interview is standardised across different respondents and situations.

Structured interviews involve tight control over the format of the questions and answers. Here, the researcher has predetermined questions, to which the respondent is invited to offer limited-option responses, that is, there is little room for variation in response. This offers standardisation in the whole process, and thus, ensuring that data analysis is relatively easy. Effectively, structured interview lends itself to the collection of quantitative data, often associated with surveys with emphasis on breath rather than depth in terms of information
collected (Denscombe, 1998; Fontana & Frey, 2003). This type of interviewing is deemed not suitable for this study in that it focuses on breath as opposed to depth – which is the central focus of the study.

With unstructured interviews, emphasis is placed on the interviewee’s thoughts. Here the researcher’s role is to introduce the topic and then let the interviewee takes over. The interviewee offers his or her ideas on the subject, that is, speaking their minds without no constrain imposed by preset question from the researcher. This technique tend to let a lot of information turn up even that is not relevant to the subject under investigation (Denscombe, 1998). In that way, although it can provide valuable information, lack of control over what information interviewees can provide result with too much data that makes analysis of data likely to be difficult and time consuming. For that reason, unstructured interviews are not deemed appropriate for this study.

A semi-structured interview is a relatively informal, relaxed discussion based around a predetermined topic. It combines a structured agenda with the flexibility to ask subsequent questions. Not all questions are designed and phrased in advance. Most of the questions are formed during the interview, allowing both the interviewer and the person being interviewed the flexibility to probe for details or discuss issues. The interviewer is normally required to ask specific questions but is also free to probe beyond them if necessary (Punch, 1998). This data-gathering technique offers greater opportunity to gain in-depth and insightful information from those being interviewed, providing researchers with an opportunity to investigate experiences, emotions, and feelings of respondents rather than more straight-forward factual matters (Denscombe, 1998). In this way, semi-structured interviews provide depth instead of breath as a data-gathering technique.

In order to undertake semi-structured interviews, the researcher usually has to make decisions in terms of gaining access and choice of informants, among other things. The manner in which authorisation for this study was gained is detailed in section 3.6.3 of this chapter. In terms of choice of informant,
Denscombe (1998) indicates that people tend to be selected deliberately because they have some special contribution to make, have unique insight, or because of the position they hold. For this study, emphasis was placed on choosing key stakeholders in the reform process such as top and middle level management officials within the Botswana public service and other individuals beyond the employ of government such as politicians, consultants and academics.

Related to the issue of selection of respondents, the researcher also has to deal with telling whether the informant is telling the truth. This becomes even difficult when researchers are dealing with such issues that concern emotions, experiences, and feelings of the interviewee (Denscombe, 1998). However, there are measures to help researcher to have confidence in the interview data. These measures include checking interview transcripts with the informant, triangulation, and ensuring plausibility of the data and are discussed in section 3.6.

Semi-structured interviews are, therefore, deemed appropriate for this study as they allow the researcher an opportunity to gain insight and in-depth information on the subject of study. Allowing the participants to express their views on NPM reforms in a semi-structured manner has the potential not to limit respondents in terms of information they can provide to illuminate on the subject under investigation. At the same time, the control that semi-structured interviews impose on the respondents ensure that they don’t provide unnecessary information for this study.

3.4.2 Documentation

Yin (1994) identifies three general categories under which documentary sources fall: primary, secondary and tertiary document sources; public and private documents; and unsolicited and solicited sources. Documents can be letters, memoranda, agendas, administrative documents, newspaper articles, or any document that is useful to the research.
This study primarily used official documents derived from the state. The state produces a great deal of both statistical and textual material of interest such as parliamentary acts, presidential commissions and reports. This method is seen as useful; for instance, primary sources provide accurate historical and contextual account. In this sense, documentation offers the researcher an opportunity to examine texts written in the participant’s own words. This kind of data can certainly be seen as authentic and as having meaning (Bryman, 2004).

Although official documents are deemed important for this study, they require somewhat greater consideration. As Bryman (2004: 387) argued, ‘the question of credibility raises the issue of whether the documentary source is biased.’ Governments do produce credible evidence, but in other instances they tend to serve their own political interest, which in turn, suggest that caution is necessary in attempting to treat them as depictions of reality. Section 3.6 discusses techniques employed in this study to deal with credibility issues that the study faced with use of documentary sources of information.

Moreover, although the documents are ‘all out there’ waiting to be assembled and analysed, this is not to suggest that availability of documents for the researcher to work on renders them somehow less time-consuming or easier to deal with. On the contrary, the search for documents relevant to researcher’s topic can often be a frustrating and highly protracted process (Bryman 2004: 381). To deal with this problem, the researcher was selective in terms of information collected to focus on data that is likely to address the research question(s).

The method is also deemed appropriate for this study because it offers numerous source of information that is already ‘out there.’ Again, in the interest of triangulation of evidence, the documents serve to corroborate the evidence from other sources.
3.5 Data Analysis

The centrality of data analysis in qualitative research and, especially for the case study design, cannot be overemphasised. In particular, analysing data is crucial in ensuring that the conclusions reached are rigorous and valid. In this way, data analysis provides the necessary framework within which valid conclusions can be drawn for the wider audience. Although this is the case, however, analysing data in qualitative, unlike in quantitative research, is a challenge (Creswell, 2007). Miles (1979 cited in Punch, 1998) emphasises this point:

‘The most serious and central difficulty in the use of qualitative data is that methods of analysis are not well formulated. For quantitative data, there are clear conventions the researcher can use. But the analyst faced with a bank of qualitative data has very few guidelines for protection against self delusion, let alone the presentation of unreliable or invalid conclusions to scientific or policy making audiences.’

There is diversity in qualitative data analysis. To Punch (1998), this is the case because of the richness and complexity of looking at social life and, hence, the need for a variety of techniques to address different questions and different versions of social reality that can be elaborated. This is in contrast to quantitative research with its methods of data analysis well known and established. Despite the diversity in qualitative data analysis, Gibbs (2007) indicates that all qualitative approaches are based on textual analysis. Consequently, any sort of data in qualitative research has to be prepared for being analysed as text and not any count or measures.

To Gibbs (2007) analysis implies some kind of transformation. In qualitative research, this often starts with what he calls ‘office’ processes that involve the sorting, retrieving, indexing, and handling of data. These processes are designed to deal with voluminous amount of data that are created in qualitative research and its analysis remains grounded in those data. Then again,
transformation usually allows for what is called interpretation. The researcher in qualitative research is an integral part of the research instrument - the researcher's self is inevitably as a vital part of the data analysis as he/she interprets and makes sense of data they collect.

Miles & Huberman (1994) proposed a qualitative data analysis framework that comprises of three linked sub-processes. First, data reduction helps sharpen evidence presented to find clusters, themes and patterns without losing information in a way that allows for valid conclusions to be drawn. Techniques used here include editing, coding, memoing and, in later stages, explaining and conceptualisation. Second, data display entails taking the reduced data and displaying it in an organized, compressed way so that conclusions can be more easily drawn. Third, conclusion drawing and verification is the final stage in the framework. Here, the researcher begins to decide what things mean by taking note of regularities, patterns, explanations, possible configurations, causal flows, and propositions. To Miles & Huberman (1994: 429), these processes occur before data collection, during study design and planning, during data collection as interim and early analyses are carried out: after data collection as final products are approached and completed. Thus, the process of data analysis is not completed in one step; instead it is iterative, with consecutive inductive and deductive reasoning in each pattern identification-verification cycle (Gabrielian, 1999).

Specifically for case study investigation, Yin (2003: 109) cautioned that analysis of case evidence is one of the least developed and most difficult aspects of doing case studies. Various data analysis techniques are used in case studies (see, for example, Stake, 1995). Despite the diversity in techniques, Yin (2003) outlines five specific analytic techniques: pattern matching, explanation building, time-series analysis, logic models and cross case synthesis. Given the nature of this study, all the analytical techniques are utilised except logic models. The relevant techniques are discussed in detail below.
Pattern matching is one of the most common analytical techniques used in qualitative research. Here, some data are analysed for patterns that are then compared to predicted patterns. In this way, an empirically based pattern is compared with one or several predictions. Predicted pattern are based on a prior literature review and are in most cases completed before engaging in the evidence collection processes (Yin 2003: 116 -120).

Explanation building is another commonly used analytical technique in case study. It is a special type of pattern matching but a much more complex procedure. Here, casual links or theoretical propositions are made as part of explanation building process. In an exploratory case study, casual links are established to explain the data.

Time-series analysis is another method employed to analyse case study evidence (Yin, 2003; 122 – 127). Yin outlined three common time-series analysis techniques for case study namely: simple time series, complex time series and chronologies. For this investigation chronology is seen as the most applicable and, as such, warrants particular attention. A chronology allows the researcher to trace events under investigation over time. It does so by describing events as they unfolds (i.e., what happens first, what happens next and provides an explanation of why). A chronology in case study therefore studies events over time to build cause-and-effect relationship.

Cross-case synthesis applies specifically to analysis of multiple cases Yin (2003; 133 -137). The technique is deemed more relevant in situations where a case study consists of at least two cases – which is the case in this study. The underlying aim of cross-case analysis is to find patterns by comparison of multiple cases. The case comparison is made against predetermined categorises by looking for similarities and differences across cases.
3.6 Ethics and Quality in Research

The issue of quality is important in social research. This is to ensure that work produced is of highest quality. Many of the ideas about quality of research have been developed in quantitative research; with various approaches and techniques developed to ensure that study findings are, as far as possible, valid, reliable, and generalisable (Punch, 1998). In the context of qualitative research, however, the question of quality in research is still contested with competing claims to what count as good quality research (see, for example, Seale, 1999). Despite this, however, this issue cannot be escaped. One response by those undertaking qualitative research has been to focus on possible threats to quality that arise in the process of analysis (Gibbs, 2007: 91). Emphasis on quality has both practical and ethical implications for research. I discuss below suggestions for good research practice meant to minimise such threats for this study.

3.6.1 Reflexivity

The product of research reflects the researcher’s basic beliefs and assumptions. This can create a potential problem of the researcher imposing their own personal beliefs in the production and analysis of data (bias) - especially in qualitative research, where the researcher is an integral part of the investigation. For Denscombe (1998), two measures can be employed to guard against such eventuality. On one hand, knowing their self-beliefs, qualitative researchers should be on the guard to distance themselves and suspend their judgement for the period of their study. On the other hand, they can directly consider the way their research agenda has been shaped by personal experiences and social backgrounds. In doing so, the reader of the research is provided with information to base a judgement about how reasonable the writer’s claims are with regard to the detachment or involvement of self-identity, values and beliefs. In the current project, the researcher provided his personal background/motivation in Chapter 1 as a reflective account concerning the researcher’s self and its impact on this study (see section 1.2).
3.6.2 Triangulation

Developed in quantitative research, the idea of triangulation derives from discussions of measurement validity – that is convergent and discriminant validation of measurement instrument (the use of several methods at once so that the weaknesses/biases of any one method might be addressed by those of others. Several triangulation types have been identified (Patton, 2002). However, the focus here is on data triangulation to improve the quality of research findings. Data triangulation involves the use of a variety of data sources in a study. This is crucial in research because, as Yin (2003: 98) indicated, using multiple sources of evidence leads to the development of converging lines of inquiry\(^3\). Therefore, any finding(s) or conclusion(s) in a case study is likely to be much more convincing and accurate if it is based on several different sources of information. In this sense, data triangulation can improve on the credibility of findings of a particular study. Moreover, triangulation can get away from the idea of convergence on a fixed point and accepts a view of research as reviling multiple constructed realities – a revelation of difference is now exposed (Seale, 1999: 474).

An audit trail is also useful in dealing with the issue of reliability in qualitative research. It mostly involves providing the reasoning behind key decisions made in a particular study. As Denscombe (1998: 213) argued, ‘only if such information is supplied is it possible to reach conclusions about how far another researcher would have come up with the same findings.’ In a similar vein, Lincoln & Guba (1985: 319 cited in Denscombe, 1998) stress that ‘an inquiry audit cannot be conducted without a residue of records stemming from the inquiry, just as fiscal audit cannot be conducted without a residue of records from the business transactions involved.’

\(^3\) Dealing with data that is contradictory also raises difficulties. However, other scholars provide possible solutions. See, for example, Johnstone (2007).
3.6.3 Ethical considerations

As a student of The University of Newcastle, I abided by the ethical Code of Conduct established by the University in conduct of this study. The Human Research Ethics Committee granted their Certificate of Approval H-2008-0303 in September 2008. The researcher progressed with data collection in October 2008 until December 2008. Authorisation was sought from the Government of Botswana to conduct research within the public service organisations. With permission granted, letters were prepared for the case study organisations outlining the research purpose and seeking participation of organisational members.

During the research the researcher maintained responsibility to protect participants, ensuring that correct research procedures were undertaken, records and results are managed appropriately and that there were no inherent risks. Each interview participant was asked to sign a Participant Consent Form regarding their participation in the research to guarantee their anonymity. The participants also received a Participant Information Statement indicating the contact details for the University’s Human Research Ethics Committee if those interviewed had any queries at any time concerning the research procedures. Ethics were maintained through observed and expected societal norms of behaviour and code whilst conducting the research in respect to participants and their organisations.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the research methodology adopted for the research issues developed in the literature review regarding adoption, implementation and fate of NPM reforms in Botswana. It evaluated the overall research approach in which the research would be conducted and concluded that a qualitative one was appropriate for this study. The chapter then developed the research design to guide in the thesis. It was found that a case study was appropriate to address the research questions. The criteria for case selection
and unit of analysis were discussed. Purposive selection was deemed appropriate with interviews and documentaries used as principal data-gathering methods. How gathered data will be analysed was also discussed.

The following chapter provides an overview of the Botswana public sector which provides context for this study.
Chapter 4
Botswana and its Public Sector
4.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the Botswana’s public sector. In doing so, the chapter serves three key functions. First, it provides background information on Botswana’s public sector that is common to all the case studies. Providing this information here avoids repetition and is therefore more efficient than providing separate background material on each case in later chapters.

Second, this chapter provides context that informs the analysis of the cases that are presented in later chapters. Chapter 3 on Methodology has already demonstrated that context is especially important for qualitative case studies. In particular, the capacity to develop explanation that incorporates both the actions of the parties within the case study organisations and the ‘external’ contexts of the cases is strength of case study analysis.

Third, by revealing the nature and character of Botswana’s public sector more broadly, this chapter provides a basis for exploring the ‘typicality’ of the case study organisations. Setting the context and identifying the typicality of cases is important because while case studies cannot be used to generalise to the broader population, ‘analytic generalisation’ allows comments to be made about the broader theory and policy implications of the findings from individual case study without assuming every case is the same. Therefore, it is important to identify how the case studies fit within the general practices in the public sector.

To develop a picture of the Botswana public sector, this chapter draws on international secondary studies as well as primary and secondary data from Botswana. The international studies are largely from developing countries, in particular from Africa, since the public sectors of these countries operate in a somewhat similar fashion to Botswana’s public sector (see, for example, Poteete, 2003). The Botswana data are drawn mainly from official reports, documents and other documentary sources.
The historical account of the development of the Botswana public sector begins in section 4.2, which traces developments from the establishment of the Bechuanaland Protectorate in the 19th century until attainment of self-rule. This account reveals that Botswana in this early period can be viewed as a case of acute neglect and underdevelopment (Parson, 1984), which can be largely explained by features of the pre-independence British administration and the apparently resource-barren nature of the land.

Section 4.3 describes the unexpected and ‘exceptional’ development of Botswana in the post-independence period from 1966 until the 1980s. Compared to most other Sub-Saharan African countries, Botswana managed record high economic growth for the better part of that period, while upholding strong liberal democracy. Section 4.3.1 focuses on the contribution of minerals, especially diamonds in the whole development process. Section 4.3.2 discusses the role of the state towards general development of the country.

Section 4.4 discusses features of the contemporary Botswana’s public sector from the 1990s to date. Analysis of data reveals a situation of economic slowdown. Additionally the period is marked by an expanded public sector. Cumulatively, declined revenue and increased government spending presented a potential problem in the long-term country’s development efforts. Section 4.4.1 presents an overview of the economy and the public sector. Section 4.4.2 focuses on emerging problems within the public sector, and Section 4.4.3 addresses public sector reforms, paying particular attention on two administrative measures namely; Work Improvement Teams (WITs) and Performance Management System (PMS).

Before undertaking a more detailed account of the Botswana public sector, it is necessary to define it. With independence, Botswana adopted a mixed form of government, combining elements of both the Westminster model and the presidential system. This hybrid system of governance placed all the executive
powers within the Office of the President\textsuperscript{4}, who in executing his/her duties and responsibilities operated through the cabinet, civil service, local government and public enterprises. The cabinet advises the president and is accountable to parliament for all the matters decided under the authority of the president. The Permanent Secretary to the President (PSP), who is the secretary to the cabinet, also heads the civil service (Good, 1994; Kebonang & Maundeni, 2008; Mfundisi, 1998; Othhogile, 1998).

The public sector consists of central government, local government and public enterprises. Within the central government, there are various independent ministries and within them, a number of departments. Ministries are under the supervision of ministers who are members of parliament and headed by permanent secretaries. Local government comprises statutory bodies as agencies of devolution and deconcentration (rural & urban councils and district administration). Local authorities fall under four types; district and urban councils, land boards, tribal administration, and district administration, all of which are coordinated by Ministry of Local Government within the central government (Jones, Blunt, & Sharma, 1996). Public enterprises entail wholly and partially state-owned enterprises entrusted with provision of goods and services operating largely on a commercial basis (Jefferis, 1998) often referred to as ‘parastatals.’ They are headed by Chief Executive Officers who enjoy a degree of autonomy in operational matters but report directly to the permanent secretaries of respective ministries.

Together, these three sub-sections are referred in the remainder of the chapter as the Botswana ‘public sector.’ At a more specific level, ‘civil service’ in the context of Botswana public service refers to both central and local government operational levels, while ‘public service’ entails the three sub-sections described above.

\textsuperscript{4} There is a growing concern about the excess powers conferred upon the Office of the President, for further discussions see Good (1996), who sums up the prevailing dominance of the president as ‘authoritarianism’, and Mogalakwe (2006), argues that an unelected president has more power and authority than an elected parliament.
4.2 The British Colonial Legacy (1885 – 1966)

This is not the place for a detailed chronological account of British rule in Bechuanaland from 1885 to independence in 1966. Rather, this section highlights select features of the period that had a significant impact on the economic development and public sector of what later became Botswana. In particular, attention is focused on the unusually modest nature and non-interventionist role of the British administration and the unusually resilient traditional governance structures of the Tswana people.

Located between Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia, Botswana (or Bechuanaland, as it was called before independence) were lands traditionally occupied by the Tswana, a Bantu people. These lands are dry and agriculturally poor, but they became of interest to foreign powers during the second half of the 19th century. The years from 1870 until 1895 in particular represented a period of empire building in Southern Africa by three groups: the British, Afrikaners5, and the Germans. From the middle of the 19th century, the British informally occupied most of the Southern African region. The Afrikaners from the Cape region sought to expand into the interior in large numbers to escape the supposedly oppressive British rule; their movements brought them into conflict with the Tswana as early as the 1830s. In addition, the Germans had annexed South West Africa (Namibia) in the 1880s and were planning an expansion eastward to the other parts of the sub-continent.

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5 Originally descendants of Dutch settlers, who arrived in the Cape region of South Africa in 1752.
In this context, British missionaries working within the territory and Tswana Chiefs approached the British government to intervene and ease the pressure of Afrikaner encroachment and the possibility of annexation by the Germans (Parson, 1984). The British were initially reluctant to heed the pleas of the Tswana; but developments at the Berlin Conference of 1885 saw a drastic change of policy by the British towards the territory. In light of that, a decision was taken to keep the territory and a protectorate status was declared in the same year. However, the British government regarded the territory – ‘a barren land with no future’, according to (Mfundisi, 1998: 166) - as a temporary expedient until it could be handed over to Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) or South Africa (Adamolekun & Morgan, 1999; Parsons, 2000; Picard, 1987; Somolekae, 1998). Thus, the establishment of the protectorate over the territory was part of the wider late nineteenth century scramble for Africa by the European powers.

A key to understanding the British legacy in Botswana is the largely unchallenged assumption that there was little advantage to the British in closely ruling or economically developing the protectorate. Having conferred a
protectorate status over Bechuanaland, the British government gave overall power to rule the protectorate to a Resident High Commissioner, based in Cape Town, and a District Commissioner, based in the declared capital of Mafikeng, also in South Africa. Initially, the British authorities adopted a policy of indirect rule in the local administration. The Tswana Chiefs were recognised as exercising legitimate authority over their villages, welding all the authority and power in matters concerning their territories. They were an important link between the community and the British administration.

The Tswana Chiefs, however, were far from dictators within their tribes – the Kgotla system provided an important platform for social interaction in local administration. The Kgotla was a traditional assembly of adults where issues of public interest were discussed – it has been credited as a historical basis for the liberal democracy that has emerged after independence (Lekorwe, 1989; Molomo, 2006). At the Kgotla, the community together with traditional leadership built consensus on pertinent issues, and drew measures to initiate societal change. The Kgotla, therefore, provided a forum where the Chief and his people interacted to develop their communities. The Chief received advice and criticism from his subjects in an open popular assembly. This feature is far more a characteristic of Tswana and Sotho, with Tswana tribal experience being exceptional in that there was more tolerance of dissent than anywhere in pre-colonial Africa (Beaulier & Subrick, 2006: 107). Consequently, the Chieftainship and Kgotla system played a focal point in Tswana polity and was allowed continuity as a legitimate form of indigenous administration by the British administration (Ngcongco, 1989).

Later, during the 1920s, the British administration gradually introduced new arrangements that to some degree undermined the traditional governance structures. In particular, the British established two advisory councils, one representing Africans and the other for Europeans. The two bodies dealt distinctively with issues specific to each group, with the European Legislative council, on one hand in charge of all matters relating to white settlers, and their African counterparts, on the other hand, responsible for issues concerning the
local population. This would mark the beginning of the erosion of Chief’s powers within the territories.

As well, the Resident High Commissioner was granted powers over the local authorities, including powers to discipline, suspend and depose uncooperative Chiefs, and additionally took control of matters involving trade, hunting by foreigners and concessions (Mgadla & Campbell, 1989). To this end, the colonial administration was designed and developed to maintain order and facilitate extraction of surplus. This was a common practice in other Third World colonies (Haragopal & Chandrasekhar, 1991).

At the more local level, the District Commissioner, as the direct representative of the Resident High Commissioner, formally dominated the affairs of the protectorate, with Chiefs working under his authority (Adamolekun & Morgan, 1999). Nonetheless, the traditional leaders were still allowed by the British authorities to retain a considerable measure of autonomy and, therefore, were able to regulate nearly all aspects of tribal life (Jones, 1983: 133). In this way, the traditional local institutions of governance were not destroyed, but allowed to co-exist alongside the emerging British administrative institutions within the territory; this experience was in contrast to developments elsewhere in British colonial Africa (Crowder, 1985).

Equally important, the Chiefs, despite enjoying considerable autonomy, also felt that they did not receive adequate guidance in governance matters by the British administration. Tshekedi Khama, one of the Tswana Chiefs, feeling that he did not receive tuition and advice he needed, summed his complaint to the Colonial administration in 1929:

“I want to be taught how to govern my Country, not to be taught how to be governed.” In the absence of direction he had to teach himself government.’ (Crowder, 1985: 196)
To that end, Tswana Chiefs did not find British structures of administration as a threat to their legitimacy, but instead they saw their potential in terms of strengthening their governance capacity.

As an instrument of imperial domination, the administrative capacity and colonial government was fairly adequate for its limited functions in Third World colonies (Luke, 1986). Similarly, in the case of Bechuanaland, the British administrative actions within the territory were kept to a minimum. The District Commissioner, badly financed and understaffed, was unable to undertake socio-economic or political development of the territory even when this was considered desirable.

The modest administrative apparatus in Bechuanaland, representing the rudimentary territorial public service, primarily concerned itself with maintenance of law and order, including imposition of taxation to pay for the administrative system (Parson, 1984: 21). Similarly, Beaulier & Subrick (2006) note that seventy five percent of British spending on the territory went to administrative expenses and to upgrading tribal military to guard against external threats, thereby ignoring investment in local socio-economic infrastructure.

Significantly, locals did not participate in the few private business activities within the economy because of restrictions imposed by the British administration. According to Parson (1984: 23), even the Chiefs were denied trading licences, and a series of discriminatory laws were enacted to ensure non-participation of Africans in trading, thereby denying locals the opportunity to engage in the money economy. In effect, without an indigenous enterprising class, a potentially important section of the community was denied the opportunity to develop necessary enterprising skills and competencies and subsequently improve entrepreneurial activity and wealth creation within the territory (Mogalakwe, 2006).
The territory was administered from South Africa, with Mafikeng as its capital. During this extended period with its administrative capital disconnected from the territorial boundaries, the adopted administrative structure represented an ‘imperfect imitation’ of the Weberian model, a prevalent practice especially in the Sub-Saharan Africa (Adamolekun, 1993). Similarly, Luke (1986) observes a common pattern of ‘rational’ administrative arrangements in other British colonial Africa, although characterised by features associated with patrimonialism. To him, this system was not geared to be responsive to popular pressures; instead, it primarily served its own interests. In this way, it was not an active and dynamic agent of societal change.

The administrative apparatus in charge of the territory largely employed expatriate administrators who mainly resided in South Africa and with few locals involved administratively in the new structures of governance. Within this system, the senior civil service positions were reserved exclusively for officials from colonial capitals of Europe and they in turn displayed unquestionable loyalty to the colonial order at the expense of the local population. At the other end of the administrative ladder, were unskilled locals, mostly occupying clerical and secretarial positions, without much influence and power to shape development programmes for their territories.

This rudimentary administrative organ considerably changed in the early part of the 1960s in preparation for self-rule. An embryo ministerial system was put into operation, marking the transfer of management and control of the public administration into the hands of locals by the colonial administration. In so doing, a number of unofficial members of the Executive Council became closely involved with Departments of the Government. Sir Seretse Khama (the founding president of the country) was given the senior of these posts, being associated with the work of the Government Secretary. It was during this period that most of the decisions were made on the establishment of the public sector, encompassing central, local governance structures and parastatals (Picard, 1979: 288).
The emerging public sector entailed seven ministries and the Office of the President, the attorney general, the Public Service Commission, and the National Development Bank. In terms of staffing, there were 802 senior and middle managerial positions, of which 75 percent were occupied by expatriates and 20 percent vacant in 1964. In 1965 only a quarter of the 1,023 civil servants were locals, largely because of lack of skilled and educated manpower amongst Batswana (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001b). This, however, did not affect the operations of the public sector as it continued its reliance on the expertise of the expatriate staff.

In contrast to poor quality bureaucracies found elsewhere in other British African colonies, the quality of Bechuanaland bureaucratic apparatus was higher. The colonial administration established a high quality and clean bureaucracy within the territory. The bureaucracy was largely professional in its orientation. Its governing norms being concepts of straightforward duty without regard to personal considerations (Kiiza, 2006). This issue is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

In general terms, however, the protectorate was incapacitated, as it had to rely entirely on British aid and grants to initiate and implement development programs. There were limited educational and health facilities provided during the course of British administration, and to make matters even worse, the majority of the economically active labour force were working outside the country in South Africa and the then Rhodesia. The limited investment in the territory by the British, thus, gave rise to neglect and underdevelopment – this was the underlying legacy of colonial administration in the Bechuanaland.

4.2.1 Summary

This section shows that the colonial experience of Bechuanaland was largely of neglect and underdevelopment. This description corresponds with assertions in the literature that the extent of colonisation was influenced, largely, by the feasibility of settlement. In places where it was not favourable for colonialists to
settle, as was the case with Bechuanaland, there was no incentive for the colonialists to invest and create institutions that would impact positively on growth and social transformation (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001a)\(^6\). In the absence of such institutions, prospects for economic progress and subsequent social development of the territory were greatly undermined.

Despite this neglect and underdevelopment of the territory by the British administration, two factors with far reaching implications for the subsequent state deserve repetition. First, the indigenous structures of governance were not ruined by the colonial powers, but instead, were allowed an opportunity to grow and develop. The indigenous democratic culture underpinning these structures was therefore encouraged, enhancing their proto-democratic nature. Second, the new British structure of administration, marked by the bureaucratic formation, instilled a professional orientation in the emerging governance institutions. Cumulatively, these factors would have a significant impact on the post-independent Botswana public sector.

4.3 Post-Independence Developments (1966 – 1980s)

Prior to self-rule in the 1960s, a number of British economic survey missions came into Bechuanaland (soon to become Botswana) to assess development prospects and requirements. Each painted a gloomy picture for the imminent state, highlighting the negligible chances of rapid economic growth and development. The general consensus was that growth would be agriculturally based and, sadly, the country would continue to be among the poorest countries in the world (Curry, 1987: 477). As Curry succulently noted, ‘no economic analyst could have envisioned the wealth contained beneath Botswana’s vast, underdeveloped, and then unprospected lands.’ Similarly, Harvey and Lewis (1990: 25) summed up the prospect of the new state: ‘It was about as a bad start as it could be imagined.’

\(^6\) For more details on feasibility of colonial settlements, see Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson (2001a).
At independence in 1966, after more than seventy years of foreign indirect rule, the country was the third poorest in the world. As well, according to Owusu & Samatar (1997: 274), it was unlike most former British colonies, in that the country inherited almost nothing in the way of physical and social infrastructure to enable it to foster growth and development. By then, the country had only 22 locals who had graduated from university and 100 from secondary school, and majority of the active labour force was still working outside the country. Infrastructural development was sadly deficient, with only a mere 8 kilometres of roads tarred. To address the apparent lack of development, the country relied mostly on loans and grands-in-aid from Britain to finance both the recurrent and development expenditure (Parson, 1984; Somolekae, 1998). Additionally, agriculture dominated the country’s economy, with beef exports, mainly to the European Union and South Africa, as the mainstay of the economy (Tsie, 1996).

Despite this inauspicious beginning, the Botswana post-independence experience has been one of enormous accomplishment. Most commentators see the outstanding socio-economic and political performance that the country has since achieved as one of the few success stories in Sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, many have labelled the country an ‘African Miracle’ and considered it ‘exceptional’ among other developing countries (Good, 1994; Holm, 1994).

Its economic growth was un paralleled in the continent and ranked highly internationally. From 1966 until 1989, the country’s economic growth was the highest in the world. The following Table 4.1 summarises average annual real GDP growth rates by decade. Growth stood at 10.47 per cent from independence until the end of decade. It was at its highest in the decade of the 1970s. Significantly, the growth reached its peak of about 26 per cent in 1971 and 1972. According to Tregenna (2003), the exceptionally high growth rates of the 1970s are particularly striking in light of the general world economic recession during this period. Growth remained high in the 1980s at 11.35 per cent.
### Table 4.1: GDP growth 1966 – 1989

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Botswana had a per-capita GDP income of roughly $80 at independence. In 1970 the GDP stood at $1,072 less than the African average of $1,856, however, this indicator rose almost to $6,000 by the end of the 1980s while the rest of Africa’s per capita GDP slightly rose above $2,000 over the same period (Gwartney & Lawson, 2004). This phenomenal economic growth and progress contrast with the experience elsewhere in Africa, where post-independence experience has been underlined by bleak economic prospects and growing developmental crisis (Acemoglu et al., 2001b; Beaulier & Subrick, 2006). In most of these countries, potential that marked self-rule was not fulfilled. The economic crisis afflicting the continent led to an ‘African Growth Tragedy’ (Easterly & Levine, 1997).

The exceptionalism of the Botswana experience was, as will be detailed below, stimulated by the discovery in the late 1960s of extensive mineral deposits. However, more important was the crucial role of the Botswana state in actively organising and directing change, through policy intervention, guided by national development plans that placed it central to the whole development process. In this regard, the country earned recognition as a ‘developmental state’ in similar vain to the East Asian Tigers (Edge, 1998; Mbabazi & Taylor, 2005; Owusu & Samatar, 1997). Unlike the East Asian Tigers, however, strong state-led economic success in Botswana was achieved while maintaining democratic institutions (Carroll & Carroll, 1997).

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7 For a comprehensive discussion on developmental state, see Samatar (1999) and Leftwich (1993).
Additionally, Botswana’s adherence to democratic governance was unparallel in sub-Saharan Africa where adoption of non-democratic forms of governance became the norm after attainment of self-rule. The country had the longest uninterrupted democratic governance in the continent, and in the process earned accolades as a ‘shining example of liberal democracy’ in southern Africa (Tsie, 1996: 599). Tiruneh (2004) acknowledged the significance of both the inherited Westminster structure of governance and the indigenous Kgotla system towards institutionalisation of democratic practice in Botswana.

The Botswana public sector expanded significantly in both size and scope over the post-independence period. Numerous administrative organisations were established, with twenty-six major institutions as well as limited-function ministries created between 1966 and 1977. Similarly, public enterprises also increased significantly over the same period. The expansions carried with it related increases in the public sector employment (Parson, 1984).

Despite this expansion, there was minimal change in the inherited structural, normative and behavioural formation of the public sector. The public service, in particular, remained highly centralised and underpinned by rigid and impersonal rules (Washington & Hacker, 2005). Commentators agree that Botswana public service was of high quality, with one of the most effective public sector managements in Africa, and indeed among developing countries (Raphaeli, Roumani & MacKellar, 1984). According to Good (1994), this was achieved largely through avoidance of rapid localisation process, payment of high salaries, and the maintenance of well-defined lines of authority and accountability. In this way, ‘efficiency and effectiveness were made the overriding goals’ of the public service (Wescott, 1994: 3).

Over the period, the Botswana public service built itself into an efficient institution in policy making and implementation process. This was the case largely because of the professionalism of the public service. Such professionalism, allowed the public servants to be at the forefront in the
management of the public sector and national affairs. Importantly, the partnership between politicians and the bureaucracy in the country worked remarkably well. The civil service was given sufficient space to operate without interruption from its political counterparts. The relationship proved invaluable in that the civil service avoided political influence and intimidation, common in other countries in the continent (Hope, 1995). This arrangement largely offered sufficient centralisation for better decision-making and policy implementation within the context of state-led and mineral-led development, both which are subjects of further discussion below in section 4.3.1 and 4.3.2.

### 4.3.1 Mineral-led Development

Botswana has a long history with minerals dating back to the 1850s, when tribal leaders granted the De Beers mining company a concession to prospect for diamonds. Subsequent exploration for other minerals also ensued, although nothing significant of commercial value was discovered. However, after independence, the government revised mineral development policies, culminating with a shift of mineral rights ownership from the tribes to the central government.

Furthermore, commercially viable mineral deposits were subsequently discovered. Of particular significance was the discovery of diamond deposits in 1967 in Orapa. In 1972, the Orapa mine became operational, followed a few years later by Lethakane mine and Jwaneng mine opening in 1982. Additionally, copper and nickel discovered in Selibe-Phikwe started to operate on a commercial basis in 1973 (Curry, 1987).

After the discovery of diamonds, De Beers and Botswana government combined to form the Debswana Mining Company. Initial arrangement had De Beers granted 85 per cent ownership stake in the joint venture with Botswana government taking the remaining 15 per cent. This arrangement underscored Botswana government’s careful policymaking by allowing De Beers to invest in the exploration and management of minerals under a secure investment
arrangement. As for the Botswana government, the benefit of such arrangement was that it did not invest a lot financially but arranged to reap a high level of profits from any discoveries (Beaulier & Subrick, 2007: 14). The initial arrangement with De Beers was renegotiated in 1975 to give a 50/50 shareholding in Debswana, with Botswana government getting an estimated 75-80 per cent of profits. This deal certainly increased the benefits of Botswana’s mineral resources for its economic growth and development.

Furthermore, according to Curry (1987: 481) this arrangement also ensured that not only did the Botswana government negotiate in ways that ensured that Botswana would share in mining sector profits during good times, but also bargained to shift some of the burden of downturn to the mining companies. For instance, government policy restrict selling of diamonds during periods of economic downturn globally, rather preferring to stockpile produce while waiting for international markets to recover before selling resumes (Jefferies, 1998). In this way, the economic downturn of the early 1980s did not severely affect Botswana, when other mineral-led economies in the continent such as Zambia and Liberia experienced a halt to their economies.

The exploitation of minerals, especially diamonds, significantly altered the structure of the Botswana’s economy from an agricultural base to a largely mineral-led economy (Curry, 1987; Makgetla, 1982; Tsie, 1996). The cumulative revenue accruing to government from these minerals was substantial and, as a result, minerals replaced beef as the country’s main foreign-exchange earner. As shown in Table 4.2, diamonds as proportion of GDP rose from 13 per cent in 1976 to a peak of 51 per cent in 1988.
Table 4. 2: Diamond Contribution, 1976 -1989 (In percent of GDP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Share of GDP (%)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>15.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>23.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>41.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>46.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>43.8</td>
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<td>1987</td>
<td>44.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>50.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jefferis (1998)

An unusually long-lived diamond sales boom in the 1980s fuelled the GDP share of minerals in the Botswana economy. According to Nordas & Gergis (2000) this had more to do with the near monopoly on world sales of gem quality diamonds, dominated by De Beers, through its trading arm, the Central Selling Organisation.

Although, diamonds are largely responsible for the socio-economic achievements of the country, government was also cognisant of the future challenges facing the nation. In an attempt to address that, a substantial share of diamonds revenue was invested overseas as hedge against the future to provide for periods of low returns from mineral exports or such eventualities should mining be exhausted (Jefferis, 1998). In this context, the role of
Botswana state in relation to management of the economy cannot be over-emphasised.

**4.3.2 Role of the State in Development**

Botswana’s socio-economic development since independence was achieved within a context of increased state intervention in the economy. To Maipose (2003), expanded state involvement in the country was more a case of pragmatism rather than motivated by any ideological affiliations. The realities of underdevelopment at independence meant that the process of nation building assumed a structure that was driven by the primary concerns of development at all levels of the society. Consequently, the state structure expanded to get socio-economic development off the ground, in the absence of viable private sector and indigenous entrepreneurs (Edge, 1998; Nordas & Gergis, 2000).

At the centre of the state expansion was the country’s political leadership. With independence, the nation’s political leadership focussed strongly on the establishment of legitimacy and building an effective administration. In so doing, the state asserted its authority over the traditional leaders and made them agents of state administration at district levels. In this way, the state assumed centre stage on socio-economic and political spheres of the country without any threat of political counter legitimacy from any other source.

A consideration of the policies pursued by the government shows the significant role played by the state in the socio-economic development of the country. Acemoglu et al. (2001b) concludes that the success of the country was due to sound economic policy enacted by government especially, the role of the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. The ministry was responsible for overall policy development, leadership and direction on all matters pertaining to national development, and as noted by Raphaeli, Roumani, & MacKellar (1984), it effectively managed formulation and implementation of programs for economic and social development. In general terms, the ministry concerned itself with financial planning and budgeting for overall development programs.
From independence, the state adopted and implemented a consistent series of NDPs developed on five-year basis, setting out spending forecasts and summarising government economic policies. The NDPs provided a comprehensive development agenda as agreed by the elected officials. As noted by Harvey (1992: 343), it was illegal to implement any development project not in the plan without approval of parliament. Thus, NDPs ensured sound financial management on the part of government through investment in priority development projects. The NDPs successfully also avoided budget deficits for almost the entire post-independence period.

Sticking with spending levels and according to agreed development projects as prescribed on NDPs meant that the country’s finances were managed in a prudent way. This was the foundation of the country’s sound economic policy crucial for Botswana to escape worldwide recessions and slumps in the diamond market. Furthermore, NDPs also drew a distinct line between spending that was necessary for development and spending that was wasteful. In this way, the country was able to engage in productive development of necessary infrastructure and avoid investment in unproductive projects. Thus, placing emphasis on spending as outlined by NDPs, the country was able to avoid ‘Dutch Disease’ and the ‘resource curse’ both common among resource-rich economies (Beaulier & Subrick, 2007; Harvey, 1992). Typically, Dutch Disease relates to a situation in a resource abundant economy where there is an inverse relationship between natural resource rents and economic growth. Largely, the effects of policy failure can explain this; whereby export growth in one commodity will lead to appreciation of the currency, which in turn carries negative export profitability for other commodities (Auty, 2001).

Similarly, resource curse describes a situation where the general tendency in mineral rich countries has not been encouraging; politics tend to be coupism, the state is inherently insensitive to citizens more so that it has a guaranteed source of income, and there is increased vulnerability of the state to organisational challenges, corruption, and ineffective public bureaucracies.
Thus, resource rich developing countries performed worse, economically, than resource poor developing countries over the last three decades (Moore, 2004).

Thus, through adoption of appropriate macroeconomic policies, including avoiding temptation to increase expenditure during diamond boom period, adopting cautious spending policies and adoption of currency devaluations the country managed to avoid problems associated with Dutch Disease and resource curse (Jefferis, 1998).

Effectively, the Botswana state has played a crucial role in the economy. Good (1994: 500), summarises the role of the Botswana state as ‘careful planning, economic management, and diplomacy’ Thus, the phenomenal economic growth and development from independence until 1980s was largely achieved within a context of state-led development. The state guided by NDPs managed to be at the forefront of development drive and in the process managed to manage mineral revenue in a way that ensured post-independence period marked Botswana as an exceptional case of socio-economic transformation.

4.3.3 Summary

The literature and data discussed in this section confirm that post-independence experience of the country was of great achievement. In many respect, the country has been a model of success in developing countries, particularly in Africa. Underpinning this success has been minerals and the role of the state in the development process. Despite assertions in the literature confirming an existence of inverse relationship between economic growth and mineral resource abundance, Botswana has been among the few exceptional resource-rich countries.

Through prudent management of public finances, Botswana government succeeded in ensuring that investment in development infrastructure was undertaken on the principle of necessity and ensured that spending was within
budget. As such, Botswana avoided excess spending against the backdrop of diamond booms in the post-independence period but also managed to balance between investment on current and for the future welfare of the country.

4.4 Contemporary Botswana Development and Public Sector Reforms (1990s – 2000s)

After the sustained economic growth and social developments of the three post-independence decades, the 1990s marked a relatively new chapter in Botswana’s development with far reaching implications for the economy at large and the public sector in particular. From the 1990s, the Botswana’s economic growth slowed to an average annual rate of an estimated 5 per cent per annum, mainly because of the reduced rate of expansion of the diamond market globally (UNDP, 1997). The decline in economic growth underscored the country's vulnerability because of its dependence on a primary mineral export and its lack of economic diversification (Mhone & Bond, 2001). This led to a reassessment of the size, efficiency and the role of the public sector.

At the same time, the 1990s also saw developments within the public sector itself that damaged the reputation of the Botswana public sector. In particular, perceptions of waning public-sector productivity and service delivery combined with well-publicised episodes of corruption helped to reinforce pressures towards public-sector reform. This section will first describe economic developments and then the problems within the public sector before providing an overview of the reform initiatives.

4.4.1 Slowing Economic Growth, ‘Unbalanced Development’ and the Public Sector

The contemporary Botswana economic growth stood far below the record growth the country experienced from independence until the 1980s. From 1990 to 1999 GDP growth slowed significantly to an average annual rate of 4.89 per
cent and slightly improved to 4.92 per cent during 2000 to 2004 period (Tregenna, 2003). The sluggish growth over this period underscored structural problems with the country’s economy.

Structurally, the Botswana economy remained largely unchanged despite phenomenal economic growth over the previous two decades. The dominance of the mineral and general government sectors persisted despite government efforts to diversify the economy. Table 4.3 summaries sectoral contribution to the GDP from 1991 until 2000. The mineral sector remained the largest contributor to the GDP, ranging from 32.1 to 37 percent. General government contribution remained high averaging 15 per cent annually. Other sector’s contribution did not undergo any substantive changes except the hospitality (i.e. trade, hotels and restaurants) which experienced significant growth and in the process replaced manufacturing sector behind general government and mining within the economy respectively.

### Table 4.3: Sectoral Performance, 1991-2000

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<td>4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
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<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water &amp; Electricity</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>5.1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
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<td>3.6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks, Insurance &amp; Business Services.</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Government</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social &amp; Personal Services</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bank of Botswana
As indicated above, the minerals continued to dominate the production side of GDP. Despite this dominance, however, the mineral contribution as a share of the GDP declined over time. Part of the explanation for the decline in the mineral revenue was that global diamond demand slowed with the economic recession in the early part of the 1990s. From 1996/97 until 2000/01, mineral revenue as a share of the GDP rose significantly, reaching a high of almost 30 per cent. This had to do more with improvements in production capacity following an expansion and use of new mining technology in Orapa and Jwaneng mines.

After 2001, the mineral revenue again declined because Botswana reached a plateau in diamond production. Scholars observe an existence of a natural tendency among mineral-led economies to grow rapidly in the early phases of mineral production, which in turn result in relatively high-income levels. This phase is usually followed by stagnation and subsequently, the decline stage. During the last stages, income levels stagnate before experiencing a decline (Auty & Mikesell, 1998; Nordas & Gergis, 2000). The negative impact of reaching a mature stage in diamond production, however, was not an immediate problem for Botswana. As noted by Jefferis (1998: 315), there was no danger of diamonds deposits getting exhausted as estimates were of 50 to 100 years of supply at existing production levels. The issue of concern was, however, that output would no longer be growing unless new mines were commissioned.

The dominance by general government on the expenditure side of GDP also persisted. Government consumption remained significantly high. Despite the decline in revenues, expenditure increased and led to budget deficit. For instance, in 1999 the country experienced its first budget deficit in almost 16 years. This was followed in 2003 by yet another budget deficit (Botswana Government, 2000: 2004). The prudent financial management of the post-independence period was largely undermined with an increase in government spending. Botswana’s expenditure share of GDP, at almost 29 per cent, was
significantly high compared to an average of 12 per cent for other middle-income countries (Nordas, 2000).

However, the economic slowdown was not catastrophic for the economy. Botswana economic and development record remained positive. The GDP increased to $14 billion with per capita at $8,800. Furthermore, the country had one of the highest foreign exchange reserves in the world and foreign debt stood at 14 per cent of GNP with no domestic debt. Against this record, the World Bank classified Botswana as an upper-middle-income country in 1997 (Maipose, 2003; Taylor, 2003).

In spite of the high economic growth experienced during the previous two decades, the Botswana economy failed to transform into a case of balanced development. According to Mhone & Bond (2001), the country remained largely a mineral-dependent economy with required economic transformation and export diversification needed to transform the economy failing to happen. Jefferis (1998), for example, noted that diversification initiatives proved difficult to create sustainable sources of output, employment and exports which were not dependent on government subsidies or large-scale public expenditure of mineral revenues. Additionally, the mining sector was also not well integrated with the rest of the economy through forward and backward linkages, potentially undermining long-term sustainability of high growth rates and limiting broad-based growth (Tregenna, 2003: 4).

Within a context characterised by lack of diversification, the role of the public sector was enhanced to become the sole principal instrument of the state towards development of the country. In the process of development, the public sector expanded into almost every aspect of the economy undertaking a large number of projects and programmes. In line with assertions in the literature, economic growth generated expansion in the Botswana’s public sector as the state intervened to provide collective goods and services (Boix, 2001). [Table 4.4 summarises annual public sector employment growth from 1990 until 1998 (the figures do not include % of total employment of public enterprises). The
expansion was significant in all the years except in 1996. By 2007, there were 121,364 public servants with a distribution of 96,702 at the central government and 24,662 employed at local government level (CSO, 2007).

Table 4.4: Botswana public sector employment (1990-1998) (In thousands)

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>93.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Statistics Office

The expansion in public sector played an important role in building state capacity. However, as will be detailed below, increased role in both scope and size of the Botswana public sector failed to create expected capacity towards effective delivery of services by the public sector. Instead, expansion in the public sector created challenges for public sector management in the country.

4.4.2 Emerging Problems in the Public Sector

Although the role played by the Botswana state in the early development of the country is undeniable, there were doubts raised over the sustainability of such strategy in the long-term development efforts of the country. According to Nordas & Gergis (2000: 11), the scale and scope of government’s role in the economy appeared to be unsustainable both from financial point of view and in terms of utilising scare resources that might have better alternative use. As such, the scale and scope of the public sector posed challenges towards effective public sector management in the country.

Botswana public sector management became an issue of concern from the 1990s. As government embarked on numerous projects and programmes it outgrew its capacity for effective policy implementation. To Nordas (2000), the
public service continued to formulate good policy initiatives, take policy decisions and adhered to budget constraints, but the public service performed dismally on policy implementation. Effectively with its capacity for implementation over-stretched, many development projects and programmes were not implemented in line with NDPs.

Explaining the declining standards of public sector management, Adamolekun & Morgan (1999) observed a significant drop in morale and motivation among public servants with resultant deterioration in the quality of delivery of basic public services in most government ministries and departments. This problem was not only isolated to the public service but across the entire economy. Leith (1999), for instance, noted that total factor productivity in the 1990s marked significant change from the post-independence period. To him, total factor productivity dropped from an average rate of 4 per cent over the post-independence period to 0.5 in the 1990s.

Moreover, Hope (1995) maintains that one of the ironic results of the country’s rapid economic growth was the failure of the public sector to recruit and retain personnel that are highly skilled. Although the public sector expanded in size, there continued to be a shortage of highly trained and skilled public servants to conduct the development management affairs of government. The economic growth and government diversification efforts only helped create ample alternative opportunities to attract many of the qualified nationals away from the public service to other emerging sectors of the economy. Legwaila (1993) concurs, noting that economic progress resulted in, among other things, public sector employment losing its prestige and attractiveness. In the absence of quality personnel, productivity standards declined within the public service (BNPC, 1995).

Within declining public sector management environment, other problems emerged from the beginning of the 1990s, particularly mismanagement and corruption in the public sector. Although corruption was not seen as systemic or of epidemic levels in the country there was a rising incidence of corruption in
Botswana\(^8\) in the contemporary period (Good, 1994; Wescott, 1994: 5). In spite of such international standing, corruption and mismanagement took a centre stage in the 1990s, with a great potential to reverse the country’s economic gains and undermine its future development prospects. Events of corruption and mismanagement involving public servants and their political counterparts dominated and lead to establishment of a series of Presidential Commission of Inquiries (i.e. Kgabo Commission, IPM Report and Christie Report), in which corruption and mismanagement was established to be gaining ground within the public service. As such, effective structures of control that was the hallmark of the public sector were being undermined.

The Kgabo Report of 1991 on illegal land sales in peri-urban areas was primarily a result of larger public problem regarding land allocation in areas adjacent to Gaborone. What was more disturbing about this debacle was the involvement of senior government officials and politicians in illegal land allocations. The commission found evidence of the use of high office for personal gain by those in high public offices. Importantly, this Report highlighted irregularities in the public offices and reinforced the need for effective and efficient structures to address apparent loopholes in government that potentially encouraged corruption and mismanagement (Good, 1994; Grant, 1998).

Additionally, the Christie Report of 1992 was sparked by irregularities at Botswana Housing Corporation (a government state-owned enterprise). The report identified gross mismanagement and dishonesty in the BHC resulting in substantial losses amounting into tens of million Pula. At the centre of the row were Assistant Ministers and senior public servants. The report also established massive corruption. Therefore, as its Chairman observed, this case implied a failure in the entire government system, precisely in its highest echelons (Good, 1994: 505; Grant 1998). Furthermore, the Auditor General report also announced several cases of misappropriation, embezzlement, and fraud at various government ministries and department including state owned

\(^8\) Botswana consistently ranked the least corrupt country in the continent; see Transparency International Corruption Index.
enterprises. Against this background of growing perceptions of more corruption in the public service, government decided to take corruption seriously (Hope, 1995: 44).

A crucial source of worry for government emerged at the beginning of the 1990s with possible implications for government financing. Despite the diamonds reserves, they were unlikely to be forever. The ending of the diamond boom presented a serious concern to the Botswana government. With stagnated mineral export revenue government needed to look for alternative sources of growth and minimise its involvement in the economy. Accordingly, government acknowledged that the public sector was not sustainable. Against this background, the government had no option but to reassess the role of the public sector in the economy (Jefferis, 1998).

Also during this time, there was re-examination of the state role in the national development. The scale of the public sector was perceived as adversely affecting general progress by inhibiting development of the private sector. According to Nordas & Gergis (2000), the public sector through provision of both private and public goods, created high barriers for entry for the alternative sectors and thus, became part of the problem rather than part of the solution towards diversification of the economy.

The resultant constraints placed on the management of the public sector by its expanded scope and size provided necessary impetus for public sector reforms adoption by the government as a way of improving on declining service delivery and more importantly create conducive environment for private sector-led development.

4.4.3 An Overview of Public Sector Reforms

In most developing countries, particularly in Africa, the development crisis afflicting the countries was primarily a crisis of the state capacity (Sandbrook, 1996: 2; Maipose, 2003). In most of these countries, the state occupied a
unique position as a dominant force in the economy. Therefore, failure to perform by the state institutions compromised the socio-economic welfare of these nations. Consequently, state’s limited capacity explained African development misfortunes that adversely affected the general welfare of the continent’s population.

In an attempt to remedy this crisis, these governments embarked on public sector reform initiatives imposed as part of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) from the 1980s, by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The Bratton-Woods Institutions actively promoted the reform programmes to enhance state capacity in these countries in an effort to resuscitate ailing economies and set Africa on the path of recovery (Sandbrook, 1995). These reform measures would dominate even after the 1990s to date in many African countries.

Primarily, the reform programmes were aimed at shaping the public administration to lead national development in a more efficient and effective manner, by adopting alternative ways of organising and managing the public services and redefining the role of the state to give more standing to markets and competition, and the private and voluntary sectors within the economy. The argument being that this will offer efficiency, representation, participation and accountability. Thus, issues of good governance including consolidation of democracy and financial stabilisation were at the forefront of the reform initiatives in these countries (UNECA, 2003). Importantly, the adoption of reform programmes was among conditional requirements for securing financial and technical aid from international financial institutions by those countries.

Nevertheless, a distinctive element of Botswana’s experience with public sector reforms was that they constitutes an introspective measure adopted by the country’ government, as opposed to experiences elsewhere in the continent. The reforms in the country were therefore not part of the austerity measures imposed by international financial institutions; rather, they were a deliberative exercise on the part of the Botswana government aimed at addressing
emerging challenges and opportunities in an effort to achieve future growth and sustainable development. More importantly, there was a re-examination of the state role in national development pursued by senior government officials and other interested parties from outside government, that led to policy discourse about the need for minimised state role in development and subsequent expansion of the role of the private sector.

Explaining the change of position was government’s failure to diversify the economy away from minerals and, at the same time, increased private sector participation in the economy over years, leading to a consolidated government position to support reform through enactment of policy framework and related institutional arrangements (NDP 8 & 9; Government Paper No. 1, 2000). The official position of government has seen an adoption of policy position to make the public sector facilitator of private sector-led development in the country (Sebusang & Moeti, 2005). Thus, at a broader level, government adoption of public sector reforms was intended to reduce the role of the public sector in the economy.

At a specific level, the adoption of the reforms was aimed at improving the overall performance of the civil service. The country had a long history with administrative reforms. From independence, a series of administrative reform initiatives were implemented, to alleviate problems related to service delivery within the public service. The immediate targets of these measures focused on improving administrative process, policies and procedures. Undoubtedly, these measures helped strengthen the capacity of the Botswana public service and, thus, made it one of the few success stories in the African continent (Raphaeli et al., 1984). The focus of this section is not on historical reforms. Rather, its attention will be placed on reform initiatives that were introduced in the Botswana’s public service from the 1990s into the 2000s.

There were many reform initiatives that were simultaneously implemented across the public sector over this period (1990s – 2000s) and not all were necessarily NPM-style ones. Those initiatives modelled around the NPM
paradigm were adopted to modernise the public service. The initiatives manifested at two levels: creation of organisations and introduction of administrative improvement programmes. Amongst organisations created were Botswana National Productivity Centre (BNPC), Public Enterprises Evaluation and Privatisation Agency (PEEPA), Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) and Ombudsman. A brief review of these organisations is presented herewith.

BNPC was established in 1993 mainly to foster productivity consciousness and inculcate a culture of high performance and excellence across the whole economy, both public and private sectors. To achieve its mandate, BNPC develop and organise productivity improvement and management programmes for employees from all sectors of the economy. Importantly, it offers advisory and consultancy services to effect increased levels of productivity and efficiency; undertakes productivity measurements exercises to establish and develop national performance standards; conduct studies, enquiries and research in the fields of management development and productivity; serves as a base for collecting and disseminating information on productivity improvement and other techniques together with publication of information related thereto; and train employees and their representatives in measures designed to improve labour productivity (Hope, 1995; Morapedi, 2003).

PEEPA was established in the early 2000s to advise on and oversee all aspects of the implementation of commercialisation and privatisation on behalf of government. Specifically, it was tasked with identifying opportunities for private sector participation in the economy. Towards that end, PEEPA focus on four key activities namely divestiture, public private partnership, performance monitoring of public enterprises, and contracting out and commercialisation. In that way, it offers institutional framework to facilitate favourable policy environment for the success of privatisation in the country. In effect, through PEEPA government sought a shift towards greater market orientation in the economy, which would in turn bring improvement in management, and service delivery in the economy (Mothusi, 2008).
DCEC was established in 1994 following a series of corruption and mismanagement scandals across the public sector. It was mandated to fight corruption and economic crimes not only in government but also across the whole economy. Relatedly, the office of the Ombudsman was established in 1995 to deal with misuse of power by public officials brought before it by members of the public. As Olowu (1999: 607) put it, ‘the intention was that DCEC will deal with high profile economic crimes and related corruption while the ombudsman will tackle the petty forms of corruption and abuse of office.’ These institutions therefore complement each other to improve governance and deepen accountability and transparency in the country. In doing so, they were to enhance service delivery and promote productivity across the public service (Mokgatle & Molefhe, 2008; Mpabanga, 2008).

In addition to establishment of the organisations discussed above, various administrative programmes were also introduced that included, among others, Computerised Personnel Management System (CPMS), Decentralisation of human resources functions, WITs and PMS - which are subjects of detailed discussion below. The CPMS was introduced in 1996 to provide an accurate and up-to-date database of human resources information in the public service to all managers and staff involved in HR activities. Through CPMS it was envisaged that managers would be in a position to make informed and fast decisions and thus make the public service more efficient and effective. In effect, CPMS intended to optimise information technology to improve quality of decision making in the public service (Morapedi, 2003).

Related to CPMS, Decentralisation of HR functions sought to improve decision making in the public service. Before 1998, all personnel issues were centralised in DPSM. This centralised arrangement created serious delays in decision-making and as a result hampered efficient service delivery. Decentralisation was therefore meant to empower Permanent Secretaries, as head of ministries, to have control over staff working under them and thus reduce dependence on DPSM. Consistent with their expanded job scope, Permanent Secretaries could
recruit, appoint, promote, discipline and dismiss employees under their ministries up to the level of D1 positions. Despite the decentralisation effort, DPSM retained powers to deal with all personnel issues above the D1 level and other important personnel issues such as pay for all those under the employment of the central government. The decentralisation exercise therefore proved limited. Overall, these measures were aimed at enhancing service delivery and promote productivity within the public service (DPSM, 1999; Mothusi, 2008).

Corkery et al., (1998; 84) had this to say about the reform initiatives implemented over the past two decades in Botswana’ public service, ‘the trend is moving towards the issue of effectiveness, value for money, quality and productivity, and output’. In this way, such reforms brought a shift from preoccupation with the role of the public sector in socio-economic development, as was the case from independence until the late 1980s, to the development of strategies that promoted service delivery and productivity in the public service and called for accountability of results (Hope, 1995, 1999; Somolekae, 1998; Wescott, 1999; Sebusang & Moeti, 2005; Marobela, 2008; Dzimbiri, 2008; Conteh & Ohemeng, 2009). These initiatives clearly exhibited NPM features, terminology and strategies similar to public sector reforms that were in vogue globally under the umbrella of the NPM paradigm - they sought to implant a new approach in traditional public administration through the use of market based management approach that emphasised efficiency, productivity, improved service delivery, and accountability (Lane, 1997; Kettl, 1997).

In 1993 the government launched productivity movement in the whole public service with two main features; the introduction and establishment of the Botswana National Productivity Centre (BNPC), and introduction of Singapore-inspired work improvement teams (WITs). The productivity movement was introduced with technical assistance from Singapore, through a twinning arrangement between Singapore’s Civil Service Training Institute and the Botswana Institute of Administration and Commerce (BIAC). This arrangement was largely inspired by the Singapore’s economic success and public service
management performance towards the development of the country (Adamolekun & Morgan, 1999). Thus, WITs represented an attempt of diffusion and adoption of high work performance practices from Singapore by the Botswana public service, with primary objective of improving productivity in the public sector at large.

WITs was adopted from the work improvement group concept as implemented in Singapore; renowned for high commitment work culture, although originally was linked to the Japanese framework of quality control circles. All Botswana government ministries and departments adopted WITs, with all public servants required to be members of WITs. The practice entailed groups of employees from the same work unit, irrespective of their divisional position, meeting regularly to identify, examine, analyse, and solve problems pertaining to work in their unit. In addition, they would identify and examine improvement opportunities and propose and implement improvement measures, help to adapt the work unit and the department to changing situations.

Furthermore, they discussed and conducted studies on how to improve their working environment, efficiency, effectiveness, quality of service, knowledge and skill, teamwork, work performance, use of resources, work goals, objectives and targets, systems, methods and procedures and so on, and develop problem-solving skills and ensure job satisfaction. The underlying objective of the WITs strategy was therefore the need to increase productivity and performance in the public service. Largely, this was realised by striving for emphasis on people who are challenged, encouraged, developed and given the power to act and use their judgement with the confidence that they could address almost any challenge rather than occupy themselves with the risk of failure (Hope, 2003: 307).

WITs also encouraged participative leadership and teamwork rather than coercive and authoritarian leadership, with a vision of an ideal organisation with clearly defined purpose and goals articulated to foster commitment and collaboration. Thus, it had a ‘Bottom-Up’ approach, intended to increase
employee participation in their work, and hence improved on their motivation levels, consequently improving on the organisational performance. This became possible as the strategy foster innovative work style that seeks to address problems creatively and independently instead of relying on control from outside authority. Again, there was a strong client orientation in service delivery rather than serving a bureaucracy (Hope, 2003).

Effectively, WITs sought to introduce high performance work practices, including a non-adversarial, ‘we’ rather than ‘us and them’ employment relationship, consensus seeking and a family or team orientation. As noted by Horwitz et al., (2002), these practices were most likely to be found in East Asia, in places such as Singapore, where Confucian values underlie managerial practices. Additionally, African humanism reflects a conceptual proximity to Confucian values; as such, WITs appealed more to the Botswana context, although the underlying factor for adoption of such practices had to do more with emergent managerial belief particularly in Southern Africa that there was much to be learned from East Asian managerial practices.

Despite being mandatory, not all government ministries and departments were vigorously pursuing WITs. It also failed to meet its objectives, largely because of its fragmented ‘one shot’ approach to service improvement (www.dpsm.gov.bw). The euphoria that marked the beginning of WITs progressively declined over the course of time, largely because support from senior managers was found wanting. Again, and consistent with literature data on diffusion and adoption of cross-cultural management practices⁹, the values and assumptions embedded in the local work culture resisted WITs, largely because the local culture did not share its cultural base.

The success of New Zealand, a country that adopted Performance Management System (PMS) in the early 1980s as a reform measure to modernise and enhance performance in the public service, largely provided

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impetus for adoption of PMS in Botswana’s public service context. The New Zealand successful experience with its reform agenda, indeed, presented an opportunity for Botswana to extrapolate from its experience, and improve on the country’s public sector performance. According to (Bale & Dale, 1998), on assuming office in 1984, the elected Labour Government took an economy in a crisis, and following adoption of series of reforms, the government managed to turn the economy around, underpinned by entrepreneurial public sector. Against this background, the Botswana government ministries and departments adopted PMS, as the latest performance improvement strategy in 1999.

Unlike the previous administrative reforms, PMS was a comprehensive initiative, with a holistic and sustainable approach. Key to PMS was the development of a vision, mission, strategic plans and annual performance plans in all ministries and departments at individual and organisational level. Thus, PMS had a strategic focus in enhancing organisational performance through establishment of measurable deliverable targets. This was not the case with previous reform initiatives, which focussed on organisational processes than outcomes.

The main objectives of PMS were to improve individual and organisational performance and enhance performance in a systematic way, and enable government to improve performance and enhance its capacity to provide efficient service delivery to Botswana. Importantly, it was expected to instil a culture of managing performance and producing results as expected by the nation (Sharma, 2007: 14). With clearly established performance targets and measures, employees and organisations were expected developed well-informed achievable targets. Quarterly appraising were being considered to improve on the previous yearly appraising system, which in turn offered both the individual and supervisors opportunity to adequately track performance standards and take corrective measures before things get out of control.

PMS was designed to provide system thinking to implement change. In line with its 50th anniversary as a nation, the country created its Vision 2016 with a
broader goal of becoming a better country in the year 2016. The Vision included targets for all aspects of the nation from economic development, literacy rates, security and health among others. While intending to address long-term development challenges facing the country, PMS also intended to address immediate concerns with overall poor service delivery by the public service as its priority (Washington & Hacker, 2005).

The change agents initially were the top echelons of ministries and departments; however, full-time appointed Performance Improvement Coordinators (PICs) were introduced to lead the implementation of PMS. It largely adopted a ‘Top-Down’ approach, which has met resistance from the general employees, at least for now. (Mpabanga, 2005), found the approach to impact positively at the strategic levels, although at the operational level it only increased cynicism amongst employees, who view PMS as an imposed initiative from the top structures of government.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter highlighted a number of features of Botswana public sector including acute neglect and underdevelopment characterising pre-independence Bechuanaland, ‘exceptionalism’ in terms of socio-economic and political developments subsequent to attainment of independence marking the country until the 1990s, and a country at ‘crossroads’ since the beginning of the new millennium to date.

The notable feature of British legacy undoubtedly has been its unusually modest and non-interventionist role in the protectorate; however, that policy equally allowed continuity of traditional governance institutions. Both the indigenous and inherited British administrative structures would prove invaluable in the subsequent development within the country and influenced positively on the structural and behavioural formation of the public sector. Therefore, the salient feature of this period was the establishment and
continuity of institutions. Literature and data confirmed that countries with effective institutions fare much better than those without in terms of economic growth and development (Matthews, 1986).

Post-independence features of the country contrast with the experience of almost all other African countries. While majority of the continent’s countries experienced ‘African Growth Tragedy’, Botswana enjoyed rapid growth, fuelled by minerals, especially diamonds coupled with prudent management by the expanded state. In the process, the country succeeded in avoiding political pathologies evident in most mineral-rich economies. Subsequent public sector expansion corresponds with assertions in the literature that mineral rents positively influence public sector growth.

The contemporary period features reveal a country at ‘crossroads’ in its developmental trajectory. After a period of success over the last three decades resulting with the country becoming a model of success in Africa, events of the 1990s to date have raised questions on the interventionist role of the state against a backdrop of declining mineral revenues. Literature and data analysis reveals a need for policy discourse on the part of the Botswana government to ensure economic growth and sustainable development. Thus, current administrative reform measures aim at realising that objective.

In detailing the features of the Botswana public sector, this chapter has provided the context for subsequent chapters. Specifically, it provides a setting for the case studies and facilitates better understanding of Botswana public sector practices. Furthermore, the chapter provides a basis from which to identify typicality of the case study organisations.

The next chapter explores the specific context of the Botswana public service to better understand application of NPM reforms in the country.
Chapter 5

Botswana Public Service and NPM
5.1 Introduction

This chapter has two aims: first, it provides a case study of the adoption of NPM reforms in the Botswana public service. Second, it provides specific context that informs analysis of the cases presented in Chapters 6 and 7. In Chapter 2, it was indicated that scholars and practitioners paid little attention to social and institutional contextual issues in developing countries and how public sector reforms are intertwined within these influences. For instance, the dominant discourse tends to view policy-making process in these countries as externally driven, especially by international financial institutions and donor agencies. Consequently, much work focuses on the content of the policy initiatives and omits discussion of distinctive circumstances within which the reforms are proposed, understood and applied, thereby neglecting the policy-making and key actors involved in the process (see, for example, Conteh & Ohemeng, 2009; Whitfield, 2006). This chapter, therefore, takes a different view by investigating the specific context of Botswana public service to understand the adoption of particular NPM reforms, which are the subject of this thesis.

The chapter describes and explains salient features of the Botswana public service. Consistent with this task, it begins in section 5.2 by outlining the post-independence development of a strong institutional capacity in the Botswana public service. It is shown that the policy choices of the political and administrative leadership in Botswana proved crucial in the development of sound public institutions, especially at the central government level. In many ways, this turn of affairs contrasts with experiences elsewhere in much of the sub-Saharan Africa region, which are characterised by a lack of institutional capacity and, thus, weak public institutions. Next, in section 5.3 it outlines the policy-making process in the central government, which is marked by coherence and strong centralisation. This section also examines the relationships between key stakeholders in the policy-making process as they have evolved over time, that is, from independence until 2008. This will help to explain how the decisions to embrace NPM reforms were made, by whom and why. Finally in section 5.4, the chapter discusses the adoption process leading
to public sector reforms that were introduced in the period 1993 to 2008. By doing so, it will help to show how the general policy adoption worked in the specific case of the NPM reforms under investigation in this study.

5.2 Botswana Public Service: An African Model?

The Botswana public service is hailed as a model of success in public sector management surpassing most, if not all, other African countries. The public service has been able to efficiently carry out its mandate of ensuring that government development policies are implemented effectively. This section traces factors that can explain sound institutional capacity that helped shape Botswana’s public service high performance status across the sub-Saharan Africa region.

5.2.1 Independence transition and institutional legacies

The advent of independence in 1966 did not halt the evolution of Botswana’s politics and institutions; rather, with the Constitution having set the “rules of the game,” the political contest and the institutional arrangements defining and constraining government now worked within a new framework, albeit one that was keeping with Tswana traditions. The policy thrust and, in turn, economic growth were clearly influenced by the new environment. (Leith, 2005: 54)

Chapter 4 outlined the historical evolution of public administration within the larger political economy of Botswana. It was argued that the country’s public administration system is a direct extension of the colonial administration in both its structure and the way it functions – it preserved its essential inherited features, unlike those in many other developing countries, especially of the sub-Saharan Africa region.

Somoleke (1993) explores in detail factors that differentiate Botswana’s public administration from others in sub-Saharan Africa. Crucially, she identifies the lack of violent struggle for independence in the

10 Somoleke (1993) explores in detail factors that differentiate Botswana’s public administration from others in sub-Saharan Africa. Crucially, she identifies the lack of violent struggle for independence in the
Scholars suggest that in the immediate aftermath of independence in most countries, the leadership increasingly failed to provide a useful blend of both traditional and European/Western institutional arrangements when crafting their new public administration institutions. Instead, what emerged was a rapid and radical transformation of the colonial administrative legacy. Goldsmith (1999: 537) succinctly captured this point when observing the transition across African countries:

‘...senior staff were well-educated, experienced, and socialised to professional norms. But they were mostly European...A shift had to happen, and Africanisation of the professional and managerial levels of the civil service became a universal goal in the waning days of colonialism. The debate was how to do it without diluting quality.’

The rising expectations that accompanied the euphoria of independence in most of these countries led to the establishment of patrimonial states, with disastrous effects on the quality of their administrative machineries (Dia, 1993; 1996). The concern of new nationalist leaderships was to consolidate newly gained freedoms by creating new institutional arrangements that emphasised Africanisation. For example, many less qualified locals hastily replaced foreign personnel that dominated the colonial administrative machinery. In this way, rapid appointments of locals to replace predominantly white colonial administrators became the norm at the end of colonialism and thereafter. In a general way, this picture of hasty localisation/Africanisation came to characterise most of these countries’ policies that forged new institutional arrangements which viewed colonial administration apparatus with hostility and suspicion (Amsden, 1971; Cabral, 1974; Lange, 2009; Somolekae, 1993).
Moreover, there was a further expansion of the public sectors covering many activities in the economies of these countries. The rising expectations of the population led to large-scale expansion of the public sector as it was considered essential for driving national development. For instance, there was a proliferation of training institutions aimed at imparting techniques of ‘Western management.’ The result was a bloated public sector with its undertakings expanded beyond its capacity (Dzimbiri, 2008). Expressing similar sentiments, Turner & Hulme (1997) observed growing acts of mismanagement, nepotism, political patronage, large and rigid bureaucracy and widespread corruption within the administrative apparatus of the state. To Esman (1991 cited in Mavima & Chackerian, 2002), the 1970s also brought doubts about applicability of ‘Western management’ models in other African countries. Consequently, these policy choices set the stage for weak public institutions and the lack of capacity afflicting many public services across the continent.

A different picture emerged in Botswana that helped legitimise the new administrative machinery and also maintain its quality (Goldsmith, 1999; Good, 1992; Leith, 2005; Somolekae, 1993). The new political leadership in Botswana harboured few suspicions towards the colonial administration because they did not have to fight for independence. In particular, a comfortable working relationship developed between colonial administrators and the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) leadership that provided for a remarkably smooth shift to self-rule, for example, the then Resident Commissioner, Peter Fawcus preferred Seretse to establish national movement to counter Botswana Peoples Party (BPP), which he viewed as a socialist and extremist movement during the transitional period leading to independence (Fawcus & Tilbury, 2000).

Against this background, the leadership in Botswana refused to give in to temptation to Africanise the administration in the immediate post-independence period. Instead, it opted to stand by the expatriate administrators (Lange, 2009). In doing so, Botswana opted for continuity – building on and thereby retaining, without major modifications, the inherited colonial administration and, at the same time, managing to emphasise the importance of quality in the new
administrative machinery; a good example was the *Training and Localisation Policy* of 1971 (Modise, 1997). Accordingly, the country's first President, Sir Seretse Khama, cautioned against the prevailing drive towards Africanisation of the public services in stating that as a nation, ‘we should never sacrifice efficiency on the altar of localisation’ (Fawcus & Tilbury, 2000: 218 cited in Leith, 2005). In his first speech as President, Khama announced:

‘My Government is deeply conscious of the dangers inherent in localising the public service too quickly. Precipitate or reckless action in this field could have disastrous effects on the whole programme of services and development of the Government.’ (Cited in Tlou, Parsons & Henderson, 1995: 253)

In light of the above, a consultant was appointed to advise government on how to address severe shortage of skilled local manpower. The consultant made two important recommendations. First, it suggested that highly trained and experienced expatriates in both professional and technical fields be persuaded to stay in the employment of public service. Second, it advised that recruitment be planned to attract skilled labour from abroad (Government of Botswana, 1969 cited in Mogalakwe, 2008: 428). In this way, Botswana refrained from a policy of Africanisation for its own sake and, therefore, built upon European/Western management, which helped with maintenance of high standards of public sector management (Wescott, 1994).

The avoidance of rapid localisation and strong emphasis on institutional capacity building for quality administrative machinery continued to guide the practice of public administration in Botswana into the 2000s. The top political and administrative leadership’s approach emphasised upholding high standards of public management through maintenance of professional norms and practices that included, among others, continued use of foreign staff in the public service. As Somolekae remarks, ‘...up to today, qualifications still play a primary role when people are considered for work. If there is a vacancy, and no qualified citizen of Botswana is available to take the post, an expatriate is hired’
(1993: 118). To this end, the Botswana public service was staffed with experienced and trained personnel and this is one of the reasons why it sustained excellent performance.

As a result of the rejection of Africanisation of the civil service, a large proportion of the senior administrators were expatriates. Macartney (1977) shows that in 1972, expatriate officers occupied 44 percent of all middle and senior grade posts, a number that declined to 34 percent by 1977 (cited in Lange, 2009). Isaksen (1981) drew a similar conclusion, noting that over this period about 30 percent of the civil service was manned by technical expatriates with almost 100 percent in upper echelons, although the numbers declined in subsequent years. Isaksen concluded that with the proportion of expatriates in the civil service one-third higher than at independence, Botswana was among the highest in the world in terms of expatriate technical assistance workers per capita. For a development-oriented state, the knowledge and skills offered by the expatriate staff could not be overemphasised in building institutional capacity within the public service.

The emphasis on continuity with the colonial legacy by the top political and administrative elites can be explained by various factors. First, as was detailed in Chapter 4, a lack of skilled staff and other resources at independence posed a serious threat towards addressing underdevelopment. In the absence of qualified locals, government did not have much option but to rely heavily on expatriate personnel (Mogalakwe, 2009). Second, localisation efforts were supposed to accelerate in line under the government’s Training and localisation policy of 1971, but this failed to materialise. Duncan et al., describing this paradox, noted:

‘...heavy investment in education and training has rapidly increased the supply of skilled citizen personnel and enabled significant localisation, but rapid economic growth and hence expansion of the economy has also meant that the number and range of skilled personnel required has
continued to rise sharply. As a result there remain a significant number of
posts occupied by expatriates.’ (2000: 133)

In a large way, this pragmatic approach of addressing emergent challenges characterised the nature of policy development in the country which, in turn, helped with the maintenance of an effective public service.

Undoubtedly, as a result of strong emphasis on preserving essential colonial administration features, Botswana continued to build institutionally sound public service machinery at least until the 1990s. Furthermore, reliance on expatriates meant that Botswana’s public service came to be more open to ideas/models from other jurisdictions/countries. This openness also ensured that the public service incorporated innovative and creative ways of resolving problems as they arose. There are implications of this openness as far as NPM transfer, adoption and implementation process in the context of Botswana’s public service is concerned. This matter will be the focus of discussion in section 5.4.

5.2.2 The central administrative arm: Its character

Chapter 4 outlined the composition of the Botswana’s public sector, comprising of central government, local government and parastatals. Within this broad structure, the central government was always dominant. Decentralisation of power sometimes was attempted, such as during the 1960s through creation of bodies at lower levels (e.g. Councils and Land boards) that were meant to bring services closer to the people and also encourage local participation in development efforts. However, these efforts failed and the 1970s brought changes that saw the power of local governance structures curtailed. As Lange (2009: 10) notes:

‘This began after the central government became unsatisfied with their ability to work through chiefs and district councils. Consequently, the central government increased central representation locally and expanded administrative interaction with and control of local councils.’
This construction of a bureaucratic structure linking local and central government undermined autonomy of local level institutions (Maundeni, 1998: Sharma, 1996). As a result, central administrative arms of government came to be the primary vehicle through which development policies in the country could be realised.

In the case of Botswana, unlike in other sub-Saharan African countries, bureaucratic professionalism proved crucial in the nation’s development process. According to Somolekae (1993: 116), the Botswana civil service is modelled along the Westminster civil service system, which has traditionally been guided by principles of autonomy, neutrality, and permanent career tenure. By the principle of neutrality, civil servants are expected to be apolitical and be able to serve with due diligence which ever government is in power; that is, they are expected to execute orders from any political superior, irrespective of his or her political persuasion. As Somolekae (1993) further states, neutrality and impartiality also go hand in hand with autonomy. A bureaucracy remains a separate tool at the disposal of any party that assumes political office, and as such, has to be permanent. In reality, however, these principles are yet to be seriously tested. BDP has been in government continuously since independence and, in the absence of a change of government, full knowledge of how bureaucrats would respond in case of change in government is yet to be established. It is important to point out, however, that opposition parties have been in control at local government levels and civil servants demonstrated the capacity to be professional in executing their functions.

The civil service managed to discharge its duties in a transparent manner that can be regarded as being apolitical and one where public servants are held accountable. Indeed such professionalism allowed the public servants to be at the forefront in the management of the public sector and national affairs, dominating the country’s policy-making and implementation process. Different commentators agree that public sector management in the country was performed with commendable attention to detail, discipline and dedication by
the civil service (Hope, 2003; Raphaeli et al., 1984). Studies also find Botswana public service effective along dimensions of government effectiveness, rule of law and control of corruption. Table 5.1 below lists Botswana’s global percentile ranking for three indicators of state governance compiled by the World Bank (2007). Botswana had the score that placed it near the 75th percentile (top 25%) of all countries in the world. Its rankings were even more impressive when compared to other countries in the sub-Saharan Africa.

**Table 5.1: State Governance Indicators, Average Global Percentile: 1996 – 2005**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Government effectiveness</th>
<th>Rule of law</th>
<th>Control of corruption</th>
<th>Average percentile</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>76th</td>
<td>70th</td>
<td>79th</td>
<td>75th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>49th</td>
<td>45th</td>
<td>43rd</td>
<td>46th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Lange (2009)

To maintain its professional standards various measures were put in place over the years. Good (1992) outlines high pay, provision of training and merit-based entry and progression across the public service. Similarly, Kiiza (2006: 4) maintains that having entry requirements for civil service, paying reasonable salaries and a merit-based system of internal promotions produced a bureaucracy of high quality in Botswana. As a consequence of this professionalism, Botswana public service managed to avoid serious problems that plagued other public services across the continent such as corruption, ineffective service delivery system, among many others (Wescott, 1994). Despite this highlighted professionalism, the 1990s saw new challenges that undermined these qualities of the country’s public service, as was detailed in Chapter 4.
5.2.4 Summary

This section provided historical account of how the quality of the public service was established and sustained in Botswana’s post-independence period when general evidence elsewhere in the continent and, specifically for sub-Saharan countries, indicated a decline in the quality of their public administrations. By allowing blending of elements of the colonial administration together with modern ones, Botswana managed to create institutionally sound administrative machinery. More significant in the establishment of high capacity in the public service, rapid Africanisation was avoided and, instead, it was allowed to progress at a slow pace. Doing so offered locals an opportunity to learn the much needed skills and professional norms from their expatriate compatriots. Other significant choices were made and as Modise (1997) concluded, a pragmatic and evolutionary management practise ensured remarkable achievement in building an institutionally sound public service.

5.3 Policy-making process in the public service

The highly centralised process of public policy development in Botswana has been a subject of interest to scholars and practitioners, especially to those interested in explaining the country’s outstanding socio-economic and political progress. In many of these works, there is agreement on the significant role played by the public service in policy-making process and, in particular, the ministry of finance and development planning - hereafter referred to as MFDP (see, Leftwich, 1999; Isaksen, 1981; Molutsi, 1988; Somolekae, 1993; Charlton, 1991). There is, however, an emerging debate on the quality of the country’s policy-making development process on other important dimensions such as participation and inclusiveness by other stakeholders in the process. This section considers the policymaking process to help locate NPM adoption and implementation within the broader policy development framework in the Botswana public service.
5.3.1 Broader Policy Framework: NDPs and Vision 2016

The National Development Plans (NDPs) epitomise the process of policy development in the country – a coherent state-led plan to implement a development philosophy. Since independence, NDPs have come to be the pillar of Botswana’s success in development (Edge, 1998; Leith, 2005; Somoleke, 1998b). Emphasising the importance of these plans, especially during the precarious economic environment following independence when the country depended almost entirely on foreign aid, the former president Sir Q.K.J Masire has this to say;

‘And so, [i.e. the plans] helped us in looking for money because people felt if they give us money we knew what to do with that money; we didn’t say give us money we are going to look into developing Plan C. We developed Plan C and then used it to look for money. It helped us a lot because even the Overseas Development Administration (i.e. the ministry of overseas development in UK) when they had problems with other countries underspending they would come to us and say look we are going to return a lot of money because it was not spent and they would find us with Plan C.’ (Interview, 25)

In this way, the preparation of NDPs proved critical in foreign aid mobilisation. As Lekorwe (1998) indicated, national development plans were a requirement when requesting foreign aid loans from international aid agencies such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Plans were therefore used to advertise crucial developments for which governments were seeking funding. Botswana was one of the few African countries, which not only produced such a comprehensive plan but also worked hard to implement these national development programmes. The commitment to NDPs was emphasised by the country’s first president Sir Seretse Khama in 1970s noting that:

‘Our commitment to planning springs from the recognition that our resources are limited, and must therefore be carefully allocated. We are
in a critical stage in our development. Decisions taken in the current plan period will affect the quality of life in Botswana for generations. We must therefore be sure that we understand the choices before us and make the right decisions.’ (NDP 3 cited from Lekorwe, 1998: 174)

Furthermore, Leith (2005: 58) shows the significance of the then-president Masire to the success of NDP framework by noting that:

‘Under his leadership, the planning process was not a mere public relations exercise to attract donor funds, to be ignored in actual practice; rather, it became a central part of the process of government.’

The NDPs articulated a wide range of issues and not restricted to narrow economic questions. NDPs thus became crucial instruments of governance in the socio-economic and political development of the country. This is in contrast with experiences of many other developing countries in Africa. For instance, Dror (1983: 110) admits that despite predisposition towards planning in most of these countries, the policy making process was not comprehensive because they concentrated on a limited cluster of issues, especially those involving economic development and neglected other important policy issues such as education and health. NDPs, therefore, in many ways guarded against ad hoc planning based around a cluster of few policy issues but also offered broaden and focused scope in the country’s policy process.

As the country’s ultimate planning framework, NDPs are developed and implemented in a structured way covering periods of 6 years and are given a number (i.e. NDP 1, 2, 3 etc), together with a guiding theme; NDP 9’s theme, for example, was ‘Towards realisation of Vision 2016: Sustainable and diversified development through competitiveness in global markets’ (Government of Botswana, 2003). This rigorous planning was upheld from NDP 1 of 1966 up to NDP 9, which covered the financial period 2003/04 until 2008/09. There is also provision for mid-term reviews every three years to review progress and, where necessary, make adjustments to reflect changes.
that emerged in the larger socio-economic and political environments over the term of the plan under consideration. In this way, NDPs assume a strategic outlook in terms of setting goals and establishing measures that guide against progress towards achievement of broader policy goals. Importantly, the policies are clear, consistent and comprehensive and take a short and medium-term planning perspective.

NDPs are based on the four national principles of democracy, development, self-reliance and unity, which provide the basis for long-term strategy of socio-economic and political action by the government. Together with the fifth principle of *Botho*, which translates as humane behaviour, the five principles are designed to promote social harmony. In 1996, ‘in a conscious imitation of another developmental state’s Vision 2020 i.e. Malaysia’ (Taylor, 2002), government developed a broader policy document entitled ‘A framework for a long term vision for Botswana 2016: Towards prosperity for all’, commonly referred to as *Vision 2016*, that guide towards achievement of specific goals set out to be attained by year 2016, when the country celebrates its fiftieth anniversary of independence (Republic of Botswana, 1996). The specific goals set out in the vision document provide the guiding framework within which NDPs are shaped, implemented and evaluated. The specific goals of Vision 2016 are: an educated and informed nation; a prosperous, productive and innovative nation; a compassionate, just and caring nation; a safe and secure nation; an open, democratic and accountable nation; a moral and tolerant nation; and, a united and proud nation. Unlike the short and mid-term outlook provided through NDPs, the Vision 2016 adopts a long-term development perspective, which challenges Batswana to work towards the attainment of above-mentioned broad development dimensions.

The government attempt to achieve ideals outlined in the Vision 2016. Towards that end, specific measures in the form of strategic plans have since been adopted to guide in its implementation at both ministerial and departmental levels. Figure 5.1 depicts the framework within which specific pillars/goals of the Vision 2016 are to be realised. For example, the second goal, which relates to
achievement of a prosperous, productive and innovative nation, is to be driven by specific plan/action, such as economic growth and diversification under the accountability of MFDP and HR Development at DPSM is charged as an accounting agency. Notably, these goals are pursued within a comprehensive Balanced Scorecard framework aimed at assisting ministries and departments in executing their strategies through relevant business management principles (Government of Botswana, 1997 & 2003; PMS in Botswana document, undated).

In his foreword to NDP 9 the former president Festus Mogae had this to say to emphasise the strategic focus that Vision 2016 occupies in the country’s planning process:

‘The ninth national development plan (NDP 9) marks the first major step towards integration of the long-term vision for Botswana, Vision 2016: Towards prosperity for all, into the development planning process.’ (Government of Botswana, 2003: XXVI)

**Figure 5. 1: NDP 9 Strategy Map**
Adapted from Reforms Unit, Office of the President

Overall, NDPs, Vision 2016 and ministerial and departmental strategic plans provide a strong medium and long-term framework for development planning by ensuring that expenditure proposals are in line with set objectives; and that they were individually scrutinised and controlled. In turn, this led to a general pattern of well-chosen strategic investment based on system of planning targets that are regularly reviewed and updated (Duncan, Jefferis & Molutsi, 2005). Furthermore, the specific goals outlined in the vision 2016 document are linked to and realised within the NDP framework. Importantly, both NDPs and Vision 2016 provide evaluation framework used by both internal and international institutions dealing with policy issues to gauge Botswana’ progress against specified goals; for instance, the Millennium Development Goals as prescribed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2005). Internally, the impact of policies such as dynamics of population and development are realistically evaluated within NDPs and Vision 2016 frameworks (Government of Botswana, 2003).
5.3.2 Institutional Policy Framework: MFDP and DPSM

On surface, the policy making process assumes a bottom-up approach whereby individual departments make proposals, which are in turn consolidated by their parent ministries. To this end, independent departments are given necessary allowance to identify their own needs and wants which are then submitted to ministries without limitations placed on their individual demands, such as budget ceilings. The parent ministries, after consolidating submissions from their own different departments, make submissions to the MFDP, which in turn consolidates the inputs into a national policy plan that acts as the country’s blueprint of national development policy. In this way, public policy development appears to be decentralised to lower level government structures and, therefore, their participation is crucial if their inputs are to be reflected in the national policy plan (Modise, 1997).

However, in practise the ideal bottom-up policy making exercise described above that emphases a predominantly decentralised and an all-encompassing approach has turned out differently. The process is characterised by a coherent and centralised arrangement dominated by MFDP and DPSM. This can best be understood within the context of the country’s colonial economic experience of underdevelopment. As was pointed out in Chapter 4, the reality of bleak economic outlook at the country’s independence meant that there was a need for a development coordinating institution that could have direct control and, at the same time, provide direction on the use of limited finances, especially those accrued from foreign donations. The MFDP provided the much-needed strong framework for planning and budgeting purposes under those circumstances and thereafter (Leith, 2005; Somolekae, 1998).

Consequently, MFDP emerged as a key policy developing institution within the public service. For example, in reference to the use of foreign aid during the bleak economic period following independence, Maipose & Somolekae (1998: 441) remark:
‘With few known resources at the time, officials asserted that it was imperative that whatever was received had to be put into efficient use. This policy and practice of efficient management became embedded in the culture of handling the government resources.’

Against that background, aid management was placed under the MFDP. For example, only the MFDP could negotiate with donors and remained in control of all negotiations with other line ministries not afforded any opportunity to deal directly with donor agencies. This arrangement ensured that no separate or parallel structure existed to handle and plan for aid resources, as was the case in many African countries, which witnessed a proliferation of stand-alone projects (Somolekae, 1998). As a result of this centralisation through which aid is sought, received and expended, Botswana was hailed as an example of effective aid management in developing countries (Maipose, 2009).

MFDP was formed in 1971 through a merger of Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Development Planning to enhance coordination. This merger resulted from a dispute over the country’s future economic policy between conservative oriented officials who wanted to exercise caution in the development programme on one hand and, progressive officers who preferred to get international loans for development projects, on the other hand. The latter grouping would eventually dominate largely because of the support they received from the then vice president Masire, who was also the minister in charge of the ministry. MFDP occupy a central position in the public service through a combination of various key factors. First, the Finance and Audit Act gave MFDP the right to prepare and control the budget. It included the provision that all other ministries need the approval of MFDP before initiating development programmes (Clayton, 1995). As Parsons et al. (1995, cited in Taylor, 2002) states, the MFDP in some respects challenges the Office of the President as the premier ministry in Gaborone, dominating the ‘line ministries’ that deal with sectors of the political economy such as agriculture, education, health, water development, roads and so on.
Second, the minister in charge of MFDP has traditionally been the Vice President. Taylor (2003, 49) contends:

‘...it is pertinent to point out that prior to becoming president after Seretse Khama’s death, Quett Masire was Minister of Finance and Development Planning and had been Vice-President for fourteen years. Similarly, prior to assuming the presidency in 1998, Festus Mogae had been Masire’s Vice-President for five years as well as being Minister for Finance and Development Planning. In addition, Peter Mmusi, who resigned as Vice-President in 1993, had also been Minister of Finance and Development Planning. Such a Ministry and its close links to the Executive has secured a balance between development planning and budgeting, as well as strengthening the capacity to implement national goals and demonstrating a commitment to economic development.’

Thus, being under the supervision of the vice president office, the MFDP enjoyed a pre-eminent position in the public service, wielding extensive powers over and above all other ministries. Notably, it was only in 1998 that the tradition of having the vice president as the head of this ministry was not maintained, when the then Vice President, General Ian Seretse Khama (took charge as the president in April 2008), did not take up the post as the Minister of Finance and Development Planning. His deputy, General Mompati Merafe, likewise did not take responsibility as the minister in charge of MFDP.

Third, the MFDP was able to recruit many of the most able civil servants, including expatriates; in other words, it was staffed with professionals of high calibre (Clayton, 1995; Somolekae, 1998; Taylor, 2003). Maipose & Somolekae (1998) identify other important factors that accounted for high level of professionalism within MFDP: first, continuity of the staff in the ministry. For instance, they argue that unlike in other developing countries, where there was increased movement of personnel dealing with donor representatives, the case in Botswana was different, with personnel staying over a considerable length of
time and, thus, building institutional memory necessary for negotiating with donors. Second, gradual localisation and capacity-building process within the ministry was allowed to emerge. Being the slowest to localise meant that knowledge and skill transfer from skilled expatriate officials within the ministry was allowed to institutionalise. In effect, these factors resulted with MFDP being the most influential ministry in the entire public service.

The MFDP is responsible for overall coordination of planning in the whole public service. Being at the centre of the planning process, however, does not mean that MFDP solely plans for other ministries. Rather, each ministry in the public service has a planning unit. At the local government levels there are district development officers within the office of the district commissioner. Also, within each planning unit in the various ministries are planning officers. Both the district development officers and planning officers are on secondment from their parent ministry, the MFDP. The decentralisation of planning officers is meant to improve and enhance effectiveness of planning process across the public service. Although this move suggests decentralisation to line ministries, Maipose & Somolekae (1998: 448) describes it as ‘decentralisation within centralism’ or the deconcentration of the planning exercise while allowing the centre to retain allocative or financial decisions. As a result of such an arrangement, the dominant role of MFDP in the policy development process across the public service is maintained.

Despite concentration of powers within MFDP, DPSM also plays a powerful role in policy development in the country. There is agreement that both MFDP and DPSM since independence constitute the two strategic resource departments for the public service (Clayton, 1995; Agere & Mandaza, 1999). The two organisations (DPSM and MFDP) offer an environment for strong coordination and collaboration among ministries and departments on matters of finance and manpower needed for provision of services to the nation. DPSM’s role in the policy process is enhanced by the fact that part of its responsibility concerns ensuring provision of human resource capital for efficient and effective public service. Towards that end, DPSM controls and monitors the public service
establishment levels and human resource budgets on yearly basis (Republic of Botswana, 1993b). This is achieved within the broader framework provided by NDPs.

The manpower budgeting process mainly consisted of allocating posts, which takes place each year between May and November. Ministries and departments table their manpower needs with DPSM to be considered by the Working Group of the Manpower Sub-committee. Cabinet meetings then follow to establish human resource ceilings. After meetings of Manpower Sub-committee and Main Estimates Committee, the production of the agreed Establishment Register for the financial year is undertaken. Through the Establishment Register, positions for each ministry and department are defined and changes to the allocated posts can only be done through DPSM (Republic of Botswana, 1995).

In addition and importantly for this thesis, DPSM provides measures/reforms initiatives for all ministries and departments for enhancement of service delivery across the public service. In this way, public sector reforms that are adopted across the public service are done under its leadership. Corkery et al., sums up DPSM brief as to:

‘Provide active leadership on all matters of public service management policy. The department has the Presidential prerogative to proactively examine, develop, introduce and administer systems and practices to ensure that the integrity and overall performance of the service remain high. The judicial powers are conferred upon by the Act of Parliament’ (1998: 86).

Consequently, armed with presidential authority to provide national leadership on all issues of public sector management policy; DPSM took charge of measures to enhance the quality of the public service, the effectiveness of the systems, and the morale of public servants through system-wide improvements (Corkery et al., 1998). DPSM thus played key role in the policy development
process through coordination of human resource needs within the public service.

5.3.3 Other Stakeholders in the Policy Development Process

‘Policymaking is an aggregate process, whose quality depends significantly on the quality of decision making and sub policymaking done by the various units that make up the public policymaking system…’ (Dror, 1983: 78)

Despite attracting many accolades over the past four decades as a model of good governance and democracy in Africa, a closer examination of Botswana’s policy development process reveals some limitations: a predominantly top-down and non-inclusive model (centralisation). Against this context, commentators agree that the system is wanting in key indicators of good policy making process such as broad-based representation of social interest, inclusiveness and consensus building approach (Mogalakwe, 2006; Good, 1994). This section continues discussion on policy process in Botswana but pays particular attention to other policy stakeholders in the policy making process.

Two groups dominate policy development process within the Botswana public service namely, elected officials and technocrats/bureaucrats. In a general or ideal sense, the respective roles of these two groups in the policy making process should be clear and straightforward - politicians setting the agenda for policy while the administrators transform that into working policy. The process in reality, however, is much more complex. First, the relationship between politicians and administrators varies. Second, there are other players involved from outside the public service, although their efficacy in the policy development varies depending on the nature of the policy and their own organisational capacities (Somolekae, 1998a). The significance of these other parties/actors in the policy development cannot be ignored especially in a representative democratic setting like that of Botswana.
There is general agreement on the bureaucratic dominance in the policy making process in the country (Picard, 1997; Holm & Molutsi, 1990; Somolekae, 1998; Charlton, 1991). For instance, in 1971 Gunderson referred to the long standing dominance of the administrative officials in Botswana as an ‘administrative state’ where the bureaucratic elites enjoyed complete control over the decision making process (cited in Charlton, 1991: 266). The imbalance of power between elected officials and bureaucracy has been explained by two main factors. First, at the time of independence bureaucracy was the most well developed organ of the state in terms of both administrative and technical skills. As a result of the monopoly over administrative and technical skills, bureaucrats were able to embark also on policy formulation. Second, politicians were generally of lower educational level and, as a result, their involvement in policy development process was limited to peripheral issues and they had little influence over the major policy making process because they had to rely on bureaucracy (Somolekae, 1993, 1998a). This meant that bureaucrats held a disproportionately large role over elected officials in the policy development process.

This arrangement, however, was a source of wide criticism especially by those questioning democratic credentials of a country lauded as one of the few mature democracies in the continent. Holm & Darnolf (1999) lamented the inadequate involvement of the parliament in the policy development process. As representatives of citizens, legislator’s active involvement in policy development process, they argued, needed to be pronounced if people’s needs and wants were to be adequately addressed. In the absence of significant input from parliamentarians, it was bureaucrats’ perceptions rather than the informed concerns of citizens that were likely to be reflected in policies. As a result, others viewed excess power of bureaucrats as a threat to the country’s democratic future (Somolekae, 1998).

Despite their modest involvement, the elected officials appear to have been largely content with the situation (Picard, 1997). This is not surprising because
after independence, Botswana experienced an exceptionally close working relationship between bureaucracy and appointed officials (Lewis, 1993). In a similar vein, Charlton (1991) noted the harmonious and creative co-operation between bureaucracy and top elected officials. Because of this closeness, the bureaucracy played an ambiguous political role in the policy development process. This was best illustrated in the enactment and implementation of natural resource management policy called Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP).

TGLP was introduced in 1975 aimed at gradually dividing Botswana’s communal lands. It aimed to create individualism through increased privatisation in the country’s land tenure. Despite public opposition and critiques of the policy’s premises and practises by people inside and outside the country, the policy was reaffirmed in 1991. This policy clearly captured the agenda-setting authority of the bureaucrats in policy matters (Peters, 1994; Poteete, 2003). Through its influence the bureaucracy managed to push a policy that was deemed unacceptable by majority of the population who were subsistence farmers. The notable outcome of this policy was that it advanced economic interests of the elite group that included both top bureaucrats and politicians at the expense of the majority of the population. More significant, was the confusing policy role of bureaucrats. Instead of being custodians of the public interest, they allowed the satisfaction of sectional interests to dominate in the TGLP policy. Summing up this development, Good (1992; 74) described the relationship between the two groups as characterised by a closeness and mutuality of confidence and interests not unrelated to their common involvement in cattle farming.

The policy development process displayed other serious limitations. For example, Carroll & Carroll (2004: 334) argued that, ‘neither the civil service nor the political elite demonstrated much willingness to consult outside organisations on policy issues.’ Resultantly, important stakeholders such as the civil society, the citizens, and the legislature were left out of the policy making process (see also Good, 1996; Mogalakwe, 2006). Moreover, where stakeholders were consulted, it was not designed to solicit valuable input from
them to improve on a particular policy but to give legitimacy to the proposed policy. Seeking legitimacy for policy was done in different ways. The most common one was for bureaucrats and elected officials to travel around the country and solicit contributions from people at various Kgotla forums. To Holm & Molutsi (1990), these forums did not add much value to policy debate. Rather, the process was a stage-managed one, which they described as, ‘at best persuasion...presented as consultation.’ To Makgala (2007), this ‘window dressing’ signalled a shift from established Tswana culture of consultation to that of persuasion in the country’s policy-making process. In this way, policy design proved limited as it failed adequately to involve other key policy constituents.

To Mogalakwe (2006), the non-inclusiveness in the policy arena of other stakeholders has historical origins. He argues that, ‘the main continuity was the top-down authoritarian exercise of political power and the systemic exclusion of the subaltern social forces from political participation’ (2006: 18). To him, Tswana system of governance limited mass participation of locals in policy process both in the pre-independence and the post-independence eras. In the post-independence period, shared interests between top bureaucrats and elected officials saw other constituents undermined in the policy making process. As was pointed out earlier, the bureaucratic elite gradually came to consist predominantly of well-educated and well-qualified Batswana. Several members of these elites were coopted into top positions within the ruling party. Critics maintain that this cooption arrangement reinforced common interests of these two dominant grouping in the policy development process with far reaching implications on the quality of policy making process (Good, 1994).

The quality of policy process, however, improved in the late 1980s. Of significance, the dominant role of bureaucrats in policy matters suffered a major setback. As Somolekae (1998) indicated, government ministers were under pressure from party rank and file who were calling for powers of the bureaucracy to be checked because it was proving too difficult for elected officials to control them. The resultant shift in the power dynamics led to a much
more equal relationship between politicians and bureaucratic elites. Carroll & Carroll (2004: 348) had this to say about this shift, ‘as the principles of liberal democracy suggest should be true, political leaders could over-rule the bureaucracy’ in policy design and implementation. Despite the seemingly levelled playing field in the policy process, other key constituents were still not given much opportunity to participate in the decision-making process.

Social organisations (i.e. civil society) in Botswana such as trade unions and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) among others, are widely perceived to be institutionally weak and, therefore, unable to perform effective role in policy development process. Holm, Molutsi & Somolekae (1996), adopt a historical perspective to explain the limited capacity of social organisations in the country. To them, during the pre-colonial era, Tswana political culture limited almost all public discussion of community issues to adult local males. Group organisation was therefore not encouraged within Tswana polity. Colonial rule did not change this relationship between the state and society. The post-independence period also failed to alter to this relationship. For example, the first president, Sir Seretse Khama, cautioned trade unions over the looming strike action in Selibe-Phikwe mine in the 1970s, charging that by taking strike action they undermined national unity and development efforts (Khama, 1972). Government’s drive to limit influence of non-state actors meant that these groups failed to effectively engage the government in policy design and implementation. Where they tried to engage, they were found to be at best passive observers in the policy development process (Taylor, 2003; Holm, Molutsi & Somolekae, 1996).

Despite this apparent centralisation in the policy making process, the scenario began to change further in the 1990s (Maundeni, 2004; Carroll & Carroll, 2004). As Adamolekun & Morgan (1999: 593) put it:

‘Public policy-making itself has not always been terribly transparent, but it has improved. In the first decade after independence there was a decided dominance of cabinet discussions by civil servants. By the mid-1990s, despite the fact that the higher civil service, led by the economists
and finance officer cadres, tend to get what they want, there was more open debate within the bureaucracy, as well as more informed argument in parliament itself.

There were many reasons to explain changes in the policy development process. However, more important was that social change that accompanied economic development resulted with different sections of the society placing new demands on the state to create effective representation and more equitable processes of distribution of power (Selolwane & Shale, 2006; Good, 1992). Ramahobo (2002), for instance, discusses the tension that marked landmark motion passed by parliament in 1995 seeking to amend the tribally discriminatory sections of the constitution (i.e. 77, 78 and 79) between Wayeyi tribe and their Tawana overloads. Thus, the Wayeyi and other so called minority tribes heightened their demands for recognition and representation on the part of government and, therefore, make the policy making more open and inclusive (Mothusi, Molefhe & Malebang, unpublished).

A number of NGOs and other business groups began to actively participate in the policy making process with significant impact in their respective sectoral areas (BIDPA, 2006). For instance, the privatisation project brought government and private sector through its parent body Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry and Manpower (BOCCIM) in the decision-making process by establishing High Level Consultative Council (HLCC) forum. The HLCC operated under the chair of the State President and included two members from the private sector. Permanent Secretary (Development) from the Office of the President provided secretarial services with cabinet ministers also as other members of the forum. The influence of NGOs followed broad change across the movement including building its institutional capacity. Those measures helped strengthened NGO position in its dealing with government and, in turn, contributed immensely towards improvement on the quality of the policy development process in the country.
5.3.4 Summary

This section outlined policy-making process in the Botswana public service. Evidently, the process assumes a coherent and highly centralised formation. The MFDP and DPSM offered sound institutional framework within which this policy development process manifest. Reinforcing the institutional framework in the policy process were NDPs and Vision 2016 that provided strong implementation and evaluation framework. In terms of the groupings involved in the process, bureaucracy dominated owing to its possession of skills and knowledge over politicians. Interestingly, elected officials were content with excess influence held by bureaucrats. Critics argued that it was inevitable given shared interest between the two groupings. More telling, however, was the systemic exclusion of other stakeholders in the policy process.

Developments in the 1990s following economic success meant that other constituents started to demand representation in the policy process. Indeed, it was over that period that government began to actively involve NGOs, civil society and other more significant stakeholders in the policy development process. This not only helped enhance the policy making process but went far in consolidating the democratic credentials of the country.

5.4 The Adoption of NPM reforms: 1993 – 2008

Chapter 4 outlined various reforms – including NPM ones – which were introduced in the Botswana public sector since independence until the 1990s to facilitate effective service provision and delivery across the economy. This section pays particular attention to recent NPM reforms (i.e. WITs and PMS) to better understand the process of adoption of such initiatives during the period 1993 until 2008.

The NPM adoption process in the Botswana public service had three particular features. First, it assumed a centralised, top-down approach. This coherent centralised arrangement largely reflected the following elements: a) the
hierarchical policy formulation framework in the country, and b) the overarching importance of public sector reforms - as policy instruments - in the broader national policy development process. These two elements were covered in detail in section 5.3 above. A brief discussion below pays particular attention to the centralised feature that characterised adoption of NPM reforms in the Botswana public service.

At the apex of the NPM reform adoption process was the country’s leadership, both political and bureaucratic. The head of state provided an overall political responsibility for the functioning of the public service. However, the primary responsibility for the leadership and mandating of reforms lay with Office of the President, which lobbied the Cabinet and Parliament for approval of reforms. As Corkery et al., (1998; 94) observed, ‘reforms could be suggested by Cabinet members who are Ministers, and are thus heads of civil service ministries.’ In this way, the role of the political leadership in the policy formulation process leading to adoption of NPM in the Botswana public service was important.

Senior bureaucrats/technocrats, especially Permanent Secretaries, played a crucial role in the conception of NPM initiatives in the public service. This is understandable because the public service in the country continued to operate more consistently with the Westminster model than in its African counterparts. In this way, Permanent Secretaries and not politicians assumed overall responsibility for the management and performance of the public service in Botswana.

The centrality of DPSM in policy formulation predated introduction of NPM initiatives in the 1990s. However, it assumed greater prominence in the wake of NPM efforts. As was earlier indicated, NPM reforms brought a shift in focus within the public service from emphasis on management to issues of performance. Prior to introduction of NPM reforms the focus of DPSM was much more on coordinating HR activities emphasising compliance with established governance instruments across all ministries and departments in the public service. Here, compliance was valued over performance. However,
with introduction of these reforms DPSM moved away from emphasis on compliance towards results. In this way, these reform efforts have led to increased concern within the DPSM on issues of raising performance of the public service as was detailed in Chapter 3. Arising out of this shift, a new division within DPSM established in 1998 called the Public Service Coordinating Unit (PSRU) charged specifically with spearheading reforms across the public service. This arrangement changed slightly from 2004, when the PSRU was relocated from DPSM to the powerful Office of the President in order to lend ‘gravitas’ to PMS and accelerate its implementation. Establishing an operational unit within the powerful ministry (OP) ensured a clearer sense of mission as far as reform introduction and implementation in the public service was concerned. This move left DPSM with overall responsibility of policy implementation across the public service. The distancing of policy formulation and implementation through structural realignment entrenched the centralisation of policy making framework within which public sector reforms would be conceived and implemented in the public service (DPSM, 1999; Ernst & Young, 2002; Marobela, 2008).

Other public service institutions and consultative machineries also played a role in the NPM formulation process. These organisations included, among others, the Botswana Civil Service Association (BCSA) (trade union movement comprising mainly of professional and pensionable officers), the Botswana Teachers Union (BTU), and the Botswana Local Government Service Association (BULGASA). These unions regularly engaged with DPSM to review public sector reforms. They, therefore, offered an avenue for public service officers to add voice to the formulation and implementation of these reforms. Accordingly, Corkery et al., (1998) argues that representation of these organisations created a dual communication route and thus created ownership and acceptance of reforms amongst the general populace.

Second, the adoption of NPM reforms in Botswana was undertaken voluntarily to address deficiencies and problems identified in its public service. This was in contrast to the general picture that emerged amongst many other developing
countries, especially those in the Sub-Saharan African region. As was pointed out in Chapter 2, adoption of NPM initiatives in many of these countries was not undertaken willingly; instead, the adoption process manifested as a result of coercive pressures exerted through conditional lending contingent on restructuring initiatives, by supranational bodies such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). In essence, such reform initiatives were undertaken out of compliance and, therefore, rendered those countries choiceless in policy decisions related to the NPM adoption process (Conteh & Ohemeng, 2009). In Botswana the NPM adoption process differed significantly from the experiences elsewhere in other developing countries largely because the country displayed few similarities to them particularly in the economic front.

The NPM adoption process in Botswana was pursued from a relatively strong economic position (Mothusi, 2008; Conteh & Ohemeng, 2009; Jefferis, 1995). As was noted in Chapter 4, Botswana’s economy enjoyed the highest rate of economic growth in the world until the early 1990s. The country, therefore, managed to avoid dire financial crisis, which crippled many other economies across the African continent from the 1980s into the 1990s and, thus, necessitated external intervention and subsequent imposition of NPM reforms. In essence, the sound economic position of Botswana proved to be a crucial factor against imposition of structural adjustment policies promoted by external bodies. Lending support to this argument, OECD indicated that, ‘as a result of the low level debt and a sizable foreign reserves, Botswana is among the few developing countries that have not implemented the IMF/WB structural adjustment programme’ (www.oecd.org). A senior manager raises a similar view when he noted:

‘Just like in most other African countries or developing countries for that matter, there has been external influence to change the way we were running our governments, but I think the difference with regards to Botswana is that there wasn’t much pressure from outside. This was the case because we were not so much of beggars…I think we could do without IMF or the World Bank.’ [Interview, 1]
Echoing similar sentiments, another senior government official had this to say:

‘This was undertaken at the same time when external institutions like IMF and WB were restructuring in other developing countries. But of course as a country we were not coerced into models that those countries adopted. Those countries adopted such models because they faced problems with their finances but in our case we just wanted to put up an efficient public service.’ [Interview, 2]

Furthermore, the minister of MFDP Balidzi Gaolatthe emphasised this point in 2001 when he addressed the national assembly by pointing out that:

‘Botswana position with respect to privatisation (another element of public sector reforms) was different from that of other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Botswana government was not obliged to embark upon a programme of privatisation and public enterprise reform as part of economic structural reform agreements with international institutions.’ (Marobela, 2008; 430)

The adoption of NPM reforms in Botswana was in this way presented as ‘home grown’ or internally generated (Marobela, 2008; Botswana Government, unpublished). In this sense, the NPM initiatives were seen as a result of introspective search on the part of Botswana Government to improve on public service delivery. Unlike the passive role displayed by many other governments in the continent, the Botswana Government played an active role in so far as adoption of NPM was concerned. Underscoring Botswana’s relative independence in the adoption process another senior official summed it up thus:

‘I think it is out of choice. We are not forced by anybody to adopt these reforms...they are voluntary. It is out of assessment of our own situation that we found the reforms can take us somewhere. Yes, international
organisations like IMF, WB and UNDP we work with them but it is on voluntary basis. Sometimes they do provide technical assistance saying consider this or that, but at the end of the day we are largely independent from them when we take a decision of whether to adopt one kind of reform or not. It is entirely upon us, but they do often come to offer assistance by saying this is where the world is going can you consider this and then we look at it. If we think it suit our situation we adopt it. Sometimes we tell them we cannot do that because we already have plans in place.' [Interview, 4]

Admittedly, NPM adoption process in Botswana saw the Government as an active player towards a search for measures to improve its public service. However, other factors proved equally important in the adoption process. First, as the leading example of public sector management in the continent, perhaps Botswana wanted to maintain its leadership position in the continent. This point is captured clearly by the head of the country’s reform institution when he says:

‘Even beyond our borders we were under pressure. Immediately we moved from a lower to middle-level developing country status we had to abide by certain standards though which we could actually show how we were doing as a country. So in that sense we implemented the reform initiatives to help us sustain our success and therefore continue as the leader in public sector management in the continent.’ [Interview, 3]

Furthermore, NPM reforms were adopted voluntarily in the country to improve on the efficiency of the public service as a way of attracting foreign investment. This point is emphasised by another official when he maintained thus:

‘I think that we had grown as an economy. We therefore had to prove ourselves to other countries. As a country we wanted to be seen to be doing the right things more so that we wanted to attract foreign investment...we wanted to make sure our structures and processes were better placed to facilitate that end.’ [Interview, 5]
Third, NPM adoption usually involved explicit learning from other countries. A few examples can illustrate. The establishment of BNPC was preceded by government officials’ visits of Asian countries seeking measures to help improve on productivity concerns in the public sector. Singapore, in particular proved an attractive country to learn from. For instance, as a resource poor country it managed in one generation to transform itself from a poor country in the 1960s into a high-income one in the 1980s. It achieved this success largely through efficient utilisation of its human resources (Mills & Spicer, 2008). This experience attracted interest from many other developing countries including Botswana. In the late 1980s, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew embarked on an official visit to Botswana. This is how Botswana learned of Singapore’s involvement in productivity initiatives. Subsequently, a number of civil servants in Botswana went to Singapore to learn about how the productivity ideas were being implemented. This was the foundation of what became BNPC and WITs [Morgan, email 26/08/09]. Echoing similar sentiments the former head of state stated that:

‘We sent teams to Japan and Singapore. We also invited the man who was in charge of the productivity centre [in Singapore] to come over here and assist with the establishment of our productivity centre. We knew we were different from them; our circumstances were different but we thought it would be helpful if we learnt something from them. This is how we established our national productivity centre.’ [Interview, 1]

Moreover, the transformation of the Botswana Institute of Administration and Commerce (BIAC) into the Botswana Civil Service College (BCSC) also followed a visit by the Permanent Secretary to the President, Mr Eric Molale to Singapore in 2006. Having been impressed by the Singapore Civil Service College (SCSC) he resultantly sought assistance from Singapore Government to help transform BIAC into a modern public training institution modelled along the SCSC. The following year in 2007, Mr. Molale wrote to his counterpart in Singapore, Mr. Peter Ho, requesting assistance from them. In response, Mr. Ho
sent a team of consultants to Botswana to assist in this initiative (DPSM, 2007). In this case, Botswana officials encountered an impressive initiative that was deemed a success in one jurisdiction elsewhere in the world and embraced it in an effort to modernise its public service.

Another example was the establishment of the DCEC. Its establishment was preceded by learning experiences gained through study tours of countries with corruption agencies by Botswana government officials that were deemed exemplary around the world. The officials in Botswana visited a number of countries to learn about their fight against corruption. At the end, the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) of Hong Kong proved to be the model case for the corruption agency in Botswana. This was the case because ICAC was considered internationally as a case of success after sustained reduction of corruption where it once seemed unlikely (Johnston, 1999).

Adoption of NPM reforms also came about as a result of participation by Botswana Government officers at various internal forums. For example, New Zealand hosted since 1996 an annual Commonwealth Advanced Seminar (CAS) where senior civil servants from Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth countries attended and presented on their own country experiences with reforms. Several senior officials from Botswana presented papers on reform in the country (Bakwena, 2003; Magosi, 2005). Not only did these forums attract government officials but they also brought them together with academics and consultants to share experiences and therefore learn from another as far as reform adoption were concerned. Through CAS and many other international conferences, Botswana senior government officials shared their reform experiences and looked to others for ideas about how to reform their own public service (Laking & Norman, 2007).

Overall, NPM adoption in Botswana was therefore largely state initiated (BIDPA, 2004; Corkery et al., 1998; Conteh & Ohemeng, 2009; Government of Botswana, unpublished) primarily to provide solution for declining standards in
the public service delivery and productivity. Botswana’s case with adoption of NPM reforms proved to be driven by expediency – i.e. maintaining its position as a leader in public sector management in the continent, among many other reasons, rather than satisfying conditions placed by external institutions. In essence, the strong economic conditions that Botswana enjoyed provided a strong buffer against coercive external intervention by international financial institutions and donor agencies. Hence, the Botswana’s experience with adoption of NPM reforms does not fit the prevalent external inducement thesis that perceived adoption process in developing countries as a case of coercion or coercive policy transfer. Rather, it highlighted that other developing countries did have choice and were active participants in the NPM adoption process (Conteh & Ohemeng, 2009). The discussion that follows below pays specific attention on adoption of WITs and PMS.

5.4.2 Adoption of WITs

As mentioned briefly in the preceding section, the inception of the WITs concept in Botswana can be traced back to the state visit by Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew in the 1980s. More specifically, Permanent Secretaries of Botswana ministries and departments held their annual conference in the city of Francistown in 1988. At the same conference the issue of low productivity in the public service took the centre stage. Among the recommendations made was the call for establishment of a Productivity Centre to promote and improve productivity across the economy. Botswana Government subsequently accepted the recommendation but also decided that a search for appropriate productivity initiative be instigated by way of a study tour of countries that were already implementing productivity improvement programmes (Ayeni & Yong, 1998; Adamolekun & Morgan, 1999; Daily News, 2006).

The top bureaucrats thus played an instrumental role in articulating the need for reforming the public service, but the final decision in terms of whether their recommendation materialised or not rested entirely with Cabinet. As a one senior official remarked:
‘...of course as an administration we are guided by politicians who represent people and therefore make the final decision on what can best be done to serve them.’ [Interview, 5]

In the same vein, the former president had this to say to underscore the role of Cabinet towards facilitating adoption of WITs in the public service:

‘We were interested in what was happening in Japan and Singapore. And we took the two as our models. We were trying to model ourselves on that or whatever it was that made them much more productive than we were in service delivery.’ [Interview, 30]

Subsequent to Cabinet approval, benchmarking trips of productivity centres across South East Asia and, in particular Singapore, began in earnest in early part of the 1990s. These study tours led to introduction of Singapore-inspired WITs concept together with the establishment of BNPC in 1993 (Modise, 1997; ECA, 2003).

Not only was Singapore taken as the model country, it also played a critical role through provision of technical assistance towards the adoption of WITs in Botswana. At the inception of the WITs concept numerous public officers from Botswana went for training and seminars at the Singapore’s Civil Service Training Institute to learn in-depth about the concept. Although Singapore played a significant role towards adoption of WITs in Botswana, there were other key players in this process. For instance, Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation, the UNDP under its Management Development Programme, The World Bank and Commonwealth Secretariat (ComSec) (Corkery et al., 1998) were active in promoting productivity movement in the country and therefore helped raise awareness to the WITs concept. One respondent recalled the role of such external institutions as follows:
‘We received assistance from many sources in promoting productivity awareness across the economy. These institutions provided necessary advice regarding the need for WITs in enhancing productivity in the country. It was just advice...we were not forced to adopt WITs as was the case in other developing countries.’ [Interview, 14]

The role of these internal institutions towards adoption of WITs was restricted to advisory role with the local bureaucrats and their political master having the final say in terms of whether to introduce or not WITs in the country.

The Singapore-inspired WITs concept was reportedly adopted as is, that is, with little modification by the reforms unit in DPSM. In this way, there was minimal adaptation of the concept to ensure that it was appropriate for Botswana’s public sector setting. One respondent had this to say:

‘We mainly conformed to the WITs framework/template. Ministries and departments were not given much flexibility to customise the concept to suit their own specific context.’ [Interview, 23]

Another respondent recalled the process in this way:

‘We just copied the concept from Singapore. There was very little done by DPSM to ensure fit between WITs and our context...I think this was not helpful and should not be done in the future.’ [Interview, 8]

Thus, WITs adoption process was perceived by most respondents as lacking the much needed consideration for appropriateness of the concept for the Botswana public sector’s setting. Instead, the perceived success of the scheme in Singapore – a more affluent State with necessary institutional capacity to undertake reform of such scope and magnitude – was the primary consideration of policy makers in Botswana towards adoption of the scheme.
5.4.3 Adoption of PMS

The adoption of PMS also began with an initiative by senior public servants. At their 1995 meeting in Kasane, Permanent Secretaries underscored the need to restore efficiency and productivity against a backdrop of widespread complaints about declining service delivery in the public service. Among the recommendations made by the Permanent Secretaries was the need for a completely modern system to be adopted to improve the way the public service was managed. Towards that end, DPSM was charged with the search for a consultant to review public administration and recommend strategies for change and reform for efficiency and effectiveness in 1996. The American-based consultancy firm, Academy for Educational Development (AED), was engaged by the Government of Botswana through DPSM to advice on appropriate measures to address problems in the public service. AED subsequently made a number of recommendations that were debated by Permanent Secretaries at their annual meeting in 1997 in Francistown. A collective decision was then taken by Permanent Secretaries to make a number of recommendations that included adoption of PMS. The Cabinet gave approval in April of 1998 (DPSM, 1999; Ernst & Young report, 2002; Marobela, 2008).

The elected and appointed officials were not the only groupings/actors that played important role as far as adoption of PMS was concerned. Many other stakeholders from within and outside the country proved influential in the adoption process. The advice provided by external agencies proved important towards the adoption of PMS. For instance one interviewee had this to say:

‘Just like in most other African countries or developing countries for that matter, there has been external influence to change the way we were running our governments, but I think the difference with regards to Botswana is that there wasn’t much pressure from outside but certainly there was advice… and this is how PMS was adopted.’ [Interview, 17]
Both Academy for Educational Development (AED) and the United States Agency for International Development provided skills, expertise and funding for PMS initiative (Republic of Botswana, 1996). As a result of this support, many officials from Botswana were sent of training and seminars especially in the United States and New Zealand to learn more about PMS concept. As was pointed earlier, New Zealand proved to be a significant influence among Botswana authorities. Being a model of PMS success, New Zealand attracted officials from many other countries including Botswana to share experiences on PMS philosophy.

Subsequent to identification of successful cases of PMS reformers at DPSM began adoption of PMS in Botswana. In contrast to the role played by external bodies towards adoption of PMS in the country, there was minimal role played by other key local stakeholders in the reform process such as trade unions. The following view was typical:

‘DPSM opted for PMS on its own as the key institution responsible for public sector management in the country. They did not seek input from others stakeholders in the public service like ministries or trade unions.’

Of note, the PMS model was adopted as is with little deviation from templates/frameworks used in developed countries such as New Zealand and as prescribed in the literature. All that was done by DPSM therefore was to provide a similar framework/template to be used by all ministries and departments in developing their visions, missions and goals. In this way, each organisation was expected to develop from scratch their own specific dimensions/elements [i.e. visions and missions] to be context specific but that was, however, undertaken within the prescribed parameters as set by DPSM.
5.5 Conclusion

This chapter explored the specific context of the Botswana public service to understand adoption of NPM-type of reforms in the country. It was shown that unlike other developing countries, especially those of the sub-Saharan Africa, Botswana’s public service was of a better quality, which was a result of pragmatism and avoidance of hasty decisions undertaken by political leadership. More significantly, there was a successful blending of ‘traditional’ and modern elements in the country’s public administration machinery – underpinned by strong centralisation.

This centralisation marks the policy-making process in the public service where DPSM and MFDP constitute the two key ministries/departments in the entire public service. In this arrangement, policy making is mainly non-inclusive with other key stakeholders often left out when key decisions are made. Adoption of NPM reforms in the public service evolved within this centralised arrangement with DPSM at the forefront of the process with other ministries and departments being just mere recipients of such reform efforts.

The next chapter explores implementation and evaluation of WITs.
Chapter 6
Implementation and Evaluation of WITs
6.1 Introduction

Chapter 5 considered the first of the three primary research questions of this thesis – namely, why were NPM reforms adopted by developing countries? It was shown that despite sound institutional capacity of the Botswana public service during the post-independence years, the beginning of the 1990s brought to surface numerous challenges that threatened the public service and, ultimately, the economy at large. Against such a background, the Government adopted various policy measures, including the WITS initiative in 1993. In doing so, the Government - through reform of its public service – sought to reaffirm its ability to formulate sound policies to deal with imminent challenges and opportunities emanating internally and also from the wider environment (Hope, 1995, 1997; Corkery et al, 1998; DPSM, 1997, 2000). This chapter is the first of the two chapters which, taken together, address the remaining two primary research questions identified for the study – namely:

Research question 2: How are NPM reforms implemented?
Research question 3: Are the stated objectives of NPM reforms achieved?

This chapter focuses on the WITs initiative. As an NPM-style reform, WITs sought to bring changes in the culture of the public service through the use of team-based work arrangements. To fully understand the implementation and evaluation process of WITs initiative, the chapter will provide original empirical data on the implementation and evaluation of WITS in two embedded sub-units in the Botswana public service – DPSM and CTO.

The chapter is organised as follows. The next section offers accounts of the implementation of WITs in the two embedded case organisations, where section 6.2.1 focuses on the overall implementation framework in which WITs was introduced: section 6.2.2 describes WITs implementation in CTO, and section 6.2.3 describes WITs implementation in DPSM. This will be followed, in section 6.3 with an evaluation of WITs implementation, with section 6.3.1 providing an overall description of WITs evaluation; 6.3.2 evaluating, the
scheme in CTO and section 6.3.3 assessing the impact of the scheme in DPSM. Last, section 6.4 provides summary of the chapter.

6.2 Implementation of Work Improvement Teams (WITs)

Pressman & Wildavsky (1973: 143) cautioned in their seminal work on policy implementation that, ‘there is no point having good ideas if they cannot be carried out.’ As was indicated above, the adoption of WITs was presented by public sector leaders as one of those good policy ideas intended to enhance productivity and efficiency in the public service. In this section, a general overview of WITs implementation structure and strategy across the Botswana public service is provided. Notably, the general implementation framework within which WITs was meant to evolve was similar in all ministries and departments. Next, the section provides accounts of the WITs implementation process in both CTO and DPSM. The section will conclude by linking the explanation of the WITs implementation process with theory.

6.2.1 General implementation framework

The implementation of WITs initiative across the public service commenced in 1994 within a well-defined institutional framework. This arrangement reflected the hierarchical policy framework dominant in the country, which was detailed in Chapter 5. Specifically, the WITs implementation process evolved within a heavily centralised framework characterised by top-down accountability, whereby the senior public sector leadership were meant to play a significant role. In this context, the accountability of project implementation was mainly from above (from the top politicians and senior-public service managers). Figure 6.1 presents diagrammatically the hierarchy of committees throughout the public service that provided the general implementation framework for WITs initiative.
At the apex of the implementation framework was the productivity improvement committee for the whole civil service (PIC-FORCE). The PIC-FORCE comprised the Permanent Secretary to the President (PSP) and various heads of independent departments, such as the National Assembly, DCEC and the police. The PSP – as the head of the public service – chaired this committee with DPSM acting as its secretariat. The PIC-FORCE was expected to provide inspiration, support and commitment to WITs at the highest level of the civil service. The committee also established the overall policy and direction for WITs government-wide implementation by formulating strategies, setting guidelines for WITs operation and allocating resources for training, development and promotion of the programme. Effectively, the role of PIC-FORCE was to ensure the efficacy of the WITs implementation exercise.

Directly below the PIC-FORCE was the ministerial productivity improvement for the civil service (MINI PIC-FORCE). The MINI PIC-FORCE operated at ministerial levels and under the chair of permanent secretaries in each ministry and with a membership comprising the heads of departments. In terms of responsibilities, the MINI PIC-FORCE offered guidance, coordination and support for the WITs programme within the ministry. MINI PIC-FORCE,
therefore, facilitated WITs by availing resources, monitoring and, where necessary, provided corrective action to ensure success of the scheme. Furthermore, this committee appointed facilitators and made reports on WITs activities to the PIC-FORCE.

The departmental productivity improvement committees (DPICs) completed the WITs implementation framework. DPICs comprised top management at departmental levels and are under the chair of the head of the respective department. The mandate of the DPICs was essentially similar to that of MINI PIC-FORCE except that it discharged its roles at a lower level of the public service. A more detailed discussion of the role played by DPICs will be provided in later sections of this chapter, where the specific focus is CTO and DPSM.

Taken together, these three bodies provided the institutional framework within which WITs was implemented. These committees were expected to meet on specified intervals when they would review implementation progress and, where necessary, offer solutions to identified implementation bottlenecks. For instance, the PIC-FORCE was to meet on quarterly basis every year, although this was changed in 1996 to a frequency of three meetings annually. Effectively, these committees constituted a dedicated body charged with spearheading WITs implementation in all ministries and departments (WITs Document, 1997; Hope, 1998, 1999; Ayeni & Yong, 1998).

Three key support organisations complemented the general implementation framework. First, DPSM as the custodian of public sector management was given the overall responsibility to ensure successful implementation of the programme throughout the entire public service. In this way, the department assumed leadership in the implementation process as the project manager. Through its WITs Development Unit (WDU), formally established in May 1995, the department delivered and coordinated WITs training activities. For example, the WDU sought to adapt WITs to suit local context (e.g. by translating training materials into local language to help garner wider understanding) and,
therefore, support for the initiative by all public officers (Cockery et al., 1998; Ayeni & Yong, 1998).

Second, the Botswana National Productivity Centre (BNPC) was another lead institution in the government-wide implementation of the scheme. Modelled on Productivity Centres in Asia, and subsequently offered support by Singapore Government, BNPC was established through an Act of parliament in 1993. Its statutory mandate entailed productivity enhancement across the general economy. Towards this end, BNPC worked in conjunction with both public sector and private organisations to promote productivity as a nation’s long-term strategy for the creation of employment opportunities, international competitiveness and improvement in general living standards (BNPC, 1995; Hope, 2002). It advanced its mandate mainly through advocacy function (training and consulting) thereby helping individuals and organisations to be focused more on productivity and competitiveness issues in their business endeavours. Importantly, as the lead consultant in the implementation of WITs, BNPC enjoyed a better understanding of the local context, an invaluable element towards facilitating successful implementation of the scheme.

Third, the Botswana Institute of Administration and Commerce (BIAC) also contributed to the implementation of WITs. In a similar way to WITs Development Unit (WDU), BIAC played a central role in the provision of training intended to facilitate the successful government-wide implementation of the project. Specifically, it provided resource personnel to train facilitators and team leaders. As the sole public service college, it also provided WITs-related training to the general government workforce. For example, by end of 1996 a total of 102 facilitators (27 in Botswana and 75 in Singapore) and 529 team leaders (all in Botswana) were trained. This number increased to 854 by the end of 1998 (Hope, 1998; 133, cited in Hope & Somolekae, 1999; Corkery et al., 1998). Effectively, BIAC together with BNPC and DPSM, proved instrumental in the facilitation of implementation of WITs across the public service (Ayeni & Yong, 1998)
In a sign of how serious the public sector leaders were in addressing the problem of low productivity in the public service, all ministries and departments were mandated to implement the WITs programme. Within this arrangement, each government employee was compelled to actively participate in the project irrespective of his/her employment status. In this way, no public officer was excused from participating in the WITs programme. As Ayeni & Yong (1998: 15) indicated, the work teams were the main implementation tools of this strategy. Consistent with this, the formation and registration of the first set of teams across government began in April 1994. After then the number of teams progressively increased as the rollout to ministries and departments intensified. The teams were expected to complete at least two projects per year (Hope, 1999). As a way of encouraging teams to effectively address their challenges various measures were put in place both at departmental and national levels. For instance, at departmental level periodic presentations before management and peer groups by teams were organised. The presentations were usually challenging activities that provided teams with a platform to demonstrate their worth. The WITs Handbook (p.31) captures the importance of management presentations in the following way:

‘The presentation is a challenging activity and provides a WIT (i.e. team) with the occasion to show responsible and mature behaviour. It is also a communication process and provides the recognition to catalyse further WITs progress and activities. It provides management with an opportunity to show that it is sympathetic and supportive. It gives WITs members a chance to be heard by management with the WIT being responsible for the main show.’

Other efforts aimed at strengthening teams included public sector-wide presentations. Here, projects undertaken by any team, which achieved first place at ministry level competitions qualified for the annual national WITs competitions. The ‘big show presentations’ in this sense attracted various teams from different backgrounds to compete against one another. These competitions proved to be more than just contest between various teams but
acted as an invaluable opportunity for teams to share their experiences on how to manage and overcome problems in their respective workplaces.

Despite the strong implementation framework and strategies developed to guide government-wide implementation of the scheme, there were various challenges encountered that were not initially envisaged. First, despite the wide scope and serious intent of the initiative, its rollout to all ministries and departments was not preceded by a pilot project. Emphasising this point, Ayeni & Yong (1998; 4), argued that:

‘Perhaps Botswana should not have attempted from inception a full-scale implementation of the programme throughout the public service, and might have better managed a phased implementation process.’

In the absence of a piloting project, the rollout phase was undertaken with limited knowledge of potential pitfalls and opportunities. As Ayeni & Yong (1998) noted, had such an invaluable exercise materialised, the possibility of successful government-wide implementation of the scheme would have greatly been enhanced. This might have been one plausible explanation relating to piloting of the project or lack thereof. For instance, pilot project have a disappointing habit of withering on the vine – that is, people on the pilot often get excited but everyone else feels excluded and as a result don’t fully participate when their turn comes.

Second, government-wide implementation of WITs suffered with the subsequent introduction of the PMS scheme in 1997. As will be shown in more detail in Chapter 7, PMS was meant to provide a broad framework for all public sector reform initiatives, including WITs. The introduction of PMS therefore undermined the influence of WITs in the reform agenda. To underscore this point, when officially closing the third annual Ministry of Minerals, Energy and Water Affair (MMEWA) in September 2000, then Minister in charge of MMEWA, Mr Boemetswe Mokgothu, noted that, ‘WITs was one of the main cog wheels in the implementation of PMS.’ (Daily News, 18 September, 2000). With
introduction of PMS, other reform initiatives including WITs were therefore relegated to support mechanism towards successful implementation of PMS.

In summary, government-wide implementation of WITs was pursued within a hierarchy of well defined committee structures. At the same time, there were other bodies outside the public service which provided much needed support towards successful implementation of the scheme. What was absent in the implementation process of the scheme was the role played by external groups, such as management consultants, who were widely identified in the literature as key players in the NPM-type of reforms (see, Saint-Martin, 1998, 2002; Hood & Peters, 2004). Furthermore, the project encountered various challenges some of which were a result of poor project design. In particular, a pilot phase did not precede government-wide implementation of the scheme and, as a result, the implementation process was deprived of invaluable lessons which could have informed the rollout phase.

6.2.2 Implementation of WITs in CTO

CTO moved in 1994 to implement the WITs programme following approval for its government-wide implementation from the Office of the President (OP). The department-wide implementation process evolved within the mandated implementation framework depicted in figure 6.1 above. In this way, the implementation process of the scheme in CTO was carried out in conformity to the established institutional mechanism that directed and coordinated WITs implementation elsewhere in the public service. There was therefore little regard for any deviation from the established framework by individual departments to seek alternative approaches that best accommodated their own specific circumstances.

The department-wide implementation of the scheme in CTO was led by the departmental productivity improvement committee (DPIC), which comprised of the general manager and other members of the senior management team. The members of the departmental senior management team included the deputy
general manager and all heads of individual divisions within the department (namely, mechanical, transport, personnel, supplies, accounts, and information systems). The committee was mandated to facilitate the effective implementation of the programme across the department by providing necessary resources and support to the organisation.

Although the DPIC was to lead the implementation process, it was suggested by most participants that little that was done in terms of providing training to enhance the capacity of the DPIC. One respondent viewed this development in the following way:

‘I would say the capacity to successfully drive WITs was not enough amongst our DPIC. Very few members of the committee were actually offered training to enhance their understanding of WITs concept. I wouldn’t know why that was the case. However, I think that should have never been allowed to happen if they were expected to provide effective leadership to guide in the implementation of the project.’ [Interview, 3]

This view suggests that in an effort to satisfy the demands of public sector leaders, department-wide implementation of the scheme was undertaken without strong capacity amongst the DPIC and that the level of understanding of the WITs concept by members of the departmental senior team was therefore somewhat compromised.

Despite the apparent capacity constraints amongst the departmental leadership, WITs enjoyed strong support among this group. Two factors explained this state of affairs. First, the high level of support by departmental leadership was more a result of the then prevailing mood about the productivity movement across the public sector. This movement also enjoyed strong support and sponsorship from a wider section of the community, at least in the formative stages of the programme, which included business and community leaders (i.e. Chiefs), among many others. The enthusiasm with WITs was also visible amongst the public sector managers and political leaders. In particular,
President Masire’s role is widely acknowledged in driving WITs movement across the country (see, BNPC, 1995; Hope, 1996). Consequently, senior public service leaders saw themselves as part of the growing productivity movement sweeping across the public sector. According to one respondent:

’It was hard to dismiss WITs. The euphoria that marked its introduction was sustained well into the implementation phase of the project. For instance, teams were mushrooming everywhere in ministries and departments. As a leader in the public service during that time you couldn’t afford to ignore the call for change. And WITs, to many people, offered that platform.’ [Interview, 12]

Second, the broader implementation framework for WITs, presented in figure 6.1 above, compelled CTO management, through the DPIC, to take overall responsibility for the initiative and, importantly, facilitate its successful implementation. For instance, managers and supervisors were held accountable through regular reporting on the progress of the initiative in their respective units. Herein, the feedback from individual units was consolidated by DPIC to form the departmental report for submission to the parent ministry’s MINI PIC-FORCE and, finally, submitted with other reports from other departments within the ministry, to the PIC-FORCE (Ayeni & Yong, 1998; Hope, 1997). Hence, the in-build accountability mechanism within the broader implementation framework worked to ensure that implementation of the scheme in CTO enjoyed support of the departmental leadership. One respondent captures this point:

‘The reporting mechanism helped a lot to garner much needed support for WITs at the highest level. Workshop Managers were able to play an instrumental role in driving the scheme in their respective stations. Undoubtedly, almost everyone in senior management level supported those under their supervision establish teams as they were held accountable for successful implementation of the project in their operational areas.’ [Interview, 7]
The strong support shown by senior managers during the formative stages, however, waned over the course of the project implementation phase, especially following the introduction of performance management system (PMS) in the latter part of the 1990s. The introduction of PMS, as will be detailed in the Chapter 7, sought to encompass all other reform initiatives, including WITS, within its broader framework. Consequently, the inception of PMS had negative effect on the level of support for WITs within CTO, particularly among the departmental leadership. This is captured by one of the respondents when he stated:

‘…senior management doesn’t provide the necessary support for WITs these days but focus more on PMS. This is the case because PMS is driven from senior management down and, they get support from the ministry and even the Head of State and, as a result, they are giving it more priority than WITs.’ [Interview, 2]

Another respondent reiterated this point:

‘Nowadays our leaders [departmental senior management] do not care much about WITs. They do not find any reason to worry about it because nobody talks about it...I mean even our public sector leaders in general never really mention WITs these days. Maybe to them it has passed its usefulness?’ [Interview, 4]

These views suggest that the public sector leadership, including those in CTO, failed to sustain momentum for WITs, particularly in the wake of PMS introduction in 1997. As the views suggest, perhaps the departmental leadership ultimately paid more attention to PMS, as required by public sector leaders, at the expense of WITs.

With the DPIC in place, in the latter part of 1994, attention turned towards rollout of the scheme to all sections and divisions within the department.
Guiding this process were Workshop Managers and other middle level supervisors. Capacity issues were also a problem among these groups. For instance, some argued that they were not fully provided with training to enhance their understanding of WITs, with one respondent noting, ‘at best we were offered a two day seminar to gain basic understanding of WITs’ [Interview, 4]. In spite of such limitations, Workshop Managers were mandated to put in place structures in their respective jurisdictions to facilitate formation of work teams. Importantly, they were expected to appoint individuals amongst their subordinates to the positions of WITs facilitators.

The WITs facilitators occupied a significant position in the implementation process of the scheme, especially in the day-to-day operational issues required to institutionalise the scheme across the department, as was the case elsewhere in the public service. Ayeni & Yong (1998; 10) sum up the responsibility of WITs facilitators:

‘When trained they were responsible for setting up teams, guiding them, facilitating their functioning, and helping them develop and become effective teams.’

WITs facilitators were therefore responsible for much of the actual implementation of the scheme by, among others, liaising with other employees to put in place teams in their respective operational areas. In an effort aimed at strengthening their roles, WITs facilitators were sent for training at BIAC for a 10-day facilitators’ course in conjunction with WITs Development Unit (WDU) in DPSM to prepare them in the best possible way to help mount successful implementation of the project.

The first teams within the CTO were established from the beginning of 1995. Although figures showing the exact number of teams across the department are not available, all respondents confirmed that teams were rapidly put in place in all workshops and divisions. The context within which these teams developed
was characterised by high level of participation from employees, in particular industrial class employees. One respondent remembered it in the following way:

‘We were able to mobilise most of our officers in a short period of time to join WITs related teams. The response was beyond our expectations…By the end of the year we had well over a dozen of teams in operation. They were generally active [i.e., involved in meetings and other related activities] to share ideas and, thus, address challenges they faced in their units. Mostly our industrial class employees were the ones interested in being part of these teams.’ [Interview, 6]

To explain the high level of participation by lower level staff members, respondents commonly identified two key factors: on the one hand, the WITs concept was well understood across the department, and on the other, the WITs concept was perceived to be especially well suited to the CTO context. These two factors are discussed in detail below.

The department-wide implementation of the scheme was marked by a high level of understanding of the WITs concept by employees. According to accounts of most respondents, this development could be explained by a number of factors. First, given the strong support that the initiative enjoyed amongst the leadership of the department – at least at its formative stages – resources were availed to facilitate its implementation. Most respondents, for example, agreed that the department actively identified officers who were then trained as WITs facilitators and team leaders. Both facilitators and team leaders, in turn, played significant roles in disseminating information about WITs concept to other employees. As one respondent [who was amongst the first WITs facilitators in the department] observed:

‘…there were two courses that we attended at Botswana Institute of Administration and Commerce. One was the WITs team-leader course; the other one was WITs facilitators’ course. Having successfully gone through training, were able to teach other staff members about WITs. I
would say the response we got from the staff was encouraging.’
[Interview, 1]

Second, concerted efforts were made across the department, in line with the public service-wide WITs awareness campaign, to enhance understanding of the WITs concept. Indeed, targeted awareness-raising efforts aimed primarily at the unskilled and semi-skilled workers were identified as an integral part of the strategy for successful implementation of the scheme. DPSM, for instance, translated WITs documents into local language to facilitate understanding amongst these groups and these publicity instruments were widely utilised across the public service, including in CTO. These efforts were coupled with other awareness-raising measures such as radio broadcasting and media print (like newsletters) aimed at these employees. In this way, much effort was expended in these campaigns to ensure that WITs received wider coverage and, therefore, built understanding amongst public servants at lower organisational positions.

Third, facilitators and team leaders were usually appointed from the same work unit, which made it easier for other employees in the same unit or division to buy-in to the initiative. The emphasis placed on the use of employees from a common work environment as drivers of the initiative, proved beneficial as these individuals had more understanding of the context within which they operated (i.e. in terms of individual capabilities and organisational constraints). Accordingly, as some respondents argued, this awareness meant that facilitators and team leaders could easily help those in need of assistance as far as comprehension of the initiative was concerned [Interview 11 & 4].

In addition to the strong awareness and popularity of WITs, it was also perceived to be especially suited to CTO environment, which assisted the high level of participation that characterised implementation phase of the scheme. There were several factors advanced by most respondents to explain this development. First, respondents argued that the public sector leaders were able to sell the initiative as part of the broader local culture where members of the
community assisted each other to achieve success in their daily lives. In particular, the core value of WITs – i.e. teamwork – was presented by the leadership as nothing ‘new’ or foreign to local context; rather, it was viewed as integral element of the institutionalised practices for achievement of social security, such as cooperative community farming [Letsema]. For example, this was clearly brought to surface with the translation of the DPSM document’s central massage or motto, ‘pulling together is like working together and that’s productivity,’ to the local language which read thus: ‘kgetsi ya tsie e kgonwa ke go tswaraganelwa, mme se, se tsala bonatla mo tirong’ (DPSM, 1994). The use of kgetsi ya tsie, a widely used proverb related to sharing of responsibilities by members of a group/community (i.e. rearing of child or ploughing of fields) meant to foster collaborative work behaviour among the group by those in authority such as Chiefs, played a significant part in giving the concept a local feel, and thus, assisted the authorities in framing WITs as an indigenous social practice. According to one respondent:

‘Many of our employees found WITs easier to relate to because it resembled aspects of their culture. Actually, to them, there was nothing much that they didn’t know about the salient role of group work. I would argue that the move to locate the WITs concept within the local culture proved beneficial towards soliciting support for WITs implementation in the department.’ [Interview, 8]

As shown above, the authorities both within and beyond the department were able to downplay the external connection of the WITs concept [i.e. its origin in East Asia]. Instead, they emphasised the use of collaborative work arrangements which many employees felt resembled aspects of the broader social practices. In light of that, many employees found it easier to relate to WITs philosophy in the understanding that they brought to the workplace a valuable work practices they were accustomed to in their private lives.

Second, respondents saw the nature of work performed in the department as favourable to WITs concept. The department was predominantly a technical
organisation with majority of the employees occupying technical or related positions. These jobs (for example, mechanics and supplies officers) required high levels of cooperation between members to successfully accomplish their tasks. One respondent summarised this view:

‘The mechanics needed to work with other members within their units and beyond their jurisdiction [i.e. supplies staff members] so that they could get their repair kits or spare parts timely and accurately. WITs concept was therefore popular in the workshops as it offered perfect fit with the environment under which it was applied.’ [Interview, 9]

In this way, successful undertaking of tasks by many officers was very much dependent on the existence of cordial relationship within and amongst different units or divisions across the department. WITs, therefore, generated a lot of interest amongst employees in the department as it was perceived by many as a useful strategy more suited to the nature of their jobs. To this end, many employees saw WITs as a reinforcement mechanism to improve on what they were already doing in their respective work environments. The departmental environment was therefore viewed as receptive to WITs initiative.

Despite the positive elements that characterised implementation of WITs in CTO, there were challenges that emerged after the inception of the initiative that threatened or undermined its prospects for successful implementation. For example, although the implementation of WITs was meant to evolve within a well-defined top-down framework, it turned out in practise that WITs became more popular with lower level employees than their management counterparts. Against such a background, most respondents felt that the established implementation framework was not flexible enough to facilitate successful implementation of the scheme. The following views were typical:

‘I don’t think the adopted implementation framework best suited the demands of WITs. Had the authorities adapted the framework [bottom-up
approach] to suit reality on the ground that might have helped facilitate successful implementation of the scheme.’ [Interview, 3]

‘Successful implementation of the initiative required supportive framework and structures that would warrant lower level staff to claim ownership of the project without excess dependence on senior management as was already the case in the department.’ [Interview, 5]

There was also considerable indifference amongst other members of the organisation towards WITs initiative, which undermined successful implementation. Although participation in the programme was compulsory for all government employees, this was not the case in CTO. For instance, the majority of permanent and pensionable officers (P&Ps), who comprised the skilled part of the workforce and were numerically fewer than the industrial class employees, opted not to participate in WITs activities. The indifference amongst this group towards WITs stemmed in part from the growing perception that the scheme was meant to empower industrial class employees. One respondent captures this point:

‘I am aware that WITs is one reform that attracted more interest amongst our industrial class employees. Actually many of our P&Ps strongly felt that WITs could only work for industrial class employees. Because of this attitude, support for the scheme was never encouraging amongst the P&Ps.’ [Interview, 7]

This view suggests that implementation of the scheme suffered as a result of perceived lack of commitment for the project by P&Ps. With minimum commitment displayed by this group, their participation was compromised. The lack of participation by P&Ps, as a result, meant that the much needed push and legitimacy, which they would have offered, was undermined.

Moreover, the parallel introduction of other reform initiatives created confusion amongst employees across the public service. In the case of CTO, employees
failed to see the connection between and amongst the various reform initiatives. Although the various measures sought to enhance productivity and efficiency in the public service many employees viewed them as independent and sometimes competing elements. This concern was raised by DPSM when justifying the move to introduce PMS in 1997. According to their observations, the previous initiatives were fragmented ‘one shot’ measures dealing with specific aspects and problems of ministries and departments instead of addressing all areas of the organisation (DPSM, 1998: 5). It seems that officers were in state of confusion that left them unable to see the overall benefit that the different measures sought to achieve for the public service. Respondents in CTO blamed this development on what they termed ‘reform fatigue’ affecting many across the department [Interview 5, 6 & 7].

In sum, implementation of WITs in CTO was pursued in accordance with established structures and strategies that were meant to guide the process elsewhere in the public service. Although the DPIC was lacking in capacity, it initially provided the much-needed support necessary to guide successful department-wide implementation of WITs. Specifically, supporting structures were put in place and were developed to ensure successful implementation of the scheme. Notably, the scheme enjoyed strong support amongst the industrial class employees. Despite the strong structures in place and wide support for the scheme, implementation process suffered setbacks. In particular, the P&P employees lacked commitment, which resulted with low participation of this group in the implementation phase of the project.

6.2.3 Implementation of WITs in DPSM

DPSM started implementing WITs in the latter part of 1994. Compared to experiences elsewhere in the public service, department-wide implementation of WITs evolved in a much more slower and cautious manner. Indeed, it was undertaken without any sign of urgency on the part of the departmental leadership despite the centrality of the department in the project across the
public service. The following views summed up the way WITs implementation process within the department was rolled out:

‘As project managers [DPSM], the departmental leadership’s primary aim was to ensure successful government-wide implementation of the scheme. In doing so, however, they paid little attention on the process within the department. As a result, inception of the scheme in our department had to wait until the project had gained momentum elsewhere in the public service.’ [Interview, 17]

‘Our department was very cautious with WITs implementation. I would say we adopted a wait-and-see attitude. Perhaps this was the case because we had limited information on which to base the department-wide implementation process in an absence of a piloting exercise of the scheme anywhere in the public service.’ [Interview, 15]

The views suggest that the lack of urgency on the part DPSM leadership for department-wide implementation. The cautious approach adopted by the department can be explained by three main factors. The first was the role played by the department as the project managers in the public service meant that the department’s attention was externally rather than internally focused. Second and related to the first, DPSM had relatively stronger power over other departments and ministries and, as a result, could determine the pace as far as implementation of the scheme was concerned. In this sense, the department could still decide to go slow even as they were urgently pushing WITs on other departments. Third, the absence of a pilot exercise preceding full-scale implementation throughout the public service undermined the ability of the leadership to confidently proceed with WITs department-wide implementation.

Notwithstanding the delay, implementation of WITs within the DPSM was pursued within relatively strong framework and strategies, as was the case elsewhere in the public service. The DIPC, comprising of the Director – as the head of the department – together with members of the departmental senior
management assumed the overall responsibility for successful implementation of the scheme across the department. The institutional capacity of the DPIC was adequately developed to help drive successful implementation of the scheme. Specifically, the DPIC members were provided with training on WITs concept both locally and internationally [i.e. at BIAC or Singapore, among many others]. Being at the centre of WITs initiative, the department had virtually unfettered access to resources. As one respondent indicated:

‘As the lead agency in public service reforms, we had an advantage in terms of access to resources. With such resource at our disposal the departmental leadership were exposed to much needed training and other capacity building exercises than any other in the public service.’ [Interview, 17]

Having established capacity amongst its DPIC, attention on the implementation of the scheme turned to the lower department levels around the beginning of 1995. Here, responsibility was placed on divisional heads to establish structures within their respective units to facilitate department-wide implementation of WITs. Of significance, WITs facilitators and team leaders were appointed early in the project. To help equip them to guide day-to-day implementation of the programme, facilitators and team leaders were provided with training to equip them with requisite skills at BIAC.

Preparation of the lower level employees, however, does not seem to have been very effective. Industrial class employees in particular, were briefed about the WITs concept through staff meetings and any further training appears to have been limited. Such an oversight on capacity building had considerable implications on department-wide implementation of WITs. First, few industrial class employees understood the WITs concept. To one respondent:

‘Employees are not knowledgeable about WITs. Even when they present their WITs projects they try as much to bring out big words. And yet, if
you try to ask them what they mean, you see that these people don’t understand these concepts.’ [Interview, 18]

Second, levels of participation in WITs activities generally were very low. Neither P&Ps nor industrial class employees were supportive of the scheme. Although respondents were not certain about the number of teams established across the department since inception of WITs, most of them confirmed that there were few. Not only was the number of teams very low, but the quality of the existing teams was not encouraging. None of the respondents could remember any project undertaken by any DPSM team which made it into any of the annual national competitions. As one respondent indicated:

‘The few teams that existed hardly ever met. I am not even sure if they still exist. In terms of what they were doing, there was nothing to show to warrant continued support for those teams. There has not been any visible benefit of maintaining those teams.’ [Interview, 23]

The low level of participation on WITs activities by most officers in the department was, according to some respondents, a result of the nature of work performed by the department which was perceived to be unsuitable to team work arrangements. As shown in Chapter 3, the larger parts of the workforce were employed as P&P officers occupying professional positions and their jobs were predominantly suited to individual as opposed to group work arrangements (however, this arrangement does not mean policy work, which is processual is not suited to team work. This perception by respondents might have been valid or simply self-serving – or maybe both). As a result, most of the departmental staff did not actively participate in WITs activities despite their apparent mandatory status.

Departmental-wide implementation of the scheme was also marked by lack of commitment on the part of P&P employees. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that little was done by reformers to institutionalise and embed WITs. For example, most respondents confirmed that the measures put in place were not
adequate to make the scheme enduring. Notably, implementation of WITs was not complemented with changes in human resource policies and practices [such as a pay system that rewarded team work]. This impacted negatively on sustaining commitment of employees to WITs initiative. One respondent noted:

‘We failed to reinforce commitment to WITs by not modifying our formal structures, like the rewards system. We maintained what existed although the idea was to make lasting changes on employee’s behaviours. I think the authorities could have done better by bringing supportive policies to help reinforce and institutionalised WITs.’ [Interview, 27]

This indifference on the part of staff towards WITs only increased with the introduction of PMS. In particular, P&Ps paid far more attention to PMS than to WITs. One respondent captures the scepticism by the P&PS employees towards the WITs project:

‘Our colleagues [middle and senior members of staff] have failed to give WITs the necessary attention it deserves. There is a prevailing sense that WITs is generally targeted at those at the lower end of the organisation. The situation has become even worse following the introduction of PMS. I mean, no one now cares about WITs, including the industrial class employees.’ [Interview, 22]

In a similar vein, another respondent had this to say:

‘WITs from inception struggled to attract support of those in managerial positions. The situation was not helped by introduction of PMS. I would say the prevailing sentiment now is that WITs is for our industrial class employees. They, too [industrial class employees] are cynical about the scheme. I would say WITs is almost non functional in our department.’ [Interview, 20]
These views suggest the department-wide implementation of WITs progressively lost appeal amongst both P&Ps and industrial class employees. The situation became even more difficult with the introduction of PMS.

6.2.4 Summary

The implementation of WITs was ineffective within the DPSM. Despite good capacity amongst senior managers, they focused more on their role in promoting implementation of the scheme across the entire public sector rather than in their own department. Industrial class employees, for example, were given little information about the concept and rarely trained in applying it practically. The nature of the work performed by P&P employees was also perceived to be less suitable to team work organisation and there were no supporting HR policies. All these challenges were compounded by the introduction of PMS.

6.3 Evaluation of WITs

Chapter 2 underscored the difficulty of assessing public sector reform initiatives, especially NPM-type measures (Pollitt, 1995; Peters & Savoie, 1998; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000; Wollmann, 2003; Boyne et al., 2003; Hood & Peters, 2004). While acknowledging the complexities involved in evaluation, this section attempts to evaluate impact of WITs in the Botswana public service, with specific focus on CTO and DPSM. Before these assessments of WITs in the two case study organisations are offered, a brief discussion of existing evaluation efforts by consultants, scholars and public sector leaders is offered in section 6.3.1. This will be followed by evaluation of WITs in CTO and DPSM in sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 respectively. A summary of the section is presented in 6.3.4.
6.3.1 Previous Evaluation of WITs

Evaluation of WITs in the Botswana Public Service has been limited. There has, for example, been only one formal evaluation undertaken by external consultants (Ayeni & Yong, 1998). The study was commissioned by DPSM – as project managers – to fulfil the requirement for evaluation prescribed in National Development Plan (NPD) VIII (Botswana Government, 1997). Consultants from the Management and Training Services Division (MTSD) within the Commonwealth Secretariat (ComSec) completed the study in December 1998. While the primary purpose of the study was to meet the needs of DPSM, the consultants were also interested in the project for another reason:

‘Although many Commonwealth African countries have shown interest in the concept, only Botswana has really implemented it fully. An evaluation therefore provided a veritable seminal opportunity to study and document the current state of the concept. Clearly, other countries have a lot to learn from the experience, and it is part of the ComSec's responsibility to facilitate this wherever possible.’ (Ayeni & Yong, 1998: 8-9)

The report was broad in scope, covering the entire public service, thereby offering only a very general picture on the progress of the scheme. Moreover, the evaluation only examined the impact of the scheme from its inception in 1993 until 1998. Overall, the report concluded that effects of the WITs scheme were mixed, with both positives and negative elements observed.

On the positive side, the report indicated that implementation of WITs was pursued within a well-established framework, with clear and well-defined strategies. However, the report also identified various impediments to successful implementation of the scheme. For example, key mechanisms meant to facilitate implementation, such as teams, did not meet expected standards, both in terms of quality and quantity. In terms of numbers, the 500 teams registered by the end of 1998 almost reached the target of 550 provided
for in the WITs strategy document. However, in terms of the quality of the established teams, the report concluded:

‘...it should be noted that being registered is not sufficient to maintain an active and well-functioning team. Many teams cannot, in all seriousness, be described as functional. Meetings of teams are not frequently held, and the farther one moves outside Gaborone, the less satisfactory the situation one finds.’ (Ayeni & Yong, 1998: 21)

There was also very little scholarly work undertaken to assess impact of WITs. In general, the published research analyses the causes rather than effects of the scheme. As well, the two papers which deserve particular mention address the impact of public sector reform initiatives generally in the Botswana public service and, in doing so, touch only briefly on WITs (Hope, 1999; Mpabanga, 2004).

Hope (1999) analyses both the conceptual and practical problems of assessing productivity, especially in the public sector settings. In the specific case of WITs in Botswana’s public service, he observed that the scheme did not have a strong in-built mechanism for productivity measurement (p. 117). In that sense, the scheme did not have any specific pointers to indicate whether it effected any measurable productivity improvement. He was, then, unable to provide detailed evaluation of WITs. This emphasis on explanation instead of evaluation is also evident in Mpabanga’s (2004) work. She mentions the impact of WITs only in passing and this is largely negative, concluding that: ‘evaluation reports on the scheme indicated that the strategy was not as effective as expected’ (2004: 26).

The public sector leaders made no specific assessment of WITs. To that end, the available data does not offer much insight to help develop a clearer picture on the impact of the scheme in the public service. A number of reasons were advanced to help explain this lack of evaluation, and two consistently raised by those interviewed are discussed here. First, the general perception offered by
respondents was that the authorities were underplaying the importance of previous reform initiatives (i.e. WITs) in favour of PMS. As one respondent indicated:

'...We hardly ever hear anything about WITs nowadays. It is as if it never existed. The talk now is about PMS.' [Interview, 2]

Second, for some public sector leaders [and it would seem this view was encouraged by DPSM and other senior public officers], WITs was seen as an early part of PMS. As such, it became difficult for them to distinguish between the two initiatives. The result of making WITs appear as an extension of PMS had far reaching implications as far as assessment of WITs was concerned. Importantly, this created ambiguity in the evaluation process and, thus, almost impossible to assess impact of WITs on its own right. Rather, the only possible way to address this challenge was to look at PMS – as the overarching reform strategy, to know WITs impact. Despite these challenges, public sector leaders felt that reforms implemented prior to PMS were ineffective as they were seen as fragmented ‘one shot’ initiatives, which fell far short of addressing eminent complex challenges that the public service faced. This culminated with the introduction and subsequent implementation of PMS, detailed in Chapter 7.

6.3.2 Evaluation of WITs in CTO

The earlier sections of this chapter outlined expected benefits of government-wide implementation of WITs, which were to enhance productivity and efficiency levels in the public service. In the specific case of CTO, the stated objective of the scheme was to better meet the transport needs of user-departments in the public service through use of team-based work groups.

Overall, the assessment of WITs across CTO by respondents was mixed, but the dominant perception was that the scheme had a number of positive effects. First, most of the respondents strongly felt that implementation of WITs helped transform the culture of the department to one that encouraged collaboration
and consultation between management and lower level organisational members. The following views were typical:

‘WITs did a lot to change entrenched organisational mindsets that perpetuated mistrust between management and the general employees. In that environment, management hardly consulted employees on pertinent matters that affected them. Decisions were taken unilaterally by the leadership with little input sought from others in the organisation. This practice changed with introduction of WITs.’ [Interview, 4]

‘As a result of WITs, employees were given space to actively participate in the running of the organisation. Management realised that they needed to work together with other members of the organisation if the organisational mandate was to be realised.’ [Interview, 8]

Another respondent added:

‘I think WITs had a positive impact on our department. There was a strong move towards cooperation between and amongst different divisions in the department. This development was particularly visible in our workshops. Here, employees from different sections/divisions [i.e., mechanical and supplies divisions] developed strong working relationships, which facilitated accomplishment of their tasks. The result was general improvement across our workshops as far as repairing and servicing of vehicles were concerned.’ [Interview, 3]

These views suggest that WITs implementation struck at the entrenched organisational culture that had developed since colonial days and into the post-independent period underpinned by a highly centralised bureaucracy that placed strong emphasis on management in decision-making, with other actors [i.e., unions or general employees] having little input into the process. The implementation of WITs, therefore, was considered to have had a strong impact in the workings of the organisation by encouraging a different culture that
valued participative form of decision-making. As a result of WITs, it was claimed, management came to appreciate input from employees in the pursuit of organisational objectives.

Second, there was also agreement amongst respondents that implementation of WITs enhanced creativity and innovation across the department. For example, the teams that were established allowed employees, especially amongst the industrial class, an invaluable opportunity to creatively develop solutions to challenges in their various work units. The following views highlighted this development:

‘The team work arrangement proved crucial in raising creative ways by employees when responding to problems in their day-to-day activities. Employees would come together and share ideas on how best to address problems they faced. The teams were very useful in that they offered a platform to our employees to experiment with new ideas to deal with specific problems in their various work units.’ [Interview, 6]

‘Before WITs our employees expected management to provide solutions to every other problem they faced in fulfilling their tasks. WITs challenged employees to take charge and minimise reliance on management. In dealing with issues, employees began to develop new ways of dealing with work related problems and would only seek management intervention if they could not find effective solution to such problems.’ [Interview, 10]

From these views, it is clear that prior to implementation of the scheme the department adopted work arrangements that valued order and regularity. In this context, employees – especially those classified as industrial class – were expected to follow orders, with little room for deviation in pursuit of any given task. Their ability or drive to act creatively was significantly confined by rules and regulations in place. WITs, it was claimed, helped employees break through these constraints and attain some form of independence away from
direction and control of management in developing solutions to emergent organisational challenges.

Third, most respondents felt that implementation of WITs enhanced service delivery across the department. Given its mandate of providing road transport services to user-departments, other departments had to rely on CTO for transport service to meet their mandates. Previously, this role was said to be compromised by poor service standards. One respondent captured the then prevailing sentiment as follows:

‘In the early part of the 1990s, CTO was perceived as one of the poor performing departments in the public service. We were blamed by other departments for failing to provide them with transport services meant to help facilitate implementation of various development projects across the country. WITs helped change that perception. Our service improved a lot and we were able to meet the demands of our clients.’ [Interview, 2]

This improved service delivery by the department, according to respondents, was primarily explained by a shift in organisational focus away from internal matters [i.e. capacity constraints] towards a broader outlook that placed customers at the centre of service delivery. In this context, the demands of the customers became central whatever the employees worked on. Employees learnt to do their best to fulfil the demands of the user-departments whatever challenges they faced. The following views were typical amongst respondents:

‘WITs helped us become customer-focused. It is not like before whereby we will be saying we want to see CTO repairing vehicles. With WITs we began saying we want to see CTO repairing vehicles and giving them back to their owners [i.e., User-departments].’ [Interview, 11]

‘Although we have always been aware of our obligation to other departments we were never concerned about challenging ourselves to open up to them and understand their concerns. WITs afforded us that..."
opportunity to interact with our key customers and focus our effort towards fulfilling their demands. At the end, we provide service on the basis of what our clients want.’ [Interview, 7]

Fourth, there was agreement amongst those interviewed that WITs, and especially the team work arrangements, helped improve processes within and beyond the department. As was already indicated above, work processes in the department, particularly in workshops, were transformed from predominantly solitary to more collective/collaborative arrangements. More broadly, WITs brought about increased interaction amongst government departments in finding solutions to problems they faced. The following views sum up the general feeling amongst those interviewed:

‘There are interactions among government departments. For instance, we have WITs competitions whereby you come with projects and other departments would compete by presenting their projects - in the process, sharing on how they have managed to overcome problems in their respective workplaces. In the past we never interacted with others in the public service.’ [Interview, 3]

‘We are seeing cross-functional teams now coming up. Initially it was more to do with birds of the same feather flying together but now we are seeing people opening up and saying there is a problem that we can sort out across functions. The projects that they set out to achieve have really borne fruit and we have even standardised some of the solutions that came with those WIT teams.’ [Interview, 5]

‘With WITs we saw a lot of changes in the way the different departments performed their tasks. I would say there was increasing use of teams that proved beneficial in that employees from different units shared experiences in addressing common work problems. Consequently, the department managed to reduce backlog of vehicles in the workshops. Not only that, we achieved a lot in terms of reducing other staff related
problems such as absenteeism and late-coming, common amongst our industrial class employees.’ [Interview, 1]

These views suggest that through WITs there were changes to established work arrangements across the public service. Importantly, the improvements, such as teams, helped break divisional/departmental boundaries which had previously hampered interaction between and amongst various government departments and ministries.

Fifth, there was also a perception amongst respondents that WITs helped empower employees and, thus, improved quality of work life for them. To this end, implementation of WITs was credited with transforming the then prevailing culture that was marked by exclusion of the industrial class employees in the way the department was run by its leadership. One respondent remembered how management and general employees used to relate prior to introduction of WITs:

‘The interaction between our staff was not very good. Mistrust marked the way management and lower members of staff related. But WITs was able to create an avenue for improved relations between the two groupings.’ [Interview, 6]

Relatedly, WITs attracted a lot of participation from employees because many saw it as a useful tool to enrich their jobs. The respondents did indicate that prior to the introduction of the initiative many employees across the department were in jobs that afforded them no or little opportunity to play meaningful role in their day-to-day activities. As one respondent remarked, ‘they were just cogs in a machine.’ The consequent mood amongst most employees was reportedly one of disgruntlement and most employees – but especially those engaged in workshops – were reportedly showing little interest in their jobs, manifesting in high levels of absenteeism and little interest in problem solving [Interview 3 & 4]. However, with the inception of WITs, many of these employees became empowered to play a more active role in their workplaces.
Despite these many positive impacts stemming from the implementation of WITs, there were also some negative or unintended impacts reported by respondents. It was claimed by P&Ps, for example, that WITs created some confusion and resistance, especially amongst industrial class employees, to the subsequent introduction of PMS in the mid-1990s. Specifically, the strong support for WITs amongst this group meant that they opposed anything they felt challenged or undermined it [WITs]. One respondent summarised this view:

‘It is undeniable that WITs was a good initiative. However, Government realised through PMS that a new approach in reforming the public service was a necessity. Unfortunately, our industrial class employees have not been supportive of PMS. This is understandable given the amount of support they had for the scheme but they will have to come aboard and lend support to PMS like everyone in the public service. Resisting change is not going to serve them any good.’ [Interview, 5]

In other words, although WITs was supposed to be a catalyst for on-going change across the public service, including in CTO, it inadvertently helped establish a culture of resistance. Respondents argued that employees deliberately undermined PMS because they perceived it as primarily meant to replace WITs, which had served to empower them in pursuit of their jobs. The security they enjoyed under WITs was therefore threatened and, in turn, they opted to undermine PMS project.

6.3.3 Evaluation of WITs in DPSM

In the case of DPSM, implementation of WITs was meant to help the department improve on service delivery (in terms of building human resource capacity) to user departments across the public service. In general, the assessment of the scheme within the department was less encouraging. In that sense, few respondents highlighted the benefits derived from implementation of
WITs while most of them pointed towards negative effects following implementation of the scheme across the department.

On a positive note, there was a perception amongst those interviewed that WITs proved beneficial insofar as the teams facilitated change in work culture in DPSM. Prior to implementation of the scheme DPSM was faced with a disturbing culture of laxity as observed by managers characterised by non-compliance to established rules [i.e., late coming, absenteeism, among many others], especially among industrial class employees. The situation was not helped, as indicated by some respondents, by mistrust that characterised relationship between the general workforce and management. Implementation of WITs therefore brought about change in work culture across the department. The following views were typical among respondents:

‗Before WITs the department was struggling with demoralised staff. This was particularly the case amongst industrial class employees who felt that their participation was undermined by management. Implementation of WITs helped address that concern through encouraging active participation of staff in work related activities and, as a result, we witnessed improvement in the working relationship between management and industrial class employees.‘ [Interview, 16]

Another respondent had this to say:

‗WITs proved quite beneficial for us. We underwent a cultural change as a department. Although management was not much involved in WITs activities, they still appreciated what their juniors/subordinates were doing. The result was development of trust between management and those occupying lower organisational positions. That development helped our department achieve its mandate.‘ [Interview, 22]

The views suggest that implementation of WITs facilitated a change in the prevailing work culture - which had encouraged individualist arrangements - to
one that emphasised more collaborative and participative work arrangements. In the new environment, management and the general workforce collaborated in addressing work related challenges. The result was establishment of consultative mechanisms to bring the two groups together towards achievement of work goals.

Implementation of the scheme was also credited with empowerment of lower organisational members. Prior to implementation of the scheme the industrial class employees were reportedly left out of decision-making processes in the department. One respondent remarked:

‘Before we introduced WITs there was widespread cry from our industrial class staff that they were excluded from the running of the department. According to them they were treated differently from P&P members of staff. But implementation of WITs managed to bridge that gap providing platform for industrial class to be seen as integral part of the organisation.’ [Interview, 17]

Another respondent reiterated this point:

‘We used to be accused by our industrial class employees of ignoring their voice. However, introduction of WITs helped improve on their concerns. I will say they feel we appreciate them following implementation of the scheme.’ [Interview, 15]

These views suggest that implementation of the scheme helped transform the prevailing mind set among the senior management and P&Ps in DPSM that industrial class employees were of lesser value to the department. Introduction of the scheme therefore increased the standing of the industrial class within the department.

Furthermore, introduction of WITs was lauded for improving general participation of industrial class employees in the day-to-day running of the
department. Before introduction of WITs, these employees were not involved in the way the department was run. They were hardly consulted on pertinent issues affecting the organisation let alone in finding solutions to challenges they faced in their work areas. In other words, they were hardly allowed to effectively participate in departmental activities. Where they were involved it was usually within the narrow parameters set out by their job descriptions. However, introduction of WITs helped raise participation of industrial class employees in activities beyond their confined areas of work. They were therefore allowed to go beyond the prescription of the job description and apply themselves broadly in various departmental activities. These points are captured by respondents below:

‘WITs proved crucial for this department. It brought to surface the need for management to engage lower level employees as a way of addressing work related challenges. The junior members of staff managed to work on strategies to reduce absenteeism and late coming, which was a source of concern to management.’ [Interview, 22]

‘Our subordinates would meet with their peers from other different units in the department to find solutions beyond their jurisdictions. For instance, they will meet and work out a solution on their own without management intervention on how to reduce absenteeism.’ [Interview, 20]

Despite these positives, implementation of WITs across DPSM created various challenges as reported by many respondents. It was claimed by all respondents that introduction of the scheme created confusion across the department. In particular, some industrial class employees were in most cases outside their work areas attending capacity-building seminars lasting 3 to 5 days a week. If they were not attending seminars they were elsewhere on other WITs assignments. This development created confusion amongst management and industrial class employees with regards to where the latter group was supposed to be and doing. One respondent summarised this view:
‘Introduction of WITs brought with it a share of problems. But I would say the major problem was the confusion it brought to both staff and management. We operated in confusion especially with industrial class employees paying much attention to WITs activities and less to their core responsibilities. On the other hand, as management we were not so sure where they were supposed to be. I hated the confusion.’ [Interview, 19]

This view suggests that introduction of the scheme brought about uncertainty on the part of management with regard to the nature of work supposed to be undertaken by their industrial class colleagues. Some of these officers were not so sure if WITs activities constituted official activities by the industrial class members. For instance, the industrial class employees had annual competitions between different ministries and departments, which required attendance of the industrial class group. This situation created difficulties for some P&P staff who were not sure when to release their juniors and why. In this sense, WITs activities to them were not part of the core responsibilities of the industrial class employees. Equally significant, the industrial class employees were disappointed by their managerial co-workers whom they saw as hampering WITs activities. To them, their managers were not supportive of the WITs activities just because the scheme mainly involved their participation. In this regard, the introduction of the scheme created uneasy relations between the two parties who failed to see the need for both groupings to actively participate in the scheme and make it beneficial for the department.

Not only did introduction of WITs create confusion within DPSM. The scheme also helped nurture resistance amongst industrial class employees towards management and other reform efforts. To most respondents, industrial class employees were opposed to management efforts in many work related issues mainly because they felt management was not supportive of the scheme. As was indicated above, industrial class employees were of the view that management failed to provide support for the scheme. One respondent captured the relation between the two grouping as follows:
‘With introduction of WITs we started having problems with our industrial class employees. They accused us of sabotaging the scheme in many ways. As a result, they decided to be uncooperative in other departmental activities.’ [Interview, 22]

The opposition of industrial class to departmental activities increased following introduction of PMS in the latter part of 1990s. This proved to be the case as many employees amongst this group felt that PMS was targeted at their P&P counterparts. This was the case despite assurances from those in management that PMS was directed to all public servants. The following view by one respondent is representative of the general feeling amongst those interviewed:

‘Most of our industrial class employees did not want to be part of any initiative/activity in the department. All they wanted was WITs. The situation became even worse with PMS. They just felt the scheme was meant to replace WITs, which to them, offered them a platform to be take part in the way the department operated.’ [Interview, 19]

Thus WITs was used as a rallying point by industrial class group in DPSM to undermine new initiatives like PMS, which they suspected was introduced to undermine WITs.

6.3.4 Summary

This section shows that systematic assessment of WITs in the two study organisations and the public service in general was modest. Despite the few evaluation efforts, the effects of scheme proved to be mixed for both CTO than in DPSM. In particular, industrial class employees were reportedly empowered following introduction of the scheme. In DPSM, however, the scheme failed to deliver on its purported benefits given lack of support from management towards successful implementation of the scheme.
6.4 Conclusion

In conjunction with Chapter 7, this chapter addresses the remaining two primary research questions identified for the study: to understand how NPM reforms were implemented and evaluate whether they achieved their stated objectives/goals. This chapter focuses on the WITs initiative, an NPM-type reform meant to bring changes in the culture of the public service through the use of team-based work arrangements in two embedded sub-units in the Botswana public service – DPSM and CTO.

The next chapter examines the implementation and evaluation of PMS initiative in the two study organisations.
Chapter 7

Implementation and Evaluation of PMS
7.1 Introduction

As was indicated in Chapter 4, the Botswana economy posted one of the highest levels of economic growth in the world over the past four decades (1970s – 2000s). In an effort to effect socio-economic development across the country, policy proposals were adopted by the country’s leaders culminating in massive investment in infrastructure development (i.e. roads, health facilities and schools, to mention but a few). Despite such impressive development efforts, many policy proposals were not adequately translated into practise (BIDPA, 2006). Concerns about failure by the public service to successfully translate policy proposals - expressed primarily through national development plans (NDPs) - emerged as a policy issue from the early 1980s and gained wider currency in the 1990s. For instance, concerns were raised about government’ failure to complete projects on time. Lamenting the state of affairs in his address to parliament in 1989, the former president Masire had this to say:

‘There is a growing gap between the establishment of policy and its implementation. [He further noted that] ‘...the rapid growth in the formulation of policies has not been matched by the pace of implementation.’ (Cited in Mmegi, 21 February 2008)

Similarly, in his 1992 budget speech the then Vice President Mogae complained about lack of implementation of development projects (reported some years later in the newspaper Mmegi, 21 February 2008). Thus, in 1997 the National Development Plan (NDP) 7 document concluded that:

‘The inadequate implementation capacity in Government has been identified as one of the main bottlenecks in delivering services nationwide. This problem was identified during the Mid-Term Review of NDP 7, which stated that the lack of adequate monitoring and accountability throughout Government was a major contributor to the large gap between policy decision and their implementation…’ (NDP 7: 89)
The growing concern with this poor implementation record crystallised with the adoption of performance management system (PMS), which commenced with a pilot program in 1996 and rolled out more generally in 1999. When introducing this scheme, the Government highlighted the importance of effective policy implementation and management [including monitoring & evaluation] in the socio-economic development of the country.

This chapter again addresses the remaining two primary research questions: to understand how NPM reforms were implemented and whether they achieved their stated objectives/goals. The focus of Chapter 6 was on WITs; and the focus of this chapter is on PMS, an NPM-type reform intended to enhance service delivery across the public service through establishment of performance targets and measures. The chapter is structured in four Sections. Following this introduction (Section 7.1), Section 7.2 broadly outlines implementation of PMS across the Botswana public service. In doing so the section describes the general implementation structure and strategies adopted to guide implementation. Next, the focus turns to specific implementation process in CTO (Section 7.2.2) and DPSM (Section 7.2.3). This will be followed in section 7.3 by a discussion of evaluation conducted on PMS across the public service, and in particular on CTO and DPSM. Finally, Section 7.4 provides a summary of this chapter.

### 7.2 Implementation of Performance Management System (PMS)

This section has two aims. First, it provides an overview of PMS implementation structure and strategy across the Botswana public service in general. This was a centralised process, broadly similar in all ministries and departments. Second, the section provides specific accounts of PMS implementation process in both CTO and DPSM.
7.2.1 General implementation framework

The implementation of PMS was expected to bring a profound shift in the way the public service operated by placing increased emphasis on management of performance through use of private sector management techniques such as performance agreements at both individual and organisational levels. This was supposed to supplant traditional management of performance, characterised by a more traditional rules-based approach dominant in the country’s bureaucracy. The underlying drive for this major shift, as shown in Chapter 2 and 5, was to raise efficiency and effectiveness levels in the public sector in line with the NPM philosophy (Mothusi, 2008; Dzimbiri, 2008; Mpabanga, 2005). Up until 1996, the perception amongst political and public sector leaders in Botswana was that many performance improvement initiatives, including WITs, failed to bring the desired change in public sector management. A variety of factors were blamed for the limited impact of such reform measures (see, for example, Hope, 1995, 1997: NDP 8). PMS was presented as an all-encompassing implementation framework to change the way government, through the public service, carried out its business. This point is captured in the PMS Philosophy Document:

‘Prior to PMS, all reform initiatives addressed problems and specific aspects of internal processes rather than providing a holistic view to addressing issues of service delivery and poor performance. Implementation of PMS was a turning point in the transformation of Botswana Public Service.’ (DPSM, 2002: 8)

As discussed in Chapter 5, there were very broad ambitions attached to PMS. PMS implementation was expected to restructure the way the country’s public service operated. Effectively, the initiative was presented as a formula to modernise the country’s public service primarily through strengthening of its implementation capacity. Emphasising this point, DPSM maintained that:
'We desperately need to “leap frog” and forge ahead, and the PMS has been identified as the appropriate system to facilitate this necessary transition.' (Republic of Botswana, 2002: 4, cited in Mothusi, 2008)

PMS was characterised by three distinctive features. First, the implementation of PMS was linked with the broader national policy goals. Second, unlike any previous reform effort, the implementation of PMS was pursued in a phased manner. Third, there were new stakeholders participating in the entire programme cycle, in particular consultants. These three features are discussed in detail below.

### 7.2.1.1 Link with National Goals

Government-wide implementation of PMS was formally embedded in the broader national development vision. According to the PMS Philosophy Document, a pre-condition for successful implementation for change of such magnitude was a need for an over-arching vision that would offer focus and direction on the reform effort. To that end, in August 1996 the Government developed Vision 2016 focussing on the nation’s long-term development efforts (see Chapter 5). Taken together, Vision 2016 and successive NDPs constituted the country’s ultimate macro-planning frameworks/instruments. Implementation of PMS was intended to offer systematic and sustainable approach towards realisation of the broader development efforts of the nation (Hacker & Washington, 2004; Nkhwa, 2002; Dzimbiri, 2008). Figure 7.1 below provides the framework guiding PMS implementation across the public service.
Within this framework, Vision 2016 sets the desired national development goals and objectives. In an effort to realise such long-term development goals, ministries and departments developed their own vision and mission statements. In the medium term, the efforts of ministries and departments were focused by the NDPs. Implementation of PMS as a strategic management tool was therefore meant to provide a link between efforts at both individual and organisational levels in the public service to the NDPs, in pursuit of the ultimate national development aspirations as prescribed in Vision 2016 document. This point is emphasised by Nkhwa (2004: 258):

‘The installation of PMS into the Public Service was anchored on the national vision and from that point of reference appropriate strategies were designed to facilitate realignment and refocusing of Public Service plans and operations towards the achievement of the Vision 2016 goals.’

The former Permanent Secretary to the President (PSP), Mr. Selepeng, reiterated this point:

‘Permanent Secretaries acknowledged this and resolved that no doubt ministry and departments’ vision and mission statements should
emanate from, or be connected to, the Vision 2016 and the NDPs.’ (Republic of Botswana, 2002)

In a similar vein, Hacker & Washington (2004: 53) concluded that, ‘PMS was introduced as a tool to help create the necessary processes, activities and results to move the Botswana Public Service toward 2016 Vision.’

In 1998 the Botswana public service developed its vision statement:

‘We, the Botswana Public Service, will provide a world class service that is efficient, effective, caring and responsive to local and global challenges.’ (DPSM, 2002: 3)

The vision statement emphasised the desire of the public service to be a modern and very competitive institution whose delivery standards were to be comparable to the best internationally. In pursuit of that end, it was to be guided by supportive values of care and responsiveness. Furthermore, the mission statement upheld a broader public service vision theme:

‘The Botswana Public Service exists to provide efficient and cost effective service for its customers and stakeholders through the formulation and management of Government policies. The Public Service will implement sustainable performance improvement programmes; provide essential services that are not otherwise accessible to the public; and create a sustainable and conducive environment for quality service delivery.’ (DPSM, 2002: 4)

Table 7.1 below provides a chronology of major events in the design, implementation and evaluation of PMS, which will help readers to understand how PMS was implemented and evaluated over more than a decade.
Moreover, PMS implementation was supposed to unfold through well-defined institutional arrangements, a hierarchy of structures that was largely consistent with the traditional, rational top-down accountability framework characteristic of the Botswana public service (as shown in Chapters 5 & 6). At the top of the hierarchy was the Economic Committee of Cabinet (ECC). This body comprised cabinet members under the chair of the State President. In addition, all permanent secretaries attended the ECC as respective leaders of their
ministries. The EEC provided overall coordination of PMS and Vision 2016 implementation (Nkhwa, 2002).

Besides the ECC, other higher bodies involved with PMS implementation included PIC-FORCE, MPIC, Reforms Unit, Reference Group for the Botswana Performance Improvement Project (RGBPIP) and the Vision 2016 Council. The Permanent Secretary to the President (PSP) assumed the primary responsibility of the entire project. An emphasis, however, was also placed on the role of permanent secretaries in driving this process in their respective ministries. To achieve this end, decentralisation efforts commenced in 1997 to transfer control over and accountability for resource allocation to ministerial levels through permanent secretaries. This move towards decentralisation was presented as a necessity for the institutionalisation of PMS. A report by AED consultants, anticipating the introduction of PMS, concluded:

‗...the first and most vital requirement of the ‗roll-out‘ of the PMS is to obtain final approval of its government-wide implementation from the President and Cabinet. In this respect, the proposal to Cabinet must include a decision on decentralisation of DPSM authorities as well, since the ministries require such delegation to implement the PMS.’ (1996: 4)

Despite these changes to existing structures of authority, however, government-wide implementation of PMS was characterised by further acts of centralisation. For example, the 1998 *Presidential Commission on Public Service Salaries and Conditions of Services* called for establishment of a new institution that would coordinate public sector reforms. This culminated later that year in the creation of the Public Service Reforms Unit (PSRU) within DPSM. PSRU was transferred away from DPSM to the Office of the President in 2004 (Marobela, 2008). In this way, the levers of control and influence available to both the political and administrative leadership were actually enhanced, strengthening the position of the centre against those of other peripheral ministries and departments. One respondent clearly captured this development:
‘...through decentralisation permanent secretaries were given a task of leading these ministries. They were given the authority to run their ministries the way they deemed fit. We have not seen that happening. Rather, we are still dependent on DPSM, especially regarding HRM issues. Permanent secretaries are still looking up to the OP [Office of the President] to give them direction as to how they should run their ministries, so it is really an unfortunate position.’ [Interview, 27]

Implementation of PMS therefore brought paradoxical changes to the accountability arrangement by delegating power to lower level structures but at the same time concentrating power in the more dominant Office of the President.

Although government-wide PMS implementation of PMS was pursued within a strong institutional framework, there were still challenges to overcome if successful implementation of the project was to materialise. In particular, the general implementation structure was seen as not well placed to effect positive results. This concern was expressed by IDM consultants (2005):

‘The existing institutional framework was originally created to facilitate the management of the WITS programme. However, with the introduction of the PMS as the overall public service reform strategy, the roles and authority of the institutional structure were widened to incorporate PMS. This in itself initially [in the period 1996-2000] created tension and confusion about the relationship between WITS and PMS in some quarters.’

This environment of confusion was compounded by an apparent lack of clarity amongst public servants in their understanding of the PMS. On the one hand, one respondent at the Public Sector Reforms Unit had this to say:

‘What do you mean by PMS? There is nothing of that nature... PMS is not a distinctive reform initiative as many people are mistakenly made to
believe. Rather, it is a comprehensive strategy that builds on existing reform initiatives, including WITs, to effect higher performance in the public service.’ [Interview, 15]

Another respondent from the same office (PSRU) agreed, maintaining that:

‘PMS is a tool primarily intended to provide support to all other reform initiatives. It cannot therefore be viewed as an independent initiative but a comprehensive management strategy that intends to focus and direct effort towards productivity gains in the public service.’ [Interview, 17]

These views suggest that, within the PSRU, PMS was not understood as an independent reform initiative distinct from others; rather, it was viewed as a holistic management strategy seeking to harmonise and focus different reform initiatives towards broader goals of improving efficiency and productivity across the public sector.

Other public officers, however, did not share this view. To them, PMS took a different meaning. The response that sums up the general understanding of PMS by those interviewed outside PSRU is:

‘PMS is an independent reform initiative and, therefore, separate from other reform initiatives. Although its aims are similar to those of other reform initiatives, it is a completely separate initiative from them, including WITs.’ [Interview, 6]

The view suggests that other public officers perceived PMS more as just another part of the reform effort, with similar goals but not specifically related to other reform initiatives. This lack of common understanding regarding PMS had implications for implementation of the system. The intended re-alignment of PMS with other reform measures was more difficult as a result of this lack of common understanding of PMS by public servants.
The sense of confusion was compounded by an apparent inability by a segment of the public service workforce to draw a clear link between PMS implementation and Vision 2016. The following view by one respondent is representative of the general feeling amongst those interviewed:

‘We have serious problems across the public service. In particular, majority of our employees cannot tell how PMS builds on and supports the national vision. Until they know the relationship between these two, we are unlikely to reach our national aspirations.’ [Interview, 13]

In sum, it was intended that PMS implementation be pursued within a strong vision. Guided by Vision 2016, ministries and department across government were expected to develop their specific sectoral goals and objectives, expressed through vision and mission statements. Linking the broader vision with specific ones at both ministry and departmental levels, however, proved a challenge. Importantly, the process proved complex and in turn suffered from lack of clarity both in terms of basic understanding and linkage of PMS implementation with Vision 2016.

### 7.2.1.2 Phased Implementation

Implementation of PMS was pursued in a context of a detailed plan, in contrast to earlier reform efforts. Due to the size and magnitude of the project, a decision was taken by the Reference Group for the Botswana Performance Improvement Project (RGBPIP) to implement the initiative in a phased manner, with emphasis placed on piloting the project before government-wide approval (Dzimbiri, 2008; Ernest & Young, 2002). Prior to introduction of PMS, piloting of projects/reform initiatives was not common in the Botswana public service, for instance, WITs implementation was not preceded by a pilot phase. The piloting of PMS was primarily intended to test its suitability and appreciate the readiness of ministries and departments in terms of their ability to implement the programme. Following approval of PMS, the RGBPIP directed the PMS Team,
which designed the system, to work with three identified pilot ministries beginning October 1996 for a period of six weeks.

The pilot scheme concentrated on developing strategic plans, annual performance plans and measurement systems. More specifically, the objectives of the pilot project were:

- ‘To promote continuous performance improvement by defining goals and objectives, creating annual performance plans (APPs), establishing key performance indicators and performance measures with specific improvement milestones to demonstrate incremental improvements.
- To create awareness and enablement among top officials of the pilot ministries in regard to the importance of performance management.
- To upgrade the knowledge and skills of a team of senior staff members in the pilot ministries who will be entrusted with spearheading the implementation of PMS in their ministries and assisting in the rollout plan to introduce the PMS to other ministries.
- To improve the service offered to customers.’ (Dzimbiri, 2008)

The piloting phase, however, suffered significant setbacks. First, the piloting did not go according to plan. Of the three ministries identified to pilot the initiative only two (namely, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Labour) managed to launch the programme in October 1996 as planned. The third, the Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications (MWTC), did not begin with the process until end of November 1996. The delay was a result of other pressing issues that required more immediate attention of the ministry. Consequently, MWTC’s overall involvement in this phase was minimal. Second, the initial six weeks period earmarked for piloting the project was deemed insufficient. Through the recommendations of the lead consultants at this phase of the project, AED (USA), the piloting period had to be extended. The piloting phase was eventually completed after eight months (Ernst & Young report, 2002; Hacker & Washington, 2004). Consequently, the Reference Group for the Botswana Performance Improvement Project (RGBPIP) which reviewed the pilot phase,
having satisfied itself about the result of the same, sought government approval for the roll-out of the programme to the rest of the ministries at the end of 1998.

A number of issues need to be highlighted about the piloting phase. First, the feedback from piloting ministries was largely encouraging, pointing to the usefulness of the PMS as a tool with potential to enhance productivity and efficiency in the public service. Second, there was recognition that PMS government-wide implementation would require more resources (i.e. manpower, training and time) if it was to succeed. In particular, there was recognition of a need to build capacity on the part of public service leadership to take a lead role in the implementation phase of the project (Ernest & Young, 2002; Dzimbiri, 2008).

Outsiders saw the piloting of the PMS as a valuable exercise that ensured that government-wide implementation was undertaken with benefit of the ‘lessons learnt’ and thus helped enhance prospects for government-wide success (Nkhwa, 2002; Ernst & Young report, 2002; Uneca expert group report, 2003). The evidence for this view is actually quite mixed, however, as we will see later in this Chapter.

Government-wide implementation of the scheme subsequently entailed four phases. In the initial phase, emphasis was placed on customising PMS to suit individual ministries. BNPC, as the lead consultants, worked in collaboration with ministries to define the best way to introduce the system. When the ministries completed the initial phase the focus moved to departmental levels. In this second phase, the primary concern was the formulation of departmental annual performance plans (APPs). This proved to be a challenging exercise for many departments. Phase three involved development of performance targets for individual employees. Crucially, the focus here was on defining the performance management process in terms of agreed strategic goals and objectives. Finally, phase four focused on the creation of evaluation and review structures at both ministerial and departmental levels (Dzimbiri, 2008). The
implementation phases of the project in two departments will be considered in more detail in section 7.2.2 and 7.2.3, respectively.

7.2.1.3 The Roles of New Stakeholders

Implementation of PMS involved many external stakeholders. The most significant were the private consultants who were engaged to assist in implementing the PMS scheme. Although reform initiatives implemented prior to PMS (including WITs) involved some private consultants or ‘technical expects’, their role in PMS was much deeper and more extensive. In particular, their role expanded from that of advisors to become key players in the entire project life cycle; that is, from PMS inception through the evaluation phase. This was in line with developments elsewhere, in both developed and developing countries, whereby the contracting of consultants grew steadily from the 1990s. To Nixon & Nixon (2007), this was partly due to what they described as a ‘philosophy that encourages outsourcing almost everything that government does’ (cited from Fyson, 2009: 316). Botswana public sector reforms and, particularly PMS, was part of this trend. This point is emphasised by one respondent:

‘With PMS, we have seen an increase in the number of consultancies engaged in government. What has particularly been of surprise to us has been the increased reliance on the use of consultants to implement PMS. Although that is the reality now, we are worried that these consultants, particularly foreign ones, might not be well versed with the issues specific to the local context to effectively make any impact in reforming the public service’ [Interview, 14]

Another respondent, this time paying particular attention to local consultants, had this to say:

‘It is true...we have seen consultants at the forefront of PMS implementation. Although we have a growing number coming from outside the country [with insufficient knowledge of how our public service
function], we have equally witnessed an increase of locals engaged to
guide the project implementation. These people [local consultants] might
have a better knowledge of our system but they are not adequately
trained to be driving PMS. We know about this situation because these
local consultants are often former civil servants that we worked with. All
they are interested in is making money rather than offering beneficial
services to government.' [Interview, 18]

It was intended that the private consultants were brought into Botswana public
service primarily for their technical knowledge and managerial skills. To that
end, teams of foreign consultants from organisations including, AED (USA),
Flaman Management Partners (FMP) of Canada and The Performance Centre
for leadership and motivational training (USA), consultants from local
institutions such as the Botswana National Productivity Centre, or BNPC, were
brought in to assist with PMS implementation process across the public service
(IDM, 2006). The Government, through DPSM, first engaged BNPC in June
1999 to take charge of PMS implementation at the central government level,
with a mandate to run for five years, ending in March 2004. Its role was further
expanded to include various organisations at local government level in the mid
2000s. BNPC acted as the lead consultant in the installation phase of the
project despite its lack of capacity in projects of such magnitude. To
complement BNPC’s work, significant numbers of local and foreign consultants
were subsequently engaged to facilitate PMS implementation (BNPC, 2000;
IDM, 2006; Dzimbiri, 2008).

These bodies were also involved in developing the capacity and capability of
public sector managers. Government prioritised training of key personnel and
the consultants were at the forefront of offering such a service. At the inception
of the programme, AED consultants offered BNPC staff training during the
piloting phase, in order to equip them with necessary knowledge and skills to
ensure continuity once AED consultants left. In addition, as early as October
1999, AED consultants conducted training of senior managers to foster
understanding of the Vision 2016 and how PMS could be used to implement it
(Hacker and Washington, 2004). Training on PMS was also offered externally, particularly in Anglo-Saxon countries. Henderson & Hacker (2002) claim that by the end of 1999, well over 150 leaders in every ministry, including Performance Improvement Coordinators (PIC), had travelled to the US to attend focused leadership programs. Many more were sent for training in New Zealand and fellow member countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region.

In this way, the implementation of PMS was essentially a consultant-led process, and their contribution was generally welcomed as valuable. There were, however, also some problems. This point is captured clearly by another consultancy firm, IDM Consortium, in its evaluation report of the scheme. Regarding the key role played by BNPC in the implementation of the project, they submitted that, ‘it was a case of the blind leading the blind.’ The report, going further, had this to say about BNPC:

‘...the majority [of respondents] found that the BNPC consultants could not deliver and lacked consistency in the definition and application of the key terms, consulting staff lacked experience and the overall quality of the training was poor. Thus, the installation was a learning process for both BNPC.’ (IDM, 2006: 9)

The report also pointed to a growing displeasure with the pronounced role played by consultants:

‘...the situation caused confusion and some disquiet among the ministries and a number of consultants had to be changed midstream.’ (IDM, 2005: 72)

In addition, the financial cost of reliance on consultants for project implementation was another source of major concern. This proved to be the case despite Government choosing BNPC to act as the lead consultant because it was cheaper rather than opting for foreign consultants with more
experience in bigger organisational transformations. According to IDM (2005), the emphasis on BNPC was intended to minimise the costs but, at the same time, making allowance for skill transfer through the use of foreign consultants. Unfortunately, as confirmed by most respondents a lot of financial resources were expended over the course of project and also little skill transfer was achieved.

7.2.2 Implementation of PMS in CTO

Implementation of PMS in CTO, as in other government ministries and departments, began in 1999. This followed approval for mandatory government-wide implementation of the system by the state president and cabinet. EAD (1996: 3) report sums up the way PMS implementation evolved across government:

‘...no ministry can act to install the whole PMS system without full government approval, and indeed encouragement and support. Without clear approval from the Office of the President, ministries would not feel free to act unilaterally.’

As pointed out in the above quotation, the decision to implement PMS in the department was, in this sense, not contingent on the ambitions of the department leaders or its capacity to undertake a project of such magnitude; rather, its implementation was primarily driven by a desire to fulfil the demands of the senior bureaucrats and their political superiors. CTO, in this way, was a recipient of public sector management reform with little or no input by its leadership regarding how and when it was to be applied in the department. Consequently, compliance best describes the approach of implementing PMS across the department. The implementation of PMS was, as a result, pursued within established structures and strategies that were similar to those in other peripheral /functional ministries and departments.
Consistent with this arrangement, the driving force behind PMS implementation in CTO was the general manager together with members of the departmental management team. Being the ultimate authority in the department, the general manager was accountable to the Permanent Secretary of the parent ministry regarding implementation of the system in the department. Like all directors of individual departments under the Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications (MWTC), the CTO general manager participated in the pilot phase of the project in 1996 by virtue of being a member of the ministry’s Implementation Task Force (ITF). The piloting of the scheme, however, was not undertaken in CTO. All members of the ITF received 1 ½ day training in 1996 to enhance their capacity to effectively take charge of project implementation at their respective departments (AED, 1996).

The implementation process within the department commenced with various capacity building sessions exclusively mounted for top management. For instance, numerous preparatory workshops and meetings were held under the direction of the general manager. At this stage of the project these in-house sessions relied very little on outside bodies such as the ministry performance improvement coordinator (MPIC) or BNPC for help. The preparatory sessions focused on raising understanding amongst the senior management team with various elements of PMS such as developing annual performance plans, setting goals and objectives, developing key performance indicators, and developing vision and mission statements, to mention a few. One respondent who participated in those sessions vividly remembered them in the following manner:

‘...they were like academic sessions. We were lost most of the time. A lot of effort, for example, was expended just to draw the departmental vision and mission statements. Reaching that end involved drawing up numerous vision/mission statements, which were continually changed at each session. It appeared like a never ending exercise that I wouldn’t want to see myself ever repeating.’ [Interview, 10]
Later, towards the end of 1999, senior departmental management made a decision to gradually rollout the system to all parts of the organisation. To facilitate that move, workshop managers - in charge of out-stations across the country - were brought to the forefront of the process. In a similar way to members of the senior management team, workshop managers attended a series of workshop sessions to introduce them to PMS philosophy. These sessions were run by external and local consultants. Respondents interviewed [some who at that time worked as workshop managers] confirmed that the sessions were no different to those mounted for the senior management team – they were at best short of practical significance. They found the sessions quite demanding and unhelpful in enhancing their understanding of PMS because of their emphasis on ‘theory’ [Interviews 4 & 8].

With both the senior management team and workshop managers exposed to PMS, attention turned in the early part of 2000 towards building implementation capacity at lower levels of the organisation. Of particular significance, the Departmental Productivity Improvement Coordinator (DPIC) was appointed at the department’s Headquarters in Gaborone. The responsibility of the DPIC was primarily to provide coordination for the entire project implementation across the department. Simultaneously, each workshop manager was mandated to appoint an individual at their respective stations to help on a day-to-day basis towards successful implementation of the scheme at their respective workstations.

By the middle of 2000, all employees were expected to become involved in the actual implementation process. However, contrary to experience with senior management, little was done to build capacity amongst this group. For example, training was almost non-existent for them. At best the training they received exposing them to the scheme was limited to staff addresses conducted by the general manager or other members of the management team as they visited the various stations around the country [Interview 4, 9 & 11]. At this point much attention was placed on development of basic aspects of the scheme, such as key performance indicators and annual performance targets.
Although structures were put in place to guide department-wide PMS implementation, there were challenges encountered which were not envisaged at the time of planning. Among those challenges was growing concern that implementation of the system was rushed and forced. The following views were typical:

‘If you are not PMS compliant, you will be fired.’ [Interview, 2]

‘Everything was just done in a hurry without much consideration placed on the departmental implementation capacity. All we were told was that the Permanent Secretary to the president needed the project implemented within set timeframes.’ [Interview 6]

‘As members of the management team, I would say we were expected to learn as we went along. We were inadequately prepared to provide direction for PMS implementation.’ [Interview, 15]

The foregoing responses suggest that across the department PMS was used to threaten officers to comply rather than embrace it for the betterment of the organisation especially at the formative stages of the scheme. This was also found to be a case in other government ministries (see, for example, Mothusi, 2008). Furthermore, the responses suggest that the departmental capacity was insufficient to successfully implement a project of such magnitude. The leadership was not adequately prepared (i.e. sufficiently trained and resourced) to effectively take charge of a project. The lower level organisational members were similarly unprepared because the process was introduced hurriedly without proper planning and consideration of the implications regarding the same.

An even more significant problem was that the departmental performance improvement coordinator (DPIC) was not appointed early into the implementation phase. The non-availability of such a significant officer in the
project was not only an isolated issue for CTO. Rather, this was a common problem across government. Part of the explanation for this problem was manpower budget restrictions, which meant that many departments were unable to create DPIC positions in their organisational structures. Resultantly, the burden of project implementation fell directly on ministerial performance improvement coordinators (MPIC). Lamenting such a state of affairs, IDM (2006) consultancy concluded:

‘The result is that much of the expertise and the management of the PMS roll out fell on the PICs which often came down to one officer carrying the burden for Ministries ranging in size from the Industrial Court with only 30 employees to the Ministry of Health’s 6110, not counting industrial workers. The PMS implementation process therefore suffers from severe capacity constraints. Nonetheless the PICs were called upon to roll it out to ministries, departments and districts.’

Compounding this problem, the DPIC position in CTO was given to a non-permanent staffer when it was filled in early 2000. The incumbent remained in the post for further two years until a permanent officer finally filled the position. This move failed to address the administrative capacity concerns. To most respondents, the DPIC was perceived to be lacking specialist skills and qualities for such a position. The following response captured this widely shared opinion:

‘...because these are change initiatives - somebody has to really have the energies, the interest and the passion to ensure that change is facilitated. [But]...the criterion that was used to appoint them was a matter of just picking and, in most instances, the people that were picked were the ones that were not wanted in their operational divisions. So, a lot of money was invested in training them but when they came back it was just business as usual.’ [Interview, 12]
The lack of expert leadership contributed to strong resistance from many employees. According to one respondent:

'I will attribute the resistance to the way it was done. At its inception we did not try and seek their buy-in. As a result, it was like the reforms were imposed on them. That it was imposed and the fact that employees were not shown the good in PMS explains why they probably resisted its implementation.' [Interview, 5]

This resistance amongst employees was further exacerbated by failure on the part of reformers to introduce other aspects of the scheme. Specifically, the performance-based reward system (PBRS), originally considered an integral part of PMS and intended to reward employees on the basis of their performance, was not implemented. The proposed reward system was to give to deserving officers’ promotions and praise, among other rewards. All those interviewed in CTO agreed that the PBRS scheme, if it has existed in some form, was non-existent in CTO by 2008.

7.2.3 Implementation of PMS in DPSM

Implementation of PMS at DPSM began in 1999, as was the case in other departments at central government level. Although the department was mandated to provide leadership in public sector management, its role in leading reform initiatives across the public service started to attract criticism as early as 1996 (AED, 1996). This culminated in transfer of some responsibilities for initiating and managing public sector reforms away from DPSM to the Office of the President primarily “to lend ‘gravitas’ to PMS and accelerate its implementation” (IDM, 2005: IX). In this way, the department was to be partially freed from assuming overall accountability for government-wide implementation of the initiative, in contrast to experiences with other reform efforts introduced before PMS. The proposed institutional change was therefore intended to ensure that DPSM, like all other ministries and departments, focused its
attention on department-wide implementation of PMS and thereby facilitated a new arrangement in public management in the country.

Despite the proposed move, DPSM continued until 2004 as the focus of public sector reforms – at least administrative ones. This meant that the department, together with BNPC, played a significant role in government-wide implementation of the scheme as projects managers. For instance, although the Permanent Secretary to the President (PSP) was the chief sponsor of the scheme with overall responsibility for its successful implementation, in practise the responsibility was delegated to its Director (Ernst & Young, 2002). As was earlier indicated, government-wide implementation of PMS was preceded by a piloting exercise in selected ministries and departments. Despite DPSM’s role as project leader, the department was not included in the pilot phase. This omission did not go down well with observers In particular, Ernest & Young consultants could not explain DPSM’s lack of involvement in the pilot phase:

‘One surprise for us was that DPSM was not chosen as a pilot Ministry. As project managers of the PMS implementation and rollout they would clearly have benefited if they have been early participants. This would have assisted their credibility with other Ministries. We did not establish the reason that DPSM was not included in the pilot.’ (Ernest & Young, 2002: 17)

Effectively, this lack of participation in the pilot phase by the department meant that department-wide implementation of the project was undertaken without the much needed ‘lessons’ that could have been gained had the department participated in the piloting of the project.

Despite the lack of participation in the pilot, implementation of PMS within DPSM was pursued within an environment characterised, at least on paper, by strong institutional capacity at senior levels. The departmental leadership - under the guidance of its Director - assumed primary responsibility for successful implementation of the scheme. The composition of this group
included officials with vast experience in implementation of reforms across the public service. These officers, for example, participated in various committees that oversaw government-wide implementation of the PMS project. The Deputy Director and Senior Assistant Director were members of the The Technical Committee [also in charge of design, development, planning and implementation of PMS policies and strategies]. Other departmental senior managers were included in various steering committees, including the PIC-FORCE and the Reference Committee. In this way, the department therefore had a very strong managerial team with exposure to implementation of reforms initiatives within the public service.

The departmental performance improvement coordinator (DPIC) was also appointed early in the project to provide day-to-day coordination across all the divisions within the department. In addition, all divisional heads were advised to appoint individuals under their supervision to liaise with the DPIC to facilitate project implementation in their respective jurisdictions. The following views were typical:

‘We ensured that all the key positions that were necessary to guide PMS implementation across the department were filled very early in the project. More importantly, we were more interested in appointing people with necessary skills and knowledge to facilitate successful implementation of the project.’ [Interview, 17]

‘Almost all our senior management team members were able to go for training on PMS. Some were taken to external training centres particularly in New Zealand and America. Our PIC also underwent the same training outside the country. I mean...we did an excellent job in terms of training our personnel to equip them with necessary skills towards implementation of the project in our department.’ [Interview, 22]

These views suggest that the department - as project managers - largely benefited by virtue of being at the centre of PMS implementation. Certainly, in
contrast to senior managers from other Ministries/Departments within the BPS (including those at CTO), a high proportion of DPSM senior staff were provided with overseas training. This was at least in part the result of DPSM access to resources not available to other departments. More specifically, the department enjoyed sufficient resourcing which allowed it to build sufficient institutional capacity to enhance successful implementation of the project within the department. Presumably, an argument was also made that the better DPSM staff understood PMS, the more effective they would be in supporting their colleagues elsewhere in the BPS.

Having secured implementation capacity at senior levels, the focus of departmental leadership turned to other members of staff at lower levels of the organisations in the beginning of 2000. The plan was to ensure that officers were introduced to PMS through staff meetings, workshops and other capacity building forums. Divisional meetings were regularly held to assist junior officers with development of strategic objectives and annual performance plans, among many others. Experts from outside the department were brought in to help institutionalise implementation of the scheme through targeted training on aspects of PMS. The department’s reform unit played a key role in ensuring that sufficient ground was covered to effect department-wide understanding and support for PMS. Admittedly, there was a perception among those interviewed that a lot of effort was expended on raising level of understanding amongst staff on the need for change across the department through PMS. As one responded put it:

‘I think our staff members were appreciative of PMS as it promised less workload for them. They really understood the need for change. The burning platform was there for them to see and, as such, they were very much receptive to implementation of the scheme.’  [Interview, 15]

This view suggests that senior management managed to create awareness amongst organisational members on the need for change. [It also points to an adoption by the same senior staff of the ‘language’ of change so favoured of
consultants i.e. ‘burning platform’. They therefore succeeded in providing need for PMS as a way of effecting the much needed transformation to improve on the performance of the department. Consequently, staff members especially the P&P group provided much needed support towards implementation of the scheme. The support from the P&Ps was explained by various factors, but two in particular was raised by most respondents. First, PMS was seen as a potentially better instrument of performance assessment than the existing annual appraisal system. One respondent had this to say about the annual appraisal system:

‘With the old appraising system we experienced many challenges. Our employees questioned its usefulness. They saw it as lacking objectivity leading to non deserving officers being promoted.’ [Interview, 16]

In this view, PMS received wide support among the P&P officers partly because it was seen by these officers as a potentially objective assessment instrument that could help promote merit-based appointments within the department.

Second, the wide support for PMS received from the P&P employees was a result of the nature of work arrangement undertaken by these officers. As was indicated in Chapter 3, DPSM staff claimed that the nature of work they performed was better suited to individual work arrangements. Here, officers were predominantly university-educated and/or professionals who placed a high value on objectivity in assessment of individual performance. Implementation of PMS was therefore strongly supported by this particular group. The following response summed up the general view of those interviewed regarding implementation of the scheme:

‘The scheme enjoyed strong support across the department. In particular, the P&Ps provided the much-needed support for successful implementation of the scheme. PMS, to P&Ps, I will say was an important instrument aimed at enhancing individual performance levels.’ [Interview, 19]
Although implementation of the system was done relatively smoothly, there were still concerns regarding certain issues. First, much of the effort in building departmental capacity focused on senior management at the expense of other employees. For example, all the respondents complained that industrial class employees were excluded from capacity building workshops. Instead to them, much emphasis was placed on the department’s leadership and, as a result, the cascading of PMS to lower level employees across the department was significantly compromised. The following view summed up the general view by those interviewed:

‘PMS is well understood at the top. I mean…it is well understood and supported by all our managers. Unfortunately, that is not the case with our industrial class employees. They were not sufficiently exposed to PMS philosophy. As a result, I would say we failed to do a good job building capacity amongst them. This has impacted negatively on our efforts to cascade the programme across the whole department’ [Interview, 18].

Second, in light of the insufficient understanding of the programme, there was a general lack of support or interest in PMS activities particularly at the lower organisational levels, especially amongst the industrial class employees. The following views were typical:

‘Yes, we encountered resistance...senior staff officers were also not supportive of PMS but the major problem was with our employees occupying lower level positions. But I think the situation is now improving. They see that PMS is here to stay’ [Interview, 24].

‘Our industrial class employees resisted PMS. In a general sense, they perceived the scheme as meant for their P&P counterparts. As a result, they were reluctant to embrace the scheme and, in turn, opted to stay away from PMS activities.’ [Interview, 22]
This view suggests that the industrial class employees were not enthusiastic about introduction of the scheme. What one managerial (P&P) staff member interprets as ‘improvement’ may simply, of course, be resignation to the situation in which they find themselves. Moreover, it seems clear that the industrial class either did not understand the scheme; or perhaps did understand it, but chose to see it as less favourable than its predecessor (WITs); or even designed to favour the P&P class at their expense. Also, given the lower proportion of industrial class workers to P&P workers in DPSM, compared to other departments, their participation may have been seen by managers as less important to success. Whatever the reason, the industrial class officers failed to “buy into” the scheme. Consequently, implementation of the scheme failed to attract support of crucial constituents for the success of the same within the department, despite the vaunted “institutional capacity” of DPSM.

Third, there was concern about complexity and cumbersomeness of the scheme. In particular, the quarterly assessment format adopted following implementation of PMS - which replaced the annual appraisal system - was perceived by majority of the industrial class group as a difficult process for them to easily comprehend. They were, for example, reportedly finding it very difficult to set performance targets [Interviews, 16 of the 18]. In the absence of detailed set performance targets it was not easy for supervisors to monitor if indeed officers had delivered on their promises. This seems to be more evidence that DPSM senior managers saw successful implementation of PMS for their industrial class employees as a relatively low priority, given the importance of objective measures for the successful implementation of PMS.

7.2.4 Summary

This section considered implementation of PMS in both CTO and DPSM. Notably, crucial structures were put in place to guide successful implementation of the scheme in the study organisations and the public service in general. In
addition, institutional capacity was developed at various levels of the both organisations. Despite, the strong institutional capacity implementation of the scheme also faced various challenges. Resistance on the part of the industrial class group marked implementation of PMS in the two study organisations.

### 7.3 Evaluation of PMS

This section explores and evaluates the consequences of PMS in the Botswana public service. Before assessing the evidence about impacts, however, it is important to highlight the complexity of the task at hand. First, assessing results for any reform initiative is by no means a straightforward exercise. Specifically, as detailed in Chapter 2, assessment of NPM-type of reforms has proved a challenge for both academics and practitioners (Wollmann, 2003; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2002, 2003; Jones & Kettl, 2003). Second, the exercise becomes even more difficult in developing countries where monitoring and evaluation of these reforms is hardly ever done – or introduction of such is still in its infancy in these countries (Shah, 1998; Kusek, Rist & White 2005).

In the case of PMS in the Botswana public service, the picture was not any different. Only three evaluation exercises have been undertaken since its inception (Ernest & Young, 2002; IDM, 2006; DCDM, 2005). Briefly, Ernest & Young consultants embarked on mid-term evaluation of PMS project. This evaluation focused on pilot phase, proposed rollout and, consolidation and reporting aspects of the PMS project. Although the evaluation was more encompassing, in terms of scope and coverage (ministries and departments), it only reviewed the project from its inception until 2002. To that end, it did not provide a picture of the full implementation of the scheme. The report concluded, as of 2002, that the scheme was largely successful. In particular, the report highlighted improvements in processes across the public service (Ernest & Young, 2002).

Second, IDM consortium reviewed PMS implementation in the public service. The focus of the review was on evaluating the relevance, efficiency and
effectiveness of the scheme. In doing that, it paid attention to the three phases of PMS – design, installation and implementation. All ministries and departments were covered. The report concluded that there were both benefits and negatives as a result of implementing the scheme. On a more positive note, they underscored the level of commitment to PMS philosophy at all levels of the public service, among the many benefits mentioned. However, among other negatives, they found that the scheme failed to integrate other government policies and processes within its framework (IDM, 2006).

Third, a DCDM Solutions survey evaluated customer satisfaction across the entire public service. One of the expected outcomes of implementing PMS was improved quality of services provided to the public. The objectives of the survey were threefold: first, determining the level of customer satisfaction with different aspects of service provided by various ministries and departments; second, soliciting customer’s suggestions for improvement in each service area; and third, recommend quality-improvement strategies required to better serve the customers in the public service (DCDM Solutions, 2005: 1). Of the two case study organisations for this thesis, only DPSM was included in the survey, while CTO was left out. The survey showed a very low level of satisfaction of 25% among customers with the public service. Specifically for DPSM, the picture was also not encouraging at 31%. Overall, the report concluded that public service satisfaction score was extremely low by any measure in light of the normative performance benchmark score of 75% internationally (DCDM, 2005).

Taken together, all three reports proved useful in the endeavour to assess PMS across the public service. Unfortunately, the reports had their own limitations. For instance, they were broad in scope and, as a result, failed to get deeper insights of the evaluation in ministries or departments. Second, some the evaluations were undertaken early in the project to offer any detailed account of progress to date (i.e. 2008).

On the scholarly front, the picture was not any different. The few studies that evaluated PMS included: (1) Sebusang and Moeti’s (2005) article examined
customer satisfaction towards the Botswana public service (ten departments and five public enterprises were chosen for the study). The results of their survey confirmed that the scheme had failed to improve customer service; (2) Mpabanga’s PhD dissertation sought to understand the way Department of Administration of Justice adopted and implemented PMS. She concluded that much work was needed to enhance chances of success for the scheme in the said department (Mpabanga, 2005); and, (3) Mothusi’s PhD dissertation investigated PMS and organisational culture at various departments at both central and local government levels, namely; Department of Local Government Service Management (DLGSM) and Department of Local Government Development Planning (DLGDP) both under the auspices of Ministry of Local Government (MLG) and, Department of Lands (DoL) and Department of Housing (DoH) both under the Ministry of Lands and Housing (MLH). His conclusions were mixed. He found evidence that the scheme did help inculcate a new culture in the public service. Equally, he cautioned of emergence of resistance especially amongst the rank-and-file employees who were largely sidelined in PMS activities. To this group, he found evidence that suggests continuation of old ways of doing things within all the departments under investigation (Mothusi, 2008). Evidently, there has been limited scholarly work on evaluation of PMS in the Botswana public service and, particularly, at CTO and DPSM.

Last, a review of how public-sector leaders (i.e. bureaucrats and politicians) evaluated the scheme also exists. As was the case with NPM-type reforms in other countries – developed or developing - there was much rhetoric about PMS results from the public-sector leaders. For instance, senior bureaucrats presented the results of PMS in the Botswana public service as largely positive. This information was mostly shared in settings outside the country [i.e. international conferences and workshops, see for example, Nkhwa, 2000, Moleboge, 2003].

As for their political counterparts there was also consistent ‘talk’ that PMS was achieving its objectives. Perhaps, as Pollitt & Bouckaert (2000: 97), cautioned
'the political price of saying anything less would have been considerable.’ This ‘talk’, however, was not very much pronounced because of the nature of political competition in the country that hardly featured any discussion on aspects of public service reforms. Notwithstanding that, however, accounts of politicians assessing impact of PMS featured in key forums such as the Presidential State of the Nation addresses [2005, 2006 & 2007], NDP 9 and Budget speeches [also see, 2005, 2006 and 2007]. In his State of the Nation address in 2005, the then President Mogae stated:

‘As regards public sector reforms, Mr Speaker, the Performance Management System (PMS) continues to be a driver of change and performance improvement. I have indicated on a number of occasions that the PMS in particular has facilitated the introduction and institutionalization of useful tools to enhance performance planning and delivery in the Public Service.’

Going further, he specified progress on specific aspects of service delivery:

‘I am pleased to report that there has been a measurable improvement in the service delivery of some Ministries as a result of their embrace of the PMS process. The registration of companies now takes on average 11 days, while the issuance of title deeds in the urban centres is 6 days. While I am concerned about continued instances of late payment on the part of Central Government to suppliers, I am pleased to note that most departments have achieved a 14 day turn around.’

In light of limited discussions by both practitioners and scholars on evaluation of PMS across the public service and, specifically in the context of this thesis’ case study organisations, the following discussion will heavily rely on interview data to assess results of the scheme in CTO and DPSM in section 7.3.1 and 7.3.2, respectively.
7.3.1 Evaluation of PMS in CTO

As discussed in Chapter 6, the argument for implementing PMS was to enhance productivity and performance across the Botswana public service. In the specific case of CTO, the underlying drive for implementing such a reform measure was to facilitate better provision of transport services to user-departments as expressed though the departmental vision and mission statement. Admittedly, without revisiting the reform intentions it is difficult to better assess the impact of the initiative across the department. Overall, the results of PMS were considered by the interviewees to be mixed, that is, both beneficial and negative effects were observed.

On a positive note, there was a general perception amongst respondents that implementation of PMS continued the transformation of the department (begun with WITs) from an inwardly-looking organisation to a more outward-looking one. The following views were typical among respondents:

‘Through PMS reform we have come to realise that there are duties which are not relevant to our organisation, for instance, fuelling of vehicles, issuing of industrial gases. Even now we are even thinking of giving away the pool activities so that CTO remains with maintaining vehicles only. PMS has helped us identify the core business of the organisation.’ [Interview, 3]

Another respondent [also from the mechanical division] had this to say:

‘There is an element of ownership. We are getting improvements because now we see national projects being completed; it used to be accusations amongst departments for projects failure. For instance a department will claim in the past that they didn’t finish a project because CTO didn’t avail vehicles. The police will say they cannot curb crime because all our vehicles are at CTO. This has since changed because of PMS.’ [Interview, 9]
Another respondent from the administrative services division expressed similar sentiments:

‘Now our services are customer-focused and the benefit is that people are getting better services. We used to dominate in the news for the wrong reasons, but since PMS we are receiving good reviews for service provision.’ [Interview, 6]

These views strongly suggest that the department experienced positive transformative change following implementation of PMS. Notably, the department was perceived as more customer-oriented, faster, and more effective in pursuit of its mandate by those interviewed. These views suggest that implementation of PMS therefore helped transform the department into a more responsive entity with quicker turn-around times for repairs of vehicles, among many other success measures identified. This perceived success does confirm that PMS did achieve ‘process improvement’ and thus helped institutionalise new working arrangements across the department. For instance, as another respondent observed:

‘There is an emphasis now on process mapping. This is done mainly to determine if structures and process in place are supportive of engendering a high performance organisation.’ [Interview, 7]

There was also agreement amongst respondents that the reform initiative contributed to a new culture of working in the department. For example, PMS helped employees plan their work better and, in turn, manage their time and other resources more effectively. The following views were typical:

‘We are now beginning to see a change in attitudes whereby people now know… I think the fact that we have objectives that direct our operations we are now beginning to see people understanding the mandate of their
different units and departments. This has brought positive changes to attitudes of many in our department.’ [Interview, 8]

‘...PMS, yes it has borne fruits. We are now more directed because we now have objectives. For instance, in my division setting objectives have given us direction. Before PMS we were just working haphazardly in an environment where you didn’t quite know what to expect at the end of the day. But we now have our eyes set on common objectives. Again, the regular reporting format has really put us under pressure to ensure that you really deliver on what you set out to achieve.’ [Interview, 2]

These views suggest that PMS encouraged a systematic way of doing things. The old culture meant that employees would work without following any plan (i.e. in a fragmented fashion). PMS advanced values such as transparency, accountability and fairness in the workplace. In this new environment employees were therefore able to focus their effort towards meeting departmental goals.

Despite the apparent benefits of implementing PMS, the department also endured more negative effects. These unintended outcomes manifested in many ways. One example was that implementation of PMS inadvertently helped establish a culture of insecurity across the public service, including in CTO. The fear amongst employees followed direct intervention by senior bureaucrats and their political counterparts pronouncing publicly (i.e. in the media and other forums) that non-performers risked losing their jobs following implementation of PMS. Indeed, a growing number of officers (including those occupying high positions in the public service, such as permanent secretaries) were dismissed or forcefully retired on grounds of non-performance. Consequently, the firing of senior bureaucrats also gave rise to anxiety among the rank-and-file officers. The following statements attested to this development:

‘...people are not doing that out of their own will...people are afraid because the current President and Permanent Secretary to the President
PSP have said that if you don’t perform I throw you out…but now people are performing out of fear but as you may know if you have such leadership style it does not work….they are usually short term gains but they are not sustainable.’ [Interview, 2]

‘This PMS thing was just another ploy to downsize the public service. No one is sure about his job nowadays. This is not good…I mean we live in fear. The working environment has changed for worse’ [Interview, 4]

These views confirm the growing perception amongst employees that implementation of PMS within the department was more than just an objective management tool. The employees perceived it negatively as a substantially politicised public management initiative, which gave rise to increased involvement of politicians in management of the public service especially where hiring and firing, was concerned, particularly of public managers. With their managerial counterparts losing their jobs, perhaps the rank-and-file employees were reasonable to suspect that PMS was a disguised instrument meant to purge the public service. In this sense, implementation of PMS was associated with loss of employment and retrenchment by departmental staff members.

Second, the implementation of PMS in the department was considered by some to have failed to deliver intended institutional changes, such as devolving power to the lower levels structures in the department. For instance, respondents argued that the initiative failed to give departmental managers the discretionary powers to add value to public services. The promised shift in control for managers [i.e. ‘letting the managers manage’] therefore did not materialise. What emerged was, according to some respondents, a move towards further formalisation and bureaucratisation. One respondent summarised this view:

‘We have now resorted to quarterly appraising of our staff. Although this is good, I find it strenuous. More than that, I find it more an instrument of control because we are now more concerned with whether employees conform to established targets. In the mean time we are also under
constant scrutiny from our bosses. Everything now appears to be overly regulated.’ [Interview, 3]

Third, implementation of PMS also gave rise to a decline in teamwork among departmental employees (in direct contrast to WITs). The diminished team spirit was a result of emphasis placed on stringent system of assessment, through personal development plans and quarterly performance reviews, among others. According to 8 of the 14 respondents, these individualised performance measures exacerbated problems of employee collaboration in the pursuit of organisational goals. To them, individuals were more concerned about immediate performance outputs and, therefore, failed to see the need for collaboration, which would have been more beneficial to the organisation in the long run. The need for teamwork for CTO to achieve its objectives was quite high, since the nature of the work was particularly suited to a team-based-working arrangement, requiring collaboration and sharing of skills and resources

Fourth, there was a strong perception among those interviewed that assessment criteria used in assessing individuals were subjective. For example, many reported that they have heard about undeserving officers being awarded high marks, while their high performing counterparts were scored low. Accordingly, this gave rise to a host of problems such as cynicism, decline of morale, and in some instances outright refusals by some to participate in these performance reviews. Unfortunately, PMS helped to intensify a sense of indifference amongst many employees, particularly amongst the departmental rank-and-file.

Fifth, respondents argued that implementation of PMS stifled innovation/creativity across the department. Stringent accountability arrangements were said to exacerbate risk-averse behaviour amongst employees. Within the new system, employees and their supervisors reviewed progress towards performance targets on quarterly basis as opposed to the annual reviews, which were used prior to introduction of PMS. In this context,
the supervisor's primary concern was ensuring that there is conformity to what was contractually agreed between them and their subordinates. The result was that many employees opted to go 'by the book', with little or no incentive to go beyond what was contractually specified in the performance agreements. The following view was representative of the feeling amongst those interviewed:

‘...people are now preoccupied with complying with and meeting performance targets. I mean no one is taking chances to try anything new in his/her job. There is little room to try anything that is not specified in the agreement to advance the organisational mission.’ [Interview, 11]

In this way, emphasis placed on the use of measures and targets unfortunately exacerbated inflexibility in the workplace. The use of this predominantly rational management instruments therefore helped displace willingness to think creatively and also the ability to exercise good judgement by employees in pursuit of complex organisational ends. Even managers were discouraged by excessive reliance on performance measurement from innovating in their respective jurisdictions. The importance of creativity for organisational effectiveness should not be overlooked.

Finally, consultation was reportedly subverted following implementation of PMS. There was agreement amongst those interviewed that PMS resulted in a heightened sense of mistrust between management and rank-and-file employees. This 'polluted environment' [Interview, 6] brought about a decline in workplace consultation, particularly on pertinent issues such as personnel related matters. Emphasising this point, one respondent maintained that:

'We have seen people sent out on transfers. Others have been retired forcefully. In all these instances, people are no longer consulted before such actions are taken. Even when they are fired they are no longer offered sufficient legal protection to challenge management decisions. We no longer have any say... We are no longer important in this department.' [Interview, 12]
Significantly, these views suggest that trust was at historical lows across the department following implementation of PMS. The departmental staff members, especially those at lower organisational levels, were finding it difficult to have confidence on their managerial counterparts. It appeared that the rank-and-file employees suspected that management was not taking into account welfare of their juniors while pursuing organisational objectives. This situation was not helped by the fact that the main trade union continued to cast management and specifically the political leadership as mainly concerned about downsizing the public service by also targeting rank-and-file employees.

### 7.3.2 Evaluation of PMS in DPSM

As discussed in Chapter 6, the introduction of PMS in DPSM was intended to assist the department transform to become a more customer-driven organisation, characterised by a culture of excellence in the way it delivered services to its stakeholders, as spelled out in its vision and mission statements. It is against these espoused ideals that this section endeavours to assess results of PMS implementation across the department.

Overall, it seems DPSM benefited but also encountered several problems. On a more positive note, five areas of improvement following implementation of the scheme were raised by respondents. First, all those interviewed agreed that the scheme led to improvement in the quality of service provided by the department. This improvement in service delivery followed mainly on redefinition of organisational structures and processes which were brought about by PMS. It was indicated that prior to the introduction of PMS [which culminated with transfer of authority to permanent secretaries in line with decentralisation move], DPSM officers were unable to give priority to issues that were deemed pertinent to the success of the department because they were burdened with excessive workload on simple HR issues that could have been addressed by HR officers at ministry or departmental levels across the public service. Consequently, the department received widespread criticism from
across the public service and the wider population for poor service delivery. A respondent captured this transition in the following way:

‘We were blamed for almost anything. I mean even things that were not within our scope. However, since PMS we have seen an improvement in the way we do business because we are now able to focus on the value-adding aspects of our duties. I mean…things are much better now.’ [Interview, 21]

Another respondent remembered how the department was perceived by others within the public service before PMS was implemented in the following way:

‘We were seen as impediments to improved service delivery across the public service. For instance, no matter how timely other ministries and departments dealt with HR issues for onward submission to us, we mostly failed to provide feedback to them within reasonable time. We were seen as a key impediment to improved service delivery across the public service.’ [Interview, 16]

This view suggests that implementation of PMS was beneficial to the department as it freed particularly the P&P staff from burden of work overload that could have been addressed by ministries and departments. The new outward focus on meeting the needs of user departments therefore allowed DPSM employees to focus on key performance indicators or activities to advance the organisational mission. In that sense, PMS brought about the emergence of stakeholder and customer focus in the way the department pursued its mandate.

Second, there was a suggestion that organisational productivity improved after the scheme was introduced in the department. In particular, the scheme was credited for integrating individual goals with those of the department. This integration meant that individuals were able to identify areas of concern and creatively devised ways to remedy them together with their supervisors during
quarterly performance reviews. In that context, for example, if an employee was identified as lacking specific skills to help him/her deliver in their job, effort was taken to ensure that the identified gap is addressed through training. In turn, employee morale and motivation improved as their work-related challenges were addressed [Interview, 18 & 23]. Thus, productivity within the department improved and organisational performance was enhanced as a result of PMS implementation. One respondent captured the development in the following way:

‘We managed to provide targeted training to our employees [referring to the P&P class]. This was possible because PMS offered us an opportunity to interact with our subordinates to identify their needs. Following this, our performance as a department has improved a lot.’ [Interview, 20]

Third, respondents claimed that the department witnessed significant transformation in organisational culture as a result of PMS. Specifically, introduction of PMS ushered in a new culture of planning and accountability across the department. Before implementation of the scheme it was indicated that most of the departmental staff worked in a disorganised fashion, where employees were not guided by any systematic plan and took no responsibility for their actions in pursuit of organisational objectives. However, PMS assisted departmental staff to develop, for example, clear vision-mission, strategic plans, key performance areas and performance measures, which greatly helped instil a strong culture of planning but also placed demands on individual employees to account for one’s performance, particularly P&P ones. One respondent concluded that:

‘PMS proved beneficial for us in that it helped us set for ourselves specific goals and achievable targets. With it [i.e. PMS] we started to recognise the importance of proper planning towards achievement of individual and organisational objectives. And more importantly, we had to
account to our supervisors regarding our individual performance towards achievement of organisational goals.’ [Interview, 16]

Fourth, the scheme was credited for improving on communication and consultation between management staff and their junior colleagues. In particular, the quarterly performance appraisals were reportedly crucial in providing an opportunity for management and subordinates to meet and explore challenges and opportunities in their respective areas of engagement. In these forums, the two parties were able to openly discuss challenges they faced in pursuing individual and departmental obligations. Where such impediments were identified, appropriate intervention measures were proposed by both parties. In this way, the regular performance reviews that followed implementation of PMS offered an invaluable outlet where management and lower level staff members could meet and discuss pertinent issues in an effort towards achievement of organisational ends. One respondent remembered the way management and junior staff used to relate and how the scheme helped improve the on the situation:

‘The relationship between us and our junior staff [referring to junior P&P staff and industrial class staff] was not good. They felt that management failed to consult them on many issues. However, we interact and share ideas on how best to improve our departmental performance a lot because of PMS.’ [Interview, 19]

Another respondent shared similar sentiments in:

‘We had witnessed a shift in the way we do business here. The new culture places more emphasis on consultation in establishing both individual and departmental objectives. To that end, management and junior officers meet regularly according to PMS demands.’ [Interview, 22]

These views suggest that implementation of the scheme facilitated a supportive and involving management style following implementation of the scheme. The
development of performance plans, which involved both supervisors and their junior counterparts, provided a valuable opportunity where the parties could find lasting solutions to identified individual and organisational challenges.

Lastly, implementation of PMS was reportedly able to encourage a leadership driven transformation across the department. This development was noted elsewhere across the public service (see, for example, DCDM, 2005). As was indicated in section 7.2.1, implementation of the scheme adopted a top-down approach where management provided direction for success of the scheme. Consequently, a lot of effort was expended on training departmental management on aspects of transformational leadership. As one respondent indicated:

‘Before PMS, the focus was on managing to ensure compliance to established rules and regulations. However, PMS brought to attention the need for a leader-driven change. As a result, many of us we sent for training to equip us with requisite skills to lead more as transformative rather than transactional agents.’ [Interview, 23]

Despite these positive benefits discussed above, implementation of PMS in the department also created adverse consequences. In particular, many respondents blamed the scheme for failing to support teamwork within the department. According to all respondents, the focus with individual performance indicators meant that employees solely placed attention on achieving set targets rather than working with others. This point is capture by one respondent noting:

‘With PMS you have to account for your performance. It is more about the individual contribution towards achievement of departmental goals. In that sense, there is little or no incentive to worry about co-employee’s contribution.'
This view suggests that the introduction of PMS had a negative implication on collaborative work arrangements, which were encouraged through WITs intervention. Hence, individualism rather than teamwork was encouraged under PMS. This could prove counter-productive for other employees, such as those in the industrial class undertaking jobs that often required participative and collaborative way of doing things.

Furthermore, the scheme was blamed for heightened sense of suspicion between management and lower level employees (both junior P&P employees and industrial class employees). To many respondents, before the introduction of PMS, employees, especially those of the industrial class, preferred to cooperate in pursuit of their goals in line with demands of the WITs project. However, the introduction of PMS emphasised individualised working arrangements, thereby undermining the collaborative set up. This arrangement had a negative impact on the way employees related with their supervisors. One respondent summed up the widely held view in the following way:

‘Our lower level employees have a strong disdain for quarterly performance reviews. They see this as a way of getting rid of them from the system. They don’t want to see the benefit of PMS. Maybe they failed to get exposed to what exactly PMS is about?’ [Interview, 19]

This view suggests that the scheme failed to bring the purported conducive work environment across the department. What emerged, however, was increased sense of mistrust between senior management and lower level employees, especially the industrial class ones. In this way, PMS proved unhelpful towards achievement of organisational goals by members of staff.

7.3.3 Summary

The preceding sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 considered impact of PMS in the two case study organisations. These sections showed that systematic evaluation of the schemes was modest by both practitioners and scholars in the two study
organisations and the public service in general. Despite the limited evaluation efforts, empirical analysis show that the effects of the scheme proved to be more beneficial for DPSM than in CTO. This proved the case for DPSM, which was more inclined to individual work arrangements. Hence, there was congruity between the demands of PMS – underpinned by individualistic model – and the departmental context. On the other hand, the scheme failed to deliver on its purported benefits for CTO chiefly because majority of its workforce (i.e. industrial class employee) were not supportive of it.

### 7.4 Conclusion

This chapter presented and discussed the way PMS was implemented and evaluated in both CTO and DPSM. Of particular significance it was shown that PMS implementation and evaluation were done in an instrumental fashion with well-defined structures and strategies adopted across the public service to guide both processes. Notably, government-wide implementation and evaluation of the scheme was formally embedded in broader national vision framework. This arrangement was intended to offer the public service and, in particular, ministries and department, greater focus on specific sectoral target in pursuit of national development aspirations, as prescribed in Vision 2016.

As was the case across the public service, implementation and evaluation of the scheme in CTO and DPSM assumed a top-down approach reflecting the hierarchical nature in the way the public service conducted its business. Particularly significant, in both phases of the scheme consultants were used extensively. Equally important, departmental management teams in both organisations were giving overall responsibility for the success of the project. In terms of results the picture was patchy in both organisations. Successes mentioned included inculcation of new culture in the way officers undertook their work. However, the implementation of the scheme resulted with negative or unintended consequences in the two organisations. More telling was that rank-and-file officers were cynical and dismissive of the scheme as a politically motivated effort towards purging the public service.
The following chapter presents a summary of key findings and outlines the contribution this thesis makes to the literature.
Chapter 8
Conclusions
8.1 Introduction

This study set out to explore NPM-type of reforms within the context of developing countries. In particular, the aim of the study was to better understand the application of NPM-type of reforms amongst these countries. To that end, empirical investigation of NPM reforms in Botswana’s public service during the 1990s – 2000s periods was undertaken with a view of assessing the decision to adopt, the factors facilitating or impeding effective implementation of the reforms, and the outcomes of such reform measures. The primary research question addressed by this study was outlined in Chapter 1:

How can the adoption, implementation and fate of NPM reforms by developing countries be explained?

To help fully address the main research question, specific research questions were also developed. These are restated as follows:

- Why are NPM reforms adopted by developing countries?
- What form do NPM reforms take?
- Why do NPM reforms take that form?
- How are NPM reforms implemented?
- Are the stated objectives of these NPM reforms achieved?

These research questions guided qualitative research on two instances of NPM reforms (namely, WITS and PMS) in two organisational units within the Botswana public service (namely, CTO and DPSM). There were, therefore, four cases of NPM reform, each of which focused on three dimensions of the NPM reform: (a) adoption, (b) implementation and (c) outcome. As anticipated in Chapter 3, data for this study was mainly collected through use of interviews with senior and middle-level managers in the public service and a review of Botswana government documents and related policy statements.
The aims of this chapter are to present a summary of key findings and to outline the contribution this thesis makes to the literature. The chapter is therefore organised as follows: section 8.2 discusses key findings of the study, while section 8.3 reflects on the main theoretical contributions of the study.

8.2 Summary of the key findings

The purpose of this section is to summarise empirical findings and conclusions arising from investigation of the key research questions. In particular, the following discussion and analysis reflects on the similarities and differences in the empirical findings of the four cases and compares them (empirically) with the literature. As was discussed in Chapter 3, the underlying aim of this type of cross-case analysis is to find patterns by comparison of multiple cases. Here, the case comparison is made against predetermined categories by looking for similarities and differences across cases in terms of the adoption, implementation and evaluation of NPM reform initiatives.

8.2.1 Adoption

The adoption of WiTs in CTO and DPSM shared a number of similarities and differences. The similarities largely flow from the highly centralised processes of decision-making in the Botswana public sector, which were described in Chapter 5. In this context, the decision-making process was hierarchical and centralised – a predominantly Weberian model of bureaucracy. Two units within the hierarchy, the MFDP and DPSM, provided a strong framework for planning and coordinating government financial and human resource activities respectively. In terms of the adoption of NPM reform initiatives, DPSM led the process, for instance, embarking on global missions seeking initiatives that could help improve on service delivery of the entire public service. This department therefore assumed responsibility for the development and introduction of reform measures at the expense of other ministries and departments within this top-down accountability arrangement typical of the Botswana public service.
At a broad level, the introduction of the WITs reforms (in CTO and DPSM as well as the Botswana public service generally) was not undertaken against a backdrop of socio-economic and political crisis, as was the case in many other developing countries (Mothusi, 2008; Conteh & Ohemeng, 2009). This is not to say that there were no problems in the Botswana public sector and the Botswana economy that provided strong imperatives for Botswana’s political and public sector leaders to introduce NPM changes. Chapter 4, for example, pointed to slowing economic growth against declines in diamond prices globally, growing acts of corruption in the public service and declining productivity levels across the economy since the 1990s well into the 2000s. The point is that the severity of these problems was less and they certainly fell short of a ‘crisis’, and this distinguished Botswana from most other countries in terms of the forces that led to change.

Similarly, the (centralised) decisions to adopt NPM reforms in Botswana were not the result of coercion from external authorities, in the way they often were in other developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa (Therkildsen, 2000; van de Walle, 2001; Olowu, 2001; Bwalya, 2005). There was no evidence of external coercion in Chapters 4 to 7 in the decision to adopt, or not, reforms in general or to adopt specific NPM reforms. In the two cases of reform under investigation, the political leaders and senior bureaucrats were the force behind the drive towards public sector modernisation. In Chapter 2, it was shown that adoption of NPM-type of reforms in developed countries usually involved voluntarism on the part of reforming governments. The process was distinguished by high degree of commitment by politicians and senior bureaucrats that something must be done to address problems afflicting their public services. Here, Botswana was more like these developed countries, in that the adoption of both WITs and PMS were not forced upon DPSM but came as a voluntary search for responses towards identified problems that hampered effective and efficient operations of the public service.
This is not to say that there were no external influences on Botswana’s decisions to adopt NPM reforms like WITS and PMS. The Botswana government, for example, sought to learn lessons from other countries about reform options and about how to implement them. On behalf of the government as a whole, DPSM embarked on various study missions to countries like Singapore and New Zealand seeking ‘best case practices’ to address identified constraints towards effective and efficient delivery by the public service in the case of both WITs and PMS (see Chapter 5). In addition, participation in various international forums (such as Commonwealth conventions) meant that Botswana, as a member state, was encouraged to adopt such reform initiatives. Furthermore, advice to reform in line with the NPM model was provided by international financial institutions (like the World Bank and private consultants to Botswana government) to modernise its public services. Thus, external agencies - as was the case in most of developed economies (i.e. through OECD, European Union and for-profit consultants) - influenced Botswana government to adopt such reform initiatives through promotion of these reforms at forums where local officials were in attendance.

At the more specific level of individual ministries and departments, however, the decisions to adopt and introduce both WITs and PMS were different. In the case of DPSM, these measures were voluntarily adopted. In the case of CTO, however, adoption and subsequent introduction of both these initiatives followed a directive from higher public service offices (i.e. the Office of the President) that all government ministries and departments must introduce those reform measures. In this way, introduction of such reform initiatives was not voluntarily undertaken. Rather, coercion best described the process under which these initiatives were introduced within the CTO and many other departments in the public service. The departmental leadership was largely not part of the deciding body which opted for the specific reform efforts under investigation. This development had implications for successful implementation of both WITs and PMS, as will be shown in the latter part of this discussion.
Overall, the adoption of both reform initiatives involved both voluntarism and coercion in the Botswana government generally and in the two case study organisations. This distinguishes Botswana from other developing countries where the decision to adopt was often determined by external forces at the expense of local actors such as politicians and bureaucrats (see, for example, McGill, 2007; Conteh & Ohemeng, 2009).

8.2.2 Implementation

In terms of implementation of the two reform efforts, there were both common and divergent experiences identified in the study between CTO and DPSM. Again, the similarities result from the highly centralised process by which the Botswana government sought to implement these reforms across the public service. Amongst the many issues about implementation in the CTO and DPSM (raised in Chapters 6 and 7), four deserve special mention: the process of implementation, the level of support for each scheme, the comprehensiveness of the implementation strategy and the role of politicians. Each is addressed in turn.

The process of implementation

Implementation of both WITs and PMS evolved within strong frameworks and sound institutional capacity in the two case study organisations and the Botswana public service generally. The structures guiding implementation processes in the two initiatives were virtually the same. In terms of similarities, Chapters 6 and 7 showed how various committees, comprising very high officials, such as permanent secretaries down to directors at departmental levels, were established to lead the implementation of these reforms. A well-defined top-down framework therefore characterised the process in both WITs and PMS.

In a broad sense, these centralised frameworks were effective and these schemes were well implemented in both study organisations, and in other ministries and departments across the public service in Botswana. This
contrasted with the general experiences of other developing countries, where implementation of reform initiatives was poorly undertaken (see, section 2.4.2), and reflects the reputation of the Botswana public service for competence and professionalism (see Chapter 5).

As shown in section 7.2.1, however, this centralised implementation framework was perceived to be well suited in guiding implementation of PMS, but less appropriate for WITs, which respondents felt could have been better guided by bottom-up arrangements, given the greater interest in the scheme among the rank-and-file employees (see, section 6.2.1). The better implementation of PMS (at least as perceived by P&P employees) also came from senior management at departmental levels being provided with better training and financial support to guide the implementation of this process. The level of support provided for senior managers in building capacity towards successful implementation of WITs was less satisfactory (see, Chapter, 6). This partly explained why senior managers often failed to provide the much needed support to guide in the implementation of the scheme, especially in CTO.

There were also differences in how WITs and PMS were implemented in CTO and DPSM. WITs implementation was seen as fairly successful in CTO, certainly by the industrial class and at least in the early stages by senior managers. In CTO senior leadership were supportive of WITs. In addition, it could be argued on the basis of interviews, the scheme was considered especially appropriate for CTO context, because of the composition of its workforce and the nature of work undertaken by the department (this point is discussed in detail below). Thus, in CTO there was congruity between the reform initiative and departmental context (see, section 6.2.2). In DPSM, WITs was implemented less satisfactorily. Again, part of the explanation was the lack of congruity between the departmental context and the reform initiative. The will and commitment of senior management in the DPSM, for instance, was not sufficient to drive the scheme across the department (see, section 6.2.3). The reverse was true in the case of PMS, which was well implemented in the DPSM but poorly implemented in CTO. Here, implementation of PMS suffered
setbacks that impacted negatively on the way the scheme was pursued (see, section 7.2.2).

**Level of support**

In terms of the different experiences of the two case study organisations, the WITS scheme enjoyed strong support in CTO beyond senior management as opposed to DPSM. From the interviews, it was clear that understanding of the WITs concept and its objectives within the department was relatively high. As a result, many employees, especially the industrial class ones, actively participated in the scheme (see, section 6.2.2). This, however, was not the case in DPSM. Here, the scheme was generally viewed as directed towards the lower-level organisational members instead of all department members. Because of this, the level of participation was disappointing, especially among the permanent and pensionable (P&Ps) members of staff (see, section 6.2.3). This happened despite the fact that participation in WITs activities was meant to be compulsory among all public servants.

In the case of PMS, the level of support for the scheme also differed between the two study organisations. In DPSM, the level of participation was very high. Very few employees were reported not to be supportive of the initiative, the exceptions being some industrial class workers (see, section 7.2.3). In CTO, however, the experience was different. Many employees in CTO were not actively involved in the scheme as they perceived it as an instrument of control by management in an effort to reduce the workforce levels, (see section 7.2.2). Employees in CTO therefore saw PMS in a very different light to their counterparts in DPSM.

There was also a similarity regarding implementation of PMS across the two organisations. In particular, enforcement was provided to ensure that all members of CTO and DPSM complied with directives meant to facilitate institutionalisation of the scheme. For instance, all employees were appraised in line with PMS demands (see, section 7.2.1). Unfortunately, the appraisal activity
was not tied with pay rewards in line with PMS philosophy in the two study organisations and the public service in general (see, Chapter 7).

The different levels of support the two initiatives received across the study organisations also reflects the different types of work performed by the two departments and their different workforces. DPSM was predominantly staffed by skilled professional employees who worked mostly as individuals and who were receptive to PMS. The same cannot be said about CTO, where the nature of work was better suited to team work arrangements and the teamwork philosophy that underpinned WITs gained increased support.

Finally, the differing levels of support by members of the two study organisations emphasised the importance attached by employees to the origins of the concept. For instance, in CTO where WITs enjoyed considerable support among the industrial class employees, the authorities were able to downplay the external/foreign origins of the concept [Singapore]. Rather, they succeeded in selling the concept as ‘home grown’ incorporating salient aspect of the local culture, that of collaboration in social practices. Perhaps, the authorities in DPSM were unable to ‘sell’ the indigenous aspects of the initiative much better as was the case in CTO. In the case of PMS, the issue of origin of the concept did not feature much thereby affecting the level of support of the scheme in the two study organisation. Rather, the individualistic emphasis of PMS proved congruent to the demands of work in DPSM and, therefore, enjoyed considerable level of support especially among senior level employees. On the contrary, the level of support for the scheme was low especially among lower level employees in CTO. This was partly a result of lack of appropriateness between the reform context and demands of the scheme.

**Comprehensiveness of the implementation strategy**

The two reform programs also differed in terms of the comprehensiveness of the strategy meant to guide their implementation. In the case of WITs, there was no detailed plan to drive the project; rather, an ad hoc intervention from those in authority characterised the way the scheme was implemented.
Effectively, WITs was devoid of a systematic link with other reform efforts meant to effect necessary changes in the way public service organisations were organised and managed (see, Chapter 6). PMS, on the other hand, ushered in a new way of effecting large-scale change in the Botswana public service. Here, a comprehensive and systematic model was developed to drive the scheme. Accordingly, all other reform initiatives were aligned to the broader public service vision of modernise the public service within the framework provided by PMS. In this way, PMS became the focal point of government reform efforts incorporating all other reform measures (see, section 7.2.1). This produced a negative impact on the application of WITs across the public service, with little interest devoted towards the scheme by senior bureaucrats once PMS began; indeed, they placed much emphasis on the achievement of PMS at the expense of other reform efforts. Unsurprisingly, interest among lower level employees in the study organisations, and the public service generally, for WITs declined following introduction of PMS because they concluded that little was done by those in authority to advance WITs objectives.

The role of politicians

In terms of similarities, there has been little political interference in Botswana in the implementation of both PMS and WITs in CTO and DPMS, unlike in other developing countries (see for example Saint-Martin, 1998). Public service managers - particularly permanent secretaries - enjoyed considerable autonomy in guiding implementation of both schemes. In that context, politicians have taken a much less role in the way the senior bureaucrats managed the process. This development, however, does not mean the political leadership were not interested in the reform process. They were instrumental in adoption of such initiatives, but what they did not do was to undermine the public service managers to lead the change process; rather, they ensured that they were adequately resourced and trained towards successful implementation of both reform initiatives.
8.2.3 Evaluation

There were both similarities and differences that emerged from the empirical chapters regarding the assessment of WITs and PMS in the two study organisations. In a broad sense, there has been little systematic evaluation of WITs or PMS in CTO and DPSM, and the public service in general, by either the public sector managers themselves or scholars. On the one hand, this seems odd given the substantive focus of the schemes, especially of PMS, on performance outcomes. On the other hand, the lack of evaluation in Botswana does not seem to be much different from other countries, especially developing countries. The lack of systematic evaluation of these reform initiatives is also evident among developed countries (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000). In the context of developing countries, the difficulty with systematic evaluation endeavours stems partly from weaknesses in evaluation capacity (Shah, 1998; Kusek et al., 2005).

The conclusions of the limited evaluation work that was previously completed by academics and practitioners suggest mixed results. On a positive note, both WITs and PMS were credited for inculcating new cultures of doing things across the public service. For instance, WITs helped usher in a collaborative working relationship between employees (management and lower level organisational members) away from the discordant one that prevailed prior to implementation of the scheme. In the main the few evaluation efforts paints a negative picture on impact of WITs (see, section 6.3.1). In the case of PMS, the picture was not any different. Few evaluation studies were undertaken. The purported quality improvement in the public service following introduction of the scheme, for example, was not achieved. Instead very low satisfaction rating of public service delivery by customer was recorded (see, section 7.3).

The original data reported in Chapters 6 and 7 suggest similarly mixed outcomes. In terms of WITs, there was agreement amongst interview respondents in CTO that the scheme proved beneficial for the department (see, section 6.3.2). Here, the scheme helped change the existing culture to one that valued teamwork. It therefore enhanced collaborative work among different
divisions and organisational levels, which, in turn, helped improve on effectiveness of the department towards achieving its mandate. In particular, pre-reform delays in vehicle procurement, repairs and servicing for various user departments across the public service were reduced. At individual level, there was empowerment for industrial class employees and, as a result, their participation in organisational activities was raised. More importantly, relations between management and lower level employees were improved which, consequently, loosened the highly rigid centralised system of management which prevailed prior to introduction of the scheme. There were also some negative impacts of WITs across the department that were not anticipated. The high level of support that the scheme enjoyed among industrial class employees created difficulties in terms of garnering support for other reform initiatives and, in particular, for PMS. The WITs scheme therefore inadvertently helped establish culture of resistance among this group.

The experience of the DPSM with WITs was different. Interviewees reported modest positive outcomes for industrial class employees, who were empowered to take charge of their work (see, section 6.3.3). However, the industrial class were a minority and the majority professional employees saw little relevance in the scheme for them. On the whole, WITs was seen as a waste of resources on something that was not adding value to achievement of the organisational core mandate (see, Chapter 6).

With regards to PMS, evaluation from interviews pointed towards positive outcome for DPSM. In particular, the scheme was credited for ushering new culture of planning and performance across the department. Despite the benefits, few modest benefits were reported for the few industrial class employees. Here, this group grew disillusioned following introduction of the scheme thereby failing to actively participate in the programme. They viewed it as a management tool meant to purge workforce numbers, especially amongst their grouping (see, section, 7.3.2).
Although it was made clear at the beginning of this section that systematic evaluation of NPM reforms generally was modest in the literature dealing with developing countries, however, there is a common massage from the few works: that these initiatives have failed in transforming public services in developing countries. For instance, the World Bank – as the chief sponsor of these reforms – concluded that the measures have not been effective. Similarly, Olowu (1999) maintained that evaluation of NPM reforms among sub-Saharan African countries presented a gloomy picture.

The relative success in implementing these reforms in the two Botswana study organisations, and in the Botswana public service generally, can be attributed to a relatively sound institutional capacity, at least compared to other developing countries, especially those of sub-Saharan Africa. In Botswana, the public service in pursuing these reforms enjoyed autonomy of public service managers and predictability of resources, among other important aspects indentified in the literature as crucial towards successful implementation of reforms.

8.3 The theoretical contributions of the study

The main aim of this study was to better understand NPM-type of reforms among developing countries. This requires general (theoretical) lessons to be drawn from the specific events that have been analysed in Chapters 4 – 7 of this thesis. This section therefore seeks to identify and discuss the theoretical contributions of the thesis, which means returning to questions and themes raised in Chapters 1 and 2. Before beginning this task, however, it is important to recognise the theoretical limitations of this study, which largely arise from the adoption of a case study research strategy.

Chapter 3 discussed in some depth the methodology adopted in this thesis and its strengths and weaknesses. The most relevant part of that discussion for present purposes was the limitations of generalisation based on case study research. The conclusion to that discussion was that generalisability of case studies does not rest on the representativeness of the case. This limitation
however could be enhanced by a number of ways including analytical
generalisation (see, section 3.3.3). For this reason, the theoretical contributions
of this thesis should be considered as observations on existing theory and
pointers towards theoretical development.

Within this context, Chapter 1 nominated three main weaknesses in the
literature on NPM and anticipated theoretical contributions in these three areas.
Chapter 2 then provided more detailed accounts of the existing literature, its
weaknesses and the potential advances that could be made. This section
addresses each in turn.

**8.3.1 Limited focus on developing countries**

This study provides some new insights on applications of NPM-reforms in a
different environment than previously studied. One aspect of this contribution is
that it fills a gap, identified by other researchers, that some aspects of NPM
reforms were studied extensively in the developed countries – especially the
Anglo-Saxon ones – while accounts of developing countries were less common
(see for example, Clark, 2000; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000; Manning, 2001). This
study should therefore be seen as a significant contribution towards remedying
of the neglect in the literature on NPM reforms in developing countries – filling a
gap in the literature – by studying the experience of Botswana with NPM
reforms.

Second, and related to the above, the accounts of developing countries’
experiences with NPM reforms that do exist have paid much attention to those
countries which have embarked on these reform efforts against a backdrop of
socio-economic and political turmoil. The experiences of developing countries
that embarked on such initiatives voluntarily have not received substantial
attention in the academic literature. Chapter 1 consequently argued that there
was much yet to be described, explained and evaluated about the experiences
of these countries. By studying the experience of Botswana, where the
introduction of NPM reforms was undertaken willingly within a relatively sound
socio-economic and political context, this study makes a contribution towards the development of a better understanding of application of NPM in different contexts within the developing countries. The theoretical insights gained from this new research domain can be revealed by discussing in turn the adoption, implementation and evaluation of NPM reforms, but underlying them all is the importance of avoiding over-generalisation. All developing countries are not the same.

In terms of adoption, the study showed that the introduction of NPM-type of reforms in developing countries can be an intentional process, although this appears to be rare. The adoption of NPM-type of reforms in many developing countries, especially sub-Saharan African ones, is presented as an involuntary/coerced endeavour. Here, the influence wielded by overseas aid donors and financial agencies cannot be ignored. Donors provide much of the funding for reform initiatives. This power of the purse, plus some quite definite agendas regarding what sort of reforms are desirable, according to Polidano & Hulme (1999), has led donor agencies to take centre stage in the selection and definition of reform projects.

The Botswana case, however, shows that reform in some developing countries can be initiated willingly by senior government officials (i.e. bureaucrats and their political masters albeit acting sometimes on ‘advice’ offered by international advisory bodies such as the World Bank. The local elites also imitated other cases of NPM perceived as successful, such as New Zealand and Singapore, when embarking on these reform initiatives.

Interestingly, the experience of Botswana with the adoption of WITs and PMS, to some extent, reflects those of developed countries where local leaders felt the need to do something to address perceived problems in government. Thus, the adoption of NPM-type of reforms among these countries was conditioned by choices of public service leaders with less pressure from outside/external bodies such as IMF or World Bank. The implication of such choice was a significant variation in terms of strategies adopted to address context-specific
challenges each nation faced. Path-dependency best describes adoption of NPM both in many of the advanced economies and in the specific case of Botswana (see for example, Christensen & Laegreid, 2004). This development, to a larger extent, facilitated adaptation of the reform programs to suit local contextual realities and, in turn, contributed towards successful implementation of these initiatives.

Regarding the implementation phase, the process among developing countries has mostly been seen to have failed. This development is usually contrasted with more successful reform in their more affluent developed counterparts, where implementation of NPM reforms was generally pursued with much consideration given to contextual peculiarities obtaining in each jurisdiction. In the case of developing countries, a lack of administrative capacity within the public service is usually associated with the reform process being severely compromised. The political leadership, in particular, failed to take charge of the programs given the influence exerted by external players such as World Bank and consultants. The Botswana experience with PMS and WITs pointed towards a relatively sound administrative capacity meant to drive the implementation process. This development highlighted the significance of the context within which these reforms are applied if the purported changes in public services are to be achieved (Conteh & Ohemeng, 2009).

As is the case in developed countries, proper evaluation of NPM-type of reforms is rarely undertaken, either by scholars or practitioners. In many ways, the (non-systemic) evaluation efforts by politicians and senior bureaucrats indicate that the reform measures succeeded in bringing about changes to the way public services were arranged and managed across these countries. Particularly for developing nations, the limited academic endeavours to assess these initiatives points towards failure. Lack of consideration of contextual realities to guide implementation of these initiatives largely accounted for this deplorable state of affairs (see, for example, World Bank, 1997; Polidano, 1999; Schick, 1998).
8.3.2 The Holistic Analysis of NPM reforms

Another contribution that this study makes is offering a holistic analysis of the reform process in developing countries. As was indicated in Chapter 1, much of the existing literature on NPM offers largely a fragmented analysis. Hence, this study has addressed the narrow and usually fragmented analysis of NPM-type of reforms common among the limited literature on developing countries. Towards this end, a holistic account was offered of the entire reform process - covering adoption, implementation and evaluation phases of the project. As a result, both WITs and PMS were investigated incorporating the three linking phases as a form of analysis of NPM reforms (see, Chapters 5, 6 and 7).

The link between these phases of reform is therefore an important one if we are to gain a better understanding of the reform process among developing countries. For instance, many works pay particular attention to one of the reform phases (i.e. adoption or implementation with few discussions on evaluation) and, as a result, ignore the remaining phases in their analysis. In so doing, however, these works tend to hide the important links that exist between these phases of reform. The adoption of an inappropriate model, for example, WITs in DPSM as was discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, proved to be another reason why implementation of the scheme failed to attract support in the department. Conversely, the introduction of WITs in CTO proved a success at the implementation stage as many employees in the department viewed the initiative as relevant to deal with the problems affecting the organisation (see, section 6.2.2).

Equally important, failure to evaluate the reform initiatives can obscure the reasons for inadequate implementation or lead to repeat adoption of an inappropriate reform model. Regarding inadequate implementation as a result of failure to evaluate, PMS was meant to enhance overall performance of the public service. Despite unfavourable feedback following DCDM report of 2005 assessing levels of customer satisfaction, few measures were put in place to alleviate identified implementation bottlenecks (see, section 7.3). Thus, how the
various phases of reform relate to each other is obviously of great importance
towards success or failure in the implementation of reforms, and also eventually
for the results.

This study has, therefore, demonstrated the important links between the
different phases of the reforms by focusing on the entire reform phases as
opposed to isolation of these various aspects of the reform process, which is
common in the literature and, thus, demonstrated how each phase impact on
each other.

8.3.3 The Importance of Context

A significant contribution that this study also makes is its emphasis on the
important contribution of context towards success of NPM reforms. The study
paid attention to the context of reform and, by so doing, went beyond the
dominant discussions in the literature of NPM-type of reforms in developing
countries. In many of these works, as was shown in Chapters Two and Five, the
emphasis is placed on the content of the reform measures, which are often
seen as universal in their applicability. The significance of the environment, as a
result, is too rarely acknowledged. However, the importance of context cannot
be overemphasised in the reform process. Larbi (1999), for example, argues
that the successful introduction and implementation of such reform initiatives
required certain preconditions such as existence of sound administrative
capacity (see, Chapter 2).

In that sense, knowledge of what works and what does not tends to be heavily
context-dependent. That is to say, a technique which succeeds in one place
may fail in another. As such, there is no set of general tools that can be
transferred from one jurisdiction to another, all around the world, with
confidence that they will work well every time. This means we have to look
carefully at contexts, and at the ‘terms of trade’ each time we are thinking of
borrowing a good management idea from somewhere else (Pollitt, 2003: 122). Echoing similar sentiments, Pollitt & Bouckaert (2003: 12) succinctly observed:

‘...nation states remain distinctive entities in the world of public management. They tend to have their own politico-administrative systems, administrative cultures and so on, and it seems very common for such factors significantly to influence the trajectory of administrative reforms.’

Thus, although Chapter 2 has demonstrated that despite making great strides from the late 1980s onwards in developing countries, the appropriateness of NPM reforms for them among these countries largely remained beyond question of reformers (few exceptions include, Polidano, 1999: 2001; McCourt, 1998; Schick, 1998). To this end, the importance of context, which often shapes reform developments, is often ignored. However, as Greenwood & Higgins (1996) argues, context and action are inseparable and this sentiment should guide reformers in developing countries when striving for efficient and effective public services towards socio-economic improvement of their citizenry.

**8.3.4 Future Research Areas**

This study has provided a foundation of further research work and will provoke many questions which will need answers that are beyond its scope. It is important to note from the onset that the study focused on a smaller sample of two study organisations within the Botswana public service. As such, it is not a comprehensive study of PMS and WITs initiatives in the entire Botswana public service. Hence, one potential area of research will be to undertake a similar study using a bigger sample in which other organisations within the Botswana public service are included. Mainly, the research will seek a comprehensive evaluation of the implementation of WITs and PMS in the entire public service. An additional topic for research involves investigation of unique public service organisations such as the disciplined forces like The Botswana Police, Botswana Prisons Service and Botswana Defence Force - which do not lend
themselves easily to general management prescriptions – to provide a glimpse of PMS and WITs implementation and evaluation in those organisations.

Another important area which has been identified in this research is the role played by consultants in legitimising NPM reform especially in developed economies. Hence, a study on the role of consultants and what they mean for NPM in developing countries can also be undertaken. Reflecting on consultants’ role in PMS in the Botswana public service from this study one can note that there is something about their ability to criticise after the event; but not influence sufficiently beforehand. Also, the 'language' of consulting is universal (i.e. burning platform) what does that mean to Batswana and developing countries generally? And is it really effective in all contexts – (i.e. appealing to 'western' educated senior managers, but confusing to others as demonstrated in the case of PMS in the two case study organisation). These are issues that call for further investigation to better understand application of NPM reforms in developing countries.
REFERENCES


______. (1999) “Rethinking Civil Service Reform” PREM Note number 31, October.


Appendix A - Interview Questions

Q1 Why are NPM reforms adopted by Developing countries?

- What factors led to adoption of NPM reforms [WITs and PMS]?
- To what extend were either internal or external factors influencing adoption of these reforms?
- What were these reforms intended to achieve?

Q2 What form do NPM reforms take?

- To what extend are NPM reform ideas operationalised in these countries?
- In what way are they transformed?
- Is there any variation in the content of NPM reform ideas?

Q3 Why do NPM reforms take that form?

- Are these reforms imposed or voluntarily adopted?
- What has been the dominant influence for adoption of these reforms?
- Who has been at the centre of these reforms?

Q4 How are NPM reforms implemented?

- Is there a coordinating agency that drives reforms across the public sector?
- How are the reforms implemented?
- What has been the level of support for these reforms?
- What problems have been encountered during implementation of these reforms?
- What is being done to address identified implementation challenges?
Q5 Are the stated objectives of these NPM reforms achieved?

- To what extend has NPM reforms achieved their intended goals?
- In what ways has NPM reforms transformed the Botswana public sector?
- What have been the broader implications of NPM reforms for Botswana?

Thank You for the Interview
## Appendix B: List of Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>DATE OF INTERVIEW</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mbakiso G. Morapedi</td>
<td>DPSM</td>
<td>25/11/08</td>
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<td>Maubrey Pitso</td>
<td>DPSM</td>
<td>20/11/08</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jowitt Mbongwe</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>26/01/09</td>
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<td>Dr. B. Mothusi</td>
<td>University of Botswana</td>
<td>26/01/09</td>
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<td>John Phatswe</td>
<td>BNPC</td>
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<td>Patricia Tabengwa</td>
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<td>Lawrence T. S. Thebe</td>
<td>CTO</td>
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<td>Simon Mokganya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sir Q.K.J Masire</td>
<td>Former President of Botswana</td>
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